

**FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE SHARING
WITH STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL LAW EN-
FORCEMENT: AN ASSESSMENT TEN YEARS
AFTER 9/11**

HEARING
BEFORE THE
**SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COUNTERTERRORISM
AND INTELLIGENCE**
OF THE
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**FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE
SHARING WITH STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT: AN ASSESSMENT TEN
YEARS AFTER 9/11**

Tuesday, February 28, 2012

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Patrick Meehan [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Meehan, Long, Cravaack, Higgins, Hochul, and Hahn.

Mr. MEEHAN. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence will come to order.

The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony regarding an assessment of the Federal Government sharing intelligence with State, local, and Tribal law enforcement entities. I now recognize myself for an opening statement.

I would like to welcome everyone to today's hearing, and I look forward to hearing from the witnesses on this important issue, but before we begin the actual substance of the meeting, I would like to take formal notice of the new Member sitting to my left, Congressman Brian Higgins from Buffalo, New York, the new Ranking Member of the subcommittee.

We have been discussing a little bit of ice hockey up here for the last minute or so. These are important issues before us. But I know from his very genuine and deep involvement in the numerous issues we have had here before the subcommittee to this year, he has been thoughtful and thorough in his approach, and I look forward greatly to continuing the great collaboration in a bipartisan fashion we have had on this committee through the year.

I also want to take a moment to express formally for the record my deep appreciation for the service from Congresswoman Jackie Speier from California, who has left us to move to the higher waters of the Armed Services Committee. But it was a unique opportunity for some issues that related back to Congresswoman Speier and her district. I know she reluctantly handed over the sharing of the gavel, so to speak, on this committee, but I am deeply appreciative of the great work that she has done, had done, again, in a collaborative fashion, and look forward to working with

her on some of the issues in her position. I am sure she will still remember the important work we do in this subcommittee.

Over the last year, the subcommittee has held hearings on a number of issues related to intelligence sharing and DHS's role when coordinating with its State, local, and Tribal partners to collect, analyze, share, and disseminate critical intelligence to the public and to private stakeholders Nation-wide. It is an important time right now, because we are 10 years after 9/11. It is important we assess the role of fusion centers as members of the National, State, and local intelligence and law enforcement communities and ask the important questions about their performance to date and discuss the outlook for the future.

I had the opportunity to be the United States attorney in Philadelphia after 9/11, took office just 6 days, and we as an entire Nation were responding to the new challenge of information sharing. I remember the initiation of fusion center programs, and supported them.

However, today what was envisioned 10 years ago appears to be different in some measures to what is currently in place today. That may be the result of a logical evolution, and it may very well be a good thing, but both the Government Accountability Office and the DHS inspector general have reported that DHS still lacks effective means to assess its strategy to support State fusion centers. I think that is something that we should be focused on to see how we can make progress in that area.

There has been strides made, but I think there are a couple of important questions that we need to ask. Where does DHS stand on developing metrics and defining requirements to gauge the efficacy, relevancy, and impact of fusion centers on local, State, and Federal partners? How does DHS plan to hold fusion centers to these measurable requirements? How will DHS and Federal Government sustain fusion centers financially, including determining a level of Federal funding and support for each center, as we appreciate the great struggles that we are have on the Federal level to deal with the budget deficit? Then how does the DHS plan to standardize procedure for all fusion centers to guide the type of information that is collected, the methods utilized for collection, and the manner in which it is analyzed?

I am also interested personally in understanding better the guidelines in place at the National level and, more importantly, at the State and local level to protect individual privacy. As many of you on this panel are aware, the Pennsylvania director of homeland security resigned following revelations that an organization that had contracted with the State Office of Homeland Security was collecting intelligence on lawful citizen groups, including opponents of natural gas drilling.

Now, I recognize this was not a fusion center case, and it was a violation at the State level, but privacy is still nonetheless a critical issue. We have spent a lot of time working on the importance of protecting that with the Federal agencies, but appreciate that, to the average person, government is government, and activities by local departments affiliated with homeland security that are conducting surveillance and information and intelligence gathering,

what are they doing with that material and product? How is it being protected against misuse or abuse?

I think the last issue, of course, is the budgets. As we have said, we are living in a time of budget constraints. The reality is, it is likely to continue. We are all being asked to do more with less, and I hear—look forward to hearing from today's witnesses on the important issues about how that may affect their mission and how they think they can move forward, if, in fact, we are going to be looking, notwithstanding all the advocacy we will do to fund as fully as we can, but the reality that there could be less support.

So at this point in time, the Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Minority Member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Higgins, for any statements he may have.

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my friend and the gentleman from Pennsylvania, for his welcome. I look forward to working with him.

I would also like to thank the Chairman for holding this important hearing today and want to thank the witnesses for their attendance and their testimony. Information sharing is an integral part to our Nation's security. An environment in which information is shared is where better decisions can be made and ultimately in which people are safer.

This message is not new. It is something that has been on our radar for the past 10 years. It is also something that the Federal Government has been working to get right. Since September 11, the Federal Government has developed many initiatives expanding Federal efforts at information gathering and sharing with State and local partners. We now have information-sharing partnerships that we did not have on September 12, 2001, such as fusion centers and the National Joint Terrorism Task Force, which based on my experience has been highly, highly effective.

Further, this administration has indicated that effective information sharing throughout the Government is a key priority. Over the past 3 years, three Executive Orders have been issued to improve information sharing.

Although we have made improvements with information sharing, we must not become complacent. We need specificity. We need the Government to have a clear-cut definition of the programs and activities that are most important to the homeland security mission.

Further, in this budgetary environment, we do not want to short-change security. However, as we extend financial and human resources to these programs, their value should be defined. Additionally, information sharing should have a tailored approach. State and local officers must get the assistance they need to be most effective in protecting the people in their own communities. That means that when intelligence officials are deployed to jurisdictions that they have an interest in knowing the jurisdiction and that jurisdiction's sensitivities.

That means that we must be cognizant of the entire threat. The threat that exists in western New York may not be the same as those that exist along the Southern Border. Also, we need for the agencies as a whole, especially Department of Homeland Security, to be willing participants and provide the necessary support to assist State and local efforts. Unfortunately, in November 2011, the

Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General found that there were improvements needed in this area. I look forward to hearing the Department of Homeland Security, what they have done to rectify this situation since the release of that report.

Further, as we partner with jurisdictions, we must remember that State and local officers know their jurisdictions best. They also need to have a voice and should be heard. This is not a new message, but for some reason one that we must continually reinforce.

These are the challenges that we are here to explore today. I hope that each of our witnesses will be forthcoming in your assessments of these and other challenges that lie ahead for the information-sharing environment. Only by helping us fully understand the challenges ahead can we hope to work together to craft solutions to these problems.

I welcome all of you here, and I look forward to your testimony. I yield back.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Higgins.

Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record.

Now, we are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this important topic. The Honorable Scott McAllister is the deputy under secretary for State and Local Programs for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis at the Department of Homeland Security. In this role, he manages the office responsible for Departmental and interagency support to the National network of fusion centers.

Before coming to the Department, Mr. McAllister was the chief of investigation of the Fort Myers Regional Operations Center for the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Mr. McAllister also served as the State of Florida's deputy homeland security adviser from 2007 to 2010. Prior to serving as deputy homeland security adviser, Mr. McAllister previously served as a special agent supervisor in charge of domestic security and protective operations at the Miami division of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement.

Mr. McAllister brings more than 36 years of State and local law enforcement expertise, including roles as a major crimes detective, SWAT operator, and joint terrorism task force agents. More importantly, as I understand, before he found the sunny beaches of Florida, he came from southeastern Pennsylvania, so he has got good roots.

The honorable Louis Quijas was appointed to the Department of Homeland Security as assistant secretary for the Office for State and Local Law Enforcement in July 2011. In this position, Mr. Quijas serves as the principal Department-wide liaison with State, local, and Tribal law enforcement, ensuring that both relevant information and policy development are coordinated with our non-Federal law enforcement partners.

Prior to coming to the Department, Mr. Quijas served as the president of Datong Electronics North American operations. Before entering the private sector, Mr. Quijas had a 36-year career in Federal and local law enforcement. In 2002, while in the FBI, Mr. Quijas was appointed FBI assistant director for the Office of Law Enforcement Coordination. Prior to his appointment in the FBI, Mr. Quijas was the chief of police for the city of High Point, which

I recollect from my days as a prosecutor had a very aggressive, was it—an anti-gang and anti-gun program that was Nationally recognized. So congratulations. He accepted the position of chief of police upon his retirement from Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department after 25 years of service.

Thank you, Mr. Quijas, for being here.

Mr. Eric Velez-Villar is the assistant director for the Directorate of Intelligence at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Prior to being named to this position by Director Mueller in 2012, Mr. Velez was the deputy assistant director for the Directorate of Intelligence's intelligence operations branch. That must be tough to get on a business card.

Mr. Velez started his 27-year career with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1985 as a computer specialist. Early on in his career, he worked organized crime, drug, and public corruption matters. In 2012, he served as the organized crime and drug supervisor of the Los Angeles division, until he was re-assigned to supervise Orange County's Joint Terrorism Task Force.

In 2004, he was promoted to assistant special agent in charge of the Los Angeles field office counterterrorism program. In 2006, he was appointed as the deputy director of terrorist training center. In 2008, Director Mueller appointed Mr. Velez as the first special agent in charge of the newly created Intelligence Division of the Los Angeles field office, where he remained until being appointed to the Directorate of Intelligence.

Last, from the great State of Pennsylvania, the assistant chief Maurita Bryant is assistant chief for the operations branch for the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police, where she oversees all uniform and civilian personnel in the six police zones in the special deployment division. Ms. Bryant is a 34-year veteran of the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police, getting her start in 1977. She worked as a plain-clothes officer. She was a sergeant in the mobile crime unit, and she rose to commander of Zone 5 Station.

Prior to her promotion to assistant chief in October 2006, Ms. Bryant served in various capacities, including the commander for narcotic, vice, and firearms trafficking and commander in charge of major crimes and commander of the sex assault and family crisis division. She is a 2004 graduate of the 218th session of the FBI National Academy in Quantico and a 2005 graduate from the Police Executive Research Forum's Senior Management Institute for Police in Boston, Massachusetts. She is a 2010 graduate of the 26th Class of Leadership, Pittsburgh, and an instructor for the Penn State Justice and Safety Institute.

Thank you for being here, Ms. Bryant.

So for all panelists, we will give you the opportunity to make your opening statements. We will appreciate the recognition that we have been grateful for your submitted written testimony, and I know you will do your best to try to summarize your testimony and give us the essence as best you can within what we give as the 5-minute parameters.

So let me begin by recognizing Deputy Under Secretary McAllister for your testimony.

STATEMENT OF SCOTT MCALLISTER, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY, STATE AND LOCAL PROGRAM OFFICE, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Mr. MCALLISTER. Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Higgins, and Members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify today regarding the Department of Homeland Security's efforts to keep our Nation safe from evolving threats through a robust information sharing with our State, local, Tribal, territorial, and private-sector homeland security partners.

As you know, I&A is a member of the intelligence community and fills a unique role as the critical bridge between the intelligence community and our State and local partners. I can personally attest to the vital importance of that bridge.

Prior to joining the Department of Homeland Security in December 2011, I enjoyed a 36-year career with State and local law enforcement, which included investigating terrorism cases on Joint Terrorism Task Force, overseeing a State fusion center, and serving as the deputy homeland security adviser for the State of Florida.

The collective progress made by the homeland security community to effectively collaborate became readily apparent to me during the decade I spent in State law enforcement post-9/11. Last fall, I jumped at the opportunity to come to DHS to build on that shared progress that I had previously been a part of at a State and local level.

You have my formal written testimony, so I would like to use my remaining time to discuss what DHS is doing to build this momentum. The terrorist threat to the United States has dramatically evolved since the 9/11 attacks. Today we face a threat environment where violent extremism is not defined or contained by international borders. This means we have to address threats that are home-grown, as well as those that originate abroad.

The threat of home-grown violent extremists fundamentally changed who was best positioned to spot, investigate, and respond to terrorist activity. State and local law enforcement officers are now the ones most likely to be in a position to detect the early signs of terrorist activity. This fact has profound implications on how we go about securing the homeland.

The role of State and local partners in counterterrorism efforts has never been more valuable. As a former Governor, Secretary Napolitano understands the critical role State and local governments play in protecting our communities. As the Secretary has stated many times, homeland security begins with hometown security.

DHS's efforts to facilitate the flow of information between and among homeland security partners at all levels of government is made up of several mutually reinforcing elements. First, we have fundamentally changed the way the Department provides information to law enforcement agencies by improving the production and dissemination of classified and unclassified information regarding threats to the homeland. DHS has developed tailored products, including joint intelligence bulletins, to meet the needs of the State and local partners.

Last April, DHS also implemented the new National Terrorism Advisory System. This new system is designed to provide timely, detailed information to the public and private sectors about credible terrorist threats and recommended security measures.

Second, our approach includes maturing grassroots intelligence and analytical capabilities within the State and local environment through National network of fusion centers. We are looking to ensure that every fusion center has core capabilities that include the ability to analyze local implications to National intelligence, thus enabling local officials to be—better protect their communities.

We have also supported the development of fusion centers to grants, training, technical assistance, and deployment of Federal personnel. We currently have DHS intelligence officers deployed to 64 fusion centers, and 63 centers now can receive classified threat information through the Homeland Secure Data Network.

Fusion centers are a force multiplier to inform and contribute investigation initiating conducted by the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces. Fusion centers and JTTFs have distinct, but complementary roles in securing the homeland, and I would like to thank Eric Velez for collaborating with us to strengthen this relationship and to ensure consistent messaging between fusion centers and the JTTF.

Third, DHS is partnering with the Department of Justice on a Nation-wide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, which establishes standard processes to identify, report, and share suspicious activity. Together, we have transformed how we train front-line officers to recognize and report suspicious activities.

Finally, we recognize that an engaged and vigilant public is vital to our efforts to protect our communities from terrorism. Through the Nation-wide expansion of “If You See Something, Say Something” campaign, we emphasize the importance of reporting suspicious activity to the proper law enforcement partners.

In conclusion, I look forward to continuing to further develop the distributed homeland security architecture that we have built since 9/11, in particular over the past 3 years, all while protecting the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of all Americans.

Now, I would like to close by thanking the committee for the opportunity to be here today, and more than happy to answer any questions.

[The joint statement of Mr. McAllister and Mr. Quijas follows:]

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT OF SCOTT McALLISTER AND LOUIS F. QUIJAS

FEBRUARY 28, 2012

Thank you, Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Higgins, and Members of the committee. We appreciate the opportunity to testify today on the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) efforts to keep our Nation safe from evolving threats through information-sharing activities with our State and local partners.

Over the past 3 years, one of the Department’s top priorities has been to establish a domestic information-sharing capability that facilitates our efforts to fully integrate State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) officials into our terrorism prevention capacity.

DHS is working with the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), as well as with our SLTT partners on four key priorities:

- Improve production and dissemination of classified and unclassified information regarding threats to the homeland;

- Establish grass-roots analytic capabilities through the development of a National network of State and major urban area fusion centers so that National intelligence can be incorporated into a local context;
- Standardize how we train SLTT law enforcement to recognize indicators of terrorism-related criminal activity and report those suspicious activity reports (SARs) to Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) for investigation and fusion centers for analysis; and
- Increase community awareness and encourage the public to report suspicious activity to law enforcement.

As part of these efforts, DHS, including the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and Office of Privacy, works to ensure appropriate civil liberty and privacy protections are integrated into all of our information-sharing and terrorism prevention activities.

PRODUCTION AND DISSEMINATION

- The Department has developed tailored product lines to meet the needs of our SLTT partners, and expanded our dissemination to include the diverse range of homeland security stakeholders (law enforcement, emergency management, public health, and private sector). Specifically, I&A produces a variety of timely, tailored, and actionable intelligence products for SLTT partners, to include: Daily Intelligence Highlights (DIH), Roll Call Releases (RCR), Homeland Security Notes (HSN), Homeland Security Reference Aids (HSRA), Homeland Security Assessments (HSA), Homeland Security Monitors (HSM) Intelligence Notifications and Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence Community of Interest (HS-SLIC) messages, and Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR) trend analysis. Additionally, I&A coordinates the development of tearline reporting with the larger intelligence community (IC) during times of imminent threat to ensure that SLTT partners remain fully apprised of the evolving threat environment in the Homeland. I&A also works closely with the FBI on the development of Joint Information Bulletins (JIB), both classified and unclassified, that are disseminated to SLTT and law enforcement officials, which provide situational awareness and information on potential threats.
- I&A uses feedback provided by State and local customers to adjust its analytic and current intelligence products to better meet their needs. As a result of feedback received over the last 2 years, I&A initiated new products including the Snapshot, which identifies tactics, techniques, and procedures of an emerging event which may have Homeland implications, and provides potential indicators and recommended preventive and protective actions. Analysis of survey data provided by SLTT partners on I&A products reveals that 98 percent of SLTT customers rated the relevance of I&A products they reviewed as Important to Critical. Likewise, 96 percent rated their satisfaction with the usefulness, timeliness, and responsiveness of I&A products as Somewhat to Very Satisfied. The Department has increased its coordination and collaboration with DOJ and the FBI through joint production and dissemination of intelligence and information to our SLTT and law enforcement partners. For example:
 - DHS and FBI provide joint Secure Video Teleconferences (SVTC) to SLTT and law enforcement officials, as well as the private sector to provide intelligence information regarding emerging threats. Specifically, we provided joint SVTC to stakeholders during the 10th Anniversary of 9/11 and leading up to the 2011 holiday season;
 - The Department's National Terrorism Advisory System, or NTAS, replaces the color-coded Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS). This new system more effectively communicates information about terrorist threats by providing timely, detailed information to SLTT and law enforcement partners.

FUSION CENTERS

As part of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, DHS was charged with leading the effort to support and coordinate with a network of State or local-led information sharing and analytic centers in States and major cities throughout the country. Through I&A's State and Local Program Office (SLPO), DHS has included these fusion centers in the intelligence cycle by building their capabilities to receive, analyze, disseminate, and gather information at the local level. I&A facilitates unified Federal support to fusion centers that yields the highest possible degree of two-way information sharing. This not only helps build a robust National intelligence infrastructure, it also simultaneously enhances State and local law enforcement capabilities. The result is an increasingly robust, dynamic flow of information with the States that results in joint intelligence products, report-

ing of information of intelligence value, and building of an analytic and information-sharing capacity. DHS has made considerable progress in building fusion centers' information-sharing capabilities, including the following:

- There are now 93 I&A intelligence personnel deployed in support of fusion centers throughout the country. These intelligence personnel coordinate with DHS Component intelligence and law enforcement personnel who support fusion centers in various capacities. For example, I&A Intelligence Officers (IOs) coordinate with TSA field IOs to understand threats to the transportation sector and collaborate on intelligence products
- Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN) systems are deployed to fusion centers to permit access to Secret information and intelligence at the local level. I&A has developed and deployed a collaboration tool on HSDN to connect analysts from across the Homeland Security Enterprise to focus on counterterrorism-related issues.
- Through I&A-led training, non-Federal analysts at fusion centers are rapidly increasing their analytic capacity and producing products routinely exchanged throughout fusion centers that fuse intelligence and information from the intelligence community with local/regional context.
- DHS has the first statutorily required privacy office of any Federal agency, and the Department builds privacy and civil rights and civil liberties protections into its operations, policies, and programs. All fusion centers have appointed a privacy officer and have a written privacy policy that conforms to the requirements of the Information Sharing Environment established under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. In addition, State and local personnel participate in regional workshops and on-site privacy and civil liberties training.

Almost every process or system in the fusion centers is designed to facilitate two-way information sharing. For example, I&A has deployed reports officers who work with State and local law enforcement to gather and report information of intelligence value to the Department and the intelligence community that has not traditionally contributed to intelligence community analysis. In fiscal year 2011, I&A reports officers submitted 332 Intelligence Information Reports based on information provided by State and local partners.

TRAINING

The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI), which is led by the Department of Justice, responds to the mandate to establish a "unified process for reporting, tracking, and accessing [SARs]" in a manner that rigorously protects the privacy and civil liberties of Americans, as called for in the National Strategy for Information Sharing. The NSI establishes standardized processes and policies for gathering, documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing information about terrorism-related suspicious activities. The NSI allows State, local, Tribal, territorial, and Federal law enforcement organizations, as well as private sector entities, to share information about suspicious activity that is potentially terrorism-related.

This initiative is training all law enforcement across the Nation to recognize behaviors and indicators related to terrorism, crime, and other threats; standardize how those observations are documented and analyzed; and ensure the sharing of those reports with the Federal Bureau of Investigation for further investigation. This training emphasizes privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties considerations in assessing and documenting observed suspicious activities. Beginning in December 2010, the NSI has trained over 196,000 front-line officers, with the goal that virtually all front-line law enforcement personnel in the United States—hundreds of thousands of officers—will eventually receive the training.

DHS has also worked closely with SLTT law enforcement and community organizations to support the administration's countering violent extremism (CVE) approach as outlined in *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*. Likewise, the administration's *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* (SIP) was heavily informed by State and local law enforcement and underscores the strength of community-based problem solving, local partnerships, and community-oriented policing.

DHS, in partnership with the Los Angeles Police Department and the National Consortium for Advanced Policing, is in the process of developing a CVE training curriculum for State, local, and Tribal law enforcement. This CVE curriculum was test-piloted in San Diego in January 2012 and the Major Cities Chiefs Association has passed a motion to implement this curriculum across the country once it is fi-

nalized. The curriculum includes an analysis of the common behaviors and indicators associated with violent extremism and guidance and best practices for community partnerships, to include an understanding of the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties considerations in this arena. This curriculum is a key example of the Department's efforts to partner with State and locals on countering violent extremism. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) is also currently working to develop a CVE curriculum that will be integrated into its Federal law enforcement training programs.

In addition to the Department's training efforts, DHS and FBI field personnel, on a regular basis, provide briefings and workshops to State and local jurisdictions to help them to prepare for, protect against, and respond to coordinated terrorist attacks against multiple targets. For example, DHS has worked closely with NCTC and FBI to present the Joint Counterterrorism Awareness Workshop Series (JCTAWS) to cities Nation-wide. This initiative is designed to improve the ability of local jurisdictions to prepare for, protect against, and respond to potential coordinated terrorist attacks against multiple targets. The JCTAWS workshops, held in cities across the United States, include Federal, State, and local participants from across the law enforcement, emergency response, and private sector communities.

"IF YOU SEE SOMETHING, SAY SOMETHING"

We continue to coordinate with the NSI on the rollout of the "If You See Something, Say Something™" public awareness campaign. Originally used by the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority, DHS received permission to use the MTA-trademarked phrase and to expand "If You See Something, Say Something™" to a Nation-wide effort to increase public awareness and encourage the reporting of suspicious activity to local law enforcement authorities. This campaign is being expanded in locations that are part of the NSI in order to ensure appropriate training, safeguards, and reporting mechanisms are in place prior to any launch. Engaging the public and capturing SARs is increasingly important given the on-going threat of homegrown violent extremists. In addition, DHS and the FBI have co-branded briefing and educational materials provided to stakeholders and have announced major partnerships with the State, local, and private sector.

ADDITIONAL DEPARTMENTAL INFORMATION-SHARING EFFORTS

Other Departmental information-sharing initiatives include outreach to elected and appointed officials including Governors, homeland security advisors (HSA), mayors, and Tribal officials and State and local law enforcement entities.

DHS's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs (IGA) leads interaction with elected and appointed officials and works closely with I&A and the Office of State and Local Law Enforcement (OSLLE) to ensure they are kept abreast of threat information. Interactions between HSAs and local officials and I&A Intelligence Officers in the field is routine, providing State leadership with up-to-date threat information on a regular basis at multiple classification levels. DHS also has expanded its work with Tribal governments and law enforcement entities across the Nation. DHS has Tribal liaisons in every operational component to work directly with Tribal communities. This continuous collaboration is evidence of the interagency determination to ensure State leadership is an integral part of the homeland security enterprise.

In addition, the DHS' OSLLE, working in a coordinated approach with IGA, helps ensure the broadest possible reach to the Nation's law enforcement community. The Office is staffed by a combination of second-career law enforcement professionals and current DHS Component personnel that are in law enforcement career series (GS-1800) who build and maintain relationships with non-Federal law enforcement partners.

The day-to-day interactions between fusion centers and the non-Federal law enforcement community vary throughout the Nation. In order to address the diverse nature of these relationships, the OSLLE utilizes its role as the DHS principal liaison with non-Federal law enforcement partners to ensure that those law enforcement agencies that are not integrated with a fusion center receive the same level of information as their fusion center counterparts. The OSLLE works to ensure that these law enforcement agencies receive not only threat and response information, but also information regarding National and Departmental initiatives and programs. To better serve our partners and ensure that they receive the latest information on Department activities, the OSLLE has formed an intra-agency group, the DHS Component Law Enforcement Outreach Committee (CLEOC), comprised of DHS personnel whose duties include outreach to our non-Federal law enforcement partners.

Furthermore, the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning (OPS) utilize the expertise and viewpoint of active law enforcement in its mission to maintain situational awareness. DHS OPS has sworn law enforcement personnel from across the Nation within the National Operations Center (NOC) who are included at every level of the watch functions, including reviewing the information sent from OPS to its stakeholders and partners. In particular, the law enforcement personnel in the NOC are active participants in the dissemination of products from I&A's Intelligence Watch, which is co-located with OPS in the NOC.

CONCLUSION

While America is stronger and more resilient as a result of these efforts to strengthen the Homeland Security Enterprise, threats from terrorism persist and continue to evolve. Today's threats do not come from any one individual or group. They may originate in distant lands or local neighborhoods. They may be as simple as a homemade bomb or as sophisticated as a biological threat or coordinated cyber attack.

The Federal Government realizes that State, local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement, as well as citizens, businesses, and communities are on the front lines of detection and prevention. Protecting the Nation is a shared responsibility and everyone can contribute by staying informed and aware of the threats the Nation faces.

The Federal Government benefits from a robust information-sharing infrastructure with its SLTT partners. SLTT partners similarly benefit from the collaborative environment established within the fusion centers through their analysis of the National threat picture and the provision of products that are developed and tailored using local context to support the implementation of information-driven community-based solutions by local officials. SLTT partners also benefit from the National Network of Fusion Centers' support of the implementation of the NSI and fusion center participation in the "If You See Something, Say Something™" public awareness campaign. These important initiatives, combined with other coordinated outreach efforts of the Department, underscore the concept that homeland security begins with hometown security, where an alert public plays a critical role in keeping our Nation safe.

DHS thanks this subcommittee for your continued support of our efforts, and your invaluable guidance and oversight as we continue to work to create a stronger and safer country. We look forward to any questions you may have.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. McAllister.
Now, Mr. Quijas, for your testimony, please.

STATEMENT OF LOUIS QUIJAS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OFFICE FOR STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Mr. QUIJAS. Good morning, Mr. Meehan, Ranking Member Higgins, and Members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today on the Department of Homeland Security's efforts regarding information sharing with our State, local, and Tribal law enforcement partners.

As mentioned at the beginning of this hearing, I have had the pleasure and honor of serving 36 years in Federal and local law enforcement. It is this experience that I draw on in my current position as assistant secretary of the Office for State and Local Law Enforcement.

In response to the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, Congress created my office and directed that the assistant secretary lead the coordination of the Department-wide policy relating to State, local, and Tribal law enforcement's role in preventing acts of terrorism and to serve as a liaison between law enforcement agencies across the country and the Department.

As the Department's principal liaison with our law enforcement partners, my office is uniquely positioned to assist other DHS components connect with this very important customer base. That

unique relationship exemplifies the need for a strong, independent office with a direct tie to the Office of the Secretary of Homeland Security. By moving forward with our plans to move my office as a direct report to the Secretary in fiscal year 2012, we will be better-positioned and aligned with the organizational structure of existing outreach and offices within the Department. It will also improve our ability to provide the Secretary with situational awareness and real-time information on issues, concerns, and requirements of our law enforcement partners.

The realignment will improve the office's visibility, traction, and standing within the Department, allowing us to better serve the 800,000 State, local, and Tribal law enforcement customers, the 18,000 agencies they represent, and the hundreds of organizations and associations that champion their cause.

One of the Department's top priorities has been to establish a domestic information-sharing capability that facilitates our efforts to fully integrate our law enforcement partners and to the Department's terrorism prevention capacity. In coordination with the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, my office utilizes its outreach capabilities to help facilitate information sharing with our mutual customers.

To better serve our partners and to ensure that they receive the latest information on Departmental activities and initiatives, my office formed the DHS Component Law Enforcement Outreach Group, an interagency coordination body. This group is comprised of members from across the Department that have a nexus of responsibility for outreach to our law enforcement partners.

My office is committed to proactively identify and then responding to challenges facing the law enforcement community. For example, in the recent economic—current economic downturn, law enforcement agencies are finding it difficult to maintain routine services and incident response. As a former police chief, I know firsthand that training is usually the first casualty of budget cuts.

In an effort to assist our partners in identifying options to meet their current and future training requirements, my office has a range for the leadership of the major law enforcement associations to visit and tour the DHS Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, or FLETC, in Glynco, Georgia. This visit will allow Connie Patrick, the director of FLETC, and her team to brief the attendees on the resources, capabilities, and training programs this state-of-the-art training facility has to offer. The visit will also provide the FLETC team an opportunity to help identify training efficiencies and areas for future collaboration.

The Federal Government benefits from a robust information-sharing infrastructure with State, local, and Tribal law enforcement communities. Conversely, our partners benefit from having my office as their advocate and voice within DHS to help ensure that their issues, concerns, and challenges are understood and given full consideration during the budget, grant, and policy development processes. I believe that was the intent of Congress when it created my office and named it the Office for State and Local Law Enforcement.

As an active police chief on the morning of September 11, 2001, and having had the unique experience of being a part of the FBI's

and DHS's outreach efforts to the law enforcement community post-9/11, I can say without hesitation that the level of cooperation and information sharing with these very valuable partners has never been better.

It also reflects, as Scott said earlier, our belief that homeland security truly begins with hometown security. On behalf of the Secretary, I would like to thank this subcommittee for its support as we continue to work together to create a safe, secure, and resilient Nation.

I look forward to any questions you may have, and thank you.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Quijas.

I would like to recognize now Assistant Director Velez-Villar for your testimony, sir.

**STATEMENT OF ERIC VELEZ-VILLAR, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE**

Mr. VELEZ-VILLAR. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Higgins, and Members of the committee.

I am Special Agent Eric Velez, and I am the assistant director for the FBI's Directorate of Intelligence. I have submitted a written statement for the record to the committee, so I will keep my comments brief, and I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

First, I would like to start off by saying that it is an honor to be able to speak before such a distinguished committee. On behalf of Director Mueller, I would like to thank you for the opportunity.

The FBI recognizes that with evolving National security threats, it is extremely important that we adapt and position ourselves to counter such threats before they do harm. We must do this, always keeping in mind the rights and civil liberties of our citizens. The most effective tool we have at our disposal is each other. By working collaboratively and sharing what we know, together we become a formidable force to our enemies.

As threats are increasingly conceived and carried out entirely within our borders, our reliance upon our State, local, and Tribal partners has never been more critical. It is almost certain that before an FBI agent comes face-to-face with a threat actor, a State, local or Tribal police officer or deputy will most likely encounter them first. They must know what we know in order to do their jobs.

The fusion centers have become a strong and committed partner of ours. Our special agents in charge, or SACs, serve on the various governance boards or executive committees. We have assigned analysts and agents to the majority of the centers and are committed to doing everything we can to help them succeed.

The way we see it, anyone committed to protecting our communities is a partner of ours. As a lead agency for domestic intelligence, we welcome everyone willing to assist to be part of the team. We see these centers as a force multiplier. They assist our field intelligence groups, or FIGs, in communicating our intelligence to our State, local, and Tribal partners. They keep their eyes open for any indicators of potential threats and relay that information to our Joint Terrorism Task Forces, or JTTFs. They as-

sist in our intelligence analysis by adding a State and local context to that analysis.

Some of the centers are collocated with our FBI field office, and we find it to be an optimal operating environment, which allows for seamless integration and collaboration.

In summary, I would just like to say that information sharing and our partnership with State, local, Tribal agencies is nothing new to the FBI. We have been doing it since the beginning of our organization. It is engrained in the way we do business.

9/11 was a stark reminder of how important it is for us to share information. We have worked very hard to find more effective and efficient ways to share intelligence with our partners. I look forward to answering any questions you may have, and thank you for the opportunity.

[The statement of Mr. Velez-Villar follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ERIC VELEZ-VILLAR

FEBRUARY 28, 2012

Good morning, Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, and Members of the subcommittee. It is my privilege and pleasure to address you today as the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Directorate of Intelligence, and to demonstrate our organization's commitment to the timely sharing of intelligence and information related to United States National security.

The constantly-evolving National security threat requires an adaptable information-sharing strategy. In the period immediately following 9/11, the FBI focused on threats originating outside the United States, but we now also must direct our resources to address the threat from individuals residing in our country who demonstrate violent extremist actions on behalf of either a foreign-based or domestic ideology. The FBI will continue to provide relevance and context on foreign threat information; however, we also recognize that the violent extremism threat may be first identified within our communities by State, local, or Tribal law enforcement. As a result, we have taken numerous proactive steps in the past year to develop a more robust information-sharing capacity with all Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement partners.

Given the diverse threats we face, it is essential that law enforcement entities work together, making our partnerships with all levels of law enforcement that much more invaluable. As the lead agency for domestic intelligence collection, as outlined in Executive Order 12333, the FBI must ensure that we maintain responsibility for all investigative activity involving terrorist threats while also sharing as much information as possible with our partners. We routinely disseminate raw and finished intelligence products to our partners to help us achieve this goal, and we focus on three critical tools to facilitate information sharing with our partners: Fusion centers, the FBI's Field Intelligence Groups ("FIGs"), and the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces ("JTTFs").

As the analytical counterpart to the fusion centers—sharing a similar mission of gathering, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence information—FIGs are the focal point for sharing information with fusion centers. FIGs ensure all terrorism-related information is passed to the FBI's JTTFs. Unlike fusion centers and FIGs, JTTFs conduct operations and are focused exclusively on terrorism, with the responsibility for operations against and investigations of terrorist acts and terrorist threats inside the United States as well as related intelligence collection activities inside the United States.

The FBI has implemented an engagement strategy to enhance our relationship with fusion centers and has demonstrated its commitment to partnering with other agencies, specifically, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), on fusion center initiatives in several key ways. To foster better coordination and integration of intelligence dissemination, the FBI has directly supported fusion centers by assigning approximately 96 FBI personnel to at least 55 of the 77 fusion centers on a full-time or part-time basis. Of the more than 100 JTTFs operating throughout the country—comprising more than 4,000 task force members from more than 650 Federal, State, and local agencies—16 are collocated with fusion centers, providing even greater coordination and information sharing and enabling FBI and fusion center

personnel to better understand each other's roles and responsibilities. All participants in fusion centers and JTTFs act as equal partners: Federal, State, local, and Tribal JTTF participants can access all threat information relevant to their area of responsibility, and the JTTFs share specific threat information concerning operations and investigations with relevant State and local entities.

Fusion centers maximize our ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity. They assist the FBI by providing information made available by the combination of knowledge, expertise, and information within local law enforcement and homeland security agencies operating throughout the Nation, and our participation allows us to provide a National perspective on regional threats and trends so we can better inform decision makers at all levels. The exchange of intelligence that takes place in fusion centers aids other intelligence and law enforcement organizations—including the JTTFs—in their investigative operations and serves as a critical tool for collaboration at all levels.

With the DHS, the FBI co-chairs the Fusion Center Sub-Committee of the Information Sharing and Access Interagency Policy Committee, a group that coordinates Federal support to fusion centers by providing guidance and standards to support interconnectivity, thereby ensuring information sharing among fusion centers and all levels of government. Moreover, the FBI recently hosted a 2-day northeast regional meeting of the fusion center directors, and we invited all of the directors to participate on their respective JTTF Executive Boards to ensure more effective coordination. We have also requested that the Special Agents in Charge of each FBI field office participate on their respective Fusion Center Advisory Board.

In addition to its collaboration with Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement through its fusion center initiatives, the FBI works with its law enforcement partners in many other areas. We have partnered with the International Association of Chiefs of Police, DHS, and other agencies to establish a unified approach to addressing the critical information needs of Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement. Concurrence among senior interagency leaders has resulted in an unprecedented commitment to unified messaging to the public regarding the proper protocols for reporting suspicious activity. This message encourages agencies at all levels of Government to encourage the use of the "If You See Something Say Something™" campaign to raise public awareness of behavioral indicators of terrorism, and to emphasize the importance of reporting suspicious activities to proper law enforcement authorities, which will forward suspicious activity reports to fusion centers and the FBI's JTTFs for follow-up and de-confliction.

Training materials for law enforcement agencies in several States will be rolled out in the coming weeks and months to ensure that line officers understand how to identify the suspicious behaviors associated with pre-incident terrorism activities, how to document and report suspicious activity, and how to ensure the protection of privacy and civil liberties when documenting information. This messaging will be replicated Nation-wide at all levels of government to educate the public and raise awareness.

Further, the FBI and its partner agencies have renewed their commitment to ensuring all information—whether it is reported to a fusion center or to a JTTF—is shared with those who need to know. Over the past few months, the FBI has worked closely with the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting ("SAR") Initiative's Program Management Office to implement technical and business processes that enable two systems—the FBI's eGuardian system and the Information Sharing Environment's Shared Space systems—to share SARs more quickly and efficiently. While they continue to work to improve this synchronization, as of December 1, 2011, SARs and other information are now pushed from one system to the other more effectively. This has ensured that all SARs entered into Shared Space are shared with eGuardian. The final goal in linking the two systems is to ensure that SARs will automatically pass between them without duplicating users' efforts and without changing the Shared Space system, resulting in more seamless sharing of information between fusion centers, FIGs, and JTTFs.

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today, and I would be happy to answer any of your questions.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Velez.

Now we turn to the last member of the panel to present testimony, Ms. Bryant.

**STATEMENT OF MAURITA J. BRYANT, ASSISTANT CHIEF,
PITTSBURGH BUREAU OF POLICE**

Chief BRYANT. Good morning, Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Higgins, and Members of the subcommittee and distinguished panelists.

As the first national vice president of the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, NOBLE, I am here today on behalf of NOBLE, and I thank you for the opportunity to allow me to speak on issues related to the effectiveness of fusion center operations.

Overall, fusion centers are moving in the right direction, but there are still some disconnects. In today's climate of shrinking budgets, manpower shortages, global networks supporting foreign and domestic terrorism, organization and drug trafficking, all levels of local, State, and Federal law enforcement realize we must work together and enter into the information-sharing process.

Most important to law enforcement at all levels is the critical operational capabilities that primary and recognized fusion centers provide, such as the ability to receive classified and unclassified information from Federal partners, the ability to assess, analyze, and access the implications of local threat information, the ability to disseminate threat information to other local, State, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies and private-sector entities, the ability to gather and share locally-generated information.

Continued funding to fusion centers will permit these entities to advance beyond the policy development associated with the critical operating capabilities. This will allow centers to enter into a sound implementation phase with business practices consistent throughout the National network of fusion centers. Some fusion centers across the Nation in cities such as Tennessee, Los Angeles, Boston, Chicago, and Arizona, to name a few, are more operational than others and can be modeled for their performance.

At the current time, the Pittsburgh Region Fusion Center has not been stood up for its full operational capacity. It does routinely produce and disseminate to all sectors an open-source document that is well-received by the appropriate personnel. The current and projected projects of the All Hazards Fusion Center, per Federal guidance, is specifically designed to expand beyond the terrorism nexus.

Some of the systems in place, such as National Security Institute, NSI, and the FBI's eGuardian are designed to generate day-to-day information that is—that has a possible nexus to terrorism, which is sometimes routed in the appropriate law enforcement agency.

This can be a challenge, depending upon the geographical location, personalities, and existing cultural barriers, such as sharing information among public safety disciplines. Pittsburgh is in the early stages of their fusion's effort and project that it can have a substantial impact based on experience to date with a limited deployment.

The biggest issue currently is funding in the out-years. Recently, the Pittsburgh Urban Area Securities Initiative has been removed from the list of urban areas that will be funded in the 2012 budget. Without an active and funded All Hazards Fusion Center, Pitts-

burgh will not be able to fully understand the threat, let alone react to prevent, protect, defend, deter, and respond to acts of terrorism.

One of the key capabilities of a fusion center is to have access to intelligence and threat information. In order to effectively support fusion center priorities, the process for direct fusion center funding must be explored.

Pittsburgh has recently had its threat profile downgraded from 27th in the Nation to 33rd, which has cut the funding. Pittsburgh maintains that it cannot develop a full understanding of the threat without an All Hazards Fusion Center, which leaves them in a catch-22 situation.

I will close now and then leave it open for questions.

[The statement of Ms. Bryant follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAURITA J. BRYANT

FEBRUARY 28, 2012

Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Higgins, Ranking and Members of the committee: I am Maurita J. Bryant, first national vice president of the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives. Thank you for the opportunity to testify and submit testimony for the record regarding intelligence sharing and the importance of information gathered in fusion centers to stop and prevent crime. The National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, better known as NOBLE, was founded in September 1976, during a 3-day symposium to address crime in urban low-income areas. The symposium was co-sponsored by the Police Foundation and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). The mission of NOBLE is to ensure equity in the administration of justice in the provision of public service to all communities, and to serve as the conscience of law enforcement by being committed to justice by action. NOBLE strives to be recognized as a highly competent, public service organization that is at the forefront of providing solutions to law enforcement issues and concerns, as well as to the ever-changing needs of our communities.

As the first national vice president, I am here representing a membership body of over 2,500 predominantly African American law enforcement executives from six regions across the United States and abroad. NOBLE has been a leading National voice on hate crimes, community policing, racial and religious tolerance, and law enforcement accreditation standards as a founding association of the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA), along with International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), and the National Sheriffs' Association (NSA).

As you are aware since 2001, all 50 States and some local governments have established fusion centers where homeland security, terrorism, and other intelligence information are shared. It should be noted that while the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Justice (DOJ) have been engaged in addressing the challenges fusion center officials have identified, we are of the opinion that overall fusion centers are moving in the right direction but there are some disconnects. In today's climate of shrinking budgets, manpower shortages, global networks supporting foreign and domestic terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking; all levels of local, State, and Federal law enforcement realize we must enter into the information-sharing process. Fusion Centers provide the avenue for the exchange of information. While fusion centers initially focused their efforts on terrorism-centric matters, we are pleased that they have taken on an "all hazards" approach and continuous development of these capabilities is important. Fusion centers can provide an ideal venue and an effective and efficient way to exchange information and intelligence to improve the ability to fight crime and terrorism and to respond to disasters. State and major urban area fusion centers are owned and operated by State and local entities. The Federal Government recognizes these designations and has a shared responsibility with State and local agencies to support the National network of fusion centers. Law enforcement at all levels of government has grown to utilize fusion centers to provide expertise and situational awareness to inform decision-making for the allocation of valuable resources. Approximately 18 months ago DHS came out with a self-assessment process and later developed a more structured process that involved internal and external fusion center partners. Most important

to law enforcement at all levels is the critical operational capabilities that primary and recognized fusion centers provide, such as:

- Ability to receive classified and unclassified information from Federal partners.
- Ability to access, analyze, and assess the implications of local threat information.
- Ability to disseminate threat information to other local, State, Tribal and territorial law enforcement agencies and private-sector entities.
- Ability to gather and share locally generated information.

Continued funding to fusion centers will permit these entities to advance beyond the policy development associated with the critical operating capabilities. This will allow them to enter into a sound implementation phase with business practices consistent throughout the National network of fusion centers. Some fusion centers across the Nation in cities such as Tennessee, Los Angeles, Boston, Chicago, and Arizona, to name a few, are more operational than others and can be modeled for their performance. At the current time the Pittsburgh Region Fusion Center has not been stood up to its full operational capacity. It does routinely produce and disseminate to all Sectors an open-source document that is well-received by the appropriate personnel. The current and projected projects of the All Hazards Fusion Center per Federal Guidance, is specifically designed to expand beyond the terrorism nexus. Some of the systems in place such as, NSI and the FBI's eGuardian, are designed to generate "day-to-day" information that has a possible nexus to terrorism, which is sometimes routed to the appropriate Law Enforcement Agency. This can be a challenge depending upon the geographical location, personalities and existing cultural barriers; such as sharing information among public safety disciplines. Pittsburgh is in the early stages of their Fusion effort and project that it can have a substantial impact based on experience to date with a limited deployment. The biggest issue currently is funding in the out-years. Recently the Pittsburgh UASI has been removed from the list of Urban Areas that will be funded in the 2012 budget. Without an active and funded "All Hazards Fusion Center" Pittsburgh will not be able to fully understand the threat, let alone react to prevent, protect, defend, deter, and respond to acts of terrorism.

One of the key capabilities of a fusion center is access to intelligence and threat information. In order to effectively support fusion center priorities the process for direct fusion center funding must be explored. Pittsburgh has recently had its threat profile downgraded from 27th in the Nation to 33rd which has cut the funding. Pittsburgh maintains that it cannot develop a full understanding of the threat without an All Hazards Fusion Center, which leaves them in a "catch-22" situation. Another issue that has impacted the success of those working hard to develop fusion center capabilities is the Federal grant approval process which oftentimes causes significant delays in the roll-out. However, DHS has recently removed a number of the impediments, which will make it easier to "fast track" fusion centers and other projects. Unfortunately for Pittsburgh, it will not have the funding after 2011 dollars are exhausted. In response to the question, does DHS provide sufficient guidance and structure to State and local responders and their missions? Depending upon who is asked the question, the response would be at times there is far too much guidance and structure. In places where fusion centers are more mature they can pretty much go on auto pilot with little or no guidance because they have processes and relationships in place. Fusion centers that are less mature need more structure and guidance. For some that has been the on-going issue in moving Fusion and other Homeland Security projects forward within acceptable time frames based upon the fact that the priorities of the fusion center and the State and local environment are not always consistent with the priorities promulgated by DHS.

When asked is there anything more that the Federal Government should be doing in order to make this intelligence-sharing process more efficient and reliable? A recommendation would be to put in a process to qualify larger numbers of people to ensure better dissemination of information. The disconnect is that there are not many people in local or State law enforcement who have secret, not alone top secret clearances, so the classified information is not disseminated. Although clearances play a major role, we recognize this issue is under revision. Information sharing must be a two-way street, local level information is not always communicated because personnel may not think it is worth communicating on a National level. This is where education and awareness must continue at the State and local level and within the fusion center. Any information-sharing process must better determine access and minimize exclusivity—there still remains a tendency to hoard knowledge. It will be a waste of time for everyone if the information (beyond data) available is not being shared.

Information sharing is vital in law enforcement and it is important that appropriate intelligence coupled with analysis is continually provided if we are to achieve

success in this area. DHS has been somewhat effective in getting past the old model of information “silos” that has impaired the ability of local officials to react to the ever-changing threat landscape. The capabilities of the various fusion centers must continually be evaluated on a holistic basis to ensure that across the country information is provided to State and local partners so that all gaps in identifying emerging threats to our communities are closed. As fusion centers receive intelligence that is pertinent, it is critical for that information to be shared in an expeditious manner. When information is shared it should be one message without circular reporting. Information overload is a casualty that comes from receiving the same information coming from multiple sources. It should also be recognized that large States such as Texas, California, Virginia, and Florida with multiple fusion centers allow for a greater population base to be served. One fusion center per State does not always answer the needs for the entire State. In looking towards the future, it is anticipated that collaboration efforts between State and local authorities and Federal agencies will progress and jurisdictional boundaries will become less significant over time. Information must be as highly mobile as the population in order to solve crime and thwart terrorism. While the existence of fusion centers has allowed information sharing to increase in a post-9/11 environment there is still a tremendous amount of ground to be covered if we are to fully realize a positive information-sharing environment at all levels of government.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Ms. Bryant. Thanks to each of the members of the panel, again, as I said, for your written testimony, but also for summarizing the essence of your key points in your verbal testimony.

So, again, we will allow each of the committee Members the 5 minutes allotted to each of us to begin our questioning. I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.

Let me begin by just a couple of observations and ask the panel to be responsive, because I think you spelled out well sort of the boundaries of where we were. First, we watched in the course of 10 years—and this is the essence of what I am asking—we have been 10 years at it. Where are we? What are we doing right?

We have seen a transformation, accurately identified by Mr. McAllister, in which we now are looking beyond the threat from overseas to the simultaneous reality, in light of what we have seen with Hezbollah and others and, you know, acting out potentially in Washington, DC, and the concomitant reality of homegrown terrorism, that we have got joint issues that we need to be looking at, at the same time. It is actually increased the challenge before us.

We have on the National level very sophisticated operations, Mr. Velez, throughout the FBI in every field office, in which we have stood up Joint Terrorism Task Forces, looking in a very disciplined way towards the issue of terrorism. We have down on the local level—as Mr. Bryant pointed out—fusion centers which are largely State- and local-oriented.

We have got a lot of consistency, but a lot of inconsistency, and who remembers how they are organized, how they are overseen, and the role that they play in interaction. That may be a good thing, based on local needs and challenges, but in this context, where we have got this changing nature of the threat and we are organized in different ways, both Federally and locally, is it working? What is going right? What is going wrong with regard to fusion centers? What should we be doing a better job on? May I just ask the panel to respond to those observations and give me your gut sense as to what we ought to be doing better?

Mr. MCALLISTER. Chairman Meehan, if I could address that, first of all, let me describe the National network of fusion centers. Each Governor is requested to identify a primary fusion center for his or

her State. In addition to that, there are recognized fusion centers. So right now, we have a core capability throughout the majority of State and territories in the United States as those primary touch points between the Federal Government with threat information coming down to a State fusion center, and that State fusion center applying a localized context to that threat information—

Mr. MEEHAN. How does it work with the situation in which—you coming from the southeast, you appreciate—Philadelphia has got a fusion center. Ms. Bryant is in Pittsburgh. There is a huge difference geographically with Pittsburgh and Philadelphia. Is Pittsburgh tied in? Or are there two separate fusion centers?

Mr. MCALLISTER. Well, I can describe my experience in Florida. In Florida, as the deputy homeland security adviser, we had our primary State fusion center located in Tallahassee, designated by the Governor. Also, there were two other recognized fusion centers that sat in urban areas, one in Orlando and one in the Miami area.

What is important to note is that these are owned and operated by local entities. They are not owned by the Federal Government. In turn, it is incumbent upon that State entity to describe an overarching architecture of how information and intelligence will be shared within that State. So for my personal experience, we developed a program in order for information and threat to come down from the Federal Government to the State, the State out to our other recognized fusion centers and other nodes within that State, and then the reverse flow.

Mr. MEEHAN. Ms. Bryant, you are from Pittsburgh. How does that work, from your perspective, right now?

Chief BRYANT. Well—

Mr. MEEHAN. Would you push your button so that we can hear you?

Chief BRYANT. As I stated earlier, our fusion center is not fully operational. We have the disconnect because—if I was to ask the director of our emergency management services, he would say that the disconnect is the bureaucracy and the audits, and he would give a whole lot of information.

Mr. MEEHAN. Federal audits? State audits? Local audits? Who is doing that?

Chief BRYANT. State and Federal audits. It has been a 3-year process for Pittsburgh, but it still hasn't gotten off the ground. Then it is the dilemma of, who is going to be in charge? Is it going to be emergency management? Or is it going to be law enforcement? So we have a lot of issues—

Mr. MEEHAN. Is this because you are going into all-hazards?

Chief BRYANT. Yes, because it is all-hazards. For our area, we do need all-hazards.

Mr. MEEHAN. Okay. Well, that is an issue worth—Mr. Velez or Mr. Quijas, if you have anything to add, my time has passed, but if you have something quickly to add to either the general question or the specific, I would be delighted to hear it.

Mr. QUIJAS. I think the critical piece here that as a State, we focused on is the involvement of State and locals in the fusion centers. Prior to September 11, you would not have seen that. The level of engagement, the level of involvement and the management at the local level, as Scott said, those are locally managed, which

I think says a lot about where we have come from September 11 and the engagement of our State and local partners in basically driving these initiatives. So I think there has been a lot of progress in that, and I think the fusion centers show that.

Mr. MEEHAN. My challenge is one State directing the local partnership, a State like Pennsylvania, not unlike many others, with two specific urban centers. There may be more. You know, how do we make it work in a situation like that?

Let me just—Mr. Velez, do you have any comment before I turn it over to Mr. Higgins for—okay, well, thank you so much.

At this point in time, let me recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Higgins, for his questions. Thank you.

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate very much the characterization of the disjointed way that security issues were dealt with prior to 9/11.

There is a book written by Lawrence Wright called “The Looming Tower.” The subtitle is “From Al Qaida to 9/11.” In it, there is a passage where he recounts that an FBI agent, when the second plane hit the tower, physically got sick, because he realized that between the FBI, the CIA, and local law enforcement agencies, they had the intelligence to potentially thwart that attack.

But because these barriers existed between the Federal law enforcement agencies, that intelligence wasn’t shared freely, and thus it was of no use relative to that situation. So I appreciate very much, you know, reassuring us that things have changed profoundly since, but we can never become complacent. You have to be diligent.

The Chairman had mentioned—and we have had previous testimony in this committee—about the potential threat of Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere, including North America. Hezbollah is a terrorist organization committed to violent jihad. They act as a proxy for Syria, for Venezuela, and for Iran. They have a presence in the 20-country region of Latin America, and they also have a presence in 15 American cities and four major cities in Canada.

This is a threat that we have been told we shouldn’t be too worried about it, because their activities, Hezbollah, in North America is limited to fundraising activity. Well, to me, that is cold comfort. When you look at the effectiveness of the fusion centers, are they well-positioned, some 72 of them throughout the Nation, are they well-positioned to deal with not only the existing threats, but prospective threats, as well, from organizations like Hezbollah that act as a—as I said, a proxy for people that want to harm us?

So I ask that generally to the panel.

Mr. MCALLISTER. If I may, first of all, we are positioned in order to address that. It is a complementary, rather than competitive type of environment. Working jointly with the FBI, Department of Homeland Security I&A has developed a joint information bulletin that is classified, but has been provided to our key stakeholders throughout the State and local environment, and working together with the FBI, it is a prime example of being able to communicate that potential threat.

But the concept is, is in order to provide those key leaders out there the ability to make informed decisions based on that threat in the localized context to their area of responsibility in order to

make informed decisions on deployment of their resources in order to mitigate that threat. So that process is in place, and it is working well.

Chief BRYANT. One of the problems that State and local law enforcement has is that there are not many law enforcement officers at that level that have secret, not alone top secret clearance to receive the information. We work very well with our Federal partners, but in the fusion center, if there is not an FBI analyst to decipher and disseminate the information, it doesn't always come all the way down.

Another disconnect with that two-way information-sharing is the officers who work on the street who are many times the first who would encounter a threat don't always realize the importance of pushing the information up. So there needs to additional education and awareness initiatives to ensure that more officers are sent to where they can receive the proper clearances and that the patrol officer on the street or the beat officer on the street knows what information is key to be pushed upward to our National levels.

Mr. VELEZ-VILLAR. Yes, I would just like to point out, as well, the FBI uses a variety of mechanisms in order to ensure that not only the fusion centers, but all our State and local partners are positioned as well as they can be. Mr. McAllister mentioned the joint intelligence bulletins, but one of the most effective ways of doing this is through our Joint Terrorism Task Force. Obviously, any investigation regarding Hezbollah would be operated by the JTTF. We have Joint Terrorism Task Force executive boards in which we bring in the membership of these boards, which make up chiefs of police, homeland security advisers, and we brief them on on-going efforts on these threats, and we brief them in a classified environment, if need be, but we share that directly face-to-face with them.

Mr. MCALLISTER. Just to add to that, just to give you a context of how many State and local law enforcement and other first responders have security clearances, there are approximately 4,000 State and local first responders that have been provided secret-level clearances, if not higher.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Higgins.

The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Long.

Mr. LONG. Thank you. I want to thank you all for being here today, No. 1.

You don't need to turn around and look, but there are a couple of pictures on the wall behind you all that had gone missing from this committee room for a few years, and thanks to Chairman King, they have been returned as a reminder, one, of the Twin Towers engulfed in smoke and flames. The other one is two searchlights going up at nighttime from where the Twin Towers used to stand.

With that, in our memory, I think you all aware that there was a CIA watch-listed individual that was pulled over by a Maryland State trooper 2 days before that event, and he was also one of the hijackers. Due to a lack of information sharing, we were unable to stop him or do anything that might have prevented the occurrence on 9/11.

So, Mr. Quijas, I would like to ask you, are we doing all that we can in the area of information sharing among all law enforcement agencies in this country? If not, what are the top three areas that need to be addressed, in your opinion?

Mr. QUIJAS. Thank you, sir. You know, again, I was a sitting chief on the morning of September 11, and tragically, as the events were unfolding in New York, I had two FBI agents that were sitting in my office briefing me, as we held the furniture market every year in North Carolina in High Point. I went from that period of really having to pull information out of our Federal partners to now we basically have went to the other end. In my travels, talking to the major city chiefs, the National Sheriffs' Association, IECP members, in some cases, I hear, "We are getting too much information. Is there a way that we can vet out that information so when we get it, it is more accurate and actionable?" That is what they want.

So that State trooper that you talked about that pulled that car over, I can almost guarantee you today that that officer through either the JTTF or fusion centers or one of the other mechanisms out there sharing information would more than likely have that information.

I have to agree with what the chief said. I think sometimes there is a little confusion about, you know, how much information people get, how it gets out to them, and I think the challenge for us in the future is making sure that we don't overwhelm our State and local partners, because at the end of the day they are still keeping our homeland secure. They are answering 9-1-1 calls. They are responding to burglaries. They are doing all the local stuff. Plus, we have also asked them to be on the front lines of keeping our country safe.

So I think in reality we have to be at the Federal level more sensitive to—instead of just pushing more information out, is that information timely? Is it actionable? So our State and local partners can take action on that, help keeping our communities safe, and as we all know, eventually keeps our homeland safe.

Mr. LONG. Okay. Ms. Bryant, you were nodding your head to that "too much information." Could you elaborate?

Chief BRYANT. Yes. Information overload is a casualty. It comes from receiving information from multiple sources. If you continue to receive it, you tend to discard it, that it is not important, because it is just too much. Sometimes we get the same information two and three times just from different sources, so if that could be vetted some sort of way so that the message gets out, but it is not circular reporting.

Mr. LONG. But are you able to get the critical information that you do need in a timely fashion? Do you feel between agencies information sharing?

Chief BRYANT. I think it is an on-going process—

Mr. LONG. There are no more turf battles?

Chief BRYANT. It is an on-going battle, but it is getting better. It really is getting better.

Mr. LONG. Okay.

Chief BRYANT. We are talking to one another, not talking at one another.

Mr. LONG. Next question is also for you, Ms. Bryant. I hail from the fastest-growing Congressional in Missouri. The Springfield, Branson, Joplin area of southwest Missouri grew the fastest over the last 10 years of any area in the State. My question was going to be: What could I tell my local law enforcement agencies who need a fusion center what steps they could take or what they need to do in that regard? But after your earlier testimony, where you said you all have been 3 years trying to get a fusion center, I guess I would ask if you could perhaps point out some pitfalls or things to be wary of or how—if they could go forward without falling into a 3-year morass like you all have.

Chief BRYANT. I think, first, your law enforcement leaders should visit some of the fusion centers around the country that are operational and that are working together. First, before they even start the planning phase, they need to build the relationship with the Federal, State, and local representatives.

If you don't have a relationship, you are going to have a hard way to go. Once that relationship is formed, you have to figure out, well, who is going to take the lead on the fusion center and what type of fusion center we want to have. Those are two crucial things that have to be done, and when those decisions are made, then it is just a matter of submitting the paperwork and getting started.

Mr. LONG. So you all do not have an operational fusion center as we speak?

Chief BRYANT. It is not fully operational, no. As I stated, some information is disseminated, but the information is from open sources. You could pretty much get it from anywhere. The law enforcement component to the fusion center is not quite together yet.

Mr. LONG. This is for any of you real briefly. How many operational operating fusion centers are there in the country?

Chief BRYANT. Seventy-two throughout the Nation.

Mr. LONG. Okay, without the—not counting Pittsburgh?

Chief BRYANT. Well, we are counted a little bit.

Mr. LONG. Mr. Quijas, I don't know if you ever had cause to run into my buddy Forest Mendenhall down there in High Point, but good auctioneer buddy friend down there.

I yield back. Thank you.

Mr. MEEHAN. Never losing an opportunity to push the business, huh, Mr. Long?

[Laughter.]

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Long.

At this point in time, the Chairman recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms. Hahn.

Ms. HAHN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am really appreciating this hearing that we are holding this morning.

I have a great success story from one of the two fusion centers in L.A. County. This was from a press account about the JRIC, which is the name of our fusion center. It was in 2006.

As the month-long Israeli-Hezbollah conflict embroiled the Middle East earlier this year, in 2006, a group of analysts working on the seventh floor of an inconspicuous office building in Norwalk, California, near Los Angeles started to connect some dots. In a room with low cubicles to ease the flow of communication, specialists in areas like epidemiology, hazardous material, and terrorism

intelligence began analyzing information and assessing various situations, possible threats, and potential targets.

Through the JRIC intelligence, information valued for its currency and relevancy was furnished to agencies throughout Southern California, sending officers to reinforce sensitive locations, like the Jewish Federation of Greater Los Angeles. Soon after, on July 28, 2006, 1,200 miles from Los Angeles, a gunman opened fire at the Jewish Federation of Greater Seattle, wounding five women and killing one.

While cities scrambled to protect their Jewish centers, the greater Los Angeles area was already prepared, thanks to the JRIC's foresight, said John Miller, FBI assistant director of public affairs. With its landmark model of interagency cooperation, the center is one step ahead of counterterrorism efforts Nation-wide, predicting threatening situations instead of reacting to them.

The JRIC, a multi-agency fusion center, looks strategically at all criminal activities locally and internationally. Since opening, the center has grabbed the intelligence community's attention and received praise from law enforcement agencies.

I thought it would be great to offer a success story this morning as we talk about how critical and important these fusion centers are. Sitting here as a relatively new Member of Congress, you know, knowing what this center was able to prevent, and then hearing from Ms. Bryant of centers that are still not up and running, and talking about how we might continue as Congress to ensure that we connect the dots—because that is really what this is about. Since 9/11, that seemed to be the recurring theme for us was, how do we connect the dots?

We also have one at the Port of Los Angeles, which, you know, the Port of Los Angeles between Los Angeles and Long Beach is the largest port complex in the country. Forty-four percent of all the trade that comes into this country comes through that center. We know, if something were to happen at one of those ports to knock it out of service, it would cost this country, I believe, \$2 million a day in our local economy. By the way, every Congressional district depends on what comes through those ports.

I am concerned about the funding. You know, I feel like we need a continued revenue stream of funding for our fusion centers. I am worried that many of these analysts in these fusion centers were grant-funded, and I am concerned of some of the—some of you have alluded to it, but I guess my question would be, what do you see, realistically, as the impact of some of our cuts back here, particularly in some of these security grant fundings projects? What is that going to have—what kind of an impact is that going to have, particularly on the analysts that are in these fusion centers that, as I just read that story, were critical in preventing a deadly attack in Los Angeles?

So I am concerned about—I am concerned about the ports, and I am concerned about the grant-funded analysts in these fusion centers across the country.

Mr. MCALLISTER. First, I could not have more eloquently described a success story that, again, hearkens back to that taking threat information, applying a localized context to it, and then developing a mitigation strategy on how to address that threat.

Pertaining to grants, again, remember that there—the State and local fusion centers are locally owned, and they have a variety of different sustainment methods in order to use either general revenue or some grant money in order to sustain those efforts.

Ms. HAHN. But I—let me just say, the centers have received \$426 million in Federal funds since 2004.

Mr. McALLISTER. Correct. What we do is we work to convey the Secretary's message as far as how important when it comes to the grant language that the National network of fusion centers is interwoven into those sustainment efforts, through grant language, as well as working on the assessment and metrics in order to provide your colleagues here with the return on investment from those already invested dollars that have come from Congress.

Ms. HAHN. Anybody else want to speak to the port security issue?

Mr. VELEZ-VILLAR. I can't speak to the funding issue, but I can tell you about the port security issue. Having come from L.A.—and I served as the Joint Terrorism Task Force supervisor in Long Beach and was on the executive committee for the JRIC, so I appreciate the comments on the JRIC and the success.

With regard to the ports, whether there is funding from DHS to the fusion center for that, ultimately from a JTTF perspective, protecting those ports was extremely important to us. We created a squad at the FBI office solely dedicated to port security. I served on the area maritime security committee with the Coast Guard captain of the port, and we are constantly working with the port to ensure that that infrastructure is protected.

Ms. HAHN. Thank you. I will yield my time.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thanks, Ms. Hahn.

At this point in time, the Chairman will now recognize the gentlelady from New York, Ms. Hochul.

Ms. HOCHUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to congratulate my colleague, Congressman Higgins, on his elevation as our Ranking Member on this subcommittee, so thank you. It is great to be able to tag-team on issues that relate to the Canadian border, as well. It is something that we are very concerned about.

I am sorry I missed the earlier testimony. In fact, I am on deck to ask questions of the Secretary of the Air Force about something in our area, so I have to—I only am going to have time for one question, because I have to run over there.

But representing the western New York area on the border with Canada, tell me how our relationship with the Canadian government has improved with respect to information sharing since 9/11? That is critically important, with the four bridges we have, bringing lots of people into our communities from Canada, which has certainly standards to get into the country, but we are always concerned about people crossing the border. The airports, the air base we have there, and actually the critical infrastructure, which is a huge hydroelectric power facility that gives power to the grid to take to New York City.

So in my sense, we have some vulnerabilities up there, but I want to know what is being done to engage the Canadian government and how you feel that is going and, No. 2, can it be improved?

Mr. MCALLISTER. If I may—and I know you are short on time—but the Secretary is very collaborative in the Beyond the Borders Initiative. Our under secretary of intelligence and analysis was just up with Canadian officials to address information sharing and collaboration across the border, particularly in the area of suspicious activity reporting and the like.

So if you would like—I know you are short on time—we are more than happy to come back and give you a more thorough brief on what is underway.

Ms. HOCHUL. My question is: Are you comfortable with the level of cooperation? Or is there room for improvement?

Mr. MCALLISTER. My personal experience has been that the Canadians are—have a thirst for knowledge and have the proper perspective in order to do the right and collaborate in that information sharing and collaboration across the border in order to ensure both Canada and the United States is safe.

Ms. HOCHUL. Thank you.

I yield back the rest of my time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you for taking the time, Ms. Hochul, to juggle the balls, but to get here for our committee hearing.

I now appreciate that we have been joined by another seasoned veteran of the committee, and at this point in time, if the gentleman from Minnesota is prepared to ask a question, we would be delighted to entertain that opportunity.

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate it.

Let's see. I am trying to catch up, so—I just came out of one committee, so I apologize to the Members of the committee. Thank you very much. It is very important what you do, and I am going to jump on in.

Fusion centers were originally intended to serve as a conduit for information to flow from State and local enforcement to Federal Bureau of Investigation's Joint Terrorism Task Force, JTTFs, and to promote regional information sharing to combat terrorism by combining Federal, State, and law enforcement resources.

Is there any metric that you can tell me in place to measure how intelligence gathered at fusion centers has supported the Federal counterterrorism investigations? I will just open that up to a broad question.

Mr. VELEZ-VILLAR. Sir, I can't speak of a specific metric that has been captured. I know within our organization, within the FBI, we actually do capture—whenever we conduct an investigation, whether it is terrorism-related or whether it is criminal investigations, if there is support from the fusion center, we capture that on a form that we utilize in which we give it a score from one to four pertaining to the amount of assistance that was provided by the fusion center. So we do capture that internally within our field offices.

Mr. MCALLISTER. Just to add to that, JTTFs are involved in counterterrorism investigations and are operated and owned by the FBI. Fusion centers are locally owned and operates and collaborate in a more broader focus. They collaborate with each other, which is important to note. Through the analysis that fusion centers do, they complement what investigations are underway by the JTTFs.

Mr. CRAVAACK. So you find the communication to be pretty good, back and forth?

Mr. MCALLISTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. CRAVAACK. Excellent. Federal guidance required that by October 29, 2010, DHS was to develop an annual reporting process that would document the total operational sustainment costs of each of the 72 fusion centers in the National network. Has this been completed yet?

Mr. MCALLISTER. We are completing the 2011 assessment on a National network. That document should be finalized and available within the next month or two. We will be happy to share that with you at that time.

Mr. CRAVAACK. Any red herrings?

Mr. MCALLISTER. Not that I am aware of, but I have only been here since December, so—

Mr. CRAVAACK. Welcome aboard.

Mr. MCALLISTER. Thank you.

Mr. CRAVAACK. Let's talk a little bit about mission creep. The number of fusion centers has gradually increased to about 77. Furthermore, the original mission of the fusion centers expanded from preventing terrorist attacks in some places to criminal analysis and emergency management. Has DHS strictly defined the limit or scope of fusion centers' mission or our jurisdiction?

Mr. MCALLISTER. The answer is no. Fusion centers are owned and operated locally. They are designated by the Governor or the particular State that they reside in, both in primary and recognized fusion centers. What we bring to bear is we provide the senior intelligence officers and the secure network in order for them to receive secure information, analyze it in a local context, determine what is of value as far as a mitigation strategy, as well as providing that localized context back up through the intelligence community to add value there.

Mr. CRAVAACK. In your opinion—and this is a generalization, since you have been on-board since December—how many total fusion centers are needed to ensure the country remains safe? Is 77 enough? Do you think we need more? In your opinion, in analyzing the threats that are out there and the—and the geography of those, the demographic of those threats, what do you think?

Mr. MCALLISTER. I served as the deputy homeland security adviser for the State of Florida, and there we had more than one fusion center in that State. But what was incumbent upon me and other senior executives within the State was to determine the architecture in which information and information sharing would be shared.

In response to my opinion, we cannot say a specific number, as far as what is the ideal amount. That is determined by State and local officials, as well as the Governors of the States and territories.

Mr. CRAVAACK. Okay, thank you. Let me just—if you don't mind, switch gears a little bit. Let's talk about immigration, border security. It has come to my attention that ICE personnel serve at some of the fusion centers. Is that correct?

Mr. MCALLISTER. We have some personnel commingled in the fusion centers, but at a minimum—and, again, I can base this on my experience—at the State of Florida, the State fusion center there, we didn't have an ICE personnel there, but our analysts had built

relationships with those individuals in order to have a seamless collaboration on any—with that component, as well as other components within DHS.

Mr. CRAVAACK. Okay. How much of ICE's fusion center would you say is related to illegal immigration? Would that be something that is specifically on your radar for any length of time? Is it constant? What would you say?

Mr. MCALLISTER. If I may, I would prefer taking that back in order to get you the proper answer.

Mr. CRAVAACK. Okay. Okay.

Mr. MCALLISTER. Thank you.

Mr. CRAVAACK. Do you think that—this is another general question—I would like to ask each one of the members—if I may just be indulged, sir—let me ask you this question. Do you think we have a secure Southern Border? I will just take it down the row, if you don't mind.

Mr. MCALLISTER. I think that we have secured the border more and that, as with any initiative or issue, there is always room for improvement. If we can—you know, as a normal business process, try and close those gaps, we strive to do so.

Mr. CRAVAACK. Do you think it is a vitally important mission?

Mr. MCALLISTER. Absolutely.

Mr. CRAVAACK. Sir, can I ask you?

Mr. QUIJAS. As Scott said, I have to agree that—I mean, it is an on-going process. It is not an event. As long as we continue to develop our relationships with our other Federal, State, and local partners that have responsibility for the Northern Border, I believe we are situated currently to have a very secure Northern Border.

Mr. CRAVAACK. Coming from Minnesota, we appreciate that, so—sir?

Mr. VELEZ-VILLAR. Yes, I would just echo what my colleagues have said. Obviously, from the FBI's perspective, when it comes to the Southern Border, we need to ensure that we are doing everything possible to ensure that any violence or any crimes along those borders are not coming through over the border into our communities, and we are working very closely with our partners along the borders to ensure that we effectively mitigate those types of threats.

Mr. CRAVAACK. You would agree this is a vitally important mission?

Mr. VELEZ-VILLAR. Absolutely.

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thank you. Thank you, sir.

Ma'am.

Chief BRYANT. I think for any of us to say that something is completely secure would give a—would not be good to do. We continually work to make sure that we do the best that we can to make sure that our borders are safe, and that is with working together.

Mr. CRAVAACK. You would agree that is a vitally important mission, as well?

Chief BRYANT. Yes.

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thank you, ma'am.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the Chair's indulgence.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you to the gentleman from Minnesota.

I just have a quick follow-up line of inquiry, and I will certainly invite any of my colleagues if they have any follow-up questions to do so, as well. But I follow again from the recognition, Mr. McAllister—among others, you have testified that we have created this separation from the local fusion centers, in the sense that they are products of State and local government, so we encourage them, but we have created some kind of separation.

My fear is of—sort of two sorts. One is that we have created an expectation and we see the situation in Pittsburgh where they have stood one up, but it isn't getting the full, you know, level of support. Or is it inappropriate to have so many, if, in fact, they are not going to be able to be, you know, fully supported by a commitment from every agency to participate?

Then you see differences among them, where some are all-hazards and others seem to be more focused on counterterrorism. How are we communicating with the local level to create some kind of a sense of standardization and expectation with regard to what we want from them? I would like to ask Mr. Quijas and Mr. McAllister to respond to that.

Mr. McALLISTER. Thank you, sir.

First of all, there was developed baseline capabilities for all State and urban fusion centers. That was done in—I think it was 2009. As building upon that, there was grant language that indicated that recognized fusion centers need to try and adhere to that baseline capability so we have consistency across the United States.

Further development was in 2010. Part of that grant language indicated that in order to use preparedness grant monies that the insurance—or the fusion centers have a privacy policy in place, as well as compliance for all the personnel to 28 CFR Part 23, which deals with civil rights and civil liberties.

There is a build-up to that, as well as what is important to note is we work on the not only individual fusion centers that are, again, owned and operated by local governments and recognized by the Governors, but on a National network, as well. So not only do we have information coming down from the Federal Government and that localized context taking place, but also fusion-center-to-fusion-center collaboration.

As an example, I can note one from Pennsylvania, actually, which was a rape suspect who had committed a crime in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania fusion center had obtained partial information on a main tag that collaborated with the main fusion center, identified the suspect, found out that he had traveled over into Canada, and subsequently through the sharing of that information, led to an arrest in Canada for that particular individual.

Mr. MEEHAN. How do we protect against what Ms. Bryant was identifying, which is that there seems to be no consistency with respect to how that pattern of communication takes place? If you are talking fusion center to fusion center and then JTTF down to fusion center and, you know, you have got a lot of different ways the circuitry can work, is there any predictability as to how it will regularly work? Or is it just sort of catch as catch can?

Mr. McALLISTER. No, there is a system in place, sir. That is further developed by the information-sharing environment, through the PMISC, as it is called, which standardizes the flow of informa-

tion and intelligence down, as well as outward, throughout the fusion center network.

I would be more than happy to further brief you at a later time on that.

Mr. MEEHAN. Okay. Well, we may follow up on that. I thank you.

My last question relates to this issue of privacy, because the extent to which the local fusion centers, are they conducting any of their own internal investigation and creating some kind of local objective, either in all-hazards or in particularly in monitoring and preventing future acts of terrorism by understanding what they believe is going on in their own region?

Mr. Velez and Ms. Bryant, maybe you could help me with that.

Mr. VELEZ-VILLAR. I can't speak—I know the fusion centers have privacy officers within each fusion centers. They take civil liberties and privacy very seriously.

I could speak on behalf of the FBI, if that helps any. With regards to privacy, civil liberties are something that we take extremely seriously. Any time that we conduct an investigation or an assessment, we are guided by a series of guidelines that are very strict. The Constitution allows us to do certain things. The attorney general guidelines allow us to do other things.

Our bureau policies are even more strict, and that is how we ensure that we take into account all the civil liberties and the privacies of all our investigations and our assessments.

Chief BRYANT. We are sworn to protect the civil liberties of all individuals, so it is very important to us that we put measurements in place to protect those privacies and so that we don't do something that infringes on someone else's rights. So I can't speak for all fusion centers, but I am sure that is a top priority in each one of them.

Mr. MEEHAN. But you think there is sufficient training and guidelines and otherwise to protect against the abusive information that can be held and developed at a local level and disseminated to others with the imprimatur of intelligence that comes from a governmental agency?

Chief BRYANT. We could always use additional training. Training cannot hurt. We can always use additional training.

Mr. MEEHAN. All right. Thanks, Ms. Bryant.

Mr. MCALLISTER. Mr. Chairman, I can give you some statistics on that, if you would like. There are 77 privacy policies in place right now. Grant guidance calls for, like I said earlier, that all personnel comply with 28 CFR Part 23 training, as well as have an approved privacy policy in place.

There is a joint DHS-DOJ technical assistance program that is in place that supports the development of further privacy policies, working with civil liberties advocates within the communities, and as well as training for analysts in that particular endeavor.

We also have a privacy, civil rights, civil liberties institute training program that has developed train-the-trainer curriculum, and so far, we have had privacy and civil rights, civil liberties train-the-trainer at 69 fusion centers, on-site training for 35 fusion centers, as well as there are web resource toolkits that are available and a subject matter expert flyaway team, in order to go deal with a hot-button issue that might emerge.

So there has been great emphasis placed on not only by the Secretary, but the Department on the protection of privacy and civil rights and civil liberties.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you.

At this point in time, do any of my colleagues—Mr. Higgins? Any further—Mr. Long? One follow-up question?

Mr. LONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I take umbrage with the fact that you sort of chastised me a while ago for giving what you thought was a shameless plug for a friend in North Carolina, but I didn't even mention that Mr. Quijas worked 25 years for the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department in the Show-me State, where the Missouri Auction School is located. Now, that would have been a shameless plug, if I would have said that.

I want to direct this to the entire panel, concerning the Secret Service, counterfeiting operations, and internet financial fraud, so that is going to be the—any of you can answer if you will, but what regular intelligence data sets are provided by the Secret Service regarding counterfeiting operations and internet financial fraud? How is this data shared with State and local agencies? I ask, because a small land title company in Springfield, Missouri, had \$400,000 lifted out of their bank account a little over a year ago, and over a weekend. It went overseas, never to be returned.

The United States Secret Service led that investigation, which I didn't understand that exactly, but—and this isn't the first cyber crime in my district. So I want to make sure we are doing what we can to help.

Mr. MCALLISTER. If I may, Secret Service is a component of the Department of Homeland Security. If, with your permission, we will get a detailed brief on their efforts to combat—

Mr. LONG. Great.

Mr. MCALLISTER [continuing]. Cyber crime.

Mr. LONG. Okay. Okay. Okay, and thank you all again for being here today.

Mr. MEEHAN. I thank the gentleman from Missouri, and I thank the panel for your preparation and for your being here today, but most significantly for your work each and every day in helping us to continue to be on the forefront of protecting not just the homeland, but America across the world against the threat of terrorism and the threat to our homeland. So thank you for your service.

I ask you, as well, to continue to be diligent in helping us to grow this bureaucracy—effective, to be sure, but it is a huge challenge. We have got to be the ones ensuring that there are efficiencies and, you know, effective communication up and down the line.

So I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the Members for their questions. The Members of the committee may have some additional questions for the witnesses, and we will ask you to respond in writing for those if they are forwarded. So the hearing record will be held open for 10 days.

So, without objection, the committee stands adjourned. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN PATRICK MEEHAN FOR SCOTT McALLISTER AND
LOUIS F. QUIJAS

Question 1. The Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers include “strategic analysis services.” How have these services been used by DHS to develop a National threat picture?

Answer. State and major urban area fusion centers (fusion centers) are State and local resources. The strategic analysis services that the Baseline Capabilities encourage fusion centers to develop are intended to serve their respective State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) jurisdictions. These strategic analysis services enable local officials and front-line personnel to understand the local implications of National intelligence and better protect their communities. The DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) does, however, leverage fusion center strategic analysis to inform analysis of the evolving threat environment and create a more comprehensive and holistic National threat picture. For example, in March 2012, I&A produced a collaborative analytic product exploring the possibility of illicit khat sales being utilized to raise funds for terrorist activity that incorporated reporting from five fusion centers.

Question 2. DHS has participated in drafting Federal strategies such as the Obama administration’s Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. This strategy covers many types of illegal activity such as drug trafficking, human smuggling, trafficking in persons, intellectual property theft, and cybercrime. These affect Americans at the State and local level every day. Since 9/11, fusion centers have evolved to deal with criminal, public safety, and terrorism matters across multiple disciplines.

Has DHS considered leveraging fusion center assets to help with National-level strategies that deal with issues other than terrorism?

Answer. DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) regularly engages Fusion Centers in strategy and policy development. Recent examples include the National Intelligence Priorities Framework and Presidential Policy Directive—8 National Prevention Framework.

In addition, I&A is leveraging fusion center assets for intelligence production and information gathering to support the execution of National strategies, and to address National homeland security issues related to transnational criminal activities and enterprises. For example, as part of the DHS Priority Actions Implementing the White House Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) Strategy in 2012, I&A personnel are working with the fusion centers to develop regional production and collection plans which address the collective TOC-related intelligence and information needs of Federal, State, and local stakeholders. These production plans will include the identification of intelligence gaps related to TOC which are of interest to both DHS and the fusion centers, and which can be answered through the generation of intelligence products—either by I&A, DHS Components, the fusion centers, or through interagency joint production efforts. Additionally, related information collection plans are being developed to identify how DHS, intelligence community, and Federal, State, and local assets can be effectively and appropriately leveraged to gather information to fill critical information gaps about TOC adversaries and operations. I&A is also using this collaborative intelligence support planning approach with the fusion centers to support Federal, State, and local law enforcement and public safety operations related to TOC prevention and interdiction.

Question 3. Not so long ago there were 72 fusion centers. Today, that number is 77. Would you please explain how and why that number continues to grow? Is DHS planning to assign Intelligence Officers to each of these new centers? At what point do we reach a saturation point where the number of fusion centers yields diminishing return, particularly in the current fiscal environment?

Answer. Fusion centers are State and local entities designated by State governors, and with the bulk of a fusion center's work supporting State and local needs; therefore, DHS does not control their number. While the number of fusion centers has held steady at 72 for several years, over the past several months, the Governor of the U.S. Virgin Islands notified DHS of the creation of a territory-wide fusion center and the Governor of Texas notified DHS of four additional recognized fusion centers for a new total of 77. Like the decision to designate fusion centers, the saturation point for the number of fusion centers is a State-by-State decision.

DHS uses the June 2011 *Federal Resource Allocation Criteria (RAC) Policy* issued by the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) to prioritize allocation of Federal resources such as an intelligence officer, classified connectivity, training courses, and technical assistance to fusion centers.

Question 4. What are DHS' primary objectives in providing funds and personnel to State fusion centers? Do these objectives match the State fusion centers objectives?

Answer. DHS does not provide funds to fusion centers. Grant funds are available to States which may in turn use them to support fusion centers, but fusion centers are primarily funded and staffed by State and local governments.

DHS does support the fusion centers through the deployment of intelligence officers, classified connectivity, training courses, and technical assistance. Through the deployment of these resources, DHS objectives are to establish focal points within the State and local environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information among Federal and State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) partners in support of homeland security and counterterrorism objectives. While important, these Federal objectives are seldom enough to justify the substantial State and local investment in each fusion center. Therefore, each fusion center has primary duties that vary based on the environment in which the center operates; some have adopted an "all-crimes" approach, whereas others have also included an "all-hazards" approach. DHS will continue to focus its support on achievement of the identified critical operational capabilities (receive, analyze, disseminate, and gather), while respecting that a fusion center's mission will also be defined based on jurisdictional needs.

Question 5. Do you believe there is a long-term need for separate offices with outreach to State and local law enforcement, or in your opinion could it someday make sense to roll the mission into a single place within DHS?

Answer. The breadth of DHS's support for State, local, and Tribal law enforcement make its effective provision by a single DHS office unlikely. DHS's support goes beyond intelligence and information-sharing matters, to include coordination during policy development and operational activities, such as responses to or recovery from an incident. While the Office of Intelligence & Analysis (I&A) leads efforts to support the timely sharing of intelligence and information through fusion centers, DHS Components also engage State and local law enforcement partners beyond fusion centers (e.g., U.S. Customs and Border Protection on border-related issues, U.S. Coast Guard on maritime issues). In addition, the Office for State and Local Law Enforcement (OSLLE) plays an important role in advocating for and advising the Secretary on the issues, concerns, and requirements of our State, local, and Tribal law enforcement partners during policy development and strategy formulation. In order to assist DHS in synchronizing and aligning the internal DHS messaging about Department-level initiatives and programs, the OSLLE chairs an internal DHS coordination body—the Component Law Enforcement Outreach Committee (CLEOC) whose mission is to align and coordinate with the Component-level offices located throughout DHS who perform outreach to non-Federal law enforcement. As described in the response to Question No. 6, the National Operations Center (NOC) within the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning (OPS) provides incident and event reporting to homeland security enterprise partners, including State and local law enforcement stakeholders, through the NOC's common operating picture.

Question 6. By maintaining multiple offices within DHS that outreach to State and locals in different ways, are we inadvertently reducing the effectiveness of the fusion centers? Particularly given this budget climate, if we were to truly focus State and local information sharing at the fusion centers, would it raise the stature of the fusion centers, and perhaps ultimately make them more valuable to their State thereby helping them in the fight for State grant dollars?

Answer. DHS offices carry out different mandated functions which require engagement with State, local, and Tribal partners based upon their mission set or for matters that fall outside of the intelligence and information-sharing realm. Departmental-level intelligence and information sharing is focused through fusion centers (for strategic, operational, and tactical products) and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), but this is only one piece of the daily interaction that the Depart-

ment's Components and offices have with State, local, and Tribal governments. For example, the Office for State and Local Law Enforcement (OSLLE), through its daily interactions with law enforcement associations, is responsible for sharing information about DHS programs and initiatives. The OSLLE is also responsible for ensuring that DHS leadership is aware of and considers the issues, concerns, and requirements of the State, local, and Tribal law enforcement communities during Department-wide policy development.

Question 7a. Is there an accounting of how many different offices within the Department with "State and local outreach" or "State and local information sharing" as part of its mission?

Answer. The main DHS offices responsible for State, local, and Tribal outreach are the Office for State and Local Law Enforcement (OSLLE) for law enforcement associations and the Office of Intergovernmental Affairs (IGA) for State, local, Tribal and territorial elected and appointed officials. The Office of Intelligence & Analysis (I&A) is the lead for intelligence and information sharing. Other DHS Components have direct communication with their State, local, and Tribal counterparts on operational issues.

Question 7b. How many of those offices have regular, direct contact with State and local law enforcement, versus passing their information through one of your offices?

Answer. All DHS Operating Components have regular contact at the operational level with their counterparts in State, local, and Tribal law enforcement. This contact cannot and should not be confined to a single office.

Question 7c. How are these offices coordinating with each other?

Answer. The OSLLE chairs an internal DHS coordination body—the Component Law Enforcement Outreach Committee (CLEOC) whose mission is to align and coordinate with the Component-level offices located throughout DHS who perform outreach to non-Federal law enforcement. In addition, IGA holds weekly calls with all of the DHS intergovernmental offices or component points of contact. IGA also holds quarterly face-to-face meetings. During these calls and meetings, the participating offices provide read-outs on current and future interactions with State, local, Tribal, and territorial officials to ensure effective coordination across the Department. Additionally, IGA has specific points of contact within each component/office. As topics/issues arise that should be brought to the attention of other DHS Offices, IGA helps to facilitate that conversation and coordination.

Question 7d. Who is ultimately "in charge" of ensuring they are coordinating?

Answer. While IGA, OSLLE, and I&A share this responsibility with specific stakeholders, IGA's weekly coordination call helps to increase and facilitate the level of coordination between these offices.

Question 7e. What ability does that office/person have to hold other "outreach offices" accountable for coordination?

Answer. Regular communications occur between IGA, OSLLE, and I&A to ensure that stakeholder outreach is well-coordinated and effective, and it is in everyone's best interest to ensure that the meetings, briefings, and messages to our stakeholders are delivered in a clear and consistent manner.

Question 8. The President's budget for fiscal year 2013 proposes to consolidate eligible activities of the State and local preparedness grants into a single grant program, the National Preparedness Grant, with priority given to projects that are determined to be "deployable assets." In your estimation, would fusion centers be considered a deployable asset?

Answer. Fusion centers are not deployable assets. The proposed 2013 National Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP) vision document clearly states that a portion of grant funding may be used by States and high-threat urban areas to sustain core capabilities that may or may not be deployable, such as fusion centers.

Question 9. Given the deep cuts we have seen to the DHS grant dollars for SLT Law Enforcement, what impact will these cuts have to the continuing maturation of fusion centers across the network?

Answer. DHS is committed to resourcing the homeland security mission responsibilities of the fusion centers by providing deployed intelligence officers, training, technical assistance, exercise support, security clearances, connectivity to Federal systems, and technology. However the overall resourcing of each fusion center is dependent on the circumstances of their State or local government's budget and commitment to the effort, or on their successful competition for, and subsequent distribution of, grant dollars. With regards to grants, the amount of grant funds leveraged by individual State Administrative Agencies (SAAs) for fusion centers varies greatly. DHS cannot predict the exact impact of the reductions in grant funding. Fusion centers continually compete for funding support with all other State and local homeland security and emergency management-related priorities, such as interoper-

able communications, emergency operations planning and emergency operation centers, personal protective equipment, etc.

Question 10. Currently, States have discretion in allocating homeland security grant funds for fusion center activities. Do you believe this structure has provided sufficient Federal funding to fusion centers? If not, what guidance would you provide the States to assist them in determining appropriate levels of funding for fusion centers?

Answer. Ideally, each State and local entity with a fusion center would sustain it largely through its own resources, with DHS providing an intelligence officer, classified connectivity, training and other assistance directed at the portion of the fusion center's work dedicated to homeland security mission responsibilities. In many fusion centers, this is already the case. In others—predominately those that are still building their capability—the fusion center is heavily reliant on the Federal grants process. The State Administrative Agencies (SAA) must consider a variety of factors unique to each individual State when determining the amount of grant funds allocated to the fusion center. DHS's position is that States should direct Federal grant funds towards identified gaps in their achievement of Baseline Capabilities. These goals are identified and updated via participation in the annual Fusion Center Assessment Program, managed by DHS, which is a requirement for access to DHS grants.

Question 11. Secretary Napolitano has repeatedly stated that State and Local Fusion Centers are the primary contact point between the Department (DHS) and State and local law enforcement. Would you please elaborate on why having a State and Local Law Enforcement Office within DHS Policy—and separate from the State and Local Program Office—is necessary?

Answer. In 2007, Congress created the Office for State and Local Law Enforcement (OSLLE) to be the voice for State, local, and Tribal law enforcement within DHS. OSLLE acts as the Departments primary liaison between DHS and our non-Federal law enforcement partners.

In October 2011, Secretary Napolitano spoke to the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). In her address, she stressed the importance of the OSLLE and its unique mission: “. . . [W]e recently filled a critical position at DHS that I know is important to IACP members—our Assistant Secretary for State and Local Law Enforcement. We're proud to have Lou Quijas now leading this office. He is well-known to the IACP, having worked closely with you during his time overseeing the FBI Office of Law Enforcement Coordination. And as the former Chief of Police of High Point, North Carolina, and a 25-year veteran of law enforcement in Kansas City, Missouri, he understands the needs and perspective of our Nation's police officers. I know he is committed—as I am—to strengthening our partnership not just with IACP, but all law enforcement, at all levels.”

The OSLLE is not a source of intelligence or operational coordination, but rather is the Department's liaison to strengthen the partnership and sharing of ideas and opportunities between DHS and the non-Federal law enforcement community.

To ensure that this information is coordinated between the DHS Components and messaging is consistent, the OSLLE formed the DHS Component Law Enforcement Outreach Committee, an intra-agency coordination body composed of members from across the Department that have some level of responsibility for outreach to our non-Federal law enforcement partners.

Within DHS, the OSLLE serves as an advocate for non-Federal law enforcement. As an outreach office, the OSLLE is responsible for ensuring that DHS leadership is aware of and considers the issues, concerns, and requirements of State, local, and Tribal law enforcement during policy development and strategy formation. As Assistant Secretary Quijas stated in his oral testimony to the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence on February 28, 2012, “I believe this was the intention of Congress when it created and named my office, the Office for State and Local Law Enforcement.”

In contrast to the OSLLE, the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has the mandate within the intelligence community (IC) to share strategic information, operational information, and intelligence with State, local, and Tribal governments and the private sector. This is a vital and high-priority mission within DHS; however, it is distinct from the mission of the OSLLE. Although, when appropriate and authorized, the OSLLE may assist in expanding the dissemination of this type of information, I&A remains the primary component within DHS responsible for the analysis and dissemination of operational information and intelligence through various means, to include State and major urban area fusion centers. Additionally, DHS Components also have direct communication with law enforcement partners, including fusion centers, to coordinate and share information related to operational issues in accordance with their respective missions.

The distinction between I&A, operational components, and the OSLLI is a matter of type and scope of information. I&A focuses primarily on the analysis and sharing of information and intelligence, and DHS components focus on the coordination of operational activities and information. The OSLLI focuses on coordinating Departmental positions and communicating to our non-Federal law enforcement partners a broad range of information, including DHS initiatives and the opinions, concerns, and requests of State, local, and Tribal law enforcement officials that can affect and be affected by Departmental policy.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN PATRICK MEEHAN FOR ERIC VELEZ-VILLAR

Question 1. What criteria does the FBI use to determine which FBI employees are assigned to fusion centers? What additional training, if any, does the FBI provide to its personnel assigned to fusion centers?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

Question 2. From an information management perspective, some fusion centers leaders note the requirement for their personnel to routinely check numerous Federal information and intelligence systems to be certain they are aware of all of the intelligence that may be relevant to their State. What have you done, perhaps jointly with the DHS and/or the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment, to streamline how FBI information flows to fusion centers?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

Question 3. It is the committee's understanding that to standardize its approach to interacting with fusion centers, the FBI Fusion Center Integration Unit (FCIU) has evaluated its field offices' engagement with fusion centers. What are the FBI's plans to work closer and more effectively with fusion centers and promote the continuity of information sharing at the field office level, not merely headquarter-released products? What steps have you taken to require all field offices to take the same forward-leaning information-sharing approach?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

