[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SECURING FEDERAL FACILITIES: CHALLENGES OF THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE
SERVICE AND THE NEED FOR REFORM
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY,
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION,
AND SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 13, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-38
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
_____
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Rigell, Virginia Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Billy Long, Missouri Vacancy
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Mo Brooks, Alabama
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, AND SECURITY
TECHNOLOGIES
Daniel E. Lungren, California, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Tim Walberg, Michigan, Vice Chair Laura Richardson, California
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Billy Long, Missouri William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Coley C. O'Brien, Staff Director
Alan Carroll, Subcommittee Clerk
Vacancy, Minority Subcommittee Lead
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security
Technologies................................................... 1
The Honorable Yvette D. Clarke, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security
Technologies................................................... 3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 4
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. L. Eric Patterson, Director, Federal Protective Service:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Mr. Mark L. Goldstein, Director, Physical Infrastructure,
Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Panel II
Mr. Stephen Amitay, Legislative Counsel, National Association of
Security Companies:
Oral Statement................................................. 36
Prepared Statement............................................. 38
Mr. David L. Wright, President, National Federal Protective
Service Union, American Federation of Government Employees:
Oral Statement................................................. 45
Prepared Statement............................................. 47
SECURING FEDERAL FACILITIES: CHALLENGES OF THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE
SERVICE AND THE NEED FOR REFORM
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Wednesday, July 13, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection,
and Security Technologies,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Daniel E. Lungren
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Lungren, Meehan, Long, Marino,
Clarke, Richardson, Richmond, Keating, and Thompson.
Also present: Representative Jackson Lee.
Mr. Lungren. This hearing will come to order. I understand
that there are several Members who are detained who will be
here in a few minutes, but with Mr. Richmond's assistance we
will start.
Do you have a unanimous consent request?
Mr. Richmond. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I would ask unanimous
consent to allow the representative from Texas, Ms. Sheila
Jackson Lee, to participate on the panel. She is on the full
committee, just not the subcommittee.
Mr. Lungren. Without objection, so ordered.
The Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure
Protection, and Security Technologies is holding a hearing
today on the subject of ``Securing Federal Facilities:
Challenges of the Federal Protective Service and the Need for
Reform.'' We have two panels of very distinguished witnesses we
are to hear today and I will recognize myself for an opening
statement.
The Federal Protective Services is a vital component of our
Nation's homeland security. Securing Government buildings is
the mission of FPS and is critical to protecting hundreds of
thousands of Government employees working in Federal buildings
across the Nation. These Federal buildings have been assessed
as key facilities, important to the operation of our
Government, and therefore deserving of FPS protection.
Recent terrorist attacks have demonstrated that security at
these Government buildings is absolutely necessary. In 1995 the
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City was destroyed with a
truck bomb killing 168 people, including 19 children.
Since then, other attempted attacks have occurred in
Government and public facilities, including the fatal shooting
of the Holocaust Museum security guard in June 2009 in
Washington, DC; the man who flew a small plane into the
Internal Revenue Service office in Austin, Texas, killing an
IRS employee in February 2010; and the recent discovery of an
improvised explosive device placed near the McNamara Federal
Building in Detroit, Michigan.
The Detroit IED incident was an example of how, in my
judgment, not to respond to suspicious packages. The egregious
mishandling of this IED package raises serious questions about
whether the FPS is fulfilling its mission to secure Federal
buildings and demonstrates the continued vulnerability of
Federal facilities and the safety of the Federal employees who
occupy them.
Our hearing today will examine several perennial problems
which have impacted the FPS mission. One problem identified by
GAO and illustrated by the IED incident is the need for
enhanced training for contract guards.
This training curriculum and FPS certification should be
available to the contract guards to ensure that they possess
the appropriate skills to meet their contract requirements.
Additionally, GAO also highlighted the need for more robust FPS
oversight of the 14,000 contract security guard force.
Poor management of the Federal Protective Service is
another problem. Current plans call for the FPS to once again
reorganize within the NPPD Directorate. If completed, by my
count this would be the third reorganization the FPS has been
involved in since leaving GSA and joining the Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, otherwise known as ICE, in 2003.
I would believe it extremely difficult to develop and
implement the policies and procedures necessary to effectively
secure Federal buildings when there is little continuity in
leadership and structure within FPS, to say nothing of the
disruption which takes place when you have a reorganization of
any organization, public or private.
Last year the Committee on Homeland Security held hearings
on the Federal Protective Service in response to a series of
scathing GAO reports and covert tests which identified serious
shortcomings in the Federal Protective Service's ability to
protect Government facilities. One hearing was directly related
to whether a Federalized guard force would improve security at
Federal buildings. Director Schenkel noted at this hearing that
a Federalized guard staff would increase the cost per guard by
32 percent and the Department had no evidence a Federalized
guard staff would improve security.
A final thought regarding recent suggestions to Federalize
the FPS contract workforce: Administrator Pistole, of the TSA,
tried to argue before our subcommittee some months ago that the
TSA Federal workforce was in some ways smarter and more skilled
than private contractors who screen at SPP airports. While I
have gladly and happily represented many Federal employees,
both in my current term in the Congress and when I was in
Congress before, I totally reject the administrator's premise
and believe that if we educate and train workers equally that
the private contractor is every bit as capable as the Federal
worker.
That is why I have been a strong advocate for TSA's
Screening Partnership Program, which allows airports to opt out
of Federal screening and hire private screeners. They usually
make that decision, and some would decide that they continue
with Federal screeners; others have decided or would decide
that they wish to go with private screeners.
I don't think that we need to influence that in a way that
would just add to the massive Federal workforce, particularly
when we are under such budget constraints today. I would think
we would encourage competition and opportunity so that we would
actually have better performance, both in the private sector
and the public sector, and in that way it is the private sector
providing another efficient alternative. I think that you just
get improvement in performance when you have that kind of
competition.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses this morning
about what they believe the FPS challenges are and how we can
improve the security of our Government facilities.
I now recognize the gentlelady from New York, the Ranking
Member of this subcommittee, Ms. Clarke, for her opening
statement.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for convening this hearing.
We are here to examine the Federal Protective Service's
management of its contract guard service and its status within
the National Protection and Programs Directorate. FPS is
responsible for safeguarding Federal facilities. FPS employs
13,000 contract security guards who protect 9,000 Federal
buildings all over our Nation.
Despite this important role, FPS has long been viewed as a
stepchild within the Department. Since FPS moved to the
Department from the General Services Administration poor
management practices and funding issues have hampered its
ability to fulfill its mission.
This committee has held multiple hearings on FPS. GAO has
issued several reports documenting the challenges that FPS
faces.
Mr. Chairman, we know what the issues are facing FPS and we
are here today to find out what concrete solutions are being
put in place.
I come from New York City, a well-known target for
terrorist attacks. I am a Member of this committee because I
want the rest of this country to learn from New York's
experience. Experience has taught the people of New York about
the need for robust protection of critical facilities.
In January Ranking Member Thompson reintroduced H.R. 176,
the Federal Protective Service Improvement and Accountability
Act of 2011. I am proud to be a co-sponsor of this bill. This
bill calls for improvement in FPS management, stabilization of
the FPS workforce, and a study to determine whether the
conversion of contract guard staff into Federal employees would
enhance the protection of Federal facilities.
Mr. Chairman, we know the problems. The only question
remaining is whether we have the will to solve them.
Here on Capitol Hill we are fortunate. All of our buildings
are protected by Capitol Police. As Members of Congress we know
that the Capitol Police will stand between us and all threats.
Every person who works in or visits a Federal building
should share our sense of safety and the confidence we have in
those who protect those hallowed halls. I am sad to say that as
long as doubts about training and contracting surround FPS,
feelings of security and confidence will be misplaced.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you to reform
this agency and yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. Lungren. I thank the gentlelady for her comments.
Now the Chairman would recognize the Ranking Member of the
full committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson,
for any statement that he might have.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
holding today's hearing. I welcome our panel of witnesses,
also.
Mr. Chairman, during the last two Congresses the committee
held several full committee oversight hearings on the Federal
Protective Service. Those hearings examined the effectiveness
of that agency's efforts to train, supervise, and monitor its
contract guard service, contract management, and its placement
within DHS. Promises of reform were made, a new director was
hired, and FPS was transferred from ICE to NPPD.
The committee was told that FPS would develop a computer
system to track training and certification of contract guards.
The committee was told that this system would ensure that every
guard had the right credentials and was capable of doing the
job. For a minute I believed.
Then in February 2011 I was jarred back into the reality of
FPS. A bag containing a bomb was left sitting outside of the
McNamara Federal Building in Detroit. A security guard employed
under a contract did not understand the possible threat. He
brought the bag inside the building.
For 3 weeks that bag was a concealed bomb that sat inside
the lost and found of a Federal building in Detroit. Finally,
in mid-March, an FPS inspector discovered the bag, scanned it,
realized the danger, and acted appropriately.
This incident paints the clearest picture I have seen of
the importance of training and the reality of the threat we
face. This incident also illustrates the other problems at FPS:
Its fundamental ineptitude at managing contracts.
Shocking as it may seem, in the aftermath of this incident
FPS did not terminate the contractor. Instead, FPS imposed a
small monetary fine and accepted the contractor's offer to
conduct additional training.
It is my understanding that this contractor earns $1.6
million a year from guarding this one building in Detroit. I
cannot understand how or why we pay companies that do not
perform, but apparently paying for nonperformance is not a
problem at FPS.
Recently FPS decided to abandon the development of the
promised computer system, called RAMP. That system was supposed
to help FPS monitor and verify the status of guard
certifications and training.
After spending $41 million on this contract FPS has
concluded that the system doesn't work and cannot be made to
work. Where I come from $41 million is still considered a lot
of money.
These practices cannot be allowed to continue. Mr.
Chairman, I am pleased that you have decided to examine FPS. I
suggest you begin where we left off in previous Congress. I
would recommend that you take a look at H.R. 176, a bill that
reflects this committee's extensive oversight in this area.
The Nation cannot afford additional delay in securing
Federal facilities. Further, we cannot tolerate wasteful
spending in pursuit of unproven technologies and schemes. Now
is the time for FPS to be held accountable.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Lungren. I thank the gentleman for his statement.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record. We are pleased to
have two very distinguished panels of witnesses before us today
on this important subject.
L. Eric Patterson was appointed director of the Federal
Protective Service, a subcomponent of the National Protection
and Programs Directorate, in September 2010. He previously
served as the deputy director of the Defense
Counterintelligence and HUMINT center at the Defense
Intelligence Agency.
Prior to joining DIA, Mr. Patterson served as a principal
with Booz Allen Hamilton, where he supported two of the Defense
Technical Information Center analysis centers, one focused on
information assurance and the other on the survivability and
vulnerability of defense systems. Mr. Patterson is a retired
United States Air Force Brigadier General with 30 years of
service, and we thank you for that service.
Mark L. Goldstein is director of physical infrastructure
issues at GAO. Mr. Goldstein is responsible for the agency's
work in Federal property and telecommunications. A former
award-winning journalist and author, his other public service
work has included roles as chief of staff to the D.C. Financial
Control Board and chief investigative staff to the Senate
Committee on Government Affairs.
Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing here.
Director Patterson, General Patterson, you are recognized.
We would tell you that your written statements will be made a
part of the record in full and we would ask you to try and
confine your comments to 5 minutes, after which time, hearing
from both of you, we will have a round of questions by the
panel.
STATEMENT OF L. ERIC PATTERSON, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL PROTECTIVE
SERVICE
Mr. Patterson. Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Lungren,
Ranking Member Clarke, and the distinguished Members of the
subcommittee. I would also like to thank Ranking Member
Thompson for making time to be here today.
My name is Eric Patterson, and I am the director of the
Federal Protective Service within the National Protection and
Programs Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security. I
am honored to appear before you today to discuss the work of
the Federal Protective Service.
The Federal Protective Service, or FPS, is responsible for
providing risk assessment and mitigation, physical security,
and Federal law enforcement activities at more than 9,000 GSA-
owned and leased Federal facilities. These facilities are
located in all 50 States and United States territories. In
addition, we provide law enforcement and security services to
non-GSA Federal properties throughout the country.
Each day FPS is responsible for the safety of more than 1
million people who pass through our security portals. Each year
we cover more than 1,000 demonstrations and disturbances, make
more than 1,600 arrests, and confiscate more than 700,000
dangerous objects and contraband, including weapons.
FPS is divided into 11 regions Nation-wide and employs more
than 900 Federal law enforcement officers supervising
approximately 14,000 contract protective security officers. We
also use four MegaCenters to coordinate incident response 24
hours a day, 7 days a week
I have set priorities for our service that are challenging
yet realistic. I continue to closely monitor performance and
hold service providers accountable to ensure that they are
performing in full compliance with our contracts.
In addition, FPS has been the subject of several Government
Accountability Office reports in recent years and I want to
ensure all of you that addressing GAO recommendations is a top
priority. For example, FPS now conducts unannounced inspections
to evaluate the effectiveness of contract protective security
officers in detecting the presence of unauthorized persons or
potentially disruptive or dangerous activities in or around
Federal facilities through a program called Operation Shield.
Operation Shield also deserves--serves as a visible, proactive,
and random deterrent to disrupt the planning of terrorist
activities.
FPS is also taking steps to revise its development approach
of the Risk Assessment Management Program, also known as RAMP.
RAMP will provide FPS personnel with a centralized source of
information for Federal facilities they protect.
The development for the second generation of RAMP will
address GAO's recommendations, such as providing a contract
protective security officer certification validation process.
The second generation of RAMP will also help FPS track trends
and correct any identified deficiencies.
FPS also is taking action that--when mistakes are made. For
example, in response to an incident at the Patrick V. McNamara
Federal Building in Detroit, Michigan, FPS dispatched a mobile
training team to provide additional training at the facility
and conducted an audit of all training records in the region to
assess compliance.
FPS also took action against the contract company as a
result of the incident, including a contract deduction. In
addition, the individual primarily responsible for the mistake
was terminated and is barred from working at FPS facilities.
As indicated, FPS remains committed to its mission to
prevent, deter, mitigate, and defeat terrorist and criminal
acts against anyone working in, or visiting, or passing through
our Federal facilities that we protect.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to discuss FPS with
you today, and I am pleased to answer any questions you might
have.
[The statement of Mr. Patterson follows:]
Prepared Statement of L. Eric Patterson
July 13, 2011
Thank you Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and the
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. My name is Eric Patterson,
and I am the director of the Federal Protective Service (FPS) within
the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
I am honored to appear before you today to discuss the actions that
FPS has undertaken to secure thousands of Federal facilities across our
country and protect millions of Federal workers, contractors, and
visitors who pass through FPS security portals on a daily basis to
conduct business in these facilities.
fps background
This year, FPS is celebrating its 40th year of service to the
Nation under its current name. Although our service functions and law
enforcement authorities can be traced much further back in time, FPS
has been part of the General Services Administration (GSA), the U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and most recently, NPPD.
FPS is responsible for the safety of more than a million people who
pass through our security portals each day. More than 700,000 dangerous
objects and contraband, including weapons, are confiscated each year at
FPS screening posts. Our FPS officers complete hundreds of building
security assessments, cover more than 1,000 demonstrations and
disturbances, and make more than 1,600 arrests annually.
FPS's security mission extends to the approximately 150
Congressional offices housed in Federal facilities located across the
country. FPS is responsible for risk assessment and mitigation,
physical security, and Federal law enforcement for more than 9,000 GSA-
owned and leased Federal Government facilities in all 50 States and the
U.S. territories. In addition, we provide law enforcement and security
services to numerous non-GSA Federal properties throughout the country.
FPS coordinates incident responses through four MegaCenters. Each
MegaCenter monitors multiple types of alarm systems, closed circuit
television, and wireless dispatch communications within Federal
facilities throughout the Nation. These centers--located in Michigan,
Colorado, Pennsylvania, and Maryland--are equipped with state-of-the-
art communication systems and are in operation 24 hours a day, 7 days a
week.
FPS is divided into 11 regions Nation-wide and employs more than
900 Federal Law Enforcement Officers supervising approximately 14,000
contract Protective Security Officers (PSOs). FPS includes contract
management, budget, and other administrative staff billets, providing
law enforcement and security mission support.
FPS currently employs a variety of measures to train PSOs in order
to ensure our officers on the front lines have the tools they need to
do their jobs. For example, in November 2010, FPS updated the
orientation training provided by FPS to all newly hired PSOs. This
training incorporates locality-specific information, scenario-based
activities, and general procedures. During this training, FPS stresses
the importance of obtaining building specific information in order to
appropriately respond to occupant emergencies (for example, active
shooter, Code Adam, Evacuation, Shelter-in-Place).
priorities
I have set priorities for our Service that are challenging but
realistic. I continue to closely monitor performance and hold service
providers accountable to ensure that they are performing in full
compliance with the requirements and standards set forth in our
contracts. Additionally, I work closely with our customer agencies,
their leaders, and the committees responsible for the safety at the
local, metropolitan, State, and National levels.
The transfer of FPS from ICE to NPPD, which was included in the
fiscal year 2010 DHS Appropriations Act, is close to completion.
Transitioning FPS to NPPD unified the security of the Government
facilities sector into a single component, enabling DHS to provide a
comprehensive infrastructure security program under the guidance
provided by the Interagency Security Committee (ISC), as well as other
oversight and regulatory bodies.
FPS has received several Government Accountability Office (GAO)
reports in the recent years with an upcoming report expected to be
released later this month. Addressing GAO recommendations is a top
priority that we monitor closely. I am happy to make our experts
available to you and your staff to provide additional briefings as
requested.
countermeasures
In addition to its daily law-enforcement, investigative, and
protection duties, FPS continues to measure the effectiveness of its
countermeasures and related efforts. Through Operation Shield, we
conduct unannounced inspections to evaluate the effectiveness of
contract PSOs in detecting the presence of unauthorized persons or
potentially disruptive or dangerous activities in or around Federal
facilities. Operation Shield also serves as a visible, proactive, and
random deterrent to disrupt the planning of terrorist activities.
Working in conjunction with State, local, and Federal law enforcement
organizations, FPS has expanded Operation Shield to include exercises
that blanket a Federal facility with a significantly increased law
enforcement presence. We have also increased testing of FPS response to
suspicious packages and launched the Department's ``If You See
Something, Say Something'' campaign at more than 9,000 Federal
facilities. Since deploying this program in December 2010, our
MegaCenters have received and coordinated responses to more than 2,400
suspicious activity reports related to the ``If You See Something, Say
Something'' campaign.
Finally, immediately following the incident in FPS Region 5 at the
Patrick V. McNamara Federal Building in Detroit, Michigan, FPS
dispatched a mobile training team to the Detroit area to provide 8
hours of weapons-detection training, including X-ray and magnetometer
training, to all of the 85 PSO and supervisory PSO employees working at
the McNamara Federal Building. Subsequent to the refresher training in
Detroit, FPS headquarters conducted an audit of all Region 5 PSO
training records maintained in vendors' files to assess compliance with
the terms of the contract. This team discovered deficiencies in
training and certifications records, which are now being addressed.
Additionally, FPS took action against the contract company as a result
of this incident, including a contract deduction.
risk assessment management program
The development of the Risk Assessment Management Program (RAMP),
which was designed to provide FPS personnel with a centralized source
of information for Federal facilities they protect, has been under way
for nearly 4 years. Yet, after careful consideration and review, FPS
has determined that RAMP development--as it was being pursued--was not
cost-effective and has not fulfilled its original goals. However FPS
has a continuing need for elements of RAMP and its basic functionality.
FPS has carefully assessed alternative programs to RAMP, including
the DHS Science and Technology Directorate's recommended Integrated
Rapid Visual Screen solution and Bridge and Tunnel Risk Assessment
Program and the Infrastructure Survey Tool (IST), which is used by
NPPD's Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP). A version of IST was
selected as the interim RAMP solution, while FPS completes the
development, testing, training, and implementation of RAMP 2nd
Generation, also based on IST. The interim solution will enable FPS to
continue processing credible Facility Security Assessments, which are a
cornerstone of the protective services provided to the Federal
community and FPS's other efforts, such as patrol and response, tenant
awareness training, and countermeasure testing.
There are many advantages to using the IST, as the next generation
of RAMP is developed and implemented. The IST can be used as a security
assessment tool when conducting market research of new facility leasing
options with GSA as well as special security assessments, such as
temporary leased facilities for FEMA disaster response operations. IST
will enable field-based inspectors to complete and file their assigned
assessments electronically as well as provide supervisors the ability
to approve or comment on the assessments electronically. The IST
approach will also allow FPS to leverage the development done to date
on RAMP and ultimately gain efficiencies by improving RAMP capability
based on the NPPD/IP gateway.
The development of RAMP 2nd Generation will address specific
recommendations the GAO has provided to FPS. For example, RAMP 2nd
Generation will ultimately improve the PSO certification validation
process. Effective July 1, 2011, FPS requires security vendors to send
PSO certification data directly to their respective contracting officer
in their regions for review and validation. FPS regions are responsible
for maintaining accurate and up-to-date data for their region and
submitting it to FPS headquarters on a monthly basis. With RAMP 2nd
Generation, FPS headquarters will be able to analyze this data monthly
and provide metrics to track trends and deficiencies as well as address
and correct identified issues.
In addition, FPS is revising the post inspection process to focus
on contractor performance more closely. This new PSO inspection process
will concentrate on assessing the PSOs' knowledge of the post orders,
emergency preparedness, and response measures specific to the facility
they protect (e.g., Active Shooter, Code Adam, Occupant Emergency
Plans, Shelter-in-Place, response to suspicious packages and bomb
threats, and so forth). Additionally, FPS administers an Agency
Technical Representative program, which serves as a force multiplier
allowing tenant agencies to assist FPS in providing important oversight
of the PSO Program. With RAMP 2nd Generation, FPS will analyze the data
collected from PSO inspections and use results to identify
opportunities for remedial improvements in PSO training, procedures,
post order revisions, and updates.
FPS is also taking advantage of its transition to NPPD by
leveraging mission-enhancing synergies; the plan to have the Critical
Infrastructure Protection program engineering team conduct the work to
re-engineer RAMP demonstrates FPS's intention to capitalize on these
synergies at every opportunity. The partnership between FPS and IP has
the potential for significant cost and time savings, as well, because
RAMP re-engineering efforts will leverage the existing risk assessment
tools already developed and deployed for IP.
Additionally, the data collected via the interim IST will
ultimately be available in the shared risk assessment database. NPPD
plans for the completed facility assessments to become a part of the
National critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) database,
allowing NPPD the capability to view and share all CIKR assessments.
NPPD leadership joins me in my commitment to actively address the
challenges posed in the process of developing RAMP and remain engaged
as solutions to these challenges are successfully implemented.
conclusion
FPS remains committed to its mission to prevent, deter, mitigate,
and defeat terrorist and criminal acts against anyone working in,
visiting, or passing through the Federal facilities we protect. I
commend the thousands of FPS employees who ensure the safety and
security of our clients and customers every day throughout the country.
Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss FPS with you
today, and I am pleased to answer any questions you might have.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
Now Mr. Goldstein.
STATEMENT OF MARK L. GOLDSTEIN, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Goldstein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the
subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on
issues related to the Federal Protective Service.
As part of the Department of Homeland Security, FPS is
responsible for protecting Federal employees and visitors and
the property in approximately 9,000 Federal facilities owned or
leased by the General Services Administration. FPS has a budget
of approximately $1 billion and maintains approximately 1,200
full-time employees and about 13,000 contract security guards
that help accomplish the agency's facility protection mission.
My testimony today is based on past reports and testimonies
and discusses challenges FPS faces in carrying out its mission
with regard to risk management, strategic human capital
planning, oversight of its contract guard program, and ensuring
that its fee-based funding structure is the appropriate
mechanism for funding the agency.
Mr. Chairman, our work has found the FPS continues to face
challenges in carrying out its critical mission. Our findings
in our recent reports include some of the following: First,
that the absence of a risk management program hampers FPS's
ability to protect Federal facilities. For many years GAO has
advocated the importance of a risk-management approach.
GAO reported in August 2010 that FPS does not use a
comprehensive risk management approach that links threats and
vulnerabilities to resource requirements. Instead, FPS uses a
facility-by-facility approach, which assumes that facilities
with the same security level have the same risk regardless of
their location or other attributes. Without a risk management
approach that identifies threats and vulnerabilities and the
resources required to achieve FPS's security goals that GAO has
recommended there is limited assurance that programs will be
prioritized and resources will be allocated to address existing
and potential security threats in an efficient and effective
manner.
Second, that FPS has not fully addressed several key human
capital issues. FPS continues to operate without a strategic
human capital plan to guide its current and future workforce
planning efforts. We recommended this in 2009.
Further, FPS is not able to determine what its optimal
staffing level should be because the agency does not collect at
headquarters data on the force's knowledge, skills, and
abilities. FPS has yet to fully ensure that its recent move to
an inspector-based workforce does not hinder its ability to
protect Federal facilities.
Third, that FPS faces long-standing challenges in managing
the contract guard program. Weaknesses in FPS's contract guard
program hamper its ability to protect Federal facilities, as
many of you understand and have discussed this morning already.
GAO reported in 2009 and 2010 that FPS cannot ensure that
its contract guards have required training and certifications.
FPS is in the process of addressing recommendations in this
area and has revised its X-ray and magnetometer training for
inspectors and guards.
Fourth, FPS has not reviewed its fee design or determined
an appropriate funding mechanism. FPS increased its basic
security fee four times in 6 years to try to cover costs but
has not reviewed its fees to develop an informed, deliberate
design.
Its current fee structure has consistently resulted in
total collection amounts less than agency costs and continues
to be an issue for Congressional interest and inquiry. The
agency has not evaluated whether its fee-based structure or an
alternative funding mechanism is most appropriate for funding
the agency.
FPS has made some progress in improving its ability to
protect Federal facilities. For example, in response to
recommendations by GAO FPS began to develop a system called
RAMP, which could enhance its ability to comprehensively assess
risk at Federal facilities and improve oversight of its
contract guard program. That program is now under some review.
Nevertheless, of the 28 recommendations we have made to FPS
since 2007, none of them have been fully implemented. DHS and
FPS initiatives--have initiatives in process to address 21 of
the 28 recommendations.
According to FPS officials, the slow pace in implementation
results in part because of changes in the agency's leadership,
organization, funding, staffing levels, and delays in
developing several new management systems, including RAMP. On
some of these issues, including the organizational transition
to NPPD and RAMP, GAO has on-going work that we expect to issue
shortly.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This concludes my statement, and I
would be pleased to answer any questions the committee has.
[The statement of Mr. Goldstein follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mark L. Goldstein
July 13, 2011
gao highlights
Highlights of GAO-11-813T, a testimony before the Subcommittees of
the House Committee on Homeland Security.
Why GAO Did This Study
As part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal
Protective Service (FPS) is responsible for protecting Federal
employees and visitors in approximately 9,000 Federal facilities owned
or leased by the General Services Administration (GSA). FPS has a
budget of approximately $1 billion and maintains approximately 1,200
full-time employees and about 13,000 contract security guards that help
accomplish the agency's facility protection mission.
This testimony is based on past reports and testimonies and
discusses challenges FPS faces in carrying out its mission with regard
to: (1) Risk management, (2) strategic human capital planning, (3)
oversight of its contract guard program, and (4) ensuring that its fee-
based funding structure is the appropriate mechanism for funding the
agency. GAO also addresses the extent to which FPS has made progress in
responding to these challenges. To perform this work, GAO used its key
facility protection practices as criteria, visited FPS regions and
selected GSA buildings, reviewed training and certification data for
FPS's contract guards, and interviewed officials from DHS, GSA, guard
contractors, and guards.
What GAO Recommends
DHS and FPS have generally concurred with GAO's past
recommendations. DHS and FPS have initiatives in process, for example,
to address risk management, strategic human capital planning, and
oversight of its contract guard program.
homeland security.--protecting federal facilities remains a challenge
for the department of homeland security's federal protective service
What GAO Found
FPS continues to face challenges in carrying out its mission.
Specifically:
The absence of a risk management program hampers FPS's
ability to protect Federal facilities.--For many years, GAO has
advocated the importance of a risk management approach. GAO
reported in August 2010 that FPS does not use a comprehensive
risk management approach that links threats and vulnerabilities
to resource requirements. Instead, FPS uses a facility-by-
facility approach which assumes that facilities with the same
security level have the same risk regardless of their location.
Without a risk management approach that identifies threats and
vulnerabilities and the resources required to achieve FPS's
security goals, as GAO has recommended, there is limited
assurance that programs will be prioritized and resources will
be allocated to address existing and potential security threats
in an efficient and effective manner.
FPS has not fully addressed several key human capital
issues.--FPS continues to operate without a strategic human
capital plan to guide its current and future workforce planning
efforts, as GAO recommended in 2009. Further, FPS is not able
to determine what its optimal staffing levels should be because
FPS headquarters does not collect data on its workforce's
knowledge, skills, and abilities. FPS has yet to fully ensure
that its recent move to an inspector-based workforce does not
hinder its ability to protect Federal facilities.
FPS faces long-standing challenges in managing its contract
guard workforce.--Weaknesses in FPS's contract guard program
hamper its ability to protect Federal facilities. GAO reported
in 2009 and 2010 that FPS cannot ensure that its contract
guards have required training and certifications. FPS is in the
process of addressing GAO recommendations. For example, FPS
revised its X-ray and magnetometer training for its inspectors
and guards.
FPS has not reviewed its fee design or determined an
appropriate funding mechanism.--FPS increased its basic
security fee four times in 6 years to try to cover costs, but
has not reviewed its fees to develop an informed, deliberate
design. FPS's current fee structure has consistently resulted
in total collection amounts less than agency costs and
continues to be a topic of Congressional interest and inquiry.
FPS has yet to evaluate whether its fee-based structure or an
alternative funding mechanism is most appropriate for funding
the agency, as GAO recommended in 2008 and 2011.
FPS has made some progress in improving its ability to protect
Federal facilities. For example, in response to GAO recommendations,
FPS is developing the Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP),
which could enhance its ability to comprehensively assess risk at
Federal facilities and improve oversight of its contract guard program.
DHS and FPS have initiatives in process to address 21 of the 28
recommendations GAO has made related to the challenges above, although
none are yet fully implemented. According to FPS officials, this is in
part because of changes in the agency's leadership, organization,
funding, staffing levels, and delays in developing several new
management systems, such as RAMP.
Chairmen Lungren and Bilirakis, Ranking Members Clarke and
Richardson, and Members of the subcommittees: We are pleased to be here
to discuss the challenges the Federal Protective Service (FPS) faces in
carrying out its mission to protect Federal facilities, particularly
with regard to: (1) Risk management, (2) strategic human capital
planning, (3) oversight of its contract guard program, and (4) ensuring
that its fee-based funding structure is the appropriate mechanism for
funding the agency. We will also discuss FPS's assessment of its
performance and the extent to which FPS has made progress in responding
to these challenges. Recent events have exposed weaknesses with FPS's
ability to protect Federal facilities, including GAO's covert testing
at Federal facilities in 2009, FPS's on-going penetration testing at
Federal facilities, and FPS's contract security guards allowing
components of an active bomb to remain in a Federal building in
Detroit, Michigan, for 3 weeks in March 2011 before a bomb squad was
called.
As part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), FPS is
responsible for protecting Federal employees and visitors in
approximately 9,000 Federal facilities owned or leased by the General
Services Administration (GSA).\1\ FPS has a budget of approximately $1
billion and maintains approximately 1,200 full-time employees and about
13,000 contract security guards (also known as protective service
officers) that help accomplish the agency's facility protection
mission. FPS's primary responsibilities include: (1) Conducting risk
assessments of Federal facilities and recommending countermeasures
aimed at preventing incidents at facilities; and (2) undertaking law
enforcement activities, including responding to incidents at Federal
facilities.
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\1\ In this testimony, we refer to property that is owned by the
Federal Government and under the control and custody of GSA as GSA-
owned property.
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This testimony is based on our past reports and testimonies.\2\
Work conducted for these reports and testimonies included assessing
FPS's facility protection efforts using our key security practices as a
framework.\3\ We also visited selected FPS regions and selected GSA
buildings to assess FPS activities first-hand. Additionally, we
reviewed training and certification data for 663 randomly selected
guards in 6 of FPS's 11 regions. Because of the sensitivity of some of
the information in our prior work, we cannot specifically identify in
this testimony the locations of the incidents discussed. For all of our
work, we reviewed related laws and directives; interviewed officials
and analyzed documents and data from DHS and GSA; and interviewed
tenant agency representatives, contractors, and guards. These reviews
took place between April 2007 and May 2011. Our work was conducted in
accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards.
Additional information on scope and methodology is provided in the
previously issued products.
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\2\ See related GAO products at the end of this statement.
\3\ GAO, Homeland Security: Addressing Weaknesses with Facility
Security Committees Would Enhance Protection of Federal Facilities,
GAO-10-901 (Washington, DC: August 5, 2010).
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the absence of a risk management program hampers fps's ability to
protect federal facilities
For many years we have advocated the use of a risk management
approach that entails managing risk through actions, including setting
strategic goals and objectives, assessing risk, allocating resources
based on risk, evaluating alternatives, selecting initiatives to
undertake, and implementing and monitoring those initiatives. Risk
assessment, an important element of a risk management approach, helps
decision makers identify and evaluate potential risks so that
countermeasures can be designed and implemented to prevent or mitigate
the effects of the risks.
FPS meets its mission to protect GSA's Federal facilities by
assessing the risks that face those facilities and identifying the
appropriate countermeasures to mitigate those risks. Despite the
importance of this mission, FPS has not implemented an effective risk
management program. In August 2010, we reported that FPS does not use a
comprehensive risk management approach that links threats and
vulnerabilities to resource requirements.\4\ Instead, FPS uses a
facility-by-facility approach to risk management: We reported in 2010
that FPS assumes that all facilities with the same security level have
the same risk regardless of their location. For example, a level IV
facility in a metropolitan area is generally treated the same as one in
a rural area.\5\ This building-by-building approach prevents FPS from
comprehensively identifying risk across the entire portfolio of GSA's
facilities and allocating resources based on risk.\6\ Both our and
DHS's risk management frameworks include processes for assessing
comprehensive risk across assets in order to prioritize countermeasures
based on the overall needs of the system.
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\4\ GAO-10-901.
\5\ The level of security FPS provides at each of the 9,000 Federal
facilities varies depending on the building's security level. Based on
the Department of Justice's (DOJ) 1995 Vulnerability Assessment
Guidelines, there are five types of security levels. A level I facility
is typically a small storefront-type operation such as a military
recruiting office which has 10 or fewer employees and a low volume of
public contact. A level II facility has from 11 to 150 employees, a
level III facility has from 151 to 450 Federal employees and moderate-
to-high volume of public contact, a level IV facility has over 450
employees, a high volume of public contact, and includes high-risk law
enforcement and intelligence agencies. FPS does not have responsibility
for Level V facilities which include the White House and the Central
Intelligence Agency. The Interagency Security Committee has recently
promulgated new security level standards that will supersede the 1995
DOJ standards.
\6\ GAO, Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces
Several Challenges That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal
Facilities, GAO-08-683 (Washington, DC: June 11, 2008). See also GAO-
10-901.
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In response to our recommendations in this area, FPS began
developing a new system, the Risk Assessment and Management Program
(RAMP). According to FPS, RAMP will support all components of the risk
assessment process, including gathering and reviewing building
information; conducting and recording interviews with GSA and tenant
agencies; assessing threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences to
develop a detailed risk profile; recommending appropriate
countermeasures; and producing facility security assessment (FSA)
reports. FPS also plans to use RAMP to track and analyze workforce
data, contract guard program data, and other performance data, such as
the types and definitions of incidents and incident response times. We
are finalizing our on-going review of FPS's efforts to develop and
implement RAMP as well as FPS's transition to DHS's National Protection
and Programs Directorate (NPPD) and expect to report on these issues
soon.
fps has not fully addressed several key human capital issues
Over the last 3 years we have reported on the challenges FPS has
faced in the human capital area since moving to DHS from GSA in 2003.
As mandated by Congress, in 2009 FPS increased the size of its
workforce to 1,200 full-time employees.\7\ However, FPS continues to
operate without a strategic human capital plan. We recommended in 2009
that FPS develop a human capital plan to guide its current and future
workforce planning efforts.\8\ We have identified human capital
management as a high-risk issue throughout the Federal Government,
including within DHS. A human capital plan is important to both align
FPS's human capital program with current and emerging mission and
programmatic goals, and develop effective processes for training,
retention, and staff development. In 2009, we reported that the absence
of such a plan has contributed to inconsistent human capital activities
among FPS regions and headquarters, as several regions told us they
have implemented their own processes for performance feedback,
training, and mentoring. In addition, we found that FPS's workforce
planning is limited because FPS headquarters does not collect data on
its workforce's knowledge, skills, and abilities. Without such
information, FPS is not able to determine what its optimal staffing
levels should be or identify gaps in its workforce needs and determine
how to modify its workforce planning strategies to fill these gaps. FPS
concurred with our recommendation and drafted a workforce analysis plan
in June 2010. According to FPS, the plan must be reviewed by the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) before it is subject to approval by the
Secretary of Homeland Security.
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\7\ Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub.
L. No. 110-329, Division D, 122 Stat. 3574, 3659-3660 (2008). This
requirement for FPS to maintain a minimum number of full-time
equivalent positions has been included in subsequent appropriations
acts. See Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-83, 123 Stat. 2142, 2156-2157 (2009), and Department of
Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub. L. No.
112-10, 125 Stat. 38, 142-143 (2011).
\8\ GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service Should
Improve Human Capital Planning and Better Communicate with Tenants,
GAO-09-749 (Washington, DC: July 30, 2009).
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FPS also has yet to fully ensure that its recent move to an
inspector-based workforce does not hinder its ability to protect
Federal facilities. In 2007, FPS essentially eliminated its police
officer position and moved to an all inspector-based workforce. FPS
also decided to place more emphasis on physical security activities,
such as completing FSAs, and less emphasis on law enforcement
activities, such as proactive patrol. We reported in 2008 that these
changes may have contributed to diminished security and increases in
inspectors' workload.\9\ Specifically, we found that when FPS is not
providing proactive patrol at some Federal facilities, there is an
increased potential for illegal entry and other criminal activity.
Moreover, under its inspector-based workforce approach, FPS is relying
more on local police departments to handle crime and protection issues
at Federal facilities; however, we previously reported that at
approximately 400 Federal facilities across the United States, local
police may not have the authority to respond to incidents inside those
facilities.\10\
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\9\ GAO-08-683.
\10\ At approximately 400 Federal facilities Nation-wide, the
Federal Government has exclusive jurisdiction of its facilities,
whereby the Federal Government has all of the legislative authority
within the land area in question and the local police have no residual
police power.
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We recommended in 2008 that FPS clarify roles and responsibilities
of local law enforcement agencies in responding to incidents at GSA
facilities.\11\ While FPS agreed with this recommendation, FPS has
decided not to pursue agreements with local law enforcement officials,
in part because of local law enforcement officials' reluctance to sign
such agreements. In addition, FPS believes that the agreements are not
necessary because 96 percent of the properties in its inventory are
listed as concurrent jurisdiction facilities where both Federal and
State governments have jurisdiction over the property. Nevertheless, we
continue to believe that these agreements would, among other things,
clarify roles and responsibilities of local law enforcement agencies
when responding to crime or other incidents. We are currently reviewing
to what extent FPS is coordinating with State and local police
departments to ensure adequate protection of Federal facilities and
will issue a report next year.
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\11\ GAO-08-683.
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fps faces longstanding challenges in managing its contract guard
workforce
FPS's contract guard program is the most visible component of the
agency's operations and the agency relies on its guards to be its
``eyes and ears'' while performing their duties. Guards are responsible
for controlling access to Federal facilities by checking the
identification of Government employees and the public who enter Federal
facilities, and operating security equipment to screen for prohibited
items. Since 2009, we have identified weaknesses in FPS's contract
guard program which hamper its ability to protect Federal facilities.
For example, we reported in 2009 and in 2010 that FPS does not have a
reliable system to ensure that its 13,000 guards have the training and
certifications required to stand post at Federal facilities or comply
with post orders once they are deployed.\12\
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\12\ GAO, Homeland Security: Preliminary Results Show Federal
Protective Service's Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Is Hampered
By Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program, GAO-09-859T
(Washington, DC: July 8, 2009). See also GAO, Homeland Security:
Federal Protective Service's Contract Guard Program Requires More
Oversight and Reassessment of Use of Contract Guards, GAO-10-341
(Washington, DC: April 13, 2010).
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In 2009, we also identified substantial security vulnerabilities
related to FPS's guard program.\13\ In April and May 2009, GAO
investigators conducted covert tests and were able to successfully pass
components of an improvised explosive device (IED) concealed on their
persons through security checkpoints monitored by FPS guards at 10
Level IV facilities in 4 major metropolitan areas. In addition, FPS's
penetration testing--similar to our covert testing--shows that guards
continue to have problems with detecting prohibited items.\14\ For
example, in March 2011, FPS contract guards allowed components for an
active bomb to remain in a Level IV Federal building in Detroit,
Michigan for 3 weeks before a bomb squad was called to remove them.
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\13\ GAO-09-859T.
\14\ FPS employs Operation Shield to systematically assess the
effectiveness of FPS countermeasures, including Protective Service
Officers, at Federal facilities.
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We also found in 2010 that although some guard contractors did not
comply with the terms of their contracts, FPS did not take any
enforcement action against them.\15\ According to FPS guard contracts,
a contractor has not complied with the terms of the contract if, for
example, the contractor has a guard working without valid
certifications or background suitability investigations, or falsifies a
guard's training records. If FPS determines that a contractor does not
comply with these contract requirements, it can--among other things--
assess a financial deduction for nonperformed work, elect not to
exercise a contract option, or terminate the contract for default or
cause.
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\15\ GAO-10-341.
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We reviewed the official contract files for the 7 contractors who,
as we testified in July 2009, had guards performing on contracts with
expired certification and training records to determine what action, if
any, FPS had taken against these contractors for contract
noncompliance.\16\ According to the documentation in the contract
files, FPS did not take any enforcement action against the contractors
for not complying with the terms of the contract. Instead, FPS
exercised the option to extend the contracts for these 7 contractors.
Additionally, although FPS requires an annual performance evaluation of
each guard contractor and at the conclusion of contracts exceeding
$100,000, FPS did not always evaluate the performance of its
contractors as required, and some evaluations were incomplete and not
consistent with contractors' performance.
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\16\ GAO-09-859T.
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In response to our recommendations, FPS has taken several steps to
improve the oversight of its contract guard program. Since July 2009,
FPS has increased its penetration tests in some regions and the number
of guard inspections it conducts at Federal facilities in some
metropolitan areas. Additionally, FPS began the process of providing
additional X-ray and magnetometer training for its workforce. Under the
new requirement, inspectors must receive 30 hours of X-ray and
magnetometer training and guards are required to take 16 hours.
Previously, guards were required to receive 8 hours of training on X-
ray and magnetometer machines. Finally, FPS expects to use RAMP, once
it is developed, to determine whether its 13,000 guards have met its
training and certification requirements and to conduct guard
inspections. As stated earlier, we are finalizing our review of FPS's
RAMP.
fps has not reviewed its fee design or determined an appropriate
funding mechanism
We reported in May 2011 that FPS increased its basic security fee 4
times in 6 years to try to cover costs (an increase of over 100
percent).\17\ However, FPS has not reviewed its fees to develop an
informed, deliberate fee design. We found that timely, substantive fee
reviews are especially critical for fee-funded agencies to ensure that
fee collections and operating costs remain aligned. FPS has broad
authority to design its security fees, but the current fee structure
has consistently resulted in total collection amounts less than agency
costs, is not well understood or accepted by tenant agencies, and
continues to be a topic of Congressional interest and inquiry.\18\
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\17\ GAO-11-492.
\18\ Pub. L. No. 109-295, title II, 120 Stat. 1355, 1361 (Oct. 4,
2006).
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In 2008, we recommended that FPS evaluate whether its use of a fee-
based system or an alternative funding mechanism is the most
appropriate manner to fund the agency. Although FPS agreed with this
recommendation it has not begun such an analysis. Based on our updated
work in 2011, we recommended that such an analysis include the
examination of both alternative fee structures and a combination of
fees and appropriations as well as the options and trade-offs discussed
in our 2011 report.\19\ FPS agreed with this recommendation.
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\19\ GAO-11-492.
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fps faces limitations in assessing its performance
We have reported that FPS is limited in its ability to assess the
effectiveness of its efforts to protect Federal facilities.\20\ To
determine how well it is accomplishing its mission to protect Federal
facilities, FPS has identified some output measures. These measures
include determining whether security countermeasures have been deployed
and are fully operational, the amount of time it takes to respond to an
incident, and the percentage of FSAs completed on time. As we reported
in 2010, while output measures are helpful in assessing performance,
outcome measures can provide FPS with broader information on program
results, such as the extent to which its decision to move to an
inspector-based workforce will enhance security at Federal
facilities.\21\ Outcome measures could also help identify the security
gaps that remain at Federal facilities and determine what action may be
needed to address them.
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\20\ GAO, Homeland Security: Greater Attention to Key Practices
Would Improve the Federal Protective Service's Approach to Facility
Protection, GAO-10-142 (Washington, DC: October 23, 2009).
\21\ GAO-10-142.
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In addition, we reported in 2010 that FPS does not have a reliable
data management system that will allow it to accurately track these
measures or other important measures such as the number of crimes and
other incidents occurring at GSA facilities.\22\ Without such a system,
it is difficult for FPS to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of
its efforts to protect Federal employees and facilities, allocate its
limited resources, or make informed risk management decisions. For
example, weaknesses in one of FPS's countermeasure tracking systems
make it difficult to accurately track the implementation status of
recommended countermeasures such as security cameras and X-ray
machines. Without this ability, FPS has difficulty determining whether
it has mitigated the risk of Federal facilities to crime or a terrorist
attack. FPS concurred with our recommendations and states that its
efforts to address them will be completed in 2012 when its automated
information systems are fully implemented.
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\22\ GAO-10-142.
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fps has begun some initiatives, but most gao recommendations have not
been fully implemented
FPS has begun several initiatives that, once fully implemented,
should enhance its ability to protect the more than 1 million Federal
employees and members of the public who visit Federal facilities each
year. Since 2008, we have made 28 recommendations to help FPS to
address its challenges with risk management, strategic human capital
planning, oversight of its contract guard workforce, and its fee-based
funding structure. DHS and FPS have generally agreed with these
recommendations. As of July 2011, as shown in Table 1, FPS was in the
process of addressing 21 of them, although none were fully implemented.
Of the remaining 7, 5 were recommendations from our May 2011 report,
and we would not necessarily expect them to be fully implemented yet.
According to FPS officials, the agency has faced difficulty in
implementing many of our recommendations because of changes in its
leadership, organization, funding, and staffing levels. In addition,
FPS officials stated that its progress in implementing our
recommendations has been affected by delays in developing several new
management systems, such as RAMP.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GAO Report Recommendations Status
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Budget Issues: Better Fee Design Conduct regular reviews of FPS's security fees Not implemented.
Would Improve Federal Protective and use this information to inform its fee Not implemented.
Service's and Federal Agencies' setting. Not implemented.
Planning and Budgeting for Security, Include system-wide capital investments when Not implemented.
GAO-11-492, May 2011. estimating costs and include them when setting Not implemented.
basic security fee rates. In process.
Make information on the estimated costs of key
activities as well as the basis for these cost
estimates readily available to affected parties
to improve the transparency and credibility--
and hence the acceptance by stakeholders--of
the process for setting and using the fees.
Assess and report to Congress on: (1) The
current and alternative fee structures, to
include the options and trade-offs discussed in
this report, and if appropriate, and (2)
options to fund FPS through a combination of
fees and direct appropriations, to include the
options and trade-offs discussed in this report.
Evaluate and report to Congress on options to
mitigate challenges agencies face in budgeting
for FPS security costs, such as: (1) An
alternative account structure for FPS to
increase flexibility, while retaining or
improving accountability and transparency or
(2) an approved process for estimating fee
rates.
Collect and maintain an accurate list of points
of contact of customer agency officials
responsible for budget and billing activities
as well as facility designated points of
contact as we previously recommended in 2010.
Homeland Security: Addressing Develop and implement procedures that, among In process.
Weaknesses with Facility Security other things, outline the facility security
Committees Would Enhance Protection committees' organization structure, operations,
of Federal Facilities, GAO-10-901, decision-making authority, and accountability.
August 2010.
Homeland Security: Federal Protective Identify other approaches and options that would In process.
Service's Contract Guard Program be most beneficial and financially feasible for In process.
Requires More Oversight and protecting Federal facilities. In process.
Reassessment of Use of Contract Rigorously and consistently monitor guard In process.
Guards, GAO-10-341, April 2010. contractors' and guards' performance and step In process.
up enforcement against contractors that are not In process.
complying with the terms of the contract. In process.
Complete all contract performance evaluations in In process.
accordance with FPS and Federal Acquisition
Regulations requirements.
Issue a standardized record-keeping format to
ensure that contract files have required
documentation.
Develop a mechanism to routinely monitor guards
at Federal facilities outside metropolitan
areas.
Provide building-specific and scenario-based
training and guidance to its contract guards.
Develop and implement a management tool for
ensuring that reliable, comprehensive data on
the contract guard program are available on a
real-time basis.
Verify the accuracy of all guard certification
and training data before entering them into
RAMP, and periodically test the accuracy and
reliability of RAMP data to ensure that FPS
management has the information needed to
effectively oversee its guard program.
Homeland Security: Greater Attention Provide the Secretary with regular updates, on a In process.
to Key Practices Would Improve the mutually agreed-to schedule, on the status of In process.
Federal Protective Service's RAMP and the National Countermeasures Program, In process.
Approach to Facility Protection, GAO- including the implementation status of
10-142, October 2009. deliverables, clear timelines for completion of
tasks and milestones, and plans for addressing
any implementation obstacles.
In conjunction with the National Countermeasures
Program, to develop a methodology and guidance
for assessing and comparing the cost-
effectiveness of technology alternatives.
Reach consensus with GSA on what information
contained in the building security assessment
is needed for GSA to fulfill its
responsibilities related to the protection of
Federal buildings and occupants, and
accordingly, establish internal controls to
ensure that shared information is adequately
safeguarded; guidance for employees to use in
deciding what information to protect with
sensitive but unclassified designations;
provisions for training on making designations,
controlling, and sharing such information with
GSA and other entities; and a review process to
evaluate how well this information sharing
process is working, with results reported to
the Secretary regularly on a mutually agreed-to
schedule.
Homeland Security: Federal Protective Improve how FPS headquarters collects data on In process.
Service Should Improve Human Capital its workforce's knowledge, skills, and In process.
Planning and Better Communicate with abilities to help it better manage and In process.
Tenants, GAO-09-749, July 2009. understand current and future workforce needs. In process.
Use these data in the development and
implementation of a long-term strategic human
capital plan that addresses key principles for
effective strategic workforce planning,
including establishing programs, policies, and
practices that will enable the agency to
recruit, develop, and retain a qualified
workforce.
Collect and maintain an accurate and
comprehensive list of all facility-designated
points of contact, as well as a system for
regularly updating this list.
Develop and implement a program for education
and outreach to all customers to ensure they
are aware of the current roles,
responsibilities, and services provided by FPS.
Homeland Security: The Federal Develop and implement a strategic approach to In process.
Protective Service Faces Several manage its staffing resources including In process.
Challenges That Hamper Its Ability determining the optimum number of employees Not implemented.
to Protect Federal Facilities, GAO- needed to accomplish its facility protection Not implemented.
08-683, July 2008. mission and allocate these resources based on In process.
risk management principles. In process.
Clarify roles and responsibilities of local law
enforcement agencies in regard to responding to
incidents at GSA facilities.
Improve FPS's use of the fee-based system by
developing a method to accurately account for
the cost of providing security services to
tenant agencies and ensuring that its fee
structure takes into consideration the varying
levels of risk and service provided at GSA
facilities.
Evaluate whether FPS's current use of a fee-
based system or an alternative funding
mechanism is the most appropriate manner to
fund the agency.
Develop and implement specific guidelines and
standards for measuring its performance,
including outcome measures to assess its
performance and improve the accountability of
FPS.
Improve how FPS categorizes, collects, and
analyzes data to help it better manage and
understand the results of its efforts to
protect GSA facilities.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source.--GAO.
Note.--We reviewed information from FPS regarding our recommendations and, based on this information,
categorized our recommendations accordingly. ``In process'' indicates that FPS has actions on-going but has
not completed them. ``Not implemented'' indicates that FPS has not yet taken any action to address our
recommendations.
Chairmen Lungren and Bilirakis, Ranking Members Clarke and
Richardson, and Members of the subcommittees, this completes my
prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you or
other Members of the subcommittees may have at this time.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Goldstein. Thank you
for your testimony.
We will now go to a round of questioning, and I will yield
myself 5 minutes to begin the questioning.
General Patterson, you have heard the criticisms of FPS.
You have heard some of them repeated here.
You come from a distinguished background serving in one of
the great institutions of America, the United States Air Force.
You realize what leadership is and discipline is within an
organization.
There have been continuing problems with FPS, some before
you were there, some continuing since you have been there. How
do we have confidence that you are making the changes that were
indicated by previous GAO reports in light of some of the
shortcomings that--incidents that we have already observed and
have been articulated here?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir. To answer that, first of all, I
would like to say I clearly understand how important it is to
protect those 1.4 million folks that transit and work in our
facilities every day. We are responsible for protecting 9,000
facilities and 1.4 million folks and I know and understand how
important that is.
When I took over as the director of the Federal Protective
Service one of the first things I did was to establish a code
of conduct. That code of conduct was to establish, to ensure
that we abided by and work towards a set of personal and
professional goals of conduct. I thought that was very
important so that every day in every instance when our people
work with and interface with our--the folks that we protect
that we know how to treat them and we treat them in a fair and
equitable way and that we are--that we understand the
challenges that they face in wanted to be safe and secure in
those facilities.
I also set priorities--very tough priorities, but
achievable priorities in training. We didn't have a director or
assistant director of training. One of the first things I did
was go to the under secretary and ask him could I hire a senior
to direct our training effort, and he agreed and said yes. That
announcement is on the street today to hire a director of
training for the Federal Protective Service.
I also understand and know that we have challenges with
RAMP. It is no question about that.
I identified those challenges, I brought those--some of the
problems we were having, I brought those to the attention of
GAO, that we were having problems. They already knew some of
them. But I told them that we were moving in a different
direction and that I needed to be clear, up front, and
transparent about where we were going.
We need to develop--we are also developing a common
communications plan so that people understand who we are and
what we do and how we are to interface and work with the people
we are charged to protect, and clearly create a close
relationship with our customers.
Mr. Chairman, it is my intent--I lead from the front--to
ensure transparency, to--so that not only does the Secretary
understand what our challenges are but these Congressional
committees also understand what our challenges are, and work
with you to try to put into place those changes and implement
whatever changes we need to do to help us move forward.
Mr. Lungren. General, let me ask you this: We have had
prior hearings and somehow it seemed to get into the question
about whether we should Federalize the guards or not Federalize
the guards, and it just seemed to me the problem was intrinsic
to the entire FPS. That is, that it doesn't matter whether your
guards are Federal employees or non-Federal employees if they
are not trained properly and they are not supervised properly,
and I believe you have something like 1,400 or so on the
supervisory level. So to me it is not a question of a problem
with respect to the identity of the guards; it is a problem
with respect to the training and the continued supervision of
those employees.
So you have outlined the kinds of things you want done, but
again, going back to your military background, you expect
things to be done on a timeline. You expect change to be made.
You expect to see some actual on-the-ground differences.
When should we expect to see that?
Mr. Patterson. Mr. Chairman, I would expect to see those--
as we begin to move forward, as we begin to make changes, as I
begin to implement changes we will see that. Currently I have
done several studies looking at what training currently is
provided to our PSO force. Okay, right now the majority of the
training is provided by the contractor, okay?
I need to understand whether that should be a mix of
training. Should we have more of our training provided by our
Federal forces, let's say, for instance, at FLETC, or should
we--or should we continue with the line of training that we
have now? So that is something we are looking at.
Mr. Lungren. My time is expired.
The gentlelady from New York is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Patterson, I kind of appreciate what seems to be a
dilemma for you. How long have you been director of the Federal
Protective Services now?
Mr. Patterson. About 9 months, ma'am.
Ms. Clarke. Wow. Well, you have inherited a real big
challenge here. But I think the GAO has pointed to some really
critical areas and I just wanted to ask your responses to at
least a couple of the points raised by the GAO report.
The absence of a risk management approach: Given the
limitations of your resources and given the bifurcated way in
which our buildings are protected both by your officers and
contract officers, do you think that a risk management approach
is--that you are capable of establishing a risk management
approach?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, ma'am, I do. I believe----
Ms. Clarke. Go on, sir. You can----
Mr. Patterson. I think that is the way that we should
proceed is a risk management approach. I think that all threats
aren't the same, all vulnerabilities aren't the same. So I
think we need to look at each facility differently and assess
the vulnerabilities of each facility independent of the other.
Ms. Clarke. Are there any particular impediments in the way
of moving in that direction fairly rapidly?
Mr. Patterson. I would have to assess--I think we are
trying to do that now, ma'am, under the RAMP process. I think
that is going to allow us to begin to move in that direction.
To be honest, we have had some challenges in developing RAMP,
so that has slowed this process some.
But I am confident as we move forward that we will be able
to accept this challenge and move forward very quickly in
developing the RAMP process.
Ms. Clarke. Do you have a sort of deadline by which you
expect to see RAMP accomplished?
Mr. Patterson. I have a mental deadline, ma'am. But right
now we are in the process of evaluating an alternative process
through an interagency agreement with a different contractor to
move us forward. That particular process is currently still
under review.
We don't know that we are going to be able to move in that
direction. That is the direction that I hope--I sincerely hope
that we are able to move in that direction, but until my
contracting officers--my contracting office department and our
legal staff tell me that it is okay to move in that direction I
am still kind of on hold with that.
Ms. Clarke. So what is the deadline for the ending of the
evaluation and assessment?
Mr. Patterson. I don't control it, but I am hoping within
the next few weeks.
Ms. Clarke. Okay.
Let me ask about the strategic planning for human
resources. Is that also contained in this evaluation and
assessment of RAMP or is this something separate that you
should be focused on?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, ma'am. I am focused on--I guess, are
you talking about how are we going to obtain more people or----
Ms. Clarke. Well, the strategic use. I mean, you are
limited, right?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, we are.
Ms. Clarke. Okay. So within those limitations we are
expecting that----
Mr. Patterson. Yes, okay.
Ms. Clarke. Okay?
Mr. Patterson. Yes. RAMP will allow us--what RAMP allows us
to do is to hopefully leverage and utilize our--the existing
staff that we have more efficiently and more effectively, okay?
Quite honestly, we are using some antiquated methods of how we
collect data and how we do our jobs, and RAMP is going to help
us move forward. I have every confidence once we get RAMP
moving that we will be able to do that.
Ms. Clarke. What about your contract guard management?
Would all of that ultimately hinge on a successful
implementation of the RAMP or is this something that you have
separately looked at particularly given the breaches or the
breach--the major breach--that has come to the attention of our
Nation?
Mr. Patterson. Right. RAMP is only a part of that. Clearly
to ensure that our inspectors and our law enforcement folks are
providing the necessary direction as--when they interface with
our contract--with our PSOs we are ensuring that we are
providing them the adequate direction and I am evaluating that
as well.
Ms. Clarke. In just those three areas there seems to be a
nexus component, which is RAMP. What happens if RAMP does not
work?
Mr. Patterson. RAMP will work, ma'am.
Ms. Clarke. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
Mr. Meehan, gentleman from Pennsylvania, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Patterson and Mr. Goldstein, for taking the
time to be with us today. I speak as one who enjoyed the
protection of the Federal Protection Service for almost 7 years
as a United States attorney and operated in a building in which
we were handled by contract guards overseen by the FPS, and
have to say that day in and day out established sort of a
familiarity with the group, found them to be very professional
in what they were doing.
But I can imagine that there are a number of challenges,
and one, of course, is the changing nature of the threats that
we have and training.
Now, Mr. Patterson, I also dealt with police forces all
across my State and we are different municipalities but we
found a common scheme of training that was required, and this
would be established each year. Isn't there a grid, so to
speak, for certain categories of training in specific areas
that would year-to-year be evaluated and changed so that we
would keep pace with technology and be able to know that any
contract guard has been trained to that level?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir. The challenge that we have
currently is not the technical limitations or the technical
level of the training, it is currently our ability to ensure
that the training has been delivered in an acceptable manner,
and that is our challenge. Most of the training is being
delivered by the contractor, so we have approximately 130
contractors across the Federal Protective Service, and as such
we can't ensure that a certain standard or level is being
delivered at a particular level over each one of those
contracts.
Mr. Meehan. Well, is it impossible to work with
organizations that we know are capable of delivering a
standard? For instance, the State police force that each year
trains a number of people. Is it possible to go back and look
at creating professional standards that we know that can be
upheld so that you are not relying on, you know, on a
contractor that says, yes, I did it?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sure. I am sure that there are any
number of probable solutions that we may undertake. That is why
I have hired--in the process of hiring a professional to try to
give me a sense of what the best direction is. How do we need
to get our arms around this so that I can give you confidence
and the American people confidence that we are doing our job?
Mr. Meehan. Yes, I would hope--I mean, it doesn't seem like
it--I know it sounds simplistic, but there is basic training
and it is just really assuring that we have that done.
Another aspect I am interested in is your concept of the
challenge in which--there are just so many different Federal
facilities. But how do you prioritize? Is it first looking at
where there are people being the highest priority, or certain
kinds of buildings that receive priority over others in terms
of your risk assessment?
Mr. Patterson. Right. Our priorities are set by the
occupants and the nature of the business that they do in those
buildings and the location of those facilities, and we have a
set level of priority four down to one, and depending upon the
level of what we believe to be the threat to that facility is
how we dedicate resources to that facility.
Mr. Meehan. What kind of connection do you have to some of
the other existing networks that we have in place with Homeland
Security on the constant assessment of threat analysis so that
we might begin to appreciate that because of a particular
case----
Mr. Patterson. Right.
Mr. Meehan [continuing]. A particular courthouse might be a
place of, you know, higher significance for a period of time?
Mr. Patterson. Right. Every morning I receive a briefing
from the folks within the Department of Homeland Security that
we receive from intelligence and analysis. They are the folks
who are responsible for providing the Secretary a comprehensive
understanding of what the key threats are around the Nation and
to Federal facilities, or to commercial and other facilities,
for that matter.
So I feel that I am fairly well-informed about what the
threats are. Our challenge is how quickly we can get that
information down to those 9,000 facilities, and we are working
on a process to make that happen fairly quickly now.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you for your work.
Mr. Goldstein, you have a lot of oversight capacity. You
spend a lot of time feeding. What do you think is the first and
highest priority in return--in regard to what we ought to be
doing to assure security at these facilities?
Mr. Goldstein. I would agree with General Patterson, that
the most important thing to do is to develop a risk management
strategy that the agency can use to evaluate across this entire
portfolio so that it can begin to choose those that are at
greatest risk to protect better.
Mr. Meehan. We have that in place already or that is what
is being developed?
Mr. Goldstein. No, sir, we do not. You need RAMP to even
begin to create that process, sir.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is expired.
Mr. Lungren. I thank the gentleman.
The distinguished Ranking Member of the full committee, Mr.
Thompson, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General, FPS in one capacity or another is about 50 years
old now?
Mr. Patterson. Forty years old, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Forty years old. Okay.
Well, and I find it really competent, on one hand, that you
finally decided that you need a code of conduct for your
employees. I think that is commendable on your part because in
any organization I think you have to have it and I want to
compliment you for doing that.
But also, I also want to talk briefly about the RAMP
contract, a $41 million contract that I am told everybody
agreed that it, at this point, is a failure. Are we correct or
is it--where are we?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir, if I might, RAMP does not work as
it was intended to. I will tell you that.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Patterson. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. Now, and my staff tells me that we have now
given another contract to the same company that we spent $41
million with to do something else with RAMP.
Mr. Patterson. No, sir. What has happened is that while we
we are in the process of moving forward and working with
another contractor to do that, because we have spent--developed
a lot of backend areas for--that move RAMP, that make RAMP
work, we have to maintain that. That is called kind of the
operations and maintenance part of RAMP that we have to
maintain.
If we don't maintain that--if we are to take what we have,
what we spent our $35.6 million on today, if we are to move it
to another contractor we have to maintain all the data, all the
information to do that. So that is costing us some money but we
have ceased--we have descoped the contract so that the existing
contract is no longer doing any developmental work with RAMP.
Mr. Thompson. But we are paying them to keep whatever they
did?
Mr. Patterson. We are asking them to keep--yes, sir--to
maintain the data that we had developed and we have in RAMP so
that we can move it to another venue in the near future.
Mr. Thompson. So do you know if your contract had any
measurements that said, ``Now that we have hired you to do it
it must work,'' or how do we get into spending this kind of
money and at the end of the period it not work? Look, I know
you inherited the baby. I just need you to figure out what
happened.
Mr. Patterson. Right. I had asked the senior members of the
contractor to come in and talk to me about why RAMP doesn't
work. I asked each one of them why is it that it didn't work
and to a person they said, ``We understand that it didn't
deliver what we said it would deliver but we can make it
work.''
Mr. Thompson. With more money.
Mr. Patterson. With more money, yes, sir. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Okay.
Mr. Patterson. As I began to make my way through to visit
our regions to talk to our folks in the field about why RAMP
doesn't work it was very clear to me that if we were to
continue down the same path we would be just throwing good
money after bad.
Mr. Thompson. Well, thank you.
Mr. Goldstein, did you all look at RAMP and did you make
some recommendations on it?
Mr. Goldstein. Yes, sir. We have completed a report that we
expect to issue shortly to you, sir, that should be available
within a matter of weeks now.
Mr. Thompson. Okay. I look forward----
Mr. Goldstein. It evaluates the entire process and problems
of how RAMP was developed and what happened to the program.
Mr. Thompson. General, I am--you know, you have been there
9 months, and--you know, but for better or worse you are there.
Did anybody lose their job over the RAMP contract?
Mr. Patterson. Well, we have moved--I have moved people
within my--within the Federal Protective Service who were
managing RAMP. They didn't lose their job but they have been
moved.
But I will tell you, sir, one of the things that we have
done in order to move this program forward is to create a great
partnership with Infrastructure Protection and looking at how
they conduct their assessments within the private sector within
the critical infrastructure protection sector. I will tell you,
I am very confident that as we look forward and move forward
with them and how they are looking at how they do it I think--I
am really excited about the way forward and the challenges with
RAMP.
Mr. Thompson. Well, did the contractor who failed to
perform lose the contract?
Mr. Patterson. The contract was descoped and when we move
on he will have lost the contract because the contract was
for--was to go run for 10 years.
Mr. Thompson. So descoped means what?
Mr. Patterson. Descoped means there is no more development
by this contractor.
Mr. Thompson. Are they still doing work for FPS?
Mr. Patterson. The only work that they are doing is
maintaining the databases that we asked them to create.
Mr. Thompson. So that is the only work they are doing?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Yield back.
Mr. Lungren. The gentleman yields back.
Happy to recognize Mr. Long, the gentleman from Missouri,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Long. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Patterson, when you took this job back in--what was it,
September 2010?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Long. Before you took the job did anybody tell you that
you were going to be in charge of securing 9,000 Federal
facilities and caring for 1.4 million people?
Mr. Patterson. They didn't tell me, sir, but I did find--I
did some----
Mr. Long. Found out after the fact?
Mr. Patterson. I did some research, yes, sir.
Mr. Long. Because I am going to question why you took the
job if that is--do you think that it could possibly be too big
a task for one organization to be trying to ride herd on 9,000
facilities and 1.4 million people concerned about their
security. Is there a chance that we need to look at a different
model than what we have today?
Mr. Patterson. No, sir. I think we can do it. I just think
that we just need to begin to look at a focused approach and
begin to better develop the tools in our toolbox to make this
happen.
But I believe that we can do that. I don't think that there
would be any benefit into breaking this up. I think that the
focus of a single organization or single agency over this can
do it and can do it effectively.
Mr. Long. What percentage of hired guards or whatever, like
the one where the package got through back in February of this
year, what percentage are not Federal employees, and are any
Federal employees that are guarding that?
Mr. Patterson. No, sir. We don't have--none of our PSOs,
none of the folks who are standing post are Federal employees.
They are all contract employees--contractors.
Mr. Long. On this RAMP issue, I heard Mr. Thompson in his
opening remarks say it was virtually a worthless program and
then I was very surprised to hear you and Mr. Goldstein both
talk about it like it was an integral part of what you are
doing and we are going to go forward with it. What was it
designed to do that it doesn't do?
Mr. Patterson. Well, sir, RAMP was supposed to do a couple
of things. It was supposed to help us do post tracking. That
means I need to know every day that if I have 9,000 posts that
need to be manned I need to know that there are guards--PSOs--
on each one of those posts, okay, and that is----
Mr. Long. That would be handy.
Mr. Patterson. Yes. Yes. Absolutely. So it is supposed to
help us do that.
It is also supposed to help us do facility assessments.
Each one of these facilities must be assessed for
vulnerabilities so that we can provide the tenants knowledge of
what the vulnerabilities are or what the threats are to those
facilities. So RAMP was supposed to help us do that.
Mr. Long. It is not?
Mr. Patterson. Not at this time.
Mr. Long. You can't go to RAMP and find out if all 9,000
posts are being manned, then?
Mr. Patterson. No, sir. I can't.
Additionally, provide guard certification. We wanted one
place that we could go to ensure that at any given time that
each one of our PSOs was certified--that means trained to stand
post. Before a guard is allowed to stand post he must be--he or
she must be trained and then we give them the authority to go
ahead and stand that post.
So, but RAMP was supposed to help us do that and----
Mr. Long. We are not doing that either?
Mr. Patterson. No, sir.
Mr. Long. Okay. Might have been easier to ask what does
work about it than what doesn't, but continue.
Mr. Patterson. That is it, sir.
Mr. Long. Okay. That was the two things that is was
supposed to do?
Mr. Patterson. No, three things. The post tracking, and the
assessments, and the certifications.
It helps us to compile all of that information and better
understand where we may need to make changes and better
understand the threat. So it is a risk management tool for us.
Mr. Long. Forty-one million dollars and it doesn't seem
like it is that complicated of an issue to cover those three
things. Aren't you--I mean, I know, as Mr. Thompson said, you
inherited it, but I guess I would be curious, the ones that
have been reassigned, were they promoted?
Mr. Patterson. No, sir, they weren't. But I will tell you,
as I stated before, that I believe that we are moving in a very
positive direction with RAMP. I have worked with and had time
with the I.P. brethren and understand how they do it, and they
have some very robust programs that do very much what we want
to do and I think we can leverage that and leverage that
capability and leverage that technology that they have already
had existing to make RAMP move forward or to help RAMP to move
forward.
Mr. Long. Okay. Thank you for being here and your testimony
today.
You too, Mr. Goldstein. I think I am running out of time to
ask you my questions but I yield back.
Mr. Lungren. Gentleman yields back, and Mr. Richmond, from
Louisiana, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for conducting and
having this hearing, and thank you to the Ranking Member.
Mr. Goldstein, Mr. Patterson, thank you for coming.
I just have some very basic questions. Looking at the
incident, I believe, in Detroit, it appears that the company
fired the employee who brought the package inside and put it in
lost and found, correct?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richmond. So if we follow their logic of zero
tolerance, and dismissing that employee for their failure, why
wouldn't we fire the firm who hired the employee and show the
same zero tolerance for protecting our Federal employees and
our citizens that take the time to come visit Federal buildings
and need services?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir. I had asked our contracting office
what was in the realm of the possible relative to whether or
not we could dismiss this company and their review suggested
that this wasn't just about a single incident. Formally and
legally they had to take a look at the entire performance of
the contractor.
That review is still being done, so--and a--what we call a
contract performance appraisal review is yet to be written. It
will be written, I think, within the next 60 days. So I guess
that it is still possible that it could happen but it was not
something that could take place immediately.
Mr. Richmond. I would just say, not looking at the contract
but being a lawyer, that there's probably a for cause provision
in there and we don't have to argue about it, but I would just
imagine that it--had that bomb gone off that it would have been
good cause to do it and we should look at it as if it did
because it had the potential to do that. We will move on, and
thank you for that answer, but I think we ought to show the
same zero tolerance.
The second thing is, as we talk about the private companies
that do the security--and I will just tell you, as someone from
an urban city, that people without the ability to arrest don't
get the same respect as police officers and other people, I
mean--and I don't say this to perpetuate the stereotype, but at
home they are called either rent-a-cops or flashlight cops, and
to the extent that that is the perception of what is guarding
our Federal buildings, that is a concern for me when you talk
about their training and their ability to arrest.
Do you all--and I would ask the GAO also--do you all get
that feedback in terms of from the private companies that
patrol and stand post at the buildings?
Mr. Patterson. I haven't really gotten that feedback, sir,
but I will tell you that presentation--the presentation of our
PSOs is important. How they present themselves, their training,
and all of that is very important. Just to be clear, our PSOs
are allowed to detain, so if there is a problem they can detain
an individual and then they immediately call one of our
inspectors who can come in and arrest if that is necessary.
Mr. Goldstein. Congressman, our experience is that the PSOs
and their companies do try very hard to maintain a professional
appearance. One concern I do have, as you indicate, without the
authority to, you know, to arrest, even the detention
authority, often we have found in our experience, is not
utilized. Our previous work has shown that in a number of
instances security guards have actually stepped back from
taking any action whatsoever because either tacitly or
otherwise their firms have told them not to do anything that
would get them in any legal action, and we have documented this
in our reports in the past.
The other issue I would briefly mention that you raised
regarding the performance evaluations of a contractor that
General Patterson referred to, our previous work has shown that
many of the contract files that FPS maintains on its
contractors do not have adequate information of files on which
to judge the evaluation, and so it may be difficult for Mr.
Patterson potentially to take action in the sense that it is
depending on what is found in that file.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you.
The last question--and I have very little time left--but,
Mr. Patterson, I noted here, and I don't know if I wrote it
down correct, that they have to be trained before they stand
post but we don't have a system to know whether the person who
is standing post has been trained or not. Did I hear that
correctly?
Mr. Patterson. No, yes. One of the things that we were
trying to--attempting to do was to push all of that
documentation to a central point. As of 1 July we no longer do
that. We push all that documentation now to the regions, so the
regions now who are geographically aligned with the contractors
now know whether or not the folks who are standing post--in
real time--whether, if they are trained or not.
Mr. Richmond. Okay. I see I am out of time, but I would
just add that, you know, if we had that zero tolerance with the
contractors that if they put someone standing post who is not
certified that we would terminate contracts. I think that may
send a message that that is something you ought not do.
But thank you, Mr. Patterson. I have all the confidence in
the world that you will right the ship that you inherited, and
I look forward to working with you in the future.
Mr. Lungren. Gentleman yields back his time.
Mr. Marino is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Marino. Thank you, Chairman. I apologize, I got called
out on an emergency, and I do not like to ask questions without
hearing what my colleagues have asked. I am going to ask a
general question and leave it at that and just ask both
gentlemen to respond to it if it hasn't already been asked.
In addition to needing more money what can we do in
Congress to facilitate you to improve your--to help improve
your ability to protect us?
Mr. Patterson. Sir, for me, very simply, your continued
interest and wanting to help is what--is really what helps me.
The idea that I am sitting here and--before this august
committee and you asking me is help in itself. So we will do
our best to try to get you the information through our
Department and in other venues to allow you to better
understand how the Federal Protective Service can use your
help.
Mr. Goldstein. I would say strong oversight, Congressman. I
think continued vigilance by this and other committees is
critical to ensuring that the FPS can have both the resources
and the impetus within the Department of Homeland Security to
achieve its mission effectively, because as many of you have
stated previously, this is not an agency that has always
received the attention it needs. It is an agency that, I think
Ms. Clarke said, is a stepchild at times and does require, I
think, support to ensure that this critical mission is
achieved.
Mr. Marino. Thank you, gentlemen.
I yield back my time.
Mr. Lungren. Gentleman yields back.
Now the Chairman would recognize Mr. Keating, from
Massachusetts, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member.
Question, maybe a comment. First question is to what
extent, and are you satisfied to this extent, that your agency
is internally trying to send people out to see if security can
be breached? Are you testing yourself internally by sending
people out to check the security of these facilities and are
you satisfied that that is done enough if it is the case?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir. We employ a covert testing program
as well.
Mr. Keating. Now, looking at the GAO report one of the
things that troubles me--and I do not have an answer; it is
more in nature of a comment, but it has to be resolved--is
this, because actually my father was head of security for a
Fortune 500 company that had defense contracts and one of the
things I knew was they had to be in cooperation and
understanding with local police. There are no letters of
understanding, you know, as indicated.
If you don't have the ability to be able to deal with the
local police in those cities and towns that are there--or
counties, whoever is jurisdictionally in charge--and you don't
have that understanding in place you have inherently got a
terrible breach of security just there in trying to react to a
crisis because if that is not in place and it is not seamless
then there is going to be a problem even if people act, you
know, according to their training.
Mr. Patterson. Congressman, to this point we have never had
an instance where we had not had great cooperation of the State
and local forces--police--any time that we needed them. One of
the proactive things that our inspectors do are continuing to
develop those relationships with State and locals and
collaborate on various levels. We are active participants in
the fusion centers along--which are Homeland Security-sponsored
but belong to the State and local authorities, and we
participate in those.
So to date we really haven't found the need to create
written documents, or documentation, or requirements, or MOUs,
or agreements at this point because any time we call the State
or local, I mean, they respond, and so we haven't had a problem
to this point.
Mr. Keating. I yield back my time. Thank you.
Mr. Lungren. Gentleman yields back.
The gentlelady from California, Ms. Richardson, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Richardson. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding
this hearing today.
First of all, my first question is, in the next panel we
are going to hear from a security organization, and one of the
things that they point out is that although ``FPS is being more
proactive and positive with contractors, such as the
establishment of regional industry days and quarterly meetings
with individual contractors and a greater willingness to
address the legal liability issues, there is so much more that
can be done to improve the relationship. Only recently has FPS
sought out the experience, expertise, and views of its partners
on the small amount of substantive contract guard program
initiatives,'' and it goes on.
Have you had an opportunity to read the testimony of the
folks coming after you?
Mr. Patterson. I have not. No, ma'am.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. What do you think about that, in
terms of the concerns of engaging your stakeholders through
this process?
Mr. Patterson. I am continually, and my seniors are
continually, engaging our stakeholders very proactively.
Ms. Richardson. In the testimony they say that there has
been an improvement since you have been on-board but it is not
sufficient.
Mr. Patterson. I will have to go back and study that,
ma'am.
Ms. Richardson. Do you have those stakeholder groups that
you work with that is a part of any of the new changes and you
had an opportunity to go back and forth on a regular basis?
Mr. Patterson. Nothing on a regular basis, ma'am. One of
the initiatives that I have is that as I get out to my regions
I am out visiting all of the stakeholder seniors, at least, in
our region areas, and we are starting to develop--as I am
building my leadership team, we are beginning to assess how we
might do that outreach on a continuing basis. But no, I don't
have a--today I don't have a proactive methodology for doing
that.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. Well, I might suggest that you
consider taking them up on their offer and engaging them.
My next question is: How does FPS measure the performance
of its private security contractors, and if so, how frequently
are the performance evaluations conducted?
Mr. Patterson. Well, clearly every year we create something
that is called a CPAR, and that is the contractor performance
appraisal review. We have CTRs, contracting technical
representatives, who are responsible for providing information
and feedback to the contracting office as those CPARs are
provided. So every year we do an evaluation on the performance
of each one of the contractors.
Ms. Richardson. My next question, building upon that: In
the February incident in Detroit, which also Mr. Richmond
discussed as well, the company providing security for the
building received a small monetary fine and was required to
provide additional training. Is this your typical response for
a review?
Mr. Patterson. No. Actually, one individual was fired.
Actually, there were four individuals who were removed from
that contract; 14 were suspended; and three received written
warnings.
We did go up immediately--once we identified that there was
a problem we immediately sent a team up to evaluate all of
the--the contractor's performance at that location as well as
provide training. So I think we----
Ms. Richardson. Had you evaluated that facility prior to
the incident?
Mr. Patterson. Yes. When we conduct Op Shield we evaluate
the facility and the inspector who found the device was
evaluating that facility--was evaluating the facility that day.
Ms. Richardson. So just that day they were beginning to do
their annual evaluation?
Mr. Patterson. No, ma'am. I don't know exactly how often
that facility was visited, but it is visited on a routine basis
but I can't tell you exactly how often it is.
Ms. Richardson. So my question goes back to my first
question: If you are evaluating the facilities on an annual
basis, and if you are saying this facility was evaluated, what
does that say in terms of the evaluation that is being done?
Mr. Patterson. I am not sure I understand your question.
Ms. Richardson. The question is, you are saying that this
facility was evaluated, right?
Mr. Patterson. I am saying that our inspectors have visited
that facility.
Ms. Richardson. Had they performed an evaluation?
Mr. Patterson. I don't know when the last evaluation for
that facility was done.
Ms. Richardson. Could you supply to the committee, for the
records of the incidents that have been noted in this
committee----
Mr. Patterson. I can.
Ms. Richardson [continuing]. What process you did prior to
the incident and then thereafter?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, ma'am. We can.
Ms. Richardson. Okay.
Mr. Chairman, would you indulge me to ask one more
question, please?
Thank you, sir.
In 2003 there were 10 major cities where FPS had a 24-hour
law enforcement coverage. There are now only two. Which two
cities have the 24-hour coverage and what factors went into
dropping the other eight cities from 24-hour coverage?
Mr. Patterson. I will have to get back to you on that one
as well, ma'am. I don't know.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Lungren. The gentlelady yields back.
Under unanimous consent Ms. Jackson Lee was given
permission to sit on the subcommittee, although she is a Member
of the full committee, not this subcommittee. So if she has any
questions at this time she will be recognized for 5 minutes. If
not, I would excuse the panel.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your kindness
and I will--I do have some questions.
First of all, let me thank the witnesses. I just have a
little anecdotal story that is taking up my time is that we
were meeting with the Transatlantic Dialogue of European Union
member countries and--this morning--and the key topic--I will
exaggerate and say standing room only--was on cybersecurity. So
I believe this is truly important.
I would like to just ask both Mr. Patterson, as my--as I am
ably getting some other issues--and Mr. Goldstein--and I missed
your testimony so I apologize, but what is the level of how
serious--how devastating is the potential hacking in Government
entities? I know that the United States military a year ago had
severe hacking and loss of data. I also know a couple of years
ago someone in the Veterans Affairs Department lost or misused
data, or lost a laptop, and that we didn't really connect what
was happening then.
So how much in jeopardy are our Federal assets with respect
to hacking?
Mr. Patterson. Ma'am, I can't address that specifically,
but I can tell you that as part of our assessment process going
forward what we are looking at is not only the vulnerabilities
from threat from terrorists, or criminal threat, or
environmental threat, but also the threat through the cyber
system. That is one of the things we historically, from the
Federal Protective Service, we have not looked at, but since
our alignment with NPPD and because we are closely aligned not
only with infrastructure protection but also with cybersecurity
that is one of the things that we have chosen to put on our
plate to begin to understand and assess not only what are the
threats from the physical aspect but also from the cyber
aspect.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I understand that we have asked on a
number of occasions what is your relationship with NPPD as it
goes--undergoes its reorganization; we have not got an answer.
Are you an equal among equals, or how are you relating and able
to solve problems working with NPPD on this very important
question?
Mr. Patterson. From my perspective, ma'am, we are an equal
among equals. I have an incredible relationship with the under
secretary, and I have a great relationship with all of our--
with the other subcomponents of NPPD. In fact, that is what is
helping us to move aggressively forward----
Ms. Jackson Lee. So what specifically are you doing with
this partnership?
Mr. Patterson. Well, again, for RAMP, when the problems--
when I understood we were having problems with RAMP, when I
identified the problems we were having with RAMP, I sat down
with our infrastructure protection folks to figure out--to
better understand what do they do to protect the
infrastructure, not in the Federal sector but in other sectors
that they are responsible for. As they shared that with me we
began to collaborate and better understand how we could merge
systems and bring systems together----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Is that----
Mr. Patterson. Yes, ma'am?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Can you share that with Congress so that
we have a better understanding how our assets are being
protected?
Mr. Patterson. Yes. We are doing that right now. This is
what we are----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, I know you can't get it all in. Is
there some report or some assessment that I may have missed?
Mr. Patterson. No, ma'am. What we are doing right now is
RAMP--is we are moving from one contractor to another. We are
looking at an interagency agreement with Energy that would
allow us to leverage a contract that is currently in use by
infrastructure protection.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank you. Let me go to Mr.
Goldstein quickly.
How serious is our problem? Is this a good answer to the
protections that we need?
Mr. Goldstein. I think that RAMP can be a useful tool if it
is developed correctly. Now, whether or not you need all of
those in one program, that is a policy decision that FPS has
made.
You certainly do need to have a strong program to ensure
that people are trained and certified. We don't have any
assurance that that is occurring today.
We need to have a building security assessment program that
is robust. There are significant weaknesses in it today.
We don't have an understanding of, on any given day,
whether our contract workforce is showing up, and where they
are posted, and what is going on with them in a way that can be
evaluated against risks that might exist.
So those are all important components. The agency is
understanding that these are not working today and it is trying
to put in place a new program that might help them get there.
Whether or not they can achieve that, you know, I think remains
to be seen----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Training is important on these
contractors?
Mr. Goldstein. Training is critical, ma'am. In one
Operation Shield that I went to late last year where the
agency's inspectors were able to get weapons through the
magnetometers and the X-ray machines undetected, of the 11
people standing post only two had had training.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the Chairman on allowing me a
broad range of questioning, and I thank the Ranking Member for
her courtesies as well.
Mr. Lungren. I thank the gentlelady. Her time is expired.
We have had our round of questions for these witnesses. We
thank you for your presentation and we would excuse you now.
I would ask that our second panel come forward, that is Mr.
Wright and Mr. Amitay.
All right. We thank our two members of the second panel for
taking the time to be with us.
Steve Amitay is the president of Amitay Consulting, a
lobbying and consulting firm in Washington, DC. Since 2006 he
has served as Federal legislative counsel for the National
Association of Security Companies, NASCO, the Nation's largest
contract security association.
For the past 12 years he has represented ASIS
International, the world's largest association of security
professionals, and was involved in the Congressional passage of
the Private Security Officers Employment Authorization Act. Mr.
Amitay previously served as a professional staff member on the
then-Senate Governmental Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on
Government Efficiency, Federalism, and the District of
Columbia.
Mr. David Wright started with the Federal Protective
Service in July 1986. He was promoted to inspector in the year
2000, and in January 2006 he formed a local--chartered by the
American Federation of Government Employees in April 2006. He
has held the position of president since that time. Mr. Wright
is a U.S. Navy veteran.
Mr. Wright has a report to be included with his testimony
that was distributed in advance and so I ask unanimous consent
to include his report in the hearing record. Hearing no
objection, it is so ordered.*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The information has been retained in committee files.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gentlemen, your testimony--your written testimony--will be
made a part of the record in full, and we would ask that you
would attempt to summarize your remarks within 5 minutes.
Mr. Amitay, I would now recognize you to testify.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN AMITAY, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF SECURITY COMPANIES
Mr. Amitay. Chairman Lungren and Ranking Member Clarke----
Mr. Lungren. You need the mic.
Mr. Amitay [continuing]. And distinguished Members of the
subcommittee, my name is Stephen Amitay and I am Federal
legislative counsel to NASCO, the National Association of
Security Companies. Nearly 2 million people are employed in
private security domestically and approximately 75 percent of
private security officers work for contract security companies.
NASCO is the Nation's largest contract security trade
association, and as the leading representative of the industry
NASCO works with legislators and officials at every level of
government on issues that affect contract security companies
and their officers.
At the Federal level, as you mentioned, NASCO was the
driving force behind the 2004 passage of the Private Security
Officer Employment Authorization Act, which provided employers
of private security officers Federal authorization to request
criminal background checks on their officers. Since then NASCO
has been working to establish an effective State and National
process to conduct these checks.
Of more relevance to today's hearing, over the past several
years NASCO has worked with Congress, the Federal Protective
Service, and the Government Accountability Office on issues of
legislation related to FPS and the FPS contract guard program.
We remain ready, willing, and able to provide further such
assistance and consultation with all these entities.
There is no doubt that FPS faces some serious challenges in
its mission to secure Federal facilities, and over the past
several years the GAO has uncovered deficiencies within the FPS
contract guard program. While there have been problems with
individual contractors and incidents of poor performance by
security officers GAO has never inferred that contract security
officers are not capable of providing effective security, and
those who believe officer performance will be improved by going
down the extremely costly and cumbersome path of Federalization
are mistaken. One only needs to look at the current performance
and other problems of the Federalized TSA screener force to see
that Federalization is not the prescription for better
security.
What can improve the security provided by FPS and its
contract security officers is better training, oversight,
management, record-keeping, and contracting. In its review of
FPS GAO has made numerous recommendations to FPS in this area.
However, as Congresswoman Richardson inferred, the underlying
foundation of any action taken by FPS to improve the contract
guard program must be a strong working relationship between FPS
and its contract security partners.
FPS is not the only Federal agency that contracts for
security services. There are probably about 20,000 to 30,000
contract guards being utilized by other Federal agencies. But
while these agencies routinely bring in security contractors to
discuss possible changes and new requirements, put out draft
RFPs, provide specific performance guidance when asked, and
work closely with contractors on major initiatives, this has
generally not been the case with FPS.
When it comes to topics such as training, deploying, and
supervising security officers, security service contracting,
and other topics related to the business of security services,
often the security contractor who is working with FPS has
vastly more knowledge and experience than FPS contracting
officers and inspector. It goes without saying that FPS
contractors, just like FPS, have a vested interest in the
success of the agency in using contract security officers to
secure Federal facilities.
It makes little sense for FPS not to be seeking greater
cooperation and consultation with contractors on contract guard
program issues. One wonders if--maybe, if contractors were
consulting during the development of RAMP, which, as we have
been told today, was being created to better track security
officer certifications and post orders, if things may have
turned out better. We look forward to working with FPS on the
second generation of RAMP, if possible.
Overall, a major theme being emphasized now at FPS is
standardization, and NASCO fully agrees that greater
standardization and consistency across all elements of the
contract guard program will improve performance and cost
efficiency.
Often FPS policies and actions are not--not only vary from
region to region, but within region from building to building
and contract to contract. This can lead to confusion, increased
costs, and problems with performance. Greater standardization
and consistency is needed in contracting, training, audit, data
management, equipment, post orders, and in other issues.
Again, the success of FPS efforts to standardize and
improve these elements of the contract guard program can be
greatly enhanced if they are undertaken with meaningful input
from contractors.
Related to standardization and what can also improve
contractor and security officer performance is greater guidance
from FPS on key issues, such as how to deal with possibly
dangerous individuals, the amount of supervision required in a
contract, building evacuation plans, and other issues. Greater
cooperation from FPS is also needed in disciplinary actions
against officers and with providing certification information
about incumbent officers when a contract is up for bid.
Through greater standardization, providing better guidance,
adopting successful contracting and management policies, and
most of all, through a better working relationship with
security contractors, FPS not only can increase the level of
security provided at Federal buildings but also do so in a
cost-efficient manner.
In closing, under the tenure of Director Patterson FPS has
reached out to contractors in new and positive ways, which bode
well for future relationship and cooperation between FPS and
its contract partners. NASCO and the contract community stand
ready, willing, and able to work with FPS and Congress to
address the current challenges that are impeding better
performance by security officers and contractors at FPS.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Amitay follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen Amitay
July 13, 2011
background on nasco and private security
NASCO is the Nation's largest contract security trade association,
whose member companies employ more than 300,000 security officers
across the Nation who are servicing commercial and Governmental clients
including the Federal Protective Service (FPS). Formed in 1972, NASCO
strives to increase awareness and understanding among policy-makers,
consumers, the media and the general public of the important role of
private security in safeguarding persons and property. At the same
time, NASCO has been the leading advocate for raising standards for the
licensing of private security firms and the registration, screening,
and training of security officers, and NASCO has worked with
legislators and officials at every level of government to put in place
higher standards for companies and officers. As the recognized source
of information and views for the contract security industry, NASCO
regularly holds seminars and other events for industry which provide a
forum for information and interaction with Members of Congress,
Congressional staff, Federal officials legal and policy experts on
Governmental and other issues and activities affecting the private
security industry.
At the Federal level, NASCO was the driving force behind the 2004
passage of the Private Security Officers Employment Authorization Act
(PSOEAA), which authorized all employers of private security officers
to request FBI criminal background checks on their officers, and NASCO
is continuing to work to establish an effective and comprehensive
PSOEAA check process. Of more relevance to today's hearing, for the
past several years, NASCO has worked closely with both the House and
the Senate Homeland Security Committees, the Federal Protective Service
(FPS), and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) on issues and
legislation related to FPS and the FPS Contract Guard Program. NASCO
testified at the two hearing last Congress on FPS that were held by the
Full Committee.
Nearly 2 million people are employed in private security
domestically compared to fewer than 700,000 public law enforcement
personnel. Approximately 75 percent of private security personnel work
for contract security companies, with the balance serving as
proprietary or ``in-house'' security. The vast majority of contract
security firms employ many former law enforcement and military
personnel in management and as security officers. Private security
officers are guarding Federal buildings, courthouses, military
installations, critical infrastructure facilities, businesses, and
public areas. Private security officers are often the ``first''
responder on the scene of a security or terrorism-related incident
providing crucial support to public law enforcement. In addition, with
increasing fiscal pressure on Governmental entities, private security
is increasingly relied upon to fill the gaps resulting from law
enforcement funding cutbacks.
At the Federal level, not including the military services, there
are approximately 35,000 to 40,000 private security officers working
for various Federal agencies with almost 15,000 at FPS.
challenges of the federal protective service
introduction
There is no doubt that FPS faces some serious challenges in its
mission to protect over 9,000 Federal facilities of which at over 2,300
facilities approximately 15,000 contract Protective Security Officers
(``PSO's'') are deployed. And over the past several years, the GAO has
uncovered deficiencies within the FPS ``Contract Guard Program.''
However, GAO has never inferred that contract security officers are
incapable or unable to provide effective security, and GAO has made
repeated recommendations to FPS of steps it should take related to
training, oversight, management, contracting, and recordkeeping that
will improve the operation of the Contract Guard Program and PSO
performance.
NASCO believes that FPS, working with security contractors, can
address the current challenges, laid out in this testimony, that are
impeding better performance by PSO's and contractors. NASCO also stands
ready to work with the Members of this subcommittee and others in
Congress to improve the operation of FPS through authorization and
reform legislation.
Under the tenure of Director Patterson, FPS has reached out to
contractors in new and positive ways which bode well for the future
relationship and cooperation between FPS and its contractor
``partners.'' FPS security contractors have considerable expertise and
working experience in matters related to contract officer training,
deployment, tracking, communication, that can benefit FPS. One wonders
if maybe contractors were consulted during the development of the RAMP
program, which was touted as an easy to use interactive database that
would track PSO records, things may have turned out better.
Overall, a major theme being emphasized now at FPS is
standardization and NASCO fully agrees that greater standardization and
consistency across all elements of the Contract Guard Program will be
of great benefit to FPS and contractors. Often FPS policies and actions
not only vary from region to region but within regions from building to
building and contract to contract. In addition to working more closely
with contractors, FPS could also benefit from adopting successful
contracting and management policies and procedures that other Federal
agencies use with their contract security contracts and contractors.
While there is much to criticize and question at FPS, it must be
emphasized that the relative situation for contractors has improved
dramatically over the past couple years and under Director Patterson
the degree of communication between FPS and contractors is at a new
level. Whether this better attitude translates into working
relationships on various items--and currently no mechanism exists for
new initiatives to be vetted through industry prior to implementation--
remains to be seen, but the contracting community has reason to
optimistic.
federalization is not the answer
While some have suggested that the solution to improving security
officer performance is to ``Federalize'' the FPS contract security
officers, such a ``solution'' lacks any substantive rationale or proof.
In fact, one can look at the current performance problems of the
Federalized TSA screener force (and performance comparisons with non-
Federalized airport screeners) and it abundantly clear that the
``Federalization'' is not the prescription for better screening
performance. What is clear though about ``Federalization'' is that it
would greatly increase the costs to FPS and the American people. In
2009, in response to a question at a Senate FPS hearing, then FPS
Director Gary Shenkel estimated that on an annualized cost basis (thus
not including retirement benefits) Federalizing FPS security officers
would increase costs by about 35% or an extra $400 million per year.
Additionally, in the private sector, constant competition from
other contractors creates an incentive to perform well, employ best
practices, eliminate waste, and seek to constantly improve. Such
performance drivers are not present in the Federal sector and the
Federal workplace is beset with additional employee performance and
motivation issues. Finally, as the TSA Federal screener program has
revealed, the same entity should not serve as the regulator, operator,
and auditor of security services.
the need for greater cooperation between fps and contractors and better
fps guidance
As noted above, while the relationship between FPS and contractors
seems to be on the upswing, one problem that has plagued FPS for years
is its treatment and lack of consultation with security contractors.
FPS is not the only Federal agency that contracts for security
services, but while other agencies routinely bring in security
contractors to discuss possible changes and new requirements, put out
draft RFP's for contractors to comment upon, provide specific guidance
when asked, and work hand-in-hand with contractors on key issues, this
has generally not been the case with FPS. When it comes to topics such
as the training, deploying, and supervising of security officers at
buildings, security service contracting, and other topics related to
the ``business'' of security services, often the security contractors
working with FPS have vastly more knowledge and experience than FPS
contracting officers and inspectors. It also goes without saying that
FPS contractors have a vested interested in the successful provision of
security at Federal facilities by FPS and they want to see FPS operate
as effectively as possible.
While there are signs that FPS is being more proactive and positive
with contractors such as the establishment of Regional Industry Days
and quarterly meetings with individual contractors, and a greater
willingness to address ``legal liability'' issues, there is still much
more that can be done to improve the relationship. Only recently, has
the FPS sought out the experience, expertise and views of its
``partners'' on a small amount of substantive Contract Guard Program
initiatives. In addition, in many key areas related to PSO performance
and contracting, FPS has not adequately addressed contractor concerns
and provided clear guidance. Not only can a better working relationship
between FPS and contractors and better guidance provided to contractors
lead to improved and more effective building security, but it could
also save FPS money.
As mentioned above, FPS contractors were not consulted during the
development of RAMP and were constantly told different things about the
system. Now, after a year or so of operation, RAMP could prove to be a
very costly mistake. Even when it was up and running, there were major
problems, mostly relating to fact that contractor's could not access
the database.
While not as drastic, a similar misstep was brewing with the
current FPS effort (``National Training Initiative'') to increase and
improve the substance and delivery of PSO training. Currently PSO
training totals about 128 hours of which 112 is provided by the
contractor. No one will argue that PSO training needed to be updated,
improved, and standardized, and some of the improvements that have been
rolled out so far have been very positive. At the outset of the
initiative several years ago, during a PSO ``job task analysis''
contractors (including NASCO) were consulted. However, for a long
period of time not much about the NTI was revealed to contractors nor
was there any consultation. Thus, it came as quite a shock to the
contracting community last December when FPS shared with NASCO a
proposal to replace the current 128 hours of training with an existing
337-hour FLETC training program for ``Infrastructure Protection
Officers.'' Yes, such training would be standardized and likely to
improve performance, but logistically it would be incredibly difficult
to undertake and the costs would be astronomical. After receiving
further input, FPS drilled further down on what training was needed for
PSO ``critical tasks'' and determined such a program was not necessary.
Related to the lack of contractor input on the ``National Training
Initiative'' is a similar lack of contractor input on a concurrent FPS
effort to improve X-ray and Magnetometer training called the ``National
Weapons Detection Training Program''. The Program would increase
current FPS provided X-ray and Magnetometer training--a crucial piece
of training--from 8 hours to 16 hours. FPS proposed the new training
after the first 2009 GAO Report that found weaknesses in the
performance of PSO's and FPS training. Last year, GAO reported that the
16 hours of training was supposed to be delivered to all PSO's by the
end of 2010. At last check, the training program was still under review
and revision at FPS HQ--almost 2 years after it was proposed. Again,
contractors, who have extensive experience with X-ray/Magnetometer
training, including their own programs that have been certified by
other Governmental entities, have not been consulted by FPS on
developing the new training nor approached on any type of beta testing
of the new program in the field.
Also, guidance from FPS to contractors is lacking in many critical
areas despite repeated attempts by contractors to obtain clearer
guidance. One such area is guidance related to detaining individuals.
There is a thin line between what constitutes detention and what
constitutes an arrest, and a PSO and his employer could face legal
liabilities in cases of ``false arrest.'' Contractors have told FPS
that the current Security Guard Information Manual (SGIM) is vague and
unclear in this area.\1\ Making the situation more confusing, FPS
officials in the field are giving PSO's detention instructions that
differ from what is in the SGIM. Despite these obvious problems, FPS
has yet to provide stronger and more consistent guidance in this area.
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\1\ For instance, PSO's are sometimes required to pat down
individuals and if something is found the individual is asked to remove
it. However, in cases where the individual refuses, there is no
guidance.
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Related to a lack of guidance is a lack of cooperation with
disciplining officers. Both FPS and contractors would benefit from
greater coordination and mutual support with regard to the discipline
and removal of contract security officers. Contractors fully understand
that it is the contractor's responsibility to discipline employees.
However, when discipline is based solely on the observations or
information provided by FPS or other Government officials, it is
critical that the contractor be able to present those observations or
information in any subsequent labor or legal action. Currently, FPS is
reluctant to permit its officials to testify in labor arbitrations, to
provide videotapes, or even to allow the contractor to communicate
directly with its tenant agency personnel. This can make it virtually
impossible to defend a suspension or termination when the affected
employee files a union grievance. FPS does not benefit when a
terminated contract security officer wins reinstatement and back pay
because the relevant information was withheld from the union
arbitration.
Post Orders represent a vexing problem for PSO's and contractors.
Post Orders can conflict with the desires of the actual building
manager of the facility being protected. This can put the contractor
and the PSO in a difficult position, and potentially may compromise
facility security. More so, Post Orders are fairly nebulous and vague,
and can be different for functionally identical posts, such as Social
Security Administration offices. In addition, changes to Post Orders
are often made verbally with no concurrent written update. Similar
problems exist with Occupant Emergency Plans (OEPs) which often are not
current, and in some facilities are nonexistent. However, in such
facilities, the PSO on post is still responsible for the safe and
effective evacuation of facility occupants. Without an OEP, the
security officer will have to rely on his own judgment, and his own
knowledge of the facility, which may be incomplete. Every facility
should have a current OEP for the guidance of the security officer on
post.
In the Senate FPS Reform bill (S. 772) there is language related to
requiring FPS to initially update and then regularly update the
Security Guard Information Manual and post orders for each guard post
overseen by the FPS. A requirement to update the SGIM, post orders, and
also Occupant Emergency Plans should be considered for inclusion in
possible House legislation.
Other areas in need of better guidance are Supervision and Relief
and Dual Employment.
On a positive note, more recently, at a meeting in the National
Capital Region (NCR), the largest FPS region by far, FPS actively
reached out to contractors to involve them from the ground floor in a
new effort to utilize the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)
to provide alerts, bulletins, and critical information to contractors
on a timely basis. Later HSIN could be used to conduct on-line
training, track posts, and fill out incident reports. FPS officials at
the meeting stated that they did not want to create another thing that
``we think is great'' but ``users don't like'' and FPS said they wanted
to hear from their ``partners'' (the contractors). As such, a pilot
program using HSIN is being set up in the NCR.
NASCO and the FPS contractor community remain ready, willing, and
able to work with FPS to improve the current training and delivery
methods, improve guidance given to contractors and PSO's and assist FPS
in any other way. Contractors have experience with various training
regimes across the Federal Government, in the States, and the
commercial sector. It makes sense that pilots or ``beta testing'' (like
what is contemplated with HSIN) should be developed prior to National
implementation of new programs and feedback opportunities should be
built into new programs shortly after roll out. This will provide FPS
with the ability to more quickly respond to changes that would allow
these new initiatives to be more efficient and effective in the field.
The HSIN pilot program represents a very positive development in
terms of cooperating with contractors and showing them the professional
respect that a ``partner'' deserves. However, whether this represents a
``sea change'' in FPS' relationship with contractors remains to be seen
and there are still a great deal of other important issues that need
addressing.
training and standardization
One area where there continues to be room for improvement at FPS is
with the training of PSO's, including training substance,
standardization, delivery, verification, and availability. First off
though, FPS is to be commended for recent improvements/updates it has
made to various PSO training, certification, and equipment requirements
and its goal toward greater standardization of training. These include
new physical agility test standards, increasing firearm qualification
from once to twice a year, standardizing equipment, and other changes.
Recently, these new standards in training helped contractors meet FEMA
requirements to move PSO's across State lines during the recent spate
of natural disasters.\2\
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\2\ With the standardized PSO training, FEMA is getting a
consistent and expected level of PSO everywhere from CA to ND to AL.
Although this is a positive development, it is still hindered by the
requirement to have State and local licensure, even during emergency
response situations. Given that there is a new, substantive training
standard, the time might be right for FPS to approach local
jurisdictions through MOU's (or Congress through legislation) that
allows the temporary posting of PSOs for emergency response situations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While FPS has made strides in improving training and
standardization, there is still room for much more. Weapons training
and standardization is a prime example. As for training, a lack of
consistency in approach has caused some PSOs to be disqualified where
they might not be somewhere else in the country.\3\ Contractors are
comfortable with and can train to any standard. FPS range review
officers should be provided with standardized instruction in how to
assess the training. In addition, contractors would like to see greater
standardization in the caliber of weapons. Currently, the weapon varies
from region to region. While some areas still use a .38 caliber
revolver, others use a 9mm or .40 S&W semiautomatics, and yet others
are using a .357 SIG semiautomatic. Standardization of the weapon
caliber across all regions would have several benefits: It will permit
contractors to create and implement a Nation-wide training syllabus and
training standard. This will allow contractor trainers to focus on a
single standard and improve proficiency. Standardization across all
regions will assist with disaster and surge response, allowing
contractors to move security officers across regions more efficiently.
The Government would realize some cost savings long-term because the
same weapon can be used on all contracts, and no change in weapon
platform changes would be required when contractors change. For similar
reasons, FPS would benefit from standardizing the requirement for OC
``pepper'' spray. Currently, some contracts require OC spray while
others do not.
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\3\ In a related example, recently some PSO's went to an FPS
weapons qualification course dressed in Government approved fatigues,
which have been accepted by FPS qualifiers in the past, but were not on
that day, and so the PSO's were turned away.
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Another area of training where improvement is needed, and was noted
by GAO, is building-specific and scenario-specific training.
While FPS is to be applauded for the steps it is taking to improve
and standardize training, there are still a number of training-related
issues and inconsistencies that NASCO and FPS contractors stand ready
to work with FPS and Congress to identify and address.
Perhaps though the greatest problem related to training is not so
much substance but the lack of FPS time and resources for training
delivery and oversight. As more and more is added to the
responsibilities of FPS inspectors some functions have slipped to a
lower priority. This includes such areas as weapons training oversight
and Government-supplied training. These cause delays in deployment of
new PSOs and contractors build higher levels of overtime into proposals
to compensate for these delays, thus potentially costing the Government
more than might be expected.
In its July 2009 report on the Contract Guard Program the GAO noted
that in some cases the FPS provided 8 hours of X-ray/Magnetometer
training was simply not provided to contract security officers or in
other cases it was inadequate and not uniform. While FPS' response was:
(1) Not all PSO posts required X-ray/Mag training; and (2) FPS would
increase X-ray/Mag training to 16 hours, as noted above, that 16-hour
training course still has not been developed. More so, with staffing
shortages and competing demands, it is unlikely the training will be
delivered efficiently and soon enough. In many cases, the single
qualified FPS Inspector also serves as the Area Commander and
Contracting Officer's Technical Representative, so the X-ray/Mag
training is at best a secondary duty, more likely a tertiary duty.
Given the scrutiny that is being applied to the Mag and X-ray
screening, and the vital importance of this screening to keep
explosives and weapons out of Federal facilities, this is not a good
situation.
As alluded to above, one solution to address the inability of FPS
to produce on a timely basis effective X-Ray/Mag training is to consult
with security contractors who have already developed such training on
their own that is used for other clients and to test their PSO's.\4\
More so, a proven way that FPS can address its lack of training
personnel is to follow the example of numerous State governments who
``certify'' private trainers to provide the required training
(firearms, handcuff, baton, ``pepper spray'') that security officers
need to obtain State licenses and certifications. Contract trainers
could go through an FPS ``train the trainer'' program and receive
certification to train and qualify PSO's on the current contractor
provided training and the X-ray/Mag training.\5\ Such a ``certified''
trainer program would create more uniform and ``trusted'' training and
contractor trainers are much more flexible in terms of scheduling than
FPS trainers and less expensive. FPS inspectors could still audit and
spot-check training but they could reduce the amount of training
monitoring they have to perform and would be freed up to attend to more
important duties. In the Senate FPS Reform Bill (S. 772) there is a
requirement that by 2014 at least 25% of all training be monitored by
FPS. This would not be necessary with a certified trainer program and
also would be incredibly labor intensive and disruptive for the
contractors. In fact, due to the current overburdening of FPS staff,
FPS is not even able to meet the current 10% monitoring requirement,
let alone meet an increased requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ In the past, an FPS contractor developed an X-ray/Mag training
program that FPS stated would be a sufficient substitute for the 8-hour
FPS provided course. However, FPS later rescinded that approval.
\5\ Given that contractors supply the vast of amount training to
PSO's why does FPS have to supply the X-ray/Mag training? PSO's who
fail field X-ray/Mag tests obviously passed the FPS X-ray/Mag training
or they would not have been deployed in the first place. The key is
better training and better supervision in the field, not who
administers the training.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
better oversight, management, and contracting
In past reports, the GAO has called for better management and
oversight of Contract Guard and Program contracts. Over the past
several years, FPS has made moves to professionalize and standardize
the contracting process and the contracting personnel with positive
results. The ability of the industry to understand what is expected
both in Contract Administration/Proposal Development and in Service
Delivery/Officer Standards is much better, and it allows the Government
to achieve a higher level of consistency/lower level of risk from
building to building, from officer to officer.
However, improvement is still needed. Like other agencies, FPS
should consult more with contractors on the procurement process and the
upfront aspects of procurement; development of the scope of work,
establishing evaluation criteria, setting realistic and detailed
financial parameters to ensure realistic pricing submissions--must be
at the core of the FPS Mission to improve quality. Doing so will have
much more effect on quality than post award remediation and training.
Another issue is that FPS contracting personnel do not coordinate
with FPS field personnel in creating solicitation standards and
evaluating contractor proposals. Currently, solicitations are allowing
contractors to propose supervision plans based on their best judgment
of post requirements, while at the same time aiming toward a
competitive low cost. The evaluation board accepts the proposal that it
considers to be ``best value,'' but it appears that the FPS field
personnel are not on board with that process. As a result, when the
contractor attempts to implement the supervision plan that was accepted
as part of the winning bid, the FPS field personnel often object that
it is inadequate. Both FPS and contractors would benefit from including
a minimum supervision requirement in each solicitation that has been
evaluated and reviewed by the Contracting Officer's Technical
Representative and other FPS field personnel. This will allow a better
understanding of contract requirements, and allow contractors to fully
price the actual requirements on the front end, instead of fighting
with FPS for reimbursement of increased costs after the contract is
awarded.
A real sore point with contractors is the fact that FPS will not
provide any of the certifications held by incumbent PSO's to the
successor contractor, who by Executive Order, is required to offer all
qualified PS's a position under the new contractor. Thus, when bidding
a contract, a contractor has no idea if the current officers hold the
proper certifications or meet the training requirements. Theoretically,
a new contractor would have to consider pricing in full retraining and
certification of incumbent officers since it can only guess how many
incumbent officers fully meet the new contract requirements. It is not
reasonable to expect the old contractor to turn over the records or for
the PSO to have them. FPS has said it will work with contractors on
transition issues, but a responsible bidder cannot rely upon such
statements when formulating a proposal. A requirement for FPS to make
available certification and qualification data could save money in the
procurement process.
Finally, there are still concerns that some FPS contracting
officials are looking more at ``low cost'' than ``best value.'' While a
``best value'' evaluation is required, there is ample evidence that
awards allegedly based on ``best value'' are more realistically based
on lowest cost, and technical capability and past performance are not
being valued as they should. The FPS is now placing more emphasis on
past performance rather than the ``low bid'' approach but price is
still a deciding factor (the three evaluation criteria are now past
performance, technical approach, and price). NASCO supports the
inclusion of higher performance related standards in contracts, as well
as taking steps to ensure that the quality of a company's training,
personnel, management, and operational procedures--which result in a
higher bid--are adequately considered during the procurement process.
Companies should not be essentially penalized for going beyond the
minimum training and management standards required by the contract.
In terms of oversight, FPS is to be commended for its efforts at
quality assurance through Operation Shield. Many contractors have
similar internal Red Team exercises and see the value of this effort.
One issue that FPS is working on is to get the results of Operation
Shield exercises to the contractors more quickly. Currently, results
may follow by a few days, making it difficult to determine who was
posted on which equipment during the test and even harder to determine
corrective action for individual officers.
FPS is also moving in the right direction with mid-year reviews and
the administrative process associated with suitability determinations
for new hires. FPS is coming close to meeting the standard for response
times. By FPS facilitating the process efficiently, PSOs are getting
out to the field and on post faster. This cuts down on the number of
potential PSOs who find other jobs in the midst of the process due to
the time lag between conditional job offers and actual posting. It also
reduces the number of backgrounds performed since we put fewer
potential candidates through the system.
In the area of audits, there is still a lot of inconsistency. One
problem is that sometimes COTRS use contractors on audits who do not
understand the contract.
data management
Much has been reported on RAMP and a GAO Report is due out soon.
While RAMP may turn out to be a failure, what still remains is the need
to better manage and store contractor and PSO-related data. More so,
FPS should be the central repository for all certification records. It
is hard to understand why FPS does not maintain the documentation
regarding all the PSO's qualifications. They are essentially
``licensing'' the PSOs but they don't have any evidence other than an
``entry'' in RAMP.
Another issue that has been a persistent problem is how the
security of individual Federal buildings is managed. Building security
is managed by what is referred to as a Facility Security Committee
(FSC) made up of building tenant representatives, who more often than
not do have any security background. The FSC is commonly chaired by a
primary tenant agency of the building. Often, the FSC is more
interested in ``customer service'' than building security. This forces
the security contractor to answer to two masters when the FSC does not
want to cause any hindrance to the access to the building through the
now more stringent access control processes as advocated by the FPS. In
the Senate bill, S. 772 there is language that requires basic security
training to be provided to all members of an FSC, and outlines its
responsibilities. Security companies should also be allowed to
participate in Facility Security Committees. While this subject matter
may not be under the jurisdiction of the Homeland Security Committee,
it is an important issue. Of note, the Interagency Security Committee
will soon be coming out with a Standard for Facility Security
Committees.
conclusion
While I have outlined a host of issue and problems at FPS related
to the Contract Guard Program, it is important to note that FPS has
come a long way since its troubled time within ICE, and by partnering
with quality private companies; the security of Federal buildings will
improve. FPS' relationship with security contractors is definitely on
the rise with greater communication between FPS and contractors and a
willingness by FPS to work with contractors on Contract Guard Program
issues. FPS is taking strides toward National standards that work, they
are focusing more on training and contracting and it is getting more
efficient. Clearly there is work to be done, but under the stewardship
of Director Patterson, FPS is definitely going in the right direction.
NASCO and Federal security contractor stand ready to work FPS and
this committee to improve the performance of FPS and the 15,000
contract Protective Security Officers deployed by FPS at Federal
facilities.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Amitay.
The Chairman will now recognize Mr. Wright for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF DAVID L. WRIGHT, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL FEDERAL
PROTECTIVE SERVICE UNION, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES
Mr. Wright. Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke,
Members of the committee, my name is David Wright. I am
president of AFGE Local 918, the NPPD Union, which represents
the dedicated men and women of the Federal Protective Service.
I have been an FPS law enforcement officer for the past 25
years.
In almost 10 years since 9/11 the FPS has faced many
challenges. During the last 3 years the need for reform has
been well documented in numerous reports by the GAO and nine
hearings by committees of the House and Senate.
The Union has produced an analysis of these actions
entitled ``Federal Building Insecurity: A Chronicle of
Government Inaction,'' which is included in the record. It is a
summary of GAO reports, Congressional hearings, and terror
incidents at Federal facilities which paints a stark picture of
much oversight and little action. It depicts an agency
criticized, underfunded, ill-managed, and still fundamentally
unreformed.
Today I am here to communicate to you that the time for
reports and hearings has passed. It is time for you to act now
to prevent future attacks.
The Senate Homeland Security Government Affairs Committee
has marked up a bill which is now awaiting action on the Senate
floor. Ranking Member Thompson of this committee has introduced
H.R. 176, the FPS Improvement and Accountability Act of 2011.
We encourage this subcommittee and the full Homeland Security
Committee to consider H.R. 176 and its own version of a
comprehensive FPS reform act as soon as possible.
In the last 2 years an IRS office in Austin was attacked by
a disgruntled taxpayer in an airplane. There have been attacks
by gunmen at the Pentagon and at a courthouse in Las Vegas.
Bombs were left at a courthouse in Spokane and at a Federal
building in Detroit. Individuals parked and attempted to
detonate bomb--truck bombs at a courthouse in Springfield,
Illinois, and office building with Federal tenants in Dallas.
Just last month there was a plot to attack a Federal
building in Seattle with automatic weapons and grenades.
Fortunately, the FBI thwarted the bombing in Seattle plots and
arrested the perpetrators.
These plots and attacks clearly indicate there are imminent
threats to Federal workplaces. Had any of the attacks been
successful many lives would have been lost with tragic impact
to both Federal employees and the public.
While everyone in our Nation hopes the successful streak by
the FBI at thwarting these attacks will continue, we have to
realize that hope is not a security countermeasure and we won't
always be lucky. There are simply not enough trained Federal
police officers patrolling our facilities that we protect to
detect or break up terrorist planning cycle or to ensure the
competent performance of over 13,000 contract security guards.
FPS transferred to DHS in 2003 with 1,450 positions; today
we have about 1,225, a cut of 18 percent. Meanwhile, the total
number of DHS employees has increased by 18 percent.
FPS stands alone in the DHS as the only law enforcement
organization with less staff than it had at the Department's
inception. Once again, FPS stands alone in the DHS as the only
law enforcement organization with less staff than it had at the
Department's inception.
Even with the fiscal year 2012 proposed increase in staff
FPS will still have less than 90 percent of the FTE and
capability it had before 9/11. Despite public law that FPS
maintain now fewer than 935 full-time in-service field staff
directly engaged in enforcement of laws at Federal buildings I
have been told that the actual number is barely 800.
Apparently in the bureaucratic world of OMB FPS
headquarters staff and GS-14 and GS-15 regional managers
sitting at desks are considered boots-on-the-ground law
enforcement. A simple reading of the statute indicates
otherwise. This committee should immediately inform DHS and OMB
to comply with that law.
Clearly, with a significant increase in plots and terrorist
attacks affecting Federal facilities immediate legislation to
give DHS and FPS the tools and staff necessary to successfully
protect them is critical. These tools include: Sufficient FPS
law enforcement manpower; law enforcement retirement coverage
for FPS officers to allow for recruitment and retention of top-
notch employees; tools to properly manage the contract security
force; codification of the FPS mission, responsibilities,
functions, and duties; and codification of the roles and
responsibilities of the ISC with clear guidance that DHS is in
charge.
Mr. Chairman, Federal employees and Federal buildings are
at risk. Attacks, whether successful or thwarted, are real
threats and have already cost lives. The sole Federal agency,
FPS, charged with the critical mission of protecting thousands
of Federal buildings and millions of people is faced with
potential failures that if not immediately remedied by Congress
will likely result in further loss of life.
Again, the time for reports and hearings has passed, and if
we are to succeed in preventing the next attack immediate
legislative action to reform the FPS is required now.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I am
available to answer questions.
[The statement of Mr. Wright follows:]
Prepared Statement of David L. Wright
July 13, 2011
Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke and Members of the
committee: My name is David Wright. I am President of AFGE Local 918,
the NPPD Union, which represents the dedicated men and women of the
Federal Protective Service. I have been an FPS Law Enforcement Officer
for the past 25 years. In the almost 10 years since the September 11
attacks, the Federal Protective Service has faced many challenges.
During the last 3 years the need for reform has been well documented in
seven reports by the Government Accountability Office and the nine
hearings by Committees of the House and Senate. The NPPD Union has
produced a ``Chronicle of Federal Inaction'' which is a compendium of
GAO Reports, Congressional hearings, and terror incidents at Federal
facilities and paints a stark picture of much oversight and little
action. It depicts an agency criticized, underfunded, and ill managed,
but still fundamentally unreformed. The time for your action is now!
In the last 18 months under the guidance of Under Secretary Beers
there has been progress, including the selection of a highly qualified
career law enforcement professional as the FPS Director. Both Under
Secretary Beers and Director Patterson have made significant progress
to better protect Federal employees, facilities, and members of the
public who obtain services from their Government, but in doing so, they
have used almost every tool in their toolbox. Today I am here on behalf
of the dedicated law enforcement officers of the FPS to communicate to
you that the time for reports and hearings has passed and immediate
action by the Congress is required to prevent future attacks. The
Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee has marked up
a bill which is now awaiting action on the Senate floor. We urge this
subcommittee and the full Homeland Security Committee to consider and
adopt a comprehensive Federal Protective Service Reform Act as soon as
possible.
federal facilities face increased risk of attack
Today our dedicated civil servants and the facilities where they
work are clearly at heightened risk of attack. In the last 2 years, an
IRS office in Austin was attacked by an airplane and there have been
attacks by gunmen at the Pentagon and a Courthouse in Las Vegas. There
were bombs left at a Courthouse in Spokane and a Federal Building in
Detroit. Individuals parked and attempted to detonate truck bombs at a
Courthouse in Springfield, Illinois; at an office building in Dallas
where the Regional EPA Office is housed; and at a square in Portland,
Oregon which is next to a U.S. Court of Appeals Courthouse. Just last
month there was a plot to attack a Federal building in Seattle with
automatic weapons and grenades. While a Military Entrance Processing
Station was the focus of the plot, that building also houses a
childcare center for Government employees and other Federal offices.
These attackers were not deterred by armed contract guards, and their
plan called for killing the guard as the first step in their attack
plan.
Fortunately, the FBI monitored the truck bombing plots, ensured
real explosives were not present and arrested the perpetrators at the
scene. In the Seattle plot it appears the FBI drew an inside straight
when local law enforcement was alerted by a convicted felon who had
been recruited to participate in the attack. As a result of this
information the FBI was able to thwart the attack.
These plots and attacks clearly indicate there are imminent threats
to Federal workplaces. Had the FBI not detected the plans of the
bombers in Springfield and Dallas, or been informed by a criminal of
the plot in Seattle many lives could have been lost with tragic impact
to both Federal employees and the public. None of these planned or
actual attacks was deterred or detected by FPS, for there are simply
not enough trained Federal Police Officers proactively patrolling the
facilities we protect to detect or break up the terrorist planning
cycle. While everyone in our Nation hopes our inordinately long lucky
streak at detecting and interdicting planned attacks will continue,
hope is not a method and we can't always be lucky. Immediate concrete
legislative action by the Congress is required to give Under Secretary
Beers and Director Patterson the additional tools they need to provide
safe and secure workplaces for the over 1 million dedicated civil
servants who work in the 9,000 FPS-secured facilities located in over
2,100 American communities.
dangerously low staffing levels
FPS is woefully short of the personnel necessary to properly
protect Federal facilities, including those necessary to ensure the
competent performance of the over 13,000 contract guards that assist
with the facilities protection mission. There are simply not enough
Inspectors and Police Officers in the field to reliably detect pre-
operational surveillance or break up an attacker's planning sequence
through pro-active patrols. In fact Inspectors in many regions tell me
they spend almost all their time on the security assessments, guard
post inspections, completing reports and administrative requirements
for contracting officer and coordination with facility security
committees to explain and negotiate necessary security procedures.
There is little time for patrol of facilities other than scheduled
Operation Shields. Since 2003 there has been a significant decrease in
the number of arrests made by FPS Officers, which is indicative of a
much reduced proactive activity level due to reduced service hours and
elimination of Police Officer positions. As an example of reduced
service hours, in 2003 there were more than 10 major cities where FPS
had 24-hour law enforcement coverage; now there are two. Those who want
to attack Federal workplaces don't work bankers' hours and neither
should FPS. Adequate staffing levels for extended service hours in the
largest cities coupled with proactive patrol and frequent contact with
tenants to determine unusual or suspicious circumstances are critical
to preventing future attacks.
Following the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City,
FPS was authorized approximately 1,450 staff. After 9/11 there was no
increase in authorized staff. In 2003 FPS transferred to DHS with
approximately 1,450 positions, with over 92% were assigned to the
regions. In 2007 most of Police Officer positions, which provided
proactive patrol, surveillance detection/deterrence and contract guard
monitoring were eliminated. Today, FPS staffing is slightly over 1,225
with only 80% assigned to the regions. For example, the number of
acquisition and human capital staff who are on the FPS HQ payroll but
do not report to the FPS Director, has more than doubled without
anywhere near a 100% improvement in contract or personnel management.
Unfortunately, FPS stands alone in the DHS as the only organization
with less staff than it had at the Department's inception. While FPS
was cut 18%, the administration and Congress increased the total number
of DHS employees by 18%, from 162,550 in September 2004 to 191,658 in
March 2011. It is time to recognize that the protection of Federal
workplaces is of equal importance to other DHS missions. Had FPS
increased at the same 18% rate as the Department it would have 1,711
personnel and be much better equipped to properly mitigate the risk of
attack.
The below table illustrates differences in average buildings per
Officer, the decrease in service and decrease in arrests between 2003
and 2010. The decrease in arrests is attributed to the virtual
elimination of proactive patrol and curtailed service hours--the
offenses still happen but the perpetrator is not caught.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 2010
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Buildings per Inspector/Police Officer............ 7.7 11.0
GSA Managed Sq Ft per Officer..................... 322,000 426,000
Cities with Night and Weekend Service............. 12 2
Arrests by Officers/Inspectors (Lack of patrol 3,100 1,600
results in fewer arrests)........................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
After the ill-advised and dangerous 2007 attempt by the embedded,
intransigent, and unaccountable bureaucrats at OMB to cut FPS staff by
35% to a total strength of 950, Congress stepped in and established a
minimum number of in-service field staff and a minimum total FPS
personnel strength. As a result, Section 1628 of Public Law 112-10
mandates that, no later than September 30, 2011, the Federal Protective
Service shall maintain not fewer than 1,250 full-time staff and 935
full-time Police Officers, Inspectors, Area Commanders, and Special
Agents who, while working, are directly engaged on a daily basis
protecting and enforcing laws at Federal buildings (referred to as
``in-service field staff''). I have been informed by bargaining unit
members in the regions that the actual number of Inspectors, Police
Officers, Area Commanders, and Special Agents working in the field is
barely 800. Apparently in the bizarre world of OMB and the DHS
Headquarters bureaucrats, personnel assigned to the FPS Headquarters
and GS-14 and -15 regional managers sitting at their desks can be
considered in-service field staff directly engaged in enforcing laws,
when even a simple reading of the statute indicates otherwise.
Therefore, they have not provided the necessary funding to enable FPS
to comply with the law and immediately hire an additional 135 Police
Officers and Inspectors.
The President's 2012 budget requested an increase of 146 positions.
According to the Congressional Justification submitted with the budget,
88 of the positions are for Inspectors to help to bring the regions
that that have the highest risk-based need in alignment with other
regions of similar scope and more evenly distribute the workforce
allocation. The FPS transition to NPPD required the remaining 56
positions to perform oversight and other support functions formerly
provided by ICE as part of their appropriated base. These functions
will now be accomplished by staff on the FPS payroll and paid through
increased security charges to FPS protected facility tenants. Even with
this increase in staff, at the end of 2012, FPS will still have less
than 90% of the capability it had before 9/11.
The fiscal year 2012 FPS Congressional Budget Justification also
states: ``The projected Federal employee to contractor ratio of 1:10
does not provide sufficient capability to assure contractor
performance, particularly the 13,000 contract PSOs located at over
9,000 buildings across the Nation. The fiscal year 2012 request will
result in a Federal employee to contractor ratio of 1:9 which is the
optimal ratio.'' While the FPS field staff will certainly welcome the
long overdue and critically-needed staffing increase, a ratio of one
Federal employee (including support staff, senior managers, and
National Headquarters staff) to 9 contract guards is far from optimum.
The below table illustrates historical ratios of FPS employees to
contract guards. FPS was most successful at accomplishing its mission
with a ratio in the range of three to five guards per FPS employee
rather than the extremely high nine guards per FPS employee.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Guards
Fiscal Year No. of per FPS
Guards Employee
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2000.................................. 5,000 3
Fiscal year 2002.................................. 7,000 5
Fiscal year 2011.................................. 13,000 10
Fiscal year 2012.................................. 13,000 9
------------------------------------------------------------------------
I understand FPS has conducted an analysis of its staffing
requirements that was approved by the Secretary which indicates the
required staff necessary to properly protect Federal employees and
facilities against attack is approximately 2,300. This would provide a
sufficient level of proactive patrol and monitoring of contract guard
performance. At 2,300 employees FPS would have almost the same five
guards per FPS employee ratio as existed prior to 9/11.
In fiscal year 2011 FPS is projected to have 1,225 personnel and
approximately $250 million to protect 9,000 facilities and over 1
million employees Nation-wide. Contrast this with the over 1,600
Capitol Police with $292 million, to protect the Capitol and
Congressional Offices in a 12-block area of Washington, DC; and the
Secret Service has over 1,300 officers in its Uniformed Division, to
protect its assigned facilities in Washington, DC. The Veterans Health
Administration has over 2,500 Police Officers to protect their 154
medical centers Nation-wide. Congress had ensured our veterans
hospitals are adequately protected, now it is time to provide at least
the same protection to other Federal employees and facilities.
hiring and retaining top-notch inspectors and police officers
FPS stands alone within the DHS as the only law enforcement
organization that has not been authorized law enforcement retirement
coverage. Additionally, other agencies with comparable facility
protection missions such as the Capitol Police, Secret Service
Uniformed Division and Park Police have been granted that retirement
coverage. Just as Congress recognized with CBP that the lack of this
coverage affected their ability to recruit and retain high quality
employees it should do the same with FPS. A CBO analysis of the
coverage proposed in the Senate SECURE Facilities Act indicates no
additional cost for the first 20 years--in fact the additional required
retirement contributions by employees would actually reduce the deficit
through increased revenue during that period.
dysfunctional fps funding structure
FPS is funded through offsetting collections. The basic services
provided to all protected facilities are provided through an assessment
per square foot of space occupied by an agency much like a local
property tax rather than a direct fee for service. Facility
countermeasures, including contract guards, are funded by dividing the
cost for those services by the square feet in the building to determine
each tenant agency's share. This is then collected from the agency on a
monthly basis. The funding sources and collection authorities should be
included in an FPS Authorization Act rather than only on a year-to-year
basis in annual Appropriations Acts. Of the $1.2 billion FPS collects
in security charges less than $300 million goes to actual FPS
operations. The remainder is collected and then passed directly through
the FPS account to pay for contract guards and other security
countermeasures. Relying only on increased basic fees, as OMB has done,
ultimately reduces the basic security services agencies can afford and
increases the risk of their employees and facilities to attack. It also
complicates the agency budget process since by the time OMB approves
any increase the agency budgets have been submitted. An appropriated
base for future increases while maintaining the existing basic and
building specific charges could resolve this and other issues. Other
short-term alternatives include extending the basic security charge to
DHS-owned facilities and all unoccupied GSA space in their owned and
leased facilities.
contract guards not adequately monitored or trained
The GAO has clearly documented the risks inherent in depending on
contract guards as a force multiplier without adequate Government
inspection, performance monitoring, and training. Additionally since
contract guards lack the authority to arrest, FPS must have sufficient
staff to respond to guard reports of suspicious or unusual activity and
take appropriate enforcement action. With additional staff, FPS would
have significantly higher assurance guards are performing and are
trained to the specifications of the contract, through robust
inspection and monitoring protocols. Guard training has been noted as
inadequate with potentially tragic results as evidenced by an incident
in Detroit where a Detroit Police Department Sergeant moonlighting as a
FPS Contract Guard unwittingly brought a bomb into a major Federal
building. Contract guards should not have the sole responsibility for
all dedicated facility patrol, access control, CCTV monitoring, and
weapons detection at all facilities--to include complex buildings with
established high and very high risks. Roving patrol and weapons
detection positions at the highest-risk facilities should be performed
by Federal Police Officers, just as they are at the White House, the
Capitol, and Congressional Office Buildings, and the Pentagon. In-
sourcing these positions at select facilities to use FPS Police
Officers would materially reduce the risk of successful attack using
tactics similar to those used by the GAO. Additionally, these entry
level Police Officers would have a natural career path, building on
their experience as Federal officers, to the Federal Protective Officer
and Inspector positions, creating an initial accession position within
FPS. The use of contract guards can continue for monitoring functions,
for agency-specific requirements, and at lower-risk facilities with
guard requirements such as Social Security Offices.
facility security committees fail to approve necessary security
measures
The GAO reported Facility Security Committees, which are not
composed of security professionals, have responsibility for approving
security countermeasures to reduce that facilities vulnerability to
attack. Additionally, due to budget pressures, agencies had competing
uses in addition to security, for their funds. As an example, at an
unguarded courthouse in a western State, there were gunshots directed
into a Congressional office window. FPS has proposed a nighttime guard
for that facility each year since initial building planning in 2002,
but it has never been implemented by the FSC. Action to place DHS in
charge of this process, coupled with a means to collect the cost of
countermeasures deemed mandatory by the ISC are necessary to ensure
facilities are properly protected.
role, mission, and duties of the fps not clearly established in statute
The FPS should have the same clear statutory guidance as other law
enforcement agencies. A FPS Authorization Act should include the
mission, duties, and powers of the Director relative to training and
the primary functions of investigation, law enforcement patrol,
emergency plan assistance, security countermeasures, suitability
adjudication of guards and building service contractors, contracting
for guard service, awareness training for Federal employees and
facility security assessments.
qualification, training, and performance standards for armed or unarmed
contract guards at federal facilities
There are no codified standards for the use of contract guards to
protect Federal facilities. In addition to FPS, several agencies
contract for their guard services and in many cases have less rigorous
training and performance standards than FPS. The FPS should be required
to establish minimum qualification, training, and performance standards
for the use of armed contract guards to protect Federal facilities
subject to ISC standards. The ISC in conjunction with the FPS should
establish companion standards for unarmed contract guards.
Additionally, the FPS should be responsible for providing all armed
guard services to non-court facilities subject to ISC standards.
Establishing standard requirements and limiting which agencies can
procure guard services will allow the Government to achieve economies
of scale, reduction of other agency contracting/security staff, and
would likely result in considerable cost savings.
isc guidance misinterpreted by facility security committees
The Interagency Security Committee (ISC) recently promulgated new
guidance on the establishment of Facility Security Level (FSL). The FSL
determines what level of protection a building should have. Members of
the GSA and other agency security staff have stated that if a facility
is not going to implement required security standards for that level,
the FSL level should be downgraded as a risk acceptance measure. This
has the effect of hiding, not mitigating risk. DHS should be assigned a
clearly defined management and oversight role for the ISC to ensure
consistent implementation of its critical security guidance, rather
than the ``consensus basis'' under which it currently operates.
Facility Security Levels should be set by the professionals in the
agency that provides law enforcement and security to the facility in
accordance with ISC guidance.
dhs lacks statutory authority to enforce security standards
When President Clinton issued Executive Order 12977 in 1995
establishing the ISC, he specified that the GSA Chair the Committee
with Director (then Assistant Commissioner) of FPS as a full member of
the ISC. He also made the Director of FPS responsible for monitoring
Federal agency compliance with the policies and recommendations of the
ISC. When the Bush administration revised the order upon the creation
of DHS, the critical monitoring role was eliminated. The duties, roles,
and responsibilities of the committee and the chair should be codified
to promote efficiency and clarity in the provision of facility security
across all agencies. The DHS Secretary should be given clear authority
for oversight and control of the ISC.
agencies security organizations attempt to provide services that fps
delivers more efficiently
Since 2001 the number of non-DOD security specialists and police
officers has increased in the Government by over 3,200 positions. For
example, CBP security staff has increased by over 200% CIS by over
135%; ICE by over 260% and FEMA by over 92%. Even GSA--whose security
mission was transferred with FPS to DHS--increased its security staff
by over 650%.
Many of these security positions appear to duplicate functions and
services provided by FPS, and may represent inefficient agency empire
building. Some agencies have even claimed that since they have security
specialists they should not have to pay security charges. This is like
a homeowner buying a shotgun and garden hose, then claiming he should
be exempt from paying taxes for police and fire protection. Ad hoc
security staff and procedures can create additional vulnerabilities and
make coordination of Government-wide standards difficult. It was even
reported that the DHS Office of Security attempted to create its own
law enforcement agency to protect its GSA-owned space, rather than use
FPS for the service. The ``I will take care of my agency and everyone
else be dammed'' attitude prevalent in some of these uncoordinated
security staffs increase both the overall cost and the risk that we may
fail to put the pieces together to prevent an attack. These separate
organizations each build their own supervisory and overhead staff and
in total cost more than placing the responsibility with a single
agency. A single provider like FPS can achieve Nation-wide economies of
scale that elude most non-DOD security staffs potentially resulting in
substantial savings.
recommended immediate congressional actions to prevent attacks
The critical tools necessary for successful protection of Federal
workplaces include sufficient FPS law enforcement officers, measures to
allow FPS to recruit and retain top-notch employees, tools to properly
manage the contract security force until many of these positions can be
in-sourced, codification of the FPS mission, and delineation of the
responsibilities of the Interagency Security Committee and facility
security committees.
1. Provide sufficient minimum FPS staffing levels to properly
protect Federal facilities:
The Congress should immediately notify the DHS Secretary
and the Director of OMB that staff assigned to FPS HQ and
GS-14 and -15 managers are not field staff; the current
staffing situation is unacceptable; and inform them they
must comply with the law which requires 935 in-service
field staff before September 30, 2011.
Until an FPS authorization bill that establishes the FPS
missions and sets minimum staffing levels is enacted,
restore the annual Appropriations Act rider setting minimum
levels of in-service field staff. For fiscal year 2013 this
level should be set to at least 1,450 total staff with a
minimum of 1,325 in-service field staff to match the number
of positions FPS came to DHS with. Restore full-time Police
Officer positions responsible for proactive patrol coupled
with extended service hours in New York City and other
major cities.
2. Authorize FPS Officers Law Enforcement Retirement on the same
basis as CBP Officers.
3. Establish standard minimum requirements for contract guards at
all Federal facilities:
Assign FPS responsibility to establish minimum
qualification, training, and performance standards.
Achieve economies of scale by mandating FPS as the source
of armed guards at all facilities under ISC standards.
Modify procurement rules to ensure the most effective and
efficient providers with proven track records of superior
performance fill these critical requirements.
4. Clearly establish an FPS funding mechanism that results in
sufficient security measures to prevent future attacks:
Consider an appropriated base for increased staff
requirements.
Consider extending the basic security charge to DHS-owned
facilities and all unoccupied GSA space within their owned
and leased facilities.
5. Codify the roles and responsibilities of the ISC:
With the mandate of section 1315 of title 40 USC that the
DHS protect all Federal facilities, the ISC should be
codified as well.
FPS should be restored to its roles in the original
directive.
Clear guidance should be provided that DHS is in charge of
security standards for Federal facilities. Federal facility
security standards are too important to be left to a
consensus decision by ad hoc committee members.
6. Establish FPS as the primary law enforcement and security
provider for facilities subject to ISC standards:
Achieve personnel and other cost savings using the FPS
National economies of scale to provide facility security
and law enforcement services.
Maintain current status for U.S. Marshals, Secret Service,
and FBI.
7. Require critical security positions provided by contract guards
be in-sourced:
Just as Congress and the White House use Federal Police
Officers for dedicated patrol and weapons detection
positions, all high-risk Federal facilities should use
these highly qualified law enforcement personnel rather
than depending entirely on contract guards to perform these
functions.
Direct the Department to in-source these positions.
Implement the transition at the rate of 300 officers a
year.
summary
The protection of Federal employees, facilities, and the members of
the public who seek services from their Government has been an
essential function of the Federal Government since 1790 when as a
result of legislation, six night watchmen were hired to protect the
buildings in Washington, DC intended for Government use. Congress again
recognized this solemn obligation when it gave the mission of
protecting Federal facilities to DHS. In placing this mission with the
Department, Congress also recognized making one agency responsible
gives us the best chance of connecting the dots before a future attack.
Additionally, in these times of fiscal constraint, vesting this
responsibility in one organization consumes fewer resources than every
agency building their own security capabilities, a crucial
consideration.
The dedicated men and women of FPS need your immediate help to
enable our success and to protect Federal employees across the country.
Clearly, with the significant increase in plots and terrorist incidents
affecting Federal facilities, legislation to give DHS the necessary
tools and staff is critical. Since 2003 Congress has found the
resources to increase the DHS staff by 18% while FPS was cut by 18%. A
downpayment of at least the same 18% staffing increase the rest of DHS
received since 2003 would be a good start.
Mr. Chairman, Federal Buildings are a real and symbolic target of
domestic and international terrorist and criminal attacks. The
attacks--whether successful or thwarted, covered by the press or not--
are real threats and have already cost peoples' lives. The sole Federal
agency charged with the critical mission of protecting thousands of
Federal buildings and millions of people from these terrorist and
criminal attacks is faced with potential failure that if not
immediately remedied by the Congress, will likely result in tragic loss
of life.
If we are to succeed in preventing the next attack, immediate
legislative action to reform the Federal Protective Service is required
now!
Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify at this important
hearing.
The document chronicling GAO Reports and Congressional hearings to
reform FPS in recent years is attached.*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The document has been retained in committee files.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Wright.
We will now begin our questioning, and I yield myself 5
minutes for questions.
Let's see, Mr. Wright, as an FPS law enforcement officer
did you undergo training in X-ray and magnetometer detection?
Mr. Wright. Through the years since coming on board in
1986--let me back up. When I came on board in 1986 we had
transitioned from FPS employees standing at X-ray machines to a
mobile patrol force. I have relatively little X-ray and
magnetometer training.
Through the years we get the training in an effort to help
train the contract guards, and a lot of it is more familiarity.
Mr. Lungren. Do you think you get sufficient training such
that you can do that job of helping the contract guards or to
be able to observe their performance?
Mr. Wright. At this time, no.
Mr. Lungren. Okay. You have the rank of inspector?
Mr. Wright. Yes.
Mr. Lungren. As an inspector, can you tell me how often you
would visit a facility to which you were assigned? Because that
came up in the last panel about how often these inspections
take place.
Mr. Wright. Right. Actually, I have been out of the field
for quite some time now. Going by facility security levels, a
typical inspector should visit his--the security levels
basically dictate the----
Mr. Lungren. Frequency of the----
Mr. Wright [continuing]. Frequency that an inspector visits
that property. So----
Mr. Lungren. So at least on that level there is some risk
assessment going on. If it is a higher level you would visit
more often.
Mr. Wright. Right. On a daily basis--Federal buildings,
Federal courthouses, regional headquarters, such as that.
Mr. Lungren. Okay.
Mr. Amitay, one criticism of the FPS is that there is a
failure to share information, or at least it has been alleged
that there has been a failure to share information with the
contractors by FPS about training and certification information
with previous contract guards when a contract is taken over by
a new contractor. Is that true?
Mr. Amitay. Yes. By Executive Order incumbent guards have
to be kept on a contract if they are qualified. Yet, when the
successor contractor, though, takes over that contract he
doesn't know which of these guards have the proper
certification or required level of training.
Mr. Lungren. You are not allowed to have that information,
or----
Mr. Amitay. It is not provided by FPS. I am pretty sure it
is allowed, but FPS does not provide information on security
officer certifications and training completions to other
contractors when it comes to bidding for a facility on a new
contract. This is something that the contractors have asked FPS
for this information because then they could more accurately
structure their bids and it would be more precise and be more
cost-efficient.
Mr. Lungren. Now, let me talk about training, because that
has been a big bugaboo around here. Everybody seems to believe
that we don't have the data to find out whether there has been
training.
There appears to be criticism of the supervisory level of
ensuring that the training has been done. There seems to be
some suggestion that training may be uneven across different
contractors and different facilities.
How do you respond to that? What has your observation been?
Some would say, well, if a contractor holds himself or herself
out to be certified you would presume they would take with that
the responsibility of training their people to the level
adequate to perform the task for which they have contracted.
Mr. Amitay. Yes. With training there are a lot of issues:
Non-uniformity, lack of training. One issue that has been
raised today is X-ray-mag training. When Mark Goldstein said
that when they did--with Operation Shield and they went and
they saw that IED components were able to get through the
screening, but then only two of the 11 contractor security
officers on post actually had the training. Well, X-ray-mag
training is the responsibility of FPS to provide, and it is
critical. So this critical training is FPS' responsibility.
Now, one solution that has been offered by contracting
communities--and it is not a novel solution; it is something
that States are doing already when it comes to training that is
required for certain licensing, weapons qualifications, baton,
handcuffs--is to train the trainer and have certified trainers
out there. Private trainers who are then certified by FPS could
then be a lot more flexible in terms of scheduling the
training, they would be a lot more available to provide the
training, and it would be less costly. We believe that is
something that FPS should look at because training is an issue,
and especially with the critical X-ray-mag training, which
right now FPS is required to provide but really doesn't have
the resources or personnel to provide.
Mr. Lungren. If there is one thing that seems to be in
agreement across the board in a bipartisan way here and also
with witnesses that we have had it is that we have a problem
with training, that we better pay more attention. I don't care
whether you call it RAMP, or un-RAMP, or what do you call it,
it seems to me training is a crucial part of this thing that we
need to exercise oversight on and ensure that that is being
done.
My time is expired. The gentle lady----
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Amitay, in your testimony you began by stating that the
National Association of Security Companies is the leading
advocate for raising standards for the licensing of private
security firms and the registration, screening, and training of
security officers. You also state that the vast majority of
contract security firms employ many former law enforcement and
military personnel in management and as security officers.
So how do we--how do we explain the poor performance of
contract guards hired by DECO who allowed the bag of explosive
material to sit inside the McNamara Building in Detroit for 21
days?
Mr. Amitay. I think you would have to take that up with
DECO.
Ms. Clarke. Are they part of your association?
Mr. Amitay. No, they are not.
Ms. Clarke. Okay.
Mr. Amitay. I would note that that officer also is a former
law enforcement officer who then obviously had additional law
enforcement training and experience.
Ms. Clarke. I got you. I just wanted to get a sense of the
scope, and breadth, and depth of your association so that if
your association were to identify member companies who were bad
actors and that don't meet your standards in the industry are
there any internal provisions within the association that sort
of move those types of companies out of the way. Because
clearly DECO, notwithstanding their personnel, was not up to
the job.
Mr. Amitay. Well, NASCO has said at previous hearings that
if a contractor is not living up to the standards of the
contract then we fully support FPS taking all necessary
action----
Ms. Clarke. Yes. Well, my question is, how does NASCO hold
its members accountable for their poor performance?
Mr. Amitay. NASCO is a trade association, and it is not to
the point where it is a--it governs its members in any way.
Ms. Clarke. Okay.
Mr. Amitay. But the members of NASCO tend to be the larger,
more national companies who have their own internal standards
that are much higher than are required by law.
Ms. Clarke. Yes. I got you. You know, you have an
association and that association is associated with a certain
quality. You have members in your association that don't meet
that standard it kind of is a reflection on the association.
That is the only point I was trying to raise.
Mr. Amitay. Those type of members tend not to take on the
added expense to join an association such as NASCO.
Ms. Clarke. That is good to know.
Mr. Wright, several reports over the years have been raised
with concerns about the fairness of basic security flat fee and
does not take--a flat fee which does not take into account the
degree of risk at specific buildings, the level of service
provided, or the cost of providing the service. FPS workload
studies have estimated that the agency spent about six times
more hours protecting higher-risk buildings than lower-risk
buildings but the fees for both were the same.
So my question to you is: What would you recommend to
reasonably change the fee system to reflect those varying
costs? I think a lot of what has been discussed at least within
this panel has to do with, essentially, how you fund it.
Mr. Wright. Right. My initial recommendation would be let's
go to an appropriations setup.
This fee funding mechanism is antiquated. I would really
like to see the overhead that is put into processing these
payments. So initially I would say I would like to move to
direct appropriations.
But if we stay with fees we--for lack of a better word, we
view it as--or we look at it as like a property tax. If a city
has taxes on all their residents and there is a crime that is
prevalent in one community, that community is going to get the
focus of the services, whereas where crime is not so prevalent
they are paying the same amount. I don't see a way to tailor
those fees to the more risk-averse properties.
Ms. Clarke. Okay. Then let me ask you, you recommend that
the FPS Federalize guard positions at high-risk facilities--
level three and level four buildings--and increase Federal
oversight of contract guards at lower-security facilities--
level one and level two buildings. How do you believe that this
change would help FPS address its challenges with its contract
security personnel?
Mr. Wright. Federal police officers at these X-ray and
magnetometer stations--let me go to what you have here in the
Capitol. You have Federal police officers that have been
through the academy--the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center in Glynco, Georgia, and they are vested in a Federal
career. The training is monitored by the Government and updated
regularly. So that is the importance of having Federal officers
at these security checkpoints at higher-level facilities.
Ms. Clarke. Well, thank you for your response, gentlemen,
and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Lungren. Gentlelady yields back.
Now I would recognize Mr. Long, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Long. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Amitay, you--some people have argued that FPS should
more closely resemble the Federalized security screening model
that is employed by TSA, and in your testimony you argue that
bringing FPS security in-house through the creation of a
Federalized FPS security force is not a solution to the current
challenges in the contract guard program. In your view, would
Federalizing all or some of the contract guards in FPS-
protected facilities improve security?
Mr. Amitay. No.
Mr. Long. Do you want to elaborate? No--I am just kidding.
Another question I have for you is on--in your testimony
you say that FPS fails at consulting with contractors who often
have superior knowledge and experience. What do you mean by
that?
Mr. Amitay. Well, for instance, these contractors--it is
not like FPS is their only business, and it is not like
security services are only contracted out by FPS. These
contractors have a lot of experience with other Federal
agencies in the commercial world in terms of supplying contract
officers to guard and protect buildings. It is somewhat of a
transportable job, and so they are able to--they have
experience and knowledge about amount of supervision that is
necessary, amount of training that is necessary.
Then also in terms of training--I mean, they have their own
training programs that developed over years and years, and
these are very----
Mr. Long. Companies like DECO?
Mr. Amitay. I don't know about DECO. I am talking about
these--the large companies, the National companies who are
members of NASCO. These companies that are--many of them are
FPS contractors. They have their own X-ray-mag training
programs. They have been certified by States to provide
training.
There is a lot that they can provide in terms of their
working experience and expertise to FPS, and they have to other
agencies. But so far the level of receptiveness by FPS to work
with contractors on common issues has not been very good at
all. We are hoping it can get better because it can lead to
better performance and more efficient and effective
performance.
Mr. Long. So the contractors such as the one in Detroit,
where they let the bomb come in the building and sat in lost
and found for 3 weeks or whatever it was, they have the
expertise that FPS should be reaching out to to learn things?
Mr. Amitay. Well, FPS can review each contractor's
proposals and training programs individually. Who knows? The
DECO program, they might say this isn't sufficient. But that is
an individual incident and so it is really hard----
Mr. Long. But it could have been very disastrous----
Mr. Amitay. Oh, I agree. Also, the fact that it took 3
weeks for an FPS inspector to find that package also points out
another problem. I mean, I would think a building like that
would have inspections more regularly than once every 3 weeks.
Mr. Long. I will ask you the same thing I asked the--one of
the witnesses from the earlier panel: Do you think that one
organization trying to oversee 9,000 buildings and 1.4 million
visitors and employees--does that make common sense to you, I
mean, in one group?
Mr. Amitay. I think that is an excellent question. Right
now a big issue at FPS is the ability to delegate to other
agencies the--what FPS says, ``Okay, HHS or HUD, this is your
building. We are responsible for protecting it but we have a
process called delegation where you can hire the contract
security officers and you can manage the contract and you can
supervise them.'' That has found to be a very successful
program.
It seems, though, now that the trend is to pull back those
delegations, and that would only increase the responsibilities
of FPS. So I agree, that is a very interesting issue.
Mr. Long. I would like to look into that further.
Also in your testimony you say that FPS has a history of
withholding information from contractors with regard to
disciplined officers. As such it is virtually--and I am reading
from your testimony--virtually impossible for FPS or
contractors to defend employee suspensions. Can you explain
what you mean by that?
Mr. Amitay. Yes. In situations like that you might have a
situation where a--at, say, a Federal building one of the
tenants there, you know, an agency, says to the contractor,
``Hey, your guard was not doing his job,'' or, ``He fell
asleep,'' or perhaps even an FPS inspector noticed that a guard
was not performing correctly. So then the guard--oftentimes the
guard companies will say, ``Well, we need to terminate this
individual.'' Well, that individual then, if he is unionized or
not, would might file a grievance and fight that suspension or
termination.
Well, then during that process--during that arbitration or
that union proceeding--the contractor would look to, then, the
tenant agency or FPS to provide support saying, ``Hey, it was
your person who saw the guard sleeping. Can you please, you
know, testify to that effect or provide some information?'' But
information like that has been lacking and that has created a
real problem. There needs to be better cooperation between FPS
and tenant agencies----
Mr. Long. It looks like that information would come from
the contractor, right, or----
Mr. Amitay. Well, if the contractor did not see the
offending action it is very hard--if the employee says, ``No,
that didn't happen,'' how can the contractor say, ``Well, yes
it did happen,'' then they would ask for evidence----
Mr. Long. You are saying FPS----
Mr. Amitay [continuing]. And then FPS says, ``Well, we are
not going to get involved in your employer-employee
relationship.''
Mr. Long. Don't have a dog in that fight----
Mr. Amitay. In fact, they do, because they essentially
started the fight.
Mr. Long. Okay. Thank you.
I yield back what time I don't have.
Mr. Lungren. He gets more liberal all the time.
Mr. Marino is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Marino. Thank you, Chairman.
Gentleman, let me preface something before my questions and
comments are posited. I worked as a prosecutor at the local,
State, and Federal Government as U.S. attorney and district
attorney so I am very familiar with the process. I still
consider myself to be a law enforcement guy, and I have worked
very closely with contract officers who were good officers and
very closely with, like, Federal employees who were top-notch
employees, as well.
So I think we have to be careful here about--I don't want
to see any pointing of fingers because for every mishap that we
see in the one side of this I can point out several to the
other side of this, as well. We are human beings and human
beings make mistakes.
I do have a problem with inventories not being reviewed on
a frequent basis and analyzed, because you are--we could have
had a catastrophe there. But that is a procedure that I think
has to be implemented--reviewed frequently and analyzed, and
then that report sent off to--if it is a contractor or
regardless if it is not subcontracted--sent off to the main
agency so they can review that, as well.
But, Mr. Amitay, would you agree with me that most if not
all the officers--and I am referring to the officers, agents,
all one--have law enforcement experience or have come out of
college with a degree in criminology or law enforcement?
Mr. Amitay. I don't have that information, but, you know,
obviously all officers meet the requirements set by FPS in
terms of educational background, in terms of training, and I
think that, you know, the Federal Government is moving to a
standard where a degree in criminology or previous law
enforcement or an armed security officer employment would be a
requirement to be a contract security officer for FPS.
Mr. Marino. So there are a myriad of people out there in
law enforcement, whether they are retired from the previous
position, or dissatisfied, or just decided to make a change. I
would have to imagine that both the Federal Government and
contractor who would have a plethora of people from which to
choose, as opposed to picking someone who has no experience and
that they will have to train----
Mr. Amitay. Exactly. I think with full military--with the
vets coming home----
Mr. Marino. I have military in there, too. I mean, you just
don't take a blue collar worker off the street and hire that
individual because you have experienced people, whether it is
military, law enforcement, or education-wise to fill these
positions.
There is no shortage of people out there looking for work
in these positions? I guess that is my question.
Okay.
Mr. Wright, I do sympathize with you and the decrease in
the personnel from the switch. I mean, we talk about decreasing
the cost but we have to be smart; even though we are almost $15
trillion in debt we can't be foolish and step over dollars to
pick pennies up. We have to be wise enough to prioritize.
But I am going to ask you a question, and please don't take
it personally, but I am going to ask you to take off your union
hat for a moment, and do you see a problem with having
subcontractors hired and not people that are hired into the
Federal Government that would be members of the union?
Mr. Wright. Repeat the question, please.
Mr. Marino. Do you have a problem with hiring--with seeing
the Federal Government hiring contract individuals as opposed
to hiring Federal employees that will become a member of the--
members of the union?
Mr. Wright. I think the problem with hiring contractors
now--and I have testified to it several times--is the lack of a
training standard and the lack of certification. As it stands--
and I will go back to Kansas City, where I am from--if an
individual wants to work as a security officer in Kansas City
he goes to the Kansas City Police Commission and gets his
commission and goes through the training by FPS and stands
post. You drive 50 miles up the road and the requirement to get
a St. Joseph, Missouri, police commission--or law--or
watchman's commission is to have a Kansas City commission.
Mr. Marino. Okay. I understand that, sir.
Chairman, would you indulge me for 30 seconds, please?
But isn't there a standard that contractors have to follow
pursuant to the Federal Government? The Federal Government has
to have a standard, whether it is a Federal employee hired that
said, I need you to fill that position, or a contractor to fill
that position.
Mr. Wright. No.
Mr. Marino. There is no standard?
Mr. Wright. No. Security officers--and I hope we are on the
same wavelength here----
Mr. Marino. I don't think we are.
Mr. Wright. For a security officer to work in Kansas City
he must have a Kansas City local commission. For a security
officer to work in St. Louis he must have a St. Louis
commission----
Mr. Marino. Okay. But isn't there a standard from the
Federal Government whereby if those individuals do not measure
up to that level of training at the Federal Government that
they have to be trained to that level of the Federal
Government, or am I missing this completely?
Mr. Amitay, jump in here if you have an answer to this.
Mr. Amitay. To become an FPS officer--security officer--you
need to have a B.S. degree or 3 years of security experience or
law enforcement or military service. In addition, you have to
qualify through any certifications required by FPS in all
training. That is weapons qualifications, 128 hours of
training.
Mr. Wright. You have answered my question.
Gentlemen, believe me, I sympathize with both of you. I am
a law enforcement guy. We need to see that you have the
resources to protect us and I am one of the individuals that is
going to be fighting for that. Thank you.
Chairman, thank you for the extra time.
Mr. Lungren. Yes, sir.
Well, that concludes our questions, so I thank the
witnesses for your valuable testimony and the Members for their
questions--the Members of the committee.
We have some additional questions for the witnesses, and we
would ask you to respond to these in writing. The hearing
record will be held open for 10 days and this subcommittee
stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:01 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]