[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY'S OFFICE OF HEALTH AFFAIRS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE,
AND COMMUNICATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 29, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-81
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] CONGRESS.13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Joe Walsh, Illinois Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Ben Quayle, Arizona Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Janice Hahn, California
Billy Long, Missouri Ron Barber, Arizona
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida, Chairman
Scott Rigell, Virginia Laura Richardson, California
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania, Vice Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Chair Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Blake Farenthold, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Robert L. Turner, New York (Ex Officio)
Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Officio)
Kerry A. Kinirons, Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Vacant, Minority Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witness
Dr. Alexander G. Garza, Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs,
Chief Medical Officer, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Appendix
Questions Submitted by Chairman Gus M. Bilirakis for Alexander G.
Garza.......................................................... 21
THE FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY'S OFFICE OF HEALTH AFFAIRS
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Thursday, March 29, 2012
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response,
and Communications,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:36 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Gus M. Bilirakis
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Bilirakis and Richardson.
Mr. Bilirakis. Good morning. Thanks for being so patient,
by the way. But the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Response, and Communications will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony from
Dr. Garza on the President's fiscal year 2013 budget request
for the Office of Health Affairs.
I now recognize myself to make an opening statement.
I am pleased to welcome back Dr. Garza before the
subcommittee to discuss the President's budget request for the
Office of Health Affairs. Welcome, sir.
The Office of Health Affairs' mission is to provide health
and medical expertise in support of the Department's mission,
to prepare for, respond to, and recover from all hazards
impacting the Nation's security. OHA is charged with helping to
protect the health of Americans in the case of, God forbid, a
National incident with health consequences.
This subcommittee maintains great interest in ensuring that
OHA's request and ultimate use of appropriated funds are indeed
providing enhanced health security for the Nation. The
President's fiscal year 2013 budget request included $166
million for OHA, a slight decrease over the fiscal year 2012
appropriation.
As for previous years, the BioWatch program accounts for
the vast majority of this spending. BioWatch is far and away
the most expensive activity of OHA's, comprising $125 million,
or 75 percent of its request this year. Forty million dollars
of the BioWatch request is proposed for continued testing of
the next generation technology known as Gen III.
If successful, this new system would enable a drastic
decrease in detection time, from the current 12 to 36 hours,
down to 4 to 6 hours. It would also provide detectors that
function reliably indoors.
As I relayed at our fiscal year 2012 budget hearing, such
milestones could represent important advances, but only if we
actually achieve those milestones. I and other Members have
become increasingly concerned about the viability of this
developing technology, and also about OHA's ability to deploy
on time and within budget.
Any new BioWatch program, particularly one that will cost
$5.7 billion, must prove that it provides a substantial
improvement over current technologies, and that communities in
which it will be deployed are fully on board with using it.
In addition to BioWatch, I also look forward to discussing
with Dr. Garza, the National Biosurveillance and Integration
Center, NBIC. NBIC seeks to fuse myriad biosurveillance data to
provide early detection of an event of National significance,
whether a devastating food-borne outbreak, or an airborne
release of anthrax.
The $8 million request for NBIC is difficult to understand
in light of the absence of demonstrable success of the NBIC,
and also in light of the continued absence of a promised new
strategic plan.
Dr. Garza's comments on this, as well as on how the new
biosurveillance pilot programs outlined in the request will
help achieve integrated biosurveillance of course will be
appreciated. Although BioWatch and NBIC comprise about 80
percent of your request, I also look forward to hearing how the
fiscal year 2013 budget plan supports other activities, such as
medical countermeasure distribution, to DHS employees and first
responders, information sharing with State and local partners,
and facilitation of agricultural security.
Then also, by the way, I would like to point out Dr.
Garza's good work in procuring medical countermeasures for DHS
employees ahead of other Federal agencies. Congratulations,
sir.
Thank you very much for your good work. Very much
appreciated.
In light of continued risks to human and animal health from
terrorists and from Mother Nature, the level of attention in
funding these activities receive continues to be a priority of
this subcommittee.
With that, I once again welcome you, Dr. Garza. I look
forward to your testimony.
[The statement of Chairman Bilirakis follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Gus M. Bilirakis
March 29, 2012
I'm pleased to welcome back Dr. Garza before the subcommittee to
discuss the President's budget request for the Office of Health
Affairs.
The Office of Health Affairs' mission is to provide health and
medical expertise in support of the Department's mission to prepare
for, respond to, and recover from all hazards impacting the Nation's
security. OHA is charged with helping to protect the health of
Americans in the case of a National incident with health consequences.
This subcommittee maintains great interest in ensuring that OHA's
request and ultimate use of appropriated funds are indeed providing
enhanced health security for the Nation.
The President's fiscal year 2013 budget request includes $166
million for OHA, a slight decrease over the fiscal year 2012
appropriation.
As per previous years, the BioWatch Program accounts for the vast
majority of this spending. BioWatch is, far and away, the most
expensive activity of the Office of Health Affairs, comprising $125
million, or 75 percent, of its request this year.
Forty million dollars of the BioWatch request is proposed for
continued testing of the next-generation technology known as Gen-3.
If successful, this new system would enable a drastic decrease in
detection time from the current 12 to 36 hours, down to 4 to 6 hours.
It would also provide detectors that function reliably indoors. As I
relayed at our fiscal year 2012 budget hearing, such milestones could
represent important advances, but only if we actually achieve those
milestones. I and other Members have become increasingly concerned
about the viability of this developing technology, and also about OHA's
ability to deploy it on time and within budget.
Any new BioWatch Program--particularly one that will cost $5.7
billion--must prove that it provides a substantial improvement over
current technologies, and that communities in which it will be deployed
are fully on board with using it.
In addition to BioWatch, I also look forward to discussing with Dr.
Garza the National Biosurveillance and Integration Center. NBIC seeks
to fuse myriad biosurveillance data to provide early detection of an
event of National significance, whether a devastating food-borne
outbreak or an airborne release of anthrax.
The $8 million request for NBIC is difficult to understand in light
of the absence of demonstrable success of the NBIC, and also in light
of the continued absence of the promised new strategic plan. Dr.
Garza's comments on this, as well as on how the new biosurveillance
pilot programs outlined in the request will help achieve integrated
biosurveillance, will be appreciated.
Although BioWatch and NBIC comprise about 80 percent of your
request, I also look forward to hearing how the fiscal year 2013 budget
plan supports other activities, such as medical countermeasure
distribution to DHS employees and first responders, information sharing
with State and local partners, and facilitation of agricultural
security. In light of continued risks to human and animal health from
terrorists and from Mother Nature, the level of attention and funding
these activities receive continues to be a priority for this
subcommittee.
With that, I once again want to welcome Dr. Garza. We look forward
to your testimony.
Mr. Bilirakis. Now I would like to recognize our Ranking
Member for any comments she might make. You are recognized, Ms.
Richardson.
Ms. Richardson. Yes, good morning. Before I begin, I would
like to take a moment to thank Chairman Bilirakis and the
Majority staff for working with me yesterday and my staff
during the full committee mark up of H.R. 3563, and your
kindness to include our amendment that would help improve
participation of the educational institutions in the Integrated
Public Alert Warning System, which we both firmly support.
So I wanted to personally thank all of you.
Mr. Bilirakis. My pleasure. Thank you for all your good
work as well.
Ms. Richardson. No problem.
So, regarding today's hearing, we want to acknowledge our
lone witness here and thank you for your testimony in advance.
I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the activities carried
out by the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Health
Affairs and the fiscal year 2013 budget request for the office.
When you testified before this panel last year, I expressed my
concern that the Office of Health Affairs was having a
difficult time defining its mission being attributed to the
growing pains, some would say, by the administration's
reorganization that had occurred.
The Office of Health Affairs was administratively created
to assist the statutorily-created chief medical officer. Under
this statute, the chief medical officer is charged with the
responsibilities of advising the Secretary on public health
issues and to coordinate bio defense and medical preparedness
activities within the Department, among other Federal agencies,
and with the State and local governments.
Under our discussion today is BioWatch, as the Chairman
alluded to, and the National Biosurveillance Integration
System, that is consuming 80 percent of the full year 2013
budget request for this office.
Consequently, the National Academy of Sciences has raised
questions about the efficiency of these programs. Likewise,
Federal watchdogs have determined that the BioWatch program has
suffered from some growing pains, others might call management
issues, and upgrades of the development and the delays of the
Generation III technologies.
Setting aside these questions, I am concerned about the
BioWatch's coordination with State and local public health
officials. It is my understanding that the Office of Health
Affairs lacks the authority to compel information sharing by
other Federal agencies.
The development of this information-sharing framework is
the essence of this program. One GAO report found that the NBIC
resorted to gathering information publicly, available on the
internet. This certainly isn't the best use of our taxpaying
dollars and the expertise that we hope to enjoy.
I have been assured that the strategy to improve NBIC is
forthcoming. However, it is my understanding that strategy has
not been shared yet with this committee. As your authorizers,
we need to understand the strategy to properly evaluate your
budget request.
I encourage you today to provide necessary information and
understanding, that we might continue to support the programs.
With that, I thank you for being here. I look forward to
your testimony. I yield back the balance of my time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Richardson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ranking Member Laura Richardson
March 29, 2012
I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the activities carried out
by the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Health Affairs and
the fiscal year 2013 budget request for the Office.
When you testified before this panel last year, I expressed my
concern that the Office of Health Affairs was suffering from an
identity crisis.
The Office's difficulty in defining its mission have been
attributed to growing pains and the fact that it came about as the
result of an administrative reorganization.
Without a statutory authorization to guide it, the Office's mission
seemed to lack clarity and consistency.
Recently, the Office appears to be morphing from a policy office to
a program office.
The Office of Health Affairs was administratively created to assist
the statutorily-created chief medical officer.
Under the statute, the chief medical officer is charged with the
responsibilities of advising the Secretary on public health issues and
to coordinating biodefense and medical preparedness activities within
the Department, among other Federal agencies, and with State and local
governments.
Since its inception, the number of Full-Time Equivalents in the
Office of Health Affairs has nearly doubled.
BioWatch and the National Biosurveillance Integration System
consume 80% of the fiscal year 2013 budget request for the office. Most
troubling is that GAO and the National Academy of Sciences have raised
questions about the efficacy and efficiency of these programs.
Federal watchdogs have determined that the BioWatch program has
suffered from poor management of upgrades and developmental delays of
Generation 3 technologies.
Setting aside these management questions, I am also concerned about
BioWatch's coordination with State and local public health officials.
Unfortunately, concerns about the BioWatch program are not the only
concerns.
The National Biosurviellance Integration Center also suffers from
efficacy concerns. It is my understanding that the Office of Health
Affairs lacks the authority to compel information sharing by other
Federal agencies. The development of this information-sharing framework
is the essence of this program.
One GAO report found that NBIC resorted to gathering information
publicly available on the internet. This does not seem to be an
effective use of taxpayer dollars.
I have been assured that a strategy to improve NBIC is forthcoming.
However, the strategy has not been shared with this committee. As your
authorizers, we need to understand this strategy to properly evaluate
your budget request. I encourage you to make it available to us. Dr.
Garza, I look forward to hearing your plans to address these concerns.
Mr. Bilirakis. I thank the Ranking Member for her
statement. I want to remind other Members of the subcommittee,
you are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for
the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
March 29, 2012
Congress cut funding for the Department of Homeland Security by $2
billion in fiscal year 2012.
Less money for the Department meant that programs like the
Metropolitan Medical Response System had to be consolidated into larger
grant programs. Funding for University Programs and Research and
Development programs were dramatically reduced.
I raised my concerns about the wisdom of these budget cuts when
Congress passed the fiscal year 2012 appropriations bill at the end of
last year.
I am not here to belabor those issues. But it is important to
understand the context in which we must review all budget requests.
The prospect of sequestration looms, and my friends on the other
side of the aisle have indicated their intention to protect certain
sacred cows.
These pressures will force this committee to assure that Homeland
Security dollars are spent on programs that are effective, efficient,
and contribute to the safety and security of this Nation.
To that end, we must take a serious look at Generation 3 of
BioWatch. According to DHS, over the last 10 years, we have spent $800
million for BioWatch.
During that time, the feasibility of the technology has been called
into question by the National Academy of Sciences and there is only one
potential vendor.
In light of the current fiscal climate, we need to begin to ask
hard questions about the feasibility of continued support.
Mr. Bilirakis. Now I am pleased to welcome Dr. Garza back
to the subcommittee. Dr. Garza is the assistant secretary for
health affairs and chief medical officer of the Department of
Homeland Security.
He manages the Department's medical and health security
matters, oversees the health aspects of contingency planning
for all chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
hazards, and leads a coordinated effort to ensure the
Department's preparing to respond to biological and chemical
weapons of mass destruction.
Prior to joining the Department in August 2009, Dr. Garza
spent 13 years as a practicing physician and medical educator.
He most recently served as the director of military
programs at the ER One Institute at the Washington Hospital
Center, and has served as the associate medical director of the
emergency medical services for the State of New Mexico, and the
director of EMS for Kansas City, Missouri Health Department.
Dr. Garza holds a medical degree from the University of
Missouri Columbia School of Medicine, a masters of public
health from St. Louis University's School of Public Health, and
a bachelors of science in biology from the University of
Missouri in Kansas City.
Prior to earning his medical degree, he served as a
paramedic and an emergency medical technician. He is a fellow
at the American College of Emergency Physicians and a member of
the American Public Health Association.
Again, welcome, Dr. Garza. Your entire written statement
will appear in the record. I ask that you summarize your
testimony. You are now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ALEXANDER G. GARZA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HEALTH
AFFAIRS, CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Dr. Garza. Thank you, sir. Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking
Member Richardson, and distinguished Members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.
I would like to share with you some of OHA's
accomplishments over the past year and my priorities for the
coming year.
As you are aware and as you have expressed, the Office of
Health Affairs provides health and medical expertise in support
of the DHS mission to prepare for, respond to, and recover from
all threats. I view OHA's mission as protecting the United
States from the impact of health threats, regardless of whether
they are naturally occurring, manmade, intentional, or
accidental.
I often say that we look at health through the prism of
National security. Our health expertise is unique within DHS.
Our security outlook is unique within the health field.
Over the past year, OHA has accomplished much towards our
mission. As part of OHA's goal to build National resilience
against health incidents, we have worked to improve programs in
biodefense and chemical defense, strengthened our outreach in
State and local public health officials, and developed key
programs to promote health within the Department.
Starting with our BioWatch program, this continues to be
the only Federally-managed, locally-operated, Nation-wide
biosurveillance system, designed to detect the intentional
release of select aerosolized biological agents.
This is an invaluable resource for the Nation. However, its
strength is really in the symbiotic relationship with our
partners at the State and local levels, making this truly a
biodefense system, and not merely a biodetection system.
In addition to our day-to-day operations, BioWatch also
supports multiple National special security events, which will
keep them quite busy this year. BioWatch has made tremendous
strides over the past year.
We continue to mature our laboratory capabilities. We have
introduced a Critical Reagent Program from the Department of
Defense into our BioWatch labs, and have implemented a
comprehensive quality assurance program.
In the coming year, in addition to continuing to improve
our current operations, we will move forward with the
development and testing of our the Next Generation Biodetection
technology.
The National Biosurveillance Integration Center, or the
Center, has been made especially significant progress this
year, including the upcoming launch of an effective strategy.
This strategy will be defined by the extraordinary
collaboration from inter-agency partners, as well as the
private sector and State and local officials.
In addition to the new strategy, the Center continues to
provide day-to-day situational awareness of biological events
of concern. As an example of this, in May 2011 in the E. coli
outbreak in Germany, at the request of the National Security
Staff, the Center executed an NBIC notification protocol,
bringing together multiple Federal agencies.
As a result of this collaborative effort, American citizens
at home and abroad were given up-to-date information about the
outbreak, how to stay safe. The U.S. Customs and Border
Protection were able to use this information to target imports
that may have posed a risk to the United States.
We view this type of collaboration as just one component of
the future of the Center.
As you know, the threat posed by attacks using chemical
agents is both very real and very troubling. Our Chemical
Defense Program has made tremendous strides this year,
assisting State and local jurisdictions to evaluate chemical
defense capabilities, through a demonstration project in
partnership with the city of Baltimore and the Maryland Transit
Authority.
The Chemical Defense Program has also rightly focused on
post-incident planning, including the decontamination of people
following a chemical attack, by developing best practice
protocols in line with the best possible science.
In the coming year, we will continue to improve our
chemical defense capabilities to meet this threat. We have also
continued our efforts with our State and local partners, as
well as to ensure that they had information about the threats.
OHA continues to help States identify where they need to
develop additional capabilities, provide information on best
practices, grants, and training.
As you have mentioned, OHA is charged with protecting the
DHS workforce. The potential health threats facing DHS
employees are diverse. As the chief medical officer, I along
with my office work to address issues ranging from resilience
and wellness, developing quality measures for medical, and the
protection of employees against biological attacks.
OHA's Medical Countermeasures Initiative provides DHS
personnel with immediate access to protective measures in the
event of a biological attack. We procured medical
countermeasures for the entire DHS workforce. This will ensure
that the United States will continue to have a robust National
security posture in the event that our workforce needs to
respond.
In addition, OHA has initiated the Medical Quality
Management Program to work to standardize health and medical
policy across the Department, and have initiated a new program
with medical liaison officers.
These are just a few of the many achievements that that we
have accomplished over the past year.
We recognize the challenges that will need to be addressed
in the upcoming year. We will redouble our efforts to meet
them.
I want to thank this committee for your continued interest
and support, and for the opportunity to testify before you
today. I look forward to answering any questions that you might
have. Thank you.
[The statement of Dr. Garza follows:]
Prepared Statement of Alexander G. Garza
March 29, 2012
Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, and distinguished
Members of the committee: Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you
regarding the fiscal year 2013 budget for the Office of Health Affairs.
I appreciate the opportunity to update you on our progress from last
year in addressing homeland security issues with health impacts.
As you are well aware, the Office of Health Affairs (OHA) provides
health and medical expertise in support of the DHS mission to prepare
for, respond to, and recover from all threats. OHA's responsibilities
include: Serving as the principal advisor to the Secretary and FEMA
Administrator on medical and public health issues; leading and
coordinating biological and chemical defense activities; providing
medical and scientific expertise to support DHS preparedness and
response efforts; and leading the Department's workforce health and
medical oversight activities. OHA also serves as the primary DHS point
of contact for State and local governments on medical and public health
issues.
OHA has four strategic goals that coincide with the strategic goals
of the Department:
1. Provide expert health and medical advice to DHS leadership;
2. Build National resilience against health incidents;
3. Enhance National and DHS medical first responder capabilities;
and
4. Protect the DHS workforce against health threats.
Today I will discuss how we are working to achieve our mission and
goals and how our fiscal year 2013 budget will support these efforts.
goal 1: provide expert health and medical advice to dhs leadership
Coordinated medical oversight ensures that the care rendered by
both our occupational health system and our operational medicine system
is uniform and consistent with National standards. To fulfill our
statutory responsibility to provide expert health and medical advice to
leadership throughout DHS, OHA is working with DHS components to build
a Medical Liaison Program.
Medical Liaison Officers (MLOs) are OHA physicians that work with
DHS components to ensure consistent health and medical advice is
provided across DHS. MLOs will provide dedicated support on guidance
related to operational decisions as well as occupational health and
workforce readiness issues. MLOs will also develop pre-deployment
guidance to personnel deployed both domestically and abroad and
strengthen the capability and capacities to provide medical
countermeasures to our deployed workforce. Ultimately, this program
will enhance consistency across DHS on health and medical issues, while
providing each component with information tailored to their specific
operational needs.
Recently, OHA's Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) MLO
served as the lead medical/public health representative for FEMA's
Whole Community Executive Steering Committee, which developed the
country's first-ever National Preparedness Goal under Presidential
Policy Directive 8. OHA is working to expand the presence of MLOs to
additional components to improve the quality of health and medical
advice to support DHS operations and the DHS workforce. This year, we
hope to have a total of four MLOs on board.
OHA is also creating a centralized DHS medical credentialing
management system that ensures verification of medical provider
credentials. This system is used to verify DHS employee qualifications,
licensure information, and relevant health care provider data and has
increased the ability to track and provide care to those within DHS.
Currently 63% of DHS medical providers have been credentialed and that
number continues to climb as we identify practitioners throughout DHS.
Future plans include integration of the Medical Credentialing
Management and Learning Management Systems to provide real-time
credentialing status and data to operational components, allowing for
distributed training and education that reduces cost, improves
efficiencies, and supports operational medical programs.
The fiscal year 2013 budget request supports the development of the
MLO program and our work in workforce credentialing management, which
will institute a ``One DHS'' policy for medical and health issues.
goal 2: build national resilience against health incidents
OHA operates, manages, and supports the Department's biological
defense and surveillance programs. Two programs that provide biological
threat awareness capacity are BioWatch and the National Biosurveillance
Integration Center (the Center).
Detection
One of OHA's primary responsibilities is to mitigate the
consequences of biological incidents through early detection. The
BioWatch Program identifies the release of an aerosolized biological
agent and provides an alert to public health officials, allowing for a
faster response and the rapid provision of medical countermeasures.
The BioWatch Program is an example of a key partnership between
Federal, State, and local government. BioWatch is the only Federally-
managed, locally-operated Nation-wide bio-surveillance system designed
to detect the intentional release of select aerosolized biological
agents. Deployed in more than 30 metropolitan areas throughout the
country, the system is a collaborative effort of health personnel at
all levels of government.
Current detection capabilities, termed BioWatch Generation 1 and 2
(Gen 1/2), consist of outdoor aerosol collectors whose filters are
manually retrieved for subsequent analysis in a Laboratory Response
Network (LRN) facility. In addition to the more than 30 cities that Gen
1/2 operates in on a daily basis, BioWatch has supported several
National Special Security Events with additional collectors, personnel,
and laboratory support, providing an additional layer of protection and
security.
The BioWatch Program continues to collaborate with partners to
improve laboratory capabilities and leverage existing knowledge and
resources. This year, BioWatch, in close collaboration with the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Department of Defense
(DoD), the Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories, the
Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL), and State and local
public health laboratories, successfully implemented the use of the DoD
Critical Reagent Program assays to conduct initial screening for the
aerosol release of bioterrorism agents. Coupling these assays with CDC
LRN assays for confirmation provides significantly increased confidence
in the analytical results of BioWatch samples.
The BioWatch Program has also developed and implemented a
comprehensive Quality Assurance (QA) program. Recently made
operational, the Laboratory QA Program Plan (QAPP) was developed in
close collaboration with State and local public health laboratories and
provides the quality assurance framework for BioWatch laboratory
operations. An example of the Laboratory QAPP is the use of QA samples
that provide an expected result into the daily analysis at every lab.
The data from these samples provides accurate insights into false
positive and false negative laboratory results and provides better
confidence in laboratory results.
While the Gen 1/2 system is extremely beneficial, it is labor-
intensive and results may not be available until 12-36 hours after the
release of a biological agent has occurred. To shorten the time to
detect, OHA has been testing the next generation of BioWatch,
Generation 3 (Gen-3) for eventual procurement, which will reduce the
time of detection of a biological agent by using automated detection.
DHS believes that early detection is an essential part of an
effective biodefense posture as reducing the time to detect is
imperative to saving thousands of lives. The fiscal year 2013 budget
funds continues the current operations of the Gen
1/2 BioWatch detection network and continues development and testing of
the next generation technology to expedite response times.
Biosurveillance
Another key element to an overarching biodefense framework is
biosurveillance. OHA is focused on developing and maintaining an
integrated, real-time surveillance picture.
The National Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS) enhances the
identification, location, and tracking of biological events potentially
impacting homeland security by uniquely integrating information and
data and leveraging interagency communications and relationships. NBIS
supports prevention and mitigation of such events by providing timely
notifications and on-going situational awareness to enhance response of
Government agencies. NBIS is a community of Federal, State, local,
territorial, and Tribal agencies, as well as international and private-
sector organizations that shares a common goal of protecting the United
States from biological threats. NBIS values trusted relationships and
collaboration across various organizational boundaries.
The National Biosurveillance Integration Center (the Center) housed
within OHA, coordinates comprehensive National biosurveillance and
situational awareness contributed by members of the NBIS. The Center's
mission is to rapidly identify, characterize, localize, and track a
biological event of National concern; integrate and analyze information
relating to human health, animal, plant, food, water, and environmental
domains; disseminate alerts and pertinent information; and oversee
development and operation of the NBIS.
The May 2011 E. coli outbreak in Germany is a recent example of how
NBIS can be used to enhance response to a health security incident.
During this incident, NBIS made subject matter experts available to
answer existing concerns about the potential origin and virulence of
the associated E. coli strain, and facilitated communication between
Federal agencies. Sixty-one individuals representing 13 Federal staffs,
agencies, or departments participated in this process. As a result of
this collaborative effort, American citizens at home and abroad were
given up-to-date information about the outbreak and how to stay safe.
Additionally, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) was able to use
this information to target imports that may have posed a risk to the
United States.
NBIS and the Center continue to work towards tackling the inherent
difficulties of integrated biosurveillance. OHA has spent the last year
working with the Federal interagency, State and local partners, and
private sector stakeholders to develop a new strategy to improve
integrated biosurveillance. With the new strategy, OHA is striving to
meet National priorities, mitigate impacts of biological events, and
make significant improvements in collaboration, information integration
and sharing, analysis, and reporting.
In the mean time, OHA is continuously examining potential areas for
improved collaboration and situational awareness. The Center is
supporting a demonstration project in North Carolina called the
National Collaborative for Bio-Preparedness (NCB-P). The aim is to
validate integrated information sharing of public health, animal
surveillance, environmental monitoring, and other biosurveillance
information on the State level. The Center is also developing projects
that pilot improved information sharing with the private sector and
Federal partners, as well as leveraging existing information technology
(IT) and biosurveillance resources at agencies such as the Department
of Defense (DoD) and CDC. The fiscal year 2013 budget request increases
resources for OHA to move forward with the new strategy for the Center
and support more pilot projects.
Chemical Defense
OHA's Chemical Defense Program (CDP) aims to provide Federal,
State, and local governments with knowledge and tools to build and
sustain a viable framework for preparedness and response to high-
consequence chemical events.
To build a response knowledge base, OHA partnered with the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to host a symposium on
the decontamination of humans after a chemical attack. This symposium
brought together leading Federal, State, and local officials to examine
decontamination guidance and research gaps. By ensuring response
activities are based on the best possible science, OHA is helping first
responders save lives after a chemical incident.
OHA launched a partnership with the Maryland Transit Administration
and the City of Baltimore to develop chemical defense techniques for
subway mass transit. This demonstration project is the next step in the
work that began last year which evaluated chemical detection
technology, providing local jurisdictions with expert evaluation of
potential capabilities. OHA is looking to expand this program to
additional jurisdictions and is developing criteria to allow
jurisdictions to submit proposals for demonstration projects. The
fiscal year 2013 budget request, in addition to anticipated carry-over
funding from fiscal year 2012, will allow CDP to move forward with
these initiatives.
Improving Public Health Information Sharing and State and Local
Capabilities
OHA works to improve State and local capabilities through
information-sharing efforts. OHA has developed a new program to sponsor
as many as 100 security clearances for key State and local health
officials to facilitate the sharing of classified health threat
information. OHA works with the Office of Intelligence and Analysis
(I&A) to enhance information sharing with State and local health
officials by providing classified health threat briefings on emerging
threats. This year, OHA provided State and local officials with this
information through briefings held jointly with events such as the
BioWatch Workshop and conferences hosted by the Association of State
and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO), the National Association of
County and City Health Officials (NACCHO), and the Association of
Public Health Laboratories (APHL). OHA also works with the National
Operations Center (NOC) within the Office of Operations Coordination
and Planning to provide key health information for the NOC's
situational awareness reports, such as contamination following the 2011
Fukushima Daichi nuclear disaster. These reports are produced and
distributed by the NOC to homeland security enterprise partners. By
ensuring State and local health officials have information on current
threats, they can better direct their preparedness efforts to meet
those threats.
Public health officials can bring valuable insights into the fusion
center environment, shaping preparedness efforts, response, and
recovery. OHA is also working to bring help bring those public health
and medical partners in to fusion centers by providing guidance
documents and technical assistance to facilitate the establishment of
information exchange between public health and other homeland security
partners to share appropriate health-related threat intelligence.
OHA has also worked to help States identify where they need to
develop additional capabilities, and has provided information on best
practices, and training.
For example, OHA partnered with the National Center for Food
Protection and Defense (NCFPD) to develop the Food Sector Food and
Agriculture Readiness Measurement Toolkit (FARM Toolkit). The FARM
Toolkit allows the States to self-assess the strengths of their food
emergency response plans and identify areas for potential improvement
through a survey tool. The survey assesses the level of preparedness in
the food sector, level of integration of the food sector into the
emergency management community, current emergency management
capabilities of the food sector, and the emergency management needs of
the food sector. Upon receiving the survey results, an integrated
database returns relevant information on best practices, planning,
training, and funding resources--all designed to help State and local
communities improve their preparedness for adverse food incidents.
OHA also developed a partner page on the Lessons Learned
Information Sharing (LLIS.gov) portal where emergency response
providers and homeland security officials can access an on-line network
of content related to lessons learned, best practices, and innovative
ideas on food, agriculture, and veterinary defense. Best practices help
States leverage lessons learned to improve their capabilities and
planning.
The fiscal year 2013 budget request will continue to support public
health information sharing and capability development initiatives.
goal 3: enhance national and dhs medical first responder capabilities
To enhance National and DHS medical first responder capabilities,
OHA works with emergency medical services (EMS) program coordinators
throughout DHS to protect our workforce and facilitate treatment of
life-threatening and common medical or traumatic events.
Within the past year, OHA developed protocols that outline the care
that medical technicians and paramedics should administer to patients.
First, OHA developed protocols for Basic Life Support (BLS) and
Advanced Life Support (ALS). The BLS/ALS protocols describe common
signs and symptoms and provide treatment options associated with common
pre-hospital injuries or illnesses encountered by DHS EMS personnel and
align with National EMS standards of care. Second, in collaboration
with several other Federal agencies such as the DoD and the Department
of Justice (DOJ), OHA created the Austere Emergency Medical Support
(AEMS) Field Guide and Training Program. This program provides support
to select and highly qualified DHS EMS personnel who are deployed to
austere, remote, high-threat, and disaster environments. To ensure
medical proficiency with the content in the field guide, DHS-OHA
conducted the first training in January 2012 with a class of 25 DHS EMS
Paramedics.
OHA recently published the first DHS EMS Strategic Plan. This plan
will ensure EMS education, training, scopes of practice, and quality
assurance practices are consistent across DHS and compliant with
National standards. Through cross-component collaboration and
standardization, patient outcomes may improve and EMS programmatic
costs may decrease.
OHA has also reached out to medical first responders to raise
awareness of human trafficking. As part of DHS's Blue Campaign, the
Department's initiative to fight human trafficking, OHA, FEMA, and the
U.S. Fire Administration produced a video for first responders
regarding indicators of human trafficking they might encounter and what
they can do to help victims. We also developed tailored indicator cards
to include health-related indicators that first responders, such as
firefighters and EMTs, may notice. We've been working with our partners
in the EMS community to get these resources out to the field through a
variety of stakeholder events.
The fiscal year 2013 budget request will support the continued
development of resources and capabilities for medical first responders
both within DHS and in our local communities.
goal 4: protect the dhs workforce against health threats
The potential health threats facing the DHS workforce are diverse
and as Chief Medical Officer, I am working to address issues ranging
from resilience and wellness to the protection of employees following a
biological attack.
We know the stress that comes from carrying out the DHS mission can
take its toll on the workforce. Secretary Napolitano asked that we
improve resilience and wellness in the DHS workforce to ensure
employees have the tools necessary to manage this stress while
supporting the mission. Our program, DHSTogether, has conducted DHS-
wide training and held two symposiums on employee resilience. The
fiscal year 2013 budget request will allow OHA to continue to work with
components on improving employee resilience through additional training
support for employees and managers.
OHA's Medical Countermeasures (MCM) Initiative provides DHS
personnel with immediate access to life-saving medications in the event
of a biological attack to ensure front-line operations can continue. At
this time, we have purchased MCM for 100 percent of the DHS workforce,
which includes working animals and critical contractors. This year, OHA
delivered nearly 200,000 courses of medical countermeasures (MCM) to
127 field locations. The fiscal year 2013 budget request will allow
OHA's MCM program to maintain the DHS antibiotic and antiviral
stockpile and expand pre-positioned MCM to an additional 350 DHS field
locations.
conclusion
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify regarding OHA's work
and our fiscal year 2013 budget request. I look forward to your
questions.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you for your testimony. I will
recognize myself for 5 minutes for questioning.
Dr. Garza, on BioWatch, the President's request included
$125 million for BioWatch, for the program, an increase of $11
million over the enacted 2012 figure. Of this amount, $39.9
million is intended for continued testing for the Next
Generation Gen III System. This is an increase in $16 million--
that is my understanding--66 percent over 2012.
The GAO is currently working on an investigation of
BioWatch Gen III--I know you are aware of that--due to serious
concerns over this procurement by Members of both the House and
the Senate and, of course, our committee.
There has been no comprehensive cost/benefit analysis done
to ensure that all these millions, $5.7 billion actually, in
fact, over the project's lifetime, will buy down risks
sufficient to justify the expenditure. Can you please explain
to the Members of this subcommittee how you can justify further
expenditures on this program in the absence of a cost/benefit
analysis that gets an analysis of a broad set of alternatives,
as well as other important data collection, to ensure that what
will ultimately be a multi-billion dollar program procurement--
of course, it has to be sound.
So I will give you the opportunity to respond to that.
Dr. Garza. Yes, thank you, sir.
It is a very good question. It is appropriate for you to
ask about spending taxpayer dollars. You are correct that there
is an increase in the budget request for 2013 as part of the
normal acquisition program that has been going through. So the
budget numbers are going to vary from year to year depending on
what the acquisition strategy is doing during that particular
amount of time.
The acquisition strategy that we have developed for the
BioWatch program is very robust. It has to meet certain
milestones before it can progress to the next phase, which I
think makes it give me a lot of comfort and it gives the
Department more comfort knowing that we are not going to be
spending money unless our program is able to meet the certain
goals that we have established for it.
So in terms of buying down risk, that is what the
acquisition program is all about. It is making sure that we are
addressing the risks both to the Department and to the Nation.
To the Department to make sure that we are not spending money
foolishly on equipment that is not going to do what it is
supposed to do, but also balancing that risk to the Nation as
well, and looking at what would be the impact of a biological
attack within the country.
Now as we realized in 2001, with the bio attacks which we
just celebrated the 10th anniversary of, the recovery amounts
from a biological attack during that year were in the billions
of dollars. So combined with our risk-averse strategy in the
acquisition process, we feel like we are doing a very good job
of balancing the risk/benefit ratio.
Although I certainly would not be opposed to anybody doing
a risk/benefit analysis, I feel like we have already
incorporated enough of that into the acquisition strategy to
make it much more comfortable for us moving forward.
I am sorry, sir. Did I miss another part of your----
Mr. Bilirakis. Follow up on the--sure, let me follow up on
BioWatch. Last year, fiscal year 2012, back and forth between
the Department of Homeland Security and the OMB, we learned
that OMB was questioning DHS and OHA's handling of the BioWatch
program in terms of cost controls and financial reporting, and
that the program's cost growth and delays required a more
conservative approach for fiscal year 2012.
Describe to this committee how your budget request reflects
a conservative approach and improved management practices.
Dr. Garza. Absolutely, sir.
So the budget request is always tied to the acquisition
strategy. But it is also tied to the timeliness that we can get
certain things accomplished in the Gen III program. It is a
very technically difficult program.
So we always have to remember that this equipment, this
technology has never been accomplished before. So we don't
really have a template that we can say, we think we are going
to meet data on this date exactly.
So in order to balance the risk to the Department of, we
don't want to rush through testing and evaluation, we want to
make sure that all of these issues work, versus the risk to the
Nation of we have to have technology that meets the goal of
protecting the Nation. That is a tricky balance to strike.
So you bump that up against the budget cycle as well, and
if you have a slide in any sort of testing and evaluation, that
is going to impact your budget dollars, because, frankly, you
can't do testing unless you meet certain dates.
So it is a very complex acquisition. I think we have done a
very good job of improving our financial reporting with OMB. We
speak with them frequently. We make sure that our documents are
in on time.
I think we have accomplished quite a bit in making sure
that we are being fiscally responsible, that we are meeting our
acquisition guidelines, and that we are taking appropriate risk
precautions, both for the Department and for the Nation.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Thank you very much. My time has
expired.
So now I will recognize Ms. Richardson for 5 minutes.
Just to let you know, I plan to go at least one more round
after this. Thank you.
You are recognized for 5.
Ms. Richardson. Dr. Garza, did I hear you say when we could
expect the strategy to be done? I heard you reference it, but I
didn't hear a date.
Dr. Garza. Yes, ma'am. I am assuming you are talking about
the NBIC strategy. Is that correct, ma'am?
Ms. Richardson. Yes.
Dr. Garza. Yes. So the NBIC strategy has just finished its
final round of comment and adjudication with the members of the
NBIC. That was done last week with the working group, who will
be taking it to the principals I believe in the next 2 weeks.
After we have all of those comments vetted, adjudicated, I
would project the strategy coming out probably within 2 months
or so.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. Assuming that we do have a strategy,
how will you be able to implement the strategy and necessary
improvements with $4 million less that is being recommended in
your budget?
Dr. Garza. Yes, ma'am. So part of the decline to the budget
going into fiscal year 2013 is due to some of our pilot
projects that we will be funding going forward because we
anticipate them then becoming an on-going process within the
NBIC.
So the goal of the new strategy is making sure that the
projects that we are going to be doing can become incorporated
into the normal processes of the NBIC, where they won't require
as much up-front costs, but will rather become part of the
continuing evolution of the NBIC.
So we don't anticipate needing those funds going forward.
Ms. Richardson. So you are saying that you believe you will
be able to adequately meet the affairs of your office with $8
million?
Dr. Garza. I believe so. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. One of the biggest issues we talked
about before was the inadequate participation by the other
Federal agencies that participate in NBIC. Can you give us an
update of where we are on that?
Dr. Garza. Yes, ma'am. So that ties into the strategic
planning process as well. So you are absolutely right that we
had a difficult time with inter-agency partners participating
within the NBIC process. But as you pointed out, the statutory
language for the NBIC is not ``you shall'', it is ``you may''.
It is not ``you shall.''
I think that is appropriate actually, because I want people
to be coming to the center or to the system because they see
the value in it. So one of the things with the strategy that we
made sure we do is we made sure it wasn't DHS-centric, that we
made sure that it was system-centric.
That means going and talking with each of the individual
agencies to see what their needs were, to see what they saw of
the system, how they could improve it, how they could
contribute, and what they desire out of the system.
So that is why it took a little bit longer than normal to
develop a strategic process. But it also gave us buy-in from
those institutions, because now it is them helping develop the
strategy. So they have buy into it.
I can just tell you anecdotally, from own experiences, is
that we have had quite a bit of enthusiasm and interest in
working with the Center. That gives value out to the individual
agencies.
So I can't give you any, you know, concrete numbers that
say, you know, this is how much we have improved in the
interaction. But I can tell you that I think our relationships
with the other agencies are dramatically improved.
Ms. Richardson. Do you feel they are adequate?
Dr. Garza. I think they are evolving. I think they adequate
right now for where we are. I think in the time to come that
those relationships will continue to grow, that will continue
to find novel ways of looking at data and to bring data in.
I think we will continue to refine processes. I think
people will contribute more. I think it is a good springboard
now to get better and better.
Ms. Richardson. As you know, the administration has
combined various programs and funding together. MMRS is a
popular and effective program that has been now consolidated
with UASI and some of the State homeland security programs.
Why do you think we should continue to fund NBIC over
programs like MMRS or other State and local programs?
Dr. Garza. Yes, ma'am. Although I don't----
Ms. Richardson. Besides you wanting to keep your job.
Dr. Garza. Right, exactly. Although, you know, I am never
one for trying to pit one program against another, but I do
recognize economic difficulties where you have to make
difficult choices. So the answer to that I would give is that
the NBIC, what we envision it to be is a National asset that
can help not only the Federal inter-agencies, but I think the
whole of the Nation.
So part of that is, as I expressed before, helping Federal
agencies with information, with analyses that they might have
not otherwise had, because they're siloed in their data. But
also reaching out to the State and locals, which was--
effectiveness.
We have done this in a couple of ways. One of those is
giving them access to some of our common operating pictures,
and then also developing our pilots to make sure that we are
including the State and locals.
So I think we can become a force multiplier with the States
from a biosurveillance standpoint, which will give them a
capacity that they haven't had before.
Ms. Richardson. I will yield at this time, since I am down
to about 19 seconds. Or actually I am over. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Bilirakis. We are going to go one more round anyway. So
I will recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Please provide an update on the status of the guidance for
protecting the responders' health during the first week
following a wide-area aerosol anthrax attack. This guidance has
been languishing in the clearance process for years.
Tell us why the guidance has been delayed. But first give
us the update.
When will the guidance be released?
Dr. Garza. Yes, sir, excellent question. This is something
that I think has been very important to our office. As you have
correctly noted, this has been a long time coming.
Frankly, you know, we have been working on it very hard for
the past couple years. It seems like this is a normal part of
how you get things done, is you can do that 90 percent fairly
quickly but that last 10 percent, that always seems to hold you
back.
We are at that last 10 percent right. So the document, I
believe, is at almost the 99 percent right now. We have had the
final vetting of comments, the adjudication of certain issues.
We have been working with, you know, a whole smattering of the
Federal inter-agency, HHS, NIOSH, OSHA, EPA.
Everyone seems to be on board now. As you know, you are
going to be having a hearing here in a couple weeks about
medical countermeasures. So I fully anticipate that this report
will be done, I am hoping, by that hearing.
I know that it is on schedule to go up to the Domestic
Resiliency Group for adjudication. So I anticipate it being
very shortly. I hate to give you an exact date, but I would say
that we are rounding third and we are heading for home right
now.
Mr. Bilirakis. Can you keep us informed on that, because it
is very, very important, as you know?
Dr. Garza. Absolutely.
Mr. Bilirakis. One last question: The Food, Agriculture,
and Veterinary Division with OHA is responsible for the
agriculture security activities of the Department. This small
office has typically been funded at fairly modest levels, as
you know, about at $720,000, and this year actually down to
$640,000.
This office works toward animal and agricultural health and
providing planning tools at the local level to support this.
But very little elaboration in the budget was provided as to
what this money would be used for. What will this $640,000 be
used for? Why isn't it transparent in the budget?
Dr. Garza. Yes, sir. I think you rightly stated that food--
that is a very important mission within our office, and I think
sometimes under-appreciated, how important it is, and how
important food security is for this Nation.
As you will remember during H1N1, when it first broke, it
wasn't called H1N1. It was called Swine Flu. That had a
devastating attack on the pork industry, to the tune of
billions of dollars.
So we are very keen to not even issues that affect our
stock can have a direct effect on the economy of this Nation,
which is very important. So the things that FAV focuses on is,
first, interacting with the Federal inter-agency, so with the
USDA, FDA, but also interacting within the DHS assets that
implement the regulations. So that is particularly CDP, who
does inspections.
The thing that we have been most focusing on, though, is
helping out the State and locals as well. We do that through a
couple of different mechanisms. One is through building tools
and guidance for them.
So part of this is building them guidance so that they can
look within their State and localities to see how prepared they
would be for a food emergency. They can tally up where they
are, where the challenges are. So they can direct resources and
funding through that.
So part of that has been going towards that effort. I will
apologize to you. I don't have an exact breakdown of where the
money goes, but, you know, I would be happy to get the
information back to your office, to tell you exactly all the
efforts that----
Mr. Bilirakis. Please do. I am sure the Ranking Member will
be interested as well.
Dr. Garza. Absolutely.
Mr. Bilirakis. You can get back to us on that as well.
All right, well, I will yield back the balance of my time.
I will recognize the Ranking Member for 5 minutes.
Ms. Richardson. My next question has to do with the
deployment of Gen III technology that has repeatedly been
delayed. Only one vendor has completed phase one of the
testing. I understand that part of the reason for the delay in
the deployment is due to a technical feasibility issue.
How has OHA addressed the feasibility issue? Or is that the
reason?
Dr. Garza. So I would have to make sure I understand what
technical feasibility--what you meant by that. But let me
explain to you some of the reasons why some of these issues
have come up.
So you are absolutely correct that one vendor has gotten
through phase one testing. We are having a pause right now
before we go to phase two, to go over the data from all of our
phase one testing, to look at what things are going well, and
what things need to be looked at further.
So again, it is a first-of-kind technology. Nobody else in
the world has developed this type of technology. So the pause
after the phase one of acquisition is very important, so that
we can take a look at, hey, what are the things that worked
very, very well in phase one; what are the things that didn't
work as well as we needed them to, so that we can then go back
and say, look, these things are either exactly where they need
to be or they need to be improved upon.
It is the same sort of development process that goes
through with any complex technological development. You know, I
always use the example of the iPhone. Look, the iPhone, when it
first came out, had challenges. Have to go back and do
engineering changes to improve it. That is exactly what this is
supposed to do during this acquisition process.
We take a look at what things did it do well on, what
things didn't it do well on, what things can we improve on.
Then, frankly: Is this what we really need going forward?
So the acquisition process has those dates built in to make
sure that we are doing what we are supposed to be doing, but,
frankly, doing what the Nation needs as well.
Ms. Richardson. Would you say Gen III is on track?
Dr. Garza. I would say Gen III is appropriately where it
should be right now, which is----
Ms. Richardson. I am sorry. Would you say it is on track?
Dr. Garza. Well, it depends if you are looking at the
acquisition time line, as you are looking at, hey, this is new
technology. If you are looking at the acquisition time line, it
slips. Absolutely, it slips.
But as I mentioned before, this is to be expected in
complex technology development.
Ms. Richardson. Dr. Garza, I think you know I am
supportive. It is obvious that I am supportive of the
administration. But in all fairness, I need for you to really
clearly answer the question.
The reason why I am asking the question is we, as Members
of Congress, we end up, you know, supporting funding of various
programs, projects, services and so on. You know, some of us
have had the opportunity to see projects go on way too long,
only halfway to the end, that they really not be feasibly
attainable.
Meanwhile, we have spent, you know, millions and billions.
So it is a responsibility question on our part.
I am asking you, in your professional opinion, is Gen III
on track? That is what I am asking you, yes or no?
Dr. Garza. Right. I truly appreciate your oversight of
this. Believe me, we need oversight of important acquisitions.
My professional opinion is it is right where it needs to
be. Now there is going to be slips in the schedule. There is
nothing that I can do or that anybody can do to prevent those.
Ms. Richardson. I am not asking where it needs to be. I am
asking you, do you believe that the project, given the testing
that has been done so far, is something that is potentially
feasible and attainable?
Dr. Garza. Yes.
Ms. Richardson. Within what approximate time frame would
you expect Gen III to be deployed?
Dr. Garza. Well, we have to make sure we go through our
acquisition strategy time line first. So I make no guarantees
that it will make it through the next phase of testing.
So why this acquisition strategy was built with these
milestones here. So the next phase of testing will, again, test
another part of the system. So we have to make sure that it is
hitting all those marks before we even talk about procuring a
machine.
We don't want to invest, you know, the $5.7 billion over
the lifetime of the program unless we are relatively sure--
absolutely sure that this is going to fit the bill.
So we are still in that testing and evaluation period right
now. I make no guarantees that it will go through procurement.
But what we need to do is have robust testing and
evaluation, to make sure that we are making the correct
procurement decisions. That is the important part.
Ms. Richardson. So are you anticipating 2 years, 5 years,
10 years?
Dr. Garza. The fiscal year 2013 schedule has a four-city
operational testing and evaluation period on there, which,
frankly, will take time. We need to run the machines in
different environments, you know.
So I would have to look at our acquisition time line again,
but I am thinking the procurement decision would probably come
around 18 months or so, after we complete including testing and
all the data acquisitions and looking at data.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. My last question is referring to
overlapping responsibilities. The Office of Safety and
Environmental Programs within the under secretary of management
is responsible for establishing DHS-wide safety and health
programs. Therefore it appears to be some overlap between the
occupational health efforts undertaken by OHA and the office
residing in the management directorate.
Please describe how the missions and the efforts of these
two offices differ.
Dr. Garza. Yes, ma'am. There is an important difference.
So our office focuses mostly on the occupational health
side. We have these developed guidelines with OSEP, up at the
Office of Management, to make sure that everybody knows what
each other is doing. Management has been more concerned with
workplace safety issues, more so than occupational health
issues.
I think that is appropriate, since it was in a management
office. But we have brought on a new occupational health
position, retired from the DOD, very experienced.
He has been there only a couple months, but he has already
done a lot of good work. But I think we do have a very good
working relationship with OSEP and USM. I think we clearly
understand where each others' lanes are. We work with each
other quite frequently.
Ms. Richardson. Provide to the committee where your lanes
are, what those differences are.
Dr. Garza. Absolutely.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
I have nothing further. I want to thank the Ranking Member
for her questions and, Dr. Garza, for your valuable testimony.
Then we may have some questions afterwards.
Again, the Members of the subcommittee may have some
additional questions for you. We ask you to respond in writing,
sir. The hearing record will be open for 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank
you.
Thanks to the audience for all your patience as well.
[Whereupon, at 11:14 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Questions Submitted by Chairman Gus M. Bilirakis for Alexander G. Garza
biowatch
Question 1. Knowing what you know about the biothreat, do you
personally believe that BioWatch is contributing to our overall
surveillance capability in a meaningful manner? In what specific way(s)
are the results being integrated with other surveillance mechanisms?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2a. Several Federal agencies, including CDC, DHS, EPA, and
FBI have responsibility for parts of the response to a BioWatch
Actionable Result (BAR) (laboratory analysis, detection, remediation,
and law enforcement investigation respectively). FEMA's role is unclear
and they are rarely (if ever) engaged in multi-agency planning
workgroups.
Which agency has responsibility for coordinating the Federal
response to a BAR?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2b. How does a BAR differ from what is known as a ``CDC
actionable event''?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2c. How does the Biological Agent Threat Response protocol
integrate with the Federal BioWatch response, and how is it coordinated
with the BioWatch National Conference Call?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3a. I understand that further procurement actions for
BioWatch Gen-3 have been postponed due to the Department's decision to
conduct a comprehensive biodefense strategy review to ensure
Departmental capabilities are appropriate and well-grounded.
Can you tell us the status of this review, and whether it was
prompted by concerns about the capabilities of the Gen-3 prototype
system?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3b. OHA staff indicated that this delay will impact both
the fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013 planned expenditures for the
Gen-3 program. Can you elaborate on how the planned rollout time line
will be altered by this review?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3c. Are there outcomes being considered by Review Panel
that could significantly impact the Gen-3 program?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3d. To your knowledge, has this review impacted other
acquisition activities within the Department?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4a. OHA expended significant resources to test the current
candidate technology in a field test 1 year ago in Chicago.
What were the results of this testing?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4b. When will the data from the Phase 1 Chicago field test
be made available for public and/or stakeholder review?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. Please describe, in detail, the ways in which OHA and
the Science and Technology Directorate are cooperating on development
and deployment of Gen-3 systems.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6. By how much do you expect to reduce the casualty rates
once the Gen-3 system is fully deployed?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 7a. The BioWatch program involves testing for agents
despite the fact that treatments for some of those agents are not
necessarily available.
Why should local governments test for BioWatch agents for which
there exists no medical guidance, or capability to prevent or treat?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 7b. What protocol does OHA propose they follow in the
event of a positive result?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
national biosurveillance and integration center (nbic)
Question 8a. The budget request for NBIC includes an increase of
$1.0 million for the development of pilot projects with partners in the
Government and private sectors to address core biosurveillance
capabilities such as collaboration, information integration and
sharing, and data analysis and reporting. These projects are proposed
as part of the new ``emergent strategy'' for NBIC.
How does OHA envision these pilot projects integrating into an
overall picture of improved, integrated National biosurveillance? How
will they build upon and integrate with the on-going National
Collaborative for Bio-Preparedness project, which I understand will
also continue to be funded?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 8b. What metrics have been established to assess
individual programs' short-term success as well as their contribution
towards longer-term integrated biosurveillance goals?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 8c. How are the funds being distributed across the
individual pilot projects and what are the time frames for pilot
program roll-outs?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 8d. What is the current status of those programs that have
already been initiated?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Medical Countermeasures
Question 9. You have requested $1.9 million for a new Medical
Countermeasures Program to implement the Executive Order that requires
you to provide MCMs to your employees. The goal is to ensure
maintenance of mission-essential Executive Branch functions. With this
funding, OHA will develop a strategy and provide antivirals and
antibiotics to cover the DHS workforce, critical contractors, and those
in care and custody in the event of a pandemic or other health threat.
Is specific threat or risk assessment information used to inform
DHS' MCM procurement strategy? Is there a formal process for
prioritizing procurement decisions?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Chemical Defense Program
Question 10a. Previously the Chemical Defense Program sponsored a
Transit Demonstration Project in Baltimore.
What is the status of this project?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 10b. Does the reduction in funding for the Chemical
Defense Program suggest a cancellation or elimination of these types of
projects?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 10c. Has OHA decided not to fund additional pilot
activities with transit agencies?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
General CBRN Defense
Question 11a. Recent developments in the news regarding the H5N1
virus, or bird flu, have raised serious concerns over whether the
proper infrastructure is in place to prevent dual-use research from
being misused.
In your role advising the Secretary and other Department leaders on
health and medical matters, and in fulfilling OHA's mission to provide
health security, in what way have you and your staff been involved in
the current debate as well as in the on-going debates about dual-use
research generally?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 11b. Is DHS sufficiently involved in these discussions in
your opinion?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 12. Homeland Security Presidential Directive--10
(Biodefense for the 21st Century) issued in 2004 called for the
Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with other appropriate
Federal departments and agencies, to develop comprehensive coordinated
risk communication strategies to facilitate emergency preparedness for
biological weapons attacks. This includes travel and citizen
advisories, international coordination and communication, and response
and recovery communications in the event of a large-scale biological
attack.
Has a coordinated risk communication strategy for biological
attacks been issued to date? If not, when can we expect to see it?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
agricultural security
Question 13. The S&T Directorate requested no funds for the
National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility, which was envisioned to support
the Nation's agricultural security. Agricultural security is a common
goal shared with your office. S&T is apparently reconsidering even the
very need for such a lab.
In light of decreased funding requested for your office for
agriculture defense activities, combined with this lack of request from
S&T, please relate to the committee whether this decreased emphasis is
due to perceived decrease in threat on the part of the Department, or
simply tough decisions in a tight budget environment.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
response and remediation
Question 14a. There are no Federal guidelines on indoor, outdoor,
or mass transit remediation following a biological release. If a large
city such as New York were to apply the standards used to remediate the
Senate Hart Building following the 2001 attacks to a large area release
in Manhattan, it could take anywhere from 50 to 300 years to complete.
When can local governments expect guidance from the Federal
Government to recover from a large-scale release? Do you work with the
EPA on providing such standards?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 14b. In the event of a false reactive identification of an
organism, is the Federal Government willing to indemnify local
governments for costs that would be associated with acting in response
to a positive BioWatch result? Has OHA been a part of any such
discussion?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
state and local coordination
Question 15. The economic difficulties of the last few years have
had profound impacts on State and local workforces. Many employees in
State and local health departments have lost their jobs, and I wonder
to what extent planning, exercising, and response activities are
suffering.
Have you uncovered severe challenges at the State and local level
due to the budget downturn, or for other reasons?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.