[Senate Hearing 112-364]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-364
U.S. POLICY IN YEMEN
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 19, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland MIKE LEE, Utah
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware MARCO RUBIO, Florida
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Benjamin, Hon. Daniel, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S.
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 4
Prepared joint statement with Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson.. 5
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
John F. Kerry.............................................. 46
Boucek, Dr. Christopher, associate, Carnegie Middle East Program,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC..... 28
Prepared statement........................................... 30
Capozzola, Christa, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for
Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency
for International Development, Washington, DC.................. 9
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
John F. Kerry.............................................. 43
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Robert P. Casey, Jr........................................ 47
Casey, Hon. Robert P., U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Green, Daniel R., Soref Fellow, Washington Institute on Near East
Policy, Washington, DC......................................... 25
Prepared statement........................................... 27
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator from Idaho, opening statement. 3
Sanderson, Hon. Janet, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC. 12
Prepared joint statement with Hon. Daniel Benjamin........... 5
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
John F. Kerry.............................................. 45
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
James E. Risch............................................. 47
(iii)
U.S. POLICY IN YEMEN
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TUESDAY, JULY 19, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and
South and Central Asian Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert P.
Casey (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Casey, Coons, Udall, Risch, and Corker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA
Senator Casey. The hearing will come to order.
I will start with an opening statement, and then we'll of
course introduce our witnesses, and then we may have other
statements as well.
But I want to thank everyone for being here. We're getting
started just at the right time. And we're here today for a very
important purpose.
We're here today to discuss the complex set of challenges
facing United States policy in Yemen, and that examination of
policy comes amid 5 months of popular protests and political
unrest.
During this historic period of sweeping change in countries
like Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria, Yemen often gets overlooked.
However, as a result of the power vacuum caused by President
Saleh's departure to Saudi Arabia in June, there are serious
concerns over the government's ability to prevent al-Qaeda from
gaining a foothold, or I should say a stronghold, in the
country, as well as broader concerns about the growing
humanitarian and economic crises that are plaguing Yemen today.
Al-Qaeda's presence in Yemen is not new. We know that. But
it has grown increasingly worrisome in the past several years.
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, as we know by the
acronym AQAP, has carried out multiple attacks against the
people of Yemen and also against Americans as well as other
countries and her citizens.
We all remember the foiled Christmas Day so-called
underwear bomber attack in 2009, which revealed AQAP's strategy
of direct attacks on the U.S. homeland. In October of last
year, Yemeni terrorists again targeted the United States
homeland with UPS packages containing explosives. One of the
packages was bound for the Philadelphia International Airport
in my home State of Pennsylvania.
Given the direct threat that AQAP poses to United States
national security interests, and taking into account
significant gains made in United States operations against al-
Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan over the past year,
counterterrorism efforts in Yemen must be a central focus of
our national security strategy.
That said, our counterterrorism concerns are closely
intertwined with political, economic, and developmental
challenges as well. And those challenges are those that the
United States must work to address as part of a holistic
approach to this challenge.
First of all, I'll just outline three priorities. First, we
need a better understanding of the political opposition and
prospects for democratic reform. Acting President Hadi, the
Vice President in Yemen, has only a small power base, and the
opposition appears fractured between the so-called Joint
Meeting Parties, the JMP, and other individuals, such as Ali
Muhsin, the former commander of the First Armored Division, and
Sheikh al-Ahmar, leader of the powerful al-Ahmar family.
Over the weekend, elements of the opposition announced the
formation of a shadow government, though the composition and
support for the group remains unclear. It is clear, however,
that the transition process will take place sooner or later.
The President has committed to eventually stepping down,
which will result in new leadership for Yemen, the first time
in 33 years. But the United States needs to be prepared for
this post-Saleh government, whatever that might be, and we
don't know the contours of that yet.
Second priority of the three that I'll mention in this
statement, we must be prepared to address the rapidly
deteriorating humanitarian crisis. The violence between pro-
Saleh forces and opposition demonstrators has only exacerbated
already chronically poor conditions in the country itself,
where the average citizen survives on less than $2 a day.
A third of Yemen's population is undernourished and the
country is facing a severe water shortage. It also faces, as
well, a food and fuel crisis at the same time.
Education indicators are among the lowest in the Middle
East. Only 32 percent--32 percent--of girls are attending
secondary school.
The United States needs to send a message of solidarity
with the people of Yemen, and part of that message we need to
send is that we're concerned about their well-being and their
prospects for the future. While the United States will not be
able to solve the daunting development and economic challenges
facing Yemen, we can help mitigate their impact through our
development and humanitarian assistance.
Third and final point, the United States and our
international partners should develop a long-term strategy on
conflict resolution in Yemen. In a country rife with tribal
conflict, most recently and notably the Houthi rebellion in the
north and secessionist movements in the south, al-Qaeda has
found a safe haven.
This is a clear example of how our counterterrorism
strategy must have a civilian component. USAID has done good
work through community outreach programs aimed at fighting
extremism among young people, but this is just the tip of the
iceberg. Saudi Arabia has a unique role to play, given its
strong ties to the Yemeni people and security interests.
We must think strategically about how best to leverage our
collective resources to achieve a sustainable development
policy.
As we turn to our witnesses, it's important to emphasize
that Yemen cannot be viewed through a single lens. In a country
where vast political, security, humanitarian, and development
challenges continually converge, the United States must
endeavor to formulate a coordinated short-term and a long-term
policy based on our core national security interests.
So I commend our diplomats, and I want to commend, in
particular, Gary Feierstein and Deputy Chief of Mission
Elizabeth Richard, who work continuously in an increasingly
difficult environment.
I look forward to hearing more about how the United States
can better examine and address the threats posed to our
national security and, ultimately, to better meet the
legitimate needs of the Yemeni people.
And now I turn to our ranking member, Senator Risch.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Chairman Casey, thank you so much for
scheduling this hearing. It's really appropriate that we do
focus on Yemen at this particular time.
With the Arab Spring and the many changes that are coming
to the Middle East, it's really important that we do focus on
Yemen, which is becoming increasingly more important to United
States policy in the Middle East.
As we all know, Yemen lies in the strategic crossroads
between the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa. It has
seen a flow of extremism and terrorists cross back and forth.
And recent victories of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and
in Southern Yemen should be troubling for United States
policymakers.
It seems the Department of Defense is pursuing
counterterrorism policies which indeed have demonstrated some
success, but many State Department resources have been focused
very much on the capital, and the outlying areas of Yemen need
more attention.
We need a more comprehensive strategy that coordinates the
activities of the State Department and the Department of
Defense.
While there are immediate challenges we must confront in
Yemen, we must also make sure we are not making longer term
issues in the country worse. The dangers of Yemen breaking
apart and becoming even more of a lawless landscape will have
serious repercussions on the long-term interests of the United
States in the region.
Another safe haven for pirates, the potential for attacks
like the USS Cole, and other threats endanger U.S. interests
and personnel in the region.
I hope we can quickly develop a broader strategy, because
the consequences for the region could be severe if we don't.
I welcome this hearing today in order to hear from our
witnesses and their thoughts on solutions and moving forward in
the region.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Risch.
I'll introduce our witnesses, and we'll go right to their
testimony.
In our first panel--and I'll limit the introduction to our
first panel, and we'll do the second panel when we reach that
point--we'll hear from the Honorable Janet Sanderson, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs; the
Honorable Daniel Benjamin, Coordinator for Counterterrorism at
the Department of State; and Ms. Christa Capozzola, Deputy
Assistant Administrator in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict
and Humanitarian Assistance at USAID.
And for purposes of movement from left to right, Ambassador
Benjamin, I think we'll start with you.
STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL BENJAMIN, COORDINATOR FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Benjamin. Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch,
thank you very much for inviting me to appear before you today.
As you'll hear in a few moments from my colleague,
Ambassador Sanderson, the situation in Yemen in terms of
politics and economics is quite tenuous.
The presence of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP,
means that this volatile situation has a direct bearing on our
national security. As we've seen with both the 2009 Christmas
Day bomb attempt and the cargo bomb attempts 1 year later in
fall of 2010, AQAP has developed not just the desire but also
the capability to launch strikes against the United States at
home.
As a result of the last several months of political unrest,
the Government of Yemen's efforts against AQAP have suffered a
setback. When it called most of its security forces back from
the provinces, including its counterterrorism units, to Sanaa,
where most of them remain today, AQAP took advantage of the
power vacuum to expand its operational territory, particularly
in the south, which historically has resisted rule from the
north and the capital in Sanaa.
AQAP has made territorial gains in Abyan governance,
specifically attacking the capital city of Zinjibar. This
potentially threatens the port city of Aden and gives AQAP
access to international sea-lanes.
Our two-pronged strategy recognizes that Yemen's long-term
stability requires addressing the factors that lead to
instability by promoting good governance, the rule of law, and
human and economic development. However, in order to promote
those long-term goals, we must help the government confront the
immediate security threat represented by al-Qaeda.
Our counterterrorism strategy strives to build the
capabilities of Yemen's security forces to effectively combat
AQAP and other terrorist elements, and also to reduce the
appeal of AQAP to potential recruits.
In 2010, the United States provided an estimated $179.8
million in training and assistance to Yemen's key
counterterrorism and related law enforcement units.
Specifically, through 1206 section funding, DOD has helped
build the capacity of Yemen's military forces to conduct
counterterrorism operations with programs that provide training
and equipment to Yemen special operation forces, Yemen coast
guard, border security forces, and the Yemeni air force.
However, no FY 2011 1206 funding has been programmed for
Yemen, unfortunately, because of the security situation and
political unrest.
Antiterrorism assistance training is provided to the
Ministry of Interior's Criminal Investigative Division and to
the Central Security Organization, and it focuses on building
investigative capabilities of the police and the security
forces to detect, disrupt, and respond to terrorist threats.
ATA program objectives also include improving cross-
ministerial coordination, strengthening crisis response, and
developing the ability to detect dangerous devices upon entry
at land, air, and maritime borders. However, again, due to the
security situation, ATA training was suspended in February, and
we plan to resume it when the situation improves.
We have also provided training and equipment for improving
biometric databases and aviation security, and assistance to
build capacity of the criminal justice sector.
In addition to security assistance, we are gearing up some
important efforts in the area of countering violent extremism.
With the Department of Defense, we have a project to assess
radicalization at the provincial level, to develop tailored
approaches to counter violent extremism, including viable
alternatives for at-risk youth, encouraging local credible
voices to challenge the AQAP message.
To develop a better understanding of AQAP messaging and
audiences, the State Department's Counterterrorism Strategic
Communications Center is commissioning research and analysis
projects that will outline AQAP narratives, including how these
narratives align with or conflict with specific audiences.
Despite the challenge posed by the political situation, our
counterterrorism cooperation continues, as we share a common
interest with the Yemeni Government of fighting terrorism and
defeating AQAP. It is important to underscore that our
counterterrorism partnership goes beyond one individual. And
based on our conversations with a broad cross-section of
Yemenis, we are confident that it will continue once a
political resolution is achieved.
I want to thank you very much, again, for inviting me to
testify before this committee on this very important subject,
and I look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Ambassador Benjamin and
Ambassador Sanderson follows:]
Prepared Joint Statement of Ambassador Daniel Benjamin and
Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson
Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for inviting us to appear before you today.
Representing our colleagues in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and
the Office of the Coordinator for Counter Terrorism, we appreciate the
committee's abiding interest in and attention to our Nation's
priorities and goals in the region. We are pleased to present the
committee with an overview of the administration's policy and our
relationship with Yemen.
Civil unrest in the Middle East and North Africa has focused
attention closely on the broad issue of governance across the region,
particularly in Yemen. Yemen is confronting myriad political, economic,
social, security, and governance challenges and the current political
crisis has exacerbated systemic issues such as unemployment, lack of
opportunities for a large youth bulge and rapidly growing population,
unequal development, political marginalization, widespread corruption,
weak state institutions, declining government revenues, growing natural
resource scarcity, and terrorism. Consistent with United States
national interests, we have been working to help Yemen address these
challenges.
The 2009 Christmas Day bomb attempt and cargo bomb attempts in fall
2010 made us all acutely aware of the threats posed by ungoverned and
poorly governed spaces in Yemen and around the world. But this is not a
new security concern.
Al-Qaeda has had a presence in Yemen since at least December 1992, when
it attempted to bomb a hotel in Aden where American military personnel
were staying. Today al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has
developed not just the desire but also the capability to launch strikes
against United States territory. More than ever, AQAP demonstrates that
its terrorist violence is directed both inside and outside Yemen, and
the rise of the self-styled AQAP presents a direct threat to the
security and well-being of the people of Yemen, the broader Arabian
Peninsula, and to the United States, its friends, and allies. A key
part of our work to ``disrupt, dismantle, and defeat'' al-Qaeda
involves addressing the problem of terrorism in Yemen from a
comprehensive, long-term perspective, including a commitment by the
broader international community and a bilateral partnership with the
United States to build capacity.
u.s. policy in yemen
We recognize that terrorists have taken advantage of a lack of
security in various regions of Yemen as a result of the political
uncertainty and internal conflicts. We also know that Yemen faces many
resource challenges that negatively impact good governance, the
delivery of services, and the effectiveness of the security
architecture that is needed to effectively combat terrorism. For that
reason the United States has adopted a two-pronged strategy for Yemen--
helping the government confront the immediate security threat
represented by al-Qaeda, and mitigating the serious political,
economic, and governance issues that the country faces over the long
term--the drivers of instability.
recent political unrest
Peaceful civic engagement in national affairs is key to the
democratic process. As is true in every country, it is ultimately for
the people of Yemen to decide who governs. While most protests in Yemen
have been peaceful since they began in January of this year, there have
been violent clashes between pro- and anti-government demonstrators and
between protestors and government security forces and irregular
elements using force to break up demonstrations. These have resulted in
many injuries and deaths. We are particularly concerned by government
use of force against demonstrators and incidents in which one group or
another appears to have provoked clashes. The United States has
strongly urged and publicly called for the Yemeni Government to
investigate and prosecute all acts of violence against protestors. We
have continuously called for all Yemenis, including the government, to
refrain from violence and exercise restraint, and we continue to
express our support for the right of all Yemenis, like people
everywhere, to peacefully demonstrate.
The United States continues its regular engagement with the
government, including both President Ali Abdullah Saleh (who is
currently recovering in Saudi Arabia from injuries following a June 3
attack on his compound) and the Acting President, Vice President Abdo
Rabbu Mansour al-Hadi. Our Embassy also meets with leaders of the
opposition parties and civil society activists on the range of issues
of interest to the United States, including political reform. We
support efforts of the Yemeni Government, the opposition parties, and
civil society to come together through dialogue to peacefully resolve
political differences. We strongly support the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) initiative which would lead to a peaceful and orderly political
transition. While there have been many proposals to resolve political
differences, only the GCC initiative was put into writing and signed by
both the ruling General People's Congress Party and the opposition
coalition Joint Meeting Parties. Furthermore, the GCC initiative calls
for a transition via democratic elections, which we believe are
critical to long-term stability and government accountability.
President Saleh has repeatedly said he will sign the agreement, but has
also repeatedly refused to sign it. We continue to call on him to sign
the initiative as the last remaining signatory so that a transition of
power can begin immediately.
counterterrorism and security efforts
Our political efforts are just one element of our work in Yemen. We
are implementing a multifaceted strategy designed to address the
terrorist activity that threatens Yemen and the United States, as well
as the causes underlying Yemen's instability. This strategy marshals
U.S. resources to improve Yemen's macroeconomic stability, increase the
sustainable and equitable delivery of services, and improve local
governance and civic participation over the long term while addressing
immediate political and security concerns in the short term. We are not
alone in this effort. Yemen's neighbors, European countries and
multilateral organizations have come together to assist Yemen in
dealing with its multiple challenges in the political, economic, and
security areas.
Our counterterrorism strategy focuses on building the capabilities
of Yemen's security forces to counter AQAP effectively. AQAP has
developed not just the desire but also the capability to launch strikes
against the United States as demonstrated by the 2009 Christmas Day
bomb attempt and the cargo package bomb attempts of October 2010. Our
strategic approach to terrorism and the serious political, economic,
and governance issues that Yemen faces must be comprehensive and
sustained, taking into account a wide range of political, cultural, and
socioeconomic factors.
The current protracted political standoff is having an adverse
impact on the security situation in Yemen. AQAP has taken advantage of
ongoing political unrest to expand its operational territory,
especially in the south. The Government of Yemen's efforts against
terrorist elements have suffered a setback due to the last several
months of political unrest. The government called back most of its
security forces, including its counterterrorism units, to Sanaa where
most of them remain. As a result, AQAP has made territorial gains in
Abyan governorate, specifically attacking and remaining in the capital
city of Zinjibar. This is of great concern to us and the Yemeni
Government.
Despite the challenge posed by the political situation, our
counterterrorism cooperation continues as we share a common interest
with the Yemeni Government in fighting terrorism and defeating AQAP. It
is important to underscore: Our counterterrorism partnership goes
beyond one individual, and based on our conversations with a broad
cross-section of Yemenis, we are confident that it will continue once a
political resolution is reached.
To help meet our security interests, in 2010, the United States
provided an estimated $172 million in training and assistance to
Yemen's key counterterrorism and related law enforcement units:
Through 1206 section funding, DOD has helped build the
capacity of Yemen's military forces to conduct counterterrorism
operations. Section 1206 programs provide training and
equipment to Yemen Special Operations Forces (YSOF), Yemen
Coast Guard (YCG), Border Security Forces, and the Yemen Air
Force (YAF). However, no FY 2011 1206 funding has been
programmed for Yemen because of the security situation and
political unrest.
The Office of Antiterrorism Assistance (DS/T/ATA) has
provided Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) to the Yemen Government
on an intermittent basis since 1987. ATA training is provided
to the Ministry of Interior's (MOI) Criminal Investigative
Division (CID) and Central Security Organization (CSO) and
focuses on building investigative capabilities of the police
and security forces to detect, disrupt, and respond to
terrorist threats. ATA program objectives include building
investigative capabilities, improving cross-ministerial
coordination, strengthening crisis response and developing the
ability to detect dangerous devices upon entry at land, air,
and maritime borders. However, due to the security situation,
ATA training was suspended in February. We plan to recommence
our assistance when the situation improves.
In addition, we have also provided other assistance,
including training and equipment for improving biometric
databases and aviation security, and assistance to build the
capacity of the criminal justice sector.
In addition to security assistance, we have begun an effort to
develop a better understanding of AQAP messaging and audiences, so we
can effectively counter its narrative and reduce its recruiting. The
State Department's Counterterrorism Strategic Communication Center
(CSCC) is commissioning a research and analysis project that outlines
AQAP narratives, including how these narratives align with or conflict
with specific audiences, as al-Qaeda communicators routinely tailor
their messaging to local contexts. In addition, we are working with DOD
to assess radicalization at the provincial level in Yemen, so that we
can develop tailored approaches to counter terrorism, including viable
alternatives for at-risk youth and encourage locally credible voices to
challenge the AQAP message.
humanitarian and development efforts
To advance our strategy, we've engaged consistently and intensively
with our Yemeni counterparts--from the highest levels of the Yemeni
Government to interlocutors from civil society and the private sector.
Senior administration civilian and military officials--including
Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton--have visited Yemen this
year.
In FY 2010, we significantly increased our humanitarian and
development assistance to Yemen--providing over $100 million. These
funds go toward efforts to strengthen civil society, support community-
level development, and improve livelihoods to address the long-term
drivers of instability. The portfolio utilizes small scale, community-
based projects and possesses sufficient flexibility to respond to
rapidly changing economic and political conditions. Following months of
unrest in Yemen, USAID focused its programming on the immediate needs
of affected communities. Yemen's unrest has paralyzed economic and
social development. The impact of this unrest on the daily lives of
Yemenis, particularly the most vulnerable, has been devastating. As my
colleague from USAID will discuss in more detail, USAID has expanded
humanitarian assistance to help those displaced by violence in the
south of Yemen and also continued to support vulnerable families
displaced by earlier conflict in northern Yemen. Quick impact
activities, designed to provide cash for work opportunities or assist
with immediate needs such as water access, are also underway.
Separately, the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) is
working with Yemeni civil society to empower Yemenis to shape their own
future. MEPI supports elements essential to an inclusive society, such
as responsible and representative political parties, effective and
robust nongovernmental organizations, independent media, full civic
participation by women, and a responsive educational system and private
sector. We are committed to working with the Yemeni people and
coordinating with our international partners as we work together on the
full scope of issues.
We welcome the involvement of the international financial
institutions and multilateral development banks, notably the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund (IMF) along with key donor countries in
addressing Yemen's economic and development challenges. As part of a
broad global partnership, the United States and other partners have
actively sought to help Yemen address the challenges that it faces,
enhancing Yemen's security and improving its governance. The Friends of
Yemen process provides a forum for the United States to engage
international partners, including regional states, as we collectively
work with the Government of Yemen to help address its challenges. Most
World Bank and IMF work is on hold given the current situation, but we
are committed to supporting international organizations as best we can
in the immediate environment and are prepared to move forward to do
more as soon as the conditions permit. If and when Yemen's political
transition occurs, we will focus on helping Yemen secure financial
assistance to stabilize its economy in the near term, while
concurrently working with the international donor community to support
Yemen in initiating a series of reforms that would lay the ground work
for sustainable growth.
We also believe there will be an opportunity to continue important
international engagement to assist the Government of Yemen in growing
more transparent and responsive to the requirements of its citizens
through the Friends of Yemen process once the Yemeni Government
initiates political transition. A Friends of Yemen meeting scheduled
for March 22 was postponed indefinitely by the Yemeni Government due to
the political crisis and it is unlikely that we will be able to have a
meeting before political transition takes place.
conclusion
Ultimately, the goal of U.S. and international efforts is a stable,
secure, prosperous, and effectively governed Yemen. This is an
ambitious long-term goal that demands deep and ongoing coordination
with the Yemeni Government, Yemeni civil society, and international
partners. The United States and the international community will be
able to more effectively engage in Yemen across a spectrum of issues
including political, security, economic, social, and governance reform,
once the Yemeni Government initiates political transition and
identifies its way forward.
Thank you for inviting us to testify before your committee today.
We'd be happy to take any questions that you might have.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
Ms. Capozzola.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTA CAPOZZOLA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE,
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Capozzola. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member, thank
you for your invitation to testify before you today on Yemen.
The challenges and constraints to security, stability, and
economic development for the Yemeni people are growing. The
current political crisis and related economic impacts on
foreign exchange, on imports, and on food and fuel access are
increasing the number of vulnerable people countrywide.
At the same time, the increasing political violence has
displaced an additional 70,000 or so people from their homes
since February, adding to the already large humanitarian
situation in the country.
USAID's programs and partners are responding to these fluid
conditions under difficult circumstance. The strategy and
portfolio were designed with sufficient flexibility to deal
with evolving conditions, but the overarching goal of the
strategy remains: to help build a solid foundation and the
overall resilience and stability to enable Yemen to meet its
development challenges longer term and mitigate the drivers of
extremism.
The agency is doing this by focusing on two priorities:
First, community-led activities to improve livelihoods for
vulnerable population, and especially youth. These activities
include cash for work, typically for community infrastructure
improvements, like health services and safe drinking water
access, also includes support for small farmers, access to
improved inputs and irrigation.
Linked to this community-based effort is, of course, also
USAID's maternal and child health program, including, for
example, the 1,500 midwives we've trained just in the past year
to improve women's access to health services around the
country, plus also, of course, the range of community-based
youth engagement and vocational training activities that we're
supporting around the country.
The second area of emphasis is broadly the democracy and
governance area, helping to improve governance capacity and
strengthening the role of civil society in Yemen, so ultimately
Yemen can achieve more inclusive and effective institutions
that are able to respond to Yemen's citizens and mitigate
conflict.
So how are we pivoting to meet these new challenges? First,
let me say that although the U.S. mission is under order of
departure, the USAID mission is still staffed at three, down
from five. USAID's implementing partners are facing increased
security constraints, and the pace of implementation in certain
programs has slowed. But we continue to operate throughout the
country.
Where we face new and acute security challenges plus
humanitarian requirements, such as in the south in and around
Zinjibar, access is a constraint to monitoring conditions and
responding to needs, but some key partners are operational and
delivering humanitarian aid to those in need.
Further, USAID is closely coordinating with international
organization partners and other bilateral donors to prepare for
worsening food and humanitarian conditions by identifying needs
and prepositioning relief in the areas of greatest concern.
We're also coordinating with our international partners to
prepare for a potential transition. USAID coled a recent
assessment of expected electoral process needs in the near
future.
In addition to contingency planning, we are taking action
under these rapidly evolving conditions. USAID is expanding its
geographic scope to include urban areas where recent unrest has
paralyzed more basic services and increased the number of
vulnerable people. We are continuing summer programs for over
14,000 youths in five governorates, based on a successful pilot
of youth engagement that was done last year.
The agency is providing, for example, medical supplies and
pharmaceuticals to health facilities that are treating the
wounded in cities that are facing extended violent protests.
Yemen is facing immense challenges at the same time local
and global in nature, and it is in support of vital U.S.
national interests to continue to provide development
assistance to Yemen.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Capozzola follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christa Capozzola
Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today on the United
States development priorities in Yemen. In my testimony today, I will
describe how USAID is helping the people of Yemen cope with the impact
of the current political and economic crisis, and identify and mitigate
the long-term drivers of extremism and instability.
challenges
Long-term underdevelopment throughout Yemen has resulted in chronic
poverty, poor nutrition, and substandard living conditions,
particularly related to food insecurity and limited water supplies. The
recent political upheaval has resulted in a dire economic situation and
increased humanitarian needs. Access to water is another key challenge,
and fuel shortages have worsened the situation because it renders many
wells inoperable. The political situation has exacerbated these
underlying challenges. The near total breakdown of government services
outside Sanaa has likewise heightened security and access problems for
both the U.S. Government and our international partners in the most
affected areas. Political violence has displaced 60,000-70,000 Yemenis
from their homes since February, primarily in the south. This is in
addition to the internally displaced people (IDPs) and conflict-
affected Yeminis connected to the ongoing conflict in the north.
usaid strategy
Despite security challenges and political turmoil, the U.S. Agency
for International Development's (USAID) programs continue to operate
throughout the country. Most local field offices and teams are able to
operate, managing and monitoring programs in some of the most volatile
areas of the country. Project implementation has slowed due to security
challenges and fuel shortages. Access in some area, particularly
southern Yemen, remains a persistent constraint to monitoring
conditions and responding to emerging needs.
USAID's portfolio is designed with sufficient flexibility to
respond to rapidly changing economic and political conditions. The
program supports small-scale community-led projects to improve the
livelihoods for vulnerable population. These include cash for work--
particularly focused on Yemeni youth--for infrastructure improvements;
health services and safe drinking water; provision of agricultural
inputs like seed and fertilizer; veterinary services and training; and
microfinance and small enterprise support.
Longer term development objectives are focused on building
governance capacity at the local level, particularly for service-
oriented ministries such as health and education and strengthening
civil society organizations to mitigate conflict and strengthen avenues
for civic participation and more inclusive governance.
current situation and programmatic shifts
In the wake of recent protests, political violence, and the
economic downturn, USAID is expanding its geographic scope to include
populations in urban areas where recent unrest has paralyzed the
provision of basic services. A USAID assessment team is on the ground
this week to evaluate the situation, and recommend appropriate
additional interventions.
Expanding political violence in and around the Abyan governorate
has resulted in over 50,000-60,000 IDPs, primarily in Aden, Lahj, and
Abyan governorates. In response, USAID is providing clean water and
emergency relief commodities. In recent weeks, USAID has provided more
than $4.8 million in additional humanitarian assistance to Yemen,
including $3.6 million to respond to the increasing needs of internally
displaced persons in Aden and Lahj governorates in southern Yemen. It
is important to note that USAID continues to support a robust
humanitarian program in the north to assist 400,000 IDPs and conflict-
affected Yemenis. This multisector humanitarian response is
concentrating on water and sanitation programs, including
rehabilitating water points and addressing high salinity levels of
household water.
Throughout the entire country in FY 2011 to date, the U.S.
Government's humanitarian efforts total nearly $48 million, including
almost $12 million from the International Disaster Assistance account,
$20.2 million from Food for Peace Title II food aid, and $15.3 million
for Yemeni IDPs and refugees from the Horn of Africa from the State
Department's Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM). Over
$35 million of the humanitarian assistance we provided is funding the
current United Nations consolidated appeal for Yemen, for which the
U.S. Government is the No. 1 donor worldwide. In FY 2010, the U.S.
Government provided $45 million in humanitarian assistance for Yemen.
Recognizing that deteriorating economic conditions could trigger
severe food insecurity and other humanitarian consequences, USAID and
the State Department are coordinating closely with its partners and
other international donors to identify needs and preposition emergency
relief supplies in the areas of greatest concern.
Additionally, since public utilities, schools, hospitals, clinics,
and other service providers are finding themselves short on government
capacity, supplies, fuel and staff, USAID is providing assistance to
help maintain much-needed social services in some of the highest
priority, least accessible areas around the country. USAID has also
been responding to acute emergency requirements at the sites of large-
scale protests in four cities by providing medical equipment and
commodities to health facilities that are servicing those wounded in
the protest violence.
U.S. Government programming is able to respond to the evolving
needs of the Yemeni people and mitigate the effect of the worsening
political and economic crisis. The agency is implementing seven water
projects to expand networks to reach more households and markets and
rehabilitate wells and public water storage tanks. These projects
improve access to water and sanitation for 15,900 beneficiaries in five
northern districts, where 2 months of clashes between Houthi militants
and tribesmen have displaced hundreds of families. USAID partners are
also rehabilitating roads in underserved areas. The roads improve
access to services and markets for 39,000 residents of 80 villages
while preventing isolated safe havens that can be exploited by
militants.
Additionally, USAID is equipping and supporting the operations of
mobile medical teams that visit underserved communities, treating
approximately 3,000 cases per month, and working with clinics to ensure
that they are able to operate cold storage units for medications. The
1,500 midwives we have trained in the past year are continuing to
provide maternal and child health care to their communities.
Almost a quarter of our assistance supports democratic reform by
encouraging citizen participation in the political process and
strengthening government institutions to deliver public services. USAID
will build on existing investments to respond to a possible political
transition scenario. For example, USAID provided support to Yemen in
the last Presidential and parliamentary elections and we are prepared
to assist with future political processes and elections.
Total funding implemented by USAID (other than humanitarian
assistance) grew to $77.6 million in FY 2010, including crisis-response
contingency allocations from Department of Defense section 1207
resources ($10 million) and USAID's Complex Crises Fund ($12.8
million). These resources have been critical for USAID's capacity to
operate flexibly and effectively throughout the country. The total
amount of funding for FY 2011 from all accounts for Yemen is still
under consideration.
conclusion
USAID is meeting increasing challenges in Yemen and will continue
to exercise rapid and flexible assistance response to evolving
conditions related to a possible political transition, economic crisis,
and humanitarian needs. I appreciate the opportunity to share what we
are doing to support the needs and aspirations of the Yemeni people for
a more stable, unified, and prosperous nation.
I look forward to your questions.
Senator Casey. Thanks very much.
Ambassador Sanderson.
STATEMENT OF HON. JANET SANDERSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Sanderson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members
of the committee, let me first join with my colleagues to thank
you for inviting us to appear before you today. We appreciate
the committee's abiding interest in and attention to our
Nation's priorities and goals in the region. We are pleased to
present the committee with an overview of the administration's
policy and our relationship with Yemen.
As you rightly note, Mr. Chairman, civil unrest in the
Middle East and North Africa in the past 6 months has focused
attention on governance across the region.
Yemen is, indeed, confronting myriad political, economic,
social, security, and governance challenges, and the current
political crisis has exacerbated systemic issues such as
unemployment, a rapidly growing population, weak state
institutions, declining government revenues, growing natural
resource scarcity, and, of course, violent extremism.
Consistent with U.S. national interests, we have adopted a
two-pronged strategy for Yemen, helping the government confront
the immediate security threat represented by al-Qaeda, and
mitigating serious political, economic, and governance issues
that the country faces over the long term, the drivers of
instability.
The United States continues its regular engagement with the
government, including with President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who's
currently, as you know, recovering in Saudi Arabia from his
injuries following a June 3 attack on his compound; the acting
President, Vice President Abdu Rabu Mansour al-Hadi; the
opposition; civil society activists; and others interested in
Yemen's future.
We strongly support the Gulf Cooperation Council's
initiative, which we believe would lead to a peaceful and
orderly political transition, the GCC initiative signed by both
the ruling General People's Congress Party and the opposition
coalition Joint Meeting Parties.
Only President Saleh is blocking the agreement moving
forward, and we continue to call on him to sign the initiative.
The situation on the ground remains extremely fluid, but
the solution will come and must come from the Yemeni people,
with the assistance and support of their international
partners, namely the GCC and Saudi Arabia. Conditions in Yemen
continue to deteriorate under the pressure of growing protests
and increasing divisions throughout the country.
Widespread inflation, including rising commodity prices,
decreasing liquidity, and the threat of a food shortage this
summer foreshadow an economic crisis in the coming months.
While most protests in Yemen have been peaceful over the
last couple of months, there have been violent clashes between
pro- and anti-government demonstrators, and between protesters
and government security forces and irregular elements using
force to break up demonstrations. The United States has
strongly urged the Yemeni Government to investigate and
prosecute all acts of violence against protesters.
Ultimately, Mr. Chairman, the goal of the United States and
international efforts is a stable, secure, prosperous, and
effectively governed Yemen. This is an ambitious, long-term
goal that demands the deep and ongoing coordination with the
Yemeni Government and the international partners. We will be
able to more effectively engage in Yemen once the Yemeni
Government initiates the political transition and identifies
its way forward.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting us to testify before
your committee today, and thank you so much on behalf of
Ambassador Feierstein and his colleagues at Embassy Sanaa for
your very kind words. They certainly deserve it. My colleagues
and I are very happy now to take your questions.
Thank you.
[Editor's note.--See page 5 for the prepared joint
statement of Ambassador Sanderson and Ambassador Benjamin.]
Senator Casey. Thank you very much. And to each of you,
thank you for staying with your time limits even without being
warned about time. We're grateful.
Let me just provide kind of a setting for my questions, and
then I'll start with Ambassador Sanderson.
When you go through the list of challenges that we face,
and of course the people of Yemen face directly, whether it's
the basic security challenge because of the threat posed by al-
Qaeda, not to mention other security issues, the poverty issue,
health care--you go down the list. I'm not sure there's a place
in the world that has more.
And then when you juxtapose that with the unusual
circumstances as compared to even other countries in the
region, and a lot of other places, where there was fervor for
change, you had some kind of transition process, or at least
the elements of a transition. There was a leader of one kind or
another or a group of leaders where you could have a
transition. Here, we have very little of that.
And of course, we've got a President who's not physically
there, but also has kind of given, in my judgment, a lot of
mixed signals to us and to the world. So there's a lot of--to
say there's volatility and uncertainty is an understatement.
In the context of all that, all of those challenges, plus
the unusual dynamic, which I just outlined and probably haven't
done justice to, we get the news that there's a 17-member
council, which some have described as kind of a shadow
government of technocrats, that will ultimately select 501
members of a national assembly. And yet according to one
published report, I guess it was the New York Times, that says
that many of the members of the council weren't informed that
they were named to the council.
So you have yet even more uncertainty and a lot of
questions about whether or not just day-to-day governance can
take place, which of course exacerbates the security and other
problems.
Can you tell us anything about that in terms of any current
information about this recent news about the council? And
anything you can tell us that's an update on the President,
what his intentions are, what we believe his intentions are?
Just the kind of basic day-to-day who's in charge and kind
of fundamental governance questions.
Ambassador Sanderson. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me
try, if I can.
You've covered a wide, wide group of topics, and I think
they do point to the enormous challenges that the Yemenis face
not only today, but also in the longer term.
With regard to the President, as I stated in my testimony,
he is indeed still in Saudi Arabia recovering. We have seen
reports from people close to him that he's interested in
returning to Sanaa. We're obviously not able to confirm that
one way or another.
But obviously, whatever he does looms large in the
political calculations of everyone on the ground in Yemen right
now.
We strongly believe that a transition is necessary, that an
orderly, peaceful transition is the only way to begin to lead
Yemen out of the crisis that it has been in for the last few
months.
We are strongly supportive, as I said, of the GCC
initiative. We believe that this is one way within the
framework of the existing Yemeni Constitution that not only
leads to elections, but also allows the opposition, the public,
the protesters, all to have a voice in Yemen's future. So we
continue to strongly urge President Saleh to sign and implement
the agreement.
In terms of the day-to-day governance of Yemen, the Acting
President under the terms of the constitution, is Vice
President
al-Hadi. He is a southerner who has been rather retiring in the
past. He appears to be willing to sort of step up to the plate
and begin to make the hard decisions that a President, even an
interim or Acting President of Yemen, must do. He has been
meeting with the opposition; he has been meeting with members
of his own party; he has been meeting with protesters; and he
has been meeting with the military to try and come to some type
of agreement to continue and indeed enhance the political
dialogue that's going to be so important for Yemen.
And obviously, what the endgame looks like in terms of who
will lead Yemen into the future, that's still very much up in
the air. We do hope, at the end of these consultations, we hope
that the President will sign the GCC agreement. We hope that,
therefore, that would allow a national unity government to come
forward and, again, move toward elections, as I said, within a
period of 60 days.
We've seen these reports that say that some of the
protesters have established a national council. Frankly, we
don't have a lot of information about it yet. There's no
provision for such a council within the terms of the
constitution.
Our understanding from Ambassador Feierstein and others is
there were people who were named to the council who were caught
unawares and did not expect to be so named. It seems to us that
at this point this council does not have a lot of traction, but
the political environment in Sanaa remains quite fluid. So I
think we'll have to see how it plays out.
I get back to my original point. We believe that political
dialogue is essential to unravel this set of knots that the
Yemeni political process finds itself in. We believe that
Saleh's role in that is going to be critical, but we also think
that an open political dialogue between the parties, the
opposition, the protesters, the youth, and certainly civil
society, is going to be very important for the future.
Senator Casey. I wanted to ask you before I turn to Senator
Risch, as you could note from my opening, I believe we should
be sending a very clear message to the people of Yemen that
we're focused on their concerns as well.
And sometimes, as it happens, sometimes just by implication
or maybe by emphasis, we focus appropriately on
counterterrorism, but sometimes that can, in some ways,
downgrade or deemphasize our focus on the people.
I guess I'd ask, on behalf of the administration, what
would you say, if you had a room full of citizens of Yemen
here, what would you say to them in terms of our focus and our
message to them, beyond the common focus that we have on al-
Qaeda and other extremists?
Ambassador Sanderson. Well, I think, sir, that's an
excellent question. And I do want to stress the fact that we
see our partnership with Yemen far beyond the prism of
counterterrorism cooperation. Obviously, that's important. But
we have broad relations in terms of our assistance
relationship, our public diplomacy outreach, and our support
for civil society.
We are working very closely with the Yemeni people on
priorities that are important to them. They face, as you noted,
enormous economic challenges that frankly are driving the
country, I'm afraid, into immediate crisis. But we understand
that our relationship is simply not a security or a military
relationship, that it has to be broader, fuller, and it must
bring to bear all the resources of the U.S. Government, so we
can support Yemen as they go through what is going to be an
extraordinarily difficult transition for them.
Senator Casey. And I'll turn to Senator Risch. I might ask
you a little bit later about the kind of results that our
taxpayers can see, and by way of measuring.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Well, can you describe for us the situation
down in the southwest, where the militants seem to be in
charge, and
al-Qaeda's influence in that regard?
Ambassador Sanderson. Senator, what we have seen as a
result of this focus by the government on the security
situation, the political unrest in the large cities, is a
growing space in which extremists have been able to operate.
There are reports that Islamic militants, among them
included some members of al-Qaeda, have gone in and taken
control of the city of Zinjibar. There are reports that a
couple smaller cities in that area have also been taken over by
militants. We do know that the 25th Mechanized Division in the
Zinjibar garrison is under siege and has not been relieved,
although the government is trying to find a way to do that in
the very near future.
It speaks to our concern about control of the central
authority over various parts of the country. Even the Vice
President himself has admitted that the government does not
have control in 5 of the 21 governorates.
What we are concerned about, obviously, is with this focus
on the political malaise, with this focus on the political
unrest, that the very real threat to Yemen, to us, to the
people of the region, from al-Qaeda and from extremists, is
going unaddressed. It's one of the reasons why we continue to
urge President Saleh and the various players to come to some
type of agreement to get the political dialogue started and get
a solution under way.
But, yes, we are quite concerned about the situation in the
southwest.
Senator Risch. Ambassador Benjamin, do you have anything to
add to that?
Ambassador Benjamin. Senator, it is of course a matter of
great concern that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula sees this
opportunity to establish a territorial hold on this area in
Zinjibar and Jaar. It is something that we are watching with
great concern.
We are worried, obviously, when they have a safer haven in
which to operate. We are worried that they threaten the city of
Aden to some extent, and that, of course, if they are able to
get access to the sea, that presents other concerns.
And, really, I just want to echo what Ambassador Sanderson
said. It is vitally important that the transition take place
and that the security forces in Yemen get back to business,
that we be able to resume the full range of training activities
that we have with them so that they can deal with this issue.
And undergoverned spaces are not new to Yemen. This has
been a problem for not just years but decades.
But the situation is quite worrisome. And that is really
why it's so important that the political stalemate be broken.
Senator Risch. One of the reasons I ask this is you
mentioned the money that the United States was spending in
arming and training the security forces. And we have learned
the hard way that sometimes the people that we are arming and
training become our adversaries in the future. I don't need to
go into specific examples of that. We all know.
Is that a concern here?
Ambassador Benjamin. I don't think it's really a paramount
concern right now. The militants who are active in the south
are not people that we have armed or trained before in any way.
And we don't expect that there would be many individuals who
would defect from the armed forces and join with this group of
militants.
What we are occasionally concerned about is that the
weaponry and the training that we give particular forces are
used for the reason that they were given. And we maintain a
very scrupulous end-use monitoring. Obviously, our monitoring
is somewhat affected by the fact that the situation, the
security situation, is not what we would like, and, therefore,
our ability to investigate is limited.
But I don't think that we have to worry right now about
Yemen tilting the other way.
And I would just want to underscore another part of my
statement, which is that we do believe that there is a strong
desire on the part of Yemenis across most of the political
spectrum to cooperate with us and deal with the terrorist
threat within Yemen's borders. And the soundings that the
Embassy has taken in the opposition, for example, have been
quite clear about that.
And our counterterrorism cooperation really is not just
about one person, one particular leadership group. It is very
much about helping the people of Yemen deal with this
pernicious presence within the Yemeni state.
Senator Risch. Well, I appreciate that. And that was the
reason I asked the question, is, if you look at that, it
certainly seems to me, at least, that there is some risk that
this blossoms out and envelopes the whole country, where
they're as weak as they are, where the government is as weak as
it is, and the people really ineffective in being able to
govern themselves. And your words
are comforting. I hope that's the situation and continues to be
the situation.
Thank you.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Risch.
Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. I want to thank Senator Casey for holding
this critically important hearing on United States policy in
Yemen.
And I am deeply concerned, as are other members of the
committee, about Yemen, given the presence of al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula and recent political upheaval and other
sources of instability the panel has ably described.
In our recent hearings as a full committee on Afghanistan,
I made the case that, in my view, the United States has to
maintain the resources and flexibility needed to respond to
other emerging security threats such as those in Iran and
Somalia and specifically Yemen. And I'm increasingly concerned
that our commitment in Afghanistan has limited the resources
available for addressing such threats.
And I wanted to start by asking Ambassador Sanderson, do
you believe the United States has dedicated the resources
really necessary for addressing emerging security threats and
the other development-related sources of instability in Yemen?
And I'd be interested in an overview from all three of the
panel members about whether you think we're providing the
needed both capital and political and developmental resources
to deal with the challenges in Yemen.
Ambassador Sanderson. Well, thank you, Senator.
I have to say that there's been a significant increase, as
you are aware, in our assistance both from the civilian and the
military side, since 2009, to Yemen. We have, I think, a
holistic approach to our policy toward Yemen, that, on one
hand, we are working hard to try and address the issue of
terrorism, to address the issue of extremism, to provide the
training and equipment to the Yemenis so they can deal with
this very important issue.
On the other hand, we understand that we have to focus on
development, governance, social issues, the types of things
that do create the conditions in which extremism can flourish.
So I have to say that, from our perspective in the State
Department, we have the tools we need, at least at this point,
to do the necessary in Yemen.
To be honest, in Yemen we are somewhat hamstrung by the
absorptive capacity of the Yemenis themselves. There is not a
large capacity to take on either large amounts of development
assistance.
On the military side, we very much focused on the C.T.
elements that are going to be partners with us in the effort
against violent extremism.
But we have been, I'd like to say, very creative in the
tools that we're bringing to bear on the myriad problems that
Yemen faces, whether it's through the typical traditional aid
programs that Christa can talk about or the Middle East
Partnership Initiative, where we have a very robust program in
Yemen that addresses things like political party development
and civic education, as well as things like child brides.
I think that we have the tools we need to address issues on
the ground. I have to, however, flag the fact that when there
is this transition, this political transition, the needs of the
Yemeni people, I think, are going to become much greater. And
the international community, of which the United States is,
obviously, a leading player, is going to have to step up and
help the Yemenis in this new political environment move
forward.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Ambassador.
Ms. Capozzola. Thank you.
To reiterate what my colleague has said, our resources were
stepped up last year, in fiscal year 2010, quite significantly.
In terms of development and humanitarian assistance, they more
than doubled compared to fiscal year 2009.
So we're really stepping up our game and using, as was
said, a variety of creative mechanisms to extend our reach
throughout the country, get into more communities in more
areas, do more community-level investments, the kinds of things
we can do in this environment, where we may not have the type
of partnership we need at the central level to tackle some of
the fundamental development challenges, for example, water. So
we're doing a lot of local-level water with these increased
resources and, I think, sending a very strong message to the
Yemeni people about United States support for their situation.
On the other hand, we can't address the longer term water
challenges that Yemen faces right now until attention can be
turned to that in the center on key policies and engagement
with the broader international community to bring the kind of
investment together that will tackle those sorts of challenges.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
And, Ambassador Benjamin, if I might add to the question of
whether we've got sufficient resources to deal with security
issues, we've partnered with the Saudis to some extent. We've
diverged with them, to some extent, in terms of our policy and
our approach.
I'd be interested in hearing your comment on both.
Ambassador Benjamin. First, on the resources, let me just
elaborate on what's been said before and say that the primary
constraint on making progress in Yemen right now is not the
numbers. It's the political situation that inhibits our ability
to spend effectively.
And just to give you one indicative set of numbers, our
1206 funding went from $4.3 million in 2006 to $153 million in
2010. That's an extraordinary leap. Yet we are unable to spend
1206 money this year because of the political insecurity.
So I think we have the right mix of resources, and I should
also add that from a counterterrorism perspective, I'm
particularly pleased at the strong commitment that the
administration has to invest on the development side and
governance side, because that's vitally important for dealing
with the fundamental underlying causes that drive extremism.
The real issue will be when we can get back to work there.
You asked about the relationship with Saudi Arabia. We
consult with the Saudis every step of the way. They, obviously,
are the most influential power in the region and Yemen's
neighbor to the north. I think that we have, actually, a very
clear understanding of the requirements there. They share our
desire to see resolution of the political situation and to get
on with helping Yemenis solve their security problem and deal
with the very, very formidable long-term economic development
and governance problems that they face.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Ambassador.
Thank you, Senator.
Senator Casey. Thanks, Senator Coons.
I wanted to start this round with Ms. Capozzola with regard
to not just the dollar amounts and what it's being spent for,
but what results you're seeing. And I can't even begin to
describe, maybe you could, if you had a lot of time, the
challenges you face. And USAID is always facing difficult
environments, but this has to be one of the most difficult,
where you have not just a tremendous need, but with the rise in
violence and other complicating factors, it's harder to deliver
on what we propose or promise or fund.
But I was just going through your testimony and just kind
of highlighting some of the things you've mentioned as
progress, either progress or just initiatives. I'm looking at
page 2 of your testimony, where you describe some of the
challenges in the number of internally displaced persons,
50,000 to 60,000, and the help you're providing there--clean
water, emergency relief, humanitarian programs. You highlight
health care services, agricultural inputs.
And then on page 3 you actually list, in a more specific
way, some of the work that's being done--seven water projects,
water and sanitation for 15,900 beneficiaries in five northern
districts, rehabilitation of roads, mobile medical teams, 1,500
midwives, you go down the list.
I'm going to ask you two questions. What's the best way to
articulate results from all of that effort, say, over the last
year or two? No. 1, what's the best way to articulate the
results?
And then No. 2, can you provide us with any vignettes or
examples or testimony that would make the linkage between
poverty and economic devastation or desperation, maybe, that
you're seeing leading directly to extremism or terrorist
activity, or at least the inspiration for that? Because we say
that in a way where we, I guess, believe it's self-evident,
that if someone is poor and desperate and hungry, they may turn
to extremism. But I wanted to ask you, because you may be
seeing things on the ground that are more evident or are more
powerful of an example of how those conditions lead to
extremism.
But, first, the question on kind of results for our dollars
and our taxpayers.
Ms. Capozzola. Thank you for the excellent question,
Senator.
I think that really is a key question. We talk about our
objectives in terms of mitigating the causes of instability. We
have a very broad portfolio with a lot of activities around the
country. And what is it all adding up to in terms of impact?
This is the key question.
At the first level, I think USAID's activities are fully
engaging with Yemeni people. And to your earlier question about
the message that we're sending, I think that it's on the first
level very important to look at the outputs and the engagement
of our work in terms of the number of youths that we reach and
provide training services and development activities to, the
number of women who get improved access to health care.
But those are outputs and, to be honest, in my view, the
ultimate outcome, which is laying a more solid foundation for
Yemen's development, we aren't there yet to be able to really
evaluate in this current environment what that impact is.
But that really is the ultimate indicator. Will we be in a
position in the near future for the Yemeni people to move
forward on some of the fundamental development challenges:
jobs, water, services and, you know, constructive engagement
between government and citizenry that will move the country
forward and beyond the cycle of conflict and instability?
We have a lot of anecdotal examples of the way projects at
the community level mitigate conflict. So, for example, in a
few different areas in the north, there's a lot of conflict
between tribes that is created by access to water for farming.
And programs that have been just doing simple repairs to
irrigation canals that have been neglected for many years are
having a documented impact on these communities and how they
are able to prevent and work out conflicts over water access.
So we see a lot of examples like that at the local level.
And, again, our ultimate goal is to see that add up to a bigger
impact for the country as a whole.
Senator Casey. We can get to the second question in a
moment. But I want to press you a little bit on the first part,
or the first question.
We're living in an environment here, fiscally and in terms
of our budget, where I think taxpayers need to see results.
Especially they don't expect results in 2 months, but I think
over a year, and in some cases 2 years, when you can make that
comparison to say--I mean, some of what you have here are
results.
When you say there are 1,500 midwives who were trained,
that's a result. We know you can extrapolate from that the
number of pregnant women that will be helped, or at least get a
good estimate.
When you say improved access to water and sanitation for
15,900 beneficiaries, that's a result you can measure.
But I think in order for this to work, in order for us to
sustain support for strategies that are going to have these
kinds of positive outcomes, we've got to be able to list,
itemize, measure. And I know that's difficult, but I'd urge you
to try to continue to provide those kinds of lists.
I know I'm almost out of time for this section. Let me just
add a little more time to my question period.
This linkage or the perceived linkage between poverty and
desperation and extremism, can you give us any insight into
that or any evidence?
Ms. Capozzola. Well, I think it's been documented in a
number of analyses that there's a very strong link between
economic opportunity and attraction to extremism in a number of
different settings. I don't have an assessment at this time of
our Yemen youth activities to be able to say, ``Here, look at
the analysis.'' I will look into it and see if I can find a
specific, project-level, community-level story for you, because
I think it's a great question.
And the work that we're doing with just this summer
reaching over 14,000 youth around the country is extremely
important. The work that we're doing in--there are at least
four different new vocational training centers that are
providing small business and entrepreneurial skills to youth.
We are also in the civil society side of the portfolio
engaging to support emerging youth leaders. And I think this is
very important in working closely with the Embassy on those
activities.
As you said, there are a lot of outputs and interim results
that we can point to about the types of good impacts we're
having on people's lives. And we'll continue to make that
presentation as strongly as we can.
Senator Casey. I'll come back to Ambassador Benjamin in a
moment.
But, Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Briefly, as we do need to get to the next
panel, but Ms. Capozzola, something that's of interest to me
and I suspect of interest to a lot of other Senators up here
is, can you give us your assessment of how Americans are held
in regard in Yemen?
And I ask that question because a lot of us are relatively
concerned, and I guess offended to a degree, as to how poorly
we're held in repute in Pakistan.
You know, we went in there and spent hundreds of millions
of dollars rebuilding their bridges after the floods in Swat
Valley, and we put in billions of dollars there every year. And
they have objective measurements that show that the
favorability of America is in the single digits in Pakistan.
And, frankly, that's pretty disgusting when you're spending
that kind of money there, and you're trying to help people, and
you get no appreciation for it. And I understand there's no
objective standard in Yemen because it's more difficult--it
would probably be impossible, really, to measure on an
objective basis.
But maybe from anecdotal testimony or from some subjective
standpoint, can you give me your description of how we're held?
Ms. Capozzola. Thank you, Senator, for that question.
In general, USAID's experience is that the perception of
Americans and our aid is positive. And I guess the way that I
can help illustrate that most poignantly is that we brand our
assistance in most cases throughout the country. So it's
tagged. It's clear who it's coming from.
So this is important in terms of the messaging, again,
Senator Casey.
But it also means that we are able to operate--our
partners, many USAID partners, are able to operate openly as
funded by the American people. And this is well-received and is
done, you know, for the most part, safely throughout the
country.
Senator Risch. What would be just a gut feeling if they did
some objective standard or did an objective survey? What
percent of the people of the country do you think would respond
that they were favorable or at least neutral as far as the
United States is concerned?
Ms. Capozzola. I really can't speculate. I may also turn to
my colleague from State to see if there have been any surveys
done.
I am not familiar with data on perceptions. It may have
been done.
But is there a recent experience you can point to either?
Ambassador Sanderson. Senator, I've seen some of the Pew
reports and others that have done some surveys in the region,
but I'm not aware that there's anything on Yemen specifically.
I can only share, as does Christa, some anecdotal evidence
in terms of our Embassy outreach.
Until the most recent security problems, the Embassy was
really moving outside of Sanaa to make sure that there was a
sense among the Yemenis that it was more than just a focus on
the capital, which is sometimes one of the things that we are
accused of, no matter where we are.
The reception that the Ambassador and Embassy colleagues
have received throughout the country has been extremely good.
In terms of specific information, we can look into that and
see if there have been some more recent polls, but I don't have
anything to share with you.
Senator Risch. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Casey. Just a couple of followups.
Ambassador Benjamin, did you have anything you wanted to
add on the question of that linkage between poverty or
desperation and extremism?
Ambassador Benjamin. I would like to address that.
I should also say to Senator Risch that we know from
pockets of polling that the United States is much more popular
in Yemen than it is in Pakistan. I'm sure there's more data out
there we can get you.
I will tell you that last year, the National Defense
University hosted a large group of Yemeni officials from the
government and from civil society. I met with them two or three
times. Many other officials met with them. The desire to engage
with the United States is very, very powerful. There is a deep
desire to work together to deal with Yemen's problems.
So I think that we have strong partners there who, once
they are enabled by the political situation, will want to
collaborate with us, cooperate with us, to address some of
Yemen's pressing challenges.
Senator Casey, on the issue of poverty and radicalism, I
think it's important to underscore that the research indicates
that there is not a direct link between poverty and
radicalization.
Poverty is often used by those who incite others to become
radical in an instrumental fashion to illustrate that their
position in the world is poor, and it is poor because they're
being oppressed by others, and, therefore, they should become
more radical. I think that our findings that are particularly
relevant to Yemen--and, by the way, just to step back for a
second, if you look across the range of key terrorist
operatives, ones who have been, you know, wrapped up, arrested,
disrupted over the years, there are an awful lot of people who
have never known real poverty, but who, in fact, because they
enjoyed some comfort in life, had the leisure to develop
radical ideas, if you will.
Nonetheless, it's very important to go at the fundamental
socioeconomic problems as well, because one of the key drivers
of radicalization is poor governance and the failure of
governments to provide fundamental social goods, such as
services. And this is something that comes out in conversation
again and again with Yemenis, their frustration that they don't
have adequate education for their children, that they don't
have water, sanitation, any number of different kinds of those
things that we take for granted and we consider to be
fundamentals of modern life.
And so that's why the development aspect of our policy is
so important, not just to lift people out of poverty, which is
an important goal in its own right, but also because their
sense that they are partaking of the modern economy, the modern
world, that they're on an equal footing with others, is vitally
important. And corruption and poor governance are key drivers--
key drivers--of radicalization.
Senator Casey. I know we're just about out of time.
Let me just highlight one part of your testimony and ask
you one quick question.
On page 2, Ambassador Benjamin, you say that--and I'm glad
you have this in your testimony, by the way--``The United
States has strongly urged and publicly called for the Yemeni
Government to investigate and prosecute all acts of violence
against protesters.''
You don't have to comment on that. I'm just commending you
for putting that in there. It's important we do that.
But the point that you make, there's so many you could make
about the security situation. We don't have nearly enough time,
but you say on page 3, ``Our counterterrorism strategy focuses
on building the capabilities of Yemen's security forces to
counter al-Qaeda, AQAP, effectively.''
And I know you've addressed this already, to a certain
extent, but what can you tell us about that? Because, look,
when our taxpayers see our efforts and our dollars, they want
to--when I asked about results earlier on other fronts, they
want to be able to say that we're getting results here and that
the Yemeni security forces can do this on their own at some
point.
What kind of progress report or what kind of indication can
you give us about how we're doing on that score?
Ambassador Benjamin. Senator, the view from the
administration, particularly from DOD, which is doing, of
course, the lion's share of the training, although State
Department, through antiterrorism training, is doing a good
deal as well, is that the Yemenis are improving their
capacities; that they are making good progress toward being
able to deal with the threats within their border.
But it is important to recognize that our engagement in
Yemen was interrupted for many years. Yemen did not have the
kind of mentoring programs, the kind of training programs, that
many of our other counterterrorism partners had. It was really
when the Obama administration came into office that a review
was done in March, the beginning of March 2009. It was
recognized that Yemen was a major challenge in the world of
counterterrorism.
And it was not until December, after many conversations
with the Yemenis, that we really felt that they were on board
with the project and in fact took their first actions against
AQAP. This, as you may recall, was just shortly before the
attempted December 25 bombing of the Northwest flight.
So this is a military and a set of Ministry of Interior
that is civilian units that are making good progress, but
obviously, have a lot to learn.
So again, vitally important that we get back to the work of
training these units, so that they can take on the missions
they need to.
Senator Casey. Well, thank you very much.
I know we're out of time, and I'm sure members will have
questions for the record that you can answer in that way.
We wish we had more time, but we're grateful for the
testimony and for your work, the public service work, that each
of you do, and we'll move to our second panel.
Thank you very much.
As we are transitioning, I will indicate that our second
panel has two individuals testifying. First of all, Dr.
Christopher Boucek, the Middle East research associate at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and also, we have
Mr. Daniel Green, Soref Fellow at the Washington Institute on
Near East Policy, who will testify.
We'll ask each of our witnesses to provide an opening
statement. As you noticed, the first panel stayed well within
their time limits, which we try to be roughly within the 5-
minute timeframe, as is true of the first panel.
I'm not sure I said this for the record, but their full
testimony will be made part of the record, as will each of our
two panelists on this second panel. So your full testimony will
be made part of the record.
And if you could provide about a 5-minute summary, then
we'll have a period of questions.
And, Mr. Green, we can start with you. Thank you for being
here.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL R. GREEN, SOREF FELLOW, WASHINGTON
INSTITUTE ON NEAR EAST POLICY, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Green. Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, and
members of the committee, thank you for allowing me to speak
with you today about the challenges our country faces in Yemen.
Since the outbreak of protests earlier this year against
the continued rule of Yemen's President Ali Abdullah Saleh,
there's been a significant increase in activity of al-Qaeda's
affiliate in Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
Much of this has to do with the fact that the Yemeni
security personnel are preoccupied with either regime survival
or regime change in Sanaa or protecting protesters. Most
notably, the U.S.-trained Republican Guard has been battling
members of the Hashid tribal confederation in Sanaa and not
focusing on counterterrorism missions.
There have also been reports that President Saleh has
deliberately removed his security personnel from certain areas
of the country to precipitate a security crisis in an attempt
to prompt the United States to support him as the only
solutions to the problem of al-Qaeda.
The security situation in Yemen's countryside where al-
Qaeda is principally located is deteriorating rapidly. Over the
last 4 months, AQAP's low-level activities of killings,
targeted assassinations, thefts, and kidnappings have expanded
and become more sophisticated. On March 27, as you well know,
alleged AQAP members seized a munitions factory in the town of
Jaar in Abyan province. This was followed by a May 29 operation
where more than 200 alleged AQAP members overran the town of
Zanjibar, the capital of Abyan in southern Yemen, which is just
east of the major city of Aden.
AQAP's siege of Zanjibar is ongoing and the Yemeni military
is attempting to retake the city with the assistance of local
tribesmen.
On June 22, several dozen alleged al-Qaeda prisoners
escaped from a prison in the port city of Al-Mukalla. These and
other incidents have contributed to a general sense of
lawlessness in the countryside, enhancing AQAP's ability to
mount additional attacks against the U.S. homeland and our
interests.
Although conflicts in the capital will affect Yemen's
future course as a nation, efforts to control the provinces
more directly affect United States national security interests.
The key battle with AQAP is in the countryside and the U.S.
Government needs to pay more attention to this problem and
craft a suitable strategy to address it.
As part of this effort, the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy is conducting a series of studies on the key
provinces within which al-Qaeda is located. Much like the
organization of AQAP, the U.S. approach must be decentralized,
locally based, long-term, and holistic, blending military and
civil approaches.
Saleh has traditionally been the greatest impediment to an
expanded U.S. presence in the countryside. With the President
convalescing in Saudi Arabia and Yemen's political factions in
a stalemate, now is the time to consider offering Saleh an
expanded aid package to help the government stabilize the
provinces.
We should adopt a forward strategy consisting of four main
components. In many respects, these are more about how we are
organized in Yemen rather than how many resources we are
devoting to the problem.
First, the United States needs a robust foreign internal
defense program. Washington should consider an expanded
training initiative for Yemen's security services,
concentrating on both its counterterrorism units and its
conventional forces. United States trainers should embed with
Yemeni units deployed to the provinces. The government forces
would then benefit directly from U.S. training and equipment as
they confront AQAP in the countryside. Additionally,
Washington's understanding of provincial dynamics would improve
considerably.
Second, the United States needs to establish a foreign
internal governance strategy to complement a foreign internal
defense strategy. With the security initiative underway, the
United States should evaluate the practical aspects of
decentralizing its governance and development programs moving
some of them from the capital to the countryside in partnership
with provincial governors or other officials, including
possibly tribal leaders. This might be facilitated by having a
consulate presence in central or eastern Yemen, although I
realize that's a significant political gesture.
The decentralized approach would bolster local governance
and mitigate some of the underlying grievances that AQAP
exploits to increase its support.
Third, the United States needs to leverage the human
terrain more effectively to defeat al-Qaeda. The United States
should consider a dedicated effort to map Yemen's human terrain
and gain a better understanding of local communities.
Additionally, the State Department, the United States
Agency for International Development, and the United States
military should extend the tours of select personnel serving in
Yemen in order to facilitate a deeper understanding of the
local situation. Within this framework, the United States
should develop a Yemen Hands initiative similar to the Afghan
Hands initiative, wherein United States personnel work in the
country for a number of years. These approaches would even help
the continuity problems that result from constant personnel
rotations.
And then, finally, the United States should consider
appointing a special envoy to supplement the work of our United
States Ambassador in Yemen and assist him in regional diplomacy
efforts to promote stability in Yemen and to ensure that the
issue of AQAP continues to receive the attention it requires.
This person would provide a needed alternative to an
overwhelming counterterrorism narrative that has often prompted
Yemenis to be skeptical of United States intentions. The envoy
can also address the growing relationship between AQAP and
Islamist militants in Somalia and work to craft a strategy to
confront both.
Thank you, and I look forward to answer any questions you
may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Green follows:]
Prepared Statement of Daniel R. Green
Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the committee,
thank you for allowing me to speak with you today about the challenges
our country faces in Yemen.
Since the outbreak of protests earlier this year against the
continued rule of Yemen's President Ali Abdullah Saleh, there has been
a significant increase in activity of al-Qaeda's affiliate in Yemen,
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Much of this has to do with
the fact that Yemeni security personnel are preoccupied with regime
survival or regime change in Sana'a or with protecting protesters. Most
notably, the U.S.-trained Republican Guard has been battling members of
the Hashid Tribal Confederation in Sana'a and not focusing on
counterterrorism missions. There have also been reports that President
Saleh has deliberately removed his security personnel from certain
areas of the country to precipitate a security crisis in an attempt to
prompt the United States to support him as the only solution to the
problem of al-Qaeda.
The security situation in Yemen's countryside, where al-Qaeda is
principally located, is deteriorating rapidly. Over the last 4 months,
AQAP's low-level activities of killings, targeted assassinations,
thefts, and kidnappings have expanded and become more sophisticated. On
March 27, for example, alleged AQAP members seized a munitions factory
in the town of Jaar in Abyan province. This was followed by a May 29
operation where more than 200 alleged AQAP members overran the town of
Zinjibar, the capital of Abyan in southern Yemen, which is just east of
the major city of Aden. AQAP's siege of Zinjibar is ongoing and the
Yemeni military is attempting to retake the city with the assistance of
local tribesmen. On June 22, several dozen alleged al-Qaeda prisoners
escaped from a prison in the port city of
Al-Mukalla. These and other incidents have contributed to a general
sense of lawlessness in the countryside, enhancing AQAP's ability to
mount additional attacks against the U.S. homeland and our interests.
Although conflicts in the capital will affect Yemen's future course
as a nation, efforts to control the provinces more directly affect U.S.
national security interests. The key battle with AQAP is in the
countryside, and the U.S. Government needs to pay more attention to
this problem and craft a suitable strategy to address it. To address
this issue, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy is conducting
a series of studies on the key provinces within which al-Qaeda is
located.
Much like the organization of AQAP, the U.S. approach must be
decentralized, locally based, long-term, and holistic, blending
military and civil approaches. Saleh has typically been the greatest
impediment to an expanded U.S. presence in the countryside. With the
President convalescing in Saudi Arabia and Yemen's political factions
in a stalemate, now is the time to consider offering Sana'a an expanded
aid package to help the government stabilize the provinces. We should
adopt a forward strategy, consisting of four main components. In many
respects, these are more about how we are organized in Yemen rather
than how many resources we are devoting to the problem.
First, the United States needs a robust Foreign Internal Defense
program. Washington should propose an expanded training initiative for
Yemen's security services, concentrating on both its counterterrorism
units and conventional forces. U.S. trainers should embed with Yemeni
units deployed to the provinces. Government forces would then benefit
directly from U.S. training and equipment as they confront AQAP in the
countryside. Additionally, Washington's understanding of provincial
dynamics would improve.
Second, the United States needs to establish a Foreign Internal
Governance strategy. With the security initiative underway, the United
States should evaluate the practical aspects of decentralizing its
governance and development programs, moving some of them from the
capital to the countryside in partnership with provincial governors or
other officials, including possibly tribal leaders. This might be
facilitated by having a consulate presence in central or eastern Yemen.
The decentralized approach would bolster local governance and mitigate
some of the underlying grievances that AQAP exploits to increase its
support.
Third, the United States needs to leverage the human terrain more
effectively to defeat al-Qaeda. The United States should consider a
dedicated effort to map Yemen's human terrain and gain a better
understanding of local communities. Additionally, the State Department,
the United States Agency for International Development, and the U.S.
military should extend the tours of select personnel serving in Yemen
in order to facilitate a deeper understanding of the local situation.
Within this framework, the United States should develop a ``Yemen
Hands'' initiative similar to the ``Afghan Hands'' program, wherein
U.S. personnel work in the country for a number of years. These
approaches would even out the continuity problems that result from
constant personnel rotations.
Finally, the United States should appoint a Special Envoy to
supplement the work of our Ambassador in Yemen and assist him in
regional diplomacy efforts to promote stability in Yemen and to ensure
that the issue of AQAP continues to receive the attention it requires.
This person would provide a needed alternative to an overwhelming
counterterrorism narrative that has often prompted Yemenis to be
skeptical of U.S. intentions. The envoy can also address the growing
relationship between AQAP and Islamist militants in Somalia and work to
craft a strategy to confront both.
Although any U.S. strategy for Yemen will be difficult to
implement, it will be harder if there is a limited understanding of the
country outside the major cities. It is only through a better
understanding of local dynamics and the ability to influence them that
U.S. policymakers will be able to make the crucial decisions needed to
defeat al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
Thank you and I look forward to answering any questions you may
have.
Senator Casey. Thanks, Mr. Green.
Dr. Boucek.
STATEMENT OF DR. CHRISTOPHER BOUCEK, ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE MIDDLE
EAST PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Boucek. Thank you very much.
Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, members of the
subcommittee, I'd like to thank the subcommittee again for the
opportunity to be here today to discuss what is truly a very
critical issue for the United States, policy toward Yemen.
And I'd like to start off by saying that I think it's
important that we keep in mind that there's very much that we
do not know about what's going on in Yemen right now. It's
incredibly difficult to get accurate information about what's
happening. It's more and more difficult to travel throughout
most parts of the country. And it's a very fluid and changing
situation, as was noted in the first panel.
I think it's also important to note that the initial fears
of violence, mass violence, how bad things could really go,
have not come to pass. There have certainly been some episodes
of very severe violence, but it has not devolved into the civil
war that I think many people were talking about 5, 6 months
ago.
That said, it still can go very wrong very quickly. I think
this goes to the importance of why we're here today to speak
about Yemen.
Yemen's problems are very well-known. They were gone over
at length in the first panel. But I think it bears keeping in
mind that the failing economy is really at the heart, I would
argue, of everything that's going wrong in the country.
We have a situation of rampant poverty--really, truly
grinding poverty--rampant corruption, unemployment that's
officially at 35 percent, which would put it on par with the
Great Depression in this country. In actuality, it's probably
much higher than that. A whole host of governance deficiencies
and abuses, resource depletion, and nearly one of the highest
population growth rates anywhere in the world.
All that said, I think it's very challenging when we're
talking about United States policy, because everyone knows what
we want to avoid in Yemen--state failure or state collapse--but
no one can really tell you what that looks like or how that
might happen.
So I think for policymakers, it's especially difficult
trying to come up with the prescriptive measures to address
what you can't imagine and you can't think through what the
causes may be.
There are no easy options in Yemen. There are no easy
policy solutions. If there were, I think we would have come up
with them by now.
And I think it's especially important that we look at Yemen
with a healthy dose of realism about what we can accomplish and
what we can't. Ultimately, at the end of the day, the United
States has very little leverage with which to influence events
in Yemen. However, what we can do is help to alleviate how bad
things will be.
And I think it's by making progress against the whole
spectrum of Yemen's challenges that we can give the Yemeni
Government more space to breathe and deal with these issues and
alleviate the humanitarian impact of how bad this will truly
be.
Much of American policy toward Yemen has been focused on
counterterrorism. And despite, I think, all of the efforts of
our Government and what we heard in the first panel, I think
the perception in Yemen is still that counterterrorism and al-
Qaeda is what the United States cares about.
And while there's certainly a need for a robust
counterterrorism program, there are also a number of other
things that we can look at and we probably should look at. And
I would say that corruption and access to water are two of the
most important issues that we can focus on.
These are issues that affect every Yemeni. There are things
that we can do to improve the situation, because security and
stability will come when the situation and conditions in Yemen
improve, full stop, for everyone in Yemen.
We need to make sure that our policy is geared toward
addressing the public of Yemen, not the government. I think
that's an important message that we need to maintain.
And we need to make sure that we continue to focus our aid
and assistance programs not only on areas where we're concerned
about al-Qaeda or radicalization, because, again, that sends
the message that this is the only reason why we're interested
in Yemen.
And I think in my testimony I go through a number of
points, but I'd just like to spend the few minutes that I have
left talking about two issues: the economy and Saudi Arabia.
And I really think that after this political crisis ends, one
way or another, the economy will dwarf this current problem.
The problems facing the Yemeni economy are overwhelming. If
Yemen is not yet a failed economy, it's probably on its way to
being one extremely soon. Food prices, fuel prices, cooking gas
fuel have all skyrocketed, and this is in the country with the
most vulnerable population in the region, the poorest country
in the region.
On Saudi policy, I think it's important to stress that
there is not one Saudi policy toward Yemen; there's not one
Saudi policy on just about anything. I think the Saudis are
trying to figure all of this out right now, just as many others
are. But security and stability is the key issue that the
Saudis are concerned about.
And with that, I look forward to your questions, and thank
you again for the opportunity to be here.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Boucek follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Christopher Boucek
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here to discuss U.S. policy
toward Yemen.
Yemen presents a complex challenge for U.S. foreign policy.
Successive American administrations have grappled with implementing an
integrated policy toward Yemen. There is near unanimity on what the
United States and its allies want to avoid in Yemen: the collapse of
the state and greater operational space for al-Qaeda to plan and launch
attacks against the United States, and its interests, friends, and
allies. A key obstacle, however, is that no one can really articulate
what a ``failed'' Yemen looks like, much less the triggers that might
lead to state failure. It has therefore been extremely difficult for
policymakers to design a policy when they do not know what they want to
avoid and do not know how it might happen.
In large part, U.S. policy toward Yemen has focused almost
exclusively on the issues of terrorism, counterterrorism, and al-Qaeda.
To be sure, terrorism and security are major issues with regards to
Yemen; however, the United States should not allow these issues to
dominate the relationship. Terrorism and al-Qaeda may be the current
issues of most concern to Washington, but they are not the greatest
threats to Yemeni stability.
In order to improve security and stability in Yemen, U.S. policy
should be focused on addressing the systemic sources of instability in
the country. These include a collapsing economy, rampant corruption,
widespread unemployment, rapid resource depletion, and a series of
political and socioeconomic challenges that have manifested as security
challenges to the current government. A policy centered on
counterterrorism to the near exclusion of other issues will ultimately
prove counterproductive. While initial gains may be seen, they may be
short lived. Improving American and allied security will come when
conditions in Yemen improve.
yemen's numerous challenges
Yemen is facing an unprecedented confluence of crises, the
combination of which threatens to overwhelm the beleaguered Yemeni
Government. The country's problems include international terrorism,
violent extremism, religious and tribal conflict, separatism, and
transnational smuggling. Attempts to build effective national
governance are frustrated by porous borders, a heavily armed
population, and a historical absence of much central government
control. More than 3 million barrels of oil pass the country's coast
every day, through treacherous waters where Islamist terrorists and
Somali pirates have staged several successful maritime attacks,
threatening to disrupt international commerce and the flow of vital
hydrocarbons. These challenges not only endanger Yemen's stability and
regional security, but they also threaten American foreign policy and
national security interests.
Interrelated economic, demographic, and domestic security
challenges are converging to threaten the stability of Yemen. At the
heart of the country's problems is a looming economic collapse. Yemen's
oil reserves are fast running out, with few viable options for a
sustainable post-oil economy. Yemen is the poorest country in the Arab
world, with most people surviving on less than $2 per day and, in many
places, just $1 per day. Its population growth rate, which exceeds 3
percent per year, is among the world's highest. The government has been
unable to provide adequate educational or other public services for the
rapidly expanding population, more than two-thirds of which is under
the age of 24, and illiteracy stands at over 50 percent in general and
close to 70 percent for women. The failing economy and poorly prepared
workforce have pushed unemployment to almost 40 percent. The country's
dire economic circumstances will soon limit the government's ability to
deliver the funds needed to hold the country together. The population
is expected to double to 40 million over the next two decades, by which
time Yemen will no longer be an oil producer, and its water resources
will be severely diminished. This is currently the greatest source of
violence in the country; an estimated 80 percent of violence in Yemen
is about access to water. A rapidly expanding and increasingly poorer
population places unbearable pressure on the government's ability to
provide basic services. Domestic security is endangered by Islamist
terrorism, magnified by a resurgent al-Qaeda organization, an armed
insurrection in the North, and an active secessionist movement in the
South.
Yemen's challenges are compounded by corruption, severe governance
deficiencies, and an absence of central government control in much of
the country, as well as by the pending transition in political
leadership. While President Ali Abdullah Saleh announced in February
that he would not stand for reelection, he has no obvious successor.
The post-Saleh government will be severely strained by a combination of
reduced revenue, diminished state capacity, and three ongoing
conflicts.
yemen and the arab spring
This year has witnessed historic change sweeping the Middle East
and the recent wave of unrest has not spared Yemen. Since late.
January, popular protests in Sana'a, Taiz, Aden, and other cities have
been ongoing against the government of President Saleh. This recent
protest movement has mobilized a segment of the population that had
previously presented little challenge to the Yemeni Government. In an
attempt to short-circuit the protest movement, the government announced
a series of economic concessions. It sought to maintain the allegiance
of the military and security forces by announcing pay raises and even
access to free food and gas. It addressed the concerns of civil
servants by putting into immediate effect salary increases for the
lowest paid employees originally scheduled for October 2011. It cut the
national income tax by half and reportedly increased some subsidies and
introduced new price controls. The government also waved university
tuition fees for currently enrolled students and announced a scheme to
help new university graduates find employment. Finally, it extended
social welfare assistance to an additional one-half million families.
When economic measures failed to quell the discontent, President
Saleh turned to political concessions. In a speech to the Parliament
and shura council on February 2, he announced that he would not stand
for reelection in 2013 and that his eldest son and presumed heir,
General Ahmed All Abdullah Saleh, commander of the Republican Guard,
would also not run for President. He ``froze'' the implementation of a
controversial constitutional amendment eliminating term limits on the
Presidency. Saleh also stated that regional governors would now be
directly elected rather than indirectly elected by local councils, a
little noticed but important change. And finally, he called for the
formation of a national unity government and the relaunching of the
stalled national dialogue process, and postponed parliamentary
elections scheduled for this April to allow time to properly prepare.
The protest/opposition movement includes several different
groupings. Youth and civil society demonstrators launched the initial
protests. It has been estimated that this group represents only a
fraction of the total number of protesters on the streets. After the
protests proved to not be short-lived, the ``official'' opposition--the
Joint Meeting Parties (JMP)subsequently joined the demonstrations. The
JMP includes the Yemeni Socialist Party, the Islamist Isiah party, and
several other smaller parties. Overlaid on top of this are personal
rivalries of the country's power elite, most often characterized by
enmity and fighting between the Saleh and the al-Ahmar families.
The current political opposition in Yemen is not unified. They are
united only inasmuch as they all want to see the Saleh government step
down. As for what comes after President Saleh, there seems to be
considerable disagreement.
As Yemen's political crisis drags on, conditions have severely
deteriorated. For almost 2 weeks at the end of May, fierce fighting
broke out in the capital between government forces and those aligned
with the al-Ahmar family. On June 3, President Saleh and a number of
senior government officials were gravely wounded when a bomb exploded
in a Presidential mosque during Friday prayers. Saleh survived the
assassination attempt, and was transported to Saudi Arabia for medical
treatment where he remains today. Following the attack, a cease-fire
was negotiated by Saudi Arabia. The exact nature of President Saleh's
injuries is not publically known, although it is likely that he will
remain in Riyadh recuperating for the foreseeable future. A number of
questions surround his possible return.
al-qaeda in the arabian peninsula
Since its creation in January 2009, the Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has eclipsed ``core al-Qaeda'' as a primary
terrorist threat to U.S. national security. In an address at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace last December, Assistant to
the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism John Brennan
termed AQAP ``the most operationally active node of the al-Qaeda
network.'' In testimony earlier this year, National Counterterrorism
Center Director Michael Leiter referred to AQAP as the most significant
risk to the U.S. homeland.
AQAP has rapidly evolved into an increasingly lethal and agile
organization, with a proven track record of mounting operations within
Yemen, regionally and internationally. AQAP thrives on Yemen's internal
disarray. The government's inability to control territory provides the
space al-Qaeda craves, using poverty and legitimate grievances against
a repressive domestic regime to win support. The organization has a
very fast learning curve, quickly adjusts and improvises, and is very
adept at exploiting opportunities. AQAP has been clear in stating its
planned objectives, and it has repeatedly delivered on its threats.
The attempted bombing of Northwest Flight 253 over Detroit on
Christmas Day 2009 marked the first time since the September 11 attacks
that al-Qaeda had successfully engaged a domestic American target. This
attack was further noteworthy because the plot did not originate in
South Asia with the al-Qaeda senior leadership--it came from Yemen. The
Christmas Day attack was followed some 10 months later when AQAP again
targeted U.S. aviation with the attempted delivery of explosives
concealed as cargo packages mailed from Yemen.
Since the start of the protest movement, the Yemeni Government has
redeployed its counterterrorism assets from going after AQAP and moved
them to bolster internal security. Islamist fighters--possibly
including some al-Qaeda elements--have been increasingly active in the
south of the country. It must be noted that there is a broad range of
Islamist actors in Yemen, and it is frequently very difficult to
determine with certainty what group or movement is responsible for
specific actions in much of the country. In recent weeks, the Yemeni
Government has sought to take more aggressive action, and has killed a
number of senior al-Qaeda operatives, including two wanted Saudi
nationals (Waleed All Mishafi alMishafi Assiri, No. 83 on Saudi
Arabia's 2009 list of 85 most wanted; and Ahmed Abdulaziz Jasser al-
Jasser, No. 1 on Saudi Arabia's 2011 list of 47 most wanted).
As the central government's authority continues to recede, the
operational space for AQAP is increasing. While the Saleh government
has sought to reassert control in some areas, their ability to fully
establish control is not known.
conclusion
Developments in Yemen are of critical importance to the United
States, and Washington has deep and enduring national interests in
promoting stability and security that go beyond terrorism and al-Qaeda.
A terrorism-centric U.S. policy may generate short-term gain in the
struggle against violent extremism, but it also risks creating greater
problems down the road.
There is no dispute that American policy toward Yemen must include
a robust counterterrorism element, but this cannot be at the exclusion
of all other issues. The United States and its allies can work to
improve security in Yemen by focusing on issues other than direct
action counterterrorism operations. Washington should also focus on
other indirect measures that can help bolster security and stability in
Yemen. For instances, aiding the Yemeni Government in drafting
effective counterterrorism legislation will help empower law
enforcement officials to charge and prosecute individuals engaged in
and supporting terrorism. Judicial training programs can help promote
fairer practices and improve conviction rates. There is research that
demonstrates that abuse by police, intelligence, and domestic security
agencies leads to future recruitment and radicalization. Efforts to
professionalize these services can help reduce such effects.
Improvements in prison conditions will not only help to reduce
recidivism, but it will also help decrease the number of now-infamous
``escapes.''
Serious and sustained effort must also be focused on Yemen's many
other challenges, including those outlined above. Two key issues that
should receive more attention are corruption and access to water. These
issues affect almost every Yemeni. Land reform is another crucial area.
Support for programs to consolidate land registries and establish
lawful ownership can help diffuse conflict.
The primary policy challenge with regard to Yemen is how to build
the relationship between the Yemeni people and their government. This
requires building the capacity of the Yemeni Government to be
responsive to the needs of its people and to expand the capability of
the government to deliver basic services throughout the country. This
will necessitate measures to bolster the government's legitimacy as
well as its ability to exercise control throughout the entire national
territory. It will also likely require empowering local governments to
administer their affairs in harmony with priorities mutually developed
by Sana'a and the governorates, as well as sharing revenues to fund
local development.
There is little disagreement that Yemen is a critical state-at-
risk, beset by a daunting set of challenges. In spite of this, the
United States has yet to craft and implement a unified strategic policy
for Yemen. Washington must identify what it seeks to accomplish in
Yemen. These goals will also need to be tempered by reality. Moreover,
Washington has very little leverage with which to influence events in
Yemen. We will need to be realistic about what the United States--and
the international community--can accomplish in Yemen. Ultimately, many
of Yemen's problems cannot be solved. Resource depletion, economic
failure, and explosive population growth represent an almost
insurmountable set of challenges, and these conditions cannot be
completely reversed. Rather than eliminating these factors, U.S. policy
can help to minimize their impact. If we work to make small
improvements across the spectrum of challenges, we can reduce the
severity of their impact, lessen the humanitarian suffering, and
bolster the Yemeni Government. This will hopefully improve U.S.
security and bolster Yemeni stability.
Senator Casey. Thanks very much.
Both panels did a good job on time. You're setting a good
example.
I wanted to, not by way of a competition or a challenge
between panel one and panel two, but Doctor, I wanted to ask
you first, when you outlined the two among many challenges, but
you highlight two that you spoke to and it's in your testimony,
both corruption and access to water, when you hear USAID's
testimony, when you hear the State Department's testimony, when
you examine and consider other evidence on the record, how do
you assess U.S. efforts on just those two, anticorruption
measures and strategies to help on the question of water or
other kind of basic needs?
Dr. Boucek. Thank you. I think the points that were made
about efforts to improve irrigation canals, I think those need
to be commended. But there's an awful lot more that we can and
should be doing, right?
It's been estimated that 80 percent of violence in Yemen is
about people fighting over water, or access to water, the land
that controls water. I think it's very easy, if we're looking
at TV coverage or media coverage, to think that it's all about
al-Qaeda and violence, and actually it's something else.
So I think we can do more in this area, I'd say helping
with rain collection, helping with programs to deliver the
message about how you use water and what it has to do with
security and stability. I mean, this is a huge area that we can
do more about.
It's terrible to think that when it rains in the capital,
there are children that die, because of drowning in a country
that's running out of water. So I think we can do more to help
Yemenis collect water and reintroduce traditional methods of
irrigation, et cetera.
On corruption, I don't think we can do too much on any of
these issues, right? I mean, we can always probably do more.
And I think these are the two issues that not only affect
every Yemeni, but I think increasingly are going to be the
sources of future violence and instability.
Senator Casey. When you look at the question of those
priorities that you outline, water and corruption, and you set
that aside or next to the efforts we're undertaking now, both
dollars and in terms of the number of initiatives or number of
strategies, are we trying to do too many things? Or do you
think we should concentrate more on these priorities? Or what's
your sense of the way we've been both prioritizing and being
successful in the results we get?
Dr. Boucek. My perception is that American policy is geared
at counterterrorism and al-Qaeda, No. 1, and everything else is
after that. And I think we all understand what the reasons for
that are.
But I don't think that we are doing enough to focus on
these other issues. I think we have a very immediate, near-term
look at this problem. And this is going to take years to deal
with.
So I think if you look at the central problem, it seems to
me, in Yemen is how do you improve the relationship between the
government and the people? How do you build capacity in the
Yemeni Government to be a more responsive government, able to
deliver more services? And how do you build the belief in the
people to think that their government is not working against
them. And that is not a fast-solving problem.
I think anyplace where you have receding state authority
this is an issue, and it will be an issue going forward, not
just in Yemen, but throughout large parts of the world.
Senator Casey. Mr. Green, I wanted to ask you about--you
outlined in your testimony four policy ideas. Number one--I'm
shorthanding this for purposes of the question--but number one,
an expanded training initiative; number two, an internal
governance strategy, a more robust effort there. You also
outline a mapping of Yemen's human terrain, a kind of new
initiative there similar to what we're undertaking in
Afghanistan. And then, fourth, the appointment of a special
envoy.
When you make these recommendations, are you saying that
we're not currently undertaking any of them? Or do you see some
of them as an expansion of what we're doing? Or as I was saying
before, more of a focused approach?
Mr. Green. Well, sir, I served in Iraq and Afghanistan. I
served a year with the State Department in Afghanistan, served
with the Navy in Afghanistan and Iraq. And you see again and
again the State Department, USAID, having difficulties
adjusting to the challenges of irregular warfare and a
decentralized enemy.
And when I started working on Yemen, it's a very familiar
situation to me, although it's not, obviously, Iraq and
Afghanistan. And a lot of it's capital-centric. It is focused
on working with local partners that may or may not work in the
areas we're mostly concerned with. It's overly centralized.
It's very focused on process and sort of the factions that are
in the national capital.
And if I could tell you what the political--I can't tell
you what the political opposition is in Shabwa province, where
the al-Awlaki tribe is. That's the political opposition we need
to be worried about, in addition to certainly that which is
going on in Sanaa. But we don't have a good understanding of
the human terrain.
Just now, in Afghanistan, we're really mapping the human
terrain, here 8 or 9 years into the conflict. And, in Iraq, it
almost happened by accident that we--for example, they had the
Anbar Awakening. Our sensitivity to these nonstate types of
identifies is not particularly well-developed.
And I think most of our human terrain is probably focused
on the counterterrorism mission, sort of find, fix, and finish,
but not about the human terrain to leverage it, and showing
that we have a sensitivity to the interests of the people.
Senator Casey. And you mentioned in your testimony a number
of times about the effort you think we should undertake in the
countryside.
Mr. Green. Yes, sir.
Senator Casey. And how do you best describe that? Because I
realize that sometimes we make efforts in another country that
are focused on the capital or a big urban area. But can you
describe what you mean by that and why it's of particular
concern in Yemen?
Mr. Green. Yes, sir.
You know, again, going back to Iraq and Afghanistan, we
always seem to just have to relearn some of these lessons that
so much of the situation out in the countryside affects our
interests.
And our ability to influence that is often through national
level programs or national implementing partners that, for one
reason or another, don't go out to areas that are either too
dangerous or aren't considered strategic. And I think that's
the same problem we have in Yemen.
And, unfortunately, no one wants to send anyone into harm's
way. But at the same time, no one wants to see al-Qaeda have a
successful attack. Somewhere between those two left and right
parameters there's got to be something we can do that can put
folks into these areas, to show the American face isn't just
counterterrorism strikes but people have an interest in their
livelihoods.
Senator Casey. Is there a model that you can point to in
Iraq or Afghanistan, or efforts that are anywhere, where you
think we can draw a lot of good inspiration from that's not
capital- or Embassy-centric, but is more kind of local and
countryside in nature?
Mr. Green. Yes, sir. I worked at a provincial
reconstruction team in Afghanistan for a year. And that is one
attempt. There's also district support teams, which are three-
man or three-person elements in Afghanistan, for instance.
But in Yemen, we have something called civil military
support elements, which are an interesting innovation there.
The people who principally man, I believe, are the military,
but they wear civilian clothes. And a lot of what they're doing
is sort of doing that humanitarian work and human terrain
mapping.
And it's a very small program. It's an unclassified
program. But I think that's a way that we might be able to
address some of these problems.
My preference, of course, would be State Department AID
people. But our force protection concerns are so great.
Obviously, no one wants to lose an American life unnecessarily.
But you can't have a policy of having holistic, long-term
strategy with an Embassy that's on ordered departure. These are
incompatible goals.
And I understand the need to--I don't have the
responsibility, obviously, of governance here, but we have a
lot of lessons we learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we seem
to be chronically forgetting some elements of those.
Senator Casey. But you said in Yemen now we have a kind of
a foundation for that. But you think it needs to be----
Mr. Green. Yes, sir. I think it needs to be expanded
significantly. And frankly, we have a generation of State and
AID folks who've been in ambushes, who've been in firefights,
who've been out in these areas, where it's pretty dodgy. And
frankly, Yemen, in some ways, looks, you know, peaceable
compared to what some of us have gone through.
Senator Casey. Thanks very much.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
First of all, both of you, I appreciate your pragmatism on
these issues. Sometimes we don't get a lot of pragmatism here.
And we're not always good at pragmatism. So I appreciate those.
And I appreciate your views that we really should focus on
what we can do, not only what we should do, but what we can do,
because we lose sight of that a lot of times, and we get bogged
down pretty badly, if we lose sight of what we can do.
Mr. Boucek, you said it was getting more difficult to
travel around the country. In what regard? Are you talking
about mechanically, physically? Or are you talking about from a
security standpoint? Or what are you talking about?
Dr. Boucek. What we've seen is, as the situation has
deteriorated in Yemen, it's become less safe for foreigners,
for Americans, to travel in lots of parts of the country. And I
think especially, right now, there's some sort of a limbo. It's
unsure.
The President is recuperating in Saudi Arabia. The fighting
is in some sort of a lull. And I think people are apprehensive
and fearful that fighting can start again, even in the capital,
where most foreigners spend most of their time.
Senator Risch. Appreciate that. I'd appreciate hearing both
of your views on what, from the average--if there is such a
thing--Yemeni, how do they view Americans?
Mr. Green. I think, like anything, if your principal
experience with a country is kinetic, you tend to have a darker
perspective.
For example, when I was in Afghanistan, whenever I met an
infantryman, his interaction with Afghans was usually in
firefights, so he often had a fairly dim view of Afghans.
Whereas, from my perspective, most of mine were building
schools and building roads and things of that nature, so I
tended to have a positive perspective.
I think my sense is the Yemenis are very curious about
Americans and not many of them ever met any of them, but the
little interaction they've had is, if it's been through let's
say a Predator strike or something like that, they may have a
dim view of that. But it just also goes back to whether there
were civilian casualties involved in that as well.
I think my sense is that there's an openness to our
presence there. But how we're there is more important than the
fact we're there, I think.
Senator Risch. Mr. Boucek.
Dr. Boucek. I think I would have a bit more of a
pessimistic view on this. And not having any data in front of
me, I would venture to guess that probably the view of the
United States is probably less positive than was alluded to in
the previous panel.
There's a difference, I think, between perceptions of
American foreign policy, what U.S. Government has been
perceived as doing, if it's counterterrorism operations or
support for a government that's unpopular, and how individual
Americans are received. And I think it's very difficult to get
accurate polling data or public perception data out of that.
But I think a wide view, I would venture to guess, is that it's
less positive instead of more positive.
Senator Risch. Finally, I want to explore one other area
that we really haven't talked about much, and that is as we
move forward, how do the natural resources of the country--gas
and oil--play into all of this?
Mr. Boucek, you want to take a run at that?
Dr. Boucek. The oil will run out sooner rather than later
in Yemen. I think there have been a variety of estimates.
Within 10 years, I think, is the commonly thought idea of
when the oil is going to run out, commercially viable,
extractable oil.
Natural gas will generate revenues for the next 20 years or
so through royalties and revenues, about $20 billion over the
course of the next 20 years, so $1 billion per year. That will
not make up for the shortfall.
The economy is in freefall. And the big concern, I think,
is any government that comes next. Who knows what it'll be
like, but I'm afraid they will look at the balance sheets and
they will see that there is no money to pay for anything.
There's no money to pay for things right now. There's a huge
budget deficit from last year.
And if they enact all of the current spending, plus the new
spending that was announced at the beginning of this year
around the start of the protest movement, that would equal
another 3.5 percent, which they do not have the money to make
up.
So, either way, Yemen is headed for financial catastrophe.
Senator Risch. Mr. Green.
Mr. Green. Sir, I agree with most of what Chris said.
I think we do have to focus also on the state of the
economy over there. And I think, for example, Under Secretary
of Defense Brinkley's office does a lot of great advisory work
with private industry in Iraq and Afghanistan. I know there's
some effort or it has already occurred they are being wrapped
into USAID.
But I think focusing on the private sector is absolutely
central. Obviously, we do that here first in the United States.
But we have to do that as well in Yemen, and not look at it
simply as a development crisis.
I mean, there are plenty of people there who are involved
in business and want to make money and want to help their
communities. I think we need to focus on that as well.
Senator Risch. Mr. Boucek, you said they were going to run
out of oil. Is that because they haven't done the exploration
that they need? Or is it just a fact that physically that their
reserves are depleted?
Dr. Boucek. I think it's the result of several factors. One
is the big international operating companies do not typically
go to Yemen to look. There are only, I think, 6 production
blocks that are productive in Yemen out of 90 or so. And Yemen
is not blessed with the hydrocarbon resources that some of its
neighbors are.
More and more, it's a difficult environment to operate in.
And the easily extractable oil has already been extracted.
So at its height, Yemen was producing maybe 450,000 barrels
per day. That dropped, maybe, to just under 200,000, and
recently, it was probably under 100,000, compared to 9.5
million barrels per day in Saudi Arabia.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Casey. Thanks, Senator Risch.
I want to ask Dr. Boucek about some of the other points you
made in your testimony, or the written version, the
conclusions.
You mentioned in the second paragraph of your section on
conclusions some really interesting topics which we can often
easily overlook. And you're saying, ``Judicial training
programs can help promote fairer practices and improve
conviction rates. There's research that demonstrates that abuse
by police, intelligence, and domestic security agencies leads
to future recruitment and radicalization.''
What can you tell us more about that, but I guess, more
particularly, what can you tell us that we could be doing or
are doing to try to move forward a judicial training program or
other help on their judiciary?
Dr. Boucek. Thank you.
I think what I would say is that if our goal is to improve
security and stability in Yemen, we can work to improve the
security of the country through indirect means as well as
through the direct counterterrorism measures that have been
discussed earlier.
I think you can make progress all across the line. You can
improve the investigative skills to make sure that the
authorities apprehend the right individual. As you noted, in
the testimony I wrote that abuse and arbitrary detention leads
to future recruitment and radicalization, not just in Yemen but
throughout the region.
We can improve the abilities of the judges and prosecutors
to get convictions. We can improve the ability of the Yemeni
authorities to charge people by helping them draft and
implement effective counterterrorism legislation to criminalize
the behavior that we would like to see criminalized.
We could help improve prisons. This is a huge area that we
should do more about. Bad stuff comes out of prisons in the
region, and we want to make sure that people, when they do get
convicted, stay incarcerated, something that doesn't always
happen in Yemen.
So I think there are things that we can do all along this
process, short of arming and doing the kinetic counterterrorism
operations.
I'd also add that I think, in those programs, you can do
more rule-of-law training. You can do more English-language
training. You can do more training on the connection between
abuses and grievances and recruitment, radicalization,
criminality, et cetera.
I think this is an area that we can focus on. And if it's
something that the American Government can't or shouldn't be
doing, we have lots of friends and allies that do this very
well. And we need to look at this in a broader sense, I
believe.
Senator Casey. And I guess you would argue that that would
be linked to your focus on anticorruption? I mean, ultimately,
that's part of what a good judiciary would result in.
And you also say, toward the end, you talk about the
relationship between the Yemeni people and their government.
Tell us more about that, because it's a broad statement, and
again, something we often take for granted. But the confidence
in, or legitimacy for or about, and the support for,
ultimately, a government like the people of Yemen have
experienced will determine so much.
And I just want to get your sense of what you mean, what
undergirds that statement about the relationship between the
government and its people?
Dr. Boucek. We and our allies, I think, can do a lot to
help improve the capacity of the Yemeni Government to be a more
responsive government, able to deliver more civil services,
able to be in greater control of the territory in Yemen.
But also, I think when everyone is equal before the law,
when everyone is prosecuted the same, when corruption at the
top and at the bottom goes through the same process, and when
it's a process-driven situation instead of a personality driven
situation, or who I know to help me get something--and starting
off knowing that none of this is going to be easy to do or that
it's going to be completely solvable. I think, if we make
improvements on that, because I think there is a perception
right now that the government is not working in the interests
of the people. If it's economics, if it's social, education
opportunities, then I think you can do more to improve that
relationship by addressing those issues that common Yemenis
complain about, about government abuses, about the unequal
application of the law.
Senator Casey. And I was going to ask, Mr. Green--I'll ask
both of you this question, but I'll start with Mr. Green.
There are a number of scenarios that some have sketched as
to the succession that will take place. And do you have any
sense of what's most likely or what's, maybe, most optimal for
the people of Yemen, in terms of transition to a new President,
a new government, a new era, really, after more than 30 years
of rule? What's your sense of that?
Mr. Green. Sir, obviously, a lot of this hinges upon what
President Saleh's going to do, whether he comes back or not.
But it seems as if the factions in the capital are, sort
of, at a military stalemate. And I like to think of it as
whether it's going to be a revolution, it's going to be
evolution, or deevolution.
And, I mean, there are many ways it could go, for sure, and
that's just in Sanaa. You know, Taiz and Aden are other things
that are going on.
I think, certainly, there's going to have to be some sort
of a process, and maybe August 2 might be the date. That will
have been 60 days since President Saleh left for Saudi Arabia,
where the constitution says there has to be an election around
that date.
I think that might be a forcing mechanism for some sort of
way forward. But if there is an election, it has to have the
confidence of the people, and it has to be perceived as
legitimate. And there has to be some likely outside participant
to help monitor that. You know, and all the normal suspects, if
you will, the United States, even Saudis, are sort of tainted,
to one degree or another. Maybe unfairly, but they are by some
population groups.
So it might require a U.N. presence or some other presence
to give people confidence that their vote matters.
Senator Casey. What do you think is optimal, though?
Mr. Green. I think, frankly, there might be an evolutionary
process. We're not going to see, I think, a complete setting
aside of Saleh and all his supporters. I think they're a part
of the political geography. They're not going to go away.
Certainly, no one can force them to, if only for the fact that
they're armed.
And there might be some sort of parliamentary system that
develops or elections where some of these factions feel like
they have greater representation, and there may have to be some
element of power-sharing. But getting people to walk back from
shooting at each other is going to be a process, and making
sure they have confidence in the electoral process is also
another challenge to meet that goal.
Senator Casey. Doctor, anything on this?
Dr. Boucek. I think we don't know how things are going to
turn out. I think, most likely, I would tend toward thinking
that there will be a system where the elites in the country,
the power elites inside the regime and outside the regime, come
together to address some sort of a negotiated settlement, where
you don't see much of a change in the system.
And I think there's a belief in Yemen and in the region
that no outside actor really wants to see a wholesale change.
And I think, should that happen, maybe it's--I don't know if
this would be evolution or how they would fit in with this. I
think, you know, the youth or the civil society protesters who
started all this, they're going to be the ones to lose out,
because they don't have a constituency behind them. And this is
the one group that's talking about the things that our
Government talks about, if it's accountability or transparency
or freedom or democracy.
I would like to see elections. I'd like to see a
transition. I think how the Yemeni Government will deal with
that has yet to be seen. I think, you know, there's a lot of
things that are still unclear.
But it seems to me that calling for early elections and
then moving toward some sort of a transition is what has to
happen to get out of this situation.
The President has already said that he won't stand again
for reelection in 2013, that his son will not contest the
election.
I think we need to start this process and move toward it.
And where the United States and the international community can
be most helpful is help to prepare for that eventuality, help
train voter registers, help reform voter rolls, all these
things that will need to happen, because the GCC and the plans
that have been endorsed call for very quick elections. I'm not
sure that's either in the best interests of Yemen or security
and stability in the region.
Senator Casey. Mr. Green, how about al-Qaeda? We hear
reports all the time about al-Qaeda generally, and obviously a
lot of news and a lot of focus on the May 1 and 2, with regard
to the killing of Osama bin Laden, but of course an appropriate
shift in focus now to a place like Yemen and AQAP.
And I think most security experts, I guess, would say
that's where they're strongest or at least seem to have the
strongest foundation in place.
But what's your assessment today with regard to AQAP, its
strength and viability, and al-Qaeda, more generally, today
versus where we were 6 months ago?
Mr. Green. You know, whenever you look at insurgencies and
also for counterterrorism--or, excuse me, terrorist
organizations, there's always a lot of sort of low-level
activity that's often mistaken as criminality. You'll see bank
robberies, you'll see occasional killings.
And a lot of these are the precursors or the beginning of
an organization. They're gathering money to fund future
operations. They overran, for instance, a munitions factory in
Jaar, acquired more weaponry.
The fact that they were able to mount--and I don't
understand exactly how many people were involved, but at least
200, if not more. To overrun Zanzibar in Abyan province is a
real measure of the level to which they have advanced. It takes
a lot of people, at minimum, but also leadership and
sophistication, the ability to communicate, and, frankly, the
confidence of the regular foot soldier in his leaders to take
and hold land.
That's a real measure of the state of that particular
organization. That's as true for the Taliban as it is for any
Iraqi insurgency group.
So I think they now have an internal sort of, say, safe
haven. A lot of our focus has been on the violence in Abyan
province. But I like to think sometimes there are areas that
have no violence. That doesn't mean that al-Qaeda doesn't
control it. They control it so thoroughly that there is no
violence.
I think if you look at some of the provinces, like Marib
and Shabwah, Abyan, these places--maybe not in Abyan--but there
is an absence of violence, which doesn't mean violence is
absent, if you will. I think they have everything they really
need right now to plan, to fund, to recruit.
You know, the Internet obviously makes it very easy way for
them to influence, which they've done repeatedly.
Senator Casey. So you'd say that, whether it's comparing
now to 6 months ago or even a year ago, you'd say that AQAP's
capacity to launch an attack, a strike, on our homeland has
been enhanced as opposed to degraded?
Mr. Green. Their capacity to do so has been increased. We,
of course, have responded to the various attacks with more
preventive measures and in some cases going after them.
But with an Embassy that's on lockdown, that's on reduced
manning, we're not completely blind, but we are very much
operating in sort of the dusk, if you will, or almost
nighttime.
We don't have a good understanding of what's going on, I
believe, outside of the capital region or the big cities. That
makes it very difficult to plan. And we have to, I think, incur
some risk and put some of our personnel out in areas.
I'm not saying necessarily put 12 Americans in Marib
province overnight, but there are ways of doing this that can
get us a little more forward-deployed and inside the country,
if only to improve our understanding of the dynamics in the
countryside, let alone influencing them or shaping them.
Senator Casey. Doctor, anything on the security front, with
regard to AQAP or al-Qaeda generally?
Dr. Boucek. Well, I would just add to that I think we see
the undergoverned spaces are getting larger in Yemen, as the
state's authority recedes, either by choice or by----
Senator Casey. You say ungoverned or undergoverned?
Dr. Boucek. Undergoverned, I would say.
Either as the state's authority and presence and capacity
to do this recedes intentionally or as things fall apart in
Yemen, I think we see in AQAP an organization that is
increasingly lethal, increasingly opportunistic, that
demonstrates a very quick learning curve.
Very clearly, AQAP has the intention and capacity to strike
locally in Yemen, regionally and internationally. And
increasingly, it seems they have the capacity to do so.
Not just in Yemen, but I think the other side of this is
the potential for AQAP or those affiliated or aligned with AQAP
to reach back into communities in this country and in Western
Europe through English language, non-Arabic language materials,
through the Internet, to reach individuals that are not
otherwise part of the counterterrorism landscape.
And just today, there's another issue of Inspire magazine
that's been released. It's a clue the organization is
continuing to do this, despite everything that we see going on
in the country.
Senator Casey. Well, I think we're ready to wrap up, but
anything that either of our witnesses would want to say for the
record that would be of interest, or an area that you think we
should, here in the Senate or the House, especially here in the
Senate, areas that you think we should focus on the next couple
of months?
Mr. Green. Just one thing. I realize we have challenging
economic times and fiscal times. And I think we sometimes
mistake throwing lots of resources at a problem as a possible
strategy. I really do think how we're organized matters
sometimes a heck of a lot more than how much money we're
spending on things.
Again, my experience is working in isolated forward-
operating bases in Afghanistan and Iraq, and working with
Afghans who had never met an American, and I'm not saying that
that's what would occur in Yemen, but we have to incur some
risk on our side of getting out behind these concrete walls in
Sanaa and really living amongst the people out in the
provinces.
And we can start with provinces that are relatively safe,
safer at least--we don't have to start where al-Qaeda is the
strongest--if only to learn lessons. But I think too frequently
we get focused on how much money we're spending or not
spending. And I realize at the end of the day, it's very
important, of course. But I think that's the big challenge.
I don't know how much can be done from the Senate side, but
it's certainly something to think about.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
Doctor, anything before we go?
Dr. Boucek. I'd just add to that I think recognizing the
economic challenges, and I don't want to underestimate Yemen's
ability to absorb money, because I think as much money as we
want to spend in Yemen, we can find people to spend it. I think
as was just mentioned, we don't need to find high-cost, high-
impact solutions for some of these challenges. I think there
are lower-cost, high-impact things we can do that would make a
big difference.
But I think this comes back to a fundamental challenge I
see is that we do not resource this issue, Yemen, the way we
talk about it.
By that I mean we've heard all kind of counterterrorism
officials talk about how AQAP is the biggest threat and that
Yemen is the biggest challenge, but we do not resource it
anywhere near the level that we do, say, Pakistan.
And we know what will happen in Yemen if we don't do
anything. And after the next attack or after things fall apart
further in Yemen, it will get more difficult.
So as painful and as difficult as these choices are now,
there are worse, fewer options in the future.
Senator Casey. We're out of time, I know, but thank you
very much.
The record will be open for questions that members can
submit, but we thank you for your testimony and grateful for
the time you spent with us.
We're adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Deputy Assistant Administrator Christa Capozzola to
Questions Submitted by Senator John F. Kerry
Question. Sanaa could become the first capital city in the world to
run out of water. Some analysts have said that much of the violence and
instability in Yemen is related to water shortages.
How is the United States, in conjunction with the
international community, addressing this growing need in a
sustainable way?
Answer. Yemen is one of the world's 10-most water-scarce countries.
In many of Yemen's mountainous areas, available drinking water is down
to less than 1 quart per person per day. The nation's aquifers are
being mined at an alarming rate; groundwater levels have been falling
by 10 to 20 feet annually, threatening agriculture and leaving major
cities without adequate safe drinking water. The water crisis is the
result of mainly five factors: rising domestic consumption, poor water
management, corruption, absence of resource governance, and wasteful
irrigation techniques. The water-intensive qat cultivation presents an
extra burden on the already limited water resources of Yemen; it also
fuels corruption, creating a destructive cycle.
The violence and instability in Yemen emanates in part from
political, grassroots sentiments fostered by the Arab Spring. The lack
of a political solution has exacerbated a crisis which has destabilized
Yemen's economy on a number of fronts. It has also hampered the
government's ability to provide basic services and maintain
infrastructure--including water networks.
Availability of clean drinking water and management of remaining
ground water resources are two key issues on which the international
community has engaged the Yemeni Government, academics,
agriculturalists, and communities as a way of encouraging open
discussion and moving toward solutions. Donors assisted the Republic of
Yemen Government in establishing the Water and Environment Ministry and
developing a National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Program;
however, the Ministry's legal oversight is limited and the four
government institutions charged with implementing the strategy need to
be strengthened. USAID and others are working with the Yemeni
authorities on environmental and water policy reforms and on public
awareness campaigns to increase public engagement on the issues.
At the subnational and community level, USAID is implementing
activities to promote effective water management techniques for
household and agricultural purposes, including: improving water
harvesting techniques for rainwater; rehabilitating water storage/
distribution structures; training farmers on point source irrigation
systems; promoting water-efficient crops; and demonstrating low-cost
filtration systems, readily available in Yemen, to encourage water
management and sanitation at the household level. USAID has been
involved in the water sector in Yemen since the 1970s; at that time,
Yemen was more effectively managing its water resources. However, given
the existing political underpinnings to the situation, current
activities are not guaranteed to solve the problem.
Additional donor activity includes: (1) The World Bank is focusing
on urban and rural measures to promote soil conservation, modern
irrigation methods, and public awareness of water conservation; (2)
Germany is assisting municipal water utilities to improve cost recovery
and fees; (3) Japan is preparing to initiate rural water supply
projects at 19 sites in five governorates; and (4) the Dutch-funded
urban and rural water, sanitation, and irrigation infrastructure
projects and worked with the government to increase institutional
capacity and promote water sector reforms.
Question. How can the United States, while continuing to pursue a
robust counterterrorism strategy and partnership, better demonstrate to
the Yemeni people that United States-Yemeni cooperation extends beyond
counterterrorism?
Answer. The U.S. Government is committed to working closely with
the Yemeni people, as well as with Yemen's neighbors and the
international community, to bring peace and stability to a country that
has experienced too much bloodshed and hardship over the past several
years.
The United States can continue to demonstrate to the Yemeni people
that our cooperation extends beyond counterterrorism by continuing to
respond to evolving conditions on the ground with targeted and
effective assistance programming. USAID engages citizens and their
leaders on issues that concern daily life in Yemen, demonstrating to
the Yemeni people that United States-Yemeni cooperation extends beyond
counterterrorism. Livelihoods programs work with the most vulnerable
populations on activities that address basic development needs in
health, education, and agriculture, including mobile medical clinics,
small enterprise support, and provision of agricultural inputs like
seeds and fertilizer. Programs at both the subnational and national
levels help civil servants and political leaders develop capability for
managing community services and responding to citizens' needs.
USAID humanitarian programs respond to the Saada conflict in the
north and to recent population displacements in the south by providing
clean water, emergency relief commodities, medical equipment and care,
and food assistance.
Question. In light of the difficult operating environment in Yemen,
and the fact that Embassy staff are on ordered departure, please
describe any impediments to operating and disbursing U.S. assistance
funding in the country.
How is USAID adapting its program to a deteriorating
security environment?
Answer. In response to political turmoil and security challenges in
Yemen, USAID is adapting its program in a number of ways. For example,
USAID is increasing the number of quick impact projects and expanding
geographic targets to meet the emerging relief and recovery needs in
both urban and rural communities. Since public utilities, schools,
hospitals, clinics, and other service providers are suffering from lack
of supplies, fuel, and staff, USAID is providing assistance to help
maintain much needed social services in some of the highest priority,
least accessible areas around the country.
USAID is also responding to acute emergency requirements at the
sites of large-scale protests in four cities by providing medical
equipment and commodities to health facilities that are servicing those
wounded in the protest violence. The number of cases served by mobile
medical teams has increased due to temporary clinic closures; USAID
continues to equip and support the operations of these teams despite
the rising fuel and equipment costs.
USAID recognizes that maintaining development and humanitarian
assistance programs in Yemen is essential to ensuring that the U.S.
Government continues to show commitment to the Yemeni people. USAID
programs continue to operate throughout the country; however, project
implementation has slowed due to security challenges, fuel shortages,
power outages, evacuation of USG and implementing partner staff, and
other issues. While many implementing partner expats are returning,
they continue to face challenges such as: (1) Access in some areas
remains a persistent constraint to monitoring and responding to
emerging needs; (2) the absence of government interlocutors and
international organizations due to evacuations has impeded progress,
particularly in rural areas; and (3) sporadic availability of foreign
currency has made payments for goods, services, and staff salaries
difficult for implementing partners.
Question. A May attack against an oil pipeline in the Marib
province severely disrupted Yemen's oil flow for nearly 2 months,
further exacerbating Yemen's economic crisis.
Are there steps the United States and international
community can take to help support Yemen's ability to protect
its energy infrastructure?
Answer. USAID/Yemen does not have any energy or security projects
in its portfolio. This question has been referred to the Department of
State.
______
Responses of Deputy Assistant Secretary Janet Sanderson to Questions
Submitted by Senator John F. Kerry
Question. Sanaa could become the first capital city in the world to
run out of water. Some analysts have said that much of the violence and
instability in Yemen is related to water shortages. How is the United
States, in conjunction with the international community, addressing
this growing need in a sustainable way?
Answer. The violence and instability in Yemen emanates in part from
political, grassroots sentiments fostered by the Arab Spring. The lack
of a political solution has exacerbated a crisis which has destabilized
Yemen's economy on a number of fronts. It has also hampered the
government's ability to provide basic services and maintain
infrastructure--including water networks.
Availability of clean drinking water and management of remaining
ground water resources are two key issues on which the international
community has engaged the Yemeni Government, academics,
agriculturalists, and communities as a way of encouraging open
discussion and moving toward solutions. Donors assisted the Republic of
Yemen Government in establishing its Water and Environment Ministry and
in developing a National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Program;
however, the Ministry's legal oversight is limited and the four
government institutions charged with implementing the strategy need to
be strengthened. USAID and others are working with the Yemeni
authorities on environmental and water policy reforms and on public
awareness campaigns to increase public engagement on the issues.
At the subnational and community level, USAID is implementing
activities to promote effective water management techniques for
household and agricultural purposes, including: improving water
harvesting techniques for rainwater; rehabilitating water storage/
distribution structures; training farmers on point source irrigation
systems; promoting water-efficient crops; and demonstrating low-cost
filtration systems, readily available in Yemen, to encourage water
management and sanitation at the household level.
Additional donor activity includes: (1) The World Bank is focusing
on urban and rural measures to promote soil conservation, modern
irrigation methods, and public awareness of water conservation; (2)
Germany is assisting municipal water utilities to improve cost recovery
and fees; (3) Japan is preparing to initiate rural water supply
projects at 19 sites in five governorates; and (4) the Dutch funded
urban and rural water, sanitation, and irrigation infrastructure
projects and worked with the government to increase institutional
capacity and promote water sector reforms.
Question. How can the United States, while continuing to pursue a
robust counterterrorism strategy and partnership, better demonstrate to
the Yemeni people that United States-Yemeni cooperation extends beyond
counterterrorism?
Answer. In Yemen, we support a two-pronged approach that aims to
strengthen the Government of Yemen's ability to promote security and
minimize the threat from violent extremists, while addressing the
drivers of instability including the deteriorating economic situation,
deficiencies in government capacity to provide essential services to
the Yemeni people, poor governance, and limited transparency. The
Yemeni people face significant challenges on the security, governance,
and economic fronts. In tackling these conditions, the United States
continues to implement a broad approach by addressing longer term
political, economic, and social challenges, which Al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) exploits to create a safe haven.
The United States provides counterterrorism and security assistance
to Yemen, but also provides humanitarian and development assistance
directly to the Yemeni people. We take steps to increase the Government
of Yemen's ability to provide services and be responsible to the needs
of its people, and we support efforts by Yemen's vibrant civil society
to hold its government accountable. We continue to emphasize our two-
pronged approach--helping the government confront the immediate
security concern of al-Qaeda and mitigating the serious political,
economic, and governance issues that the country faces over the long
term--in bilateral and multilateral messaging on Yemen.
Question. In light of the difficult operating environment in Yemen,
and the fact that Embassy staff are on ordered departure, please
describe any impediments to operating and disbursing U.S. assistance
funding in the country. How is USAID adapting its program to a
deteriorating security environment?
Answer. In response to political turmoil and security challenges in
Yemen, USAID is adapting its program in a number of ways. For example,
USAID is increasing the number of quick impact projects and expanding
geographic targets to meet the emerging relief and recovery needs in
both urban and rural communities. Since public utilities, schools,
hospitals, clinics, and other service providers are suffering from lack
of supplies, fuel, and staff, USAID is providing assistance to help
maintain much-needed social services in some of the highest priority,
least accessible areas around the country.
USAID is also responding to acute emergency requirements at the
sites of large-scale protests in four cities by providing medical
equipment and commodities to health facilities that are servicing those
wounded in the protest violence. The number of cases served by mobile
medical teams has increased due to temporary clinic closures; USAID
continues to equip and support the operations of these teams despite
the rising fuel and equipment costs.
USAID recognizes that maintaining development and humanitarian
assistance programs in Yemen is essential to ensuring that the U.S.
Government continues to show commitment to the Yemeni people. USAID
programs continue to operate throughout the country; however, project
implementation has slowed due to security challenges, fuel shortages,
power outages, evacuation of USG and implementing partner staff. While
many implementing partner expatriates are returning, they continue to
face challenges such as: (1) Access in some areas remains a persistent
constraint to monitoring and responding to emerging needs; (2) the
absence of government interlocutors and international organizations due
to evacuations has impeded progress, particularly in rural areas; and
(3) Sporadic availability of foreign currency has made payments for
goods, services, and staff salaries difficult for implementing
partners.
Question. A May attack against an oil pipeline in the Marib
province severely disrupted Yemen's oil flow for nearly 2 months,
further exacerbating Yemen's economic crisis. Are there steps the
United States and international community can take to help support
Yemen's ability to protect its energy infrastructure?
Answer. In Yemen, oil pipelines run above ground through rural,
open areas often governed by tribal leaders. While the United States
and others in the international community can advise the Yemeni
Government on energy infrastructure protection, it is up to the Yemeni
Government to ensure successful relations with the tribal leaders of
the areas through which oil pipelines run. The United States and the
international community will continue to advise the Yemeni Government
of steps to improve critical infrastructure protection.
______
Responses of Coordinator for Counter Terrorism Ambassador Daniel
Benjamin to Questions Submitted by Senator John F. Kerry
Question. How can the United States, while continuing to pursue a
robust counterterrorism strategy and partnership, better demonstrate to
the Yemeni people that United States-Yemeni cooperation extends beyond
counterterrorism?
Answer. In Yemen, we support a two-pronged approach that aims to
strengthen the Government of Yemen's ability to promote security and
minimize the threat from violent extremists, while addressing the
drivers of instability. Those drivers include the deteriorating
economic situation, deficiencies in government capacity to provide
essential services to the Yemeni people, poor governance, and limited
transparency. The Yemeni Government and people face significant
challenges on the security, governance, and economic fronts. In
tackling these conditions, the United States continues to implement
policies and programs to address longer term political, economic, and
social challenges, which Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
exploits to create a safe haven.
The United States provides counterterrorism and security assistance
to Yemen, but also provides humanitarian and development assistance
directly to the Yemeni people. We take steps to increase the Government
of Yemen's ability to provide services and to be responsible to the
needs of its people, and we support efforts by Yemen's vibrant civil
society to hold its government accountable. We continue to emphasize
our two-pronged approach--helping the government confront the immediate
security concern of al-Qaeda and mitigating the serious political,
economic, and governance issues that the country faces over the long
term--in bilateral and multilateral messaging on Yemen.
Question. A May attack against an oil pipeline in the Marib
province severely disrupted Yemen's oil flow for nearly 2 months,
further exacerbating Yemen's economic crisis. Are there steps the
United States and international community can take to help support
Yemen's ability to protect its energy infrastructure?
Answer. In Yemen, oil pipelines run above ground through rural,
open areas often governed by tribal leaders. While the United States
and others in the international community can advise the Yemeni
Government on energy infrastructure protection, the Yemeni Government
must work to ensure successful relations with the tribal leaders of the
areas through which oil pipelines run. The United States and the
international community will continue to advise the Yemeni Government
of possible steps to improve critical infrastructure protection.
Question. You noted in your testimony that ``no FY 2011 1206
funding has been programmed for Yemen because of the security situation
and political unrest.'' How has this delay in 1206 programming affected
Yemen's ability, and the ability of the Special Operations Forces in
particular, to combat Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula? How does it
affect the bilateral security relationship?
Answer. The delay in delivery and programming of 1206-funded
equipment for Yemen has not so far affected the Yemeni Government's
ability to respond to terrorist threats. Recommendations for FY 2011
1206 programs required long lead-times and the equipment would not have
been delivered for over 12 months. We continue regular communication
and cooperation with our counterparts in the Yemeni Government
regarding their counterterrorism operations, and continue to build the
relationship.
Question. What is the relationship between the Ansar al-Shariah
group, which has reportedly seized territory in Abyan province, and Al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula?
Answer. Ansar al-Shariah is the name that Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) is using in Yemen's Abyan Governorate. AQAP uses the
name Ansar al-Shariah most likely in attempt to better relate to the
local population and divert attention from its al-Qaeda connection.
______
Responses of Deputy Assistant Secretary Janet Sanderson to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
Question. Stepping back from the immediate security challenges and
threats, what are the strategic objectives of the United States in
Yemen? And given the deteriorating security situation and its impact on
U.S. ability to conduct development outreach and CT training programs.
What tools are at U.S. disposal to pursue these strategic objectives?
Answer. In Yemen, we are working to strengthen the Government of
Yemen's ability to promote security and minimize the threat from
violent extremists, while addressing the drivers of instability
including the deteriorating economic situation, deficiencies in
government capacity to provide essential services to the Yemeni people,
poor governance, and limited transparency. The Yemeni people face
significant challenges on the security, governance, and economic
fronts. In tackling these conditions, the United States continues to
provide a range of assistance in the context of quiet diplomacy and
international partnership to address these long-term objectives.
Question. What could the United States be doing to better prepare
for a prolonged period of unrest in Yemen?
Answer. We continue to advocate for peaceful dialogue as the best
solution to the political crisis in Yemen. Genuine participation by all
sides, including youth and civil society, in an open and transparent
process that addresses the legitimate concerns of the Yemeni people,
including their political and economic aspirations, will assure the
success of political transition. We will continue to work with our
international partners to secure an agreement that is acceptable to
both the government and the opposition.
In conjunction with any political solution, there must also be
wide-ranging international engagement to help the Yemeni government
solve its looming economic crisis in order to prevent a humanitarian
catastrophe and ensure long-term economic and social stability. The
United States has focused on promoting transparency and political,
economic, and governance reform as well as our counterterrorism
relationship. We have consistently engaged with both President Saleh
and members of the formal and informal opposition and will continue to
do so in an effort to promote dialogue and a peaceful resolution of
conflict.
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Responses of Deputy Assistant Administrator Christa Capozzola to
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr.
Question. During his July 10 visit to Saudi Arabia, White House
Counterterrorism Advisor John Brennan urged President Saleh to
``fulfill expeditiously'' his pledge to sign the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) agreement as the best way to ensure continued U.S.
assistance.
Should the U.S. condition future aid to Yemen based on
democratic reform?
Answer. Underdevelopment in Yemen has resulted in widespread
poverty, chronic food insecurity, inadequate health care, and limited
water supplies. Since early February 2011, clashes between Republic of
Yemen Government military forces, antigovernment demonstrators,
progovernment demonstrators, rival tribes, and militant and terrorist
groups have exacerbated these conditions. Political unrest has
heightened concerns regarding security, access, and the government's
ability to provide basic services.
U.S. Government is committed to working closely with the Yemeni
people as well as with Yemen's neighbors and the international
community to bring peace and stability to a country that has
unfortunately experienced too much bloodshed and hardship over the past
several years. The political transition is critical to resolving the
many challenges to Yemen's security, including the humanitarian crisis,
economic difficulties, and the threat from Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula.
USAID/Yemen strategy is an integral part of the larger, National
Security Council-coordinated interagency strategy for Yemen.
Programming addresses the drivers of instability and responds to the
articulated needs and frustrations of vulnerable communities. These
communities are in the governorates most susceptible to extremist
ideologies and prone to violent means of resolving grievances. Making
aid, particularly humanitarian assistance, contingent on democratic
reform could further frustrate these vulnerable, already marginalized
populations. Prior to the political crisis we were working through the
international Friends of Yemen forum and bilaterally to help the
Yemenis identify economic, governance, and rule of law reforms that
could be implemented to help Yemen address its many challenges. We will
resume those efforts once the political environment permits but should
not restrict aid to progress in democratic reform when we are
simultaneously working on reforms in so many other areas.
Despite security challenges and political turmoil, USAID continues
to provide assistance and respond to evolving conditions in Yemen.
USAID has already committed over $40 million in FY11 to respond to the
increasing humanitarian needs and is increasing the number of rapid
response projects to meet emerging relief and recovery needs in both
urban and rural communities.
Question. Outside of conditioning assistance, what steps will a
transitional government need to take to satisfy the American tax
payer's concerns that foreign assistance is spent wisely?
Answer. Yemen faces very serious political, economic, and security
challenges. The United States has been working closely with Yemeni
officials and opposition elements, GCC partners, and other
international actors to bring an end to the political turmoil and
violence in Yemen. The United States supports the Yemeni people's
aspirations for meaningful political reform, but it is up to the Yemeni
people to decide what form political reform takes.
As part of its procurement reform process through USAID Forward,
our programming is designed to enhance partnership with the host
country and achieve more effective results by increasing host country
accountability for program outcomes.
USAID will continue to counter corruption and to thoroughly vet all
grant proposals and grant recipients to ensure that foreign assistance
is spent wisely.
To prevent corruption, USAID does not provide cash
assistance in Yemen, and does not provide direct monetary
support to the Republic of Yemen Government. The majority of
our support is to communities, and is provided in the form of
in-kind assistance. Community engagement is an essential
element in countering corruption, as communities who have
bought in to the activities and see the benefits of them are
less likely to allow those activities to fall victim to corrupt
practices and fail.
USAID has standard provisions in all its contracting
instruments regarding vetting. We have reviewed those
provisions with all our implementing partners in Yemen, and
partners have processes in place to vet recipients of grants
through all our programs.