[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON AVIATION SECURITY
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 7, 2011
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Serial No. 112-17
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Rigell, Virginia Vacancy
Billy Long, Missouri Vacancy
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Mo Brooks, Alabama
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
Mike Rogers, Alabama, Chairman
Daniel E. Lungren, California Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Tim Walberg, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois, Vice Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Mo Brooks, Alabama Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Amanda Parikh, Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Thomas McDaniels, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
Security....................................................... 1
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security........................................ 2
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. John W. Halinski, Assistant Administrator for Global
Strategies, Transportation Security Administration, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Panel II
Mr. Filip Cornelis, Head of Unit for Aviation Security,
Directorate General for Mobility and Transport, European
Commission:
Oral Statement................................................. 24
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
Mr. Rafi Ron, President, New Age Security Solutions:
Oral Statement................................................. 30
Prepared Statement............................................. 32
Mr. Jim Marriott, Chief, Aviation Security Branch, International
Civil Aviation Organization:
Oral Statement................................................. 35
Prepared Statement............................................. 36
STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON AVIATION SECURITY
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Thursday, April 7, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Rogers, Walberg, Cravaack, Walsh,
Jackson Lee, and Davis.
Mr. Rogers. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee
on Transportation Security will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on the
need to strengthen international cooperation on aviation
security and the progress that has been made with our foreign
partners. I want to thank the witnesses for being here today
and for your time in preparing for this.
The evolving terrorist threat to aviation security requires
us to re-evaluate how we approach international aviation
security in an effort to develop common security standards with
our foreign partners in the most critical areas. TSA's Office
of Global Strategies is responsible for engaging those foreign
partners, assessing threats and vulnerabilities originating
overseas, and finding ways to mitigate those threats as best we
can. From intelligence and information sharing to advanced
passenger and cargo screening methods, we must continue to work
closely with our international partners to strengthen aviation
security.
One critical gap that I intend to pursue through
legislation is TSA's lack of authority to donate screening
equipment to countries that cannot afford to purchase their
own. Weak security standards in one link in the global aviation
chain could have catastrophic consequences.
TSA deserves the authority to assist countries where they
have identified vulnerabilities or where there simply is need.
For example, recent reports have indicated that TSA has surplus
baggage screening equipment in a storage unit that, in some
instances, has been replaced by more advanced technology. That
type of equipment could prove very beneficial in a foreign
country seeking to improve its screening capabilities. It is in
our interest to increase aviation security, passenger, and
baggage standards to an acceptable standard, particularly in
countries where flights depart for the United States.
I look forward to dialogue with our witnesses on this
issue; and I also look forward to a discussion on TSA's foreign
assessment program, the partnership between the United States
and the European Union on aviation security, the best practices
and lessons learned from previous terrorist plots and attacks,
as well as the role of the International Civil Aviation
Organization in the enhancement of aviation security standards
and coordination.
The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member of the
subcommittee, my friend, the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson
Lee, for any statement she may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
good morning. Good morning to Members; and thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for your indulgence.
The Democrats are in a leadership meeting on the pending
issues of the day; and I know that, as I have just left that
meeting, that Members of the committee will be joining us
shortly.
Again, I appreciate you calling this hearing today on the
important, relevant, and timely issue of strengthening
international cooperation on aviation security.
It is no secret that terrorists try to attack our Nation
through the aviation system, originating from locations abroad.
I repeat my frequent refrain on the new attitude and approach
to terrorist is that it is franchised. Individual actors can
create enormous havoc and kill many people, innocent
individuals. So we must be forever vigilant, and our
international operations are crucial to this vigilance.
Last October, international cooperation and public-private
interaction resulted in a successful interception of explosive
devices shipped on passenger and all cargo aircraft from Yemen.
The results that would have come out of inactivity or failure
would have been catastrophic.
The year before, a terrorist attempted to destroy Northwest
flight 253 over the skies of Detroit on December 25, 2009. That
flight originated in Amsterdam. That traveler, however, came
from Ghana to Nigeria and then on into Europe. It is
interesting that the individual actor chose a day when most
Americans were turning toward both their faith and their
families.
So the question I will present to the administration, to
all of our witnesses today, is: How do we secure our skies,
secure our air borders, if you will, while also allowing for
the flow of law-abiding passengers, our own residents,
tourists, and students traveling to this great land of ours?
How will we protect families who are simply seeking to reunite
their families overseas? How do we balance securing a shipment
of cargo and commodities against sabotage with the need to not
interrupt the essential flow of commerce through the quickest
form of transportation, that being aviation?
We grapple with these questions domestically, but these
questions and issues are magnified when addressing securing the
global aviation system. Aviation is made of hubs and spokes,
commercial and general aviation aircraft, passenger and cargo
traffic, domestic and international routes. All of these
complexities must be considered in the implementation of
effective and efficient security programs, processes, and
procedures.
Secretary Napolitano and Administrator Pistole have put the
important issue of raising and harmonizing security standards
before the governments of the world. Agreements have been
signed, accords have been reached, but what we are here to
examine today is how the United States can leverage these
developments along with the security programs required by the
Transportation Security Administration to secure aviation from
terrorist attack.
I would like to welcome our witnesses today. We truly have
an international panel, and I look forward to your perspective
and insight into what is happening on the international level
in terms of increasing security at airports and throughout the
global supply chain.
Now more than ever we must work with our partners abroad in
government, at airports, with air carriers, and throughout the
industry to seek solutions to the complex issues associated
with aviation and global supply chain security.
Mr. Chairman, I am interested in your idea of sharing our
unused equipment. I believe it is important that it is a
bipartisan approach, and I would be delighted to review, as you
move forward, on this question.
I think there are a number of legislative initiatives that
might also be helpful as we look to the opportunity of
expanding our security chain through global aviation.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentlelady.
Other Members are reminded that they have opening statement
potential to put into the record.
We are pleased to have several distinguished witnesses
before us today on this important topic. Let me remind the
witnesses that their entire written statements will be put in
the record.
Our first witness is Mr. John Halinski, who was named
assistant administrator of the Office of Global Strategies at
TSA in April 2010 after serving as the deputy assistant
administrator since December 2008. He previously served 25
years in the U.S. Marine Corps in a variety of positions in the
intelligence and infantry communities, working extensively in
special operations.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Halinski for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF JOHN W. HALINSKI, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR
GLOBAL STRATEGIES, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Halinski. Good morning Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member
Jackson Lee, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today about the
Transportation Security Administration's on-going efforts to
improve international aviation security.
TSA's mission is to secure our Nation's transportation
system and to help keep the traveling public safe. As recent
attempts by terrorists have shown, safeguarding America's
transportation system requires an international approach.
Within TSA, I lead the Office of Global Strategies, or OGS,
which works proactively with international partners on overseas
transportation operations that affect the United States.
TSA's global mission is to develop and promote the
implementation of enhanced transportation security processes
worldwide, while ensuring compliance with international and TSA
security standards. This mission focuses on three areas:
Compliance, outreach and engagement, and capacity development.
We use a risk-based approach that evaluates the factors of
threat, vulnerability, and consequence.
To fulfill the mission area of compliance, TSA
transportation security specialists conduct security
assessments of all international airports from which the U.S.
air carriers operate, from which a foreign air carrier serves
the United States, those that pose a high risk to international
air travel, or others determined by the Secretary of Homeland
Security. Through these assessments, TSA evaluates the security
postures of the airports in accordance with security standards
established by the International Civil Aviation Organization,
or ICAO.
OGS teams conduct annual inspections of U.S. and foreign
air carriers to ensure they operate in compliance with required
security measures. These inspections enable TSA to identify
risks to the international air transport system, followed by
mitigation through outreach and engagement and capacity
development.
Extensive global outreach and engagement is conducted at
the global, regional, and bilateral levels to encourage
international counterparts to recognize that the threat to
aviation remains high. Globally, OGS works with ICAO to
establish and enhance baseline international standards in place
of aviation security. At the regional and bilateral level, TSA
representatives are stationed in key locations worldwide to
work with foreign governments and to support implementation of
enhanced security matters.
TSA also conducts outreach activities to engage the
aviation industry, particularly air carriers and aviation
stakeholders. Our international industry representatives work
closely with industry to ensure that requirements for foreign
air carriers are implemented and to alert airlines to new
threats.
TSA further mitigates risk by helping partner nations build
sustainable aviation security practices through capacity
development.
In addition to a variety of specific aviation security
courses, TSA's Aviation Security Sustainable International
Standards Team, or ASSIST program, provides comprehensive
technical assistance to countries with demonstrated difficulty
in satisfying ICAO standards.
As you can see, the breadth of OGS operations is
significant. In the last 18 months, our inspectors have
conducted 185 airport assessments, 1,149 foreign air carrier
station assessments, and 290 cargo station assessments. We have
also completed 154 visits to foreign repair stations in advance
of the issuance of the final rule. Altogether, over the last
year and a half, we have conducted outreach with over 150
foreign governments.
In the final mission area of capacity development, in
fiscal year 2010, OGS provided 45 aviation security training
sessions in 28 countries and is scheduled to provide 51
sessions in 35 countries this fiscal year. Assistance and
training has recently also been provided to other countries,
including Liberia, St. Lucia, Georgia, and Yemen through our
ASSIST program.
Although we have accomplished a great deal, we recognize
the need to be forward looking. As part of this effort we
recently created a rapid response team to handle international
incident management. Recently, we have also deployed to Haiti,
Yemen, and to Japan in support of these types of operations.
TSA will continue outreaching engagement to foster a common
view of the international threat level. Outreach and engagement
efforts in years ahead will include active support and
engagement with ICAO and our bilateral partners.
Before I conclude, I must say that the caliber of OGS
workforce is key to our success. The dedicated men and women
who support all of these initiatives face unique challenges
every day. These challenges require a highly specialized skill
set that balances technical expertise with diplomacy. It takes
years to develop.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, thank you again
for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to answering
your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Halinski follows:]
Prepared Statement of John W. Halinski
April 7, 2011
Good morning Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify today about the on-going efforts of the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to improve international
aviation security.
TSA's mission is to prevent terrorist attacks and reduce the
vulnerability of the Nation's transportation systems to terrorism. In
meeting this mission, TSA's goal at all times is to maximize
transportation protection and security in response to the evolving
terrorist threat while protecting passengers' privacy and facilitating
the flow of legal commerce. Balancing these elements is a difficult and
demanding challenge particularly in a vast and complex international
air transport system that involves a network of thousands of operations
linked across the globe. Within TSA, the Office of Global Strategies
(OGS) works proactively with a variety of international and domestic
partners on overseas transportation operations that affect the United
States, including major transnational aviation-related organizations
and regional bodies dealing with transportation security. TSA also
participates in numerous bilateral cooperative efforts with various
countries, and interagency efforts dealing with transportation
security.
TSA'S GLOBAL STRATEGY
TSA's global mission, executed by OGS, is to develop and promote
the implementation of enhanced global transportation security processes
and structures worldwide, while ensuring compliance with international
and TSA security standards. This mission focuses on three areas:
Compliance, outreach and engagement, and capacity development. Our
mission is accomplished by using a risk-based approach that evaluates
the factors of threat, vulnerability, and consequence when determining
our efforts to enhance global aviation security across the three
mission areas.
To fulfill the mission area of compliance, TSA conducts security
assessments of all international airports from which a United States
air carrier operates, from which a foreign air carrier serves the
United States, those that pose a high risk to international air travel,
and others as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security. These
assessments are conducted by OGS International Transportation Security
Specialists, who operate out of five Regional Operations Centers
located in Frankfurt, Singapore, Los Angeles, Miami, and Dallas.
Through these assessments, TSA evaluates the security posture of the
airport in accordance with security standards established by the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the specialized
agency of the United Nations that deals with commercial aviation. The
frequency of each airport assessment is based on risk computations of
current threat, documented vulnerabilities, and flight data at these
airports.
TSA OGS teams also conduct annual inspections of U.S. air carriers
to ensure that they operate in compliance with TSA regulations
identified in the Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program and
supporting Security Directives. Likewise, we inspect foreign air
carriers that fly to the United States to ensure they operate in
compliance with TSA's Model Security Program and supporting Emergency
Amendments. These inspections enable risks to the international air
transport system to be identified, followed by mitigation through
outreach/engagement and capacity development.
Extensive global outreach and engagement is conducted by working at
global, regional, and bilateral levels to encourage international
counterparts to recognize that the threat to the aviation sector
remains high and therefore mitigation measures must be developed and
implemented to counter existing threats as well as new and emerging
threats as they arise. At the global level, TSA OGS works with ICAO to
establish and enhance baseline international standards in place for
aviation security. At the regional and bilateral level, TSA
Representatives are stationed in key locations worldwide to work with
foreign governments in developing effective and complementary
transportation security measures and to support immediate
implementation of enhanced security measures as necessary.
TSA also conducts outreach activities to engage the aviation
industry, particularly air carriers and aviation stakeholders such as
International Air Transport Association (IATA), Air Transport
Association, American Association of Airport Executives, and Airports
Council International. Our International Industry Representatives work
closely with industry to ensure that necessary requirements for foreign
air carriers are implemented and to alert airlines to new threats,
while our Principal Security Specialists provide the same coordination
and oversight with U.S. carriers.
TSA further mitigates risk by helping partner nations build
sustainable aviation security practices through capacity development.
An important part of this effort is aviation security training and
technical assistance to meet needs identified by the Departments of
Homeland Security, State and Transportation, ICAO and civil aviation
authorities of foreign governments. TSA provides aviation security
training to foreign partners through a variety of courses in screener
supervisor skills, preventative security measures, crisis management,
basic security training, cargo security inspections, train the trainer,
and others.
In addition, TSA's Aviation Security Sustainable International
Standards Team (ASSIST) program provides comprehensive technical
assistance to countries with demonstrated difficulty in satisfying the
security Standards and appropriate Recommended Practices established by
ICAO. The ASSIST program addresses the self-identified civil aviation
security needs of the host nation by aiding the establishment of
sustainable institutions and practices through aviation security
training, technical assistance, and overall security assessments.
RECENT ACTIVITIES
TSA OGS is continuously working to enhance global aviation security
across our three mission areas. In the area of compliance, our
inspectors have conducted 185 airport assessments, 1,149 foreign air
carrier station assessments and 290 cargo station assessments over the
last 18 months. We have also completed 154 visits to foreign repair
stations in advance of the issuance of a final rule governing security
at such repair stations. When combining all engagement performed over
the last year and a half, we have conducted outreach with over 150
foreign governments.
To further aid TSA's international active engagement efforts, we
work closely with our multilateral, regional, and industry partners,
including IATA, ICAO, the European Commission, the European Civil
Aviation Commission, the Latin American Civil Aviation Commission, and
the International Working Group on Land Transport Security. In support
of an initiative announced by Secretary Janet Napolitano early this
year, Administrator John Pistole engaged with international
counterparts in Switzerland and Belgium this past March to discuss
efforts to secure global supply chains with international cargo
organizations and government officials. During the visit, Administrator
Pistole met with the World Customs Organization Secretary General and
the Director of the Universal Postal Union among others.
In addition, TSA continues to coordinate with our sister components
at DHS, as well other relevant agencies, such as the Department of
State and the Federal Aviation Administration, to further enhance the
inter-agency process and communication. For example, TSA works closely
with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) through current
initiatives such as the Air Cargo Advance Screening Project. Through
this effort, TSA and CBP obtain manifest information for cargo destined
for the United States before it is loaded on inbound flights, allowing
TSA and CBP analysts to identify shipments warranting heightened
screening based on jointly developed standards for high-risk cargo.
OGS recently created a Rapid Response team based at the
Transportation Security Operations Center to oversee all international
critical incident management activities. The capability of the Rapid
Response team to get into a region in crisis quickly and mitigate
security vulnerabilities is vital to the international TSA mission.
Most recently, the team responded to the earthquake and tsunami in
Japan by deploying additional personnel to assist OGS staff working at
the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo. The Rapid Response ensured unified and
continued communication and collaboration between the Departments of
State and Homeland Security.
Following the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, TSA deployed a Rapid
Response to assist that country and international aid organizations in
re-opening the Port Au Prince airport. Opening up the airport was
essential to the international relief effort and to the delivery of
goods to the county in the wake of the disaster. The OGS ASSIST program
began where the Rapid Response Team left off and worked with Haitian
officials, carriers, and other countries to provide technology and
training to ensure that security requirements were met at the airport.
Assistance and training have also recently been provided to other
countries including Liberia, St. Lucia, Georgia and Yemen. Following
the attempted terrorist attacks on cargo operations this past October,
TSA immediately deployed a team to Yemen to assess cargo security
programs. Subsequently, TSA procured and delivered Explosives Trace
Detection (ETD) equipment and provided training to mitigate threats to
the cargo security network. Separately, in Liberia, OGS coordinated
with the host government and Delta Airlines to ensure aviation security
standards were met, opening the way for direct flights from Liberia to
the United States.
In the final mission area of capacity development, we work closely
with ICAO and other foreign partners to eliminate duplicative efforts
by coordinating training given by donor nations to countries in need of
technical assistance. In fiscal year 2010, our Capacity Development
branch provided 45 aviation security training sessions in 28 countries
and is scheduled to provide 51 sessions in 35 countries in fiscal year
2011. New courses in development will include topics such as National
civil aviation security program development, interviewing techniques
for suspicious persons, and training and recertification program
development.
LOOKING AHEAD
Key among TSA OGS's priorities to address the evolving threat are
initiatives designed to continue to develop a workforce of capable and
responsive international personnel. There will be increased emphasis on
expanding the knowledge, skills, and abilities of the OGS workforce as
the challenges they are expected to face will require advanced
technical knowledge, diplomacy, adaptability, innovation, precise
judgment, creative problem solving, and an understanding of the
international norms and cultures.
OGS will continue to visit and assess international airports in
order to verify compliance with international standards and TSA
security requirements. Additionally, we will pursue increased access to
those international airports that present a high risk especially where
TSA believes it is necessary to more frequently review compliance. Key
priorities related to compliance in the years ahead include:
Incorporating more advanced risk analysis in our compliance operations
to look beyond the Standards and Recommended Practices put forward by
ICAO to identify vulnerabilities more broadly in order to quantify
risks; enhancing automation efforts to allow for data examination to
support risk analysis; and identifying enhancements to international
standards or TSA requirements.
TSA OGS will continue outreach and engagement to foster a common
view of the threat at the international level, which will also increase
our ability to conduct compliance and capacity development efforts.
Outreach and engagement efforts in the years ahead will continue to
occur at the global, regional, bilateral, and industry levels. These
efforts include: Active support and engagement with ICAO; finding
mechanisms to share releasable threat data through ICAO's information
sharing framework to encourage mutual recognition of the threat to
international aviation; coordination of international capacity
development efforts through ICAO to ensure the provision of technical
assistance to those most in need, sharing resources, and avoiding
duplication of effort; developing more robust coalitions at the
regional level to advance strategic goals and objectives; and
strengthening partnerships with key aviation security partners,
including key industry stakeholders, to advance strategic goals and
objectives.
We will continue to work to effectively address the needs of
partner nations to build sustainable aviation security practices
through capacity development. TSA will continue to support capacity
development efforts and work to establish the ASSIST Program as an
international model for capacity development while also exporting the
program to more locations to expand its reach and provide technical
assistance to additional governments.
CONCLUSION
OGS is one part of the holistic approach to security that TSA uses
to mitigate the threat both internationally and domestically. Our
international efforts effectively provide the first layer of security
thousands of miles from our shores. I always say that the sun never
sets on OGS, as we have someone at work around the world, every minute
of every day.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, I thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today and I look forward to answering
your questions about TSA's work in the international arena.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
I will start off with the questions.
In reading the briefing on this hearing, I was struck by
the fact that the ICAO offers suggested uniform standards, but
there is no compulsion by the member organizations to
participate at those standards. Is that accurate?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, ICAO sets a standard internationally to
the 190 countries, and what ICAO strives to do is to ensure
that these countries meet those minimum standards, and what we
try to do within TSA is work with ICAO. We have people on
several of their subcommittees to develop new standards that
try to increase the level of security worldwide. This is done
in a very formal process. It takes about 3 years to pass these
new types of standards, but we work very cooperatively with
them.
The reason that I think that ICAO standards are very broad
and general in nature in some cases is so that every country
can try to reach those minimum standards, and they have done a
lot of work most recently I think in increasing and enhancing
those standards. It is a good partnership relationship for us,
quite frankly, because it enables us the opportunity to work
with an organization that has that international recognition.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent.
In looking at your organization, I understand you have got
21 TSA representatives and 50 inspectors, is that accurate?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir, we have approximately 25 TSA
representatives, and we have approximately 50 inspectors, yes,
sir.
Mr. Rogers. You have got 300 airports that you--and how
many countries that you are trying to inspect?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, we inspect--there are approximately 300
last-point-of-departure airports to the United States that
stretch across approximately 100 countries, plus the air
carrier inspections that we are required to conduct under
Federal regulation as well as cargo stations.
Mr. Rogers. Are those 75 personnel adequate for that
mission?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I would tell you that when OGS was
created--we are a new organization. We were created about 3\1/
2\ years ago. At the time, we believed that that organizational
structure would meet those requirements. As we can see from 12/
25 and from the recent cargo threat and the increase in the
need for international operations, that there has been a
significant increase in the need for the international mission.
Mr. Rogers. Let me ask, in dealing with the foreign
countries, how do you ensure that those foreign countries are
going to meet our minimum standards or the suggested minimum
standards by ICAO? Is it just collaborative? Is there anything
coercive that you can do to ensure that they try to meet those
standards?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, we look at it from a three-tier
approach, actually. The first tier is we have the International
Civil Aviation Organization standards. If it is a last point of
departure to the United States, we also have TSA standards for
the specific flights that go and come into the United States.
The first thing we do is we do have inspectors and we do
assessments of the airports and of those air carriers to meet
TSA standards for the air carriers, ICAO standards for the
airports. If we have a problem, this is where our TSA
representatives come into play. We identify the problem, and
our TSA representatives then try to work collaboratively with
that host government to reduce the issues of vulnerability that
may have been identified.
The third part of our outreach actually deals with capacity
development. In some countries that don't have the capability
to fix those problems, we try to help them develop a system
that they can fix those problems and then take them on
themselves. Continuing to help them in the long term, we are
trying to build a system for them so that they are capable to
do it themselves.
So it is really a three-tier approach.
To get back to the basis of your question, we believe in a
very strong partnership, sir, and that requires developing a
relationship with all of the countries that have flights to the
United States so that we can work together when we identify
problems and vulnerabilities.
Mr. Rogers. What I am concerned about is when a country
refuses to be helpful. For example, Venezuela has refused to
allow your TSA inspectors to inspect their security systems for
flights coming to the United States. What can you do to help
them behave? Can you refuse to allow the flights to come into
the United States?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir. There is a process, and it is a
tiered process.
The first step that we generally take is what we call a 90-
day action, and that is where we identify the problem to the
country, and there is a 90-day period for them to take
corrective action.
If that doesn't occur and this goes from TSA then to the
Secretarial level, there are a couple of other options, one
being public notice. As in the case of Venezuela, they are
currently on public notice. We have not found vulnerabilities
in the system because we have not been allowed to go in and
look at the system. That is why they are on public notice.
Public notice basically notifies the world, airports throughout
the world, that we cannot see the security system in that
particular country--for example, with Venezuela--or whatever
other problems are there, and we put it out publicly.
The final stage is, sir, there is the authority to suspend
flight from that country to the United States, and that is an
action that is taken at the Secretarial level, with a lot of
cooperation between Homeland Security and the Department of
State, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Well, I would urge you to urge the Secretary to
use that power liberally. If a country is so belligerent and
anti-American as Venezuela that is not going to allow us to
inspect their security systems, I don't want a plane coming out
of that country into the United States.
With that, I would yield to the Ranking Member for any
questions she may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you; and thank you to
the witness. Let me thank you for your years of service in the
United States military and particularly for your assistance in
evacuating Americans in 2006 from Lebanon.
I continue to believe, as I indicated in my opening
statement, that terrorism is a franchise operation. There is no
need to be called massively, 200 and 300 people, but someone
can act upon this in a manner that is an individual act and can
take out thousands of lives.
Tell me how many stations are in the system. What is the
number that we are working with that your staff would need to
have access to?
Mr. Halinski. Ma'am, I will tell you that there are
approximately 300 last-point-of-departure airports to the
United States, and I say approximately because it varies
depending on the time of year. We also look at up to 1,000 air
carriers a year that fly from these airports into and out of
the United States, and that is both domestic and U.S. air
carriers. Then, with the upcoming final rule for repair
stations, we will be looking at approximately 750 repair
stations worldwide, based on that rule. Plus approximately 400
to 500 cargo facilities worldwide as well.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Break them down as to what locations they
are in.
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am. I would say that--and I do have a
graphic. I don't know if it has been put up. It is the second
graphic. It is a color-coded graphic.
The areas in blue are basically last point of departure,
and that would include any--and then there are some numbers and
figures there that outline it by the total number of last-
point-of-departure-airports, cargo----
Ms. Jackson Lee. How many are in Europe? How many are not
in Europe?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am. A large majority of last point of
departures are in Europe. We have approximately 64 airports in
Europe, four cargo airports that we look at. Foreign repair
stations, there are about 452.
Ms. Jackson Lee. In Europe and in the others outside, what
would you characterize as a particularly challenging site that
is outside of the European area?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am. I would say that what we have
found, particularly outside the United States, is that the
quality of aviation security varies depending on the region.
Europe and the United States are very comparable. Canada and
the United States are very comparable, Australia and the United
States. When you start to move to other areas, particularly
Africa, some areas in the Middle East, some areas in South
Asia, and some areas in Latin America, the standards are not as
comparable to the United States or to Europe.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So, with respect to your team, you would
advocate for increased resources to provide the kind of
skilled, trained personnel that can help in these expanded
airports?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am.
I would say that when we envisioned originally OGS starting
about 3\1/2\ years ago, we were looking at it from the
compliance piece. This was before 12/25. It was before the
cargo threat, and that has significantly focused on
international operations. The threat is outside of the United
States coming in, and we were staffed at that level 3\1/2\
years ago, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Is that 168 with 50 inspectors?
Mr. Halinski. It is roughly about 160 personnel with
roughly 50 inspectors, yes, ma'am. Then I have my TSA
representatives and I have my industry reps that deal with
foreign air carriers.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You were, in essence, allotted 75 new
slots. What is the status of that?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am. After 12/25, we were supposed to
get 75 new employees based on this fiscal year. Currently,
ma'am, based on the budget, we have not hired those employees
yet because we do not have the authorization to hire those
employees at this point.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Following on that line of reasoning, the
present budget that is being offered by the majority would cut
TSA by $42 million; and I understand this type of cut would
impact on your ability to expand your presence overseas. Can
you explain the importance of having more officers overseas?
What other detrimental impact would come about by those budget
cuts?
Mr. Halinski. Ma'am, I am not familiar with the budget cuts
themselves and what that would mean. I do believe that we need
to increase our overall capability to work within the
international community, because the international community
faces a threat. If there is a threat that attacks the aviation
system, the aviation system is a global system, so we need to
increase the relationship of working with our partners. To
develop those types of relationships, you have to talk to
people face to face. You have to build those relationships. You
have to build a level of trust.
Ms. Jackson Lee. What do you think was most instrumental in
the circumstances of the Christmas day bomb? Was your office
involved or was your office involved in the fix?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am. I would say that one of the
things that we did--I think one of the vulnerabilities of that
particular attack was the fact that the threat was able to
manipulate the system and use a device from a threat
perspective that would defeat most of the standard security
technology that was out there. They did this by using a
nonmetallic device put in an area of his body that was
culturally taboo for a lot of security systems throughout the
world.
One of the things we did was immediately put into effect a
security directive and an emergency amendment for all flights
to the U.S. inbound. These measures were very draconian.
Because what they required, quite frankly, until we understood
the threat better, was a 100 percent full body pat-down; and we
believed that that would immediately mitigate the threat. We
have now a belief in the use of other technology which we think
we can do that, and we have modified that.
But, specifically, I would like to talk about what we did
in working with some of the countries, for example, Nigeria. In
Nigeria, we have worked extensively with them over the past
couple of years; and, if you remember, the Christmas day bomber
flew through Nigeria.
Ms. Jackson Lee. That is correct.
Mr. Halinski. We have worked with Nigeria. They have
increased their security system, I would say, 10-fold, ma'am.
They are one of the few countries in the world that actually
use AIT technology in primary right now. We have worked with
them so that they have opened two new areas, both Lagos and
Abuja, with direct flights by U.S. carriers to the United
States. We have done this extensively through our ASSIST
program, through training with them, and through working with
them over the past, I would say, 3 years on this.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman for his indulgence.
I think it is important to get on the record the kind of
impact that this particular office has had in ramping up the
security parameters of countries that you would not expect to
have that. I think you have said that Nigeria and South Africa
are the two top African countries that have raised their
standards of security at their airports?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am. This is my opinion, that the two
leading proponents of aviation security within the continent of
Africa I think are South Africa and Nigeria. They have enormous
influence.
Nigeria has also partnered with us and held one of the
regional conferences for aviation security last year with our
Deputy Secretary, and we are hosting an insider threat
conference in Abuja in October of this year, which is another
part of the aviation security aspect. So they have been very
forward-leaning, supporting, and influencing aviation security
throughout the region.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the witness, and I thank the
Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentlelady.
She is absolutely right. We both agree that you need to
have more than 50 inspectors in your office. Obviously, I think
you need more than 25 representatives to work with those
inspectors; and hopefully we can help you address that.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Michigan,
Mr. Walberg, for any questions he may have.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I thank the
witness for being here today and the work you do.
Continuing some of that train of questioning, the European
Union conducts 100 percent screening of airport workers, while
the United States uses a random approach, as I understand, to
worker screening. To what extent has the United States or
European Union modified its worker screening procedures to
address these differences, or have they agreed to mutually
recognize different approaches in achieving an equivalent
result?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, first, let me say that I just attended
an Aviation Security Panel in Montreal for ICAO, and that was
one of the topics there for the Aviation Security Panel. The
panel actually meets once a year to decide key issues for the
international standards. This is one of the key questions,
because we do have, I would say, a divergence of opinion on 100
percent staff screening.
Actually, let me put it this way. I think that we all agree
on 100 percent screening of staff. It is the methodology that
is used where we have a divergence.
TSA has a philosophy of the use of unpredictability. While
a lot of countries in the world define 100 percent staff
screening as a member going through a walk-through metal
detector and perhaps an X-ray machine, one of the problems that
we have with that is it is our belief that is a single point of
failure.
If you have an insider who knows the system and knows who
is on duty and they walk through that walk-through metal
detector--and, quite frankly, the threat is nonmetallic at this
point. We think if you are relying on that as your only point
for staff screening it is a single point of failure. So what we
try to do is build a defense in depth, overlaying layers of
depth for employees.
One of the first things that we do, sir, is perpetual
vetting of anybody that has a badge through our TTAC, and that
is our credentialing system.
Mr. Walberg. TTAC again?
Mr. Halinski. It is the----
Mr. Walberg. I am sorry----
Mr. Halinski. I am going to catch a lot of grief when I go
back, sir, on this because I didn't know it. I believe it is
the Terrorist Threat Analysis and Credentialing.
Mr. Walberg. See, I don't feel half as dumb now.
Mr. Halinski. I am going to catch a lot of grief on this
one, sir.
But TTAC, what they are is they vet our people against
criminal and terrorism databases on a 24/7 basis, sir. Most
countries in the world, they do vetting of their personnel
about once every 5 years. So this is an enormous advantage when
it comes to the insider threat. That is No. 1.
No. 2, we do have screening checkpoints on and off, and we
use a system of unpredictability where we will put our TSOs at
various areas behind the sterile area and throughout the
building and they will conduct a screening of people that do
have badges on a random basis.
Why do we believe this is so important? It is because if
you can introduce unpredictability and random in a security
solution what you are doing is you are mitigating the insider
threat. I would tell you that it is not just staff screening.
What we are talking about really is mitigating the insider
threat.
So we take a varied approach to it. We use various layers,
and I think that is going to be much more productive when it
comes to mitigating the insider threat. We are not opposed to
100 percent screening. We just believe that you need a few more
layers.
Mr. Walberg. Has there been push-back against that approach
from TSA?
Mr. Halinski. No, sir, not from TSA. I think TSA agrees
with this approach.
Where we have found divergence is in the opinions of the
international community. Like we said, we agree with 100
percent screening of staff. It is just the methodology used. So
I think it is the interpretation. It is something I think that
ICAO has taken on-board. There is a committee, an international
committee, that is now formed to try to define what this is;
and we plan to work actively within the committee to come to
some kind of resolution on this particular question where it
will be presented next year in Montreal at the Aviation
Security Panel, which is part of ICAO.
Mr. Walberg. That is helpful.
What type of training do TSA representatives and TSA
inspectors receive?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I would like to tell you, we are a
little bit different than everybody else in TSA. Because what
we try to do is, No. 1, our people work exclusively overseas.
So what we are looking for when we hire a TSA representative or
an industry rep, No. 1, we are looking for maturity. We are
looking for people who have the skill set to work overseas.
A lot of our people--I would say at least 75 percent--speak
more than one language, and we are looking for people who
display diplomatic skills. Because what we are talking about,
both with the industry rep and the TSA rep, is we are going to
put you in a foreign location and we want you to develop a
relationship--more importantly, a partnership--with a foreign
government, with foreign air carriers and foreign stakeholders.
Because that partnership becomes important when we have a 12/
25. We need to be able to pick up the phone and call on our
partners and say, we need your help.
So that is really what we are looking for when we look at
our people, is maturity, professionalism, diplomatic skills,
and the ability to work overseas by themselves.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois,
Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and thank
you, Mr. Halinski.
Let me ask you, have we had any instances where countries
have attempted to deny access to our inspectors? If so, what
rationale did they give?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir. I would say that that is a problem
that we face, and it is a challenge that we face where the
rationale can vary to--that they don't believe that we have the
authority to come in and look at their country. It can vary to
the fact that they may be embarrassed about their particular
system and they don't want us in there. It could be a variety
of reasons.
So one of the things that we try to do is to work very
diplomatically. This is where we really have a great
partnership with the Department of State. We work through the
embassies and we work through the Department of State to try to
overcome any kind of hesitation to look and see what these
systems are.
Quite frankly, a lot of it sometimes is just the education
factor, the factor that we need to tell them and explain to
them we have a regulatory responsibility to look at a last-
point-of-departure airports to the United States; and we have
to look at any flight that is coming into the United States. It
is not that we are there to judge your system. It is there
because we view this as our right, because you are flying into
our country, to protect our country and that we have that right
under the international conventions under ICAO.
Mr. Davis. How successful would you say that these
negotiations have been?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I would say that we have been
exceptionally successful, except in one case. That case, quite
frankly, would be Venezuela at this point.
Mr. Davis. When training does occur, who generally
initiates the training? I mean, is it a recommendation that we
might make? Or is it a recognition on the part of the host
country that they are in need of assistance and might request
training?
Mr. Halinski. It is a great question, sir. Actually, it is
both. When we identify vulnerabilities or problems in a system,
then we turn to our TSA representatives who offer that type of
training.
At the same time, we get a lot of requests from countries
that feel that they want to upgrade their system, and so we
will go and conduct a survey. In some cases, they are not last
point of departure to the United States. That is our first
priority. But we will go do a survey, and we will try to help
them.
I would like to use the case of Liberia, sir. A couple of
years ago, we were approached by the Liberian Government that
they wanted direct service to the United States. We went and
looked at the airport; and we said, you are not ready for
direct service. Our TSA determined that they were a priority to
the United States. Delta Airlines was willing to fly in there;
and, quite frankly, it is going to help open up West Africa.
We committed to 18 months worth of assistance to Liberia.
We worked extensively with them, getting their system up to
minimum ICAO standards. I would tell you, it is a success story
for us. Because, right now, there is a direct service between
Liberia and the United States, stopping in Ghana. So we were
able to open that airport.
We have had success recently in Angola doing the same type
of operation, helping them build their airport system so that
they can fly direct to the United States.
What we have found, sir, is--as I said, we are a three-
prong approach. You can walk into an airport and say, you know
what, you have problems with your systems. But if I walk out
the door and don't do anything about it, I am going to come
back next year and find the same thing. So what we want to do
is we want to try to help them get that system up to the
standards. Because it not only helps the United States. Quite
frankly, it helps the entire global system.
Mr. Davis. You mentioned the role of the State Department.
Have you found that--while we are basically concerned about
airport security, have you found that these interactions and
negotiations perhaps have also been helpful to our country in
building relationships with other countries that we didn't
necessarily have or did not have to the extent that now we
perhaps do?
Mr. Halinski. Absolutely, sir. We work very closely with
the Department of State. We have TSA representatives, as I
think was on one of the graphics, posted in embassies
worldwide. The whole idea is to work within the partnership of
both Department of State and we work with our Department very
closely and the components within our Department overseas.
Because it really is a joint effort. What we have found is, for
the amount of training, for the amount of engagement that we
do, we reap the benefits five-fold, quite frankly; and anytime
we can raise the international standard up, it helps the entire
system, sir.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, sir. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Davis.
I want to be clear on something. Mr. Davis asked you about
whether we provide training or not. Do you have the authority
to provide training? I know you can't provide equipment.
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I do not have the direct authority to
provide training. What I have is I work through the State
Department and--I work through the State Department. So we have
to work collaboratively with the State Department to provide
that training, because I don't have the authorization to
directly provide training to a country.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. We need to work on that.
The Chairman now recognizes a Member of the committee who
knows more about these foreign airports than anybody else on
the committee since he has flown in and out of them, the
gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Cravaack.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your service in the Corps. Were you O-3?
Mr. Halinski. O-3, yes, sir.
Mr. Cravaack. Okay. I know we are in good hands then. So
thank you very much.
I just have a couple of questions. I have flown in and out
of third-world countries, both as a flying passenger and also
as a freight dog, flying 747 cargo. I have seen operations on
both sides. You hit the nail right on the head. You have to
have layers of security, and single point is just not going to
work.
To be clear, to make sure the committee understands, we do
100 percent screening here in the United States. We just do it
in a different method. They may not pass through a metal
detector or something of that sort. But the other ones that
don't do that on a daily basis, just to confirm, sir, that they
do have extensive background checks and things of that nature,
would be able to show an ID, would that be correct?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir that is correct.
Mr. Cravaack. Okay. That is great. I just wanted to make
sure everybody was clear on that. Nobody does get on an airport
property without being screened in some capacity.
I just had a question in regards to the most recent E.U.
change of venue in regards to gels and liquids that can be
brought on-board aircraft after going through screening. As I
understand, it can be purchased in a secure area and then
brought on-board an aircraft. Could you comment on that, and
what are your views on this?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir. This goes back to the liquids,
aerosols, and gels scare that we had in 2006; and everyone,
quite frankly, worldwide has been trying to work a technology
solution into this. Most recently, we know that the European
Union has passed two pieces of legislation. I am sure one of my
fellow panelists might correct me if I make a mistake here,
because we work together all the time, and we are very familiar
with each other's practices and our regulations.
Currently, the European Union at the end of April will
reach what is called phase one with the way they are screening
liquids, aerosols, and gels; and then 2 years, in 2013, they
will reach another level. In the most current changes they are
looking at, it is the allowance of liquids, aerosols, and gels
in steps which are the sealable, tamper-evident bags which are
going to be screened in a certain manner coming to the United
States or throughout that region.
We have been working very closely with the European Union
on this particular issue. We have sent teams to the European
Union, and they have sent teams here. We have regular meetings
with the European Union on this issue, and we are trying to
both find a technology solution to this and a practical way
forward on this, sir.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you.
In going into some of the countries I have gone into, one
of the chief concerns that I have always had is the standard of
living in a lot of these countries is extremely low. In seeing
some of the security that is at the airport, around the airport
and within the airport, one of the concerns I have always had
is corruption and where a few dollars can buy access very
easily into an airport.
Does the TSA address some of these problems in regards to,
you know, how members of security forces around airports and
within airports are making sure that they are--for a lack of a
better word--paid well but made sure that they are a little bit
beyond reproach from being corrupted?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir. Let me use a couple of examples
here on how we do that.
There are places throughout the world where we know that
corruption is a major factor. So what we try to do is, when we
build an emergency amendment or security directive, which can
be global in instances or it can be for specific regions, if we
have a belief that there is a region in the world or a country
in the world where that is a major factor, we will build
mitigation measures against that.
A good example of this, sir, is in a couple of countries
where there might be an issue with corruption. We have 100--or
there might be an issue on the use of technology and the
capability to use technology. What we have built in is that,
for example, 100 percent hand search by a contractor that is
paid for by the air carrier of everything before the flight and
then another layer at the gate and another layer perhaps plane-
side.
The reason we do this is for the corruption factor itself,
sir. We consider that when we do our risk analysis of any of
the last-point-of-departure airports. So what we try to do is,
in many cases, you will see emergency amendments or security
directives that are geared towards specific countries where we
have identified a problem like that, sir.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you very much. I have 8 seconds left,
and I yield back. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairman now recognizes the Vice Chairman of the
committee, Mr. Walsh of Illinois, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Walsh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and, Mr. Halinski,
thank you for being with us today.
Let me drill down on a topic that you have touched upon,
the way we conduct assessments of foreign airports. Drill down
on that for me. How exhaustive a process is that? How
challenging a process is that? What sorts of specific
challenges do you run into constantly?
Mr. Halinski. All right, sir.
What we do, first off, is we do a risk analysis of all of
the airports that we are going to, and we identify them on what
we consider to be the highest-threat airports, and the
regularity that we will go to those airports is more frequent
than we might to some other airports that have higher
standards. That is No. 1.
No. 2 is, we then work with the State Department and
foreign government there, our TSA representatives, to schedule
an assessment. Sometimes we just can't schedule it by picking
up the phone. It is a diplomatic process. It could take 6
months to get into an airport. It can take 30 days. It all
depends on that relationship, which is key.
I then send a team of inspectors--and I have inspectors
posted throughout the world--that will go in, and usually it is
two to three inspectors, and they drill in on three areas.
Because they are using for the airport ICAO standards.
I like to say my inspectors are very experienced people.
Because the three ways they can do that--because you have to
also realize, they know we are coming into the airport. So they
are going to put their best foot forward.
Mr. Walsh. There is no way around that?
Mr. Halinski. There is no way around that, sir. We can't go
in unless we have diplomatic approval.
So what we do is we train our inspectors in three ways.
One is observation. No matter how good you put your front
foot forward, you are going to be able to observe things at a
large airport, walking around that airport, because we are
going to be there for about 5 to 7 days.
The second piece is conversation. We are going to talk to a
variety of people. In that exchange, we always start picking
out kernels, and we link that with observation.
Then we look for documentation. Do they have their records?
What do the records reflect? Then we are going to ask questions
based from the records, on the conversations, and what we
observe. Well, they put this in writing, but, you know what, I
don't see this here. This is why we take about 5 to 7 days.
Mr. Walsh. Even though they know you are coming and they
are putting their best foot forward, the folks that we have
got, your investigators, are adept enough at seeing through
things and reading things?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir. In fact, to come into OGS we won't
hire an inspector unless they have had 4 to 5 years of
inspection training within domestic airports; and then at that
point we give them extensive training on the international
standards. So they are aware of that.
Some of our better inspectors we then send to the ICAO
auditing course when we get an opportunity to do that. ICAO has
been very helpful in getting us to those. We have sent some of
our inspectors to the European auditing course so we have an
exchange of ideas and best practices.
Mr. Walsh. Remind me again, what would cause you to send
inspections to an airport?
Mr. Halinski. If it is a last-point-of-departure airport to
the United States, sir.
Mr. Walsh. Those are inspected on a regular basis?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir, they are. It depends on the
airport. Once again, with 300 airports, I have a limited number
of inspectors. So what we have to do is we base it on--we work
very closely with our intelligence people. We base it on
threat, and we base it on risk. This is why we may go to an
airport in this region once every year, and we may not go to an
airport in another area except once every 2 years because they
have a comparable system, the threat is not as high. We want to
focus based on threat, where we think it is emanating from, and
that is where we need to focus our efforts with limited assets.
Mr. Walsh. Is cooperation ever a factor in these
inspections? Is there resistance?
Mr. Halinski. It all depends, sir. Quite frankly, that goes
back to the training of my inspectors. I have to have a person
that is on the ground that is diplomatic; and if there is
confrontation, they understand how to handle confrontation. So
they are trained to do that.
The other piece is they are trained in the art of
negotiation. They need to be able to sit across the table from
someone and ensure that the United States is getting what we
are requiring. But they also have to understand they need to
probably give something up there. So they are schooled in the
art of negotiation. It is a key to developing a strong
partnership.
Mr. Walsh. Last question, are there particular geographic
areas around the world where cooperation is more?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir. I would like to point that we have
a very good relationship with the European Union, we have a
great relationship with Canada, Australia. In fact, we have
formed a group called the Quad; and the purpose of the Quad is
for the leaders of aviation security to get together--or
transportation security, quite frankly--twice a year and to
talk about issues that we think the international community is
facing.
It is a very loose group. It is kept that way because the
more bureaucracy you add on to a problem, you are not going to
get a solution. So these are the folks that have very good
systems. We try to work together, and we try to have input to
the international community and to all of our regions. This is
important because there are a lot of places where I may have
difficulty getting in, but I know the Canadians can get in.
We also partner in a lot of ways. We are partnering with
the Canadians in Haiti right now. We are looking at partnering
with Australia in other areas for capacity development, and we
just finished partnering with the Europeans in the former
Russian State of Georgia to help build their system.
Mr. Walsh. Great. Thank you, Mr. Halinski.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member
for additional questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I think those are wonderful stories, the story of Nigeria,
the story of Haiti and Georgia; and, as the Chairman said, we
both agree that this is a major component of the securing of
America. I think it is important.
It is already on the public record that we have about 770--
I think you said 772--important sites that are under your
jurisdiction, 450 or so in Europe. That gives me pause.
Because, one, you have already acknowledged that there are 72
unhired positions that you still need--I think about 72 or so--
75 that you still need.
Let me focus, then, on this repair station. One of our
colleagues, Congressman Langevin, was very interested and we
worked very closely on this. It gives me pause, as well,
because, as we sit here today, our planes are flying in and out
of international ports, some friendly and some not and some
with repair stations.
What is the intensity of your time as it relates to repair
stations? I use that in the context--and let me just shoot my
questions out, and then I will just let you--I say that
because, again, I speak to the individual operator, the
individual actor rather, that could do harm to an airliner that
is traveling. So I am concerned about the minuteness of that
person's actions and how do we feel comfortable--nothing is
perfect--in our inspection of repair stations.
Then I would like you just to give me a little bit more on
the ASSIST Program and whether or not you believe the ASSIST
Program is successful and what the characteristics of that
program are that make it successful.
After the 12/25 Christmas day bombing attempt, we
dispatched the Secretary of Homeland Security and the
administrator around the world. I know that they were working
with your TSA reps and trying to build rapport and trying to
get more response as it relates to security measures at
airports.
My question is: When you are engaging in discussions with
foreign governments on security screening, are these
negotiations based on rapport and the talents of your TSA reps?
Do you need further authority on cementing these agreements and
these national standards?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am. Let me start with foreign repair
stations.
As you said, ma'am, there are approximately 770 foreign
repair stations that will come under the final rule when it is
published. We expect that, quite frankly, our fingers crossed,
ma'am, hoping that it will be late summer or by the end of this
fiscal year.
But we cannot wait--because we understand Congress' intent
on this rule--we can't wait to look at those until a rule is
done. So what we have done is we have proactively categorized,
once again based on risk, the repair stations. We have broken
them down into a tier system.
That tier system starts with the highest tier, and what I
am describing here is a repair station that might deal with a
part of the aircraft that could knock the bird out of the sky.
Repair the engines, repair the avionics, repair the navigation
system, the communication system. Tier 1 and Tier 2 are
critical repairs to that aircraft that will keep it airworthy.
What we have done--and there are about 160 of these types
of foreign repair stations outside the United States. So what
we have done is we have started security assistance visits to
these facilities. The vast majority of these, over half, quite
frankly, are in Europe, which we know the standards are very,
very high. A lot of these are on airport sites, so they already
have security programs.
So we have looked at 154 of these foreign repair stations
already in anticipation of the rule, but just to get a feel for
how they look. What we have found is actually quite
encouraging. What we have found is they do have security
systems, they do run background checks, they do have a security
manager and a security program, those not only on-site at an
airport but those off-site.
We haven't looked at some of the Tier 3 and 4 level repair
stations because I would describe those that are repair
stations that are more attuned to being mom-and-pop-type repair
stations. They may repair the seat cushion on the aircraft.
They may repair the wheel on the catering cart. Those aren't
critical to keep the bird in the sky.
So what we have tried to do is take, with our man pool
assets, and hit the most critical ones that pose the risk to
the aircraft. We are anticipating getting to all of these
facilities when the rule is passed. We will put an emphasis--
because we do know that this is of interest to Congress, ma'am.
If I could go into the ASSIST program----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes, thank you.
Mr. Halinski [continuing]. How we deal with ASSIST. We
actually created the ASSIST program about 3 years ago because,
quite frankly, if we are ever going to increase the
international standards, we had to take action. It is one thing
to walk in the door and tell them, ``You have problems at your
airport,'' and walk away. It is another thing to help them get
up to minimum standards.
So what the idea behind the ASSIST program is is to go in
and do a survey initially: Where are the problems? So we do a
baseline survey. What we have found is, in some cases with
aviation security in countries throughout the world, they don't
have the laws in place. So we will send in lawyers who actually
will help them draft their civil aviation laws for aviation
security, so people have the authority to do security.
Then we will send in the standard aviation security people.
But, at the same time, we will send in people that know how to
handle crisis management. What do you do if you have a plane
crash? What do you do if you have a terrorist attack? We send
in public relations. We send in screeners. We send in extensive
trainers. So we send in a variety of people, because just
teaching them how to screen isn't going to be enough that they
meet standards. So it is a full commitment.
We ask that a country before--and this is the part that is
essential. Before I am going to commit my money and my assets
for a period of time to a country, I want that country to come
back and say, ``We are willing to do this.'' So every time we
go in, we give them a set of standards. If they don't meet it
by the time we are scheduled to come back, we don't come back.
We have an agreement that is signed between the embassy and the
host government to this fact. We have been very lucky because
we have been in--when we have had difficulties between the
embassy and the host government, we have been able to work it
out, and we have demonstrated a lot of success.
But the key is, also, don't give away anything for free. If
you give away something for free, people aren't going to
respect that. You need to encourage them that this is your
system, you need to build on this system, and you need to hit
these checkmarks so that you have sustainability. Because that
is the key in aviation security: Not that you have the best
equipment, but can I sustain the system I have, and does it
meet the mark?
The last piece, ma'am, is, I believe that we do have the
authorities that we need, from the standpoint of a regulatory
standpoint. I would tell you that, when we deal with host
nations, we welcome, quite frankly, and we want to be on the
State Department embassy team. I mean, I think that the
relationship that we have developed with the State Department
overseas is the right relationship, and it is the way that we
should work in conjunction with the State Department. It is a
very good partnership, and it is one that we actually are very
grateful for.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just say, that is very important. I
think we have gained sort of a framework of what your needs
are. But the fact that you are energetic, you are overt in your
actions, and it is constant, I think, in terms of securing the
homeland, that equals due diligence. However you can ramp up
that level of due diligence, I think is all the better for
securing the American public and all those who are traveling
the skies in between nations around the world.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the lady.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Cravaack for an additional
question.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just one question: Coming from a 30,000-foot level, what
keeps you up at night?
Mr. Halinski. Okay, sir, I am asked that question a lot,
and I am going to be real honest with you. I have a lot of
really good people that work for me, and it is the same answer
I would have given you a few years back when I was in the
Marine Corps, and that is the safety of my people. I put my
people in Yemen, Kabul, Baghdad, places in Africa like the
Congo. The idea is to build the system, but what keeps me up at
night, quite frankly, first and foremost, is the safety and
welfare of my people.
The second is that we face a threat that is adaptable, and
it changes based on what they perceive as vulnerability. They
have the time, they have the patience, they have the money. We
have to understand that, that they are going to find a gap in
the system. There is no 100--and, sir, I will go on record
saying this. I don't believe there is a 100 percent solution to
any security system. If you say there is a 100 percent solution
to a security system, you have never done security work,
because there is not. So what we can do is we can try to
mitigate that threat the best way we can.
My concern, the other part, is the threat, sir. They are
adaptable, and they modify. When you have the time, when you
have the money and you have the patience that they have, it is
very hard to mitigate and defeat that threat.
Mr. Cravaack. I couldn't agree with you more. It is
asymmetric warfare, and we have to adapt to overcome. So I
appreciate your comments on that. I think we have the right man
for the job, so thank you very much for----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Will the gentleman yield just for a
moment?
Mr. Cravaack. Yes, ma'am, I will yield.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You were asking about from the skies. Let
me just ask Mr. Halinski a question.
I will just hold it up, and I know you have seen it. Is
this a workable chart for you? You were trying to get the
acronym going, and I am trying to get an understanding. This is
not a trick question, it is just that--does this work?
Mr. Halinski. Ma'am, I am going to be honest----
Ms. Jackson Lee. This is your chart. Someone is bringing it
to you. I am not trying to--it looks like an extensive maze,
and I am just wondering----
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am. This is my organizational
structure.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Can you get your phone calls through?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am. I am really going to take a
beating when I get back to the TSA, of course. But----
Ms. Jackson Lee. No, it was far away. I wasn't trying to--
it is just that----
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am. It is my organizational
structure. Actually, one of the things that we do is----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Is it streamlined?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am, it is streamlined, because one of
the things we do is we regularly practice communications. One
of my concerns is always, I have to be able to talk to my
people in the field. So we have redundant communications. We
practice on a regular basis.
The example I want to use is 12/25. From the time we
started until the time we--we had people worldwide, because we
have an office open everywhere someplace in the world--it was a
matter of hours before our people were reaching out to host
governments and trying to work that mitigation measure.
So we do practice this, and we have a very good
communications system.
I would like to say that TTAC stands for ``Transportation
Threat Assessment and Credentialing.''
Ms. Jackson Lee. You have been redeemed.
I am going to count on you, Mr. Halinski, to come in and
prove to this committee and to the Chairman that this kind of
operational chart is easy access in times of emergency and you
can reach your people and they are all sort of on one page
here.
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. In more ways than one.
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am. Redundant coms is the trick,
ma'am. Be it phone, be it e-mail, be it BlackBerry, we have a
way to get hold of them. Trust me, ma'am, I reach out to my
organization all the time. They don't particularly like it
because sometimes it is 3 o'clock in the morning or 2 o'clock
in the morning. But we can reach out very quickly.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I thank the Chairman.
Mr. Cravaack. I claim back my time and yield the rest of my
time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
Thank you, Administrator Halinksi, for your time. It has
been very helpful to us. Your panel is now dismissed, and we
will call up the second panel.
All right. The Chairman will now recognize the second
panel.
We have Mr. Filip Cornelis, as the head of the unit of
aviation security for the European Union. I understand he will
be testifying in a foreign language this morning.
Mr. Rafi Ron is the president of New Age Security
Solutions. He formerly served as director of security at Tel-
Aviv Ben-Gurion International--all three of us on this panel
were at that airport about 2 weeks ago--and the Israeli Airport
Authority between 1997 and 2001.
Mr. Jim Marriott is the chief of the Aviation Security
Branch at the International Civil Aviation Organization. He is
responsible for creating and implementing ICAO's aviation
security and facilities policies.
I want to state for the record that the committee
recognizes that Mr. Cornelis as well as Mr. Marriott's
statements are being given in the spirit of cooperation, are
voluntary, and these witnesses are not appearing under the
jurisdiction of the Congress. They represent international
organizations. We very much appreciate your willingness to be
here.
With that, the Chairman now recognizes Mr. Filip Cornelis
for his opening testimony.
STATEMENT OF FILIP CORNELIS, HEAD OF UNIT FOR AVIATION
SECURITY, DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR MOBILITY AND TRANSPORT,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Mr. Cornelis. Chairman, thank you very much.
Honorable Representatives of the House, let me first thank
you for inviting the European Commission to testify on the
European Union's partnership with the United States in the
field of aviation security.
We strongly believe, in Europe, that we share a common
agenda with the United States and that we should pursue that
agenda in tandem to combine and reinforce each other's action.
We have a very similar assessment of the threat and a very
similar way of addressing it. Thanks to our respective efforts
since 9/11, we have succeeded in protecting our aviation system
from several attempted attacks of sabotage.
However, we recognize that a lot of work remains to be
done. Let me say a few words about the European Union's
relations internationally with the rest of the world and
bilaterally with the United States.
First of all, we believe that the International Civil
Aviation Organization, ICAO, must be the driver for the overall
policy in order to ensure proper buy-in at the global level.
The next ICAO triennial period should be guided by the outcome
of last year's ICAO assembly, notably on the basis of the ICAO
Declaration on Aviation Security, which, no doubt, my fellow
panelists will touch upon later. The European Union is
committed to play its part fully in this work.
Our most immediate priority in this area is cargo security.
There is considerable concern among politicians in Europe about
the security of flights coming into the European Union, in
particular since last year's incidents. E.U. ministers adopted
an action plan in December on strengthening air cargo security,
with tight deadlines for us to meet. The action plan recognizes
that cargo and mail is, by its nature, a global business, and
so the cargo security regime must be approached as a global
challenge. We must keep in mind the need for aviation to
develop further in a healthy and economically viable way;
otherwise, the terrorists have already won.
We support Secretary Napolitano's call to improve global
supply chain security as a means of reinforcing our air cargo
regimes. Like the United States, we are examining how existing
customs systems can be adapted to become a powerful instrument
for air cargo security. We are also working on screening
requirements for high-risk cargo.
So, at the global level, we will work with ICAO through the
newly established Working Group on Air Cargo Security to
prepare new ICAO standards and recommended practices in this
area. We should do this together. Where the United States and
European Union agree on certain standards, those standards have
a good chance of becoming global standards. If we set different
standards, however, we don't achieve higher security,
necessarily, but probably we do achieve higher costs and
greater difficulty to ensure proper compliance.
We have offered our TSA counterparts to prepare new rules
for air cargo security jointly, including a definition of high-
risk cargo, screening methods, and international supply chain
security.
Downstream from the rulemaking, proper implementation of
global standards is just as important. Capacity-building
activities in key third countries are essential for delivering
uniform implementation of international standards. They are
best focused on those areas that are identified through the
results of ICAO's Universal Security Audit Program. Here, the
European Union is in favor of greater transparency of ICAO
audit results, notably where significant security concerns are
identified.
Let me turn to our bilateral relationship. The U.S.-E.U.
Air Transport Agreement has opened great opportunities here.
The legal basis established by Article 9 on security of the
agreement attests to, and I quote, ``the importance of working
toward compatible practices and standards as a means of
enhancing air transport security and minimizing regulatory
divergence.''
We feel it is worth investing in this work because,
together, we account for almost 50 percent of global air
traffic. One in five passengers coming into the United States
departs from Europe, and vice versa. This represents almost 50
million passengers. We are also each other's biggest partners
in terms of air freight, with 2 million metric tons being
transported annually between the European Union and the United
States.
We feel it is worth investing, but we also feel it is
justified investing in this cooperation because our societies
possess amongst the most sophisticated security regimes in the
world. We should capitalize on that fact and treat each other
as equal partners. The European Union, in the eyes of the
United States, should not be grouped into the same basket as
the rest of the world.
We have a robust, tried-and-tested aviation security
regime, the merits of which we can and we do share with our
counterparts in the U.S. administration. The European Union
rules are very well enforced, owing to a strong system of
oversight, both at the European Union level and at the level of
the E.U. member-states, in which TSA officials are regularly
invited to take part, as our inspectors take part in
inspections in the United States.
At a high level, that of Secretary Napolitano and
Administrator Pistole, the European Union and the United States
have been heavily engaged in dialog with each other, especially
since the Northwest Airlines and Yemen incidents. These more
recent contacts are complemented by a solid history of working
together for many years on aviation security issues through
various fora, but we would like to see more practical results
from those exchanges.
For example, we discussed new post-Yemen security controls
for air cargo at various occasions. Against that background,
the most recent U.S. emergency amendment on cargo and mail came
as something of a surprise to the European Union and its
aviation industry. The new requirements had not been discussed
before and did not take into account the existing measures in
the European Union which already achieve the same security
outcomes, or the new rules which are currently being developed
as part of the action plan and which should be ready for
adoption before the summer. That is a missed opportunity.
The European Union believes that much more can be achieved
through our cooperation by aiming for better security that
avoids duplication of controls where our systems equivalent, by
mutually recognizing each other's controls wherever possible,
not only to facilitate the traveling public, but also to allow
security staff to focus on real and unchecked threats and to
free up limited aviation security resources for use elsewhere
in the system to make air transport more secure.
We have taken steps in this direction to recognize the
equivalency of U.S. controls on passengers, for example, and we
are ready to relax the screening of passengers originating in
the United States when they transfer at E.U. airports. The
United States has the National Cargo Security Program, which
allows TSA to recognize foreign cargo regimes. Although we have
some specific issues with this program, it is something we very
much welcome and encourage.
We have, still, an opportunity to make headway in cargo and
mail security reform. The aim would be to replace unilateral
measures, such as U.S. emergency measures, with mutually
acceptable and mutually compatible security solutions for
cargo, implemented on flights leaving and coming into our
respective territories.
To conclude, Honorable Representatives of the House, it is
important to underline that the security of international civil
aviation is a joint responsibility of all countries, not least
those who account for the biggest amount of traffic. As such,
the European Union will continue to engage fully with the
United States, with ICAO, and with other key international
partners to address the threat to civil aviation, both from
rules-based and capacity-building perspectives.
Thank you for providing this opportunity to the European
Commission to participate in this very important discussion.
[The statement of Mr. Cornelis follows:]
Prepared Statement of Filip Cornelis
April 7, 2011
Honourable Representatives of the House: Let me first thank you for
inviting the European Commission to testify on the European Union's
partnership with the United States in the field of aviation security,
with the shared and joint objective to keep flying secure.
In a period of less than a year, the international civil aviation
community has been challenged by two well-planned terrorist attempts
against air transport. These attempts would have caused significant
loss of human life had their execution not been disrupted or discovered
in time.
I am talking of course about the attempted sabotage of Northwest
Airlines flight 253 on Christmas day 2009 and about the attempts at
sabotaging aircraft on 29 October 2010 using improvised explosive
devices concealed in air cargo originating from Yemen.
The first attempt was foiled due to the poor execution of the plan
and the intervention of passengers on the flight. The second attempt
was thwarted by intelligence.
When our aviation security measures are challenged and come so
close to being circumvented by terrorists, we must ask ourselves the
questions: Are there still weaknesses in our system? And what can we do
better to make our system more robust?
We know that the nature of the terrorist threat is innovative and
evolving. We also know that aviation remains a target for terrorists,
and that aviation security measures must respond, and ideally, pre-
empt, that phenomenon, difficult as it may be to do.
We, as regulators, have a duty towards the travelling public to
demonstrate that we are doing everything in our power to stay one step
ahead of the terrorists and that we can defend our air transport
system. If the threat is evolving, we too must evolve.
This must always be done in a way which allows aviation to develop
further in a healthy and economically viable way. Otherwise, the
terrorists have already won.
Only in so doing so, will we be able to deliver our respective
constituencies a right that is fundamental to the functioning of our
economies and communities: The freedom to fly.
We strongly believe, in the European Union, that we share a common
agenda for aviation security with the United States, and that we should
pursue that agenda in tandem, to combine and reinforce each other's
action.
Thanks to our respective efforts since 9/11, we have succeeded in
protecting our aviation system from several attempted acts of sabotage.
However, a lot of work remains to be done, and here I turn to the EU's
relations internationally with the rest of the world, and bilaterally
with the United States.
The International Civil Aviation Organisation, ICAO, must be the
driver for the overall policy to ensure proper buy-in internationally.
ICAO must ensure the effectiveness of the global aviation security
regime, both in terms of its design and its implementation. The
European Union and the United States cannot relax their efforts in
assisting ICAO to see that this is done. Our work together is
absolutely necessary. But it is clearly not going to be sufficient.
ICAO has already played an instrumental role in reinforcing
aviation security worldwide and must continue doing so in the future.
The next ICAO triennial period should be guided by the outcome of last
year's ICAO Assembly session whose conclusions were highly relevant to
the challenges the air transport industry is facing.
The historic adoption of the ICAO Declaration on Aviation Security
by the Assembly confirms our joint priorities for future work on
protecting air transport. The ICAO Comprehensive Aviation Security
Strategy serves to drive that process by bringing forward concrete
policy. The European Union is committed to play its part in this work.
Let me turn to our most immediate priority for international
cooperation. There is considerable concern among politicians in Europe
about the security of flights coming into the European Union since last
year's incidents concerning improvised explosive devices in air cargo
originating in Yemen. The European Union demonstrated its commitment to
international cooperation in this field through the adoption by E.U.
Ministers of an Action Plan on Strengthening Air Cargo Security last
December.
The Action Plan serves as the European Union's response to the
Yemen incidents. It encapsulates a number of measures aimed at
reinforcing the air cargo supply chain both within the European Union
and beyond. It tackles three areas: First, rapid exchange of
information on new threats and on emergency measures taken to counter
those threats, and development of a common E.U. risk assessment
capability; second, new cargo security rules for the European Union;
and third, international co-operation. This third part recognises that
cargo and mail is, by its nature, a global business and so the cargo
security regime must be approached as a global challenge if global
trade is to be facilitated. As such, there are strong expectations in
Europe that ICAO must set a high baseline level of security and must
ensure it is implemented. We also support Secretary Napolitano's call
to improve global supply chain security as a means of reinforcing our
air cargo regimes and, like the United States, are examining how
existing customs systems can be adapted to become a powerful instrument
for air cargo security.
So, first, we will work with ICAO, through the newly established
Working Group on Air Cargo Security, to prepare new ICAO Standards and
Recommended Practices on air cargo security. It must be borne in mind
that developing tomorrow's aviation security regime is a joint effort
and as such, our respective approaches, should be as compatible as
possible. Where the United States and European Union agree on certain
standards, those standards have a good chance of becoming global
standards. That way, we help the aviation industry and its essential
clients--in particular the air cargo industry--to meet high security
standards in a way which least hampers trade. If we set different
standards, we do not achieve higher security, but probably higher costs
and greater difficulty to ensure proper compliance. We have offered our
TSA counterparts to prepare new rules for air cargo security jointly,
including the definition of high-risk cargo, screening methods, and
international supply chain security.
Second, proper implementation of global standards for aviation
security is just as important. This leads me to the topic of capacity
building. Non-implementation of ICAO Annex 17 Standards and Recommended
Practices in some ICAO Member States can expose the entire air
transport system to attack. To counter that scenario, capacity building
can play an important role.
Capacity-building activities are essential for delivering uniform
implementation of international standards across the globe. Such
activities are best focused on areas identified through the results of
ICAO's Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP). Those audit results
can help to show where support is most needed, in particular in
tackling Significant Security Concerns exposed in ICAO Member States.
The European Union is in favour of greater transparency of ICAO audit
results, notably where Significant Security Concerns are identified.
Information sharing could be facilitated by ICAO Member States
providing information on their capacity-building activities to ICAO.
This way, better coordination of such activities can take place in
order to ensure maximum effectiveness. This will also ensure that there
is no duplication of effort and that complementary activities can be
implemented for the overall good of the whole aviation security system.
Bilaterally, the U.S.-E.U. Air Transport Agreement has opened great
opportunities for further work on aviation security between the
European Union and the United States. The legal basis established by
Article 9 on Security of the Air Transport Agreement attests to--and I
quote--``the importance of working towards compatible practices and
standards as a means of enhancing air transport security and minimising
regulatory divergence.''
We feel it is worth investing in this work because together we
account for almost 50% of global air traffic. One in five passengers
coming into the United States departs from Europe; and vice versa. This
represents almost 50 million passengers.
Furthermore, we feel it is justified to invest in this work because
our societies possess amongst the most sophisticated aviation security
regimes in the world. We should capitalise on that fact.
At a high level, the European Union and the United States have been
heavily engaged with each other, especially since the Northwest
Airlines and Yemen incidents. Vice-President of the Commission,
responsible for Mobility and Transport, Mr. Siim Kallas, and Secretary
Napolitano are meeting regularly to discuss the shared challenges and
agree the overall direction of our efforts to address them, and they
meet again on 11 April in Washington.
These more recent contacts are complemented by a solid history of
working together for many years on aviation security issues through the
long-established forum of the E.U.-U.S. Transportation Security
Cooperation Group. That Group meets periodically to discuss the
challenges of the day, exchange information on new security methods and
technologies, and to co-ordinate international work, especially vis-a-
vis the International Civil Aviation Organisation.
Furthermore, the group of like-minded so-called Quad members--that
is Australia, Canada, the European Commission, and the United States--
also work together to co-ordinate their positions and to drive the
agenda internationally. A recent example of such co-operation is the
joint position on future work for air cargo security presented with the
support of the Quad members to the ICAO Aviation Security Panel at its
meeting last month in Montreal at ICAO headquarters.
Against this background, the most recent U.S. Emergency Amendment
on cargo and mail came as something of a surprise to the European Union
and our aviation industry. The new requirements had not been discussed
before, and did not take into account the existing measures in the
European Union which already achieve the same security outcomes, or new
rules which are currently being developed in the European Union and
should be ready for adoption before the summer. That represents an
opportunity missed to work out new rules on air cargo and mail security
together. However, it is still not too late to do so, and we do hope
that the United States will engage fully with the European Union on
designing compatible rules. We are each other's biggest partners in
terms of air freight; 2 million metric tonnes being transported
annually between the European Union and the United States.
The European Union believes that much more can be achieved through
our cooperation efforts, and that we can have a much stronger impact on
the ground. We should aim for better security that avoids the
duplication of controls where our aviation security systems are
equivalent, by mutually recognising each other's security controls
wherever possible. We should do this not only to facilitate the
travelling public, but to allow security staff to focus on real,
unchecked threats and to free up limited aviation security resources
for use elsewhere in the system to make air transport more secure. The
European Union has pushed for this approach for some time now. It is a
clear objective of the U.S.-E.U. Air Transport Agreement to which we
are both committed. We feel this is a better approach than to impose
unilateral measures on each other in relation to incoming flights.
Finally, within the European Union, we have developed common
security rules and procedures which are applicable and enforced in a
uniform manner in 30 European countries (including non-E.U. countries
Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland) accounting for over 500 million
European citizens. That means, when travelling within these European
countries, re-screening is not necessary on transfer by virtue of the
security controls being applied once at the point of departure for the
entire length of the journey. We term this concept ``One Stop
Security.''
We are now looking to conclude agreements with our key
international partners which have equivalent standards of aviation
security. Indeed, such efforts have also been made vis-a-vis the United
States. We are currently engaged in setting up One Stop Security
arrangements to allow passengers arriving on flights from America into
Europe to transfer onto connecting flights without needing to re-screen
them or their baggage. E.U. law allows for including the United States
in its One Stop Security system, and we do hope that U.S. law will make
room for the European Union!
The reality is that we should treat each other as equal partners in
aviation security. The European Union, in the eyes of the United
States, should not be grouped into the same basket as the rest of the
world. The European Union has a robust tried and tested aviation
security regime, the merits of which we can, and we do, share with our
counterparts in the U.S. administration. The E.U. rules are well-
enforced owing to a strong system of oversight both at E.U. and E.U.
Member State level, in which TSA officials are regularly invited to
take part.
That exchange of information, that understanding of each other's
systems, should foster acceptability and trust of each other's systems.
As such, the European Union would greatly appreciate working together
more closely with the United States to define the aviation security
standards that are applied across the trans-Atlantic market and beyond.
In the domain of cargo security and with respect to our respective
efforts to counter a Yemen-style attack, we do have an opportunity to
make headway here. The aim would be to do replace unilateral measures,
such as U.S. Emergency Measures, with mutually acceptable security
solutions for air cargo security which are implemented on flights
leaving our respective territories.
``Strengthening international cooperation in aviation security''
should not simply be about dialogue, it should be about action. And in
that respect, we urge the United States to engage with the European
Union to deliver common solutions to our common challenges.
To conclude, honourable Representatives of the House, it is
important to underline that the security of international civil
aviation is a joint responsibility. As such the European Union shall
continue to engage fully with the United States, with ICAO, and with
other key international partners in addressing the threat to civil
aviation, both from the rules-based and the capacity building
perspectives.
Thank you for providing this opportunity to the European Commission
to participate in this very important discussion.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Cornelis.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Rafi Ron for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF RAFI RON, PRESIDENT, NEW AGE SECURITY SOLUTIONS
Mr. Ron. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
subcommittee. First, let me thank the committee for inviting me
to testify about international cooperation issues surrounding
aviation security.
I am Rafi Ron, president of New Age Security Solutions, a
transportation security consulting firm based in Dulles,
Virginia. The company was established in the wake of the 9/11
disaster to provide more effective security solutions to
airports, Government agencies, and private transportation
companies. Over the last 9 years, we have supported numerous
projects in the United States and abroad, involving airport,
seaport, and ground transportation.
Prior to founding New Age Security Solutions, I served as
director of security at Tel-Aviv Ben-Gurion International
Airport for a period of 5 years. In this position, I was
responsible for all aspects of security operation and
coordination with my counterparts at airports around the world.
My previous experience included more than 30 years in the field
of security, intelligence, and counterterrorism for the
government of Israel.
Since the 9/11 attack, aviation security has received a
great deal of attention, and enormous resources have been
dedicated to improve the system. During the last 9 years, the
United States has become the driving force in making domestic
and global aviation systems safer. Unquestionably, American
aviation has become a harder target as a result of that for
terrorists to hit. Yet, there are still many vulnerabilities
that require our attention. The question, however, is: What
investments in international cooperation will pay the highest
dividend in increasing security?
I would like to focus on three areas that need attention.
The first one is the potential of uniform minimum security
standards at airports, which is very much what was discussed
earlier in more details, or, in other words, the harmonization
of standards on a global basis. The second subject is the
challenge in effectively sharing terrorism information with
foreign countries. The third one is the role of professional
and financial support in helping certain countries to upgrade
their security--aviation security.
As far as the uniform standards, or a harmonization, it was
already recognized way back in the 1940s with the ICAO, the
Annex 17 document, that there is a need to harmonize and to
create global standards for aviation security, for a variety of
reasons, some of which I will go into in the next couple of
minutes.
Annex 17, titled, ``Safeguarding International Civil
Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference,'' it was
updated shortly after 9/11 with the help of an international
working group representing a cross-section of stakeholders, and
I had the honor to be one of the participants in this group.
ICAO Annex 17 is the only document today that establishes
global standards for aviation security. Since the annex is
based on the consensus of all ICAO member-states, it
establishes a relatively low standard that can be achieved by
countries with limited technological infrastructure and few
traditions supporting public order and law enforcement.
During the last few years, ICAO has implemented an
aggressive auditing program in various parts of the world to
help member-states to meet Annex 17 requirements. Despite the
relatively low threshold, many countries still find it
difficult to meet the standards, and fail the audits.
The ICAO standards were found not sufficient by some of the
countries, mostly in the developed world. Both the United
States and Europe has issued their own standards and a
regulatory framework. The European and the American system are
based on the same concept of operation but differ in some of
the actual requirements.
For example, as it was mentioned before here today, the
European Union recognizes advanced X-ray technology screening
as the standard for its bags, while the United States has
raised the threshold to computerized tomography, which has a
greater probability of detection.
In contrast, Europe requires 100 percent employee screening
and a vehicle search before personnel can enter the security
sterile zones; yet, American airports are not required to do
any employee screening, and there are no consistent vehicle
search protocols.
The goal of achieving a global one-stop security zone
throughout the aviation system that minimizes the rescreening
of travelers on the one hand and provides adequate airport
security on the other still seems to be very far off, if not
unrealistic. As long as there are countries that support
terrorism and countries that have difficulty in maintaining
minimum performance standards, we will not reach this goal.
What can be attained appears most likely when based on
bilateral agreements with friendly, trustworthy countries.
Through them, we can reduce costs, ease operational delays,
and, above all, increase the quality of security among partner
countries. The on-going dialogue between TSA and our foreign
partners is promising, but, with differing standards, even
bilateral negotiations are unlikely to create a true one-stop
security zone without action by the Congress and the
legislative bodies in the partner countries.
The second issue is the issue of sharing intelligence
information, the inability to readily share information and
intelligence data across national boundaries. Intelligence data
is, by nature, an extremely sensitive national asset, and most
countries are very reluctant to share it.
Yet, the need to share information has proven to be
critically important more than once in recent years. The latest
example is the attempt against FedEx and UPS cargo flights last
year. It took intelligence sharing and cooperation between
Saudi Arabia, the United States, the United Kingdom, Yemen, and
Dubai to uncover the plot and stop the explosive devices from
reaching U.S. territory.
In sharing intelligence data, the highest-value information
is both specific and actionable. It is a critical layer in the
U.S. aviation security system, but we cannot assume that
specific intelligence information will be available whenever
someone plans a terrorist act against us. Indeed, all the
attacks carried out against the United States on 9/11 and after
lacked that specific warning.
We have learned that our best early indicators of terrorism
are typically revealed from regular access to information about
passengers and cargo. In order to implement an effective risk
assessment for inbound passengers and cargo, we need to have
baseline access to local terrorist watch lists, criminal
history, et cetera.
At this time, passenger risk assessments are implemented in
a limited way through the Secure program and bilateral
agreements, especially with the European Union. Better----
Mr. Rogers. Excuse me, Mr. Ron. If you have been hearing
the bells, we have been called for votes. I want to try to get
a summary of Mr. Marriott's testimony before we recess to go
over there. Then we will pick back up on questions of that.
Mr. Ron. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Ron follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rafi Ron
April 7, 2011
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee. First,
let me thank the committee for inviting me to testify about the
international cooperation issues surrounding aviation security.
I am Rafi Ron, President of New Age Security Solutions, a
Transportation Security Consulting firm based in Dulles, VA. The
company was established in the wake of the 9/11 disaster to provide
more effective security solutions to airports, Government agencies, and
private transportation companies. Over the last 9 years, we have
supported numerous projects in the United States and abroad involving
airports, seaports, and ground transportation.
Prior to founding NASS, I served as Director of Security at Tel-
Aviv Ben-Gurion International Airport for a period of 5 years. In this
position I was responsible for all aspects of the security operation
and coordinating with my counterparts at airports around the world. My
previous experience included more than 30 years in the field of
security, intelligence, and counterterrorism for the government of
Israel.
New Age Security Solutions maintains an on-going relationship with
its clients to help them adapt as the international picture evolves. As
part of our continuous working relationship, we recently conducted a
progress audit on our first project involving Logan Airport in Boston,
Massachusetts. As you may recall, two of the
9/11 planes originated at Logan Airport. The Massachusetts Port
Authority (Massport), responsible for Logan Airport, was determined to
significantly improve the airport component of aviation security.
In the fall of 2001 we helped them develop and implement new
security policies and elevate protection at Logan airport. A key
strategy was the implementation of a behavior pattern recognition
program (first of its kind in the United States) that trains personnel
to spot aberrant activities by terrorists, independent of the specific
international threat. Massport has since taken a lead role in
developing the next level of airport security. Logan Airport's
achievements are widely recognized today by the Federal Government as
well as by the aviation industry.
Transportation in general and aviation in particular, have become
high-priority targets for international terrorist organizations.
Consequently, it is clear that the solutions must also be international
in scope. Transportation systems constitute a critical infrastructure
without which our modern industrial societies cannot function. Every
indication is that these systems will remain high-risk venues for the
foreseeable future. Unfortunately, key links in our transportation
systems remain vulnerable to attack. Potential damages include not only
a large number of casualties but also significant residual delays with
major economic and political repercussions. Few other systems carry a
higher level of vulnerability, with so many potential targets for
terrorists who seek to act against the interests of the United States.
Since the 9/11 attacks, aviation security has received a great deal
of attention and enormous resources have been dedicated to improving
the system. During the last 9 years, the United States has become the
driving force in making the domestic and global aviation system safer.
Unquestionably, American aviation has become a harder target for
terrorists to hit. Yet, there are still many vulnerabilities that
require our attention. The question, however, is: ``What investments in
international cooperation will pay the highest dividends in increased
security?''
I would like to focus on three areas that need attention:
The potential for uniform minimum security standards at
airports worldwide;
The challenges in effectively sharing terrorism information
with foreign countries; and
The role professional and financial support plays in helping
certain countries upgrade their aviation security.
UNIFORM STANDARDS
Since the late 1940s the international community has recognized
that cooperation and standardization were needed to foster an effective
global aviation industry. The International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), a U.N. agency, was formed to insure that the global aviation
system is coordinated and regulated to create a safe and secure
industry. As of today 189 states are ICAO member states. Since the
initial treaty (Chicago Convention 1947), 18 separate annexes have been
adopted.
Annex 17 is titled ``Security: Safeguarding International Civil
Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference.'' It was updated
shortly after 9/11 with the help of an international working group
representing a cross-section of stakeholders. I was honored to be among
the participants. ICAO annex 17 is the only document today that
establishes global standards for aviation security. Since the annex is
based on the consensus of all ICAO member states, it establishes fairly
low standard that can be achieved by countries with a limited
technological infrastructure and few tradition supporting public order
and law enforcement.
During the last few years, ICAO has implemented an auditing program
in various parts of the world to help member states meet the Annex 17
requirements. Despite the low threshold, many countries still find it
difficult to meet the standards and regularly fail the audits.
The ICAO standards were found inadequate by most of the developed
world. Both the United States and the European Union (EU) have issued
their own standards and regulatory frameworks. The European and the
American systems are based on the same principals but defer
substantially in some of the actual requirements. For example, the
European Union recognize Advanced X-ray (AT) screening as the standard
for all bags, while the United States has raised the threshold to
Computerized Tomography (CT) which has a greater probability of
detection. In practical terms that means a bag that was screened in
Europe must be rescreened before entering the U.S. system. In contrast,
Europe requires 100% employee screening and vehicle search before
personnel can enter security ``sterile'' zones, yet American airports
are not required to do any employee screening and there is no
consistent vehicle search protocols.
The goal of achieving a global ``one stop security zone''
throughout the aviation system that minimizes the rescreening of
travelers on the one hand and provides adequate airport security on the
other, still seems very far off--if not unrealistic. As long as there
are countries that support terrorism and countries that have difficulty
maintaining minimum performance standards, we will never reach the
goal.
What can be attained appears most likely when based on bilateral
agreements with friendly trustworthy countries. Through them we can
reduce cost, ease operational delays and above all increase the quality
of security among partner countries. The on-going dialogue between TSA
and our foreign partners is promising. But with differing standards,
even bilateral negotiations are unlikely to create a true ``one stop
security zone'' without action by the Congress and legislative bodies
in partner countries.
SHARING INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
The second issue, is the inability to readily share intelligence
data across national boundaries. Intelligence data is by nature an
extremely sensitive national asset and most countries are very
reluctant to share it. Yet, the need to share information has proven to
be critically important more than once in recent years. The latest
example is the attempt against FedEx and UPS cargo flights last year.
It took intelligence sharing and coordination between Saudi Arabia, the
United States, the United Kingdom, Yemen, and Dubai to uncover the plot
and stop the explosive devices before reaching U.S. territory.
In sharing intelligence data, the highest value information is both
specific and actionable. It is a critical layer in the U.S. aviation
security program. But we cannot assume that specific intelligence
information will be available whenever someone plans a terrorist act.
Indeed, all the attacks carried out against the United States on 9/11
and after, lacked specific early warnings. We have learned that our
best early indicators of a terrorism act are typically revealed from
regular access to information about passengers and cargo. In order to
implement an effective risk assessment for inbound passengers and cargo
we need to have baselines and access to local terrorists watch lists,
criminal history, etc. At this time, passenger risk assessments are
implemented in a limited way through the ``Secure Flight'' program.
Better access to local information will increase its effectiveness.
Given the data currently available, it is important to note that
relevant passenger data can be accessed without raising new privacy
concerns if the program is designed correctly.
The intelligence-sharing policy of most countries is bilateral in
nature and goes well beyond aviation security issues. Proactive efforts
by the U.S. intelligence community and the Department of Homeland
Security have created relationships and infrastructure that have proven
to be very effective on many occasions. Despite the sensitivity of the
intelligence data, we have been fortunate that diverse governments have
often been willing to share information when it comes to aviation
security. However, the current unrest in Africa and the Middle East
raises serious continuity questions for the future.
NON-SECURE COUNTRIES
The third aspect of international cooperation I want to highlight
is the role of the United States in supporting countries that are
unable to construct and operate an acceptable standard of aviation
security. The United States is already engaged in efforts to improve
security resources in some parts of the world. This investment has
historically paid very well in terms of elevating the global aviation
security picture. It also lays the groundwork for better information
sharing and proactive intelligence gathering. For better or worse,
there is frequently a correlation between the countries that need help
implementing better security protocols and the countries where
terrorist are active. In this respect, TSA's efforts in Yemen should be
complemented. Again, the instability in the region raises questions
about future security risks.
SUMMARY
Most of the terrorist activities against U.S. aviation originates
abroad. Every day brings hundreds of flights into U.S. airports on
foreign airlines. U.S. carriers also have hundreds of flights that
originate every day from foreign airports. The issues are mirrored in
many respects on the many air cargo flights that bring parcels from
foreign locations. International cooperation and coordination play a
critical role. Without a high level of cooperation our vulnerability
increases substantially.
Our efforts should focus on three dimensions of cooperation and
coordination:
a. Creation of bilateral ``one stop security zones'' with the
European Union and other trustworthy partner countries.
b. Continue the proactive policy for generating and sharing
relevant intelligence with foreign countries.
c. Increase the professional and financial support to countries
that are committed to upgrading their aviation security.
Thank you for your consideration.
Mr. Rogers. So, Mr. Marriott, I would like to recognize you
for 5 minutes to summarize your testimony.
STATEMENT OF JIM MARRIOTT, CHIEF, AVIATION SECURITY BRANCH,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
Mr. Marriott. Mr. Chairman, Members of the subcommittee,
ladies and gentlemen, the International Civil Aviation
Organization, ICAO, is very pleased to participate in today's
hearing on strengthening international cooperation on aviation
security. Thank you for this opportunity to provide an overview
of ICAO's Aviation Security Program and international
cooperation in the field of aviation security in the company of
distinguished international partners.
By way of background, ICAO was established by the 1944
Convention on International Civil Aviation, also known as the
Chicago Convention. ICAO is the specialized agency of the
United Nations responsible for international civil aviation. As
the global forum for cooperation among its 190 member-states
and with the world aviation community, the organization set
standards and recommended practices for the safe and orderly
development of international civil aviation.
In fulfilling its mission to foster a global civil aviation
system that consistently and uniformly operates at peak
efficiency and provides optimum safety, security, and
sustainability, ICAO has established three strategic
objectives: First, enhance global civil aviation safety; the
second, enhance global civil aviation security; and, third,
foster harmonized and economically viable development of
international civil aviation that does not unduly harm the
environment.
Activities under ICAO's Aviation Security Program focus on:
The development of international standards, recommended
practices, and guidance material to establish a single
international aviation security performance baseline; the
conduct of audits of State aviation security and oversight
systems to identify deficiencies and provide recommendations
for their resolution; and assistance and capacity-building
activities to further help States resolve deficiencies and in
other ways strengthen their aviation security programs.
The regime of international standards and recommended
practices for aviation security is contained in Annex 17 to the
Chicago Convention. The international regulatory framework,
applicable to all member-states, sets out the accepted minimum
level of aviation security and covers a wide range of matters,
including allocation of responsibilities for aviation security,
international cooperation, and air cargo security.
Annex 17 was first adopted by ICAO in 1974. The 12th
amendment of Annex 17 is on track to become applicable on the
1st of July this year, with important new provisions to
strengthen air cargo security and other areas of risk.
ICAO's Universal Security Audit Program provides for
regular, mandatory, systematic, and harmonized audits of the
aviation security and oversight systems in all ICAO member-
states. The audit program was launched in November 2002 as a
key outcome of the High-Level Ministerial Conference on
Aviation Security convened by ICAO in the aftermath of the
tragic events of 9/11.
ICAO recognizes that aviation security cannot be successful
without implementation. This is why an increasing measure of
ICAO's resources is being directed to a range of assistance and
capacity-building activities throughout the world. These
include the global network of 20 ICAO-endorsed aviation
security training centers; direct in-country assistance to
States to help them address deficiencies; assistance to
regional organizations to establish priorities and action plans
for aviation security enhancement; and collaboration with other
international organizations, like the United Nations, the
Organization of American States, and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, to leverage resources to
enhance aviation security.
The common thread through all of ICAO's aviation security
activities is international cooperation. In the aftermath of
the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on the
25th of December, 2009, ICAO convened a series of regional
conferences on aviation security. These events culminated in
the unanimous adoption of a Declaration on Aviation Security by
the 37th Session of the ICAO Assembly last October.
The declaration urges ICAO member-states to enhance
international cooperation to counter threats to civil aviation
in nine areas, including: Strengthening security screening
procedures, strengthened and harmonized measures and best
practices for air cargo security, and provision of technical
assistance to states in need.
ICAO was very pleased by President Obama's statement on the
9th of October commending ICAO for adopting the declaration and
for noting ``the extraordinary global collaboration . . . to
bring about a truly 21st-century aviation security framework
that will make air travel safer and more secure than ever
before.''
There is obviously much more work to be done. ICAO is
leading a second round of regional conferences, this time
focused on implementation of the declaration.
ICAO's successes in leading international civil aviation
security enhancements are due in large part to the partnerships
it enjoys with member-states, other international and regional
organizations, and industry. Of course, among these is the
strong relationship ICAO has with the United States and the
TSA.
ICAO and international civil aviation security continue to
benefit from U.S. leadership and cooperation in many ways:
Invaluable support through the sharing of technical information
and expertise; the voluntary contribution of financial and in-
kind resources used to supplement ICAO's own capacity, thereby
extending our reach and impact; support of consensus-building
and excellence in international policy development; and
concrete projects to assist States to strengthen their aviation
security programs. ICAO looks forward to further deepening and
strengthening this important and timely relationship.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Marriott follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jim Marriott
7 April 2011
Mr. Chairman, Members of the subcommittee, ladies and gentlemen,
the International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO, is very pleased to
participate in today's hearing on ``Strengthening International
Cooperation on Aviation Security''. Thank you for this opportunity to
provide an overview of ICAO's Aviation Security Programme and
international cooperation in the field of aviation security in the
company of distinguished international partners.
By way of background, ICAO was established by the 1944 Convention
on International Civil Aviation, also known as the Chicago Convention.
ICAO is the specialized agency of the United Nations responsible for
international civil aviation. As the global forum for cooperation among
its 190 Member States and with the world aviation community, the
organization sets standards and recommended practices for the safe and
orderly development of international civil aviation. In fulfilling its
mission to foster a global civil aviation system that consistently and
uniformly operates at peak efficiency and provides optimum safety,
security, and sustainability, ICAO has established three Strategic
Objectives:
1. Enhance global civil aviation safety;
2. Enhance global civil aviation security; and
3. Foster harmonized and economically viable development of
international civil aviation that does not unduly harm the
environment.
Activities under ICAO's Aviation Security Programme focus on: The
development of international Standards, Recommended Practices and
guidance material to establish a single international aviation security
performance baseline; the conduct of audits of State aviation security
and oversight systems to identify deficiencies and provide
recommendations for their resolution; and assistance and capacity-
building activities to further help States resolve deficiencies and in
other ways strengthen their aviation security programmes.
The regime of international Standards and Recommended Practices for
aviation security is contained in Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention.
This international regulatory framework, applicable to all Member
States, sets out the accepted minimum level of aviation security, and
covers such matters as the objectives of aviation security, allocation
of responsibilities for aviation security, international cooperation,
quality control, access control, aircraft security, passenger and
baggage security, cargo security and the management of acts of unlawful
interference. Annex 17 was first adopted by the ICAO Council in 1974.
The twelfth amendment of Annex 17 is on track to become applicable on 1
July 2011, with important new provisions to strengthen air cargo
security and other areas of risk.
ICAO's Universal Security Audit Programme provides for regular,
mandatory, systematic and harmonized audits of the aviation security
and oversight systems in all ICAO Member States. The Audit Programme
was launched in November 2002, as a key outcome of the High-level,
Ministerial Conference on Aviation Security convened by ICAO in the
aftermath of the tragic events of 9/11. The first cycle of the
Programme was designed to determine the degree of compliance of a State
in implementing Annex 17 Standards. The audits also assessed the
sustainability of each States aviation security system through the
establishment of appropriate legislation, National policies, and an
appropriate aviation security authority provided with inspection and
enforcement capabilities. Currently in its second cycle, the Audit
Programme now focuses on the critical elements of States' aviation
security oversight systems.
ICAO recognizes that aviation security cannot be successful without
implementation. This is why an increasing measure of ICAO's resources
is being directed to a range of assistance and capacity-building
activities throughout the world. These include:
1. A global network of 20 ICAO-endorsed Aviation Security Training
Centres--centres of excellence for training aviation security
professionals on a number of key topics;
2. Direct, in-country assistance to States to help them address
deficiencies;
3. Assistance to regional organizations to establish priorities and
action plans for aviation security enhancement; and
4. Collaboration with other international organizations, like the
United Nations, the Organization of American States and the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, to
leverage resources to enhance aviation security.
The common thread through all of ICAO's aviation security
activities is international cooperation. In the aftermath of the
attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines flight 253 on 25 December 2009,
ICAO convened a series of regional aviation security conferences in
Mexico City, Abuja, Tokyo, and Abu Dhabi to build consensus on the
priorities for further aviation security enhancement. These events
culminated in the unanimous adoption of a Declaration on Aviation
Security by the 37th Session of the ICAO Assembly in October 2010.
The Declaration urges ICAO Member States to enhance international
cooperation to counter threats to civil aviation in nine areas,
including strengthening security screening procedures, strengthened and
harmonized measures and best practices for air cargo security, and the
provision of technical assistance to States in need. ICAO was very
pleased by President Obama's statement on 9 October 2010 commending
ICAO for adopting the Declaration and for noting ``The extraordinary
global collaboration . . . to bring about a truly 21st century
international aviation security framework that will make air travel
safer and more secure than ever before.''
There is obviously much more work to be done. ICAO is leading a
second round of regional conferences, this time focused on
implementation of the Declaration. The first of these was held in New
Delhi in February and resulted in 14 ICAO Member States in that region
adopting a roadmap of specific actions to further strengthen aviation
security. Building on this success, similar conferences are being
planned by ICAO and host States for this year in other Regions.
ICAO's successes in leading international civil aviation security
enhancements are due in large part to the partnerships it enjoys with
Member States, other international and regional organizations, and
industry. Among these is the strong relationship ICAO has with the
United States and the Transportation Security Administration.
ICAO and international civil aviation security continue to benefit
from U.S. leadership and cooperation in many ways: Invaluable support
through the sharing of technical information and experience; the
voluntary contribution of financial and in-kind resources used to
supplement ICAO's own capacity, thereby extending our reach and impact;
support of consensus-building and excellence in international policy
development; and concrete projects to assist States in need to
strengthen their aviation security programmes. ICAO looks forward to
further deepening and strengthening this important and timely
relationship.
Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Thank all three of you for that well-thought-out and well-
prepared testimony.
As I was telling you earlier, we have been called for
votes. So, without objection, we are going to recess so that
Members can vote. We will be back 5 minutes after the last
vote, which will be about 30 minutes from now.
So thank you for your patience, and we are in recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Rogers. Ms. Jackson Lee is close and has indicated that
it is okay for us to proceed.
First, and this is really skinning my ignorance, Mr.
Marriott, but where did the term ``Annex 17'' come from? Is
this a location where you all were meeting or what? Or is that
top secret?
Mr. Marriott. No, it is certainly not top secret, sir.
The Chicago Convention, the International Convention on
Civil Aviation, is an international treaty, not unlike a
state's national legislation. Among other things, it is the
founding treaty of the ICAO.
Appended to the convention is a series of annexes dealing
with different technical disciplines within the aviation world.
So there is one on aerodromes, there is one on licensing of
personnel, airworthiness of aircraft, dangerous goods. It
happens that there is one on security, as well. Annex 17 is the
17th----
Mr. Rogers [continuing]. I see.
Mr. Marriott [continuing]. In the order of their
production.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Ron, one thing that I was struck by in your testimony
was you made the statement, ``Europe requires 100 percent
employee screening and vehicle search before personnel can
enter the security sterile zones; yet, American airports are
not required to do any employee screening, and there are no
consistent vehicle searches.''
I thought that we did. Does the United States not screen
those personnel?
Mr. Ron. As far as my knowledge goes, and I am basing that
on my observation in the airports, in the field here in the
United States employee screening is not being implemented
beyond random at American airports today. The level of
consistency in vehicle search is also lacking.
Mr. Rogers. Thanks. Well, I am glad to hear that. I will
definitely follow up with our local folks about that.
Mr. Cornelis, what do you consider the biggest obstacle in
achieving international harmonization of aviation security
standards? How are we currently doing on that front?
Mr. Cornelis. Well, I would say there are two levels. There
is the global level, and there we have ICAO, which is an
international treaty-based organization. Although they do
excellent work, of course, the pace of the work is not as fast
as we can have in our own jurisdictions. So there is a
challenge there for us, those of us who want to push forward
the standards at a global level, to keep pushing and to help
ICAO to achieve that.
In terms of our bilateral relationship with the United
States, there are a lot of good ideas out there, but I think we
need to find a way of coming to practical results on one-stop
security and mutual recognition. I am not sure where the
obstacles really are. Sometimes legal restrictions are cited to
us as obstacles. But this is something where the ideas are
there but the actual results need to come still.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. But you don't know if there are legal
obstacles or just cultural or what?
I mean, because the fact is, you know, we have wonderful
relations with the European Union. It seems to me that if there
is anybody we can make it work with, it is the European Union.
So if there is an obstacle that we can be of assistance in
removing from your way, you know, that is what I am looking
for. It may not be something that you can quantify for me
today. But just be aware, we want to be helpful.
Let me ask, what are some key provisions of the agreement
that the European Union wants to renegotiate and why?
Mr. Cornelis. Well, we have the U.S.-E.U. Air Transport
Agreement, which has a whole article on aviation security,
which, for us, is fine. That is all we need, in terms of treaty
provisions, to work together. It has the right provisions of
working toward removing regulatory divergence and so on, being
involved in each other's oversight and being able to do
assessments in each other's territory.
So it is all there, but I think we need to invest a little
bit more into putting meat on those bones, in terms of having
that mutual recognition.
Mr. Rogers. What about the PNR agreement?
Mr. Cornelis. PNR agreement, unfortunately, Chairman, is
not something that is dealt with in my department, so I
hesitate to get into details there. But we are always ready to
answer in writing if you have specific questions on PNR.
Mr. Rogers. Yeah. Well, you know, we just find it to be
such a valuable tool in our screening process that we want to
make sure that it stays something that is available to us.
What about you, Mr. Marriott, what would you say are any
major obstacles that you would find that we need to try to
remove?
Mr. Marriott. Obstacles in terms of harmonization?
Mr. Rogers. Harmonization, yes, sir.
Mr. Marriott. I think, first, it is important to put it in
context, that there is a high degree of harmonization now in
aviation security. That has come about as a product of
extensive international cooperation over many, many, many
years.
But it is true to say that there are differences, there are
important differences, in the way in which aviation security is
delivered in different jurisdictions. For airlines crossing
boundaries, international boundaries, they certainly encounter,
as do passengers, differences in the way security looks and
feels.
I have been in this business for a long time. I think one
of the key ingredients of seeking harmonization is to have a
high level of mutual trust and respect between the partners in
a negotiation and a sound process to begin and to conclude a
dialogue toward harmonization, one that is open and one that
fairly recognizes different approaches for dealing with
security threats.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Mr. Ron, do you think the European Union's decision to
partially lift the restriction on liquids and gels will inhibit
a one-stop security zone from being established?
Mr. Ron. I think that the liquid and gel, the example
exhibits some of the main problems in reaching agreements,
because I think that the various countries have different
levels of interest in this issue.
Obviously, Europe has the strongest and the highest level
of interest because of the fact that most European airports,
the large airports, are hubs for international flights, and
there is a lot of tax-free activity, commercial activity at
these airports that is based on the idea that people can
actually carry liquid and gels with them, and a lot of losses
have been triggered by the procedures.
America is less influenced by that, obviously, first of all
because tax-free shopping is not a major commercial industry in
the United States compared to Europe; and, second, because all
travelers into the United States are required to go through
Customs and Immigration upon arrival at their first airport.
Therefore, the problem doesn't exist, and they can place their
liquid and gels in their bags.
The fact that we are now, if I am not mistaken, over 4
years since the issue of liquid and gels came about and that we
do not have yet a fully accepted international standard in
order to resolve the problem indicates some of the difficulties
even with an issue that is simply a technical issue, more than
anything else, and there have been various solutions offered
for that.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Thank you very much.
The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member for any
questions she may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to all the panelists.
Mr. Ron, you were in the middle of your testimony and you
were making some comments, and the Chairman may have focused in
on this, as well, is the different screening techniques with
the United States and some concern that you had expressed.
Could you expand on that, please?
Mr. Ron. Yes. I think that the future of aviation security
is very much based on the acceptance of the fact that security
is not just about screening and about detecting forbidden
items, but it is very much about our ability to process
information that we have available to us in order to identify
in advance when an attack is imminent, and not just based on a
specific intelligence that has been generated by the
intelligence community, per se.
This could be clearly seen in the case of the cargo attacks
of last year, when we had the difficulty to identify the
presence of the explosive devices. Even after we had very
specific information that identified the parcels, still the
parcels went through screening in the United Kingdom without
detecting the device. That indicates to the failure of the
technology to provide us with a complete solution.
But, at the same time, the manifest that accompanied those
parcels contained enough information that allowed us to
identify those parcels as parcels that required special
attention from us. The fact that printers are being flown out
of Yemen to the United States already doesn't make sense by
itself, because probably the cost of shipping is greater than
the cost of buying a new one over here. Secondly, the fact that
those parcels were addressed to Jewish synagogues in Chicago
made it even more obvious that there was something wrong about
these parcels.
But we did not have the system to respond or to detect that
information in advance and point at those parcels as a source
of risk. Because if we had one, we wouldn't need the specific
intelligence that was acquired through the other channels of
communication.
In my view, the future of aviation security is very much
based on our ability to gain access and to analyze this
information. Here, I think that we are walking into an area
where cooperation, international cooperation, becomes more
difficult, because countries are reluctant to share the on-
going information beyond the specific intelligence, certainly
about their own citizens, but even beyond that. This will
require more attention in order to develop a solution that will
increase the level of cooperation in sharing information and
intelligence.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Just pursue that line of thought. What
would, then, be the solution? What is your solution? You said
access to information, but expand on that just a little bit. In
the future of aviation--and you make a very valid point, that
when you become more intrusive into a country's system, they
become less cooperative. Then what is the future of aviation
security, moving beyond what we have today?
Mr. Ron. I think that, at this point, we need to look at
aviation security as a combination of information technology,
some of which is intelligence and some of which is simply
analyzing the information that is stored in databases that we
have. We had the CAPPS program here in this country way back--
you know, the morning of 9/11, I want to remind the committee,
the CAPPS II picked up 9 out of the 19 terrorists.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The what picked up?
Mr. Ron. The CAPPS program, C-A-P-P-S. That was a
computerized program used by FAA at the time in order to detect
high-risk passengers. The system picked up 9 out of the 19
terrorists on that morning. But the problem was that we did not
fully implement it, the consequences of such an identification,
to a sufficient level that would allow us to stop the
terrorists from continuing to the aircraft.
Right now, if I have to look into the near future, I would
say that these type of programs, in combination with the
increased technological capability, can provide a much better
solution than the one that we have right now that is very
much--they are relying almost 100 percent on our ability to
detect so-called bad items through the use of detection
technology.
Our detection technology is good, but not good enough. As I
mentioned with the cargo attempted attack, it was not good
enough to detect the bomb even when we knew where it was. So it
certainly calls for our attention to support that with a good
information analysis.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Marriott, we know that the international process for
establishing aviation security standards is sometimes slow and
cumbersome. My question then to you, are we making timely
progress in establishing global aviation security standards?
What can be done to address the implementation of those
security measures?
In your experience representing the global perspective, has
TSA, from the United States, been an effective partners in
these efforts?
Mr. Marriott. Thank you.
With respect to your first question about timely progress,
I think it is fair to say that, in the security environment,
there is no such thing as moving fast enough. The nature of the
threat and the dynamic nature of the aviation industry are such
that the environment is constantly changing. So, in an ideal
world, aviation security standards, international standards,
would be developed at the same pace.
The fact is that international standards development is a
consensus-building exercise, and it is necessarily so, so that
we can achieve the broadest level of consistent, uniform
implementation around the world to plug vulnerabilities in the
system.
Does it move quickly? It does move quickly. The amendments
to Annex 17, to the international standards, will come into
effect the 1st of July this year after a process taking
approximately 2 years. But please bear in mind that that is a
regulatory process, not unlike national regulatory processes,
that creates new international law.
With respect to addressing implementation, I think a key
ingredient there is also around international cooperation and
the provision of assistance to states in need--states in need
that do not have the necessary resources and capabilities to
achieve the expectations placed on them by the international
community. ICAO helps lead that international effort by
coordinating the assistance provided by a number of states and
by acting on ICAO's own prerogative to help states improve
their aviation security systems. So implementation is the key
point there.
With respect to the TSA's effectiveness internationally and
in working with ICAO, I can say unequivocally that it is
excellent--excellent relationship, excellent contribution that
the TSA makes consistently in advancing policy discussion, in
providing technical information and sharing information,
providing experts, for that matter seconding personnel to ICAO
to work with us on advancing the international program.
In many, many ways, TSA is doing a great job.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank you for that.
I will close on this question, and let me ask it of all of
our panelists. I consistently say that terrorism is surprise.
It is an attack on weaknesses or vulnerabilities that maybe
have been studied. It is also the acts of one lone person, at
least in terms of the physical act; you may have a team behind
you, but it can be done by one. There is a degree of creativity
which keeps us ever on our toes, and difficult toes at that,
because we have to put ourselves in the minds of those who
truly want to do harm.
Just recently, we had a perimeter attack in Moscow. We have
hundreds upon hundreds upon hundreds of airports in the United
States and around the world, so, starting with Mr. Cornelis,
your thoughts on what the European Union is thinking about with
respect to securing perimeters, what ideas you have. If Mr. Ron
would then follow, and then Mr. Marriott.
I thank the Chairman.
Mr. Cornelis. In terms of perimeters, Ms. Jackson Lee, we
have very strict rules as regards what we call the critical
parts of the secure areas of airports, including access through
the building but also the fence or the perimeter around an
airport facility and entrances for vehicles and so on. We
consider the area within to be a sterile area, and everything
cannot go in unless it is fully screened and checked.
Outside that area, we feel that the general rules of public
security apply which also apply in other places where a lot of
people gather, such as train stations. Our efforts, in terms of
aviation security specifically, are focused on protecting
aircraft and people traveling on aircraft. But, certainly, at
National level in the European Union, our member-states have
programs to protect also the landside areas and other areas of
mass gathering.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Ron.
Mr. Cornelis. I am sorry, just to add, we cannot have the
same methods there of screening that we have in a confined
area, such as the gates to aircraft. We cannot imagine the same
system on a grand scale in society.
Mr. Ron. I think that the problem that we witnessed a few
months ago when we learned about a stowaway passenger who got
into the wheel well of a U.S. Air flight from North Carolina to
Boston, from Charlotte, indicates to the weakness that we have
not appropriately addressed until now. Most of our attention
since 9/11 was focused on a passenger's bags and, later on, on
cargo, and we paid relatively less attention to the issue of
the airport security as a facility.
In my view, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to
distinguish between the two categories, because if we protect
the aircraft by screening passengers and bags and cargo at such
a high cost as we do and, at the same time, a 16-year-old boy
can cross the perimeter and gain access to the same aircraft
that we are protecting and hide in the wheel well, that is
obviously an indication that there is something that we need to
address.
Now, as far as the technology is concerned, unlike the
detection technology at the checkpoint or at baggage screening
that is perhaps more limited, perimeter security technology is
very developed. There is a wide variety of solutions, most of
which were developed here in the United States by American
companies, that they can be implemented based on a proper
analysis of the needs and the conditions at the specific
location. The perimeter challenge can be resolved, I believe,
easier than the challenges that are presented to us by
passengers and bags at this time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Marriott.
Mr. Marriott. Thank you.
In response to the same question, I think the answer has
three elements to it. The first is the importance of layers of
security between the perimeter of an airport and the principal
target of terrorists in aviation security, which, of course, is
the aircraft. In the execution of layers of security, there is
a high degree of importance of building in a sensible level of
redundancy so as to recognize that no single layer of security
is impenetrable. But there needs to be a sensible level of
redundancy without creating extraordinary inefficiency, in
order to provide that sort of second opportunity to detect a
threat.
The second element is the need for constant vigilance by
and of the people in security-restricted areas of airports, a
vigilance by them to constantly observe activity in a secure
area of an airport and to challenge the presence of suspicious
activity and to report accordingly to the appropriate
authorities; and, of course, vigilance of persons in secure
areas, recognizing that there is such a thing as an insider
threat. As my colleagues have spoken of earlier, there are a
number of means to address that, including background checks of
workers and, importantly, a recognition internationally that
screening of staff to a 100 percent level is the necessary
objective.
The third element is, in recognition of the fact that many
of the security systems that aim to prevent penetration of the
perimeter are passive systems, like fencing, and, in fact, the
distance between a fence and the target, there is a need for
constant testing of airport security systems, to ensure that
they are living up to the expectations of travelers and those
who use airports.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We have
gotten an enormous amount of information at this hearing. Thank
you.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Cravaack for his questions.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First off, I would like to thank all of you here today on
our international cooperation for a joint endeavor of making
sure we combat terrorism. So thank you very much for that.
Mr. Ron, your background intrigues me. You have been a
paratrooper for the IDF; you were one of the original sky
marshals with El Al. We have just had the fortune, the Members
here, to--we just came back from Israel, and we were able to go
to the Tel Aviv airport and take a look at how they conduct
security.
One of the things that I would like to take a look at--you
have also been the director of security for the Tel Aviv
airport, and you have also come to Boston Logan and done
security there, as well.
My question is: You have used a behavior pattern
recognition program. I would like to see how successful that
was. Could it be implemented to other airports that you have
seen here in the United States, as well?
Mr. Ron. Well, first of all, thank you very much for your
kind remarks.
As far as the behavior pattern recognition program is
concerned, the behavior pattern recognition program is very
much based on the idea that, by observing human behavior, you
can get indicators that may help you identify people with
malicious intentions. But this is just one piece of the puzzle,
and we need to understand that it is not a stand-alone program
that can provide a silver bullet to all or most of our
problems. It is just one piece.
If we shift our attention from items to people--and that is
very much a part of what I was indicating to in my earlier
comments--then, in order to avoid the trap of the
discriminating or using discrimination factors that are not
acceptable in our democratic society, we need to stick to
behavioral aspects or to the way people behave.
That behavior is not only in real-time observation but
also, if we have access to a person's behavior in the past,
that could become very relevant to us in order to understand
the level of risk that that passenger represents.
So, for example, if we learned that somebody's home address
is an address that is recognized by our intelligence database
as an address that is connected to a person who is involved in
terrorism, I would say that that is a piece of information that
I would pay attention to. If I learned, as we said earlier,
that a parcel is coming out of Yemen with printers to the
United States, that is a behavioral aspect, and it has nothing
to do with any form of discrimination. That is the idea.
Behavior pattern recognition is a program that was
developed for use at the airport, which is, as I mentioned
earlier, one layer out of a few. We started it at Logan Airport
with the Massachusetts State Police. It became very successful.
After a while, TSA, watching what we were doing at Logan
Airport, has developed the SPOT program and the Behavior
Detection Officers program, which is considered to be a great
success by TSA and, I believe, is substantially contributing to
a layer that was not there before and is a very important
layer.
I still suggest that we can take that a couple of steps
forward by adopting the idea that, at the airport, it is not
enough just to look for bad items and it is not enough just to
look for suspicious behavior by observation, but, at some
point, for the very few--and when I say a very few, I mean less
than 1 percent of the passengers, hopefully--we need to be able
to talk to these people at the airport and perhaps use
interview techniques to understand a little further what their
intentions are.
These techniques have proven to be very powerful in the
past and have detected and stopped attacks in the past, unlike
a one-size-fits-all technological approach, which is based on
the idea that we can detect every threat at the checkpoint.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, sir.
Now, just moving that a little bit forward, can you see
implementing a program such as that at Midway Airport in
Chicago?
Mr. Ron. I think that the program can be implemented,
actually, everywhere. Obviously, it depends on properly
configuring the program, or reconfiguring the program, to meet
the local needs. There has to be a basic benchmark for the
program and a framework for the program so that this will not
go beyond what we intend it to go. But, at the same time, I
think that, in every airport--and not only airport, but any
other security-controlled facility, the program can be
implemented.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, sir.
With the Chairman's indulgence, if I could just have
another question, sir?
Mr. Rogers. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cravaack. The other questions I had, Mr. Marriott--
thank you very much, Mr. Ron, for your testimony.
Mr. Marriott, you hit the nail on the head. After being a
pilot and have done numerous preflights and seeing the amount
of people that are crawling in and around the aircraft, I have
always seen this as a weak link on who is there, how do we know
that they are supposed to be there. We all know that badges can
be faked and that uniforms can be replicated.
But what you said, constant vigilance is the key. It is
empowering people on the flight line to challenge people, like,
``Hey, haven't seen you around here. Where are you from?''
``Hey, do you mind if I--I don't see your ID. Can I check that
out?'' One of the things I learned in Tel Aviv was the layers
of security is the key. So you hit the nail right on the head
on that.
So I just wanted to thank you for that testimony, and I
think that is the way to go, layering for security, because
there is no one bullet that is going to keep us safe. So, thank
you very much for that testimony.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much.
I have just a couple of quick questions for Mr. Cornelis.
What processes do you have in place to identify high-risk
cargo on passenger aircraft and on cargo aircraft?
Mr. Cornelis. Mr. Chairman, we are currently working on new
rules to cover the threat of high-risk cargo inbound into the
European Union. This is rather new for us to, first of all,
work on inbound threat and on a risk-based approach to
determine which cargo should receive greater attention.
So we are looking at criteria to determine what is high-
risk cargo and then procedures, what should be done with it,
special screening requirements, additional----
Mr. Rogers. So that is still in the works? You haven't
decided yet what----
Mr. Cornelis. That is well-advanced, and we do hope to be
able to bring forward this new rulemaking before the summer.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent.
Well, speaking of rulemaking, I understand you all have
recently overturned your restrictions on liquids, aerosols, and
gels being carried on the planes. What was the logic for
overturning that? Do all your member-states agree with that?
Mr. Cornelis. Well, actually, we haven't overturned our
rules. What we have in the European Union are very strict
controls on liquids, aerosols, and gels. Many countries in the
world don't have such restrictions at all. We do have very
strict controls.
But we are working toward a 2013 deadline to screen all
liquids, aerosols, and gels, rather than banning them, onto
flights, so that passengers can take, again, liquids onto the
flights. That is a very strong demand from passengers and from
our parliamentarians.
What we are doing now this year is a first small step to
prepare this process. We will allow duty-free purchases,
properly packaged in a bag, subject to supply-chain controls,
after screening, onto a transfer aircraft for people who have
bought these items in third countries. So it is a small first
step, subject to screening, that we are taking now.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
That is all I have. Does the Ranking Member have any
additional questions?
Ms. Jackson Lee. No. Thank you for your courtesies.
I thank all the witnesses for what I think, from both
panels, have been a very, very important presentation today at
our hearing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Also, I want to restate how kind it was for you all to
travel so far and put so much time into this testimony and
answering the questions.
I would ask that if any Members of the committee who
couldn't be here have any follow-up questions, if you would
submit a response to those in writing, I would appreciate that.
With that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]