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HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED
PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
—
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
**THE POSTURE OF THE
U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND
U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND**
—

HEARING HELD
MARCH 20, 2013



—
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CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2013

	Page
HEARING:	
Wednesday, March 20, 2013, Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act—The Posture of the U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command	1
APPENDIX:	
Wednesday, March 20, 2013	39

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 20, 2013

FISCAL YEAR 2014 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. “Buck,” a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services	1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services	2

WITNESSES

Jacoby, GEN Charles H., Jr., USA, Commander, U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, U.S. Army	3
Kelly, Gen John F., USMC, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Marine Corps	5

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Jacoby, GEN Charles H., Jr.	47
Kelly, Gen John F.	73
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. “Buck”	43
Smith, Hon. Adam	45

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING:

Mr. Palazzo	122
Mr. Rogers	120
Ms. Shea-Porter	121
Mr. Smith	119
Mr. Wittman	120

FISCAL YEAR 2014 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 20, 2013.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. “BUCK” MCKEON,
A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

The CHAIRMAN. Committee will come to order. Good morning.

The committee meets today to receive testimony on the posture of both our Northern and our Southern Command.

I am pleased to welcome General Charles Jacoby, Commander of the U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command; and General John Kelly, Commander, U.S. Southern Command.

Gentlemen, thank you for your long and distinguished service to our Nation. And thank you for being here today.

Even as we proceed in this difficult budget environment and the news commands our attention to Africa and the Middle East, we must be diligent in keeping our own hemisphere safe. Therefore, I was pleased by the Administration’s announcement last Friday affirming the program of the previous administration to deploy 44 ground-based interceptors at two sites in California and Alaska.

On the other hand, canceling the fourth phase of the EPAA [European Phased Adaptive Approach] sends a terrible signal to America’s allies. I would have hoped after the 2009 fiasco that we would stop waking up our Eastern European allies to tell them at the last minute that we are changing our missile defense plans on them.

General Jacoby, I look forward to learning more about how we are filling the gaps in our homeland missile defense.

I also look forward to hearing your assessment of the progress being made by the new president of Mexico on drug-related violence and what NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] is doing to support Mexico and build their capacity and capabilities. This is a daily threat and directly impacting the U.S. homeland and we need to treat it as a national security imperative.

General Kelly, in my mind, the illicit trafficking threat is the greatest challenge we face in your geographic area of responsibility. While we continue to see success in Colombia, destabilization and violence in Central America is rampant.

Tackling these issues requires close collaboration and coordination with NORTHCOM as well as our interagency partners. Unfortunately, the Navy will eliminate its ship presence in the Caribbean in April due to sequestration.

This guarantees an increased flow of drugs and illicit networking across our borders. To that end, will you please elaborate on the other consequences of sequestration in both of your commands.

Again, thank you, gentlemen, for being here with us today.

Mr. Smith.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do want to join you in welcoming General Jacoby and General Kelly, thanking them for their very, very long service. I have had the pleasure of knowing both gentlemen for a while. General Jacoby, when he was commander out at Fort Lewis, did a fabulous job, was a real asset to our community.

It is good to see you again.

And, General Kelly, way back when I was first elected, you were working in the liaison's office, had the opportunity to travel together. You did an outstanding job there and you have done an outstanding job since.

So it is a real pleasure to have both you gentlemen here today, and thank you very much for your service.

In your current commands, I concur completely with the chairman. We do have to pay attention to our own hemisphere.

It is our, you know, first and most important line of defense. And I have had the opportunity to meet with both of you and I think you are doing an excellent job of that. As the chairman said, the main thing we want to know is how is sequestration affecting that?

I know, General Kelly, it is making your primary mission of drug interdiction very difficult if you don't have the assets to do that. We would like to have you elaborate a little bit more on the challenges of that, and what that means for us here at home, and how it potentially puts our safety at risk.

Also, you have the unenviable task of monitoring the Guantanamo situation to a certain extent. There are increasingly needs down there, in terms of military construction, as we fight the political battle back home as to, you know, whether we ever close it or how long it is there.

It is beginning to have implications long-term. I think it would be good for this committee to learn a little bit more about those implications and the challenges you face. If we are going to keep it open, there are funding obligations that are coming in order to make sure that our troops that are serving down there have the facilities and the support that they need.

On the homeland side, I had the pleasure of visiting NORTHCOM not long ago. I am learning a little bit more about what your command is focused on.

Certainly air defenses—what you do every day to track and monitor and protect our airspace—is something I don’t think most people are aware of. We appreciate that. We would like to hear more about that. I concur with the chairman’s concerns about missile defense, how we need to pay attention to protecting our homeland from rising threats in other parts of the world.

And lastly, of course, the situation in Mexico is an ongoing and evolving concern. Thus far, we have managed to, I think, protect this country fairly well, even as the violence in Mexico has become extreme.

But going forward, I would like to hear more about our partnership with Mexico with their newly elected government, where you see that going—how we can build on that partnership hopefully to begin to make Mexico less violent but certainly to make sure that we protect our country from any spillover results from that violence.

With that I yield back and I thank you very much, both of you again, for your service and for testifying today.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 45.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

We will include your written statements in the record. Without objection, so ordered.

General Jacoby.

STATEMENT OF GEN CHARLES H. JACOBY, JR., USA, COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, U.S. ARMY

General JACOBY. Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

It is a pleasure to be here with my friend and fellow combatant commander, General John Kelly. On behalf of the men and women of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, I appreciate this committee’s continuing support of our important missions.

Now in the case of U.S. NORTHCOM, our missions include homeland defense. And it is my number one priority mission, and a mission in which we also work closely with Canada in our integrated NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command] binational command.

Next, we remain active in conducting our core mission of defense support to civil authorities, for which the highlight last year was our participation in the interagency response to Hurricane Sandy. And finally, alongside cooperative defense activities with our ally, Canada, we continue to conduct security cooperation efforts with our close partners in Mexico and the Bahamas.

Now, our NORAD missions specifically include aerospace warning and control and maritime warning for the United States and Canada. Our command’s motto is, “We have the watch.” This reflects the vigilance with which we approach our duties and commitment to both the American and Canadian people. We execute our NORAD missions principally through our well-honed and uncompromising, 24/7 defense of our skies, Operation Noble Eagle.

Now our citizens have high expectations of our ability to defend and support them here in the homeland, and rightfully so. In the event of a natural or manmade disaster, U.S. NORTHCOM meets those expectations by leveraging the tremendous capabilities and capacities of the Department of Defense to support a lead Federal agency such as FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency].

Hurricane Sandy offered us a glimpse of what a complex catastrophe which spans several States and regions could look like. We will continue to mature the successful dual status command construct provided in the 2012 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] so that we will be ready to act swiftly and with unity of effort when the unthinkable happens and we are called.

Now we are facing an increasingly complex and dynamic security environment. Threats are adapting and evolving while technologies advance and proliferate, creating greater vulnerability in the homeland than ever before and complicating the accomplishment of our mission sets from cyber and ballistic missile defense to the disruption and defeat of transnational criminal organizations.

As such, a critical command priority is to advocate and develop capabilities in our core mission areas in order to outpace these threats. Yet, while we are confronted with this emerging threat landscape, the current fiscal environment adds uncertainty to the availability and development of the capabilities we will need to manage the risks these threats will pose.

Readiness concerns are sure to grow, as clearly described by our recent service chief testimonies. My most pressing of those will include unforecasted cuts to training and exercise programs which are fundamental to building the partnerships essential for responding to events in the homeland. Unexpected loss of service capabilities in readiness could also, in the future, erode our ability to conduct our critical homeland defense missions.

Now as we look forward, despite these challenges, our current layered partnerships and history of training, education, and exercise programs for now leave U.S. NORTHCOM and NORAD postured to defend the Nation against a full spectrum of threats, but we will have to work hard with the Services to sustain that posture as we deal with program and budget uncertainty.

Now, today and in the future, we will remain committed to deter, prevent, and defeat aggression aimed at the United States and Canada as two commands oriented on a single vision. With our trusted partners we will defend North America, outpace and mitigate threats, maintain faith with our people, and support them in their times of greatest need.

We will need this committee's continued support to meet that vision.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and I look forward to the questions.

[The prepared statement of General Jacoby can be found in the Appendix on page 47.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
General Kelly.

STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN F. KELLY, USMC, COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND, U.S. MARINE CORPS

General KELLY. Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, distinguished members of the committee, thanks for the opportunity to come here this morning and talk about something I am very proud of, and that is the United States Southern Command.

We are going to talk about four missions very briefly. The first, and as the chairman pointed out, countering transnational organized crime. It is both a Title 10—there is a Title 10 aspect to this as well as security cooperation activities that we are involved in every day.

Our support to law enforcement includes detention—detection, rather, and monitoring operations. We share information. We build capacity of countries we work with in the south in an attempt to dismantle these hugely powerful, ruthless, and very well financed organizations.

The second mission is partner engagement. We focus on building relationships with regional militaries to enhance the defense of the United States and the security of Latin America. Human rights play a role in virtually everything we do, from my engagements with regional leaders to our joint training teams that are working alongside our partner nations in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean.

Militaries in this region have made enormous strides in terms of professionalization and respect for civilian authorities and human rights, thanks in very large measure to what the U.S. military has done over at least two decades.

The third thing we do down there is contingency response. This involves planning for a wide range of possible crises like natural disasters, mass migration. We have seen that in the past—evacuation of American citizens.

And finally, a fourth is, as Congressman Smith pointed out, Guantanamo Bay. I manage and take care of the detainees. I support the commissions. I do not have any role in the commissions per se, but that is the fourth and final mission that the U.S. Southern Command is responsible for.

And I certainly look forward to answering all of your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Kelly can be found in the Appendix on page 73.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

With the Administration's pivot to the Pacific we must not lose sight of the security and stability within our own hemisphere. What do both of you consider the greatest threat to our hemisphere?

I think when we were talking yesterday we talked about we have troops around the world. We travel "this way" [east and west], and we don't travel much "this way" [north and south].

And I think that we need to make sure that we are not taking for granted our neighbors, [to] the south, and our own borders here. So, if you could tell us what you think is our greatest threat in our hemisphere.

And then what do you believe, in addressing this threat—what part of the DOD's [Department of Defense] core mission is part of supporting other agencies? And what do you think—what do you

see the problems with sequestration is going to cause in your commands?

General JACOBY. Chairman, I will start, if I may.

First of all, as the commander responsible for the defense of the homeland and how we support our citizens in the homeland with military capabilities, I would say, to put as fine a point on it as I can, the thing that is troubling most to me would be a weapon of mass destruction that arrives in the country through some illicit organization, or—whether it is terrorist or transnational criminal or of any nature. And that is my biggest concern.

And that is why our principal effort in our chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response enterprise is so important and has been maintained at a very high standard and we are receiving continued support from the Services on that. So I think that is really the—before I go to bed, that is what I would worry about the most.

Secondly are unexpected activities or events in the homeland, whether natural or manmade. Unexpected catastrophe could come from the fault systems on the West Coast to earthquakes or volcanic activity—something of a “Sandy-times-two,” “Sandy-times-three,” where we would have to be very focused and not being late to need—to support our citizens.

And so that may sound strange to have it be that high on the list, but since I have been in command I have had three major hurricanes, two major wildfires. We were very active in the last major Northeast snowstorm. So there is an expectation that we are going to do better and better at supporting our civil authorities in that regard.

And then we have some of the standard, longstanding, what I call now “hybrid” threats—states that can range or pose a threat to us, all the way from traditional means, whether it is missiles, aircraft, existential threats, but all the way down to unattributable threats such as cyber. And so those are new types of threats. They are difficult to deter across the entire spectrum because of degrading amounts of attribution and deterrent capability that we have.

So those are the—really the three bins of things that concern me in the homeland.

In supporting other agencies, in the homeland I get depth in the defense of the homeland by partnering. That is how I get depth—by creating relationships across Federal, State, and local agencies that allow us to see the whole “safety, security, defend” paradigm. And the better we are doing as partners in safety and security the less we may have to do in defend, or the more effective we are if we have to defend.

And so, for instance, along the Southwest border, that is a terrific opportunity for us to partner with Customs and Border Protection services.

They have got the lead. They have got the mission. But they are that front line of defense for illicit activity that could come into the country. And although they don’t work on it every day, they are having an effect that is very beneficial for perhaps other types of illicit activity that would fall more within NORTHCOM’s realm.

So that is where I think that partnering with other agencies may be a little more important in the homeland than just about any-

place else. And we have wonderful partners. In our headquarters today, 60 interagency partners from 50 agencies help bring a unity of effort that we haven't seen in the past before.

And finally, on sequestration, just a brief comment, Congressman, and I can go into more detail later, but I don't own a lot of assigned forces in the homeland so I am reliant on trained and ready forces provided to me by the Services on very short notice. And so, as service readiness erodes, as risks are taken across the readiness front, that will have an impact on my ability to accomplish my missions from homeland defense, defense support to civil authorities, and theater security cooperation with our critical partners in Canada, Mexico, and the Bahamas.

The final thing on sequestration is the morale factor for the people that work for NORAD and U.S. Northern Command. And so the idea of, for instance, of furloughing civilians—my civilians are critical to what I—what we do. That is one of the great changes I have seen over 36 years of service is the role civilians now play.

They help us with missile defense. They help us with—they are essential to our NORAD mission across all of our mission sets. And so telling them that they are going to take a 20 percent pay cut because we haven't been able to manage our budget is a really tough pill to swallow for dedicated, loyal, committed members of my team.

So thank you, Congressman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General Kelly.

General KELLY. Mr. Chairman, I think the committee understands that the U.S. Southern Command has traditionally, at least in the last 10 or 15 years, been kind of the economy of force command of all the geographical "CINC [commander in chief]-doms." So, for a long time we have operated down in the Latin America or Caribbean without a lot of assets. Now, the good news story is there is not, from a military point of view, there is not a great number of military threats down there, at least towards the United States.

But I am the beginning of the away game, if you will, for Chuck Jacoby's home game. If he is worrying about things that are coming across the Mexican border or coming through a port somewhere in the United States I think we have probably failed him and the American people in keeping it away. And I do think we fail the American people every day because there is so much that gets through that we can't take off the playing field, if you will.

The first thing I would—what is the greatest threat down there? To me, it is really the network—the network that we deal with.

Obviously, you think about drugs initially, but the network we deal with is incredibly efficient and it is plugged into a worldwide network of crime. And anything that anyone wants to put on that network, wherever it is in the world, if it is—if that person, if that individual, if that enemy of ours wants to get it into the United States, pretty good chance he or she can do it.

So the network is incredibly concerning to me because, as I say, almost anything can get on that network. You know, we watch, obviously, the drugs that come up from Central America and from Mexico. A lot of it is taken off the market, so to speak, on the way

in, but an awful lot of it does get in. We watch individuals come into the network from as far away as the Middle East.

Now, there are individuals that are trying to get into our country to make a better way of life and to jobs and things like that, but these are not the same kind of people. People pay big, big, big money to go from, say, I will give you an example, say Pakistan or from places like that, from Iran, pay big money to get into Latin America, and then they get on the network and disappear and get into America.

Whatever they are up to, they are not paying—they are not coming here to drive a cab in Washington, D.C., and they are paying a lot of money to get here. So the network is the thing that concerns me.

Like Chuck, what we do in the south and SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command] is a very, very whole-of-government, inter-agency, not just DOD. In my headquarters we have dozens of the same kind of individuals that represent the entire U.S. Government—DEA [Drug Enforcement Administration], FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], Border Patrol, all of the agencies. They are all heroes. They all work as hard as I do to try to serve the Nation and keep these malign influences and objects from coming into the United States.

But again, the network is incredibly efficient. It certainly rivals anything that Federal Express can do. It has 1,200 hubs that we know of in the United States, all controlled by cartels. They move hundreds and hundreds of tons of drugs, as an example, along that network.

You know, drugs in America cost us 40,000 lives a year, not all from what comes in the country. A lot of it is from prescription drugs. But 40,000 people a year die from drugs—our countrymen.

And you can't even put a number on the human misery associated with that, with families that lost children and all of that. Drugs cost our country \$200 billion a year, much of it in trying to rehabilitate drug addicts.

A relatively small amount of it, \$26 billion, is used in law enforcement. But if drugs get ashore in Central America they are essentially in the United States with almost—with very, very little success in taking them off the market.

But the profits that the drugs generate from the drug use in the United States obviously goes back into the drug cartels' pockets to generate more drugs that come into our country. But it also generates malign influences, or influences in other areas. And we know that Islamic extremist groups, as an example, benefit from the drug profits from our country.

We also know that drug trafficking, sex slaves, this kind of thing—much of that is financed by the drug trade coming out of the United States once the money is laundered down through Mexico and Central America.

What does sequestration do? Probably the most—the starkest figure I could give you is, generally speaking—and we understand this network, by the way, in the same way—almost to the same degree that we understood and understand the Al Qaeda network in Africa or in the Middle East.

But last year—numbers are up and down, but somewhere between 150 and 200 metric tons were taken off before they ever got ashore—of cocaine—before they ever got ashore in Honduras. And as I say, once it gets ashore in Central America, as hard as the Hondurans are in this fight with us, the Guatemalans, the Belizeans, the El Salvadorans—and they are shoulder-to-shoulder with us in this fight, with terrible, terrible death tolls in their countries, and of course, the real shining example of how to win the drug war is Colombia, and they are hugely appreciative of what we have done for them over the years.

But the point is that 200 tons—and that costs the U.S. Government about \$600 million to take 200 tons off the market. Because of sequestration, if I lose all of the ships I am expected to lose, and ships are critical, as is airborne ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance]. If I lose those assets, if they go to zero, and there are some that are predicting they will go to zero, then all of that cocaine, all of it, will get ashore. And more, I would predict, will get ashore and be on the streets of New York and Boston and Portland, Maine, and all the rest of it very, very quickly.

So we would essentially, with the exception of what our partners can do for us, particularly, as I say, the heroic efforts on the Honduran part and the Guatemalans and others—but they take very little off the market—all of that drug will get into the United States.

I also have had to cancel much of—some of my engagements in Latin America. These are small engagements. These are 12, 15 members of my staff going down and advising, you know, Colombia, Peru, Chile, all of these great partners—Brazil—advising them on this, that, or the other thing, maybe sending mobile training teams down. But I have had to cancel these.

And I live and breathe the engagement. I live and breathe on small trips down into the AO [Area of Operation] I have had to curtail my own trips in the future down into the AO.

And, you know, that leaves a question in their minds as to how committed the United States is to them. They want us in their lives, with the notable exceptions of a few countries. They want us in their lives.

They are very happy on the mil-to-mil relationship we have. They are very happy on the law enforcement relationship we have with them. But they question the commitment beyond that because there is so little interest already in that part of the world.

Our State Department does tremendous things in our embassies throughout the region, but it is hard to argue that the United States should be the partner of choice in that part of the world when we don't really do much in the way of partnering anymore.

So thanks very much for an opportunity to answer that question.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize, I will have to pass and get my questions in a moment. I have got a phone call that I have to take at 10:30, so I will pass to Mr. Larsen if he is ready, and when I come back I will take my questions then.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Do I have Ranking Member Smith's unlimited time to ask questions, as well?

[Laughter.]

Didn't hear an answer. All right, we will move on.

General Kelly, some questions about Guantanamo, if I could. First, with regards to listening and recording of conversations, there have been reports of listening devices disguised as smoke detectors in meeting rooms where detainees meet with their defense counsel. And are you familiar with this, that JTF-GTMO [Joint Task Force Guantanamo] has placed listening devices in meeting rooms where detainees have met with attorneys?

General KELLY. Am I familiar with the issue?

Mr. LARSEN. Yes.

General KELLY. Yes sir, I am.

Mr. LARSEN. Yes.

General KELLY. It is nonsense, but I am familiar with the issue.

Mr. LARSEN. It is why I am asking. It is why I am asking.

So have these conversations between counsel and detainees been listened to or recorded in the detention facility at Guantanamo?

General KELLY. No.

Mr. LARSEN. Are there currently any video or audio recording devices in meeting spaces of the detainees and their attorneys?

General KELLY. Visual—video.

Mr. LARSEN. There is video.

General KELLY. And I can elaborate if you want, I—

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, absolutely. Absolutely.

General KELLY. Guantanamo was built to be a temporary facility—

Mr. LARSEN. Yes.

General KELLY [continuing]. Eleven years ago.

Mr. LARSEN. Yes.

General KELLY. If we would have had any idea we were going to be there even 5 years doing the operations down there that have changed significantly, as you know, over the years—

Mr. LARSEN. Yes.

General KELLY [continuing]. If we knew we were going to be there 5 years even, we would have built a different facility. If we would have known we were going to be there 11 years we would have built a—you know, so this is kind of really a thrown-together operation, and it is really not 11 years long, it is 1 year 11 times.

And as the ranking member mentioned, I mean, all of these temporary buildings, for the most part, are falling apart. And we really do need to get serious about taking care of our troops that are down there as well as improving the security—not the creature comforts, if you will, for the detainees.

Mr. LARSEN. Right.

General KELLY. They are already well taken care of in that regard. But taking care of our troops.

But the point is that many of the—the facility was not built for any one thing. So years ago that particular facility was used for another purpose and that purpose required not only audio devices but visual devices. It was not used for attorney-client rooms. Again, the mission down there has morphed over time.

So the room that they were using for attorney-client discussions still had equipment, but that equipment was not energized, it was not used. And I can tell you that without question, we have not violated their rights by listening in.

Now what I have done is—since this became an issue I said, well, let's just make this simple. Let's pull it all out.

And in fact, this week not only have we pulled it all out, with exception of the video cameras, we are sending down some counterintel people to make sure that they have special technical devices to make sure that there is—they are all out.

So no, they weren't listened to. Yes, the video devices will remain—temporarily, at least. And the attorneys will understand that.

Mr. LARSEN. And why are the video devices staying?

General KELLY. Well, some of these men, arguably, are dangerous—arguably are dangerous.

Mr. LARSEN. Sure.

General KELLY. And although you would think that their defense attorneys would be safe, I have a responsibility to protect the defense attorneys as well, as I do the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] that visits and the 5,700 non-DOD people that have visited Guantanamo since the beginning.

Mr. LARSEN. Right.

General KELLY. I have a responsibility to protect them, and so I believe it is prudent to keep the video cameras going. And we will see—if they contest that, which I am sure they will, then we will see what the—

Mr. LARSEN. I understand.

General KELLY [continuing]. The judge has to say.

Mr. LARSEN. I understand.

With regards to the hunger strikes, what is your understanding of why the hunger strike is happening?

General KELLY. Well we, in talking to the detainees and talking to the hunger strikers, so-called—

Mr. LARSEN. Yes.

General KELLY [continuing]. They had great optimism that Guantanamo would be closed. They were devastated, apparently—and I don't live down there but they work for me—they were devastated—not the detainees, of course—they were devastated when the President, you know, backed off, at least their perception, of closing the facility. He said nothing about it in his inauguration speech; he said nothing about it in his—

Mr. LARSEN. Yes.

General KELLY [continuing]. State of the Union speech; he has said nothing about it. He is not re-staffing the office that would be—that was, you know—that looks at closing the facility, so—

Mr. LARSEN. Right.

General KELLY [continuing]. That has caused them to become frustrated and they want to get this—I think turn the heat up, get it back in the media.

And we know that because they talk to us. We have, actually, a fairly positive relationship down there with most of the detainees.

And we have definitions of what a hunger striker is, and of course we have an ability to take care of them if they go too far, and we will. I hope that answers your question.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you.

I see my time is up. Thank you—

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

And, General Jacoby and General Kelly, it is a pleasure to listen to you, as you are leaders of our Nation. And thank you very much.

And, General Kelly, I think it was maybe a couple years ago I either read a book or we had a hearing on the Southern Command, and it seems like that I, in my mind, remember whomever spoke or the book I read, that there was an interest in the number of those from the Middle East coming into Honduras.

In your comments you made mention, but just very—not casually, but you made mention that Middle Easterners coming into Central America. And my question is basically, is there a concern from either one of you gentlemen that one country or another country, you are seeing more activity of those from the Middle East moving into that country as to the point that maybe the population numbers are going to be at a point that they could have some type of political influence within that country?

General KELLY. Probably the country that we see—the country we see with the most activity from the Middle East is Iran. They have been very, very active over the last few years—a close relationship with Hugo Chavez, of course, in Venezuela. That became their kind of best friend in the area.

But since then they have opened embassies, they have opened cultural centers, they have done things like that. On the surface, certainly nothing wrong with that if they are just doing that to try to create better relations between them and other countries in the world, but to what end is obviously the issue.

In an unclassified setting can't get into some of the aspects of what they are using some of those centers that they are opening and even their embassies—what they are using them for, but in an open hearing we can say that they are certainly trying to befriend or get friends in the region because the more of that they can have on their side, you know, things like sanctions and all, activities in the U.N., condemnation, they are trying to create friends out of that.

We will leave that, you know, in terms of what I can say in an open setting about what the Iranians are doing.

But just very briefly—and it is not Middle East, but, you know, the Chinese, as an example, are doing very similar things economically. They have penetrated Latin America in a big way economically—not a bad thing, but it is something that they are very aggressive, as they are all over the world, frankly.

Mr. JONES. General Jacoby, would you like to answer, sir?

General JACOBY. Yes, sir.

We are keeping our eye very closely on any Iranian activity in my area of responsibility. I do not believe that they wield any influence on the governments, but they are certainly aggressive. Iranians are aggressive globally, and so any Iranian involvement in Mexico, Canada, Bahamas will be highlighted for us.

And we have good partnerships there and I don't see it as a threat other than the network itself of any Iranian activity.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be important if I might suggest that we hold a classified hearing on Central and South America, because of the problem. And you said this, Mr. Chairman, in your opening comments—for too long, I think, our country—maybe the Congress—has not been as interested in the southern hemisphere as we should be.

And I do think that, from what I have heard from General Jacoby and General Kelly today, that a classified hearing to get more into the details of the Iranians and also the Chinese would be very beneficial, and I assure you I would be here if we have that kind of hearing.

So thank you, gentlemen, very much, and I—40 seconds left, I will yield back my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, and thank you for your suggestion. We will definitely look into that. We have lots of hearings scheduled the next few weeks, but we will see what we can do on that.

Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Kelly, the 2009 Guantanamo review team made recommendations for conditions at that facility that it warned might become inhumane over time. Since those recommendations were made there has been no outside evaluation to assess the current conditions of Guantanamo, which have changed since 2009.

In addition, it is clear that the attorneys who represent the inmates are the best sources of information on the conditions under which their clients live.

General Kelly, in 2009, at the time of the study, the office of chief defense council was given less than 24 hours to generate an ad hoc list of issues that were forwarded to the 2009 review team to consider as they conducted their review. No allowance was made for the provision of classified or otherwise protected information.

At least two defense teams attempted to provide unclassified information under their own initiative and sought permission to provide classified or otherwise protected factual information, but each was blocked from providing that information. One team was told that the Central Intelligence Agency would not allow them to release the information to the Secretary of Defense or his staff.

Inmate lawyers are certainly a better place to learn and transmit information about the impact of confinement conditions on their detainee clients. They are better equipped than any other source. A more reliable study would allow meaningful input by counsel.

Why has there been no followup with regard to these conditions identified in the 2009 Guantanamo review?

General KELLY. Congressman, first—and I don't mean to challenge you—but there is no one on this earth that is better positioned to tell you what the conditions are inside Guantanamo than me. No one. Not their defense attorneys. Not their families. Nobody.

I can tell you that they are humanely dealt with. They are obviously in jail. They are in a detention facility. But from the standards that are set in our own country in terms of these kinds of operations—in fact, the ICRC gives us very, very high marks down

there every time they visit for how they are treated and how they are dealt with——

Mr. JOHNSON. Well certainly, General, I accept the fact that you assert and have no reason to doubt what you are asserting, but in terms of independent assessment, that is what I am talking about.

The attorneys seem to have been shut out of the process, and moreover, there appears to be no followup with regard to the conditions that were cited in the 2009 study that may become inhumane conditions. And so I think that it deserves a fresh look. It deserves an impartial look and a full investigatory look from different perspectives.

So I understand your perspective. I think the defense counsel has a different perspective, and perhaps some of the organizations bring their own perspectives to that mix.

Why hasn't there been a followup?

General KELLY. As I say, Congressman, I have no agenda at Guantanamo other than to do what my President has charged me to do: to take care of 166 prisoners—excuse me, detainees—and to take care of them humanely and provide them all of what they need on a day-to-day basis. And I do——

Mr. JOHNSON. Well my question is, why hasn't there been a followup——

General KELLY. I do that every day.

ICRC comes down regularly unannounced and announced. They know what goes on inside the detention facility. They give us high marks.

Mr. JOHNSON. So pretty much we are just going to have to rely on your assertion to us that everything is fine down there in Guantanamo and we are not going to get an independent review of the conditions down there? Is that what you would testify to?

General KELLY. We get an independent view on a regular basis. The International Committee of the Red Cross is down there regularly. I mean, that—they are as independent as anyone.

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't know if their agenda is the same as defense counsel or other interested parties' might be.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentleman's time has expired.

I would ask the gentleman, have you had a chance to go to Guantanamo?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you like to go again?

Mr. JOHNSON. Actually, I would like to see that facility closed and I would like to see the inmates housed elsewhere.

The CHAIRMAN. The reason I am asking, I would be happy to put together a CODEL [congressional delegation] for any members that would like to go down there and see for themselves the situations they see at——

Mr. JOHNSON. I will state for the record that when I was down there about 5 years ago I was definitely impressed with——

The CHAIRMAN. Five years, and the general has been down there much more recently than that. But if you would like to go, let me know and we will put together a CODEL for anyone that would like to——

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I may take you up on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, General.

And, Mr. Chairman, thank you not just for offering to do that, but for your leadership in having had those CODELs before, and you have taken a lot of members down there. I had the privilege of going down there with you and we got to see firsthand, and we are about as independent as you could get from this committee.

And, General, I think you are doing a great job and we appreciate your efforts down there.

General Jacoby, in the prepared testimony of the director of national intelligence last week he stated—said, “We judge Iran would likely choose a ballistic missile as its preferred method of delivering a nuclear weapon. Iran’s ballistic weapons are capable of delivering WMD [weapons of mass destruction]. In addition, Iran has demonstrated an ability to launch small satellites and we grow increasingly concerned that these technical steps, along with a regime hostile toward the United States and our allies, provide Tehran with the means and motivation to develop larger space launch vehicles and longer-range missiles, including an intercontinental ballistic missile.”

General, do you agree with the statement, and has Iran decided to build an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile]?

General JACOBY. I concur. I agree with the statement by the director.

It is my belief from every day looking closely at the intelligence that Iran is on the path to developing an ICBM and that they have demonstrated capabilities that should inform us that they can achieve, in the future, an ICBM capability.

Mr. FORBES. When is the earliest, in your best professional military judgment, that you believe Iran could flight test an ICBM, and could they do it this year?

General JACOBY. Some of these estimates need to be discussed in a—

Mr. FORBES. I understand.

General JACOBY [continuing]. In a closed hearing, and we would be glad to. I think that we should consider that Iran has a capability within the next few years of flight-testing ICBM-capable technologies.

Mr. FORBES. Are you worried about Iranian military and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ballistic missile programs, and are they both, in your opinion, under the firm control of the Iranian leadership? And why are there two programs?

General JACOBY. Congressman, I think that many of the issues associated with that very good question need to be discussed in closed session.

Mr. FORBES. Well, General, I would hope that we could arrange that so that members of this committee and the chairman could orchestrate an opportunity for us to do that. I think this is a crucial thing for us to be looking at.

And specifically, when we have that—Mr. Chairman, if we could have that kind of briefing—we would love to get your input on what additional resources, if any, you need to make sure we are

adequately dealing with this situation. I know some of that you will have to give us in that classified setting as well.

General JACOBY. Thank you, Congressman. I would be very happy to do that.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Actually, I spoke with General Dunford on the phone getting an update from Afghanistan, so they are doing an outstanding job over there, as we all know.

I want to talk through the Guantanamo thing just for a minute—couple of editorial comments and then one question. I know there is—we have had this debate and argument in this committee and I am not interested in restarting that particular argument at this moment, but there are some very severe long-term implications of what is going on down there.

We have I think it is 166 inmates down there now. They are aging, as we all are, and there are certain—there is a certain lack of support facilities in that general area. And if we are planning on keeping them there forever, there is an enormous amount of expense, in terms of both caring for the inmates and then also dealing with our staff down there that has to do that.

You know, I think medical care is one of the biggest concerns. There are not, you know, the first-class facilities down there. And as the law stands now, if we have an inmate who has a heart attack, doesn't die, but needs more complicated care, where is he going to get it in Guantanamo? He is not. And that opens up all kinds of implications in terms of human rights violations and problems that we would have with our own laws, as well as with international laws.

And, you know, Miami may be 2 or 3 hours away, but under the law right now we can't take them there, and sort of on, and on, and on. We have got, you know, the—not to use the clichéd joke, but it is the Hotel California: You check in but you can't ever check out on any—

And that is not sustainable, you know? I don't know if it is not sustainable past 3 years or 4 years or 10 years, but at some point we will have an utterly and completely unworkable situation in Guantanamo if we continue to say that once you are there you can't ever be let out. We need to think about that as policymakers and how we are going to deal with it.

And in the short term, since we have a standoff between the Administration that would like to close Guantanamo and Congress that will not let them, Congress wins that fight—just the nature of the process—so the place stays open, but we then have expenses of keeping it going.

So with that preamble, the question is: What are your short-term needs—things that we simply have to begin building down there? And, you know, we hate to invest military construction down there if you think the place isn't going to stay open very long, but we reach the point where we have to because it is open. It is going to

be open for the foreseeable future regardless of how any one of us feels about that.

So what are the short-term needs that this committee and this Congress has to provide to you to make sure that your troops down there get the support they need to do the job that they are doing?

General KELLY. Congressman, we briefly discussed this yesterday. I am with you, by the way, on the medical care. I have gotten some legal opinion from the general counsel of DOD, who has advised me on what our—not necessarily our public affairs position is relative to, as you point out, one of them having, say, a heart attack and we stabilize him there on-island but can't move him off to a higher level of care—

Mr. SMITH. We are stealing that example directly from what you said to me yesterday, so for full attribution, but go ahead.

General KELLY. So, that is a concern, but I am told legally as long as they have access to all of the medical care that is available on-island—which is—it is considerable. There is a naval hospital there, but it is kind of a small—it would be like a small town hospital. It is—doesn't have a higher level of care for, say, cancer treatment or kidney treatment or something like that.

But in any event, I have dealt—worked with the general counsels on this issue and feel as though at least the advice they have given me is we are within the law so long as they have access—and immediate access—to any and all medical care on-island, and they, of course, have that.

As far as things like MILCON [military construction], if we would have built that—if we had built the facility down there thinking that it would even be open 10 years, we would have built a far different facility.

So what are the immediate needs down there? I have 1,900 mostly uniformed personnel in JTF Guantanamo Bay—Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay—roughly 1,900. They are living in, to say the least, not squalor but in some pretty questionable—we need to take care of our troops. So we have several MILCON projects that I have submitted.

And as you know, Congressman, everything that is built down there is at least twice as expensive because everything that we build with, to include the carpenters that have to build it, has to come—

Mr. SMITH. You have got to get people there.

General KELLY. Yes. So it is really 55 percent, so a 10-penny nail costs 20 cents. So everything is more expensive.

So we have to take care of barracks. We have to replace the dining hall, the mess hall, as marines would call it. It prepares meals not only for my guard personnel, most of whom, as I say, are uniformed, but the—for the detainees, as well. It is literally falling apart.

And there are other projects that have to do with—none of them have anything to do with, you know, if you will, creature comforts for the detainees. They are already living humanely and comfortably, acknowledging the fact they are in jail, but they are humanely and comfortably treated.

So none of these projects would enhance their lifestyle, if you will. But some of the projects will add security and better ease of

movement for them. That will benefit the guard force, not the detainees—make the guard force's life a lot less complicated. But we are talking in the neighborhood of \$150 billion to \$170 billion—excuse me—million dollars, so it is a considerable bill.

There are other projects that I couldn't talk about here in the open, but do have to do with replacing one of the camp facilities where some of the detainees are—special detainees are housed. We could get into that off-line if you want.

Mr. SMITH. Okay.

General KELLY. But that is where we are right now. These are things that we have to do right now.

I am assuming Guantanamo will be closed someday, but if we look into the past 11 years, it was supposed to be temporary. Who knows where it is going? We have got to take care of our troops.

Mr. SMITH. Yes. I completely agree with that.

That is all I have. I have had the opportunity to speak with General Jacoby before and visit with him so most of my questions have been answered.

So, sir, I will yield back.

And again, thank you, gentlemen, both.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

And staff has informed me that Congresswoman Roby is leading a delegation to GTMO [Guantanamo] on April 22nd. We have three other members signed up, so anybody else that would like to go, please contact staff and get on that trip and we will send out some notice to all of the members if they have an interest to join in that CODEL.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank both of you for being here today.

And, General Kelly, I am so pleased with the success of Plan Colombia. Our family works with the Partners of the Americas program, where each American State is associated with a part of Central and South America. South Carolina is associated with Southwest Colombia. We have hosted exchange students from Cali. Two of my sons have actually been exchange students to Cali.

And so this is a success story about Plan Colombia that the American people need to know. If you could tell us what the current status is, that would be very helpful.

General KELLY. It is a great program. I have had something to do with it in other places other than SOUTHCOM, but I just talked to SOUTHCOM. I think we have 26 partnerships with States' National Guard all over the Caribbean, Latin America, Central America. It is a great program. It is a grassroots program.

I think the exchange is both ways, as you point out. I mean, people in South Carolina, to use your example, have learned a lot about a place they would have never—probably couldn't find on a map, except that there is this great relationship between Colombia and the South Carolina Guard.

I think they, as I said, they get more out of the—just the example we show them and how we interact with them on a mil-to-mil basis. You know, we treasure in our country the relationship between the military—civilian control of the military. A lot of countries in the world don't see that, but increasingly, through the

guard program or the partnership program, more and more countries are getting that message.

Same thing with human rights. I mean, we can lecture people all day long about human rights, but by our example, by the great guys and gals from South Carolina National Guard or whatever that they interact with, they get it. And they get it more and more and more.

So I can't say enough good things about the program, sir.

Mr. WILSON. And how would you characterize the level of violence that has been addressed in Colombia? And the American people really aren't aware. Actually, this is a country of 40 million people. It is huge. And it—the people there are just extraordinary. And so the level of violence is—how is that being addressed?

General KELLY. Fifteen, 17 years ago when I worked up here as a—the Marine liaison, I can remember the debates about Colombia, and some of you will remember those debates. Colombia was considered at the time to be a failed state. You couldn't move outside of your home in Colombia without being at risk of being killed. I mean, the country was run by the Medellin and the Cali cartels.

I mean, and here we go—or here we are a few years later with a considerable investment of U.S. funds—I mean, it is in the billions of dollars. But now we have a country that is not only shoulder-to-shoulder with us fighting our drug problem down there—they took 200 tons of cocaine off the market before it ever left their country and got into places like Venezuela or started the trip up to Central America—200 tons.

The biggest IED [improvised explosive device] casualty problem in the world outside of Afghanistan is in Colombia because it is how the cartels protect the factories in the jungle that make the cocaine, or how the growers—the cartels, the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia]—how they protect the grower—you know, the orchards, if you will. They are in this thing, but the violence—it is an amazing place.

You can go to Medellin now and go out to dinner and there is no violence. In Bogota where you used to be able to—you could hear the bombs going off at night from the FARC, and now all of that is pushed very—is pushed well away from the population centers. So the violence has gone down dramatically in the last 10, 12 years.

Mr. WILSON. Well, congratulations—an extraordinary success story.

General Jacoby, I am very concerned and—but also supportive of missile defense. In the 2013 budget request there was a reduction in the ground-based midcourse defense program of \$256.8 million. Why was the funding reduced and how does this impact the reduction of GMD [Ground-Based Midcourse Defense] operations reliability and any modernization?

General JACOBY. Congressman, I would have to look exactly at what those cuts were in. In 2013 we have made some great progress, particularly with testing, which is directly impacting the reliability of the GBI [Ground-Based Interceptor] fleet. So I think that what we have seen with the rollout, the introduction of new initiatives in ballistic missile defense that was announced Friday,

I think we are on a good path to outpace the threat—both North Korean and Iranian threats in the future.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Veasey.

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to ask—I had a NORTHCOM question. I am from Texas and we are a border State, and I wanted to know particularly about the drug-related violence in Mexico and partnering with the Mexican police to bolster efforts there.

General JACOBY. All right, thanks for the question. We have had a really important change over the last 4 years or so, probably a little bit more than that, in our military-to-military relationship with Mexico. We have become very good partners and a lot of that has been a centerpiece of, you know, going after, together, a shared problem, which is the drug-related violence.

And so I can point to numerous routine border conferences that are held between U.S. law enforcement and U.S. military and Mexican military. They are very beneficial. They are very cordial, and they make real progress: improved communications, improved information sharing. And we have not seen diminishment of that over the change of administration—the recent change of administration in Mexico.

So there is still a lot of work that has to be done. There is still more violence than either country wants.

The violence shifts around a bit. There is less in the north now and more deeper into Mexico. There has been a decrease—a percentage decrease so far in 2013. But it has moved and it has increased in other parts of the country.

So this is a tough fight against a resolute, well-funded enemy. But, you know, the commitment we have with our Mexican partners is very strong, and I believe that our partnership will just grow over time.

Mr. VEASEY. Some of the border cities—you know, El Paso and some of the areas in the valley that are along the Texas-Mexico border—are some of the safest cities on the United States side. With some of the violence, you know, that continues in Mexico, do you think that enough is—what we are doing right now is adequate enough to ever stop that from spilling over? Because they have done it—they have been doing a great job so far.

General JACOBY. Right. So security is going to remain a moving target. It is going to remain a moving target as long as we are not having a disruptive effect on the networks themselves.

And so it is not geographically bound. It is going to be an issue of working together across many governments, not just the United States and Mexico, and across the agencies to attack this network—this system of networks that is able to exploit vulnerabilities and gaps as they expose themselves.

And when they run into a brick wall that, you know, good law enforcement, good partnering has created with technology support, they adapt. And they are agile.

And so, we have to go after the network. We have to go after financiers, logisticians, operators, and leadership.

And we also have to make sure our institutions—and this is essentially a law enforcement problem so we have to make sure our institutions and our partners' institutions are strong and can provide the kind of security that allows for an environment where we can attack the network more effectively.

Mr. VEASEY. Let me ask you one more question, and this may be outside of your purview. *The Wall Street Journal* has done a really good job of highlighting the drug-resistant tuberculosis problem that is happening in India.

And as you know, recently there was someone that actually came, you know, from India and tried to come through Mexico, and that would have brought that drug-resistant strain here into the country. How do you feel about people being on the lookout for—and I know it is—obviously you can't tell if somebody has tuberculosis, but fighting something like that, just someone that looks like, you know, a normal person coming in. What do you do about that?

General JACOBY. Well, we have a limited role in Support of Civil Authorities, and so we actually do have a plan for how to support civil authorities if there was ever a pandemic crisis. So we are going to roll up our sleeves and get behind the relevant agencies that would deal with that.

But I think you ask a really good question in terms of—it is not illicit activity but unwanted activity that crosses our border, and so it goes back to the network. So the network that would bring you drugs and what that does to our society, human trafficking, money laundering, weapons—there are all kinds of things that can ride on that same network.

And so, as you know, in Texas we had a whole lot of children with chicken pox dropped off on the border. Those children did not come from Mexico. They came from all over Central America, brought on the same wave of these networks and deposited them on the border.

And so I think you bring up a very good point and it is another reason why we need to look harder and work with our partners across the globe and interagency to get a better handle on this.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General JACOBY. Thanks.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Jacoby, General Kelly, thank you for being here, and thank you for your dedication to what is obviously most central to our issues of our national security, and that, of course, is the protection of our homeland.

General Jacoby, I appreciate your characterization of the emerging threats that we see from Iran and North Korea. Probably our most important program that we have in trying to respond to an emerging threat is the issue of our missile defense. I was very concerned by last Friday's announcement by Secretary Hagel of the scrapping of the portion of the Phased Adaptive Approach that would have provided additional protection to the homeland.

In our policy on missile defense, one of the tenets that we have looked for for technical capability is the concept of "shoot-look-shoot." With respect to North Korea, General Jacoby, do we have

shoot-look-shoot capability in responding to a North Korean threat from the West Coast looking at our assets in California and Alaska?

General JACOBY. Congressman, shoot-look-shoot makes a lot of sense. It makes a lot of sense as a warfighter, not just as a technological means of conducting our tactics for missile defense. So, you know, shooting down—you know better than anyone, shooting down a ballistic missile is a sniper weapon requirement; it is not a machine gun requirement.

So we want to pursue shoot-look-shoot not just for North Korea but as a warfighter technique. Those are emerging capabilities and I can discuss them in detail with you in a closed session, but we are very much interested and have worked closely with MDA, Missile Defense Agency, to try to improve where we are in shoot-look-shoot.

Mr. TURNER. I appreciate that, General, and I look forward to that. But in an open session, I mean, it has been acknowledged that part of the reason why we had the final phase of the Phased Adaptive Approach providing that additional forward basing of missile defense to respond to Iran was because we had a deficiency on the East Coast with respect to shoot-look-shoot with Iran, both the—President Bush's third site that was proposed for Poland, President Obama's final phase of the Phased Adaptive Approach, was an attempt to plug that and provide that additional capability, was it not?

General JACOBY. Phase four of the European Phased Adaptive Approach, specifically with the SM-3 [Standard Missile 3] Block IIB, was designed to provide a first shot at any Iranian missile that could be coming towards the United States.

Mr. TURNER. And then we would have the additional shot from Alaska that we would have as our additional backup.

General JACOBY. That is correct.

Mr. TURNER. NORTHCOM, in its 2007–2008 GBI study, had proposed an East Coast site to look to providing that shoot-look-shoot, that additional capability when we look to protecting the East Coast, both for Iran and for North Korea.

Now that phase four of the Phased Adaptive Approach is scrapped, the—you know, obviously, we see even greater reason for that East Coast site, having been an initiative that the House put in the National Defense Authorization Act.

I think you would agree, would you not—I mean, looking at your testimony from the Senate, that the—with—building out the Alaska field does not provide us that additional capability that an East Coast site would be or that the phase four of the Phased Adaptive Approach would have provided or the George Bush third site would have provided. Is that correct?

General JACOBY. What building out the missile field at Fort Greely does for us is it allows us to increase our capability in a way that would serve both a threat from North Korea and a threat from Iran.

And so as we have adopted the missile defense approach—

Mr. TURNER. General, I have a limited amount of time so I am sorry to interrupt you—

General JACOBY. Sure.

Mr. TURNER [continuing]. But the NORTHCOM 2007–2008 GBI study took into consideration the Alaska site but still made a recommendation for an East Coast site. You would agree that that East Coast site would provide us additional capability that we cannot have in merely building on Alaska?

General JACOBY. I would agree that a third site, wherever the decision is to build a third site, would give me better weapons access, increased GBI inventory, and allow us the battle space to more optimize our defense against future threats from Iran and North Korea.

Mr. TURNER. One additional issue that I would like to raise, the, you know, the old adage of “all your eggs in one basket” seems to be similar to the interpretation of the issue of Alaska.

I mean, we do increase our vulnerability when we limit ourselves to a concentration of some missiles in California and a significant number in Alaska without that third site. I would think that would be an additional justification for a third site.

General JACOBY. I wouldn't argue with you on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And General Jacoby, General Kelly, thank you so much for being here. I am sorry I missed the earlier testimony.

But I wonder if I could just follow up with my colleague for a second, because, General Jacoby, it sounded to me like you didn't, you know, directly answer that question, and I am just wondering whether there are some real downsides to that consideration that, perhaps, have not been clear? And we are talking about the East Coast site, if you could expand on that.

General JACOBY. All right. The original missile defense construct was for limited defense against limited threats that most of them postulated into the future. And what we have done is we have availed ourselves of some options that were left open to us by not abandoning the rest of—or finishing the construction of missile field two in Alaska, not abandoning missile field one. And so that has allowed us now to keep ahead, to outpace the threat in North Korea. And also it addresses an Iranian threat, as well.

We are very pleased with the NDAA that has directed us to do a study, and it is going to allow us to keep making steps in the direction to provide us options in the future so that as a threat evolves we can keep pace or outpace the threat. And so I think we are on a good path with that.

I will tell you, all of the missile defense activity really starts with intelligence. It really starts with our understanding of the threat and building that threat picture and keeping up with it. And so we have made important strides in that regard, as well.

So I take all the points that have been brought up on an East Coast field. The fact of the matter is there is still work to be done on if a third site, where is the optimum place for a third site, given—balancing between those two threats, one of them far more advanced than the other threat?

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay, thank you. I appreciate that because I think it is obviously a point of contention, and—

General JACOBY. Sure.

Mrs. DAVIS [continuing]. Doesn't sound like it is necessarily the strategic direction that we need to go right now.

General JACOBY. What is not in contention is I fully feel responsibility and accountability for the defense of this Nation, not just from North Korea but from any threats to the Nation. And so I will be the strongest advocate for preparing ourselves and arming ourselves for evolving threat.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, General. If I could come back to you for a second, as well. I know that earlier discussing the three greatest threats in your area of command—and General Kelly, I am not sure if you weighed in in the same way on that on the three—and cyber obviously is one of those, and we certainly are well aware of that.

I wondered if you could talk a little bit more, though, about what you see the impacts that such attack would have upon our homeland, and whether there are opportunities to use, perhaps, the National Guard differently in preparing for any cyber defense strategies. And are there other opportunities that you think, perhaps, because of cost constraints or just about anything else, that we are not doing to the extent that you would suggest?

General JACOBY. On the cyber front, we share cyber concerns with Strategic Command and Cyber Command specifically. But we have great partners in the National Guard, strong partnership with the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI. And so that is how the spectrum of responsibilities kind of unfolds in the homeland, where the President's executive order and the PDD [Presidential Decision Directive] really helped illuminate some stratification of responsibilities, and I think that is swimming into focus pretty well.

Within the Department, roles and responsibilities for the different components—Active, Title 10 Reserve, and National Guard—we are working hard on those. It is really important that in the cyber domain that the standards and certification of units that participate in cyber work have got to be of the highest; and really the commander that sets the pace and sets the standard is Cyber Command.

General Grass and I met with General Alexander earlier this week to have this very discussion because we know that there is an important role for the Guard to play in support of our global, regional and State requirements for cyber.

Mrs. DAVIS. May I just ask you, General, quickly, I think one of the concerns in this area, because it is relatively new—

General JACOBY. It is.

Mrs. DAVIS [continuing]. In the scope of things in terms of the pipeline of skill sets and the expertise. How comfortable are you feeling about the way in which that training and the opportunities for people to really—to work in this field is developing now?

General JACOBY. I think it deserves our constant attention. You know, we are under tremendous uncertainty in terms of manning and budget and programs, and so I will tell you, though, this is General Alexander's domain. But he has got everyone's attention on the requirement for, as you say, ensuring that cyber warriors are in the pipeline to meet the future requirements, not just the day-to-day.

In terms of what it might look like in the homeland, I would just say that we are concerned that a cyber—a large cyber attack on the homeland—and former Secretary Panetta characterized it as the potential 9/11 event—will have cascading effects. An event like that will have cascading effects.

So they may hit the transportation network and shut things down maybe in the East Coast corridor, but it would be more than just stopping transportation. It would be the economic implications and other rippling effects into society.

A good example of how that might unfold, really, was Hurricane Sandy.

The CHAIRMAN. General, gentlelady's time has expired. She got that question in just at the close of her time.

General JACOBY. I will be glad to talk to you about it at any other time—

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, General Jacoby, before I get to my questions, I hope you remembered my invitation for you to join me for this fall's Talladega 500.

General Kelly, you come with him. You will have a good time.

General Jacoby, were you involved in the new missile defense posture decisionmaking that was recently announced on Friday?

General JACOBY. Congressman, yes I was. It was a very collaborative and detailed process over the last several months.

Mr. ROGERS. Why was the decision made last week, 3 weeks before the budget is released? Why was it important, do you think, to go ahead and announce it last week?

General JACOBY. I can't speak to the exact timing of the release. I know that it is a report that Congress asked for quite a while back and it was due.

Mr. ROGERS. I agree.

Do you know when the President's security adviser is going to be making his trip to Russia to talk about more arms control?

General JACOBY. No I do not, Congressman.

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Are you aware that the Russians have repeatedly stated that the SMD—SM-3 IIB missile is a "dealbreaker" for more nuclear arms control, which President Obama has indicated he wants?

General JACOBY. I know the Russians have been unhappy with some of our missile defense program, but I can't speak to the details of that.

Mr. ROGERS. On Friday Under Secretary Miller stated, when asked if it had been a mistake to mothball the Missile Field One [Missile Field Number One at Fort Greely, Alaska], he responded, "We saved resources at the time that we will now have to spend. But at the time the threat was uncertain, right? We didn't—we didn't know that we would—what we would see today—we did not know we would see today what we now see." Were we surprised by the North Korean threat?

General JACOBY. I wouldn't characterize it as being surprised. I think that North Korea proceeded at a pace faster than we had an-

ticipated and I think there were many factors involved in that, to include the change in leadership—the very dramatic change in leadership in North Korea over the past year.

And so I think it is very appropriate that we proceed with continuing developments that allow us to outpace this North Korean threat.

Mr. ROGERS. But as far as capability, were we surprised by the successful recent test that they had and their new capability? I recognize the leadership change was unexpected.

General JACOBY. Right. There have been several attempts with a TD-2 [Taepo Dong-2 intermediate-range missile] to put a space vehicle into orbit. The intelligence community was mixed on whether they would be successful, and I think that they—we have to consider that successful and we have to consider it a demonstration of their ability to pursue ICBM technology, as reflected in the rollout of the long-range, road-mobile missile.

And so from the NORTHCOM perspective now, what that means is we honor that threat. Okay, so exactly where it is, exactly how many is still unclear. Is it operational? Is it not?

But from a warfighter, from a commander's point of view, we honor that threat today.

Mr. ROGERS. Don't we have similar concerns with the Iranian potential threat?

General JACOBY. As I mentioned earlier in my testimony, I believe that the Iranians are intent on developing an ICBM. They have had some successful space launches where they put into orbit satellites. I believe they are pursuing ICBM, as the director of national intelligence has testified as well, so I think that we have to proceed under the assumption that without any other intervening factor that they will continue to seek an ICBM and we should be prepared to improve our capabilities as required to meet the evolution of that threat.

Right now, as you know, we are able to defend the United States against Iranian—a threat from Iran today.

Mr. ROGERS. Right.

General Jacoby, can you elaborate on sensor improvements, including added deployments of sensors that NORTHCOM believes are needed? For example, would added X-band sensor coverage on the East Coast protect against threats from Iran?

General JACOBY. Thank you.

I have been a strong proponent to work across the entire enterprise and not to stay focused on just one piece. And so to have the best GBI in the world but not to have a redundant and resilient sensor architecture to support that wouldn't make sense. And so we very much look at the whole category of things to improve across the BMD enterprise.

Now, as part of this rollout you know that TPY-2 [Transportable Radar Surveillance]—a second TPY-2 into Japan is central to that and it gives us that redundancy and resiliency in our sensor architecture.

You know that there are improvements that are being made in our UEWR [Upgraded Early Warning Radar] sites. We are strong proponents on that for both the West and the East Coast, and we

should be fully prepared to add sensors to the program as required and as the threat develops.

And it really has to do with, how sophisticated do our adversaries become over time and what does the sensor requirement become over time?

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much. My time has expired.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. And good morning, General Jacoby and General Kelly.

This question is for the two of you. The U.S. territories of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands have become increasingly affected by the drug trade. The most recent statistics provided by the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the Drug Enforcement Administration show very steep increases in drug seizures in and around the territories in 2012 compared to 2011 with no corresponding decrease in the street price of drugs in either territory.

Violence linked to the drug trade has also spiked, and the homicide rates in the two territories are the highest in the country by a substantial margin. I believe that this is a national security problem, given the fact that these are U.S. jurisdictions and the fact that the evidence suggests that up to 80 percent of the drugs that enter Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are subsequently transported by air and maritime means to the U.S.

So can you comment on what steps NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM are already taking to address drug-related violence and what additional steps you intend to take going forward to address this problem?

General JACOBY. Thank you for that question. It is a great concern for us that—the levels of violence and NORTHCOM does have responsibility for Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands and the Unified Command plan.

One of the first things that we did was to send our defense coordinating officer and planners down to work with the Puerto Rico National Guard, and that is principally how we do business is we support civil authorities, we don't conduct separate operations.

So we are very much in support of any initiatives that they may ask us to do, or our partners. And so Customs Border Patrol, Coast Guard, DHS [Department of Homeland Security]—I know that they are working a campaign plan for looking at the problems and how we can help.

And my organization that would get behind that is Joint Task Force North. They are my go-to organization to provide Defense Department support to civil authorities. That will be constrained by the budget, by how much—how many resources we can put against it, but we will make it a priority as requests come in for support.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you.

And, General Kelly.

General KELLY. As we watch the drug trafficking patterns, most of it of course—well 20 years ago it all came up through that part of the Caribbean and into Florida primarily—well, certainly the East Coast of the United States. Those patterns changed as our

partners and our own Government was successful. So as we stop that flow 20 years ago or so the flow now goes up through Panama—correction—Central America and Mexico.

As we have been somewhat successful—I wouldn't say highly successful, but fairly successful—in an operation that was started by my predecessor, Operation Martillo, we have been pretty successful in getting an awful lot of cocaine primarily off the flow. As that has been successful, I think we have started to see—and you—as you point out, the traffickers finding another way around.

The good news is, unlike 20 years ago, we watch this network pretty closely; we know what they are doing and we can detect even pretty small changes in their operation patterns.

But at the end of the day, my responsibility is for detection and monitoring, and working shoulder to shoulder with law enforcement, the other heroes in this fight: the DEA, local law enforcement, FBI, Treasury, Justice. And they are really in the interdiction business.

But, if I don't have assets, which I don't, all I can do is watch the drugs go by.

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, thank you. Thank you, General.

And I have one quick question for you, General, again.

This is regarding the State Partnership Program. I am a very strong proponent of the program and I value strong state relationships such as the one between Guam and the Philippines. I believe the National Guard state partnership program provides combatant commands with a tremendous tool to partner with allied nations.

So can you comment of the value of this program in your command? And what, if any, other opportunities are possible for the expansion of the SPP [State Partnership Program] in the SOUTHCOM AOR?

General KELLY. I agree with the Congresswoman that it is very, very useful, highly successful, as I mentioned to Mr. Wilson; he asked a similar question. We get a lot out of it for very, very, very little money. So I would certainly—I think we have 26 down in the SOUTHCOM AOR—be certainly happy to see that increase, but I think it does, to a large degree these days, come down to budget.

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, thank you very much.

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Wittman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Jacoby, General Kelly thank you so much for joining us today. We really appreciate your service to our Nation.

General Kelly, I want to ask specifically about the criticality of the Navy's mission there in SOUTHCOM and that AOR, the things that are going on there. Obviously it is a pretty expansive mission. Want to get a perspective about what the sequester and the potential of the C.R. [Continuing Resolution] places there on Navy operations in that area.

And we all know that recently the cancellation of the USNS *Comfort's* availability in that region. Just want to get your perspective on where you believe the operational capacity will be, where the needs may exist, and where there may be a gap potentially.

General KELLY. Well, the need is there, certainly. The wonderful thing about *Comfort* is it is a tremendous outreach to people who in some cases have never seen the U.S. flag before and suddenly they are having, you know, fairly detailed medical procedures done for free. I mean, thousands and thousands of medical procedures.

So the *Comfort* is a big deal. By the way, the Chinese have gotten involved in that as well and have deployed their own hospital ship to the region. To the best of my knowledge right now, *Comfort* is gone this year, it is—we are losing that and—because of sequestration. And not just because of sequestration. I mean, when you take a \$487 billion bite out of the budget things are going to start to fall, and then if you add another \$500 billion on that.

So Navy ops [operations] in my area of operations will essentially stop—go to zero, I believe. With a little luck, the United States Coast Guard, you know, the other heroes in this fight—with a little luck I might—we might see a Coast Guard cutter down there, but we are going to lose airborne ISR in this—in the counterdrug fight, we will lose the Navy assets.

Many of the assets we got—excuse me—many of the assets we got even in the recent past were just assets that were down in the Caribbean, as an example, training. And they have got to—you know, they have got to be at sea so they come down and while they were training in the Caribbean or in the Eastern Pacific they participate in the drug fight, if you will. So a lot of this stuff wasn't even dedicated to me, it was just opportune.

Same thing with some of the airborne ISRs. Believe it or not, B-52s [Stratofortress strategic bomber] and B-1s [Lancer strategic bomber] when they train have to train somewhere. The airplane doesn't know where it is when it is doing its training so we actually had aircraft like that flying over the Caribbean, JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System], opportune opportunity because they were training and we just, you know, benefited from that training exercise.

So much of what we have gotten is not really dedicated to us, but simply we take advantage of it.

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay. Very good.

General Jacoby, I want to ask you specifically about the aerospace control alert system. As you know, it is our 24-hour system that allows us to respond.

If you look at the Air Force budget it looks like that is going to be reduced significantly to where we will not have a 24-hour alert capability, and obviously in looking at the effects of the sequester and the C.R. my question is, going forward—and I understand that the Air National Guard and the Air Force provide that dual capability there—how is the sustainment of that particular effort and the critical nature of that going to continue obviously in the face of that proposed reduction, but also in looking at sequestration and the C.R., and how important is having that 24-hour capability to our ability to detect and respond to threats?

General JACOBY. Thank you.

This is a core mission for NORAD, and so we are going to maintain a 24/7 capability.

Last year a very tough decision was made to reduce two sites from 24/7 to a lower category. There was some uncertainty with the

language coming back out, and so we believe that—we haven't seen the 2014 numbers but we believe that we still may lose those two, so we have a plan to stand those down. But that is not getting rid of the unit, that is not getting rid of the capability, that is coming down from 24/7.

I believe I could mitigate that reduction but I don't want to take any more. And so across the country I still have 14 bases where I have two fighters ready to go in 7 minutes. And I really think that that is the most rapid, most capable military response that our Secretary and President has at his finger tips and we are going to maintain that. It is essential to what we do.

Mr. WITTMAN. Let me jump right in and ask this before my time runs out: So you will continue the 24/7 capability at those sites?

General JACOBY. At the 14 remaining sites in continental United States, two in Canada, one in Alaska, one in Hawaii.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Nugent.

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank both generals for being here today. We really do appreciate your service to this country.

General Kelly, I know one of the previous members had asked questions as it relates to GTMO and alluded to the fact that he thought that defense attorneys were a great source of information in regards to the treatment of prisoners at GTMO. That may or may not be true.

I will tell you having run a detention facility of 500 prisoners, they weren't necessarily objective in their criticism, you think? Particularly when we ended pizza Fridays, that was a problem.

So I am looking forward to a trip to GTMO to see exactly the living conditions for our troops, but also how we deal with those detainees, and you correctly pointed out that ICRC comes there unannounced—announced and unannounced—and I would suggest that that is a pretty independent group. I don't think they have always been supportive, and maybe you can answer that, and what has changed their mind from the past.

General KELLY. They look at it kind of two—there are two parts to their—to a discussion with them, and almost certainly within the first few days of taking command they came by to just—we had a conference down in Miami down at my headquarters that they participated in and had to do with detainee office ops.

They gave us high marks overall for how the detainees are cared for, housed, fed, medical care, but then the other part of it is—and I understand this and I have nothing but respect for what they do; I have worked with them in Iraq and other places—their idea is that their conditions should always improve ultimately until they are released.

And so there are limits, whether it is Department of Defense or the commissions or other Government agencies are willing to let that go, but they always ask for more and we do the best we can to provide more—excuse me—but they are pretty independent and they are pretty happy with what they see down there.

Again, their view would be, you know, housed in another place and maybe they question whether they should be there at all, but

at the end of the day all I am really interested in is the marks they give me for how they, you know—

Mr. NUGENT. They care for them.

General KELLY [continuing]. How humanely we treat them, yes. Exactly

Mr. NUGENT. You made a previous comment reference to *Comfort* not being deployed. What message does that send, obviously, because you are trying to build relationships with those in South America, and typically an underserved area from our perspective? How does that affect you?

General KELLY. Well, as I think I said a little while ago, for the most part the people of the Caribbean, Central America, Latin America, they really want us in their lives; with a few notable exceptions, they want us in their lives.

That means engagement. You know, it is funny, they don't ask for very much with the exception of, "Hey, we are about to do something, and, you know, could you send down a few officers to help us plan this training exercise or naval exercise?" So they ask for very little.

And just to go down there, my trips down there is a big deal to them. We will send down a small number of, say, special forces guys, gals to train them in something, and—or a company of marines to go down to Guatemala and teach them riverine ops, that kind of thing. Very, very small investments.

And so, to answer your question, you know, as those things are—not as many of those things under sequestration or even under the initial \$487 billion cut, there will be fewer—less and less of that kind of thing. And then I would—I can't underscore enough, the *Comfort* is a huge deal to them down there. And to not have *Comfort* go down is—will catch their—

Mr. NUGENT. You made, I think, a very good observation that China is going to fill that void with their own "*Comfort*," and flying the Chinese flag, particularly far away from where they live, right in our back door. So I am concerned about, you know, what message we are sending to our closest neighbors.

What else do you see from China in regards to their influence in South America?

General KELLY. I am watching the chairman, but they are very economically engaged, buying commodities in a big way and also investing in port facilities and the things like that. So they are very, very economically engaged throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.

Mr. NUGENT. I appreciate your comments. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Wenstrup.

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, General Kelly and General Jacoby, for being here.

You know, some of the issues raised today are legitimate concerns that we as Americans always have as to how we conduct our business.

But as a Army medical officer who spent a year in Iraq at a detention facility in Iraq from 2005–2006 I have some firsthand knowledge of how we conduct our business. And I came home proud to say how we conducted our business.

And I also found that often there were alleged activities that absolutely had no bearing and—on things that simply did not exist or take place. And I am sure you can appreciate that, sitting in your position.

And I can attest to the quality of care that the detainees received in our facility because it was the same providers and the same care that was offered to our troops.

And I can also say, for the record, that as far as I know, in the entire year that I was there, only one politician came to see what we were doing and that was the governor of Florida, Jeb Bush.

Also, what was addressed earlier was a hunger strike. And I was involved with the hunger strike policy that we put in place. In our case it was a very high-value detainee, and I can attest to the very humane way that we go about the business of taking care of those not so much as detainees, but we looked at them as a patient.

So just for the record, I am very proud of how we conducted our business, and I am hopeful and feel assured that you are conducting it the same way.

My question is, at Guantanamo, where I have not been—and I am assuming but asking the question—the access to medical care for the detainees is the same as it is for our troops. Would that be correct?

General KELLY. Absolutely.

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you.

And I yield back my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Lamborn.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for having to be in and out. I have another committee that is having amendments that—with—that has recorded votes so that is why I was in and out.

But both of you, thank you for your service to our country. Thank you for being here.

General Jacoby, in particular, I want to greet you. It is always good to see you.

And for the people including yourself and under your command who serve in Colorado Springs, you are such a great addition to our community and the public spiritedness. I just want to thank you for that.

And I will ask a technical question now, because I couldn't turn down this opportunity. And it has to do with missile defense.

And Chairman Rogers was referring to this earlier, but as part of the overall strategic decisions—and I applaud the 10 additional ground-based interceptors that we are going to put on our homeland, but I am hoping—and I know he shares this same concern—I am hoping that that is not at the expense of what would have been stationed somewhere in Europe, like, let's say Romania, because that is much closer to the threat of Iran that we all know is a developing threat, an emerging threat, and does protect our homeland from Iranian ICBMs, should that day arrive. And we know that their intentions are to have an ICBM capability.

Could you comment on that, General?

General JACOBY. Congressman, thanks. And it is great to see you and I will be ready to get back home with you.

So it is not really my lane for a European Phased Adaptive Approach. The rollout spoke the story of how the phases one through three will continue apace.

Phase four was centered around the SM-3 Block IIB [Standard Missile-3 ballistic missile interceptor], and I want to make sure that we are thinking about this in time correctly.

SM-3 Block IIB has been moving to the right for a long time. It is beyond 2020. It is—you know, we have a saying in the military, “It is PowerPoint deep.”

And so there were some aspects of SM-3 Block IIB that are being sustained. The advanced EKV [Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle] design work that is being done, that will be of tremendous benefit. So that continues.

But the option that was chosen was, if you place 14 more missiles at Greely you are going to outpace the future North Korean threat and still be able to defend against Iran. And so you wouldn’t be able to do that with an ICBM shooter in Europe. You couldn’t go both ways.

So, where we are, juxtaposing both threats, was a good solid decision. And where we were on the SM-3 Block IIB program, it was a solid decision. And I won’t speak for how the allies respond but I know that Admiral Stavridis is working through that right now and I would defer to him.

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, and I know that this isn’t exactly what you concentrate on all the time but it is peripheral to the threats that you do handle and so, I appreciate your answer. And I understand that if we have constraints, what was decided may very well be the best decision. However, I am hoping—and will be working—that it is a both/and situation, not an either/or situation.

General JACOBY. Right. And as the commander responsible for it, you know, we are not looking to compromise on the defense of the American people.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. I have no doubt about that.

I thank you again, and you, General Kelly, for the great service you have given our country.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. CONAWAY. [Presiding.] The gentleman yields back.

The gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Bridenstine, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.

It is great to be here. I am a new guy to the United States Congress. I have been here for 2½ months. But I am a naval aviator and I have flown counterdrug missions in Central and South America, from, you know, Colombia and El Salvador.

And I had a question for you, General Kelly, if you could share for us what the correlation is between successful missions down south and the price of cocaine at home, and if that is a reasonable way to measure success? Can you share with us your thoughts on that?

General KELLY. Well, I think the more cocaine you take off the market before it gets to, you know, Anytown, USA, will—just supply and demand will drive the price up.

Of course, they do have a little bit of an advantage there, because they can also cut it more and drive the quality down. But

at a certain point even the average drug user has got its limits in terms of the quality of the product he or she is using.

But I think, again, if you drive—if you limit the amount that flows north, that gets into Anytown, USA, that price will go up. And with a lot of prediction, I think, fewer and fewer people will try cocaine, young kids, as an example. It is not to say they won't find another way to do harm to themselves, but I think that is a measure of success.

I know the office—the White House office on drug reduction and all claims that the use of cocaine is down by 40 percent. I have no way to validate that number, but if it is down by 40 percent or 30 percent or 2.5 percent, it just might mean one other family doesn't have to bury his or her—their children.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Absolutely. I hear a lot, as a member of Congress and somebody who just got through a campaign, that the drug war is not worth fighting. And I would attest that when we see success down south we do see the effect on the price of cocaine at home. And ultimately, you know, we can prevent people from becoming addicted by driving down the access here in the United States of America.

So I just want to thank you for the work you are doing, thank you for all the people in Central and South America that are working so hard on this particular mission.

One other question I had, and this will be it: When you consider the assets that we have in the Caribbean or the Eastern Pacific and how they match up with the targets that are, you know, available, can you talk for a minute about, are those assets correctly matched? And what can we, as member of Congress, do to maybe support you in the acquisitions process to match the—you know, the right asset with the right targets?

General KELLY. Well, there are kind of three aspects of what we do in terms of the monitoring, detection, and ultimately some of the interdiction. You need good intelligence, and we have really, really good intelligence. We understand the network and have a lot of human intelligence sources, have a lot of NSA [National Security Agency] and things like that. And that is all managed for me down at JIATF-South, Joint Interagency Task Force-South, in Key West.

And then as that picture is built, then we can vector people like yourself when you flew, airborne ISR. And as I have already mentioned, we take any airplane that was available, to include B-1s and B-52s, at times, to search the ocean, find what we are looking for.

And then rather than have, you know, the Coast Guard cutters or U.S. Navy ships just out patrolling like they did 10 or 12 years ago looking, now we almost—JIATF-South can basically tell them where to go, you know, get there by a certain time, look off the port bow, and that guy that is going 40 knots, go get him. And that guy going 40 knots might be doing, you know—might have 8 to 10 tons of very, very pure cocaine on board.

We are getting better at it, and I don't want to get too much into it in an open forum, but they have—I mean, we are being so successful in many ways, they are now building their own submarines with long, long, long legs—you know, a submarine, fully submers-

ible that can go 6,800 miles on a tank of gas. And they are fully submersible—not for that whole distance; they have to come up and recharge. But we have driven them to that. They have to build these things in—primarily in the—up the estuaries in Colombia, and then take them to sea.

So that is how—I mean, that is a measure of effectiveness of how well we are doing on the high seas and in the air. We are forcing them underwater and we are working to get at them down there as well.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you so much.

Mr. CONAWAY. The gentleman's time has expired.

The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks, for 5 minutes.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And gentlemen, thank you for being here. I have had the privilege of being able to visit with both of you in a private setting and I just—you know, I always try to take the time if I can, when people with stars on their shoulders that have given their lives to the cause of freedom and given my children a better chance to be free, I just want to thank you with all my heart for your service, and I appreciate your patience sometimes with some of the incredibly brilliant questions you get from this panel.

With that said, let me try not to fall into that category here.

General Jacoby, I wanted to just again thank you for your time the other day. And I am curious to see how protected you feel our critical defense assets are from potential severe space weather or manmade electromagnetic pulse. It is a broad subject.

You know, one of the challenges we have right now, we are dealing a lot with cybersecurity. And of course, you know, our generals are doing everything they can to protect us from that but they don't have the supervisorial capability over the private I.P. [Internet Protocol] network. And the same is true of the civilian grid.

And I just wondered if you could expand on that and maybe give me time to answer—ask General Kelly a question.

General JACOBY. Sure. Thanks, Congressman. It is good to see you.

Right now I start my day with a weather report, and that includes solar weather. It does have an effect on us. And so we track that very closely and we are very interested in the effects of any problems on the electric grid to critical infrastructure.

And as you said, it is not just limited to defense critical infrastructure. Our general security is really in the hands of, you know, from private to Government to commercial, and so it is working as a team to discover what is critical, where are the nodes that need to be protected. And as we saw in Hurricane Sandy, there are cascading effects when the power grid goes down, so it is really important for us to be a partner in the larger effort to do that.

Specifically for EMP [electromagnetic pulse], we are not tracking a—intelligence on an EMP threat today, but intelligence is really the key for us, but we do have vulnerabilities. So I think that as part of any assessment of our critical infrastructure that should be one of the important questions we ask about what would an EMP effect be.

For my command itself, the NORAD, NORTHCOM, we are very well protected for EMP. We have critical national-level command

and control systems that, as part of the development of those systems, EMP hardening was taken into account and we have done that.

So also, it is important to ensure that we train ourselves in operating in a denied environment and we do that as well.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, sir. I continue to be glad you are on our side.

General Kelly, I wanted to just ask you that, you know, related to Admiral Greenert's testimony to this committee, he stated that unless our budget changes courses we will stop all aircraft deployments to South America and stopping efforts that interdicted hundreds of tons of illegal drugs in—coming into the United States in 2012. Can you explain to this committee the direct impact it will have on our Nation, from your perspective—that particular issue?

And also, I guess a little more esoteric, do you feel that greater use of autonomous surveillance sensors and communications assets could help fill any gaps in the counterterrorism and illicit drug trafficking capability deficiencies that were highlighted by Admiral Greenert?

General KELLY. Well, in terms of ships and the like, with almost scientific accuracy I can tell you that if we have one average—if we have one ship working the drug interdiction mission or actually detection monitoring and interdiction, one ship, I can tell you on average how much that ship will be responsible for taking off the market in the course of a year—two ships, twice as much; three ships, and it goes up and up and up and up.

By the same token, as you lose that capability on the water it goes down. So if I go to zero, you know, we—I believe we need 14 ships down there in the Pacific and in the Caribbean on any given day and we could really, really hurt this drug flow. I get on average about 5 or 6. That includes—I am sorry—includes Coast Guard cutters as well, and they are very, very stressed, the Coast Guard is.

So I get 5 or 6 if I am lucky. I suspect I will go to one or zero because of the budget issues. So all of that drugs that—all of those drugs will make their way up through Central America, Mexico, across the border, and right into Arizona.

Mr. FRANKS. And as far as autonomous surveillance sensors, any increased need there?

General KELLY. I mean, there are other ways to do this. Again, I would rather go in a classified setting. We are doing some things now, but things like drones and whatnot, just surveillance drones, could really help us out and really take the heat and wear and tear off of some of our manned aviation assets.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you both again for your service.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CONAWAY. The gentleman's time has expired.

I recognize myself for 5 minutes.

General Kelly, it is good to see you.

Good to see you, sir, General Jacoby, as well.

Thank you for at least twice—I got here a little bit late—for getting into the record the \$487 billion cut, as well as the \$500 billion cut and the impacts as we are going—that those will have. And we

appreciate the struggles we are going to have—you are going to have trying to make do with those much-reduced resources.

Can you give us a bit of a brief on what is post-Venezuela—or Venezuela will look like post-Chavez and the impact it has had—the influence that Chavez had throughout South America? Can you give what the current read is on what it is going to look like without him?

General KELLY. As I know you know, Congressman, there were two parts of Chavez. You know, at least 51 percent of the population of his country thought very highly of him. He had tremendous charisma and could appeal to certain elements of his society. So that is one part of it.

The other part is how, as a president, what the country—what the condition of the country is right now. And of course, it is in tough shape. It is very, very high crime, high murder rates; economy is faltering. The petrochemical industry is old and needs and awful lot of money to restructure.

The expectation is that the vice president will win the election on the 14th of April. He may or may not be a better president. He doesn't have any of the charisma and the belovedness, if you will, that Chavez had.

So he will have a tough row to hoe, because I think he will—a lot of the things that maybe were happening or not happening in Venezuela, people were willing to say, "Well, yes, we still love the President Hugo Chavez." Not going to have that advantage if you are not Hugo Chavez.

So the expectation is that the vice president will be elected and that things will continue to be as they are in Venezuela, and who knows 5 years down the line.

One of the things that I think many of the countries that benefit from Venezuela's largess—Cuba and some of the other countries—I think they realize that they cannot continue to get the very, very, very reasonable rates on loans and oil and things like that at the cost they get it. I don't think, probably, Venezuela can sustain that. So I think they are nervous that with Mr. Chavez gone, that by necessity the vice president, if he is elected—but anyone that is elected—will have to rethink the flow of money that goes out of the country to essentially buy friends.

So they are nervous about it. Many of their economies are, these nations in particular, four or five of them, their economies are kind of weak. And if they actually had to pay world prices for oil or didn't get the very, very low-interest loans that they enjoy under Chavez they would be in real trouble.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. Smith, anything else?

Mr. SMITH. No, thank you.

Mr. CONAWAY. Gentlemen, thank you for your long service to our country and your continued service.

And this meeting is adjourned. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 20, 2013

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 20, 2013

**Statement of Hon. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon
Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act—
The Posture of the U.S. Northern Command
and U.S. Southern Command
March 20, 2013**

Good morning. The committee meets today to receive testimony on the posture of both our Northern Command and Southern Command. I am pleased to welcome General Charles Jacoby, commander of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, and General John Kelly, commander of U.S. Southern Command. Gentlemen, thank you for your long and distinguished service to our Nation and thank you for joining us today.

Even as we proceed in this difficult budget environment and the news commands our attention to Africa and the Middle East, we must be diligent in keeping our hemisphere safe. Therefore, I was pleased by the Administration’s announcement last Friday affirming the program of the previous Administration to deploy 44 ground-based interceptors at two sites in California and Alaska. On the other hand, cancelling the fourth phase of the EPAA sends a terrible signal to America’s allies. I would have hoped after the 2009 fiasco, we would stop waking up our Eastern European allies to tell them, at the last minute, that we’re changing our missile defense plans on them. General Jacoby, I look forward to learning more about how we’re filling the gaps in our homeland missile defense.

I also look forward to hearing your assessment of the progress being made by the new President of Mexico on drug-related violence and what NORTHCOM is doing to support Mexico and build their capacity and capabilities. This is a threat daily and directly impacting the U.S. homeland, and we need to treat it as a national security imperative.

General Kelly, in my mind, the illicit trafficking threat is the greatest challenge we face in your geographic area of responsibility. While we continue to see success in Colombia, destabilization and violence in Central America is rampant. Tackling these issues requires close collaboration and coordination with NORTHCOM, as well as interagency partners. Unfortunately, the Navy will eliminate its ship presence in the Caribbean in April due to sequestration. This guarantees an increased flow of drugs and illicit net-

working across our borders. To that end, please elaborate on the other consequences of sequestration on both of your commands.

Gentlemen, thank you again for appearing before us today.

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith
Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act—
The Posture of the U.S. Northern Command
and U.S. Southern Command
March 20, 2013

I would like to join Chairman McKeon in welcoming General Kelly and General Jacoby. We appreciate your time and look forward to hearing your thoughts.

Moving forward, sequestration will continue to complicate how the Department of Defense plans and appropriates resources. That will certainly have an impact on your day-to-day operations as well as your ability to achieve your requirements. In light of this challenge, and the other challenges you face, I look forward to hearing from you.

General Kelly, after your first few months at SOUTHCOM, I am interested in your thoughts on the important issues in your new portfolio. These issues continue to be the nontraditional threats in the region, the rising violence and instability in Central America, our military-to-military cooperation in the area, and your counter-narcotics duties. I would also like to hear about our continuing work with Colombia and finally your impressions about the detainee mission at Guantanamo Bay. While SOUTHCOM continues to lack traditional military threats to the United States, these issues are important to the United States and often require an interagency approach to address them.

General Jacoby, you and the dedicated men and women of NORTHCOM and NORAD have been very busy lately, carrying out various missions to defend our homeland. Your support to civil authorities have been indispensable as our Nation responded to massive fires and devastating hurricanes over the last year. Internal threats such as these are increasing annually and appear to be growing in intensity.

External threats such as those posed by North Korea and Iran are also growing as they seek to improve their capabilities to launch long-range missiles. I was pleased last week to see that the Administration continues to respond appropriately and firmly by bolstering our capabilities and capacity to defend ourselves. The Administration's decision to deploy 14 additional ground-based interceptors is a wise and prudent step in implementing a sound strategy for missile defense. General Jacoby, I trust we will learn more about this decision during your testimony as well as better understand the Administration's long-term efforts to make smart investments to improve the effectiveness and reliability of our missile defense capability.

I would also ask that you comment on the defense and security partnerships with our northern and southern neighbors as we pursue mutual security interests.

Again, thank you all for your time.

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF
GENERAL CHARLES H. JACOBY, JR., UNITED STATES ARMY
COMMANDER
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND
AND
NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
MARCH 20, 2013

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to report on the posture of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). As the combatant commander charged with defense of our homeland, it is a distinct privilege to represent the more than 2,000 men and women of the Commands who stand the watch around the clock on behalf of our nation. Strengthened by robust partnerships with hemispheric neighbors and interagency communities, my commands execute three primary missions: homeland defense, defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), and security cooperation.

USNORTHCOM was established October 1, 2002 to provide command and control of Department of Defense (DOD) homeland defense efforts and to command the federal military response to requests for DSCA. The imperative to protect and secure the homeland against all hazards is even more important today. Over the last year, Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy, record wildfires, severe drought, and violent tornado activity tested the nation. The continued opening of the Arctic precipitated significant growth in human activity, potentially posing new domestic, foreign consequence management, and homeland defense challenges and opportunities. In addition to these natural events, internal and external man-made threats continue to proliferate. Cognizant of these challenges, we remain positioned to support our mission partners in their response efforts to restore normalcy following any disaster, while continually honing our capabilities to outpace and adapt to shared security threats to the United States and Canada in accordance with the NORAD agreement. Leveraging the vitally important Combatant Commander Exercise and Engagement Program, we prepare for our missions through training, education, and exercises, and take every opportunity to learn from these events. With each real-

world crisis, we apply a candid, rigorous lessons learned process to replicate successes, correct deficiencies, and ultimately strengthen our partnerships.

Defending the nation requires a reliance on partners in three distinct geographic locations: globally, in the approaches to the homeland, and within the homeland. On the outer layer of this defense in depth, my global partners include the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of State, and associated functional and geographic combatant commands, to name a few. In the approaches to the homeland are our partners in Mexico, The Bahamas, and Canada. Within our homeland, my federal partners include the Military Departments and Services, National Guard Bureau (NGB), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (specifically, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), United States Coast Guard (USCG), Transportation Security Administration, and Customs and Border Protection (CBP)), Department of Justice (DOJ), and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Finally and perhaps most critically, are my subordinate headquarters strategically placed at key intersections between the approaches and the homeland: Joint Task Force North (JTF-North) on the Southwest border, Joint Task Force National Capital Region, Joint Task Force Civil Support on the eastern seaboard, and Joint Task Force Alaska (JTF-Alaska) in America's high north.

Partnerships are equally important in my DSCA responsibilities. I live daily with the knowledge that any moment can bring news of natural and man-made disasters. To meet the deservedly high expectations of our citizens, we work in support of primary agencies responding to natural disasters as part of a team of federal, state, and local entities. Disaster response is largely a function of preparedness. As such, our training and exercise program, collaboration, and communications with our partners form the foundation of our ability to execute in times of

crisis. The trusted partnerships we have built with some 50 federal agencies are evident in the presence of more than 60 liaison officers in our headquarters with whom we work side-by-side.

These well-established partnerships achieve two principal effects. In pre-crisis, they enable safety and security activities that mitigate the effects of natural disasters and deter threat activities. Upon transition to crisis, unity of effort and the power of interagency teamwork are a function of our robust, realistic, and comprehensive training and exercise programs.

Today, our partners are pressured by budget constraints that can erode the defense and security of the homeland unless we judiciously build, balance, and protect homeland defense capabilities. We remain mindful of our nation's budgetary challenges and understand that fiscal responsibility is itself a matter of national security. The nation realizes meaningful security dividends through interagency partnering and cooperative engagement with our Canadian, Mexican, and Bahamian neighbors. As we confront shared challenges such as transnational criminal organizations, terror and weapons proliferation, and other threat networks, prudent investments made possible by the Congress equate to a significant down payment on our national security objectives. With a relatively modest geographic combatant command budget, USNORTHCOM and NORAD carry out our country's foremost and uniquely solemn duties to protect our citizens and support them in their times of greatest need. We are working smarter in an era of significant budget constraints, knowing threats to the homeland will likely not diminish. Keeping faith with our fellow Americans is our greatest moral imperative, understanding that the physical and moral consequences of a successful attack in the homeland far outweigh those of a similar attack overseas.

Homeland Defense

Homeland defense is perhaps the best example of how we defend in depth through our partners. Our Missile Defense, Aerospace Warning and Control, Maritime Warning, Cyber Security, Infrastructure Resiliency, and Antiterrorism/Force Protection mission sets require close cooperation and communication with partners globally, in the approaches, and in the homeland.

Missile Defense. North Korea's Taepo Dong 2 launch in December 2012, followed by its announcement of a third nuclear test in February 2013, are sobering reminders that our nation must remain vigilant against nation-states that can threaten the homeland directly. North Korea continues to seek international recognition as a nuclear-armed state and has unveiled a road-mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) with claims it can strike targets in our homeland. Although Iran does not yet possess a nuclear weapon, it is developing advanced missile capabilities faster than previously assessed and is apparently positioning itself to produce a nuclear warhead quickly should its leaders choose to do so.

I am confident in our ability to employ the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system to engage the current ballistic threats against the United States. The fielded system was developed using a spiral acquisition approach designed to counter a limited, unsophisticated ballistic missile threat from a rogue nation. In light of the challenging threats that loom on the horizon, Admiral Locklear (Commander, U.S. Pacific Command), General Kehler (Commander, U.S. Strategic Command), Vice Admiral Syring (Director, Missile Defense Agency (MDA)), and I are working as a team with the intelligence community to improve our capability to warn against and mitigate emerging threats. We remain committed to improving current Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capabilities to ensure we maintain our strategic advantage and guarantee confidence in our ability to defeat evolving, more complex threats in the future.

In view of the continued development of North Korean threat capabilities, we are partnering with the MDA to improve GMD reliability. To be sure, GMD is a system of systems. Only synergistic and comprehensive improvements across the entirety of the kill chain—intelligence, sensors, interceptors, and command and control—can ensure system confidence and maximize performance. We are working across the entire system to enhance system reliability. The complexity of the GMD system dictates an intricate interplay between development of new capability, operator tactics, component testing, and the continuous calibration of threat profiles.

We have worked closely with the MDA to maintain the right balance in developing and testing missile defense technologies, while increasing our readiness to execute this critical mission set. This requires that we achieve a cadence of at least one operational GMD intercept flight test annually. I am pleased with the successful flight test conducted in January 2013 and expect that future tests will serve to increase confidence in the fielded system.

Our BMD responsibilities include all potential missile threats, regardless of range or source. To evaluate our capability against a regional ballistic missile threat, we have conducted a series of tests and exercises using Joint, Deployable Integrated Air and Missile Defense systems in the protection of designated critical assets (such as population centers, major events, and critical infrastructure) against a limited air, cruise, or ballistic missile attack. These ongoing tests and exercises are oriented on the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures that integrate existing Aegis BMD, Patriot, and Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems into a layered defense. We will continue to pursue effective and efficient methods to improve our ability to protect the homeland. Our citizens expect our vigilance and rigor to protect them from a missile attack on our soil. We work diligently to maintain their trust.

Aerospace Warning and Control. A vital component of homeland defense is NORAD's Aerospace Warning and Control missions. Through the execution of Operation NOBLE EAGLE (ONE), NORAD defends North American airspace from unwanted and unauthorized aircraft on a 24/7 basis and accomplishes this critical mission with a combination of armed fighters on alert, air patrols, aerial refueling, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) surveillance platforms, the National Capital Region Integrated Air Defense System, and our ground-based Air Defense Sector surveillance detection capabilities. These assets allow NORAD to respond to both strategic and asymmetric air threats to the Homeland.

Since 9/11, more than 62,000 sorties have been flown in support of ONE. Our continued requirements for air domain awareness and intercept capabilities mean we must ensure that NORAD forces can protect our most critical national infrastructure, and that we maintain a basing architecture that defends key terrain and our most critical national infrastructure.

This has been an extremely busy year for the men and women of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, as we have successfully supported the DHS and the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) to plan and execute many National Special Security Events (NSSEs). These include the G-8 Summit at Camp David, Maryland; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Chicago, Illinois; the Republican National Convention in Tampa, Florida; the Democratic National Convention in Charlotte, North Carolina; the Presidential Inauguration, and the State of the Union Address in our nation's capital. In addition to NSSEs, the day-to-day operational planning and support generated by the 2012 National Election involved the cooperation and coordination of an array of interagency organizations. NORAD participated extensively in these efforts with a full array of support, when required by lead federal agencies. We are proud of NORAD's successful planning and execution for these critical national events.

NORAD continues to demonstrate the ability to respond quickly to potential strategic threats through Northern Sovereignty Operations, which involves the monitoring and detection of announced and unannounced Russian Military Aviation flights entering the United States and Canadian Air Defense Identification Zones. This year again, Russian Long-Range Aviation (LRA) continues a deliberate modernization plan with increasing operational capability. The successful detection and intercept of such flights demonstrates NORAD's ability and intention to defend not only the northern reaches of our sovereign airspace, but all of NORAD's area of operations. Whether in the continental United States or along the northern tier of Alaska and Canada, NORAD continues to successfully provide Aerospace Warning and Aerospace Control for North America.

Maritime Warning and Maritime Homeland Defense. NORAD's Maritime Warning Mission, which supplements the national intelligence analysis and warning capabilities of the United States and Canada, continues to mature, and we have achieved notable progress in building and maintaining relationships with mission partners and stakeholders in the maritime community of interest. My staff remains engaged with our Canadian partners through the Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD) and the Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) as we continue to improve awareness and develop the NORAD Maritime Warning Mission.

Beyond maritime warning, USNORTHCOM supports the execution of the National Maritime Security Strategy through preparations to lead or act in a supporting role to ensure the security of the homeland in the face of a maritime threat. With the recent assignment of Navy North (NAVNORTH), I now have a service component commander and headquarters responsible for maritime operations in my area of responsibility. NAVNORTH will continue to build on the outstanding working relationships with our interagency and Service partners,

particularly the USCG, to ensure future operations are coordinated and integrated to the greatest extent possible.

Cyber Security. I share former Secretary Panetta's concern that the United States may be in a "pre-9/11 moment" with regard to a major cyber attack. Global dependencies on electronic information technology offer adversaries attractive opportunities to wreak havoc in this domain. Cyber operations are non-kinetic, asymmetric options that have the added advantage of shrouded attribution. The potential effects of a targeted attack could have severe consequences for U.S. infrastructure and institutions, impede our homeland defense mission, degrade our ability to support military activities overseas, and strain our ability to provide relief to civil authorities. To address growing threats, USNORTHCOM and NORAD, in conjunction with U.S. Cyber Command, recently established a Joint Cyber Center (JCC) to recognize and assess when a cyberspace attack is being orchestrated against the homeland. Although in its infancy, the JCC's goal is to provide timely and accurate information associated with the cyber domain through focused situational awareness and integrated operational cyberspace planning. We have also incorporated more robust cyber play in our exercises to refine our cyber-defense capability and enhance our effectiveness to operate within the confines of a degraded environment.

Antiterrorism and Force Protection. Consistent with our Unified Command Plan authorities and guidance from the Secretary of Defense "to preserve the Nation's combat power," USNORTHCOM executes an antiterrorism and force protection mission across our area of responsibility. This is achieved by implementing force protection and security-related policy, ensuring compliance with standards, developing new technologies, and engaging with key mission partners. To preempt insider threats as occurred at Fort Hood, USNORTHCOM

maintains a close, trusted partnership with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to share threat information rapidly, and to synchronize the collective military response efforts of the Department.

Protection of our installations, people, and Defense Critical Infrastructure (DCI) is imperative to maintain mission assurance. USNORTHCOM advocates to ensure that sufficient resource requirements are considered in Military Department budget deliberations to implement Service Component antiterrorism and force protection programs. In addition, USNORTHCOM continues aggressive planning and collaboration with DOD components to ensure DCI most vital to mission owners is always available and mission capable, consistent with DoD guidance.

Defense Support of Civil Authorities

We assist our domestic mission partners across the spectrum of activities in the homeland. Our civil support actions range from support to law enforcement agencies (LEAs) on our borders, to mitigating the effects of man-made incidents or natural disasters. Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, our assistance in this role is always in support of the lead federal agency.

USNORTHCOM, with its homeland in my area of responsibility, is uniquely characterized by domestic laws, policy, culture, and tradition. The nuances of the homeland, coupled with the evolutionary nature of the threat, highlight the criticality of USNORTHCOM's close relationship with law enforcement partners. Our continued investment and partnership with LEAs in the execution of their homeland security activities prevents operational seams and is the cornerstone of our ability to defend the nation. Underpinning the large majority of our relationship with LEAs is JTF-North, co-located with the El Paso Intelligence Center on key terrain of the Southwest border.

During 2012, we responded to multiple requests for assistance in support of CBP, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), USSS, FBI, and other agencies along the nation's Southwest border. Exchange of information and analysis allows DOD and LEAs to be partners in the layered defense and security of the homeland. Our partnerships with federal, state, and local agencies have never been stronger.

This last year speaks to the critical nature of our strong interagency partnerships and the continued requirement to support our partners. To complement the tremendous capacity of communities and states to deal with crises, DOD has capabilities that can save and sustain lives, reduce suffering, protect property, mitigate the damage to critical infrastructure, and get citizens quickly and solidly onto the path of resuming their daily lives. Our challenge in this environment is not to be late to need. DOD capabilities are only useful if they are accessible and responsive to relief requirements. To improve the agility and effectiveness of our support, we conduct detailed integrated regional planning to better understand concurrent employment challenges of federal military forces and National Guard, and we employ Dual Status Commanders (DSCs), made possible by the Congress, to improve unity of effort.

Dual Status Commanders. A fundamental change in how we execute our civil support mission is the use of DSCs—perhaps one of the most important initiatives taken in the area of DSCA in a decade. The Secretary of Defense and state governors authorize specially trained and certified senior military officers to command federal and state military forces employed by DOD and a state, respectively, in support of federal and state civil authorities, thereby promoting unity of effort in military assistance to the affected community. DSCs provide a link between the distinct and separate federal and state chains of command that is vital to facilitating unity of effort between the operations of federal and large state military force packages supporting civil

authorities. In 2012, the use of DSCs for the Waldo Canyon fire and Hurricane Sandy provided opportunities, through unity of effort, to strengthen USNORTHCOM's close collaboration with the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC), FEMA, the NGB, and States' National Guard organizations. Multiple states requested and received DSC designations in 2012, including: California and Colorado (for wildland firefighting); and Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island (for hurricane response).

Wildland Firefighting. When the Waldo Canyon fire erupted less than 12 miles from my headquarters last June, our DSCA role was brought into sharp focus. No one could have predicted the June 26, 2012 firestorm that was fueled by 65 mile per hour winds and rapidly consumed 346 Colorado Springs homes, some of which belonged to members of my staff. In reaction to this crisis, immediate response support from Fort Carson, Peterson Air Force Base (AFB), Schriever AFB, and Buckley AFB was directed toward the effort, and the Secretary of Defense and the Governor of Colorado quickly authorized a DSC. At the request of NIFC, USNORTHCOM coordinated the deployment of Air National Guard C-130 aircraft, equipped with U.S. Forest Service (USFS) Modular Airborne Firefighting System (MAFFS) to support the federal wildland firefighting effort. Without hesitation, the courageous Airmen operating these aircraft continually put their lives at great risk to save and protect American lives and property during these wildfires. I would be remiss if I did not honor the names of Lieutenant Colonel Paul Mikeal, Major Joseph McCormick, Major Ryan David, and Senior Master Sergeant Robert Cannon from North Carolina Air National Guard's 145th Airlift Wing, who selflessly made the ultimate sacrifice fighting wildfires in South Dakota last July.

With senior leaders from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Forest Service, Department of Interior, NIFC, and the NGB, we are focused on getting ahead of the next fire

season. Through routine engagement, interagency teamwork, and a collaborative effort of working groups, we have expanded our collective understanding of the implications of and capabilities required to prepare for requests for assistance from our interagency partners' wildland firefighting operations. These include near-term proposals such as integrated training, improved processes for requesting and implementing support, and clarification of lines of authority, ensuring installation preparedness and necessary agreements are in place, and identifying technology transfers that can be accomplished before the next wildland fire season.

Hurricane Sandy Response. Hurricane Sandy challenged the agility of the National Response Framework while impacting key terrain in New York City and New Jersey. Working with FEMA (the lead agency for the federal response), the NGB, and the individual States, we estimated required support and prepositioned Title 10 resources in the region in order to respond as soon as requested. Throughout the response to the storm, USNORTHCOM was able to support our federal, state, and local partners by facilitating the Department's efforts in power restoration, dewatering, fuel distribution, transportation, and public health and safety. In addition, along with the NGB, USNORTHCOM supported the Secretary's approval of governors' requests for DSCs. As the hurricane made landfall, DSCs received orders to facilitate military unity of effort for the response and recovery efforts in New Jersey and New York. The DSCs provided critical leadership to promoting greater unity of effort between federal and state military forces responding to the devastating effects of this hurricane. As a result, USNORTHCOM was able to support our federal, state, and local partners by facilitating power restoration, dewatering, fuel distribution, transportation, and public health and safety.

As part of the Hurricane Sandy response and recovery effort, and with Military Department Secretary concurrence, we designated a number of Title 10 installations as Incident

Support Bases and Federal Team Staging Facilities (as requested by FEMA). Located throughout FEMA Regions I and II, these installations provided a platform for FEMA to stage commodities and equipment as well as response and recovery teams (such as Urban Search and Rescue Teams). Additionally, we designated four installations as Base Support Installations with the task to support logistically the Title 10 response effort. Fort Hamilton and Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst simultaneously supported both FEMA and DOD response efforts.

During the course of execution, we rapidly recognized the incredible capacity and capability of U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The established authorities, interagency agreements, funding mechanisms, and operational flexibility of these organizations are critical to mitigating large-scale catastrophic events in the future.

Leveraging our relationships with USTRANSCOM and our interagency partners, USNORTHCOM executed the strategic air and ground movements of DOD assets and private/commercial power utility company trucks and personnel. Together, our teams completed 241 sorties, hauling 4,173 short tons and 1,225 passengers. These numbers included the movement of 262 power restoration vehicles and 429 support personnel from western States to New York and New Jersey. Based on our past hurricane response experience, we pre-identified Title 10 electrical generator and water pump availability as Hurricane Sandy approached the New Jersey and New York coasts. One hundred DOD water pumps and almost 300 pump operators were requested by FEMA and greatly contributed to the overall USACE pumping effort, which removed more than 475 million gallons of water from tunnels and other critical infrastructure.

USNORTHCOM's success in civil support during Sandy was characterized by anticipation and timely support of our partners' requests for assistance during domestic crises. As a result, I am overwhelmingly convinced that DSCs are the right answer to facilitating military unity of effort before, during, and after a natural or man-made disaster. DSCs are vital for a successful roadmap to readiness that links organizational learning and adaptation to a continuous improvement of interagency preparedness in disaster response.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Response. We understand bad actors are committed to gaining access to chemical and biological weapons, as well as nuclear and radiological material, and employing these weapons against us. This truth demands our preparedness and resiliency if a CBRN attack should occur in the homeland.

USNORTHCOM, in close collaboration with the NGB and our other military and civilian partners, has made significant progress improving our ability to respond in the aftermath of a CBRN incident by increasing the overall readiness of the nation's CBRN Response Enterprise. Following a series of external evaluations and confirmatory exercises, the Enterprise achieved full operational capability (FOC) on October 1, 2012. Despite the FOC designation, important work remains to be done to realize the full potential of the enterprise. Through our robust exercise program and partnerships, we are using both Title 10 exercises (e.g., VIBRANT RESPONSE) and regional state exercises (e.g., VIGILANT GUARD) to maximize preparedness for the entire range of CBRN threats and hazards.

Security Cooperation

Security Cooperation with Mexico and Countering Threat Networks. When it comes to the security of North America and the shared pursuit of enduring stability and prosperity, we cannot afford to work in isolation. The ties between the United States and Mexico are deep and growing. The Department of Defense views Mexico as a strategic partner in mutual regional and hemispheric security interests. At the center of our shared security concerns is the proliferation and influence of transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and other threat networks that greatly undermine citizen security in Mexico.

TCOs are sophisticated international enterprises representing a national security threat based on their unique ability to move people, drugs, money, and weapons across borders. According to the National Drug Intelligence Center, the demand for illegal drugs in the United States continues, fueling the nearly \$40 billion drug trade occurring in the region¹. Per the Trans-Border Institute, since 2006 there have been more than 50,000 TCO-related homicides in Mexico,² often the result of conflicts over lucrative territory for drug trafficking and other illicit activity, routes, and access points to the U.S. drug market. Although narco-related homicides continued to occur at disturbing levels in 2012, the number modestly declined for the first time in six years.

More broadly, we are deepening our defense and military partnership with Mexico in a whole host of areas, including strengthening our ability to work together in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, cyber security, defense planning, training and education, air and maritime defense, counter-terrorism, and defense acquisition and maintenance.

¹ Richard M. Stana, Director of Homeland and Security Issues. *Testimony before the U. S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control*. March 9, 2011.

² Trans-Border Institute. *Drug violence in Mexico, Data and Analysis through 2011*. March 2012.

In support of the President's July 2011 *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime*, and his 2012 *National Drug Control Strategy*, USNORTHCOM works with mission partners throughout our region to increase collaboration to confront TCOs. Our current priority of effort resides with the Mexican military where, at their request, we work with the Mexican Security Forces to build our shared capabilities and capacities. With full respect for Mexico's sovereignty and with full understanding that efforts to counter transnational organized crime have a civilian law enforcement lead, over the past year we have worked together in three key areas: increased capacity to conduct intelligence-driven operations; improved awareness and practice in protecting human rights; and increased capacity to work on a whole-of-government basis to address the challenges posed by TCOs.

Mexico's southern border, an area of strategic importance in the counter-TCO effort, also represents a border between the areas of responsibility of U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and USNORTHCOM, requiring close coordination between our commands to ensure mission success. Illustrative of our partnership, our commands co-sponsor Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize Border Region Workshops. These workshops bring together national security forces to address communications, border security, standard operating procedures, and air, land, and maritime surveillance. Another example of our efforts is the coordinated deployment of a ground-based radar and associated information sharing protocols for Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize.

Mexico and the United States are critical, strategic partners in the security sphere. My goal remains strengthening USNORTHCOM's relationship with the Mexican military. We look forward to working closely with the leadership of the Mexican Army (SEDENA) and Navy

(SEMAR) as they implement the strategy of President Peña Nieto and integrate their actions with those of Mexico's civilian agencies.

Through our positive partnership, both nations have improved their capacity to respond to TCOs, to terrorist threats, and to natural disasters. I consider my relationship with the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico of utmost importance in the execution of Department of Defense goals and objectives throughout the region and hemisphere. Ambassador Wayne is the U.S. Government lead for engagements with Mexico and, as such, is a vital partner in all coordination and execution of DoD and USNORTHCOM's security cooperation mission. Confronting the security challenges we face in the future will continue to require an integrated, whole-of-government approach at home and close cooperation with our partners abroad. Nothing is more important to our security and prosperity in this region than strengthening those partnerships.

Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC). Located at Fort Benning, Georgia, WHINSEC remains a key component of DOD's security cooperation outreach in the Western Hemisphere. WHINSEC is the only U.S. Army School that teaches in Spanish and informs the thinking of future Latin American leaders about democracy, human rights, and military topics. It is a strategic tool for international engagement supporting principles set forth in the Organization of American States (OAS) Charter. The training offered at WHINSEC impacts approximately 800-1,000 Latin American leaders annually from military, law enforcement, and civilian institutions and serves to increase collaboration and improve foreign partner capacity in pursuit of USNORTHCOM's security cooperation objectives.

Security Cooperation with The Bahamas. The United States and The Bahamas share a strong bilateral relationship founded upon common interests in security, trade, disaster response, and the promotion of meaningful cultural exchange. These shared interests, including a common

belief in the rule of law and democratic values, and The Bahamas' geographic proximity to the United States have been integral in building this long-standing partnership. The Bahamian government is committed to close cooperation with the United States on law enforcement and maritime security concerns, as well as on counternarcotics efforts. This strong security cooperation relationship is highlighted by Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, a trilateral counternarcotics effort conducted by personnel of the Royal Bahamas Police Force, Royal Bahamas Defence Force, and the Turks and Caicos Islands police, with counterparts from the DEA, ICE, CBP, and the USCG.

One of the key focus areas in The Bahamas is the Hawk's Nest Forward Operating Base, a staging location for counternarcotics operations. Hawk's Nest is a centrally located facility on Great Exuma, used by Bahamian and interagency counternarcotics partners. We were ardent supporters of U.S. Embassy-Nassau in its successful effort to develop a cost-sharing agreement among the CBP, DEA, and FAA in an effort to maintain Hawk's Nest in a state of minimal operational capacity. The proximity of The Bahamas to the United States means that relatively small sites (like Hawk's Nest) have strategic importance for counter-illicit trafficking and Cooperative Defense mission areas.

Establishment of United States Special Operations Command, North

(SOCNORTH). On December 31, 2012, the Secretary of Defense approved the establishment of SOCNORTH. This subordinate unified command is the logical progression from our previous Special Operations Detachment (SOD). Reorganizing my existing command structures will improve the Department's ability to command, through a designated accountable commander, special operations forces throughout my area of responsibility under USNORTHCOM's existing Defense Support of Civil Authorities, security cooperation, and Homeland Defense

responsibilities. The establishment of SOCNORTH provides USNORTHCOM with a command and control structure that matches that of all other Geographic Combatant Commands, where a component commander is placed in charge of things we are already doing with a staff element. SOCNORTH will enhance USNORTHCOM's ability to meet our current security cooperation mission requirements, and improve our ability to support our interagency and regional partners. This organizational change is consistent with the new Defense Strategic Guidance that calls for low-cost, small-footprint approaches to accomplish our national security objectives.

Partnership with Canada

We continue to build unprecedented levels of cooperation across our two nations, and Canadian and U.S. cooperation in defending our homelands has been seamless. One of the most important enablers to USNORTHCOM and NORAD mission accomplishment remains our ability to conduct sophisticated, multi-echeloned exercises with our mission partners. This past December, the Commander of the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) and I signed the *Tri-Command Training and Exercise Statement of Intent*, which provides two years of training and exercise planning among USNORTHCOM, NORAD, and CJOC.

Beyond combining our exercises, the three commands have improved cooperative efforts in the Arctic. Rapid reductions in the extent and duration of summer ice cover in the Arctic region have led to increased human activity, primarily in the forms of scientific research, speculative shipping, and resource extraction. As countries and private businesses vie for regional access and influence in pursuit of economic interests, safety and security concerns will continue to rise. All Arctic nations have publicly stated their emphasis on cooperative approaches to peace and stability in the region.

The spike in regional activity may result in increased requests to militaries to provide support to other agencies, given the austere fiscal and operational environment. Other traditional military actors are already setting priorities for the region. Russia is actively recapitalizing its Arctic-focused fleet. Additionally, China, a nation without Arctic territory, is acquiring a second icebreaker.

In December 2012, USNORTHCOM, NORAD, and CJOC signed the *Framework for Arctic Cooperation*, which acknowledges that Canadian and U.S. forces will support other departments and agencies in response to threats and hazards in the region when requested or directed. The framework also strengthens an already mature partnership, ultimately enhancing joint and combined readiness in support of safety, security, and defense missions through information sharing, planning, and capability development. In this document, CJOC Commander Lieutenant-General Beare and I recognize that our near-term capability gaps in the Arctic are communications, maritime domain awareness, presence, and infrastructure. Along with the CJOC's JTF North, JTF-Alaska, which is my operational lead in the Arctic, is focused on how we will most effectively cooperate and partner to mitigate these capability gaps and effect mission success in this expansive region. Our commands will continue to seek opportunities to, in coordination with, and as part of wider U.S. government efforts, meet emerging needs associated with increased activities throughout the Arctic, and realize the full potential of our joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and private sector partnerships.

Engagement with Russia

We also continue to pursue our engagement with the Russian military, taking advantage of every opportunity to increase cooperation, interaction, and military-to-military training events.

I believe these efforts are particularly important to foster shared understanding, especially in light of expanded Russian modernization and training efforts that extend the range of patrol activities by their air forces. For example, NORAD and the Russian Federation Air Force conducted our third annual VIGILANT EAGLE counter-hijacking exercise in August 2012. By mutual agreement we conducted a non-flying, command post exercise (with each nation) with NORAD and Russian forces practicing procedures to track, intercept, and pass control for monitoring and escorting a simulated hijacked aircraft into the other's airspace. Like our 2011 event, the upcoming August, 2013 exercise will be a full-profile, live-fly event, involving a variety of NORAD and Russian military aircraft exercising a counter hijacking scenario. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are in the early stages of planning a similar cooperative counter-hijacking exercise with our Mexican partners. This exercise, known as AMALGAM EAGLE, will provide an opportunity to practice military and civilian roles in responding to a simulated hijacking situation in our respective airspaces.

In addition to fostering mutual trust and increased transparency with Russia, USNORTHCOM and NORAD have proposed connecting the Alaskan NORAD Region to the NATO/Russia Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI), currently operational in Europe. This proposal, called the Bering Strait Initiative, would provide Russian and NORAD air traffic controllers with information about tracks of mutual interest moving across the Bering Sea, using a web-enabled digital linkage to allow information exchange. Poland, Norway, and Turkey have already established a CAI link with Russia, and the system was declared operational in December 2011. We only await Russian concurrence to begin operational testing and implementation of the data link. This example of increased cooperation with Russia helps us to avoid unintended consequences associated with heightened tensions or misunderstandings.

Conclusion

We now face a security environment that is more violent, uncertain, and complex than ever before. This environment is distinguished by myriad global actors and destabilizing events including terrorism, cyber attacks, proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), turmoil in nations where WMD are stored, rogue threats, nations with nuclear weapons and those processing nuclear material, and transnational organized crime in the Western Hemisphere with a growing concern of a crime-terror nexus. Bad actors seek either to attack the homeland directly, or to diminish the nation's ability to build strong relationships that foster regional stability, security, peace, and prosperity. In the midst of this environment are near-peer competitors seeking geopolitical advantage over the United States while we are engaged in countering global threats. Since the homeland is the likely confluence of many of these threats, we face increased challenges as a nation and acknowledge the low level of national willingness to assume such risk. In the homeland, although the probability of existential and catastrophic attacks remains low, the consequences are unacceptable--driving us to seek preparedness and deterrence to reduce those probabilities as low as possible, and keep them there.

Robust, layered partnerships and steady improvement through rigorous training, education, and exercise programs have readied USNORTHCOM and NORAD to defend the homeland against a full spectrum of threats and support of civilian partners in providing life-saving and --sustaining assistance to the American people. We are guided by the belief that smart investment in relationship building with our partners in safety and security endeavors can prevent crises from reaching the nation by deterring and dissuading adversaries, and arresting threat streams. Should a transition to crisis occur, we are strengthened by the unity of effort and synergy of capabilities made possible by the depth of our partnerships. USNORTHCOM and

NORAD stand ready to deter, prevent, and defeat any aggression aimed at the United States and Canada as two commands oriented on a single vision: with our trusted partners, we will defend North America by outpacing all threats, maintaining faith with our people, and supporting them in their times of greatest need.

I am grateful for the support this committee has provided my commands and am truly honored to serve as the Commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD. I look forward to your questions.

“WE HAVE THE WATCH”

APPENDIX: Missions and Organization

USNORTHCOM Mission: United States Northern Command partners to conduct homeland defense, civil support, and security cooperation to defend and secure the United States and its interests

- **Missile Defense:** execute and direct missile defense operations to protect the homeland from hostile acts while assisting the Missile Defense Agency in developing improved capability
- **Antiterrorism and Force Protection:** improve information sharing with our interagency partners and streamline reporting within the DOD to proactively detect emerging threats directed against our nation, our military personnel, and our critical capabilities and infrastructure
- **Civil Support:** support primary federal agencies, when requested, in responding quickly to natural and man-made disasters and to the effects of terrorist attacks in the homeland
- **Security Cooperation:** support and enable other agencies, advocate for complementary resources, and work toward common objectives to improve Interagency planning and coordination that synchronize U.S. support for building our partners' capacities
- **Arctic Activity:** prepare and plan for emerging Arctic challenges to ensure economic access and freedom of maneuver

Area of Responsibility: the USNORTHCOM geographic area of responsibility for the conduct of normal operations includes North America, the Gulf of Mexico, the Straits of Florida, the Caribbean region (inclusive of the U.S. Virgin Islands, British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, Puerto Rico, the Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Islands), and approaches to the continent including significant portions of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic Oceans

Subordinate Commands

Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region (Fort McNair, Washington D.C.)

Executes homeland defense, DSCA, and incident management in the National Capital Region

Joint Task Force Civil Support (Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia)

Plans and integrates DOD support to the designated Primary Agency for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive consequence management operations

Joint Task Force North (Fort Bliss, Texas)

Supports federal law enforcement agencies in the interdiction of suspected transnational threats within and along the approaches to the continental United States

Joint Task Force Alaska (Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska)

(Provisional) Deters, detects, prevents, and defeats threats within the Alaska Joint Operations Area to protect U.S. territory, citizens, interests, and as directed, conduct civil support

U.S. Special Operations Command, North (to be established)

Service Components

U.S. Army North (Fort Sam Houston, Texas)

Executes DOD's homeland defense and civil support operations in the land domain. Develops, organizes and integrates DOD CBRN response capabilities and operations. Secures land approaches to the homeland

U.S. Naval Forces North (Norfolk, Virginia)

Provides maritime forces prepared to conduct homeland defense, civil support operations and security cooperation activities

U.S. Air Forces Northern (Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida)

Ensures the air sovereignty and air defense of the continental United States

U.S. Marine Forces North (New Orleans, Louisiana)

Executes antiterrorism program and force protection responsibilities. Coordinates with and supports USMC forces to conduct homeland defense operations and provide DSCA

NORAD Mission: conducts aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning in the defense of North America. NORAD utilizes a network of satellites, ground-based radars, airborne radars, and fighters to detect, intercept, and when necessary, engage threats to Canada and the United States. NORAD assists in the detection and monitoring of aircraft suspected of illegal drug trafficking, ultimately passing information to civilian law enforcement agencies to help combat the flow of illegal drugs into North America

NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND and UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND Biography



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General Charles H. Jacoby, Jr. UNITED STATES ARMY



General Charles H. Jacoby, Jr. is the Commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern Command, headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado.

General Jacoby hails from Detroit, MI and was commissioned a second lieutenant upon graduation from the United States Military Academy in 1978. His military education includes the Infantry Basic and Advanced courses, the Command and General Staff College, the School of Advanced Military Studies, and the National War College. He holds a master's degree in History from the University of Michigan.

His command experience includes Commander, A Company, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 325th Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina and Operation URGENT FURY, Grenada; Commander, 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Commander, Joint Task Force-Bravo, United States Southern Command, Honduras and Operation FUERTE APOYO (Strong Support), Hurricane Mitch; and Commanding General, United States Army Alaska and

Deputy Commander, United States Alaskan Command; Commanding General, I Corps, including a combat tour in Iraq serving as the Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq. He most recently completed his tour as Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J5); Senior Member, U.S. Delegation to the United Nations Military Staff Committee, The Joint Staff.

Additional assignments include Rifle Platoon Leader, C Company, and later Scout Platoon Leader, then S-3 (Air), 1st Battalion (Airborne) 325th Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Instructor, later Assistant Professor, Department of History, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York; Chief, G-3 (Operations), 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; S-3 (Operations), 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; Chief, G-3 (External Evaluation Branch), 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; Staff Action Officer, Congressional Activities Division, Management Directorate, Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, D.C.; Deputy Chief of Staff, later Executive Officer to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Southern Command, Miami, Florida; Deputy Director for Global/Multilateral Issues/International-American Affairs, J-5, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC; and Assistant Division Commander (Operations), later Assistant Division Commander (Support), 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, to include duty as Deputy Commanding General, Combined Joint Task Force-76 and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan.

General Jacoby's awards and decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters), Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster), Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal (with Five Oak Leaf Clusters), Joint Service Commendation Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster), Army Commendation Medal (with Four Oak Leaf Clusters), Army Achievement Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters), Combat Infantryman Badge, Expert Infantryman Badge, Master Parachutist Badge, Air Assault Badge, Ranger Tab, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge.

(Current as of August 2011)

**POSTURE STATEMENT OF
GENERAL JOHN F. KELLY, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND**

BEFORE THE 113TH CONGRESS

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

20 MARCH 2013



Introduction

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished Members of the Committee: thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. As U.S. Southern Command enters its 50th anniversary year, we continue to work diligently to build relationships that enhance the defense of the United States and the security of the region, and I am proud to now be part of this important mission. In my first months in command, I am struck by the stark contrasts in our area of responsibility. It is a region of enormous promise and exciting opportunities, but it is also one of persistent challenges and complex threats. It is a region of relative peace, low likelihood of interstate conflicts, and overall economic growth, yet is also home to corrosive criminal violence, permissive environments for illicit activities, and episodic political and social protests. Given the global security realities and the fiscal constraints facing the U.S. government, some might argue that we should disengage from the Americas, turn our attention to other partners, other priorities. Mr. Chairman, Members, let me be frank: we must *not* take progress and overall stability for granted; we must *not* disregard our geographic proximity and the economic, cultural, and social interconnections of Latin America and the Caribbean to the United States. I thank the Congress for sharing this sentiment, for its long-standing commitment to our security partners, and for its continued support to U.S. Southern Command's mission. However, our ability to fully execute this mission is at extreme risk as we face present-day budget uncertainty and the potentially devastating long-term impacts of sequestration and its associated out-year budget reductions.

Budget Uncertainty and Sequestration Concerns

Reduced Spending Plan. Due to shortfalls associated with the allocation of funding in the current Continuing Resolution and the cuts we face as a result of sequestration, U.S. Southern

Command is facing an immediate, combined 26% reduction to our already lean headquarters operating budget. Although this reduction applies only to this fiscal year, we could easily face another dire budget situation next year as well. We have implemented a reduced spending plan to ensure continued operations this year under the Continuing Resolution, and as a practical measure, we have incorporated potential sequestration cuts into our planning efforts. We have already undertaken painful cost-savings measures, including a civilian hiring freeze, eliminating overtime costs, not extending temporary and term hires, and reductions in travel and administrative costs, as well as cutting back or cancelling numerous exercises, training activities, and military-to-military engagements for the remainder of the fiscal year. We are also preparing for furloughs of our 851 dedicated and patriotic civilian employees, beginning in April and lasting through September.¹ I expect morale and financial effects to be severe, especially for our civilian professionals in the lower pay grades, who will face significant financial hardships due to the resulting 20% reduction in take-home pay for the last six months of the fiscal year. This reduction is compounded by living and working in Miami, one of the most expensive cities in the world.² I have directed our manpower division to offer all means of advice, support, and guidance to our people if furloughing indeed occurs. Simply put, budget uncertainty in FY 2013 is already having very real, deleterious effects on our readiness, effectiveness, and day-to-day operations in the region. Mandated sequestration cuts only amplify these effects.

Sequestration Impact—Assigned/Allocated Forces. Although I am able to accept risk associated with this year's reduced spending plan, sequestration presents significant *additional*


¹ This number includes: all Department of Army and Defense Intelligence Agency employees at our headquarters, including term and temporary hires, and civilian employees at JIATF South, U.S. Special Operations Command South, JTF-GTMO and security cooperation offices.

² UBS. *Pricings and Earnings Report, Edition 2012*. Geneva: September, 2012; Center for Housing Policy. *Losing Ground: The Struggle for Middle Income Households to Afford the Rising Costs of Housing and Transportation*. October 2012.

strategic and operational risks. The severe cuts to U.S. Southern Command, and the numerous second and third order effects from the force-providing Service cuts, will adversely impact our training and ability to respond to crises. U.S. Southern Command has traditionally achieved valuable ends with limited means through a low-cost, small footprint approach. This approach, while effective, does carry inherent risk that increases exponentially under sequestration. Due to our minimally assigned forces and diminishing availability of surface assets, we are *already* challenged to respond to large-scale contingencies such as mass migration, natural disasters, the evacuation of American citizens, or ensuring the security of our embassies; maintain comprehensive awareness in the southern approaches to the United States; and support the National Drug Control Strategy's interdiction objectives. Across-the-board spending cuts will only exacerbate this situation, at a time in which several regional security challenges require active engagement by the United States.

Sequestration Impact—Future Operations. Mr. Chairman, Members, let me be blunt: sequestration in FY 2013 and its associated out-year budget cuts in future years will severely degrade our ability to fulfill the Department of Defense's Title 10 statutory obligations and provide operational support to the U.S. interagency and our partners in the region. Given the drastic magnitude of cuts being contemplated by the Services, the day could soon come when U.S. Southern Command has no assigned DoD surface assets to conduct detection and monitoring operations.³ This would not only impact our ability to detect and monitor the illicit transit of drugs towards the United States, but we would also be unable to fully support U.S. and partner nation law enforcement interdiction operations to disrupt this drug flow. Under

³ As one example, the Chief of Naval Operations indicated in a memo dated January 25, 2013 (Ser N000/10005) that due to sequestration, the Department of the Navy will be compelled to reduce OMN expenditures through numerous actions, to include stopping all naval deployments to the Caribbean and South America.

Declining Assets and Cocaine Disruptions

sequestration, the Coast Guard has indicated that it too will curtail air and surface operations, affecting several missions including drug interdiction and other law enforcement

operations. Taken together, these limitations would undermine the significant gains we have made through the highly successful and ongoing Operation MARTILLO; the 152 metric tons of cocaine seized to date represents over three billion dollars in revenue that will *not* go to fund powerful criminal groups, violence in Mexico, and the destabilization of our Central American partners. These 152 metric tons will also *not* reach the streets of America nor fuel costly crime and drug addiction. Due to sequestration, and its associated out-year budget cuts of over \$50 billion per year across the Department of Defense, we may no longer be able to support future interagency initiatives like the Department of State's Regional Aviation Program in Central America. Additionally, we could be forced to suspend our cooperation with U.S. Northern Command and Mexico on information operations, which had been heralded as the model for cross-Combatant Command collaboration. Finally, we will face challenges to resource and sustain our emergent cyber defense capabilities, at a time when cyber concerns are increasing in scope and magnitude.

Sequestration Impact—Operational Effectiveness. It is my position that scarce assets *must* be deployed where they have the greatest impact, but sequestration will cripple our proven operational effectiveness. As responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars, we have long employed a “defense forward” approach to attack the drug trafficking problem near its origin, before bulk shipments are broken up for transit into the United States. Although the U.S. Southwest border has received the greater share of public attention and counternarcotics funding, Joint Interagency Task Force South is more effective at the removal of large quantities of cocaine than U.S. Southwest border operations, as bulk cocaine shipments are broken up into numerous smaller quantities upon reaching the transit zone of Central America. While this success is noteworthy, diminishing assets already place significant limitations on JIATF South’s ability to target the majority of documented drug trafficking events and support Coast Guard interdiction efforts. Sequestration cuts will only intensify this challenge, potentially allowing hundreds of tons of cocaine and other illicit products to flood into our cities. Likely second and third order effects include an increase in supply and purity and a decrease in cost of cocaine in the United States, undermining the significant progress that has been made in U.S. demand reduction. En route to our country, this largely unimpeded flow will chart a corrosive pathway through Central America and Mexico, contributing to instability, corruption, and violence and impacting efforts to improve citizen safety.

Sequestration Impact—Security Cooperation and Partner Engagement. Building the capabilities of regional militaries is a cost-effective strategy to help our partners confront internal challenges to security, stability, and sovereignty; increase professionalism; and strengthen defense and security institutions. Mr. Chairman, Members, I am deeply concerned by the adverse impact sequestration will have on these efforts, many of which have yielded

significant and valuable security dividends. Take, for example, how U.S. Southern Command has provided persistent, focused training to the Naval Special Forces (FEN) in Guatemala over the past four years. As a result, the FEN can now effectively locate and interdict target vessels, seize drug shipments, and cooperate as a cohesive unit. Severe budget cuts will likely reduce this type of sustained relationship building and training, the repercussions of which could be harmful to U.S. interests. Reduced engagement by the United States could result in a partnership “vacuum,” which nations like China, Russia, or Iran may seek to fill. In recent years, these countries have made in-roads, deepening diplomatic, economic, and military ties with the region. Declining U.S. influence will provide an opportunity to expand these relationships at the expense of the United States.

From a strategic perspective, our government-to-government security relationships are critical to the United States’ ability to meet complex global security challenges, facilitate U.S. military and coalition operations, and ensure regional stability. With the corresponding growth of globalization, economic integration, and a changing geopolitical landscape, expanding and deepening these bilateral relationships have become even more essential to U.S. national security and foreign policy. Sequestration cuts lead to the *exact opposite* outcome, forcing U.S. Southern Command to reduce support to partner nations’ efforts to respond to internal and external threats and impeding our ability to provide defense support to U.S. foreign policy objectives, and those outlined in the 2012 Western Hemisphere Defense Policy Statement. Ultimately, sequestration undermines our efforts to help build and maintain an international community of nations that are stable and reliable partners, whose security forces fill an appropriate role in a society that is characterized by effective, accountable, democratic governance.

Mr. Chairman, Members, this leads me to my final thought on the impacts of sequestration and its associated out-year budget cuts of over \$50 billion per year across the Department of Defense. I will speak plainly: severe budget cuts will have long-term, detrimental effects on U.S. leadership in the hemisphere. Significantly reduced U.S. military engagement will make it difficult to counter those who would seek to exploit perceptions that the U.S. is abandoning our long-standing commitment to the region. Sequestration and its associated out-year budget cuts will result in damage to the United States' leadership, national security, readiness, and ability to deter or respond to global crises and regional security challenges.

Regional Security Challenges

Unfortunately, the sequester, a full-year Continuing Resolution, and associated out-year budget cuts due to sequestration are not accompanied by a corresponding decline in security challenges within our area of responsibility. These challenges are non-traditional in nature, networked in design, and transnational in scope, requiring constant vigilance, regional cooperation, and collective action. When it comes to South America, Central America, and the Caribbean, I cannot overstate the importance of awareness, access, and the enormous return on investment from personal, on-the-ground security relationships. As the United States turns its attention to the home front to address domestic economic and budget issues, I firmly believe we *must* remain engaged with the nations in our *shared* home, the Western Hemisphere, for one very simple reason: *proximity*. Left unaddressed, security concerns in the region can quickly become security concerns in the homeland.

Transnational Organized Crime. The prevalent problem in the region—particularly in Central America—is the growing power and destabilizing activities of criminal networks, whose

illicit operations are funded in significant part by U.S. and international drug consumption, as well as diverse illicit funding streams like kidnapping and extortion. As recognized by the President's 2011 *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime*, transnational organized crime is a *global* issue with *global* implications that directly impact the United States.⁴ In the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility, these powerful groups exploit under-governed areas—where state capacity is weak and corruption and impunity are rampant—to consolidate control over drug, money, weapons, and human smuggling networks that span the hemisphere. This corrosive expansion is taking place in the context of deteriorating citizen security, especially in Honduras, where the number of people killed rivals that of Iraq at the height of sectarian violence. Like many Members of Congress, I am troubled by this rising violence and its impact on regional stability.

<i>2012 Homicide Rates per 100,000, select cities⁵</i>		
<i>San Pedro Sula, Honduras</i>		<i>169</i>
<i>Caracas, Venezuela</i>		<i>118</i>
<i>Tegucigalpa, Honduras</i>		<i>101</i>
<i>(Distrito Central)</i>		
<i>New Orleans, LA</i>		<i>56</i>
<i>Detroit, MI</i>		<i>54</i>
<i>Baltimore, MD</i>		<i>35</i>
<i>Washington, DC</i>		<i>17</i>

The impact on our own country is also clear. Transnational criminal organizations, which have expanded their presence throughout Central America, were responsible for several high-profile murders of American citizens across or on our border in recent years. Additionally, a 2007 report estimated that illicit drug use cost the United States an estimated \$193 billion dollars in combined health and criminal justice impacts.⁶ According to an analysis of arrestees carried out for the Office of National Drug Control Policy, more than half of the adult males arrested for crimes in 10 metropolitan areas tested positive for at least one drug at the time of

⁴ National Security Staff. *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security*, 25 July, 2011.

⁵ Security, Peace, and Justice (Seguridad, Paz y Justicia). *50 Most Violent Cities in the World, 2012 Rankings*. (available online at: <http://www.seguridadjusticiaypaz.org.mx>) Washington, DC figures are from the Metropolitan Police Department's 2011 *Annual Report* (most recent data available).

⁶ National Drug Intelligence Center (2011). *The Economic Impact of Illicit Drug Use on American Society*. Department of Justice.

their arrest.⁷ A recent survey estimated 6.5 million Americans 12 years and older are dependent

- *According to the 2011 National Drug Threat Assessment, Mexican-based transnational criminal organizations and their associates operate in upwards of 1,200 U.S. cities, working with domestic U.S. gangs to distribute and traffic illicit drugs throughout the United States.* on or abuse an illicit drug,⁸ while in 2009, 39,147 people died from drug-induced causes, more than double the amount that were murdered that same year.⁹
- *The FBI reports that MS-13 gang leaders in El Salvador have initiated assassination plans against U.S. law enforcement personnel and target American citizens.*

Mr. Chairman, Members, I'd like to sketch an image of illicit trafficking operations in our hemisphere to illustrate the magnitude of this problem. Picture an interconnected system of arteries that traverse the entire Western Hemisphere, stretching across the Atlantic and Pacific, through the Caribbean, and up and down North, South, and Central America. Complex, sophisticated networks use this vast system of illicit pathways to move tons of drugs, thousands of people, and countless weapons into and out of the United States, Europe, and Africa with an efficiency, payload, and gross profit any global transportation company would envy. In return, billions of dollars flood back into the hands of these criminal enterprises, enabling the purchase of military-grade weapons, ammunition, and state-of-the-art technology to counter law enforcement. This profit also allows these groups to buy the support—or silence—of local communities through which these arteries flourish, spreading corruption and fear and undermining support for legitimate governments.

The tactics, techniques, and procedures of these criminal networks have advanced far beyond the typical activities of “traditional” organized crime. These are superbly financed, well-

⁷ Office of National Drug Control Policy. (2012). *Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring Program: 2011 Annual Report*. Executive Office of the President: Washington, D.C.

⁸ 2011 National Survey on Drug Use and Health

⁹ Kenneth D. Kochanek, M.A.; Jiaquan Xu, M.D.; Sherry L. Murphy, B.S.; Arialdi M. Minino, M.P.H.; and Hsiang-Ching Kung, Ph.D., “Deaths: Final Data for 2009.” Division of Vital Statistics (Atlanta, GA: Centers for Disease Control), Vol. 60, Number 3, Dec. 29, 2011, p. 11.

organized, and ruthless adversaries for our partner nations, especially our Central American ones. These networks conduct assassinations, executions, and massacres, and with their enormous revenues and advanced weaponry, they can outspend and outgun many governments. Some groups have similar—and in some cases, superior—training to regional law enforcement units. Through intimidation and sheer force, these criminal organizations virtually control some areas. In my view, the proximity of the U.S. homeland to criminally-governed spaces is a vulnerability with direct implications for U.S. national security. I am also troubled by the significant criminal capabilities that are available to anyone—for a price. Transnational criminal organizations have access to key facilitators who specialize in document forgery, trade-based money laundering, weapons procurement, and human smuggling, including the smuggling of special interest aliens. This criminal expertise and the ability to move people, products, and funds are skills that can be exploited by a variety of malign actors, including terrorists.

Crime/Terror Nexus. Mr. Chairman, Members, the presence of all these so-called “bad actors” raises the question of possible nexus between international terrorist organizations and criminal networks in the region. The answer is complex. While regionally-based Shi’a who support Lebanese Hezbollah are involved in drug and other illicit trafficking, we have only a partial understanding of possible interconnections and overlap between terrorist financing and illicit revenue streams, both within the hemisphere and on a global scale. The 2011 Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. demonstrates Iran is willing to leverage criminal groups to carry out its objectives in the U.S. homeland. This only underscores my concerns over the exploitation of criminal capabilities. In my judgment, any group seeking to harm the United States—including Iran—could view criminal middlemen, facilitators, and support networks as potential operational *enablers*, although not necessarily operational *requirements*. As

distinguished Members of this committee have noted, an attack in or through the region would have major consequences for the entire Western Hemisphere. We remain vigilant against this possibility and its potential criminal facilitation, but need the assets to remain so.

Iran in the Western Hemisphere. This brings me to the next issue I would like to discuss, which has serious implications for U.S. national security. I share the Congress' concerns over Iran's attempts to increase its influence in the region. The reality on the ground is that Iran is struggling to maintain influence in the region, and that its efforts to cooperate with a small set of countries with interests that are inimical to the United States are waning. In an attempt to evade international sanctions and cultivate anti-U.S. sentiment, the Iranian regime has increased its diplomatic and economic outreach across the region with nations like Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Argentina. This outreach has only been marginally successful, however, and the region as a whole has not been receptive to Iranian efforts.

Members and supporters of Iran's partner, Lebanese Hezbollah, have an established presence in several countries in the region. The Lebanese Shi'a diaspora in our area of responsibility may generate as much as tens of millions of dollars for Hezbollah through both licit and illicit means. There is also precedent for Iranian and Hezbollah collusion to conduct attacks in the region, as evidenced in the 1992 and 1994 bombings in Argentina.¹⁰ In Venezuela, government officials have been sanctioned for providing financial support to Hezbollah, and for providing support to the FARC's narcotics and arms trafficking activities in Colombia.¹¹ We take Iranian activities very seriously and, along with U.S. government agencies and international

¹⁰ This refers to the 1992 and 1994 bombings of the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) and Israeli Embassy by Hezbollah operatives.

¹¹ U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control. "Press Release: Treasury Designates Four Venezuelan Officials for Providing Arms and Security to the FARC." September 8, 2011; U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control. "Press Release: Treasury Targets Hizballah in Venezuela." September 19, 2008.

partners, we remain vigilant to the activities of Iran and affiliated extremist groups and remain prepared to work with our partners to counter any direct threat to U.S.

- *The U.S. Treasury Department has imposed sanctions against seven current or former senior Venezuelan government and military officials, including the former Minister of Defense, for providing direct support to the FARC's narcotics trafficking activities.*
- *In 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions on two Venezuelans—Ghazi Nasr al Din and Fawzi Kan'an—for providing financial and other support to Hezbollah. Nasr al Din served as Charge d' Affaires at the Venezuelan Embassy in Syria and the Director of Political Aspects at the Venezuelan Embassy in Lebanon.*

national security. I would be remiss, however, if I did not share with the Congress my assessment that U.S. Southern Command's limited intelligence capabilities may prevent our full awareness of all Iranian and Hezbollah activities in the region.

Terrorist Presence in the Region. Additionally, both Sunni and Shi'a extremists are present in our area of responsibility, and I am watchful for an evolution in operational presence, capacity, or radicalization, particularly among "homegrown" extremist groups. Proselytizers with ties to global Islamic extremism are attempting to radicalize and recruit among the Muslim communities throughout the region. Outreach by external extremist groups from the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia, such as Jama'at al Tabligh, has increased. As many Members of the Congress have noted, the U.S. and our partners should be extremely concerned whenever external extremist groups or state-sponsors of terrorism see the Western Hemisphere as attractive—or even worse, vulnerable.

Terrorist groups represent a persistent challenge that has plagued the region for decades.

The U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility has the highest improvised explosive devices (IED) activity in the world outside of Afghanistan and Iraq, with Colombia accounting for over 90 percent of IEDs in the region.

The FARC is the region's oldest, largest, most capable, and best-equipped insurgency. The

Government of Colombia is currently in peace negotiations with the FARC, but the fight is far from over and a successful peace accord is not guaranteed. Although weakened, the FARC

continues to confront the Colombian state by employing improvised explosive devices and attacking energy infrastructure and oil pipelines. In Peru, Sendero Luminoso (The Shining Path), while smaller than the FARC, remains committed to violence and overthrowing the government. Both the FARC and Sendero Luminoso rely on drug trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion to fund attacks on the Colombian and Peruvian governments. The hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue the FARC receives from cocaine trafficking alone enable them to purchase surface-to-air missiles and fund the construction of multi-million dollar “narco subs.” Utilized by a variety of illicit trafficking groups in the region, fully submersible vessels are capable of transporting up to 10 metric tons of a variety of cargo and have a range capacity of 6,800 nautical miles, a range that could reach Africa. In other words, these subs, which are extraordinarily difficult to detect, can travel from the Caribbean coast of Colombia to just about any major city in Florida, Texas, or California in 10-12 days.^{12,13}

External Actors. Finally, I view the expanding influence of countries “external” to the Western Hemisphere as having uncertain implications. As I stated earlier, personal relationships are of enormous importance in this region, a fact other nations recognize. China is increasing its economic role in the region, and government-owned companies are funding or acquiring strategic infrastructure to facilitate commercial logistics. Chinese companies own and operate an interest in at least five ports in the

2012 Regional Investments by China:

- ***Two Chinese banks provided \$8 billion in credit lines for 60 projects in 12 countries in the region.***
- ***\$2 billion loan to Argentina to finance railway modernization through soy-producing regions.***
- ***\$1.4 billion investment in copper mines in Ecuador.***
- ***Joint agreement with Venezuela to develop Las Cristinas gold mine, one of the world's largest gold reserves.***

¹² Depending on the type and dimensions of the cargo, up to 10 metric tons of a variety of products could be transported. Range estimates based on Office of Naval Intelligence assessments of seized fully submersible vessels.

¹³ Written Testimony of Read Admiral Charles Michel, Director, Joint Interagency Task Force South. Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, House Committee on Homeland Security. June 19, 2012.

region, while telecommunications firms such as Huawei Technologies and ZTE have a rapidly expanding presence in South America. With an unprecedented three naval deployments to Latin America since 2008, including a hospital ship visit in 2011, China is attempting to directly compete with U.S. military activities in the region. I believe it is important to note that sequestration will likely result in the cancellation of this year's deployment of the USNS Comfort to the region, an absence that would stand in stark contrast to China's recent efforts. In my judgment, Chinese interest in cultivating relationships with countries in the Western Hemisphere reaffirms the importance of strengthening our *own* partnerships with the region.

Strategic Approach

The transnational nature of many of these challenges I described cannot be addressed by any one nation or agency alone. In my view, this illustrates the efficiency of working with and through our partners in the region and the U.S. government. U.S. Southern Command's strong, established relationships with regional militaries and security forces can serve as a catalyst for encouraging greater unity of effort on hemispheric security, from terrorism to illicit trafficking to the security of the Panama Canal. Many of the issues we face in the region transcend borders, requiring more than just a "whole of government" approach; they require a whole of community, a whole of society, a whole of *hemisphere* approach. Time and again—whether during Plan Colombia or Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE in Haiti; whether in an interdiction operation that denies drug traffickers billions of dollars in revenue; or in multinational training exercises that improve the capability of regional armies, air forces, marines, navies, and special operations forces—our partnerships are the key enablers for ensuring regional security. It is my position that strengthening these partnerships is a cost-effective use of government resources. A layered defense can help the U.S. detect and deter threats *before* they reach the homeland, and help the hemisphere collectively respond to an uncertain and complex security environment. I would like

to provide the Congress with a brief overview of what, in my view, is the invaluable return on investment from partnering and engaging with Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. I am gravely concerned, however, that sequestration and its associated out-year cuts to the defense budget will imperil our ability to sustain these successful partnerships and regional progress.

Operation MARTILLO. We are currently witnessing the security dividends from

regional cooperation as a result of Operation

MARTILLO. In support of Department of State's

Central American Regional Security Initiative, U.S.

Southern Command launched a joint, interagency,

and combined operation to counter illicit trafficking along the Central American coastlines,

coordinating with Western Hemisphere and European partner nations to maximize all possible

means for support. In addition to the measurable results of the operation, we have also seen

greater unity of effort, expanded information sharing, and enhanced interoperability among

partner nations and federal departments like the Department of Justice and the Department of

Homeland Security. I am very proud to note that 67% of illicit trafficking disruptions in 2012

were supported by partner nations, who have played an enormous role in the success of the

operation. This unprecedented level of cooperation could serve as a model for future operations

in Central America, although our ability to continue MARTILLO, build on the nascent progress

of our Central American partners, or provide complementary support to the Department of

State's Regional Aviation Program will all be in serious jeopardy due to sequestration and its

associated out-year cuts to the defense budget.

<i>Operation MARTILLO 2012 Results</i>	
<i>Cocaine disrupted</i>	<i>152,389 kgs</i>
<i>Marijuana disrupted</i>	<i>21,488 kgs</i>
<i>Bulk cash disrupted</i>	<i>\$7.2 million</i>
<i>Assets seized (total)</i>	<i>101</i>
<i>Partner nation supported disruptions</i>	<i>67%</i>
<i>Revenue denied to TCOs</i>	<i>\$ 3 billion</i>

Cooperation on Counterterrorism. In the region, our engagement on counterterrorism issues centers on promoting interoperability with key partner nations and maintaining a persistent and episodic presence to counter the influence of Islamic extremism, recruitment, and radicalization efforts. We are also conducting contingency planning for a variety of scenarios, but the most valuable deterrent to direct threats to the United States is through *presence and partnerships*, by maintaining active awareness and nurturing our relationships within the region. Continued budget uncertainty is impacting our ability to ensure this presence, however, as reduced resources have forced us to scale back deployments of Civil Affairs and Special Operations Forces teams to the region.

Interagency and Private Sector Partnerships. Collaboration with our foreign and domestic partners also underscores everything we do at U.S. Southern Command headquarters. Thirty three interagency representatives and detailees, along with five foreign liaison officers, are integrated throughout the command, allowing our military personnel to capitalize on the unique capabilities, authorities, and expertise of other government agencies and partner nations. Likewise, our military planning capability and capacity often can enhance synchronization of interagency efforts, even when the Department of Defense is not the lead agency. Cooperation with the private sector and non-governmental organizations also serves as significant force and

New Horizons 2012: Peru
Total U.S. troops trained: 435
Medical Readiness Training Exercises: 8
Patients treated: over 26,000
Animals treated: 313
Construction and renovation projects: 6
NGO Contribution: valued at over \$200K

resource multipliers to our activities and those of our interagency partners. In 2012, our collaboration with the private sector leveraged gifts-in-kind and the participation of medical personnel, emergency management practitioners, business leaders, and

academics in our humanitarian assistance activities throughout the region. While we will seek to

expand these no-cost partnerships with the private sector, budget cuts have compelled us to reduce the interagency presence in our headquarters, which undermines our coordination within the U.S. government.

Security Cooperation. Within the region, we build relationships with partner nation militaries through a range of engagements, such as training exercises, educational exchanges, and security cooperation activities. Every year, U.S. Southern Command conducts multinational training exercises with our partners, which focus primarily on maritime interdiction, the defense of the Panama Canal, and training for peace support and disaster response operations. These exercises are a unique opportunity to promote regional cooperation, enhance readiness and interoperability of our hemisphere's military forces, and encourage collective action to address shared security challenges. To help mitigate costly disaster relief operations and strengthen state presence in under-governed areas, we conduct low-cost humanitarian assistance programs and exercises that provide training to U.S. and partner nation personnel and demonstrate U.S. values to the region. The shadow of sequestration and its associated out-year budget cuts place the continuation of many of these activities in doubt, however. Our security cooperation mission has borne the brunt of our budget reductions this year, and reduced engagements may have an "eroding effect" on our partnerships far into the future.

In addition to training exercises, our Human Rights Initiative and International Military Education and Training are essential to developing professional armed forces throughout the Americas. The regional trend of deploying militaries in non-traditional roles like domestic security underscores the continued importance of our human rights training, including our ongoing support for Colombian military justice reform. Programs like the Inter-American Air Force Academy, the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, the Inter-American

Defense College, and the Combating Terrorism Fellowship build relationships among future senior military leaders in the region. Additionally, the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric

<i>Strengthening Regional Defense Institutions</i>		Defense Studies helps
<i>International Military Education Training</i>	<i>Funded 2,034 students from the region in 2012</i>	strengthen regional defense
<i>Inter-American Air Force Academy</i>	<i>In its 69-year history, ~ 44,000 graduates</i>	institutions by promoting
<i>Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation</i>	<i>In its 12 year history, trained 15,859 students from 34 nations, two of whom went on to prominent positions in their respective governments</i>	security sector reform.
<i>Inter-American Defense College</i>	<i>More than 2,380 students from 24 countries have graduated from the IADC. 34% have gone on to become partner nation presidents, cabinet ministers, ambassadors, or general officers.</i>	These entities are all vital in assisting our partner nations develop the accountable,

professional, and transparent defense institutions that are key to long-term hemispheric security. Sequestration and its associated out-year budget cuts could impact these valuable programs. Mr. Chairman, Members, we want to avoid losing an opportunity to build strong, enduring relationships with militaries in our own hemisphere.

Through our engagement and training activities, U.S. Southern Command seeks to build the capabilities of regional militaries to confront internal challenges to stability, sovereignty, and security. In addition to the rotational forces provided by our component commands, we rely on the National Guard's State Partnership Program to engage with 22 nations in the area of responsibility. The State Partnership Program provides long-term mentorship to our partner nations to advance democratic principles and values and to encourage subordination of the military to civilian authority. Due to budget reductions, however, we were forced to cancel more than 90 events aimed at improving partner nation capacity in areas such as disaster response, defense support to civil authorities, and

In 2012, U.S. National Guard units conducted 223 events, and Colombia-South Carolina became the newest partnership under the program.

countering transnational organized crime. If triggered, sequestration and its associated out-year cuts to the Department of Defense budget could further limit the Services' ability to provide forces for future security cooperation activities.

In Central America, we are providing training and security assistance to improve maritime, aerial, and land domain awareness capabilities, focusing on the Northern Tier countries where the threat posed by transnational criminal organizations is greatest. In the Caribbean, we are supporting the development of a regional maritime interdiction strategy, as well as providing equipment and training to improve maritime and air domain awareness. Further south, Foreign Military Financing for the Joint Rotary Wing/Riverine Program has delivered critical mobility to Colombian counterinsurgency efforts, while an expanded Military Justice Program has resulted in invaluable training in the Law of Armed Conflict and Human Rights Law. In Peru, we are supporting planning related to counterterrorism efforts against Sendero Luminoso. Additionally, we have partnered with the Joint IED Defeat Organization to help the Colombian Armed Forces build their counter IED capabilities, and we are in discussions on offering similar training to Peru. Our engagement with Brazil centers on space, cyber defense, intelligence and information sharing, and counterterrorism training for the upcoming World Cup and Summer Olympics. We are also exploring possible collaboration with U.S. Health and Human Services on consequence management. We fully support the proposal presented at the October 2012 Conference of the Defense Ministers of the Americas to advance a coordination mechanism for regional disaster response, and have begun discussions with the Government of Peru, the next CDMA Secretariat, on implementation. Although critical to ensuring the forward defense of the United States, our

In 2012, U.S. Southern Command's DoD Rewards Program facilitated the capture of Florindo Eleuterio Flores-Hala (aka "Artemio"), the organizational head of the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV) faction of Sendero Luminoso, landing a blow against the UHV organization.

training and engagement programs have been seriously impacted by this year's budget reductions. Sequestration and its associated out-year budget cuts will result in further debilitating effects to these valuable programs.

Partners as Security Exporters. As I travel throughout U.S. Southern Command's area of responsibility, I am continuously impressed by the contributions of our partners to regional and international security. A global leader, Brazil heads the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, provides security assistance to several African nations, participates in maritime

Thirteen countries are providing forces to multinational security operations and United Nations peacekeeping missions throughout the world, and El Salvador recently deployed personnel in support of the NATO mission in Afghanistan.

exercises with South Africa and India, and is conducting border security operations with its neighbors. Chile has integrated a Salvadoran infantry unit into a battalion in

support of the U.N. Mission in Haiti, and is exploring opportunities for further building partner capacity initiatives in Central America. Colombia is perhaps the best example of the inherent value of security assistance to the region. Once on the brink of falling to a powerful insurgency, Colombia is now a leader in counterinsurgency tactics and provides training to West African and Central American counterparts. U.S. Southern Command shares the commitment of these valued partners to ensuring a strong, secure, integrated hemisphere and global system, but sequestration may limit our ability to deepen our defense relationships with these partners or enhance the collective security of the hemisphere.

Way Ahead

Future Budget Reductions. While we have taken painful steps to reduce spending in 2013, we recognize that sequestration and its associated out-year cuts to the defense budget will

result in even more difficult decisions in the future. This year, we were able to decrease spending by applying equitable cuts across a range of programs, but future cuts may involve wholesale program elimination. As I have told my workforce, spending cuts will force us to “do less, with less.” There will be some missions we will simply no longer be able to conduct, and our regional relationships will likely suffer as a result.

Mitigating Asset Gaps in the Caribbean. Mr. Chairman, Members, as I alluded to earlier: *presence matters*. It is a documented deterrent. Given our likely continued asset reductions, we will need to rely on our partners, wherever possible, to help bridge some capability gaps in terms of assets, authorities, or resources. I credit the support of our European and Canadian allies in the Caribbean whose presence helps mitigate asset gaps, although I remain concerned by the sub-region’s vulnerability to a shift in trafficking tactics. Although an estimated 92-94% percent of cocaine destined for the U.S. still flows through Central America, known cocaine movement towards Hispaniola—mainly the Dominican Republic—appears to have increased by three percent to 32 metric tons in 2012.¹⁴ We have experienced the so-called “balloon effect” before, and focusing limited assets on Central America creates a potential gap in other areas, which could be exploited by traffickers seeking to escape pressure from Operation MARTILLO. Last year, according to local media reports, 885 pounds of marijuana washed ashore on Florida’s beaches, a vivid reminder of the heyday of drug smuggling in the Caribbean, an era I know none of us wants to see repeated.¹⁵ This will be increasingly difficult to prevent, however, given the impact sequestration will have on future asset availability.

¹⁴ Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement (IACM). *Cocaine Movement Trends 3rd Quarter 2012*.

¹⁵ “Drugs found on South Florida beaches recalls smuggling heyday.” October 1, 2012. *Sun Sentinel*.

Detainee Operations. U.S. Southern Command continues to conduct safe, humane, and transparent detention operations at Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO). The pending installation of the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station undersea fiber optic cable will save the United States millions of dollars in the long-term by reducing costs associated with using satellite communications. This cable will improve the reliability of communications with Guantanamo Bay facilities and also thereby enhance our ability to support military commissions, periodic review boards, and detention operations.

Two of the major challenges we face at JTF-GTMO are a lack of long-term resource planning, and complex issues related to future medical care of detainees. Mr. Chairman, Members, to paraphrase a former JTF-GTMO commander, we haven't been at Guantanamo for 11 years; we've been there for *one* year, *eleven* times. A temporary detainee operation has now lasted over 11 years, and the expeditionary infrastructure at JTF-GTMO is rapidly deteriorating, placing assigned personnel and operations at increasing risk. Regardless of policy disputes, we must make pragmatic decisions to protect our troops from unsafe and unsanitary living conditions and to ensure the continued safe and humane care of the detainee population. We have been relying on a patchwork of temporary fixes, but there is an urgent need for immediate refurbishment of degraded expeditionary infrastructure at JTF-GTMO. Using FY 2009 Overseas Contingency Funding for military construction, we have identified a series of projects aimed at increasing the security of the detainees, facilitating our ability to support legal processes for detainees, and most of all, meeting basic quality of life requirements for our troops. I look forward to working with the Congress as we address this issue. Additionally, the medical issues of the aging detainee population are increasing in scope and complexity. As is the case with any older person, aging detainees could require specialized treatment for issues such as heart attack,

stroke, kidney failure, or even cancer. The future emergency and critical medical care of detainees may require specialists and equipment to enhance the current capabilities at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay.

Quality of Life. As a non-traditional installation, U.S. Southern Command faces unique issues in supporting our assigned military personnel and their families, as well as retirees, and veterans living in South Florida who utilize the services available at our U.S. Army Garrison facility. In my first few months at U.S. Southern Command, I have come to realize that military families in South Florida are at a huge financial and benefits disadvantage. Access to a commissary is an integral part of the military benefits package for Active Duty personnel throughout their compensated period of duty or service.¹⁶ Service members stationed at U.S. Southern Command do not have access to a nearby commissary, yet live in one of the most expensive cities in the United States. The continued lack of a commissary at our headquarters is not only a disservice to our personnel, but to the entire South Florida military community. In addition to the demonstrated economic returns and benefits, the commissary system ensures our service men and women and their families receive the full compensation they deserve by law.¹⁷

Whenever I visit one of our component commands or joint task forces, I make a concerted effort to address quality of life issues facing our troops, even seemingly minor ones like 24-hour gym access, a small request when you are working long shifts far from your loved ones. At our headquarters, I have spent a great deal of time talking to the service members assigned to U.S. Southern Command, and every single junior enlisted person I meet has told me of the financial hardships they face trying to make ends meet under the current Cost of Living

¹⁶ Department of Defense Instruction 1330.17. December 2008.

¹⁷ Resale and MWR Center for Research. *Costs and Benefits of the DoD Resale System*. December 2012.

Allowance. For example, a typical E-3 assigned to U.S. Southern Command receives \$1,787 in monthly pay, \$1,437 per month for housing, and a mere \$18 in Cost of Living Allowance,¹⁸ in a city with some of the highest insurance rates and lack of affordable rental housing in the country.¹⁹ I am actively engaging within the Department of Defense to make them aware of my concerns, and we are working to find a solution.

U.S. Southern Command's most important resource is its workforce, and I am committed to enhancing quality of life at our headquarters. In recognition of growing concerns for the health and wellbeing of U.S. service members, we conducted two suicide prevention events, and we are developing a specialized council to address the emotional, mental, and physical health of all our personnel. Although an Army program, our Survivor Outreach Services office recently received approval to provide long-term support to family members of *all* our South Florida fallen heroes, regardless of service affiliation. As the Congress is aware, reports of sexual assault and harassment in the military have been at an all-time high, and U.S. Southern Command is doing its part to address this unacceptable issue. All incidents are handled using the exact procedures outlined in Department of Defense directives and policy, which promote sensitive care, confidential reporting for victims of sexual assault, and 100% accountability for those who commit these crimes. We also have a strong Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) program in place that ensures victims receive all the legal, medical, and psychological support they need. To support the professional development of our workforce, we

¹⁸ Based on calculations for duty location (33176) for an E3 with two years of service and no dependents. 2013 pay information from Defense Finance and Accounting Services; BAH calculator may be found at: www.defensetravel.dod.mil/site/bahCalc.cfm. The CONUS COLA calculator may be found at <http://www.defensetravel.dod.mil/site/conusCalc.cfm>

¹⁹ According to apartment market research firm AXOIMetrics, the average effective rent (which includes concessions) in Miami is \$1,269 per month, compared to the U.S. as a whole at \$964. According to the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University, the Miami rental market has the greatest share of severely cost-burdened renters (i.e. renters who pay more than half their income to rent) in the country.

expanded training opportunities last year, including language and cultural awareness training to enhance our relations with partner nations. Possible furloughs, however, will likely disrupt training and professional development for our civilian employees, while sequestration will impact our language programs, undercutting the readiness of our assigned forces.

Conclusion

Finally, I would like to extend my personal gratitude to the outstanding men and women under my command. Day in and day out, 1,482 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and civilians work to enhance the defense of the United States and build enduring partnerships across Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. Mr. Chairman, Members, although I have spoken extensively about the impact of drastic spending cuts to our missions and operations, there is also a *human* impact. Our dedicated Department of Defense civilians and Service members—our people—will disproportionately suffer the long-term damages sequestration and its associated out-year cuts to the defense budget will inflict. U.S. Southern Command is committed to ensuring the security and stability of the Western Hemisphere, and I hope the Congress will demonstrate its commitment to our great nation, its people, and its military by resolving budget uncertainty and preventing the devastating effects of sequestration. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Committee Members, I stand ready for your questions.

ANNEX: 2012 Component Accomplishments**U.S. Army South (ARSOUTH)****Headquarters: San Antonio, Texas**

- **U.S. Army South** conducted 31 security cooperation events in 13 countries in U.S. Southern Command's area of responsibility. These events represent 31 instances of engagement and building partner nation capabilities with the other militaries in the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility.
- **CONFERENCE OF THE AMERICAN ARMIES:** The Conference of the American Armies is a 22 country delegation developed for the contribution to peacekeeping operations and disaster relief operations through the creation and use of mechanisms and procedures designed to improve the collective capacities and interoperability of its members. This year ARSOUTH represented the United States at the Science & Technology Conference in Peru, the Emerging Threats Conference in Colombia, the Disaster Relief Exercise in Mexico and the Extraordinary Commander's Conference in Mexico.
- **PANAMAX 2012:** PANAMAX is a joint and combined operational exercise focused on the defense of the Panama Canal by a multi-national joint task force, as well as building disaster and pandemic outbreak response capabilities of 17 participating partner nations. ARSOUTH hosted and provided mentorship to the Colombian led Combined Forces Land Component Command which included 122 participants from 9 countries. This was a major step forward in regional/coalition operations and the first time a foreign military played this key role in a SOUTHCOM JTF.
 - **Due to budget uncertainty and possible sequestration cuts, USSOUTHCOM significantly de-scoped PANAMAX 2013.**
- **FUERZAS ALIADAS HUMANITARIAS:** Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias is a regionally oriented humanitarian assistance/foreign disaster relief (HA/FDR) exercise that brings together partner nation and U.S. military units, civilian disaster management

agencies, and local first responders. This year's exercise was held in Washington, D.C. with 70 participants from 20 nations.

➤ **Due to budget uncertainty and possible sequestration cuts, USSOUTHCOM cancelled FUERZAS ALIADAS HUMANITARIAS 2013.**

- **PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AMERICAS:** This annual exercise provides training in international stability and peace operation in support of the United Nations and the Conference of the American Armies doctrine and procedures. ARSOUTH was the Executive Planning Agent for Peace Keeping Operations-Americas 2012 which included three supporting multi-echelon unit level staff training events: two in Chile and one in Dominican Republic, with 170 participants from 16 countries and culminated with a Multinational Task Force staff Command Post Exercise (CPX) held in Chile, with over 261 participants from 22 nations. All participants received training and familiarization in working on a UN based peacekeeping operation.

➤ **Due to budget uncertainty and possible sequestration cuts, USSOUTHCOM cancelled PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AMERICAS 2013.**

- **BEYOND THE HORIZON:** Beyond the Horizon is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved, U.S. Southern Command-sponsored, Joint, Interagency, and Combined Field Training Exercise. The exercise provides and incorporates Humanitarian and Civic Assistance construction projects, Medical Readiness Exercises (MEDRETES), and other infrastructure projects. ARSOUTH was the Executive Planning Agent for the 2012 Beyond the Horizon exercises conducted in Guatemala and Honduras, which involved the deployment of 1,800 U.S. service members into the two supported countries, resulting in the completion of 18 engineer projects, including schools and clinics in 12 communities, and 6 MEDRETES that provided care to 33,330 patients and treated 27,800 animals for veterinary support. The exercises also obtained the support of 300 Guatemalan and Honduran military and interagency personnel working side by side with U.S. personnel.

- **OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM CENTRAL AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN:** In 2012, this program conducted 28 Subject Matter Expert Exchanges in seven countries (Panama, El Salvador, Honduras, Belize, Dominica, Guatemala, and Jamaica) that included over 800 host nation soldiers.
- **HUMANITARIAN MINING ACTION:** Humanitarian Mine Action is a Joint Chiefs of Staff approved, U.S. Southern Command-sponsored demining training. Humanitarian Mine Action is designed to train existing host nation Demining Units using the International Mine Action Standards. This year ARSOUTH conducted training at the Ecuadorian Engineer School in Quito, Ecuador and the Colombian Army (COLAR) Demining Training Center in Tolemaida, Colombia. The goal of the training was to assist both countries in developing the capacity to remove anti-personnel mines and demine affected land for economic development.
- **STAFF TALKS:** ARSOUTH conducted four bilateral Staff Talks in Colombia, Brazil, Chile, and El Salvador and one Rotary Wing Aviation Seminar in Peru. The outcomes of these Staff Talks are more than 60 current Agreed to Actions (ATAs) that represent mutually negotiated bilateral and regional goals. A Working Group with Peru has yielded 12 similar Coordinated Action agreements and opportunities at a permanent staff talk status in the foreseeable future.
- **LATIN AMERICA COOP:** During FY12, ARSOUTH Latin American Cooperation Funds supported 91 engagements/activities in 14 countries in the region. LATAM Coop is a critical resource to execute ARSOUTH Security Cooperation objectives and U.S. Southern Command's Theater Security Strategy. LATAM Coop supports Army to Army Staff Talks with key countries, Foreign Liaison Officers assigned to ARSOUTH, Conference of American Armies, professional development exchanges on multiple topics, army commander and distinguished visitor program, and Joint/Combined/Multinational Exercises and Operations.
- **CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS:** ARSOUTH conducted Civil Military Relations Professional Development Exchanges in Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, improving their ability to conduct inter-organizational coordination during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

12th Air Force (Air Forces Southern)

Headquarters: Tucson, Arizona

- **Air Forces Southern** conducted 21 security cooperation events in 13 countries in U.S. Southern Command's area of responsibility.
 - **PANAMAX 2012:** During PANAMAX 2012, Air Forces Southern successfully trained and integrated partner nation air planners into division processes and pushed 9 ATOs/ACOs with a total of 1,193 missions (310 sorties). The Dynamic Targeting Cell prosecuted 12 time-sensitive targets and provided collateral damage estimate calls and weaponeering solutions. For the first time, a Brazilian Chief of Combat Operations was fully integrated into AOC operations, along with Colombian JAG officers.
- **Due to budget uncertainty and possible sequestration cuts, USSOUTHCOM significantly de-scoped PANAMAX 2013.**
- **ISR Missions:** Provided C2 for ISR missions in support of U.S. Southern Command's priorities; over 28,000+ images, 1,893.8 hours of signals intelligence led to the seizure of 332,616 lbs (3.02 billion worth) of drugs and weapons; 32 high-value narco-terrorists killed in action.
 - **Airlift Missions:** Executed 118 theater airlift missions moving 4,606 passengers and 314.8 tons of cargo throughout U.S. Southern Command's area of responsibility.
 - **Medical Deployments:** Planned and executed 12 Medical Deployments for training exercises in 2012, resulting in the treatment of 60,000 patients. Each deployment provided increased readiness of U.S. forces and improved the capability of regional partners to conduct combined operations.
 - **NEW HORIZONS:** Trained 435 U.S. active duty, guard, and reserve military, medical, and 60 host nation support forces. Provided medical humanitarian and civic assistance to rural areas in Peru and trained 17 engineers. Construction projects included two clinics, a library, auditorium, SEAHUT, and a large multi-use facility. During the exercise, the medical team treated over 26,000 patients.

- **Sovereign Skies Expansion Program:** Used successful lessons learned from Dominican Republic and Colombia programs to strengthen air force capabilities in Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Training included helicopter maintenance, night operations, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
- **571 Mobility Support Advisory Squadron:** Successfully completed six deployments of 25 man teams for 6-8 weeks to Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, and Peru. Provided unit self training as air advisors, supported airfield infrastructure improvements, and built air capabilities, including logistics, communications, fuels, contracting, air traffic control, survival/search/rescue, supply, vehicle maintenance, security forces, command and control, airfield management, maintenance, information operations, and aerial port functions.
- **Support to Counter Illicit Trafficking efforts:** Presented RC-135, C-130 SENIOR SCOUT, JSTARS, AWACS, B-1, B-52, RQ-4 Global Hawk B-30, and TPS-78 ground-based radar in addition to the daily ATO support to Colombia. Provided several thousand hours of coverage in support of detection and monitoring operations, generally under the tactical control of JIATF-South. Deployed TPS-78 ground-based radar (GBR) to Honduras for 90 days in support of Operation MARTILLO, including surveillance coverage of illicit air trafficking routes resulting in law enforcement seizures of approximately 1.4MT of cocaine, 7 aircraft seized/destroyed, and 8 pilots DOA, arrested or missing. Supported four month deployment of Peruvian Air Force TPS-70 GBR for Operation ALL INCLUSIVE and provided detailed trend analysis of current illicit air traffic in Peru.

Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S)

Headquarters: Key West, Florida

- **Joint Interagency Task Force South** contributed to the disruption of 152 metric tons of cocaine in FY 2012 worth more than \$3 billion wholesale. This was a 30% increase in disruptions from the previous fiscal year. JIATF-S employs an integrated defense forward capability for the ongoing efforts at the US Southwest Border and for US

operations in the Western Hemisphere using TACON ship days, TACON flight hours and the operating cost of FSSC provided ROTHF support.

- **The vast majority of JIATF-S successes came as a result of JIATF-S leadership and coordination of Operation MARTILLO**, the multi-lateral effects based operation designed to deny the CENTAM littoral routes by illicit traffickers. Begun on 15 January 2012, Op MARTILLO resulted in the disruption of 152 metric tons of cocaine, the seizure of \$7.2 Million in bulk cash, and the seizure of 101 vessels including 4 self-propelled semi submersibles (SPSS) and 8 aircraft. At its one year anniversary, Op MARTILLO is beginning to show its desired effects: trafficking in the Western Caribbean and Eastern Pacific littorals is seen to be decreasing while the activity in the Eastern Pacific non-littoral route is rising.
- **Operational Results and Impact.** In the air domain, over the past year, JIATF-S assesses a 21 % decrease in illicit air tracks destined for Central America (primarily Honduras); and a 57 % decrease in illicit air tracks destined for Hispaniola (primarily Haiti). In the maritime domain, during the same period JIATF-S assesses a decrease of maritime activity in the Western Caribbean littoral and non-littoral trafficking areas of 36% and 38% for each vector respectively. In the EPAC, the trafficking shows a steady decrease in the littorals (from an overall increase of 71% at the end of FY12 to a current 43% decrease in FY13) while the activity in the EPAC non-littorals appears to be increasing (from an increase of 12% in FY12 to an increase of 51% currently in FY13). These changes are assessed to be a direct result of Op MARTILLO assets working in the littoral areas and reflect the start of achieving the end result of the operation in driving the traffickers out of the littorals.
- **Role of Partner Nations.** Since 15 January 2012, 67% of the disruptions were supported by partner nations who have played an enormous role in the success of the operation. This represents an increase from 57% last year.
- **Innovation to meet the counter-drug mission.** JIATF-S continues to innovate in the face of asset reductions by their demonstrated ability to integrate any and all non-traditional counterdrug assets into their force lay down in order to achieve success. JIATF-S strived to fulfill its counter-drug missions with non-traditional counterdrug assets. In FY12, the USAF deployed JSTARS, B-1, and B-52 detachments to the JIATFS

Joint Operating Area (JOA). Under JIATF-S TACON, these detachments provided critical wide area surveillance and long range maritime patrol capabilities in support of JIATF-S' detection and monitoring mission while maximizing their pre-deployment training opportunities in a semi-benign but target rich JOA.

- **Information Dominance.** Understanding the importance and growing emphasis on information warfare and cyber defense, JIATF-S reorganized their Intelligence and Security, C4I, and Innovation and Technology Directorates under a Senior Director for Information Dominance to parallel the US Navy's reorganization of their N2 and N6. This reorganization resulted in efficiencies in systems development and integration, enhanced information fusion capabilities, and development of capacities to conduct counter network operations against transnational criminal organizations

Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-B)

Headquarters: Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras

- **Support to Operation ANVIL:** Provided planning and logistical support for proof of concept for Operation ANVIL. Operation resulted in 2,300 kgs of narcotics seized and 16 indictments, and laid the groundwork for future Department of State-led operations in Central America.
- **Air Operations:** Conducted 228 air movements in support of CTOC operations, MEDRETEs, MEDEVACs, and official visitor movement within Honduras and to Nicaragua, El Salvador, Belize, and Guatemala.
- **Support to Government of Honduras:** Assisted with disaster relief at the Comayagua prison fire in February 2012, the worst in Honduran history. Coordinated with five national agencies to recover and transport 352 deceased prisoners and partnered with ATF on investigation matters. JTF-Bravo assistance was praised by President Lobo on national television.
- **Humanitarian/Civic Assistance:**
 - Conducted 14 MEDRETEs, performing 41,948 medical procedures on over 22,000 patients throughout Central America.

- JTF-Bravo assisted with the reception and distribution of 143,290 pounds of humanitarian aid cargo on military aircraft under the Denton Program, which was made available to NGOs for delivery to local families.
- Soto Cano Chapel hosted 6 chapel hikes for 521 people and distributed over 13,000 lbs of food to needy local families.
- JTF-B MSC's sponsored 4 orphanages with over 80 visits by JTF-B personnel, providing approximately \$12k of aid including facility improvements, clothing, school supplies, and food.
- **Disaster Response Training:** As part of CENTAM SMOKE, JTF-B trained 87 firefighting personnel from Honduras and Nicaragua.

Joint Task Force Guantanamo
Headquarters: Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

- **Safe and Humane Care and Custody:** Detainees have been moved from expeditionary Camps I-IV to more modern Camps V and VI. Detainees in Camp VI and parts of Camp V are allowed communal living arrangements, which improves social interaction and overall well-being for detainees, while also significantly reducing detainee-guard interactions, which reduces assaults on the guard force. Outdoor recreation areas of Camps V and VI have been significantly expanded and library holdings for loan to detainees have increased to 25,000 items. In order to further increase social interaction and mental stimulation, educational course offerings have also been broadened in scope and frequency. Detainees maintain family contact with mail, telephone calls and, in areas which support this service, videophone conferences, coordinated by the International Committee of the Red Cross.
- **Legal and Transparent Operations:** Continued assessments by the International Committee of the Red Cross have been expanded to six visits per year. The ICRC verifies compliance with international standards of custody as specified in the Geneva Convention and other international standards and provides confidential advice for suggested improvements to the JTF Commander and U.S. Southern Command. Detainees are granted routine visits by legal representatives, having received more than

898 Commissions and 362 Habeas attorney visits in 2012. JTF Guantanamo is committed to transparency and has hosted 970 visitors and 164 media representatives from 60 domestic and international news organizations over the past year.

- **Military Commissions:** In March 2011, the Obama administration announced that military commissions would resume at Guantanamo Bay. Military commissions proceedings are open to observation by the media, victim family members and non-governmental organizations. The first military commissions proceeding was the arraignment of the alleged mastermind of the USS COLE bombing in November, 2011. In 2012, JTF-Guantanamo supported 8 hearings, including: the arraignment and motions hearings of the five individuals accused of coordinating the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S. (referred to in the press as “the 9/11 Five”), motions hearings for the alleged USS COLE bomber, and an arraignment and plea acceptance of Majid Khan, who plead guilty to conspiracy, murder, attempted murder, providing material support to terrorism, and spying, including in conjunction with the J.W. Marriott bombing in Indonesia.

U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO)

Headquarters: Mayport, Florida

- **Operation MARTILLO:** Seven frigates, one replenishment ship, and four fixed-wing aviation squadrons deployed to support Operation MARTILLO, conducting Countering Transnational Organized Crime (C-TOC) Operations under the direction of Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South). Navy Forces have played a key role in providing a persistent presence as part of a cooperative effort to shift maritime illicit trafficking away from the Central American littorals. MARTILLO has had a significant impact on illicit trafficking routes (air and maritime). Compared to calendar year 2011, disruptions were up more than 20%.
- **Southern Partnership Station 2012:** Southern Partnership Station (SPS) is a series of Navy/Marine Corps Engagements focused on Theater Security Cooperation, specifically Building Partner Capacity through subject matter expert exchanges with partner nation militaries and civilian security forces. SPS Engagements include Community Relations

(COMREL) Projects that focus on our partnerships, shared interests, and shared values. SPS Deployments included:

- **HSV SWIFT Southern Partnership Station 2012:** High Speed Vessel SWIFT (HSV 2) conducted engagements in six Partner Nations (Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Panama, Guatemala, Peru, and Haiti), which included medical, veterinary, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), Maritime Civil Affairs (MCAST), and U.S. Marine subject matter expert exchanges with partner nation counterparts. SWIFT Seabees completed small-scale construction/refurbishment projects. The SWIFT Team also delivered Project Handclasp Gifts-in-Kind during COMREL Projects, and made a special delivery of relief materials to Port Au Prince, Haiti.
- **Navy Dive Southern Partnership Station 2012:** Salvage Ship USNS GRAPPLE (T-ARS 53) conducted engagements in five Partner Nations (Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago, Panama, Guatemala, and Jamaica), and featured Navy Divers conducting subject matter expert exchanges with partner nation counterparts, to include divers from Canada, Chile, and The Bahamas. These expert exchanges included numerous live diving operations. In a historic note, the GRAPPLE Team completed a refurbishment and rededication of the Oliver Hazard Perry Gate at a cemetery in Trinidad, on the Bicentennial of the War of 1812. The original dedication of the Perry Gate was in 1925.
- **Oceanographic Southern Partnership Station 2012:** Survey Ship USNS PATHFINDER (T-AGS 60) conducted hydrographic surveys in the Eastern Pacific to support U.S. Southern Command's priority Oceanographic, Hydrographic and Bathymetric Requirements. As part of this deployment, a Fleet Survey Team traveled to Colombia to conduct joint hydrographic surveys and subject matter expert exchanges with Colombian Oceanographers.
- **UNITAS 2012:** UNITAS (Latin for "Unity") enhances friendly, mutual cooperation and understanding between participating navies by developing interoperability in naval operations among the nations of the region. In 2012, the multinational maritime exercise

series, the longest-running in the world, celebrated its 53rd straight year with two major events, one in the Pacific in May and one in the Atlantic/Caribbean in September.

- **UNITAS PAC (Pacific) 2012:** Peru hosted UNITAS PAC 2012, which included Naval Forces from Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and the United States. Events included ashore and underway training in maritime interdiction operations, counter-piracy operations, air, surface, and anti-submarine warfare.
- **UNITAS LANT (Atlantic) 2012:** The United States hosted UNITAS LANT 2012 out of Key West, Florida, the largest number of multinational warships to conduct a simultaneous port call at Key West in more than 30 years. Naval Forces from Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and the United States completed shore-based professional symposia and conducted multinational Community Relations (COMREL) Projects in Key West. Once at sea, participants trained in a variety of maritime scenarios to test command and control of forces at sea, while operating as part of a multinational force to provide the maximum opportunity to improve interoperability. In 2012, UNITAS LANT also included the U.S. Marine Corps Forces South field-training exercise known as Partnership of the Americas, which was conducted at Camp Blanding in Starke, Florida, in September.
- **Southern Seas 2012:** USS UNDERWOOD (FFG 36) conducted a variety of exercises and multinational exchanges to maintain access, enhance interoperability, and build enduring partnerships that foster regional security. UNDERWOOD participated in UNITAS PAC, the Silent Forces Exercise (SIFOREX) with Peru, UNITAS LANT, and Operation MARTILLO.
- **PANAMAX 2012:** Commander U.S. Forces Southern Command served as the Commander of Multi-National Forces South (MNFS), leading a coalition of 17 Partner Nations in the 10th annual exercise designed to execute stability operations under the support of United Nations Security Council Resolutions; provide interoperability training for participating multinational staffs; and build Partner Nation capacity to plan and execute complex multinational operations.

➤ **Due to budget uncertainty and possible sequestration cuts, USSOUTHCOM significantly de-scoped PANAMAX 2013.**

- **Navy Seabees:** 85 Seabees deployed to Naval Base Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) to support construction/refurbishment projects throughout the U.S. Southern Command AOR. From this detachment, Seabee details deployed aboard HSV SWIFT to complete projects in support of HSV SPS 2012. Seabees also deployed to complete projects in support of U.S. Army South's Beyond the Horizon Exercises in Guatemala and Honduras, U.S. Air Force Southern's New Horizons Exercise in Peru, U.S. Special Operations Command South's Fused Response Exercise in Guyana, and U.S. Marine Corps Forces South Operation MARTILLO support to Guatemala. Seabees in GTMO completed projects in support of the U.S. Navy Base and the Joint Task Force GTMO Commander.

Marine Corps Forces South (MARFORSOUTH)

Headquarters: Doral, Florida

- **Marine Corps Forces South** conducted 67 Security Cooperation events in 27 countries in United States Southern Command's area of responsibility.
- **Marine Detachment in support of Operation MARTILLO:** Responding to the new National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC), MARFORSOUTH supported JIATF-South and Guatemalan Security Forces with operations to disrupt and deter trafficking along the Central American coast. The Marine Detachment conducted detection, monitoring activities to curtail illicit trafficking routes on the Pacific coast of the Central American isthmus.
- **TRADEWINDS 2012:** The Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed exercise was hosted in Barbados with over 1,000 participants from 19 countries. Participants were trained in counter illicit trafficking operations and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief responses, as well as receiving training to improve operations center management, basic infantry skills, law enforcement tactics, techniques and procedures, search and rescue, maritime interdiction operations and procedures.

- **UNITAS – Partnership of the Americas (POA):** This exercise enhances multinational operational readiness, interoperability, and security cooperation among U.S. and 9 partner nation naval infantries. In 2012, the exercise focus was amphibious operations, to include amphibious staff planning, training and equipping in support of future peace support operations and humanitarian assistance missions.
 - **Due to budget uncertainty and possible sequestration cuts, USSOUTHCOM cancelled PARTNERSHIP OF THE AMERICAS 2013.**
- **PANAMAX 2012:** As the Marine Service component, MARFORSOUTH sourced and employed a Marine Expeditionary Unit Command Element; placed liaison officers at the JTF and functional components; stood up and operated an Operations Center and Crisis Augmentation Cell; sourced a Marine General Officer, with staff, to serve as the JTF J3; and participated in the exercise as JTF staff.
 - **Due to budget uncertainty and possible sequestration cuts, USSOUTHCOM significantly de-scoped PANAMAX 2013.**
- **Counterdrug/Counternarcotics Mobile Training Team Deployments:** Provided training to build capacity throughout the region to partner nation counterdrug and counter narco-terrorism forces to increase interdiction capacities.

Special Operations Command South (SOC SOUTH)

Headquarters: Homestead, Florida

- **Building Partner Capacity.** Through persistent engagement with its partners in the region, SOC SOUTH builds partner nation security force capacities to confront shared security challenges. SOC SOUTH's focus in Northern Central America is to partner with key security forces that are best able by mission, position, and authorities to counter transnational organized crime.

- In 2012, SOCSOUTH maintained small elements in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador working with key units to improve ground and maritime interdiction, civil affairs, and intelligence capacities.
- In the Andean Ridge, SOCSOUTH partnered with Colombia and Peru to confront narco-terrorist insurgencies whose illicit trafficking operations extend throughout the hemisphere. SOCSOUTH elements provided assistance to the Colombian Special Operations Command, the new joint interagency task forces that are conducting operations against key FARC concentrations. SOCSOUTH also provided counternarcotics, small unit tactics, and riverine training to Colombian National Police and military forces. In Peru, SOCSOUTH elements conducted counternarcotics small unit tactics and riverine training with the Peruvian Joint Special Operations Command.
- **Civil Affairs.** In 2012, SOCSOUTH had eleven civil affairs teams helping nine partner nations reduce the vulnerability of key populations to influence by transnational organized crime or violent extremism. These civil affairs teams assisted with counter-recruitment programs and, in many cases, helped partner nations build their own civil affairs capacities.
- **Information Operations.** SOCSOUTH maintained military information support teams in seven key partner nations. These teams supported the DOD Rewards Program, the U.S. government's Anti-Trafficking in Persons Program, partner nation counter-recruitment programs, and active tip lines in support of the wider effort against transnational organized criminal and violent extremist organizations. The teams also helped three partner nations build their own information operations capacity.
- **Intelligence Analytical Support to U.S. Country Teams.** SOCSOUTH provides intelligence and counter-threat financing support to U.S. Country Teams in the region, focusing on terrorism, human smuggling networks, and transnational organized crime. In Colombia, SOCSOUTH supported Colombian War Plan "SWORD OF HONOR" by helping build intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination capacity in newly established joint interagency task forces fighting the FARC.


- **Logistics Training and Advisory Team.** SOCSOUTH seeks to increase the logistics capacity of key partner nation units with the goal of continued sustainment. In 2012, SOCSOUTH provided subject matter expertise to enable key Colombia partner units to establish a sustainable weapons-repair capability and initiate the development of an aerial delivery capability. SOCSOUTH also assisted Peruvian units engaged in counter narco-terrorism operations to conduct a weapons inspection, which will serve as a starting point for future SOCSOUTH logistics engagement activities.
- **Building Intellectual Capital.** By partnering with academia, SOCSOUTH seeks to build critical thinking skills of key partner unit leadership, helping them to better confront complex irregular warfare challenges. In 2012, SOCSOUTH sponsored a “Counter FARC Ideological Activities” seminar in Colombia, and a “Counterterrorist Operations Planning” seminar in Peru in support of counter narco-terrorist operations. In Brazil, SOCSOUTH sponsored a “Joint Special Operations Task Force” seminar to assist in preparation for four major events, including the World Cup in 2014 and Summer Olympics in 2016.
- **FUERZAS COMANDO 2012:** A CJCS-approved, multinational, special operations interaction exercise consisting of a team-level special operations skills competition and a minister or cabinet-level distinguished visitors program. This year’s team competition was held in Tolomaida, Colombia. The distinguished visitor program focused on regional interagency coordination and joint/combined special operations in support of overseas contingency operations and was held in Bogota, Colombia. Twenty-one partner nations from the Western Hemisphere participated in the exercise, including Mexico, Canada, and Barbados.
 - **Due to budget uncertainty and possible sequestration cuts, USSOUTHCOM cancelled FUERZAS COMANDO 2013.**
- **FUSED RESPONSE 2012:** A CJCS-directed exercise designed to validate USSOUTHCOM crisis response capabilities. This year’s exercise was a level III exercise in Guyana, involving the participation of where interagency partners, US and host nation special operations forces and staff.



General John F. Kelly

Commander, US Southern Command

General Kelly was born and raised in Boston, MA. He enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1970, and was discharged as a sergeant in 1972, after serving in an infantry company with the 2nd Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, NC. Following graduation from the University of Massachusetts in 1976, he was commissioned and returned to the 2nd Marine Division where he served as a rifle and weapons platoon commander, company executive officer, assistant operations officer, and infantry company commander. Sea duty in Mayport, FL, followed, at which time he served aboard aircraft carriers USS Forrestal and USS Independence. In 1980, then Captain Kelly transferred to the U.S. Army's Infantry Officer Advanced Course in Fort Benning, GA. After graduation, he was assigned to Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, serving there from 1981 through 1984, as an assignment monitor. Captain Kelly returned to the 2nd Marine Division in 1984, to command a rifle and weapons company. Promoted to the rank of Major in 1987, he served as the battalion's operations officer.



In 1987, Major Kelly transferred to the Basic School, Quantico, VA, serving first as the head of the Offensive Tactics Section, Tactics Group, and later assuming the duties of the Director of the Infantry Officer Course. After three years of instructing young officers, he attended the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and the School for Advanced Warfare, both located at Quantico. Completing duty under instruction and selected for Lieutenant Colonel, he was assigned as Commanding Officer, 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, CA. Holding this command position for two years, Lieutenant Colonel Kelly returned to the East Coast in 1994, to attend the National War College in Washington, DC. He graduated in 1995, and was selected to serve as the Commandant's Liaison Officer to the U.S. House of Representatives, Capitol Hill, where he was promoted to the rank of Colonel.

In 1999, Colonel Kelly transferred to joint duty and served as the Special Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in Mons, Belgium. He returned to the United States in 2001, and was assigned to a third tour of duty at Camp Lejeune, now as the Assistant Chief of Staff G-3 with the 2nd Marine Division. In 2002, selected to the rank of Brigadier General, Colonel Kelly again served with the 1st Marine Division, this time as the Assistant Division Commander. Much of Brigadier General Kelly's two-year assignment was spent deployed in Iraq. He then returned to Headquarters Marine Corps

as the Legislative Assistant to the Commandant from 2004 to 2007. Promoted to major general, he returned to Camp Pendleton as the Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward). The command deployed to Iraq in early 2008 for a year-long mission, replacing II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) as Multinational Force-West in Al Anbar and western Ninewa provinces. LtGen Kelly commanded Marine Forces Reserve and Marine Forces North from October 2009 to March 2011. General Kelly comes to United States Southern Command from his previous position as the Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense from March 2011 to October 2012

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MARCH 20, 2013

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH

Mr. SMITH. What would the cost range be for an additional missile defense site (including cost of construction, GBI procurement, maintenance, personnel, etc.)? What were the total costs of the missile fields at Fort Greely and Vandenberg AFB?

General JACOBY. This question is best answered by the MDA. USNORTHCOM provides warfighter requirements to the MDA, which shape the development of new capabilities.

Mr. SMITH. What other installations would be required at an East Coast site and what would the cost for those be (including radar systems, command and control systems, satellite ground stations, security, fencing and alarms, roads, runways, and other access)?

General JACOBY. This question is best answered by the MDA. USNORTHCOM provides warfighter requirements to the MDA, which shape the development of new capabilities.

Mr. SMITH. The National Academy of Sciences report recommended an East Coast site assuming a new type of interceptor booster and EKV were developed. Is there a plan for a new interceptor acquisition program? What would the costs be for a new booster and EKV? How long would development of the new interceptor take?

General JACOBY. These questions are best answered by the MDA. USNORTHCOM provides warfighter requirements to the MDA, which shape the development of new capabilities.

Mr. SMITH. Why did the DOD reject Grand Forks, North Dakota, as a potential GMD site?

General JACOBY. This question is best answered by OSD and MDA. USNORTHCOM provides warfighter requirements to the MDA, which shape the development of new capabilities.

Mr. SMITH. What is the legal obligation of the U.S. Government in providing treatment for detainees for life saving/emergencies that is readily available in CONUS, but not at GTMO (i.e. cancer, dialysis, etc.)?

General KELLY. The legal obligation of the United States for the medical treatment of detainees is rooted in international law, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, and the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. These principles of law are reflected in Department of Defense Instruction, "Medical Program Support for Detainee Operations," which provides that "to the extent practicable, treatment of detainees should be guided by professional judgments and standards similar to those applied to personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces."

Detainee health care is provided by the Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) Joint Medical Group (JMG), a group of more than 100 uniformed military health care professionals, and supported by the Guantanamo Bay U.S. Naval Hospital. These doctors, nurses, and support personnel provide detainees the same level of general health care given to U.S. Armed Forces, applying identical professional judgments and standards in caring for the detainee population. This health care includes providing life-saving and emergency services to the extent they are available at Guantanamo through the JMG detainee health clinic and the Naval Hospital. Sustained medical care for more complex and enduring illnesses may exceed the capabilities of Guantanamo Bay, and are case dependent.

Mr. SMITH. What is the legal obligation of the U.S. Government in the event a detainee refuses to eat and/or accept medical treatment, putting his own life in danger?

General KELLY. The legal obligation of the United States to provide health care to the detainees is based in international law, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, and the Department of Defense Instruction, "Medical Program Support for Detainee Operations." Health care personnel have a duty to perform, encourage, and support, the humane treatment of detainees and to ensure that no individual in the custody of the Department of Defense shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.

We recognize a legal and moral obligation to take action in the event a detainee puts his own life in danger by refusing to eat, or by refusing medical treatment. Prevention of unnecessary loss of life of detainees through standard medical interven-

tion includes involuntary medical intervention when necessary in cases involving detainee's who lack the mental capacity to appreciate the impact of their decisions.

Mr. SMITH. Would there be any occasions in which there would be a difference in care for a seriously ill service member at Guantanamo and a seriously ill detainee? For example, are there medical situations in which a service member would be sent by medevac to Miami and a detainee would not be?

General KELLY. Yes. The difference between detainee medical care and that of U.S. military personnel is that the latter will be brought to the CONUS for any critical or specialized care required that is beyond the capabilities of the Guantanamo Bay Naval Hospital. Detainees must be treated with the medical assets available at Guantanamo; however, medical specialists may be brought to GTMO to provide specialized care for detainees.

Since 2009, each successive National Defense Authorization Act has prohibited the use of funds by the Department of Defense to "transfer, release, or assist in the transfer or release to or within the United States, its territories, or possessions" those detainees currently held at Guantanamo.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS

Mr. ROGERS. Are you confident that the 20 CE-1 interceptor GBIs we deploy are an operational capability to defend the homeland against ballistic missile threats?

General JACOBY. I am confident that the GMD system, which includes the 20 CE-1 interceptors, can successfully defend the United States against limited ballistic missile threats. It is important that we continue to test and update our interceptors.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN

Mr. WITTMAN. General Jacoby, in your statement you discuss your work with U.S. Cyber Command to establish a Joint Cyber Center to recognize and assess cyber threats to the homeland. General, can you characterize how proactive vs. reactive your efforts are today against foreign cyber threats and attacks? Are you able to stay ahead of the perilous entities that wish to do our Nation harm in this domain? The reach of this threat is frightening because it touches so many parts of American's lives. Are you working with nonmilitary cyber entities to ensure we do not bore scope our efforts and focus, and potentially miss large attacks that threaten our homeland?

General JACOBY. We are proactive in our defensive posture for NORAD and USNORTHCOM command and control systems in that we strive to minimize known vulnerabilities. Having the capability to identify malicious cyber activity targeting our critical networks and the ability to mitigate that threat when it occurs is essential for mission assurance.

The Nation's capacity to stay ahead of entities that aim to do our Nation harm in the cyber domain is improving, but much more needs to be done. The cyber capability associated with NORAD and USNORTHCOM's Joint Cyber Center is directly tied to DOD's increase in cyber capacity, realized through changes in strategy and evolving awareness and synchronization efforts alongside a host of mission partners including DOJ, FBI, and DHS. It will take time to allocate and train the necessary workforce.

My commands collaborate daily with non-military mission partners, gaining insight into malicious cyber activity with the potential to impact our ability to execute our assigned missions. We work most closely with DHS to improve our domestic cyber situational awareness and to appropriately plan for potential response and recovery support of civil authorities, if requested in the event of a serious domestic cyber attack.

Mr. WITTMAN. General Kelly, you mentioned the Lebanese Hezbollah and Iranian connections to your theater. Can you discuss any possible links between these groups and the drug trade? Furthermore, with special operations forces and ISR assets in high demand in CENTCOM and AFRICOM right now, and a limited presence in your AOR, how do we maintain an active awareness and continue to foster the relationships that we have built in SOUTHCOM? Do you see these narcoterrorist organizations connections maturing and growing unchecked?

General KELLY. Some Latin American drug trafficking organizations with links to Lebanon maintain family and business connections to Lebanese Hezbollah. An unknown portion of their profits benefits Lebanese Hezbollah. Narcotics traffickers are generally motivated by profit and refrain from activity that will increase scrutiny by law enforcement. Conversely, terrorist organizations are ideologically driven and

seek public recognition for their actions. These inimical motives will continue to limit collusion between the two groups.

Diminished Department of Defense ISR allocation means we rely on contract ISR, organic human intelligence, open source and social media. We foster interagency/partner nation relationships to maintain awareness in the AOR. SOUTHCOM also promotes regional cooperation and intelligence sharing among partner nations by underscoring transnational organized crime as a hemispheric problem, which requires regional collaboration to counter successfully. Through conferences, workshops, bilateral and multilateral events, we have exposed partner nations to a new analytical tool that changed the way intelligence and information is shared with and among our partner nations. The Whole-of-Society Information Sharing for Regional Display (WISRD) process enables countries to share information. WISRD uses a Google Earth geospatial tool to organize and display complex information, which results in a three-dimensional regional common operating picture of the complicated transnational organized crime environment. This process provides a comprehensive common characterization to assist with identifying information gaps so nations can work together to satisfy them. Several Central/South American countries currently use WISRD successfully.

The expanded awareness of illicit activities as a hemispheric problem has increased traditional partnerships to include extra-regional countries like Mexico and Canada, bringing an added dimension to international collaboration. We have leveraged strategic partners such as Colombia and Brazil to take on leadership roles and export knowledge and lessons learned throughout the region. SOUTHCOM also provides the technology employed by most partner nations to share intelligence and information with their counterparts.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SHEA-PORTER

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. In GAO's report to Congress in January 2012, it was noted that NORTHCOM was working to establish the commander's intent and missions in the Arctic, as well as identify capability shortfalls. Please provide an update on the effort to establish this framework and what you view as NORTHCOM's mission in the Arctic. What capability shortfalls currently prevent you from meeting this mission?

General JACOBY. As the DOD advocate for Arctic capabilities, I engage with our key Arctic region stakeholders to evaluate future capabilities and coordinate operations in the Arctic. Examples of these efforts include the DOD/DHS Capabilities Assessment Working Group White Paper I endorsed along with ADM Papp, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), which assesses required capabilities in the Arctic in the areas of communications, Maritime Domain Awareness, infrastructure, and presence. These areas have been explored by NORAD and USNORTHCOM's exercise program, working closely with Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC), to look for high-payoff partnerships and burden sharing for Arctic investments. Additionally, as part of our Arctic campaign plan, we are forming a partnership between my Alaska-based operational headquarters, Joint Task Force Alaska, and the University of Alaska, Fairbanks to bring Arctic expertise together in a collaborative forum to shape the required capabilities way ahead. Lastly, in December 2012, I signed the Tri Command (NORAD, USNORTHCOM, CJOC) Framework for Arctic Cooperation at the Permanent Joint Board on Defense to promote enhanced military cooperation in the preparation and conduct of defense, security, and safety operations in the Arctic. My missions in the Arctic region are consistent with the rest of my area of responsibility: homeland defense (HD), defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), and security cooperation with our partners. My intent in the Arctic is to defend U.S. national security interests and support homeland security interests in a complementary manner with Canada to advance security, safety, and stability in the region. These missions also involve cooperative efforts with key partners such as U.S. European Command, CJOC, USCG, and other U.S. interagency and State of Alaska partners that contribute to the peaceful opening of the Arctic in a manner that strengthens international cooperation.

Although the Arctic is an austere operating area, even in the warm summer season, today I do not currently have capability shortfalls that prevent me from accomplishing my missions of HD, DSCA, and security cooperation.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. What steps is NORTHCOM taking, as recommended by the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, to enhance maritime domain awareness, communications, and search and rescue capability in the Arctic?

General JACOBY. U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) has accomplished the following actions since the 2010 QDR:

- Admiral Papp and I endorsed the Arctic Capabilities Assessment Working Group White Paper, which identified DOD and DHS shared capability gaps and potential solutions in the categories of communications, Maritime Domain Awareness, infrastructure, and presence.
- In conjunction with the Canadian Joint Operations Command, NORAD and USNORTHCOM signed the Tri-Command Framework for Arctic Cooperation that outlines areas for close coordination and collaboration on Arctic issues.
- USNORTHCOM conducted a baseline assessment for Arctic domain awareness. The output of the assessment provides the foundation for requirements generation, plans development, and follow-on studies.
- USNORTHCOM supports the Northern Chiefs of Defense Forces and Armed Forces Security Roundtable meetings aimed at improving security, willingness, and cooperation on difficult issues facing the Arctic nations.
- Proposed operations, plans and improvements in the Arctic are regularly exercised and supported. USNORTHCOM recently sponsored FY 12 exercises and workshops for Arctic stakeholders. The Arctic Collaborative Workshop brought together Federal, State, local, tribal, academia, and industry stakeholders to focus on SAR and oil spill response activities in the Arctic.
- Joint Task Force Alaska (JTF-AK), my operational headquarters in Alaska/Arctic, has been engaged at the tactical level in exercising Arctic SAR and developing tactics, techniques, and procedures. JTF-AK conducted a SAR exercise (SAREX) in February 2013 where an Arctic Sustainment Package was tested. JTF-AK is scheduled to conduct a SAREX with the Joint Rescue Coordination Center Victoria at the end of April 2013 to test an Arctic Sustainment Package with a Canadian Major Air Disaster (MAJAD) kit.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. The 2010 National Security Strategy states, “The United States is an Arctic Nation with broad and fundamental interests in the Arctic region, where we seek to meet our national security needs, protect the environment, responsibly manage resources, account for indigenous communities, support scientific research, and strengthen international cooperation on a wide range of issues.” In Section 5 of DOD’s Arctic Report to Congress, DOD notes that, “The U.S. Government has enduring national interests in the Arctic, including security, economic, and scientific interests,” and that “it is clear there is a current and continued future imperative to provide a sovereign maritime presence in the region.”

Since there is an imperative for a “sovereign maritime presence” not only in the future but right now, and DOD says that, “... only ice-capable ships provide assured sovereign presence throughout the region and throughout the year,” what would be the minimum and optimum numbers of icebreakers to address U.S. national security needs in the Arctic region? As noted by the GAO, DOD did not specify in Sec. 5 of the Arctic Report.

General JACOBY. Admiral Papp, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is the advocate of the ice-breaking mission area. I support his ongoing assessment of ice-breaker requirements and the development of those platforms. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are working closely with the USCG as they develop their Polar Ice-breaker Concept of Operations.

ADM Papp and I also endorsed the joint DOD–DHS Arctic Capabilities Assessment White Paper which identifies the requirement for polar ice-breaking capability. As expressed in my 2013 posture statement, I believe the United States should maintain an ice-breaking capability as it is essential for successfully operating in this new dimension of the global commons. National security interests closely follow economic interests; increased activity in the Arctic requires deliberate preparation to guarantee economic access, ensure freedom of navigation, and deter transnational crime.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO

Mr. PALAZZO. Can you discuss ship presence in your AOR and how that has affected your mission in light of the new defense strategy and budget? What level of cooperation do you have with the Coast Guard in counternarcotics operations in Latin America? Can you provide any detail on the performance and needs of our Nation’s new National Security Cutters?

General KELLY. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2012, Joint Interagency Task Force–South (JIATF–S) efforts were supported by a 10.2 ship presence, where 1.0 ship presence is defined as one ship working on station each day for 365 days. A much larger number than 10 ships is required to sustain this presence for a full year.

The U.S. Navy provided 30% of the total presence, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) provided 59%, and the remainder was provided by our European and Canadian allies. The FY 2013 ship allocation, to support the statutory detection and monitoring (D&M) mission under 10 USC § 124, was 8.3 ships with Department of Defense (DOD) and USCG providing 31% and 61% percent respectively. On 5 April 2013, the average ship presence fell to 2.0, provided solely by the USCG and allies, and is expected to remain at this level through the remainder of the Fiscal Year. No U.S. Navy ships will be assigned to the D&M mission for the remainder of FY 2013.

These reductions will impact U.S. and partner nation law enforcement efforts and significantly degrade our ability to support partner nation counter illicit trafficking operations. In terms of cocaine seizures, JIATF-S expects, at a minimum, an additional 62 metric tons to escape interdiction, which in effect, is a 41% decrease in cocaine disruptions compared to FY 2012.

The majority of the maritime assets and a large portion of the aviation assets under JIATF-S tactical control (TACON) are provided by the USCG, and this partnership remains incredibly strong. The maritime interdiction continuum consists of JIATF-S execution of D&M operations, and as coordinated through USCG Districts Seven and Eleven, executing interdiction and apprehension (I&A) activities conducted by Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDET).

The performance of the National Security Cutter (NSC) in support of JIATF-S operations has been impressive. During five deployments between June 2009 and March 2013, totaling approximately twelve months in the AOR, the National Security Cutters BERTHOLF and WAESCHE have disrupted and/or seized 7.5 metric tons of cocaine, apprehended 30 detainees and seized and/or destroyed 10 vessels. The unique capabilities of these new cutters—greatly increased endurance and speed, high readiness rate, a large helicopter flight deck, an over the horizon high speed small boat, coupled with significantly improved command and control/intelligence gathering capabilities—make them vastly superior to previous/current vessels. The synergistic effect of these capabilities is ideally suited to the vastness of the USSOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility, creating a true force multiplier, for both the counternarcotics D&M and I&A missions. The state-of-the-art capabilities of the NSC gives it unique, dual tactical advantage against air as well as maritime surface narcotics smuggling targets of interest (TOIs) in ways not achievable by other maritime assets in the U.S. Government inventory.

Mr. PALAZZO. With the proposed end strength of our Reserve and National Guard, and then the restructuring of SOUTHCOM, are we as prepared to respond to future natural disasters and other emergency humanitarian crises in the region as we have been in the past?

General KELLY. The short answer is no. As an economy of force command, SOUTHCOM has long depended upon deployed naval assets to provide a rapid response capability. Lack of the availability of a U.S. Navy amphibious ship during hurricane season seriously degrades our ability to respond quickly in the Caribbean basin (especially Haiti) and to remote areas of the coast of Central America.

For small scale disasters in Central America, Joint Task Force BRAVO helicopter and medical assets at Soto Cano, Honduras will continue to enable SOUTHCOM to quickly respond to logistics and medical requirements to reduce loss of life.

For a large scale disaster response, SOUTHCOM continues to rely on capabilities contained in the Global Response Force (GRF), and requests unique capabilities not contained in the GRF be placed on an alert status during hurricane season. Rapid sourcing of required Active Duty and Reserve capabilities is critical to providing time sensitive humanitarian and life saving disaster response operations, both in support of HQ SOUTHCOM and deployed Joint Task Force requirements.

Mr. PALAZZO. Is there an optimal mix of Active and Reserve forces to execute SOUTHCOM's mission? What are we doing to enhance collaborative defense and security capability in the region?

General KELLY. Optimally, SOUTHCOM would receive more Active Component personnel, but due to our low priority in the Force Allocation Decision Model, SOUTHCOM tries to cover gaps in the Active Component force structure with Reserve Component personnel. As an economy of force command, with no assigned forces, we must optimize the forces made available to us to execute our mission. Our objective is to maintain persistent presence, to the maximum extent possible, throughout the theater to remain the partner of choice in the region. Reserve forces are critical for sustained operations at the SOUTHCOM Headquarters, Components, and Security Cooperation Organization.

The USSOUTHCOM Theater Engagement Program engages Partner Nations (PNs) in our Area of Responsibility (AOR) on issues of mutual concern to share information, exchange ideas, and assist in building the capacity and capability of their security forces. Our exercises and engagements focus on building PN capacities in

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), maritime security, interdiction, interoperability and peacekeeping operations. We use Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, collectively known as Security Assistance, to build PN capabilities and interoperability with U.S. systems and methods that foster regional stability through sharing of common defense challenges. Our Civil Affairs and Humanitarian Assistance programs improve access, create visibility, and increase U.S. influence in the region, while building PN capacity to overcome natural disasters. The National Guard's State Partnership Program produces a persistent relationship between U.S. States and PNs in the AOR that supports mutual interests and often goes beyond the military-to-military ties to promote links with all levels of society. Finally, we leverage International Research and Development programs to build capacity, promote domain awareness, counter illicit trafficking, and create technologies that will assist during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

