U.S. Army War College >> Strategic Studies Institute >> Publications >> Details

Venezuela as an Exporter of 4th Generation Warfare Instability

Authored by Dr. Max G. Manwaring.

Brief Synopsis

Almost no one seems to understand the Marxist-Leninist foundations of Hugo Chavez’s political thought. It becomes evident, however, in the general vision of his “Bolivarian Revolution.” The abbreviated concept is to destroy the old foreign-dominated (U.S. dominated) political and economic systems in the Americas, to take power, and to create a socialist, nationalistic, and “popular” (direct) democracy in Venezuela that would sooner or later extend throughout the Western Hemisphere. Despite the fact that the notion of the use of force (compulsion) is never completely separated from the Leninist concept of destroying any bourgeois opposition, Chavez’s revolutionary vision will not be achieved through a conventional military war of maneuver and attrition, or a traditional insurgency. According to Lenin and Chavez, a “new society” will only be created by a gradual, systematic, compulsory application of agitation and propaganda (i.e., agit-prop). That long-term effort is aimed at exporting instability and generating public opinion in favor of a “revolution” and against the bourgeois system. Thus, the contemporary asymmetric revolutionary warfare challenge is rooted in the concept that the North American (U.S.) “Empire” and its bourgeois political friends in Latin America are not doing what is right for the people, and that the socialist Bolivarian philosophy and leadership will. This may not be a traditional national security problem for the United States and other targeted countries, and it may not be perceived to be as lethal as conventional conflict, but that does not diminish the cruel reality of compulsion.

You may also be interested in the following titles:

• 
  Strategic Landscape, 2050: Preparing the U.S. Military for New Era Dynamics

• 
  The Clash of the Trinities: A New Theoretical Analysis of the General Nature of War

• 
  Building Partner Capacity in Africa: Keys to Success

• 
  Rotational Deployments vs. Forward Stationing: How Can the Army Achieve Assurance and Deterrence Eff...

• 
  What Should the U.S. Army Learn From History? Recovery From a Strategy Deficit

• 
  The Army War College Review Vol. 3, No. 1

• 
  Ends, Means, Ideology, and Pride: Why the Axis Lost and What We Can Learn from Its Defeat

• 
  U.S. Landpower in the South China Sea

Survey: Venezuela as an Exporter of 4th Generation Warfare Instability

1. How would you rate the writing and overall quality? (5 best - 1 Worst)

12345

N/A

2. Is the content relevant for influencing present and future debates?

YesNoNo Opinion

Your Comments (No URLs Allowed):

If you'd like a reply to your comments, provide your email:
(optional)

Also by the Author/Editor:

Ambassador Stephen Krasner's Orienting Principle for Foreign Policy (and Military Management)—Responsible Sovereignty
The Strategic Logic of the Contemporary Security Dilemma
Brazil's Security Strategy and Defense Doctrine
A New Chapter in Trans-American Engagement
A "New" Dynamic in the Western Hemisphere Security Environment: The Mexican Zetas and Other Private Armies
State and Nonstate Associated Gangs: Credible "Midwives of New Social Orders"
A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and Other Illicit Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil
Latin America's New Security Reality: Irregular Asymmetric Conflict and Hugo Chavez

View other pubs in the following categories:

Military Strategy and Policy
War and Society
Western Hemisphere
National Security Strategy