[House Report 106-517]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
106th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 106-517
======================================================================
TRAFFIC STOPS STATISTICS STUDY ACT OF 2000
_______
March 13, 2000.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Hyde, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany H.R. 1443]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the
bill (H.R. 1443) to provide for the collection of data on
traffic stops, having considered the same, reports favorably
thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as
amended do pass.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
The Amendment.............................................. 1
Purpose and Summary........................................ 3
Background and Need for the Legislation.................... 3
Hearings................................................... 7
Committee Consideration.................................... 7
Vote of the Committee...................................... 7
Committee Oversight Findings............................... 7
Committee on Government Reform Findings.................... 7
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures.................. 7
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate.................. 7
Constitutional Authority Statement......................... 9
Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion................. 9
Agency Views............................................... 10
The amendment is as follows:
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu
thereof the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Traffic Stops Statistics Study Act
of 2000''.
SEC. 2. ATTORNEY GENERAL TO CONDUCT STUDY.
(a) Study.--
(1) In general.--The Attorney General shall conduct a
nationwide study of stops for traffic violations by law
enforcement officers.
(2) Initial analysis.--The Attorney General shall perform
an initial analysis of existing data, including complaints
alleging and other information concerning traffic stops
motivated by race and other bias.
(3) Data collection.--After completion of the initial
analysis under paragraph (2), the Attorney General shall then
gather the following data on traffic stops from a nationwide
sample of jurisdictions, including jurisdictions identified in
the initial analysis:
(A) The traffic infraction alleged to have been
committed that led to the stop.
(B) Identifying characteristics of the driver
stopped, including the race, gender, ethnicity, and
approximate age of the driver.
(C) Whether immigration status was questioned,
immigration documents were requested, or an inquiry was
made to the Immigration and Naturalization Service with
regard to any person in the vehicle.
(D) The number of individuals in the stopped
vehicle.
(E) Whether a search was instituted as a result of
the stop and whether consent was requested for the
search.
(F) Any alleged criminal behavior by the driver
that justified the search.
(G) Any items seized, including contraband or
money.
(H) Whether any warning or citation was issued as a
result of the stop.
(I) Whether an arrest was made as a result of
either the stop or the search and the justification for
the arrest.
(J) The duration of the stop.
(b) Reporting.--Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment
of this Act, the Attorney General shall report the results of its
initial analysis to Congress, and make such report available to the
public, and identify the jurisdictions for which the study is to be
conducted. Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Attorney General shall report the results of the data
collected under this Act to Congress, a copy of which shall also be
published in the Federal Register.
SEC. 3. GRANT PROGRAM.
In order to complete the study described in section 2, the Attorney
General may provide grants to law enforcement agencies to collect and
submit the data described in section 2 to the appropriate agency as
designated by the Attorney General.
SEC. 4. LIMITATION ON USE OF DATA.
Information released pursuant to section 2 shall not reveal the
identity of any individual who is stopped or any law enforcement
officer involved in a traffic stop.
SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.
For purposes of this Act:
(1) Law enforcement agency.--The term ``law enforcement
agency'' means an agency of a State or political subdivision of
a State, authorized by law or by a Federal, State, or local
government agency to engage in or supervise the prevention,
detection, or investigation of violations of criminal laws, or
a federally recognized Indian tribe.
(2) Indian tribe.--The term ``Indian tribe'' means any
Indian or Alaska Native tribe, band, nation, pueblo, village,
or community that the Secretary of the Interior acknowledges to
exist as an Indian tribe.
SEC. 6. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be
necessary to carry out this Act.
Purpose and Summary
H.R. 1443, the Traffic Stops Statistics Study Act of 2000,
requires the Attorney General to conduct a study by acquiring
data from law enforcement agencies regarding the
characteristics of those stopped for alleged traffic violations
and the rationale for any subsequent searches resulting from
those violations. The Attorney General is directed to perform
an initial analysis, not later than 120 days after the date of
enactment of the Act, of existing data, including complaints
and other information concerning traffic stops motivated by
race and other bias. In this initial analysis, the Attorney
General will identify those jurisdictions which will
participate as sites for the collection and submission of data
for the traffic stop study. This initial analysis will be
submitted to Congress and made available to the public. The
Attorney General will conduct a 2-year study and provide the
results of the findings of the study to Congress. In order to
complete the study, the Attorney General is given authority to
provided grants to those law enforcement agencies participating
in the study for the collection and submission of the data.
The 2-year study will include consideration of such factors
as the race, gender, ethnicity and age of the individual
stopped, the traffic infraction alleged to have been committed
that led to the stop, whether immigration documents were
requested or an inquiry was made to Immigration and
Naturalization Service with regard to any person in the
vehicle, the number of individuals in the stopped vehicle,
whether the search was instituted as a result of the stop, was
consent given for the search, whether there was any alleged
criminal behavior by the driver that justified the search,
whether any contraband or money was seized, whether any warning
or citation was issued as a result of the stop, whether an
arrest was made as a result of either the stop or the search
and the duration of the stop.
The data acquired under this section may not reveal either
the identity of any individual stopped or of any law
enforcement officer involved in the stop.
Background and Need for the Legislation
Race-based traffic stops turn driving, one of our most
ordinary and quintessentially American activities, into an
experience fraught with danger and risk for people of color.
The offense of ``D.W.B.'' or ``driving while black or brown''
is well-known to African-Americans and Hispanics across the
country. There are virtually no African-American males--
including Congressmen, actors, athletes and office workers--who
have not been stopped at one time or another for a pretextual
traffic violation.\1\ Because traffic stops can happen anywhere
and anytime, millions of African-Americans and Hispanics alter
their driving habits in ways that would never occur to most
white Americans. Some completely avoid places like all-white
suburbs, where they fear police harassment for looking ``out of
place.'' Some intentionally drive only bland cars or change the
way they dress. Others who drive long distances even factor in
extra time for the traffic stops that seem inevitable. H.R.
1443 is intended to provide a comprehensive analysis of the
scope and magnitude of the racial profiling problem.
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\1\ Thomas Fields-Meyer, Maria Eftimiades, Hugh Bronstein, Ron
Arias, Shawn Lewis Ramirez, Gail Schiller and Glenn Garelik, Under
Suspicion, People, June 15, 1996 at 40.
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While the catch phrase ``driving while black'' encapsulates
the perception of the minority community, the definition and
legal implications of racial profiling defy such
simplification. The most sound definition of racial profiling
embraces the widespread police practice of using race as a
factor in deciding whom to target for law enforcement. Properly
understood, racial profiling occurs whenever police routinely
use race as a negative signal that causes an officer to react
with suspicion.
Some commentators define racial profiling as occurring when
a police officer stops, questions or arrests someone solely on
the basis of race or ethnicity. This crude definition tells the
reality of the exercise of power over one's liberty by bigoted
law enforcement officers intent on harassment. To fulminate
against police officers who engage in such tactics, however,
requires no real confrontation with the complex intersection
between race, crime and law enforcement, because few would
defend police surveillance triggered solely by race. Moreover,
our legal system stands ready to sanction officers who use race
alone as a signal of suspicion. Such a definition, however,
diverts attention from the more complex and problematical use
of race as trigger for suspicion that captures a
disproportionate number of innocent minorities.
Media coverage of the phenomenon of racial profiling has
produced an abundance of anecdotal evidence concerning abusive
practices. Front-page stories, editorials and columns have
appeared in every major national newspaper and countless local
newspapers. The phrase ``driving while black,'' used with
bitter familiarity for years in magazines and newspapers
targeted for African-Americans, can now be found in the pages
of national newspapers and featured as lead stories in
television news commentary shows. While the media fascination
with a social problem does not necessarily make it real, the
dozens of stories in the press, combined with the lawsuits and
recent State legislative actions, make a powerful argument that
``driving while black'' is not just an occasional problem.
The majority of white, as well as black Americans say that
racial profiling is widespread in the United States today. In a
1999 Gallup Poll Social Audit on Black/White Relations in the
U.S., 59% of a sample of national adults aged 18 and older say
that racial profiling is widespread. 81% of the American public
say they disapprove of this practice.\2\
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\2\ Gallup News Service Poll, December 9, 1999
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Statistical evidence gathered in the course of litigation
shows a clear pattern of racially discriminatory traffic stops
and searches. An ACLU analysis of Maryland State Police data
showed that 73% of cars stopped and searched on Interstate 95
between Baltimore and Delaware from January 1995 through
September 1997 were those of African-Americans, despite the
fact that only 14% of those driving along that stretch were
black.\3\ Moreover, police found nothing in 70% of those
searches.\4\ Similarly, in Florida, 70% of the persons stopped
on I-95 were African-American, even though they made up less
than 10% of the driving population.\5\
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\3\ Report of John Lamberth, PhD., ACLU Freedom Network,
www.aclu.org.
\4\ Id.
\5\ David A. Harris, ``Driving While Black ans All Other Traffic
Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops,'' The Journal
of Law and Criminology, Vol. 87, No. 2 (1997) at 544-82.
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Data shows that Hispanics are similarly targeted for a
disproportionate law enforcement focus. An ACLU analysis of
Illinois State Police data found that, while Hispanics comprise
less than 8 percent of the population and take fewer than 3
percent of the personal vehicle trips, they comprise
approximately 30 percent of the motorists stopped by State
police drug interdiction officers for discretionary offenses,
such as failure to signal a lane change or driving one to four
miles over the speed limit.\6\ Further, the data revealed that
State troopers singled out Hispanics motorists for searches of
their vehicles, comprising 27 percent of all searches.
Paradoxically, though troopers asked a higher percentage of
Hispanic motorists than white motorists for consent to search
their vehicles, they found contraband in a lower percentage of
the vehicles driven by Hispanic motorists.
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\6\ ACLU Report, Driving While Black: Racial Profiling on Our
Nation's Highways (1999) at 27-28.
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Dramatic statistics have formed the basis for legal
findings of racial profiling across the nation. Lawsuits
alleging racial profiling have been filed in numerous States
including Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey,
Oklahoma and Pennsylvania. For example, in Colorado a class
action suit filed on behalf of 400 individuals asked the court
to halt racially based stops by a sheriff's department highway
drug interdiction unit. Traffic infractions were cited as the
reason for stopping the motorists, but tickets were not issued.
The court ruled that investigatory stops based solely on a
motorist's match with specified drug courier indicators
violated the fourth amendments's prohibition against
unreasonable seizures.\7\ A settlement was reached that awarded
damages to the plaintiffs and disbanded the drug unit.
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\7\ Whitfield v. Board of County Commissioners of Eagle County, 837
F. Supp. 338 (D. Colo. 1993).
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Similarly, in 1993, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
recognized racial profiling as a problem after reviewing the
case of a Santa Monica police officer who was found to have
violated the rights of two black men he stopped and arrested at
gunpoint.\8\ The Court found that the case was an example of
how police routinely violate the constitutional rights of
minorities, particularly black men, by stopping them without
just cause.\9\ Most recently, a study commissioned by the State
of New Jersey found that minorities were five times more likely
to be stopped on the New Jersey Turnpike than non-
minorities.\10\ Based upon these findings and the results of a
Department of Justice investigation, New Jersey settled a
racial profiling case brought by the Department under 42
U.S.C.A. Sec. 14141 to remedy an alleged pattern or practice of
racially discriminatory conduct by troopers employed by the New
Jersey State Police. The consent decree in that action appoints
an independent monitor, requires the State to collect traffic
stop data and to create new citizen complaint, training and
early warning procedures for the State police.\11\
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\8\ Washington v. Skystone-Eagle Lambert, 98 F. 3d 1181 (9th Cir.
1996).
\9\ Id. at * 42.
\10\ Interim Report, New Jersey Attorney General's Office (1999).
\11\ U.S. v. State of New Jersey et al., Civil No. 99-5970 (D.
N.J.).
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At the same time that racial profiling practices by law
enforcement have been expanding, the Supreme Court's
sensitivity to fourth amendment rights has been contracting. In
Whren v. United States, the Supreme Court declared that any
traffic offense committed by a driver was a legitimate legal
basis for a stop, regardless of the officer's subjective state
of mind.\12\ In practice, the Whren decision has given the
police virtually unlimited authority to stop and search any
vehicle.\13\ Because State traffic codes identify so many
different infractions, every driver probably violates some
provision of the vehicle code at some time, during even a short
drive.
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\12\ Whren v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (1996).
\13\ David Harris, The Open Road is Not so Free, The Legal Times,
July 14, 1997 at S42.
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Since Whren, the Court has extended police power to stop
and search drivers and cars even further. In Ohio v. Robinette,
the Court rejected the argument that officers seeking consent
to search a car must tell the driver he is free to refuse
permission and leave.\14\ The Court in Maryland v. Wilson gave
police the power to order passengers out of stopped cars,
whether or not there is any basis to suspect they are
dangerous.\15\ Most recently, in Wyoming v. Houghton, the Court
ruled that after the lawful arrest of the driver, the police
can search the closed purse of a passenger even though she had
nothing to do with the alleged traffic infraction and had done
nothing to suggest involvement in criminal activity.\16\ As
this line of cases have made traffic stops even harder to
challenge, the controversy around racial profiling will
continue to grow.
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\14\ United States v. Robinette, 117 S.Ct. 417 (1996).
\15\ 519 U.S. 408 (1997).
\16\ 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
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Lack of comprehensive nationwide empirical data on racial
profiling has led to the call for systematic data collection.
In June 1999, the President issued a memorandum on fairness in
law enforcement that addressed the issue of racial profiling.
The memorandum directed the Departments of Justice, the
Interior and the Treasury to design and implement a system for
collecting and reporting statistics on the race, ethnicity and
gender of individuals who are stopped or searched by law
enforcement.\17\ Several States have introduced legislation
that would require their State and/or local police departments
to collect data on the race of the drivers pulled over for
traffic stops. As of March of 2000, 20 State legislatures have
data collection bills pending. Two States--North Carolina and
Connecticut--have already passed comprehensive legislation
requiring the collection and compilation of data on traffic
stops. Over 100 police jurisdictions have begun collecting data
on a voluntary basis including among others--the States of
Michigan, Rhode Island and Florida, and the cities of Houston
and San Francisco.
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\17\ The three departments were tasked with developing data
collection plans within 120 days and implementing field tests within 60
days of finalizing the plans. After 1 year of field testing, the
departments are to report on complaints received that allege bias in
law enforcement activities, the process for investigating and resolving
complaints and their outcome.
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Conclusion
Widespread racial profiling practices deeply undermine the
legitimacy--and, therefore, the effectiveness--of the criminal
justice system, making police work that much more difficult and
dangerous. Pretextual traffic stops fuel the belief that the
police are unfair and biased. H.R. 1443 requires the gathering
of solid, comprehensive information to determine the nature and
extent of the problem of racial profiling.
Hearings
No hearings were held in the 106th Congress on H.R. 1443.
Committee Consideration
On March 1, 2000, the committee met in open session and
ordered reported favorably the bill H.R. 1443 by a voice vote,
a quorum being present.
Vote of the Committee
There were no recorded votes in the committee during the
consideration of H.R. 1443
Committee Oversight Findings
In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, the committee reports
that the findings and recommendations of the committee, based
on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the
descriptive portions of this report.
Committee on Government Reform Findings
No findings or recommendations of the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight were received as referred to in
clause 2(l)(3)(D) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of
Representatives.
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures
Clause 2(l)(3)(B) of House Rule XI is inapplicable because
this legislation does not provide new budgetary authority or
increased tax expenditures.
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(C) of rule XI of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, the committee sets
forth, with respect to the bill, H.R.1443, the following
estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office under section 403 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974:
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, March 9, 2000.
Hon. Henry J. Hyde, Chairman,
Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 1443, the Traffic
Stops Statistics Study Act of 2000.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contacts for this
estimate are Mark Grabowicz (for federal costs), who can be
reached at 226-2860, and Theresa Gullo (for the state and local
impact), who can be reached at 225-3220.
Sincerely,
Dan L. Crippen, Director.
Enclosure
cc:
Honorable John Conyers Jr.
Ranking Democratic Member
H.R. 1443--Traffic Stops Statistics Study Act of 2000.
CBO estimates that enacting this legislation would have no
significant impact on the federal budget. The bill would not
affect direct spending or receipts, so pay-as-you-go procedures
would not apply. H.R. 1443 contains no intergovernmental or
private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act.
H.R. 1443 would require the Attorney General to conduct a
nationwide study of stops of vehicles made by law enforcement
officers for traffic violations. Under the bill's provisions,
the Attorney General would collect and analyze data from a
sample of law enforcement agencies and submit two reports to
the Congress within two years of the bill's enactment. The
Attorney General would be authorized to provide grants to
states to provide data for this study; however, the agency
anticipates cooperating with law enforcement agencies that
already collect data required for this study. Consequently, we
estimate the cost of state and local grants that could be
provided under this bill would be minimal. Based on information
from the Department of Justice, we estimate that implementing
this legislation would cost less than $500,000 annually over
the next two years, assuming appropriation of the necessary
amounts.
H.R. 1443 would only have an impact on the budgets of
state, local, or tribal governments if those governments accept
grant funds and choose to provide information to the Attorney
General in connection with this study. In any event, the costs
of providing this information are not likely to be significant.
The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Mark Grabowicz
(for federal costs), who can be reached at 226-2860, and
Theresa Gullo (for the state and local impact), who can be
reached at 225-3220. This estimate was approved by Robert A.
Sunshine, Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.
Constitutional Authority Statement
Pursuant to rule XI, clause 2(l)(4) of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the committee finds the authority for
this legislation in Article I, section 8 of the Constitution.
Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion
Section 1. Short Title
The title of this Act is the ``Traffic Stops Statistics
Study Act of 2000.''
Section 2. Attorney General to Conduct Study
Section 2 of H. R. 1443 authorizes the Attorney General of
the Department of Justice to conduct a study of law enforcement
stops for traffic violations. The study shall include a
collection and analysis of information identifying the traffic
infraction alleged to have been committed that led to the stop;
the race, gender, ethnicity and age of the driver stopped;
whether immigration status was questioned, immigration
documents requested or an inquiry made to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service with regard to any person in the
vehicle; the number of individuals in the stopped vehicle;
whether there was a search conducted as a result of the stop
and whether consent was requested for the search; whether any
items including contraband or money were seized; whether any
warning or citation was issued as a result of the stop; whether
an arrest was made as a result of either the stop or the search
and the justification for the arrest; and the duration of the
stop. This section gives the Attorney General no longer than 2
years to complete the study and report the results of the study
to Congress.
This section also requires that within 120 days of
enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall perform an
initial analysis of the existing data concerning traffic stops
motived by race and bias, report this to the Congress and
identify the jurisdictions that will participate in the study.
Section 3. Grant Program.
This section authorizes the Attorney General to provide
grants to law enforcement agencies to assist them in the
collection and submission of traffic stops data.
Section 4. Limitation on Use of Data
The section provides that data acquired under this section
may not reveal either the identity of any individual stopped or
of any law enforcement officer.
Section 5. Definitions
This section defines ``law enforcement agency'' and
``Indian tribe'' for purposes of this Act.
Section 6. Authorization of Appropriations
This section authorizes such sums as may be necessary to
carry out this Act.
Agency Views
U.S. Department of Justice,
Office of Legislative Affairs,
Washington, DC, June 23, 1999.
Hon. Henry J. Hyde, Chairman,
Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to express the views of the
Department of Justice on H.R. 1443, the Traffic Stops
Statistics Act of 1999. The Department supports the collection
of data on traffic stops as envisioned in this legislation. We
believe that a study as outlined in the legislation would
provide valuable information.
By studying data that reveal the race and ethnicity of
motorists who are stopped, the reason they are stopped and the
outcomes of the stops, we can begin to assess the extent of the
profiling based on race or ethnicity. Gathering the facts about
traffic stops is an important step in our work with law
enforcement to develop possible solutions.
Also, we are pleased that the current version of the bill
authorizes funding for the study, including grants to law
enforcement agencies to collect and submit traffic stop data
that will be helpful to the Attorney General's analysis. I am
sure you are aware that one obstacle to a study of this kind is
the lack of resources at the local level for the collection of
data.
We have also considered how the legislation would be
implemented if enacted. One method of obtaining nationwide
information about traffic stops would be to collect data
through the National Crime Victimization Study (NCVS), an
annual survey of households across the country. Such data would
not, however, provide data broken down by individual law
enforcement agencies. Instead, data on individual agencies
would have to be collected directly from those agencies. Thus,
we would supplement the NCVS results with data obtained from
those agencies that are now beginning to collect traffic stop
data and from agencies receiving the grants contemplated by the
legislation.
Finally, we would suggest that three revisions be made to
the legislation. First, we believe that the ``initial
analysis'' called for in the bill would be more detailed if the
Attorney General had 180 days to complete the analysis. Second,
we recommend deleting the requirement that the Attorney General
identify in the initial analysis those agencies from which the
data for the study will be collected. The Justice Department
will likely not know at that point which agencies will be
applying for grants to collect traffic stop data. Third, we
believe the Justice Department's ability to report statistics
by individual agencies is dependent on the agencies'
willingness to undertake data collection and then submit the
results to the Department. Several organizations have urged
that the data be used solely for research and statistical
purposes, and that the agency reporting the data be given an
opportunity to address any problems that the data identify. We
recommend that appropriate language regarding the limitations
on use of the data be added to address these concerns.
The Office of Management and Budget has advised that there
is no objection from the standpoint of the Administration's
program to the presentation of this report.
Sincerely,
Jon P. Jennings, Acting Assistant Attorney General.