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**AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES:  
RESOURCES, STRATEGY, AND TIMETABLE  
FOR SECURITY LEAD TRANSITION**

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT  
AND INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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HEARING HELD  
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### WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 2012

#### AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES: RESOURCES, STRATEGY, AND TIMETABLE FOR SECURITY LEAD TRANSITION

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TRANSITION**

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS,  
*Washington, DC, Wednesday, June 20, 2012.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:35 p.m. in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Rob Wittman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROB WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS**

Mr. WITTMAN. Today the Oversight and Investigations subcommittee convenes the first of a series of hearings related to the Afghan National Security Forces.

At this hearing, we will receive testimony from the Department of Defense about the resources and strategy related to training the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] and the timetable for transitioning security lead responsibility from U.S. and NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] forces to the ANSF. The Department of Defense today is represented by Mr. David Sedney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia; and Major General Stephen Townsend, Director of the Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell.

Gentlemen, thank you so much for your participation. Thank you for your service to our country. We look forward to your testimony on plans for training and equipping the Afghan National Security Force, and details about the projected size and related rationale of the ANSF in the near and long term.

Many of us on the committee have just returned from a congressional trip to Afghanistan. And during our visit, we traveled to several provinces and met with local leaders, including the chiefs of police in a number of provinces. We also had the opportunity to talk to the military commanders on the ground who provided their impressions of the level of support that will be needed to create a self-sustaining ANSF.

It is my hope that our witnesses today can provide further context on these important issues. And as an administrative note, I recognize that members of other subcommittees will join us. And pursuant to the committee's rules, I will recognize these members after all O&I Subcommittee members have had an opportunity to question the witnesses. And we have with us today, in the stead of Mr. Cooper, our ranking member, Mr. Andrews.

And I would like to turn it over to him for any opening statement he may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the Appendix on page 29.]

**STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT ANDREWS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS**

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also appreciate the witnesses and their service to our country. And I want the record to show that I will never fill Mr. Cooper's shoes in any way, shape, or form. I will make sure he tells him that.

Thank you for calling the hearing. Look, a pivotal aspect of our country's strategy in Afghanistan is for the Afghans to be able to provide their own security. And a pivotal aspect of that goal is the training of the security forces and where that all stands.

No reflection on today's witnesses, but one of the reasons why I think it is so timely the chairman called this hearing is that, frankly, through two administrations we have had a long history of unfounded and inaccurate optimism on these questions. And I know that the two witnesses are dedicated to telling the facts as they see them.

I know the committee is dedicated to hearing the facts as they are. So, Chairman, thank you for this opportunity, and we thank the witnesses for being here.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Andrews. We appreciate your leadership on this issue also.

At this point, I would like to ask unanimous consent that non-subcommittee members, if any, be allowed to participate in today's hearing after all subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask questions. Is there an objection? Without objection, non-subcommittee members will be recognized at the appropriate time for 5 minutes.

And with that, we will begin with our witnesses, and begin with Mr. David Sedney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia. Mr. Sedney, the floor is yours.

**STATEMENT OF DAVID S. SEDNEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA**

Mr. SEDNEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, ranking member—or acting ranking member. Thank you. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today.

The subject, as the two of you have introduced it, we in the Administration believe is exactly on point. The key to success in Afghanistan is the success of the Afghan National Security Forces over the long term. The United States' fundamental objectives—our strategy, our campaign plan in Afghanistan—have been consistent since President Obama announced them in December of 2009.

Our goal remains to deny safe havens to Al Qaeda, and to deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan government. Thanks to more than 10 years, and particularly over the past 2-plus years, of dedication and sacrifice of our forces, our coalition

partners and their Afghan partners and the Afghan people, we have taken enormous strides toward these objectives.

To that end, U.S., Afghan, and coalition forces continue to work to drive down the Taliban-led insurgency in their strongholds and to build up the capacity of the Afghan security forces and the Afghan government. Our efforts remain on track to enable the Afghans themselves to assume the lead for security nationwide by the end of 2014.

As we continue to shift more areas to Afghan security lead and, by the end of this September pull out the final 23,000 surge troops which will return home at that time, that is all made possible by the improvements in the Afghan National Security Forces. American and coalition forces that remain on the ground after September will facilitate the continued transition of security to the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, in accordance with General Allen's campaign plan.

As you said, as I mentioned, the key to this success is the increasing capability and confidence of the Afghan security forces and to the Afghan people in those security forces. The Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police are both on schedule to meet their goal for size by or before October, this year.

Additionally, I would point out that the Afghan security forces now participate in over 90 percent of all operations in Afghanistan, and are in the lead for over 40 percent of these missions. And that rate of growth is on an upward trend. As General Allen stated to the House and Senate in March, the ANS<sup>1</sup> are better than we thought they were to be—and importantly, they are better than they thought that they could be.

This improved capacity is allowing the Afghan security forces to assume the security lead effectively. With the first two tranches of transition that are already under way, 50 percent of the population lives in areas where the Afghan security forces are in the lead. That number will climb to 75 percent with the recently announced tranche three of transition, which will begin to be put in place this summer.

Tranche three contains a number of contested areas; areas where the Taliban is active. Tranche three will really test the Afghan security forces. This fighting season that is coming up—that we are already in this year—will be the most significant challenge for the Afghanistan security forces, as they are more in the lead than ever before.

However, the time for this test is now, when we and our coalition partners have the forces in theater to ensure their success. Certainly the insurgency retains the ability to carry out complex attacks. April 15th attacks in Kabul, the recent attack on forward operation base Salerno, were sophisticated and coordinated. However, I would point out that those attacks were largely tactical and operational failures.

And the response to the attacks, particularly in Kabul, highlighted the increasing competence of the Afghan security forces. Because in Kabul, the Afghan security forces carried out the complete reaction and taking down of the forces that had attacked. We have

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<sup>1</sup>Mr. Sedney intended to say "ANSF" rather than "ANS."

seen two major achievements in the last 6 weeks that have sent a strong signal to the Afghan people, to the Taliban people, and to countries in the region.

First, the strategic partnership agreement that President Obama and President Karzai signed in May. President Obama subsequently made a speech to the nation from Afghanistan. That showed that the United States and Afghanistan are committed to a mutually beneficial relationship, not just until 2014 but beyond 2014. That strategic partnership extends for 10 years, until 2024.

Secondly, the Chicago Summit—the NATO Summit in Chicago—earlier this month was a great success, and demonstrated the continued dedication of over 50 NATO and other partner countries to supporting stability and security in Afghanistan. In Chicago, ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] members and partners reaffirmed their commitment to the Lisbon timeline to complete transition by the end of 2014, and also and very importantly, to continue engagement in Afghanistan after 2014.

As NATO Secretary General Rasmussen put it, “NATO and our ISAF partners will not leave the task undone. We will not let Afghanistan slip back into the hands of militants, which the vast majority of Afghan people utterly reject. We will finish the job to help create a secure Afghanistan, secure for our shared security.”

Again I will repeat, our goal is to ensure that Afghanistan is never again a base from which attacks are launched on the United States, our allies, and our partners. And in Chicago, our partners acknowledged once again that shared goal. I would also point to two recent U.S.-Afghan bilateral arrangements: the detentions and special operations memorandums of understanding.

They preceded the strategic partnership agreement, and those two MOUs [Memorandums of Understanding] are critical to demonstrating U.S. commitment to Afghanistan’s sovereignty, and they rely for their execution on the increased capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces.

Now while I have stressed the successes and the progress, I also want to very directly acknowledge that we have serious challenges still ahead. Limited governance capacity and corruption continue to plague Afghanistan, and they limit the effective governance that will be necessary for full transition.

Additionally, as stated by General Allen in his testimony and repeatedly in testimony by other witnesses from this Administration and others, the Taliban-led insurgency continues to operate from safe havens in Pakistan. And although we have had indisputable successes against Al Qaeda, as I am sure all of you are aware, we continue to press the Pakistanis on the need for them to take action against the Taliban and affiliated groups which operate out of Pakistan and carry out attacks on coalition and Afghan forces in Afghanistan.

We will continue to work with our allies and partners, in the Pakistani and Afghan governments, and our international partners to address these issues. We will keep Congress informed of our progress. As I close, I would like to thank the House Armed Services Committee and this subcommittee for the opportunity to appear before you today, for your continued support for our men and

women in uniform, and for your support to the Afghan security forces.

Because without your commitment to funding and resourcing the Afghan forces we could not have achieved the progress of the last 3 years. I look forward to your questions, look forward to your insights. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sedney can be found in the Appendix on page 30.]

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Sedney. Thank you so much for your testimony.

We now look forward to the testimony of Major General Stephen Townsend, Director of the Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell.

**STATEMENT OF MG STEPHEN TOWNSEND, USA, DIRECTOR, PAKISTAN/AFGHANISTAN COORDINATION CELL, THE JOINT STAFF**

General TOWNSEND. Chairman Wittman, Congressman Andrews, members of the subcommittee thanks for this opportunity to appear before you today and discuss how the Afghan National Security Forces are doing. Our bottom line up front is that we are on track to achieve our Nation's strategic objectives in Afghanistan.

A sustainable and sufficient ANSF, and transition, are two linchpins of our strategy. And to echo what Mr. Sedney said, the ANSF continue to grow and improve, and remain on track to assume the lead for security by the end of 2014. ISAF remains focused on building a capable ANSF of 352,000. That becomes a mechanism for defeating the insurgency. The ANSF continue to meet or exceed this year's recruiting objectives, with the Army and the Air Force expected to meet their combined goal of 195,000 by the end of this summer. And the police reaching their goal of 157,000 by October.

To be sure, the ANSF continues to face challenges such as literacy, attrition, and shortages of noncommissioned officers. The NATO training mission and the Afghan ministries provide literacy programs to approximately 90,000 ANSF each day. This is going to make the ANSF one of the most literate elements of Afghan society.

Attrition continues to be an issue, as well. Although attrition will not keep the ANSF from meeting their manning goals, it continues to hamper the long-term development of the ANSF. The security ministries continue to implement policies to combat attrition, and they are working. Attrition has gone down over the last several months.

One example is, the MOD [Ministry of Defense] recently approved stricter timelines to drop AWOL [absent without leave] personnel from unit rosters. Shortages of NCOs [noncommissioned officers], sergeants, continue to affect the development of the force as well. The army and police are training and promoting from within their ranks to fill these critical positions.

The ANSF are taking the lead in training their own forces, and they are implementing instructor cadre training programs. These Afghan instructors are providing more basic and advanced skills training at Afghan-led training centers every day. Operationally, the ANSF is making steady progress as well. ISAF Joint Command

currently rates 67 percent of the army units and 62 percent of the police units.

And the top two tiers, or categories, of operational effectiveness—that is, effective with advisors and independent with advisors—from January to April, the percentage of Afghan-led partnered operations increased from 33 percent to 59 percent. In some regions, Afghan forces conduct more independent operations than they do partnered operations.

The ANA [Afghan National Army] special operations forces also continue to grow and increase their operational proficiency. For example, ANA SOF [Special Operations Forces]-led operations increased from 44 percent in January to 54 percent in April. As we plan for a responsible drawdown of our forces in Afghanistan, the ANSF will continue to face challenges on the battlefield. But they won't face these challenges alone.

To support the ANSF during transition, ISAF is shifting to a security force assistance model. That puts Afghans in a lead combat role and has ISAF forces increasingly assuming a train, advise, and assist role. During this transition period, ISAF will still fight alongside our Afghan partners when needed, but we will shift into more of a support role as the Afghans move to the front.

ANSF's operational challenges include logistics, army and police interoperability and confidence, among others. In my own opinion, the ANSF's greatest challenge is one of confidence. Our agreement to stand with them beyond 2014 has been a tremendous boost to their confidence. The will of their force will strengthen as their leadership strengthens and as their capabilities improve, and as they continue to move more and more to the front.

Circling back to the bottom line, we assess that our security strategy, our security transition, is on track to have a sufficient and sustainable ANSF assume full responsibility for security across Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Finally, thank you all for the work that you do on behalf of our service men and women, as well as your efforts to ensure their protection and safety as they complete their mission in Afghanistan.

I stand ready to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Townsend can be found in the Appendix on page 35.]

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Major General Townsend. Appreciate your testimony, as well as Mr. Sedney.

We will begin now with questioning. And I want to begin with Mr. Sedney to get your perspective. You had spoken about transition, that we are in tranche two now. When we were downrange, we spoke with General Allen just last week, Ambassador Crocker, about some concern about the more difficult areas in transition being pushed to the end, to tranche five.

I know now there is a repositioning to put some of the more difficult areas into tranche three. Let me ask you this. If you do not achieve the desired results in this transition—whether it is tranche three, four, or five—are there contingency plans? We know 2014 is the complete turnover. Are there contingency plans, are there alternative schedules if goals aren't met, if transition doesn't take place smoothly in some of these more challenging areas within Afghanistan?

Can you give us your perspective on what you see as those contingency scenarios and alternate schedules?

Mr. SEDNEY. Thank you very much, Congressman. And thank you and you and your colleagues for making the trip out to Afghanistan to speak directly with our commanders and our troops and, of course, our Afghan partners.

In terms of plans for how we are going to evaluate the success of transition and how we might adjust the existing campaign plan, the process that we have in place is one where at the end of this fighting season—and including after the remainder of U.S. surge forces return home at the end of September—General Allen and his staff will review what happened over this year.

As I said in my testimony and as I am sure you heard our there, this is going to be a testing summer for the Afghan security forces. They are going to be in the lead as never before. So we are going to have to evaluate them. At the same time, beginning in just a few weeks, the third tranche of transition will be started, including in some very difficult contested areas.

So General Allen will have had the summer's experience to evaluate that. He will do that, then he will submit a report up the chain of command evaluating what he believes are what the future requirements are. So rather than developing a whole list of contingency plans, what we are focusing on is making what we are doing now successful. And we have a review process in place, whereby the commander in the field will evaluate if there are changes that are necessary; he will recommend those up the chain of command through General Mattis at CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] and then to the Secretary and to the President. So that is the process that we are looking for. I will say, and you have been in Afghanistan more recently than I have, but I will be able to—that won't be the case in about 5 days because I will be back out there myself and will be looking at that.

As General Allen said in his testimony, and as you may have heard when you were out there, we are finding that the Afghans, rather than doing less well than we expected, are often doing better than we expect. There are some cases where they aren't doing as well as either we expect, or they, and that is where we are able to give them the additional help that they need.

But we are also, as I said, seeing places where they are doing better than expected. We have, actually, some very aggressive and I think it is a very positive thing, Afghan commanders who are pushing to do even more than sometimes we think they are ready to. That is a judgment that our commanders out in the field have to make every day about whether people are ready to do things.

If you stretch too far, that can be dangerous. But if you don't stretch far enough, then you are not going to achieve your goal. So we do have this review process in place for this year. I would expect we would have the same process in place.

I would also add that in terms of the issue of the composition of the Afghan security forces, Secretary Panetta, in his formal meetings with the Afghan interior defense ministers in April for a group that is called the Security Consultative Forum—where we meet and discuss the strategic level issues relating to the Afghan security forces—they agreed on a 6-month review process to examine

the performance of the Afghan security forces, to evaluate what additional inputs might be needed, what changes might be needed.

So again, we have these review processes in place that we take very seriously, and look forward to being able to come back and brief you and your colleagues as these review processes are completed.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Sedney.

Major General Townsend, we know right now the majority of efforts there are along the lines of village stabilization operations. And that most of that is being executed by our special operators. As we begin to draw down forces to the 68,000 by the end of 2013, the question is, is that transition going to take place in a way to make sure that support elements are in place to make sure our special operators continue to have what they need as they get placed more and more out on an island to pursue these operations?

The concern is, if it isn't strategic in the way the drawdown is structured that those special operators may not have what they need—whether it is air support, whether it is other logistical support—and they find themselves on an island. Can you speak to that issue? And is the planning taking into account strategically where we will be in continuing to pursue this fight, especially along the lines of the village stabilization operations with our special operators and ANSF forces in these areas?

General TOWNSEND. Yes, sir. As you might expect, we are planning for various contingencies through now until the 2014 and even beyond 2014 what we call our “enduring presence” might look like. And none of those plans have really firmed up yet.

But the VSO, Village Stability Operations, and Afghan local police initiative that you mentioned, is a very high priority for COMISAF [Commander of the International Security Assistance Forces]. And so, absolutely, I can assure you that the planning will allow for the proper support that those hearty little bands of special operations folks, and also general purpose forces out on the frontier where those sites are at, the support they need will be there for them.

VSO-ALP [Village Stability Operations-Afghan Local Police] is something that is part of our enduring presence planning. So we envision that program continuing after 2014. So even in our enduring presence footprint, there will be VSO-ALP support and support to those forces that are providing it.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you.

And with that, I will move to Mr. Andrews.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you. I thank the witnesses for your testimony.

Mr. Secretary, you indicated that Afghan security forces participate in 90 percent of operations and are in the lead in 40 percent. What is the difference between being in the lead and participating?

Mr. SEDNEY. I am going to call a little bit on my uniformed—

Mr. ANDREWS. [Off mike.].

Mr. SEDNEY [continuing]. Uniformed colleague here because he is a lot more accustomed to describing operations than I would say. But I think, to me, one of the key things that I look at when I look at reports from my uniformed colleagues on this, when the issue comes to lead, are they lead in planning the operation.

Not just are they lead in carrying it out, but do they have the capacity to plan, do they execute according to plan? And then afterwards, do they have the capability to do an after-action review to see what went wrong, what went right in order to do it the next time better.

But I am going to defer a little bit on this to you, Steve.

Mr. ANDREWS. General, what would that look like?

General TOWNSEND. I will use a very kind of a simple analogy of a patrol. A patrol gets a mission and they meet together. The first thing they do is they plan that mission. When the Afghans are in the lead, they are planning the mission. We are kind of helping and advising.

Just a short while ago, almost every mission in Afghanistan would have been planned by an American, sergeant or officer. When that patrol rolls out the gate, who is leading that patrol? Who is actually in front, and who is in the command position? A short while ago that would have been an American.

Now, increasingly—and actually the latest reports are more than 40 percent—they are in the mid- to high-50 range. Half of those patrols are now led by an Afghan leader with an American leader tagging along behind watching the Afghan leader control the operation.

When you get to the objective, the force that is on the patrol, what is the predominance of the force? At RC-East [Regional Command-East], in a recent report, said 61 percent of the troops on a mission these days in RC-East are Afghans. That was not the case when I was there a little over a year ago in RC-East. And then on the objective, who is actually giving the orders—

Mr. ANDREWS. Right.

General TOWNSEND [continuing]. And who is controlling the soldiers as they move about the objective. Increasingly, in more than half the cases now that is an Afghan. So that is sort of the difference between participating and leading.

Mr. ANDREWS. Very helpful. That is very helpful. Thank you.

Mr. SEDNEY. Can I just add one thing, sir?

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, I just—

Mr. SEDNEY. Okay.

Mr. ANDREWS [continuing]. Want to jump to the next question. What is the difference between a unit that is independent with an advisor and effective with an advisor? What is the difference?

General TOWNSEND. Effective with an advisor is really a matter of degree. If you are an effective with an advisor, you are getting a lot of advice. And if you are independent with an advisor, you are getting much less advice. But the big difference is, who is generating the operations?

Mr. ANDREWS. Gotcha.

General TOWNSEND. If an Afghan commander is saying, “Hey, we need to do an operation tomorrow,” and giving orders to an Afghan subcommander, then they are generating the whole idea of the operation. And so that is really the difference between being independent—

Mr. ANDREWS. This is not a trick question, but is it possible for an Afghan unit to be not in the lead, but be independent with an advisor? Or is that oxymoronic?

General TOWNSEND. Okay, I haven't really thought about this particular question. To be not in lead—

Mr. ANDREWS. Right. Well, I will put it to you this way. If an Afghan unit is in the lead of an operation, are they by definition independent? Or are they just effective?

General TOWNSEND. No, they may just be effective.

Mr. ANDREWS. Gotcha. Are there any Afghan units that are in the lead that don't hit the top two categories?

General TOWNSEND. Yes, there are actually.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are you concerned that American troops might be under the command of a commander who is in an outfit that isn't at least effective?

General TOWNSEND. Sir, they are not. American troops are not under the command of the Afghan leader there. They are partnered and they are on the battlefield together, but there is an American leader there in charge of American troops.

Mr. ANDREWS. All right. Do we have any data on the attrition rates among the Afghan security forces? Are they up, are they down?

Mr. SEDNEY. Yes, we do have data, which we will be happy to provide the committee. We have some nice graphs. The answer is that the attrition is down in both the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police over the last 6 months.

Happy to pass these graphs up to you if you would like.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 45.]

Mr. ANDREWS. Sure. Unanimous consent to put them in a record, if that is—

Mr. SEDNEY. Okay, we can do that.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the bottom line, though?

Mr. SEDNEY. Bottom line in—

Mr. ANDREWS. What was the attrition rate a year ago? What is it now?

Mr. SEDNEY. In the case of the Afghan National Police, a year ago attrition was ranging from 1.4 percent to 4.6 percent. In the last 6 months it has ranged from 3.4 percent to, in the most recent period, 0.5 percent.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the main reason for attriting? Why do people leave?

Mr. SEDNEY. I am going to defer a little bit of this to my colleague here. But a lot of the reasons—attrition are people who have entered and leave before their contracts are up; the most common reason, is family reasons. People have family problems at home, and they feel they can't solve them. So going—

Mr. ANDREWS. My time is about to expire. One thing, if you have it, I would be interested in the KIA [killed in action] rates for Afghan forces. I hope it is zero, I mean God forbid. But I mean, what is happening with their KIA rates? Are they going up or down, or staying the same?

General TOWNSEND. I don't know which way they are trending, but I do know that their army loses, they have twice the casualty rate that we do. And their police have about four times the casualty rate that we do. So they are in this thing.

Mr. ANDREWS. I offer no glee with that statistic, by the way. I just want to know what it was. I am sure you don't either.

Thank you. This is very, very helpful. I appreciate your testimony. Thank you.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Andrews.

We will go to Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the things, when General Allen was making his presentation just the other day he just talked about tranche one, tranche two, tranche three. And what I asked is that we need a better way of measuring progress across that continuum of ineffective all the way to independent with advisor, whatever your scales are either on a district-by-district basis or some sort of way to communicate progress in the transition.

In other words, Mr. Sedney, you said that after the first two that 50 percent of the population lives under the control of the Afghans. Which would say that we are done with transition in both tranche one and tranche two. And I am not sure that was accurate.

And maybe I just misunderstood it. But we need some of the metrics that you are using to show yourselves progress. We need those, too. And so any way you can be helpful in that regard, we are open to that. Rob and I were over there last week, and we went down to Panjwahi District.

And we had a presentation by the Afghan commander there on operations over the next several months in his AO [area of operations] that was as professional as anything we would get anywhere else by folks in our uniforms. This guy was very impressive. Maybe it was just the interpreter knew what to do and he might have not been very impressive at all, but I suspect he was being interpreted correctly.

But I came out of that meeting very impressed with this guy, and the fact that he is going to be in charge here pretty soon. Major General Townsend, the ALP [Afghan Local Police]—the numbers we are shown for post-2014 in terms of the numbers of security forces versus the money that will be needed year in and year out to fund those—the money to pay the ALP, is in the estimate of what the international community will have to come up with each year to fund the security forces.

But the force number itself, the 30,000 ALP guys, are not in the force number itself. My concern is, hey, I am sold on the project—on what we are doing with ALPs—because the Taliban's sold on it. They are threatening them. They are coming after them because they see them as a threat to their ability to operate within these villages.

Is there someone in the Ministry of Interior who is going to take ownership of the ALP and be that champion that is necessary to prolong this? I know we like it, but there has got to be somebody in the Afghan system that is going to share that idea with us. Are you aware, Mr. Sedney, or either one of you?

General TOWNSEND. Sure. First, I would like to answer just the thing you said about transition at the start. Those measurements are there. They are measurements to all the stages of transition. And to answer your sort of unasked question about, you know, has any place completed it. No, none of the tranche one or tranche two

districts, provinces, or municipalities have completed all four stages of transition yet.

Some of them are in stage three, and some of them, a couple, have entered stage four. But none of them have completed transition just yet.

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, having that information would be helpful.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 46.]

General TOWNSEND. Sure. Then on your question about the ALP versus the troop numbers, and is anybody going to take charge of that. First, the troop numbers, you are correct, are not in the ANSF end-strength, by design. The money, however, is. And what we anticipate in funding in the outyears, international contributions, the MOI, the Ministry of Interior, already owns the VSO-ALP program.

And, in fact, there is a chain of command that runs through the police chain of command. And those ALP forces are responsible to the district chief of police. So there already is a funding, a training funding and equipping line, that comes down through the Ministry of Interior to the ALP.

Mr. CONAWAY. I guess the question then is, between the two of you are y'all confident that the Afghans sufficiently value this program that they won't siphon off that funding and go somewhere else with it after transition.

Mr. SEDNEY. Well, I think there are two questions there. Are we confident they won't siphon off the funding. Yes, we are confident of that because we control that funding. So that funding right now does not go to them.

Mr. CONAWAY. No, no, no. I mean post-2014.

Mr. SEDNEY. But post-2014, the ALP program has been controversial in Afghanistan. There is ownership for the Ministry of Interior. As the ALP-VSO program has proven its effectiveness, we are getting more and more support from the top levels there.

As that continues over the next 2 years I think we are very much on track for that. But it is certainly no secret that a number of high-ranking Afghans, people in their parliament, have been critical in the past of the ALP program. To get that buy-in, we are going to need at least another year or two of success to build that support.

Bureaucratically, as my colleague said, yes, in the Ministry of Interior there is a structure that governs the ALP. Right now, that structure is very—we have a lot of mentors in that process. So we are building that capacity and we think we are on track to complete by 2014. But it is one of things that we are going to be having in that review process.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Conaway.

We will now go to Mr. Critz.

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, you mentioned earlier something that I had heard last year and the year before. The concern for attrition and the lack of NCOs. And if you could, now the Secretary mentioned that the attrition had gone from 4.4 percent—in a range of, we will say,

around 4.5 percent a year ago, I believe—to 3.4 percent a month ago; ranging down to half a percent.

And just for comparison purposes, what is the U.S. military? What is our attrition rate?

General TOWNSEND. Congressman, I don't know the answer to that question. I can tell you this about the Afghanistan attrition. For the last—we have got a goal of 1.4 percent per month. And they have—the Afghan army is—about at that goal now. It has been declining, their attrition has been declining, for the last several months.

The police are actually at that goal. And, in fact, I think they are slightly below the goal. They are meeting the goal, exceeding the goal now. The army is not quite there yet. But it has been on a steady slope of improvement for the last several months.

Mr. CRITZ. Well, good, good. And that is because the police force was what I was going to ask about next, as well. But can you explain when you say that there is an issue with NCOs? What exactly do you mean?

General TOWNSEND. First of all, there is just a shortage. About 17,000 NCOs short in the army, and about 11,000 NCOs short in the police.

Mr. CRITZ. So if 17,000—how many NCOs do they have and how many does that mean that they need?

General TOWNSEND. That is a good question. I don't know. I will ask my colleagues here.

Mr. CRITZ. Well, 17,000 short of some number.

General TOWNSEND. Yes, yes. I don't know that off the top of my head.

Mr. CRITZ. Okay.

General TOWNSEND. So with the NCOs, there are two real issues here. One is a cultural one. They have not been an army that had a professional noncommissioned officer core previously. So, you know, we are trying to, one, train the army and the senior leadership of the army to value noncommissioned officers.

So that is a work in—that is probably the broad thing that is going on. Then next is actually filling their ranks. And then they have standards for the noncommissioned officers. They have to be able to read, so that is one shortfall there that we are working on. So as these guys get recognized in the ranks as a high-performing soldier they are identified to be in noncommissioned officers school.

They had to go to read, and they have to go to an NCO corps and pass that before they can be an NCO. So it is a work in progress, filling these slots.

Mr. CRITZ. Well, the reason I ask is, like I said, I had heard that issue in years past. I was in Afghanistan 2 years ago, I was in Afghanistan last year. And I am curious, with the growing amount of the force, has it remained a constant percentage of lack of NCOs? Or is it a number that has increased exponentially, or are we seeing a sharp decline in the—I mean, we all know that you have got to have those sergeants on the ground because you are going to have some lack, or approaching chaos at some points, if you don't have a amount of people you need.

And that is, as we transition here, I am trying to find out will we have the NCOs needed to support this 352,000 level? Or as we

discussed at the Chicago Summit in May, are we looking more at a 230,000 number? And where are we going with this?

General TOWNSEND. Well, we will have the NCOs we need because that is a focused area that we are trying to improve. So we will look at the data and we will try to provide you an answer before the hearing is over. If not, we will provide it for the record as to the general population of NCOs.

My guess is it probably remained pretty constant, slightly improving. Because we have been growing the force.

Mr. CRITZ. Yes.

General TOWNSEND. So it is hard to actually, you know, meet the objective when you are adding requirements, which we have been doing. But we will have the NCOs we need to man and lead the 352,000 force.

I will let Mr. Sedney address where it goes from there.

Mr. SEDNEY. Just two additional points, Congressman. The first is, as Steve stated, the reason they don't have enough NCOs is because just as on our forces, in order to be a really effective NCO you have to have 10 or 15 years of experience. And this is an army that generally has less than five.

And so they are going to grow into that. Secondly, on filling the NCOs through the process that General Townsend described. Because we will have reached the numerical goals, the 352,000, by the end of this summer, that is going to give the Afghan security forces 2 years—from October 2012 through the end of 2014—to refine their quality, to build this NCO course, to build their junior- and middle-level officer corps.

Will the process be finished? No. We, and others, will have to remain to train, advise, and assist and after that. But they will have the beginnings of what they need in terms of numbers if not in quality by 2014, and the next 2 years is when we will see the greatest progress in the NCO and junior officers.

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Critz.

Mr. Coffman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General Townsend and Secretary Sedney, thanks so much for your service to our country.

A couple points. First of all, I have a concern, I think, in looking back at U.S. military history and our involvement in South Vietnam. One of the issues, I think, that complicated the efforts of the army of South Vietnam was that we gave them our doctrine. And it was of high mobility, and that was difficult to support after we left Vietnam.

And I was in Afghanistan in November. And they took me out to see a training exercise. And it was for artillery. And it was with towed artillery. And having served in the United States Army in mechanized infantry, been an infantry officer in the United States Marine Corps, I am thinking why on earth have we procured for them towed artillery instead of mortars.

And when I pressed the ISAF representative, he said, "Well, sir, you know, Karzai had insisted on, you know, heavier, more expensive—he wanted F-16s [Fighting Falcon fighter jets] and he want-

ed this and he wanted that. And so towed artillery was kind of the compromise.”

And I am wondering how many areas like that, that where we have given them weapons and tactics that don't fit their—that aren't realistic as to their capability to maintain that after we are gone. And and General Townsend, I wondered if you could reflect on that.

General TOWNSEND. Yes, sir. I have actually seen that same towed artillery. I would point out that the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps today have a lot of towed artillery. And the Afghans have had towed artillery for decades. So towed artillery is nothing new, and there is nothing out of character for the Afghan army of the past or the present.

They do have mortars, as well. They have light mortars and medium-caliber mortars, much like we do. So they have, I think, indirect fire systems that they can have high mobility with. And then they have some that are less mobile. But I have seen them attach those, tow those E-30 howitzers behind their—

Mr. COFFMAN. I want to remind you this is at U.S. taxpayers' expense. And mortars don't require all of the support elements that towed artillery does. And so you and I obviously differ on that. Let me ask you about my concern about the culture of corruption in Afghan security forces, which is stunning.

I pressed the Oversight and Investigations Committee, under Darrell Issa, to conduct an investigation into the conduct of Afghan security forces and the lack of oversight at the Dawood military hospital where, in part, \$42 million of U.S. military aid has been missing, unaccounted for. Where the general officer in charge of that hospital was merely transferred, was never relieved.

Where Afghan police and Afghan soldiers were dying in the hospital from malnutrition and from a lack of medical care because the families couldn't come up with the necessary bribes. Certainly it speaks to a lack of oversight for ISAF personnel, the monitors. But also it speaks to not just the culture of corruption, but also just the fact that to what extent have we formed a military organization that—I mean, how capable are they when they would allow this to occur?

And so I am wondering if you all could reflect on that. Who wants to start?

Mr. SEDNEY. Maybe if I could start, Representative Coffman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Sure.

Mr. SEDNEY. First of all, thank you for your concern and interest in this area. The situation you mentioned at the military hospital is one that as we became aware of it we began investigating and began working with the Afghans to take corrective action. There are currently investigations and corrective action under way with that hospital.

Let me just go back to the words you used—“a culture of corruption.” There is, to be frank, not just hundreds but thousands of years of history in Afghanistan's surrounding regions where corruption has been part of the fabric of life.

It is not something that the Afghan people, however, want. It is not something that the majority of the Afghan military officers and the leaders of the Afghan military want themselves; from the min-

isters on down, I have seen a lot of both leaders at the top, leaders in the middle, and ordinary soldiers who are committed to not allowing corruption to destroy the structures that the Afghans need and that we are financing.

But yes, there is corruption. As I mention in my prepared statement, corruption continues to be a problem. We have to work with the Afghans to give them the capability to get rid of that corruption. That is a challenge because not only do you need to have the laws in place, you have to have the effective structures in place, you have to have a judicial system, prosecutors, courts, a system of incarceration.

All of these things the Afghans are building, or in some cases rebuilding. So it is a huge challenge. But while recognizing that corruption is a problem, I would not agree that it is endemic to the point where our investments are not going to pay off.

We have some really good partners in the Afghans. We have some problematic ones. We have some ones who are corrupt, and we need to work with the Afghans to get rid of those. But I appreciate very much the point you are making.

The things that happened in that hospital are the kind of things that should never have happened to any human being anywhere. And we are working with the Afghans to correct them.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Last point, I am just concerned that that issue at the hospital is something that very well could be representative throughout the Afghan security forces. And I think we in Congress certainly need to know—to get down to the bottom of it.

Thank you so much. I yield back.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Coffman.

We will move to Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me as a nonmember of this subcommittee to ask questions today. I appreciate it.

And greetings, gentlemen. Mr. Sedney, can you characterize for us the evolution of the Afghan Security Forces readiness over the last decade? And basically tell me when did they start turning the corner to become a force to be reckoned with in Afghanistan?

Mr. SEDNEY. I can. I actually was on the ground in Afghanistan, deputy chief of mission, at our embassy on May 1, 2002, when the first U.S. special forces arrived to begin training the Afghan army a little over 10 years ago. From that very, very, I will have to say, discouraging start—when we had not enough money, not enough trainers, not enough trainees in windowless, bombed-out buildings—to what we have today, we have made incredible progress.

I would also say that for too long the effort in Afghanistan was underresourced both in terms of money, but also in terms of the level of training and support that we were able to give. The former chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, Admiral Mullen, described that very graphically when he said—

Mr. JOHNSON. But you don't have to go—

Mr. SEDNEY [continuing]. “In Afghanistan, we just do what we can.”

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, I don't want you to go too far—

Mr. SEDNEY. But the turning point, I would say really, was about 3 years ago, following the strategic review by President Obama and members of this Administration, which recognized what we had not been doing in Afghanistan. Where we put additional resources, both personnel and money, and we really began to build the Afghan security forces to a size and capability that they are now showing.

Mr. JOHNSON. All right.

Mr. SEDNEY. We made the strategic decision, and the impacts we are seeing today.

Mr. JOHNSON. And let me interrupt you because I got a few other questions. I am sorry, I would love to listen. So how many Taliban are we fighting now in Afghanistan?

Mr. SEDNEY. There are estimates from the intelligence community, and I will defer to them on that, but I would say it is a very hard figure to come up with how many. Because many of the people—

Mr. JOHNSON. [Off mike.].

Mr. SEDNEY [continuing]. Who fight with the Taliban are part-time Taliban. There are people who fight just for a day, and there are permanent fighters.

Mr. JOHNSON. I understand.

Mr. SEDNEY. There are Taliban in Afghanistan, there are Taliban in—

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I would include all of those part-timers.

Mr. SEDNEY. And Taliban in Pakistan.

Mr. JOHNSON. In fact, I think probably most of them would be part-timers. But approximately how many, 20,000?

Mr. SEDNEY. Again, deferring to the intelligence community, the last estimate that I recall seeing that was releasable publicly was 15,000 to 20,000. I don't know if you have a better or a different figure, Steve.

General TOWNSEND. No, same figure.

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. Now, the commitment to withdrawing our forces by the end of 2014, does that include special operations forces?

Mr. SEDNEY. We have committed to drawing down our forces by the end of 2014, and ending a lead combat role. But we have committed to continuing a presence in Afghanistan after 2014. In the strategic partnership agreement that we signed with Afghanistan last month, we agreed to begin negotiations on a bilateral security agreement which will set the parameters for what that force is, including the participation of special forces after 2014.

So we are about to begin those negotiations to come up with how many special forces there will be in Afghanistan after 2014.

Mr. JOHNSON. All right, thank you. We are talking about 230,000 Afghan National Security Forces by 2017. We would be drawing down about 120,000 from the force at its maximum height. That is going to produce 120,000 jobless individuals who understand how to fight. And what do we do with those?

And also, 230,000 on 20,000. How do we get to that 230,000 manpower figure for 2017?

Mr. SEDNEY. That was exactly one of the subjects that Secretary Panetta discussed with the Afghan minister of defense, Minister

Wardak, and Minister of Interior Mohammadi in their security consultative forum in April. And they agreed to have a regular 6-month review of where the Afghan security forces stand and what our future plans are—and the security situation in Afghanistan—to see what pace that would allow for the drawdown of Afghan security forces to a long-term, sustainable level.

And the goal of something in the neighborhood of 230,000 by 2017 is one we broadly agreed to. But the actual pace—and the character, the way we get there is something we will be doing in these 6-month reviews. In terms of what happens to those who might be demobilized, there is a certain level of natural attrition.

Afghan security forces, army, and police sign on for 3-, 4-, and 5-year contracts. And a lot of them leave—30 percent to 40 percent of them leave—at the end of their contracts. That is normal in forces. So there is a certain level of normal reduction in forces.

There is the possibility of such things as a reserve force. And we have had experience in Afghanistan—

Mr. JOHNSON. Who will pay?

Mr. SEDNEY. Pardon?

Mr. JOHNSON. Who would pay for those—well, I guess—yes.

Mr. SEDNEY. In terms of payment, we have worked on a future plan of funding for Afghanistan that would come from the United States, would come from our international partners but more and more from Afghanistan itself—with a goal of Afghanistan paying for its own security forces by the year 2024.

Mr. JOHNSON. And how did we arrive at the 230,000 mark for 2017? And is that still a reasonable guestimate of the number of Afghan security forces on the ground at that time, given the fact there are 20,000 Taliban?

Mr. SEDNEY. Well, that figure certainly depends on the degrading of the Taliban. As I said, our campaign plan has been to degrade the Taliban, push the Taliban down, build up the Afghan security forces. And in our reviews, we are going to check and see whether that is actually happening.

But a much-diminished Taliban, a much less effective Taliban, will require less forces. And that is what that calculation is based on. But we are going to be looking at it every 6 months to see if, in fact, that is happening.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you.

Yield back.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. Thank you. We are going to start with the second round of questioning. There is some interest in panel members for us to do that.

General Townsend, I will follow up on Mr. Johnson's question. And that is, looking at the underlying assumptions on where we are going, transitioning with ANSF—as we spoke of 352,000 force structure by the end of 2012, and then transitioning to 230,000 by the end of 2017—I guess my question is, what are the assumptions and analysis that went into that to determine that that was a proper force structure at that time?

How does that coincide with the coincidence of a drawdown of American troops or ISAF troops during that time period? If you can just lay out where the thought process has gone, where it has been, where we are today with how we came to that number of 230,000.

I know there is obviously a resource element associated with that, but also a strategic element associated with that. So I would like to get your reflection on that.

General TOWNSEND. First of all, the 352,000 was the result of a lot of analysis, to include wargaming and that kind of thing, to allow us to defeat—allow the ANSF to defeat—the Taliban. So that is how we get to 352,000. Then there has been a decision here in our Government to sustain that through 2015, as you know.

And that is to get them through a year or more after our draw-down, and through elections. Some sensitive timeframes that will happen in the future there. So then how do you get to some number in the future? And why 230,000? Actually, ISAF and NTM-A [National Training Mission—Afghanistan] ran a number of planning excursions and 230,000 is just one of them.

Quite honestly, it is one that we would probably pick for ourselves that is a smaller force that is pretty well equipped and capable. There were other courses of action, some larger with less capability. To have more troops, you would have to have, you know, fewer trucks and helicopters and things like that.

So the approximately 230,000 course of action is one that we agreed to with the Afghans and our international partners. And as you said, there is a resource—you know, that is the \$4.1 billion course of action. But these 6-month reviews that Mr. Sedney talked about are every 6 months we are going to reevaluate.

If that still makes sense to us, based on the threat, based on what is going on in the world. That Afghans, quite honestly, would like to have a larger force and more capability. But the world community is going to fund most of that, and so, you know, there is a tradeoff there. So I think that as we go down the road we will make these 6-month reviews and determine if 230,000 makes sense, or maybe something else makes sense.

At some point in the near future here we are going to be asking Afghans, okay, give us your course, your preferred course of action. Because we have done a lot of that planning, and then brought them into it.

Mr. WITTMAN. Gotcha.

Mr. Sedney, in speaking about those 6 months' reviews, I am assuming that they will also include ISAF forces. You are looking at drawdown, obviously, after 2015 of the ANSF forces. But also ISAF forces to the end of 2014, where we will be, theoretically, out. Will those 6-month evaluations also consider if we haven't reached an acceptable security condition with that transition with ISAF force presence after December 2014?

Mr. SEDNEY. Well, the ISAF mandate the NATO heads of state have agreed on runs out at the end of 2014. That was the decision, made at Lisbon in 2010, that the Afghan security forces would be fully in the lead by the end of 2014. In terms of moving towards that, very definitely both the size, but more importantly the capabilities and the actions that will be carried out by the ISAF forces will be considered.

But as NATO stated in Chicago in defining essentially an interim milestone in 2013, that that will be the point at which Afghan forces are in the lead, with our support. So there will be a year and a half with the Afghan forces in the lead and ISAF sup-

port. And as they become more and more in the lead, they will need less and less ISAF support.

So we will be evaluating in those 6-month reviews, looking primarily at the performance of the Afghan security forces. And then if there are areas where the Afghan security forces need additional training, advising, assisting—areas where they are facing challenges—then the commander in the field, I am sure, will recommend methods to do that.

So yes, it is very much a joint unitary process, looking at the entire spectrum in the whole country of Afghanistan.

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Sedney.

Mr. Coffman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I understand that President Karzai, by the constitution, cannot run again. And that there has not been a credible election yet in Afghanistan. And I know in Iraq, under General Casey, coalition forces actively supported the independent electoral commission of Iraq to make sure that there were credible elections.

What efforts are going to be made next time to make sure—or to assist the Afghan people to make sure—that there is a credible election so that there is a peaceful transition of power?

Mr. SEDNEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Coffman. You have hit on a key issue, which is the successful elections and a successful transition of power; something that does not happen in that region of the world in general. So it will be an historic achievement, and one that the Afghan people are very much aware of.

As you said, President Karzai has pledged publicly, and privately to the U.S. Government, that he plans to step down to facilitate a transfer of power. In terms of the Department of Defense, in terms of the military role, in terms of the role that NATO and ISAF will play in both of the last two elections, in 2004 and 2009, the actual security protection that was available in areas where security had been achieved was led by the Afghan forces, particularly in 2009.

I know it is the judgment of our commanders in the field that that is going to be able to be the case in 2014, as well. So in terms of the military's role, we will be supporting the Afghan security forces to the degree necessary in 2014 for those elections in order to carry out the security. The biggest challenge, of course, is having a credible and legitimate process that results in a transfer of power that the Afghan people, the international community, see as legitimate.

That there is a very active political dialogue in Afghanistan already, and our colleagues at the State Department and elsewhere are working to that end. But I would say on the security side, all the indications are—and Steve, you can correct me if I am wrong—we think the Afghan security forces are going to be in a very good shape to take the lead and be very effective at it in maintaining security during the election period.

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. Going forward, President Karzai has come down on these night raids which, in terms of my understanding, are very effective in terms of capturing key insurgents. Where are we at right now with night raids in terms of working with the Karzai administration?

General TOWNSEND. Quite honestly, Congressman, the night raids question has pretty much dropped in the pressure. It was highly pressurized a few months ago, and now it has dropped significantly because we have made this agreement on night raids, or special operations, with the government of Afghanistan.

And essentially, we are turning over night raids, at an accelerated pace, to them. They have now four of their own strike forces that are doing these raids side-by-side. They are partnered with Americans, they are enabled by Americans. But they are completely in the lead for four of these strike forces.

There are coalition forces that are still operating each night. They are partnered also with Afghans. But it is the discussion we had earlier about who is in the lead and who is participating. But because of that agreement and because of the continuing success of these operations, the pressure on that topic has dropped significantly with the government of Afghanistan.

Mr. COFFMAN. In terms of our ability to phase down our forces, being able to redeploy them out of Afghanistan utilizing Pakistan has become an issue in working with the Pakistani government. I wonder if you could reflect on where we are right in that negotiation process.

Mr. SEDNEY. We have been talking with the Pakistanis about reopening the ground lines of communication, and we continue those discussions. I think people from my office have been involved in those discussions. My deputy was in Islamabad for about the last 6 weeks or 7 weeks carrying them out.

We have not reached agreement yet, but we do find a great deal of willingness on the Pakistan side to reopen those. And we will report back to the committee when that happens. But what I would stress is that primarily due to our partnership with a number of other countries to the north of Afghanistan we have been able to continue operations without any interruption or any hindrance.

And that the level of supplies for our troops in Afghanistan, for our NATO partners' groups in Afghanistan, is higher now than it was before those Pakistani ground lines of communication were closed. It does cost more money. It is a much longer route. It goes through some more difficult areas in terms of development of the transportation networks.

But all that said, due to some tremendous work by our colleagues at TRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation Command], at CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command], and by a number of civilian carriers, we are actually in very good shape and able to move forces in and out and equipment in and out of Afghanistan, as is necessary.

However, we don't want to be dependent upon the north any more than we want to be dependent on Pakistani. We were very much interested in having both routes open. There is both healthy competition there and a diversity of supply lines that we think is strategically important.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Coffman.

And we will move back to Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. The \$4 billion, Mr. Sedney, that is projected to be necessary to support that smaller force of 230,000 dollars—230,000 ANSF in 2017—that represents about 20 percent of

the current Afghan GDP [gross domestic product]. If we assume that Afghanistan will experience economic growth and improvements in governance, maintaining that force will, of course, require substantial international contributions.

What steps are being taken to get commitments from international donors, and how much progress have we made?

Mr. SEDNEY. Thank you, Congressman. Last year, former Secretary of Defense Gates, proposed publicly that our ISAF and other partners contribute 1 billion euros a year towards the future cost of the Afghan security forces. Since that time, we have been working very actively with our NATO and other partners, including countries in the Middle East and in Asia that are also part of the ISAF force.

And I would say we are very, very close to that goal right now. Because some of these discussions are still in diplomatic channels, we are not in a position to give you the details now. But very soon we will be able to. We have gotten a very positive response, and countries are willing to make multiyear commitments.

Obviously, each country has different budget processes, different political processes. But the commitments that were made in Chicago have been very positive. At the same time, as I mentioned before, the goal by 2024—the goal set out by President Karzai and endorsed by just about every Afghan that I know—is that Afghanistan will be able to become self-sustaining for its security forces.

That is a very stretched goal that is going to require a huge growth in the Afghanistan economy. There are other prospects in a number of areas—agricultural, transportation, mining—for that growth. But in the end, it all depends on security. If security is in place, Afghanistan has a lot of areas where its economy can grow and meet that goal.

And that, of course, comes back to the Afghan security forces. But as I said, we have been very pleased with the response from other countries, and we look forward to giving you more details of that once the diplomatic discussions are completed.

Mr. JOHNSON. I understand also that the poppy crop has been—or the level of production has declined dramatically this growing season. What is the reason for that?

Mr. SEDNEY. The full evaluation of that is still ongoing, including by our intelligence agencies. And we should have their official reports in a few weeks. But from what we understand, there is a combination of factors involved. One of the largest is weather and crop blights, other natural factors.

But we have also seen a decline in production, particularly in areas where we have been most effective in our military counter-insurgency operations. Particularly in the Helmand Province area, where the combination of increased security and an effective crop substitution effort—this is a whole-of-government effort, with the participation from our colleagues in the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, State Department, and other international partners—giving farmers the opportunity to grow something else.

Even though it might be less profitable in one sense is much more secure because they don't have the risk of having their crop destroyed, they have legitimate outlets for it, they are not being

preyed upon by Taliban and criminals. So we have seen that happening. But I would say the largest reasons, at least anecdotally that we can report right now, are natural. But they are both natural and as a result of our policies.

Mr. JOHNSON. Can you share a little bit with us about the Afghanistan police forces that we are also training, and what will be our financial commitment, if any, for them after 2014?

Mr. SEDNEY. Well, the financial commitment we talked about before was for the Afghan security forces, including the army and the police; both the uniformed police, the border police, and the Afghan local police that the chairman discussed before.

The police, as a whole, in Afghanistan, as in every other conflict and post-conflict societies, does lag behind. The police in Afghanistan, Representative Coffman mentioned before, casualty rates. The police bear a much higher casualty rate than the army. They tend to be in smaller groups, often isolated, and are quite often the choice of target for the insurgents.

That combination has made it more challenging to build the police. However, we see significant progress in the police. The attrition figures that I mentioned before show that the policemen are staying in, staying in longer, becoming part of their communities in an effective way.

There are continuing problems with corruption, as Representative Coffman mentioned. It is a problem in the police forces in many areas in Afghanistan that needs to be addressed. I don't know, Steve, if you have any comments about the police, from your experience.

General TOWNSEND. My experience over the last year in RC East, where the police continue to improve—and this is most notable in the selection and promotion of police leadership—when I first got there, I had an Afghan police general who was my partner. And when I heard word of his impending assignment I was quite nervous because he was not very corrupt.

And I thought an honest guy, trying to do right for his country. I was very concerned. And in every case, the incoming leader proved to be better than his predecessor. So that was my experience in RC East.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you.

I yield back.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Johnson.

I would like to thank the members of the committee and our witnesses today for your testimony. We appreciate the time. And with that, this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:48 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]



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**A P P E N D I X**

JUNE 20, 2012

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**PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

JUNE 20, 2012

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**Statement of Hon. Rob Wittman**  
**Chairman, House Subcommittee on Oversight and**  
**Investigations**  
**Hearing on**  
**Afghan National Security Forces: Resources, Strategy,**  
**and Timetable for Security Lead Transition**  
**June 20, 2012**

Today the Oversight and Investigations subcommittee convenes the first of a series of hearings related to the Afghan National Security Forces.

At this hearing, we will receive testimony from the Department of Defense about the resources and strategy related to training the ANSF and the timetable for transitioning security lead responsibility from U.S. and NATO forces to the ANSF.

The Department of Defense is represented today by:

- Mr. David Sedney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia; and
- Major General Stephen Townsend, Director of the Pakistan/Afghanistan Coordination Cell.

Thank you for your participation.

We look forward to your testimony on plans for training and equipping the ANSF, and details about the projected size and related rationale of the ANSF in the near and long term.

I have just returned from leading a congressional trip to Afghanistan. During my visit, I traveled to several provinces and met with local leaders, including the chiefs of police. I also had the opportunity to talk to military commanders, who provided their impressions of the level of support that will be needed to create a self-sustaining ANSF. It is my hope that our witnesses today can provide further context on these important issues.

**\*\* EMBARGOED UNTIL DELIVERY \*\***

**STATEMENT OF**  
**DAVID S. SEDNEY**  
**DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA**

**BEFORE THE**

**UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**  
**COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**  
**SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS**

**JUNE 20, 2012**

Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to update you on the Afghan National Security Forces and Transition.

The United States' fundamental objectives, strategy, and campaign plan in Afghanistan have not changed. Our goal remains to deny safe havens to al-Qaida and to deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan government. Thanks to the more than ten years of dedication and sacrifice of our forces, our Coalition partners, and the Afghan people themselves, we have taken enormous strides towards achieving those objectives, particularly over the last three years.

To that end, U.S., Afghan, and Coalition forces continue to work to drive-down the Taliban-led insurgency in their strongholds and to build-up the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces and the Afghan Government. Our efforts remain on track to enable the Afghans themselves to assume the lead for security nationwide by the end of 2014. As we continue to shift more areas to Afghan security lead, by the end of this September, the final 23,000 American "surge" troops will return home. The American and Coalition forces that remain on the ground will facilitate the continued transition of the security lead to the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) in accordance with General Allen's campaign plan.

The key to this recent success and for a successful Transition is the increasing capability and confidence of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The ANA and ANP are both on schedule to meet their goal by or before October. Additionally, the ANSF now participate in over 90 percent of all operations in Afghanistan and are in the lead for over 40 percent of these missions, and this rate is growing. As General Allen stated to Congress in March, the ANSF are "better than we thought they were to be. Importantly, they're better than they thought they could be."

This improved capacity has allowed the ANSF to assume more and more of the security lead in Afghanistan. With the first two tranches of Transition currently underway, 50 percent of the population lives in areas with ANSF in the security lead. This number will climb to 75 percent when the recently announced Tranche Three begins transition this summer. Tranche Three contains a number of contested areas and this will test the capabilities of the ANSF. This

fighting season will be the most significant challenge yet for the ANSF. However, the time to test them is now, when we have the forces in theater to ensure their success. Currently, the insurgency retains the ability to conduct complex attacks. The April 15 attacks in Kabul and the recent attack on FOB Salerno were sophisticated and coordinated. However, these attacks were largely tactical and operational failures, and the response to the attacks in Kabul in particular highlighted the increasing competence of the ANSF.

We have seen two major achievements that send a strong signal to the Afghan people, the Taliban and the region. First, the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) signed in May by Presidents Obama and Karzai shows that the United States and Afghanistan are committed to a mutually beneficial relationship beyond 2014. Second, the Chicago Summit was a great success and demonstrated the continued dedication of over 50 NATO and other partner nations to supporting security and stability in Afghanistan. ISAF's members reaffirmed their commitment to the Lisbon timeline to complete transition by the end of 2014 and continue engagement in Afghanistan post-2014. As NATO Secretary General Rasmussen put it, "NATO and our ISAF partners will not leave the task undone. We will not let Afghanistan slip back into the hands of militants, which the vast majority of Afghans utterly reject. We will finish the job to help create a secure Afghanistan – for our shared security."

Two additional U.S.-Afghan bilateral arrangements, the Detention and Special Operations Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), preceded the SPA and were completed earlier this spring. These two MOUs were critical to demonstrating U.S. commitment to Afghan sovereignty and the expanded capacity of the ANSF.

While we have made progress, challenges still exist. Limited governance capacity and corruption continue to plague Afghanistan and limit effective governance. Additionally, as stated by General Allen during his testimony to the Congress in March, the Taliban-led insurgency still operates from safe havens in Pakistan. Although we have had indisputable successes against al-Qaida, we continue to press the Pakistanis on the need to take greater action against the Taliban and affiliated groups. We will continue to work with our Allies and partners,

and the Pakistani and Afghan governments to address these issues and to keep the Congress informed of our progress.

As I close, I would like to thank the House Armed Service Committee and the Subcommittee for the opportunity to appear before you today and for your continued support for our men and women in uniform. I would also like to extend my gratitude for your support for the Afghan National Security Forces. Without your commitment to funding and resourcing the Afghan forces, we could not have achieved the progress of the last three years. I look forward to your questions.

Defense.gov Biography: David S. Sedney



**David S. Sedney**


**Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia**



David Samuel Sedney is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs.

Mr. Sedney was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia from 2007-2009. He served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing from 2004-2007. Previously Mr. Sedney was Deputy Chief of Mission at the United States Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan from 2003-2004, where he was Charge d'Affaires from August through November 2003.

Mr. Sedney was also Deputy Chief of Mission in Kabul in 2002, after the re-opening of the Embassy. Mr. Sedney was Director for Afghanistan at the National Security Council (2003), Senior Advisor in the State Department's Office of e-Diplomacy (2002), Senior Advisor to John Negroponte, United States Ambassador to the United Nations (2001-2002), Deputy Director of the State Department's Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs (1999-2001), and Special Assistant to Stephen Sestanovich, Ambassador-at-Large and Special Representative for the Newly Independent States (1997-1998).



Earlier, Mr. Sedney served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the United States Embassy in Baku, Azerbaijan (1995-1997), Political-Military Officer at the United States Embassy in Beijing, China (1991-1994) and Political Officer, Refugee Officer and Consular Officer at the United States Embassy in Bucharest, Romania (1985-1987). He was a Watch Officer at the State Department's Operations Center (1987-1988) and Duty Officer and Senior Duty Officer at the White House Situation Room (1988-1989).

Before joining the State Department, Mr. Sedney spent five years as a house-husband in Bern, Switzerland; Baton Rouge, Louisiana; and Williamstown, Massachusetts, raising three daughters. Mr. Sedney also taught courses at North Adams State College and Williams College. Earlier he worked for the United States Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division after stints as a factory worker, truck driver and taxicab driver.

Mr. Sedney is a graduate of Princeton University and Suffolk University School of Law. He attended Louisiana State University's School of Law where he studied Law of the Sea and International Law. Mr. Sedney is a distinguished graduate of the National War College. He speaks Romanian, Mandarin Chinese and Azerbaijani. Mr. Sedney has received the Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service, the Department of State's Superior Honor Award six times, and Department of State's Meritorious Honor Award twice.

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STATEMENT BY

MAJOR GENERAL STEPHEN J. TOWNSEND, U.S. ARMY  
DIRECTOR, PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN COORDINATION CELL

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS  
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES: RESOURCES, STRATEGY, AND  
TIMETABLE FOR SECURITY LEAD TRANSITION

20 JUNE 2012

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**Not For Distribution Until Released By The Committee**

Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Cooper, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity today to discuss with you how the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are doing.

Our bottom line up front is that we are on track to achieve our strategic objectives of denying al Qaeda safe havens in Afghanistan and denying the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan Government. A sustainable and sufficient ANSF and Transition are two linchpins of our strategy. The ANSF continue to grow and improve and remain on track to assume the lead for security by the end of 2014.

Over the last few months we have seen several key indicators of progress that support our approach to security in Afghanistan. We signed agreements to transfer detention and night operations to Afghan lead. These were followed by signing a Strategic Partnership Agreement, announcement of the third tranche of areas to begin Transition and the NATO Summit in Chicago. These events are important steps in transitioning to Afghan security lead, supporting Afghan sovereignty, defeating the Taliban, and preventing Afghanistan from once again becoming a terrorist safe haven.

These accomplishments were possible because of increased ANSF capacity. Through steady growth in fielded forces and improved operational capabilities, the ANSF are assuming a greater role in providing security throughout Afghanistan.

ISAF remains focused on building a capable ANSF that can defend Afghanistan and become the defeat mechanism of the insurgency. ANSF continue to meet or exceed this year's recruiting objectives. For example, the Afghan National Army (ANA) is expected to meet their 2012 manning goal of 195,000 personnel by the end of this summer. The Afghan National Police (ANP) will reach their 2012 manning goal of 157,000 personnel before October 2012. As the ANSF meet their manning goal of 352,000, recruiters can become more selective to improve the quality of the force.

The ANSF continue to face challenges such as literacy, attrition, and filling noncommissioned officer (NCO) ranks. The NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A), Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD), Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) provide literacy programs at training facilities and to the fielded force. Approximately 90,000 ANSF are in literacy classes on any day across Afghanistan. These programs are making the ANSF one of the most literate elements of Afghan society.

To be sure, challenges remain. Attrition continues to be an issue for the MOD and MOI. Although attrition will not keep the ANSF from meeting their manning goals, it continues to hamper long-term development. The security ministries continue to

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implement policies to combat attrition. The MOD directed significant changes to their policy to add timelines to drop AWOL personnel from unit rosters. This updated policy is expected to reduce the impact of AWOL personnel within the force.

NCO shortages continue to effect the development of the force. The ANA and ANP have developed plans to address NCO shortfalls. Both services are training, and promoting personnel from within their ranks to fill these critical leadership positions.

The ANSF are taking the lead in training their forces and implementing instructor cadre development programs. These Afghan instructors are capable of providing basic and advanced skills training at Afghan regional training centers and branch schools. ANSF instructors will continue to assume more of the lead for training throughout 2013.

Operationally the ANSF is making steady progress. ISAF Joint Command (IJC) currently rates 67% of all ANA units and 62% of all ANP units in the top two operational effectiveness categories of effective with advisors or independent with advisors. The number of ANSF and ISAF partnered operations increased from 116 in January 2012 to 126 in April 2012. The percentage of Afghan-led partnered operations increased from 33% in January 2012 to 59% in April. In some regions of the country Afghan forces conduct independent operations at a higher rate than their partnered operations. This increase in operational capacity continues at a steady pace.

The ANA's special operations capacity continues to grow and increase operational proficiency. The ANA is fielding special operations forces (SOF) across Afghanistan to support operations against insurgent and terrorist networks that threaten the transition process. These elements train and partner with ISAF SOF units. In the past three months, ANA SOF led or independently conducted operations increased from 44% in January 2012 to 54% in April 2012.

At the local and district level, Afghans are improving security with Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police initiatives. VSO and ALP programs are challenging the insurgency at the local level and facilitating village to national level governance.

All of these improvements in Afghan capacity are maintaining pressure on the insurgency as we recover our surge forces by the end of summer 2012. As we plan for a responsible draw down of our forces in Afghanistan the ANSF will face challenges on the battlefield but they will not face these challenges alone. To support the ANSF during transition ISAF is shifting to a Security Force Assistance (SFA) model that puts Afghans in a lead combat role with ISAF assuming a train, advise, and assist posture. During the transition period, ISAF will continue to fight alongside the ANSF when needed but will shift into a support role as Afghans step forward.

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The ANSF's operational challenges include logistics, Army-Police interoperability and confidence among others. Logistics systems in ANA and ANP are under development. NTM-A continues to generate logistics capacity to support the ANSF and ANP in the field. The ANSF logistics system is improving as ANA Corps and ANP regional systems come on line in support of the fielded force.

Interoperability between the ANA and ANP remains an issue to improving overall ANSF effectiveness. Some of this is "cultural friction" that will reduce over time as these forces operate and fight together. Operational Coordination Centers at the regional and provincial levels are one way to help improve interoperability between ANSF and better coordinate their efforts.

In my own opinion, the ANSF's greatest challenge is one of confidence. Our agreement to stand with them beyond 2014 has been a tremendous boost to their confidence. As the ANSF continue to move to the fore, their confidence will increase. The will of the force will further increase as leadership and capability improve across the formation. Once the ANSF realizes their potential they will become a force capable of securing Afghanistan.

In conclusion, we assess that security transition is on track to have the ANSF assume full responsibility for security across all of Afghanistan by the end of 2014. We remain committed to building a suitable and sustainable ANSF capable of defending Afghanistan from internal threats. As noted in the Chicago Summit declaration, "we have taken important steps on the road to a stable and secure Afghanistan and to the goal of preventing Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe haven for terrorists that threaten Afghanistan, the region, and the world."

Thank you for the work you do on behalf of our servicemen and women, as well as your concerted efforts to ensure their protection and safety as they complete their mission in Afghanistan. I stand ready to answer your questions.

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United States Army

Major General Stephen J. Townsend

Director  
 Pakistan/Afghanistan Coordination Cell  
 Joint Staff  
 3000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Room BD945A  
 Washington, DC 20318-3000  
 Since: Jul 2011

SOURCE OF COMMISSIONED SERVICE ROTCEDUCATIONAL DEGREES

North Georgia College – BS – Psychology  
 United States Army Command and General Staff College – MMAS – Military Science  
 United States Army War College – MA – Strategy

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED

Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses  
 United States Army Command and General Staff College  
 Armed Forces Staff College  
 United States Army War College

FOREIGN LANGUAGES None recorded

<u>PROMOTIONS</u>	<u>DATE OF APPOINTMENT</u>
2LT	26 May 82
1LT	26 Nov 83
CPT	1 Feb 86
MAJ	1 Apr 94
LTC	1 Feb 99
COL	1 May 04
BG	11 Jun 09
MG	15 May 12

FROM TO ASSIGNMENT

Jul 11	Present	Director, Pakistan/Afghanistan Coordination Cell, Joint Staff, Washington, DC
May 11	Jul 11	Deputy Commanding General (Operations), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky
Jun 10	May 11	Deputy Commanding General (Operations), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)/Combined Joint Task Force-101, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan
Jun 09	Jun 10	Deputy Commanding General (Operations), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky
Nov 08	Jun 09	Senior Commander, Fort Campbell, Fort Campbell, Kentucky
Feb 08	Nov 08	Executive Officer to the Commander, United States Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida
Dec 04	Nov 07	Commander, 3d Brigade (Stryker Brigade Combat Team), 2d Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington to include duty as Commander, Multi-National Division-Baghdad Strike Force and Multi-National Corps-Iraq Operational Reserve, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq
Aug 04	Nov 04	Special Assistant to the Commanding General, 1 Corps, Fort Lewis, Washington
Jun 03	Jul 04	Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations), 10th Mountain Division (Light), Fort Drum, New York to include duty as Director of Operation, C/J-3, Combined Joint Task Force - 180, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan
Jul 02	Jun 03	Student, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
Jun 00	Jun 02	Commander, 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry, 10th Mountain Division (Light), Fort Drum, New York and OPERATION ANACONDA, Afghanistan
Jul 99	Jun 00	S-3 (Operations), 2d Brigade, 78th Division Brigade (Training Support), Fort Drum, New York

MG Stephen J. Townsend

Dec 96	Jun 99	Strategy and Policy Officer, J-5, later Special Assistant to the Commander-in- Chief, United States Pacific Command, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii
Jul 94	Dec 96	Senior Liaison Officer, later S-3 (Operations), 3d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning, Georgia and OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, Haiti
Aug 93	Jun 94	Student, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Jun 90	Jun 93	Commander, C Company, 3d Battalion, later Assistant S-3 (Operations), 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning, Georgia
Dec 88	Jun 90	S-3 (Air), 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning, Georgia and OPERATION JUST CAUSE, Panama
Jul 86	Dec 88	S-3 (Operations), Headquarters and Headquarters Company, later Commander, A Company, 4th Battalion, 21st Infantry, 7th Infantry Division (Light), Fort Ord, California
Jan 86	Jun 86	Student, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia
Nov 84	Dec 85	Assistant S-3 (Operations and Training), later Executive Officer, Combat Support Company, 2d Battalion, 505th Infantry, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
Dec 82	Nov 84	Rifle Platoon Leader, A Company, 2d Battalion (Airborne), later Platoon Leader, E Company, 505th Infantry, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina and OPERATION URGENT FURY, Grenada

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>GRADE</u>
Director, Pakistan/Afghanistan Coordination Cell, Joint Staff, Washington, DC	Jul 11-Present	Brigadier General
Deputy Commanding General (Operations), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)/Combined Joint Task Force-101, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan	Jun 10-May 11	Brigadier General
Executive Officer to the Commander, United States Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida	Feb 08-Nov 08	Colonel
Commander, 3d Brigade (Stryker Brigade Combat Team), 2d Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington to include duty as Commander, Multi-National Division-Baghdad Strike Force and Multi-National Corps-Iraq Operational Reserve, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq	Jun 06-Sep 07	Colonel
Director of Operation, C/J-3, Combined Joint Task Force - 180, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan	Jun 03-Jul 04	Lieutenant Colonel/Colonel
Strategy and Policy Officer, J-5, later Special Assistant to the Commander-in- Chief, United States Pacific Command, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii	Dec 96-Jun 99	Lieutenant Colonel

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS ASSIGNMENTS

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>GRADE</u>
Deputy Commanding General (Operations), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)/Combined Joint Task Force-101, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan	Jun 10-May 11	Brigadier General
Commander, 3d Brigade (Stryker Brigade Combat Team), 2d Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington to include duty as Commander, Multi-National Division-Baghdad Strike Force and Multi-National Corps-Iraq Operational Reserve, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq	Dec 04-Nov 07	Colonel
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations), 10th Mountain Division (Light), Fort Drum, New York to include duty as Director of Operation, C/J-3, Combined Joint Task Force - 180, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan	Jun 03-Jul 04	Lieutenant Colonel/Colonel
Commander, 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry, 10th Mountain Division (Light), Fort Drum, New York and OPERATION ANACONDA, Afghanistan	Jun 00-Jun 02	Lieutenant Colonel
Senior Liaison Officer, later S-3 (Operations), 3d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning, Georgia and OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, Haiti	Jul 94-Dec 96	Major
S-3 (Air), 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning, Georgia and OPERATION JUST CAUSE, Panama	Dec 89-Jan 90	Captain
Rifle Platoon Leader, A Company, 2d Battalion (Airborne), later Platoon Leader, E Company, 505th Infantry, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina and OPERATION URGENT FURY, Grenada	Dec 82-Nov 84	Second Lieutenant/First Lieutenant

MG Stephen J. Townsend

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Defense Superior Service Medal  
Legion of Merit  
Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device  
Bronze Star Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)  
Defense Meritorious Service Medal  
Meritorious Service Medal (with 5 Oak Leaf Clusters)  
Army Commendation Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)  
Joint Service Achievement Medal  
Army Achievement Medal (with 4 Oak Leaf Clusters)  
Combat Infantryman Badge (with Star)  
Combat Action Badge  
Expert Infantryman Badge  
Master Parachutist Badge  
Air Assault Badge  
Ranger Tab



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**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING  
THE HEARING**

JUNE 20, 2012


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
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**RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ANDREWS**

Mr. SEDNEY. See attached ANA and ANP Charts from April 1230 Report, pgs. 20 & 30, with attrition levels through March 2012. [See page 10.]





**ANA Attrition Rates, December 2011 through May 2012**

Dec 2011	Jan 2012	Feb 2012	Mar 2012	Apr 2012	May 2012
2.3%	1.9%	1.8%	1.2%	1.6%	2.3%

**ANP Attrition Rates, December 2011 through May 2012**

Dec 2011	Jan 2012	Feb 2012	Mar 2012	Apr 2012	May 2012
1.4%	1.0%	1.1%	0.6%	1.3%	1.0%

**RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY**

General TOWNSEND. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] [See page 12.]

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**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING**

JUNE 20, 2012

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## QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN

Mr. WITTMAN. How was the 2014 transition deadline initially determined?

Mr. SEDNEY. The security Transition process was jointly conceived and developed by the Afghan Government, the U.S. Government, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) nations at a variety of international fora, beginning with the London Conference in January 2010 and culminating with the NATO Summit in Lisbon in November 2010. Over this period, the Inteqal ("Transition") Framework, which governs the Afghan-led transition process, was developed based on mutually agreed criteria for phased transition to Afghan security lead by the end of 2014. Following this joint Afghan and NATO/ISAF assessment, the ISAF contributing nations gathered in Lisbon and confirmed their commitment to this framework, signing a declaration with the Afghan government to transfer primary security responsibility from ISAF to the Afghan government by the end of 2014.

Mr. WITTMAN. On what assumptions about the security environment and ANSF size and capability was the 2014 decision based?

Mr. SEDNEY. The Inteqal ("Transition") Framework, which governs the Afghan-led transition process, was developed based on mutually agreed criteria for phased transition to Afghan security lead by the end of 2014. ISAF contributing nations gathered in Lisbon in 2010 and confirmed their commitment to this strategy and timeline, signing a declaration with the Afghan government to transfer primary security responsibility from ISAF to the Afghan government by the end of 2014.

In 2011, the Department of Defense conducted a comprehensive analysis to examine options for the development of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and identified the minimum level of capabilities needed to establish and preserve security in Afghanistan sufficient to support our core national security goals, and to yield an ANSF structure that is sustainable within the limits of Afghan human capital, economic capacity, and the International Community's willingness to provide long-term assistance.

The current planned ANSF force of 352,000 is considered necessary to complete the Transition to Afghan lead security responsibility by the end of 2014, and to secure the country during the transition of power following the Afghan Presidential election in 2014, while mitigating the effects of the U.S. and coalition drawdowns. In April 2012, Secretary Panetta and the Afghan Ministers of Defense and Interior committed to conducting six-month reviews of the ANSF force structure to determine future needs based on the evolving security environment.

Mr. WITTMAN. What is the evidence that security situation in Afghanistan will be sufficiently improved by 2017 to allow the ANSF to be reduced by 120,000 troops?

Mr. SEDNEY. An improving security environment would allow for a carefully planned, conditions-based reduction to an enduring force by 2017; however, no plans have been finalized at this time. Plans to reshape the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) into a more sustainable force and to refocus toward enduring security roles are still in development and pre-decisional. In April 2012, Secretary Panetta and the Afghan Ministers of Defense and Interior committed to conducting six-month reviews of the ANSF force structure to determine future needs based on the evolving security environment.

Mr. WITTMAN. If conditions on the ground in Afghanistan do not improve as expected what will be the mechanism for revising the current sizing strategy?

Mr. SEDNEY. General Allen, Commander of the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), committed to working with the Afghan Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior to conduct six month reviews of the operational conditions and the capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in order to adapt the plan for the final size and structure of the ANSF as conditions require. The first of these reviews will occur following this summer fighting season once ISAF has had a chance to observe the ANSF as it increasingly takes the lead and its capabilities are tested.

Mr. WITTMAN. What factors will determine the size of ANSF after the U.S. and NATO transition primary security responsibility to the ANSF?

Mr. SEDNEY. The residual type and intensity of the threat in a post-2014 environment, and the capabilities exhibited by the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in the field, are among the most important factors in determining the size of the ANSF after the transition. In addition to operational considerations, follow-through on international pledges made at the Chicago Conference to help sustain the ANSF through 2017 will influence end strength. Accordingly, Afghan government's ability to sustain the ANSF using approaches and cost factors that are appropriate in an Afghan context will also affect the long-term size of the Afghan force.

Mr. WITTMAN. What plans are being developed to manage the reduction in the ANSF from 352,000 to 230,000?

Mr. SEDNEY. Plans for a managed force reduction of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are still in development and pre-decisional at this time. The Department of Defense is fully aware of the challenges associated with managing a responsible reduction, and is examining multiple contingencies and policy options. This includes examining lessons learned from previous force reductions and demobilizations that will help inform future plans.

Mr. WITTMAN. When will the ANSF be fully trained?

Mr. SEDNEY. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is on track to meet its goal of recruiting a force of approximately 352,000 by October 1, 2012. Those recruits will enter training as slots are available. The Afghan National Army (ANA) is scheduled to achieve its surge-level end-strength of 187,000 soldiers inducted by December 2012, and to have these personnel trained, equipped, and fielded by December 2013. The Afghan National Police (ANP) is expected to reach its surge-level end-strength of 157,000 personnel inducted by February 2013, and to have these personnel trained, equipped, and fielded by December 2013. The Afghan Air Force (AAF) is expected to reach its goal of 8,000 airmen inducted in December 2014, and to have these personnel trained, equipped, and fielded by December 2017; although we are currently examining methods to accelerate this process.

Mr. WITTMAN. When will the full-strength ANSF be fielded?

Mr. SEDNEY. The Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police are expected to have their full surge-level end strength trained, equipped, and fielded by December 2013. The Afghan Air Force are expected to have their full surge-level end strength trained, equipped, and fielded by December 2017; although we are currently examining methods to accelerate this process.

Mr. WITTMAN. If security conditions do not improve sufficiently by December 2014, will all U.S. combat forces be withdrawn nonetheless by that date?

Mr. SEDNEY. The transition strategy and framework, established at the 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit and reaffirmed at the 2012 NATO Chicago Summit, is on track to transition full security responsibility to the Afghan Government and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) by December 2014. As provided for in the Strategic Partnership Agreement, an enduring presence will remain in Afghanistan to ensure that our hard fought gains are consolidated and sustained by providing continuing support for the ANSF and for counterterrorism operations.

Mr. WITTMAN. What conditions will the United States consider when determining the extent of further U.S. troop drawdowns?

Mr. SEDNEY. The campaign plan calls for several conditions to be met before completion of the transition in Afghanistan. The ability of the Afghanistan National Security Forces to provide suitable and sustainable security for a given area will be one of the key factors in determining U.S. and coalition forces presence. Other factors involve the ability of the provincial government to provide adequate services to the Afghan people, including access to basic social services, rule of law, and the capability for economic growth.

Mr. WITTMAN. Who will decide the scope and pace of U.S. withdrawals?

Mr. SEDNEY. The Department of Defense is currently working with commanders in the field to determine the scope and pace of additional force reductions after October 2012. Plans for further reductions are still in development and pre-decisional at this time. Following the summer fighting season and the full recovery of U.S. surge forces by the end of September 2012, General Allen will conduct an assessment to determine force levels for 2013. This assessment will take into account the aftermath of the fighting season and the progress of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and evaluate what combination of forces will be needed to handle the operating environment in 2013. This assessment will then be pushed up the chain of command for review. The safety of U.S. forces and the success of the mission are the primary concerns in our planning efforts.

Mr. WITTMAN. Will a continued, steady drawdown of U.S. troops increase the risk of successfully transitioning security to the ANSF by the 2014 deadline?

Mr. SEDNEY. The scope and pace of additional U.S. force reductions after October 2012 are still being determined. Future reductions will be tied to the conditions on

the ground and the ability of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) to provide security as they assume the lead. The performance of the ANSF over this summer fighting season, as we drawdown to the pre-surge level of 68,000 and as the Afghans increasingly take the lead in contested areas, will provide a good baseline assessment for how the ANSF can handle U.S. force reductions in the future.

Additionally, as the ANSF increase in capability and take the lead in conducting operations, the International Security Forces Assistance (ISAF) will transition to the Security Force Assistance (SFA) model. This represents a shift in focus from conducting counterinsurgency operations to providing partnering and advising assets necessary to develop and support ANSF operational effectiveness. Finally, in accordance with the Strategic Partnership Agreement, we will continue to provide support after 2014 to the Afghan Government and the ANSF to ensure a sustainable transition of security responsibilities.

Mr. WITTMAN. What size U.S. military presence will be needed in Afghanistan to achieve the U.S. goals of conducting counterterrorism operations and training and advising the ANSF?

Mr. SEDNEY. The United States, along with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies, will maintain an enduring presence to support the continued training and development of the Afghan National Security Forces and to engage in counterterrorism efforts aimed at combating al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Future U.S. force level requirements will be determined based on what assets are needed to support those activities and missions, and will be guided by the need to ensure that Afghanistan has the ability to secure itself against internal and external threats.

Towards that end, an Afghanistan-United States Bilateral Commission was established under the Strategic Partnership Agreement to promote cooperation and monitor progress. A U.S.-Afghanistan Working Group on Defense and Security will conduct regular assessments of the threat level in Afghanistan as well as the Afghan government's security and defense requirements. Recommendations will be made to the Bilateral Commission that should establish mutually determined levels of support and assistance.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CRITZ

Mr. CRITZ. How willing is the Afghan government to accept the transition?

Mr. SEDNEY. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. CRITZ. How confident are we that the Afghan government is aligned with U.S. interests? How do we make sure our interests are aligned?

Mr. SEDNEY. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. CRITZ. Is there any evidence that old members of Northern Alliance are rearming for possible civil war after transition, as suggested by CRS?

Mr. SEDNEY. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. CRITZ. Could you please identify any provinces or locations where you are concerned local militia may cause problems for the national Afghan government?

Mr. SEDNEY. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. CRITZ. How have the most recent Parliamentary elections (2010) impacted the opinion of Afghans on the legitimacy of the government and its ability to provide security?

Mr. SEDNEY. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. CRITZ. What is your opinion about governing capacity at local levels?

Mr. SEDNEY. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. CRITZ. How willing is the Afghan government to accept the transition?

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Mr. CRITZ. What is your opinion about governing capacity at local levels?

General TOWNSEND. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER**

Mr. COOPER. Breakdown of \$4.1b spending. Does it include train and equip, SFA (Security Assistance Force) or only direct costs to train, equip, and pay for salaries and operations of the ANSF?

Mr. SEDNEY. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. COOPER. Describe the Security Force Assistance (SFA) model: numbers, ROE, etc. Where are we with the planning for this?

Mr. SEDNEY. ISAF Security Force Assistance (SFA) activities are the cornerstone of developing ANSF capacity in support of Transition. Advisor Teams are instrumental in advising and assisting the fielded ANSF as they assume the lead for security through the Transition process. With Afghan leadership and our continued support, the ANSF will become an institution of national unity, the ultimate mechanism for defeating the insurgency and the long-term guardian of Afghan peace, stability, and prosperity well after 2014. This model operationalizes the shift from ISAF's role in combat operations and partnering with ANSF units to a mission focused primarily on training, advising, and assistance.

The exact details for SFA are classified by Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers—Europe (SHAPE). The Department of Defense can provide a classified briefing describing the numbers, locations, and composition of SFA Advisor Teams.

The planning for training and deploying Advisor Teams remains on schedule. This model is not entirely new. It builds upon the experience and lessons learned from previous mentor teams. To codify these lessons, SHAPE published a detailed concept of operations in March 2012. The first U.S. Advisor Teams deployed in January 2012 in advance of the concept of operations. Successive U.S. Army and Marine Advisor Teams have been deploying throughout 2012. The second phase of Advisor Teams, with U.S. and international contributions, will arrive in the fall of 2012. Recognizing the challenges in shifting to a new model while still engaged in combat operations, SHAPE and the U.S. are engaging partner nations to continue to support the SFA model through 2014. This effort will ensure achieving the Lisbon Transition milestone, though some requirements will end as ANSF units demonstrate the capacity for independent operations and geographic areas successfully exit from Transition.

Mr. COOPER. How many Taliban are we fighting? How many of these are “hard core” ideologically committed fighters and how many are part-time, local fighters? How are these numbers derived? What are the metrics we use to determine if someone is a Taliban fighter?

Mr. SEDNEY. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. COOPER. Explain in more detail why the poppy crop is down? How much is due to environmental factors (drought, blight, etc.) and how much due to ISAF or GIROA efforts? Can this lower level of production be sustained once U.S. forces withdraw?

Mr. SEDNEY. The primary causes for the lower poppy crop yield are environmental factors, including bad weather and poor soil conditions. It is uncertain whether blight can be attributed as a factor in the lower crop yield. The poor soil is, in part, a result of the success of the Afghan government-led Helmand Food Zone program, which increased food production and reduced poppy cultivation in food zone areas with higher soil quality. This pushed poppy farmers away from the province's fertile land to a more austere desert environment. The weather this year has been particularly unfavorable to poppy crops with colder temperatures and more precipitation than in past years.

U.S. forces in Afghanistan do not directly support poppy eradication efforts other than to provide in extremis support to eradication teams under attack, consistent with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) policy. The U.S. Department of State supports the Afghan Government's “Governor Led Eradication” program. Although final verified results are not available for the Governor Led Eradication program at this time, the program is on track to more than double last year's result of 3,810 hectares of poppy eradicated. Eradication efforts must be carefully planned to inflict the most damage on major drug producer's poppy crop and be focused in areas where farmers have access to alternatives to poppy cultivation. This requires a whole-of-government approach led by the Afghan Government with enabling support from the U.S. Government.

Sustained lower level production will depend, in part, on continued U.S. assistance to Afghanistan after 2014. Department of Defense is working presently on a post-2014 CN strategy for Afghanistan.

Mr. COOPER. How do we deal with the Pakistan safe havens? Is Pakistan currently taking actions to eliminate safe havens for the Haqqani Network, the Quetta Shura Taliban, or HiG? Do we expect such actions in the future? Why or why not?

Mr. SEDNEY. Militant and terrorist networks continue to exploit Pakistan-based sanctuaries. At the same time, there appears to be a growing recognition on the part of many Pakistani leaders that a secure and stable Afghanistan is vital for Pakistan's future. We look forward to Pakistan taking action towards achieving this goal. These sanctuaries remain a strategic threat to the campaign in Afghanistan. A capable Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), along with the support of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) training, advice, assistance, layered defense, and enablers, is the best mechanism to mitigate the effects of these sanctuaries in Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, the threat must also be mitigated within Pakistan, a security interest that Pakistan shares. Pakistan has suffered enormous casualties as a result of transnational terrorist networks and from acts of terrorism that often emanate from sanctuaries inside Pakistan. This includes more than 11,000 military personnel killed or wounded in action and more than 30,000 civilian casualties since September 11, 2001. Security assistance is a key tool designed to advance U.S. interests by helping Pakistan's efforts in this fight against the militants that enable safe havens, and the Coalition Support Fund authority is used to reimburse Pakistani efforts in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Nevertheless, where Pakistan's action to combat sanctuaries falls short, the U.S. Government will continue to engage Pakistan's civilian and military leaders and urge them to take action to dismantle these sanctuaries. This includes holding Pakistan to its commitments to pressure the Haqqani Network and to encourage all Taliban elements as well as other Afghan groups, including Hizb-e-Islami, to join a political settlement in Afghanistan.

Mr. COOPER. How do we deal with Afghan government corruption? What are the impacts of corruption? What level of confidence should NATO members have that corruption will be controlled post-2014? Does corruption currently undermine the effectiveness of GIROA and the ANSF? Is governmental corruption linked at all to the Taliban's ability to recruit new fighters?

Mr. SEDNEY. The United States has implemented a number of initiatives both to support the Afghan government in its efforts to reduce corruption and organized crime, and also to ensure that U.S. contracting and development assistance are not subject to fraud and corruption. These initiatives include: sustained engagement, capacity-building, and technical assistance in key Afghan ministries; an expansion of interagency efforts to mature conduct thorough assessments of organized crime and corruption in key sectors as a basis for action; the creation of joint, Presidentially-sponsored forums to promote inter-ministerial coordination and develop concrete counter-corruption recommendations; and the development of investigative leads and other forms of support for vetted Afghan law enforcement, investigative, and oversight bodies. Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF)-Shafafiyat coordinates counter-corruption efforts within the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). CJIATF-Shafafiyat fosters a common understanding of the corruption problem, plans and implements ISAF anti-corruption efforts, and integrates ISAF anti-corruption activities with those of key Afghan and international partners in an effort to address President Karzai's goal of an "active and honest administration" in Afghanistan.

Despite this sustained effort, corruption remains one of the biggest challenges facing Afghanistan. It undermines the effectiveness, cohesion, and legitimacy of the Afghan Government and alienates elements of the population. It deters investment, impedes licit economic growth, enables criminal networks to influence important State institutions and functions, and facilitates the narcotics trade and other transnational threats emerging from Afghanistan. Therefore, counter-corruption efforts are essential to strengthening critical Afghan institutions and consolidating gains in the wake of improved security as the process of transition continues.

A series of recent Afghan government commitments towards anti-corruption and good governance has instilled confidence in the international community. Cooperating to strengthen Afghan institutions and governance is one of the basic tenets of the U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement and a critical component underpinning the enduring partnership. At the Tokyo conference in early July, the international donor community and Afghanistan developed a framework for accountability, whereby money would be withheld if Afghanistan cannot meet benchmarks for improving governance and finance management, as well as for safeguarding the democratic process. Following this conference, President Karzai issued a 23-page decree ordering the Supreme Court to accelerate corruption investigations and require

ing his ministries, prosecutors, and judiciary to institute a list of government reforms to address bribery, cronyism, and nepotism.

Mr. COOPER. In your opinion, what will determine ANSF success? What factors could undermine ANSF capability and success in the future?

Mr. SEDNEY. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have made tremendous strides in their development as a force capable of providing security for Afghanistan. As of June, Afghan forces were in the lead for over 70% of total conventional operations across Afghanistan. Efforts to continue developing ANSF leadership, improving the overall quality of the force, and further expanding enabler capabilities, such as logistics, close air support, medical evacuation, and intelligence will affect the long-term success of the ANSF's ability to provide security for the Afghan people.

Factors that will challenge the ANSF's success in the future include limited resources to fully implement current development plans, sourcing the right mix of Security Force Assistance Teams to mentor and advise ANSF units, developing an ANSF enabler capability, and improving ANSF retention and attrition rates to sustain overall force quality.

Mr. COOPER. Can the Afghan Local Police (ALP) be sustained when we leave? Who will fund and train? Does the Afghan Ministry of the Interior have the ability to effectively oversee and control the ALP sites and units in the absence of USSOF?

Mr. SEDNEY. The Afghan Ministry of Interior will continue to administer the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program after the security transition is completed at the end of 2014. The ALP model is for it to become a program commanded and controlled by local Provincial and District Chiefs of Police (COP). It was established in 2010 by an Afghan Presidential Decree. Pay, uniforms, and equipment are distributed through the Afghan National Police system. U.S. Special Operation Forces and Coalition Forces continue to develop capacity in the ALP and will continue to work with District COPs, and Provincial COPs to develop and maintain a sustainable program. These over-watch efforts are part of a long-term engagement plan to transition security to Afghan control.

Mr. COOPER. As ALP is part of MOI, is ALP officially considered part of ANSF? If not, why is ALP funded through ANSF?

Mr. SEDNEY. The Afghan Local Police (ALP) are validated by and report to the Ministry of Interior. They are not part of the Afghan National Police tashkil and do not count toward the Afghan National Security Force approved level of 352,000 personnel. However, as part of the Ministry of Interior, the ALP are funded through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund.

Mr. COOPER. Explain the procedures by which we control ALP funding and make sure it won't be misspent.

Mr. SEDNEY. The Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council (AROC) oversees the management of all Afghanistan Security Force Funds (ASFF). ASFF provides support to the Ministry of Interior for the Afghan Local Police (ALP) for salaries, equipment, and recruiting. The funds are executed in accordance with standard procedures used for all U.S. financial support provided to the Afghan National Security Forces. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan oversees the obligation and execution of the ASFF.

Mr. COOPER. General Allen has stated there are three key factors for successful transition in Afghanistan: 1) security, 2) governance, and 3) development. Do you agree? Are there any other factors that you believe are significant?

Mr. SEDNEY. Yes, I agree with General Allen. Security, governance, and development are the three pillars of the Inteqal "Transition" Framework, which governs the transition process. Improvements in security conditions and the performance of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have been the keys to success thus far in the transition process, but good governance and development are necessary to ensure that those gains result in sustainable Afghan self-reliance. Although there are many factors influencing the success of Transition, regional security and cooperation from Pakistan and Iran is another critical factor. The insurgency's safe haven in Pakistan remains one of the biggest threats to a durable and sustainable Afghanistan. Strengthening border coordination and cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbors will be necessary for long-term success.

Mr. COOPER. LTG Bolger stated that if the ANSF is reduced below 352,000 he believed many of those that leave ANSF will go into civilian positions with the Afghanistan government. Do you agree? Will there be any program to facilitate such placements? Do those personnel have skills that would be directly applicable to such positions? Can GIROA support such an increased number of personnel?

Mr. SEDNEY. Plans for a managed force reduction of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) from 352,000 to 230,000, which would include contingency plans for the "reintegration" of demobilized personnel, are still in development. A common feature of reintegration programs during past demobilizations is job training and job

placement to ensure that reintegrees have the appropriate knowledge and skills to pursue alternate livelihoods. It is unknown at this time what the Afghan government's civilian workforce requirements will be three to four years from now and whether they will be able to absorb any of these personnel.

Mr. COOPER. Please explain the corrective actions and investigations taken regarding the alleged loss of \$42 million at the Dawood hospital.

Mr. SEDNEY. Since 2010, the U.S. and Afghan governments have conducted a series of investigations, including several by the Department of Defense Inspector General for Special Plans and Operations (DOD IG-SPO), on the management, medical care services, and logistics capability and accountability at Dawood National Military Hospital. These investigations arose from concerns raised by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) regarding the status of the medical logistics system within the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the alleged mismanagement and corruption at Dawood Hospital.

At the urging of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) leadership, the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD) replaced key leadership at both Dawood Hospital and the Medical Command, including the Afghan National Army (ANA) Surgeon General and Commander of Dawood Hospital, General Ahmed Zia Yaftali, in December 2010. New leadership was brought in to establish more stringent planning and oversight and to advance the professional conduct and accountability of the medical staff and administrators.

Based on the findings and recommendations of DOD IG-SPO, NTM-A medical advisors and mentors have worked in close coordination with their Afghan counterparts to establish systems and processes that have significantly improved logistics and supply management and have introduced greater transparency and efficiency. These changes have improved accountability while also reducing theft, misappropriation, unauthorized use, and improper distribution.

Numerous oversight mechanisms are now in place to ensure continued progress. The Logistics Training Advisory Group (LTAG) and Medical Training Advisory Group (MTAG) conduct continuous "Battle Field Circulations" to provide daily monitoring and to ensure compliance. The Logistics Validation Team provides quarterly assessments. DOD IG and the Afghan MOD continue to monitor the progress and provide frequent reviews.

Additionally, an Afghan inter-ministerial investigative team with the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOOAC) is currently investigating the allegations of corruption and mismanagement at Dawood hospital. The HOOAC investigation is supported by sustained ISAF and interagency engagement and is overseen by a joint Afghan-international Special Cases Committee.

Mr. COOPER. Please describe in detail the operational assessment process used to evaluate the ANSF. What data is collected? Who evaluates the data? What method of analysis is used to evaluate the data? Who makes the final decision as to a CUAT determination?

Mr. SEDNEY. The CUAT, a method used to assess progress in the development of the ANSF, was developed in early 2010 by the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) with the first reported cycle (referred to as Cycle 1) being released in May 2010. It was implemented to inform Coalition commanders on progress of the ANSF in their area of operations and to provide input to the multiple reporting requirements of the ISAF headquarters. The CUAT was developed through interaction between the staffs of ISAF, IJC, and the Regional Commands (RCs) and was based on existing reporting constructs in place at the time. The CUAT was developed because assessment tools in place at the time were not providing sufficient detail on the development and progress of the ANSF.

The CUAT is completed by the commander of the partnered Coalition unit or advisor team that has responsibility of an ANSF unit. Once completed by the partnered Coalition unit, the CUAT is reviewed by the partnered Coalitions unit's chain of command and forwarded to IJC for review. IJC reviews the CUATs with the Regional Commands and compiles a summary table of the CUAT cycle results which are forwarded to ISAF headquarters for use in various reporting requirements.

The primary purpose of the CUAT is to rate an ANSF unit's effectiveness by assigning the unit a rating on a five-level scale (known as Ratings Definition Levels, or RDLs) based on the unit's ability to operate independently. An RDL rating reflects an ANSF unit's overall operational effectiveness; however, this overall rating is derived from a more detailed assessment of each unit. The overall score is based on nine capabilities-based functional areas: leadership, operations, intelligence, logistics, equipping, personnel, maintenance, communications, and training and education. Those functional assessments are based on quantitative data (personnel, equipment, and training) as well as qualitative assessments by the Coalition

partnered advisors on areas affecting the overall effectiveness of the unit. Leadership assessments (“very positive,” “positive,” “neutral,” “negative,” and “very negative”) and partnering data are also incorporated into CUAT reports.

While the CUAT in and of itself is an incomplete assessment, it has aided in meeting the requirement to track the ANSF’s growth and development towards a capable fighting force. ISAF and its subordinate commands are continuously scrutinizing both the CUAT and their overall approach to assessing the ANSF.

Mr. COOPER. Breakdown of \$4.1b spending. Does it include train and equip, SFA (Security Assistance Force) or only direct costs to train, equip, and pay for salaries and operations of the ANSF?

General TOWNSEND. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. COOPER. Describe the Security Force Assistance (SFA) model: numbers, ROE, etc. Where are we with the planning for this?

General TOWNSEND. Security Force Assistance (SFA) is a central pillar of the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. The SFA model supports ISAF in assuming a supporting role in the campaign while enabling the ANSF to assume the lead security role across all of Afghanistan as part of the Lisbon-based security transition process. SFA teams vary in size based on operational requirements and are focused on executing train, advise, and assistance missions with ANSF counterparts (Army and Police). SFA teams operate under the standard ISAF Rules of Engagement (ROE) and retain the inherent right to self-defense. Planning is complete while deployment of teams and overall SFA footprint will adjust as units improve over time.

Mr. COOPER. How many Taliban are we fighting? How many of these are “hard core” ideologically committed fighters and how many are part-time, local fighters? How are these numbers derived? What are the metrics we use to determine if someone is a Taliban fighter?

General TOWNSEND. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. COOPER. Is the ANSF respected by Afghans? Is it respected by the Taliban? Are there differences in perceptions about the various elements of the ANSF?

General TOWNSEND. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. COOPER. Explain in more detail why the poppy crop is down? How much is due to environmental factors (drought, blight, etc.) and how much due to ISAF or GIROA efforts? Can this lower level of production be sustained once U.S. forces withdraw?

General TOWNSEND. The primary causes for the lower poppy crop yield are environmental factors such as bad weather and poor soil conditions. Blight cannot be attributed as a factor with any certainty. The poor soil is, in part, a result of the success of the GIROA-led Helmand Food Zone program which reduced poppy cultivation significantly in the food zone while pushing poppy farmers away from the province’s fertile land to a more austere desert environment. The weather this year has been particularly unfavorable to poppy crops with colder temperatures and more precipitation than in past years.

U.S. forces in Afghanistan do not directly support poppy eradication efforts other than to provide in extremis support to eradication teams under attack, consistent with NATO/ISAF policy. The U.S. Department of State supports the Afghan Government’s “Governor Led Eradication” (GLE) program. While final, verified results are not available for the GLE at this time, the program is on track to more than double last year’s result of 3,810 hectares of poppy eradicated. I believe that the eradication effort must be carefully planned to inflict the most damage on major drug producer’s poppy crop and be focused in areas where farmers have access to alternatives to poppy cultivation. This requires a whole-of-government approach led by the Afghan Government with enabling support from the U.S. Government.

Sustained lower level production will depend, in part, on continued U.S. assistance to GIROA after 2014. The Department of Defense (DOD) is working presently on a post-2014 CN strategy for Afghanistan; I look forward to providing a copy of this strategy in November 2012.

Mr. COOPER. How do we deal with the Pakistan safe havens? Is Pakistan currently taking actions to eliminate safe havens for the Haqqani Network, the Quetta Shura Taliban, or HiG? Do we expect such actions in the future? Why or why not?

General TOWNSEND. Militant and terrorist networks continue to exploit Pakistan-based sanctuaries. These sanctuaries remain a strategic threat to the campaign in Afghanistan. A capable ANSF, along with the support of ISAF training, advice, as-

sistance, layered defense, and enablers, is the best mechanism to mitigate the effects of these sanctuaries in Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, the threat must also be mitigated within Pakistan, which is an interest that, to a degree, Pakistan shares. Pakistan has suffered enormous casualties as a result of military operations against the networks that enable safe havens and from acts of terrorism that often emanate from the sanctuaries, including more than 11,000 military personnel killed or wounded in action and more than 30,000 civilian casualties. Security assistance is a key tool designed to advance U.S. interests by helping Pakistan's efforts in this fight against the militants that enable safe havens; Coalition Support Funds, meanwhile, reimburse Pakistani efforts in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Nevertheless, where Pakistan's support falls short, we will continue to engage Pakistan's civilian and military leaders to take action on its side of the border to dismantle these sanctuaries, to include holding Pakistan to its commitments to squeeze the Haqqani Network and encouraging all Taliban elements as well as other Afghan groups, including Hizb-e-Islami to join a political settlement in Afghanistan, as Pakistan's previous Prime Minister publicly committed.

Mr. COOPER. How do we deal with Afghan government corruption? What are the impacts of corruption? What level of confidence should NATO members have that corruption will be controlled post-2014? Does corruption currently undermine the effectiveness of GIROA and the ANSF? Is governmental corruption linked at all to the Taliban's ability to recruit new fighters?

General TOWNSEND. The United States has implemented a number of initiatives to support the Afghan Government in its efforts to reduce corruption and organized crime, while working to ensure the U.S. contracting and development assistance are not subject to fraud and corruption. These initiatives include sustained engagement, capacity-building, and technical assistance in key Afghan ministries, an expansion of interagency efforts to mature organized crime and corruption estimates in key sectors as a basis for action, the creation of joint, Presidentially-sponsored forums to promote inter-ministerial coordination and develop concrete counter-corruption recommendations, and the development of investigative leads and other forms of support for vetted Afghan law enforcement, investigative, and oversight bodies. CJIAATF-Shafafiyat coordinates counter-corruption efforts within ISAF, fostering a common understanding of the corruption problem, planning and implementing ISAF anti-corruption efforts, and integrating ISAF anti-corruption activities with those of key Afghan and international partners, to address President Karzai's goal of an "active and honest administration" in Afghanistan.

Despite this sustained effort, corruption remains one of the biggest challenges in Afghanistan. It undermines the effectiveness, cohesion, and legitimacy of the Afghan Government and alienates elements of the population. It deters investment, impedes licit economic growth, enables criminal networks to influence important state institutions and functions, and facilitates the narcotics trade and other transnational threats emerging from Afghanistan. Counter-corruption efforts are therefore essential to strengthening critical Afghan institutions and consolidating gains in the wake of improved security as the process of transition continues.

A series of recent commitments made by Afghanistan towards anti-corruption and good governance has instilled confidence in the international community. Strengthening Afghan institutions and governance was one of the basic tenets of the U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement and a critical component underpinning our enduring partnership. At the Tokyo conference in early July, the international donor community reached agreement with Afghanistan on a framework for accountability, whereby money will be withheld if the country cannot meet benchmarks for improving governance and finance management, as well as safeguarding the democratic process. Following this conference, President Karzai issued a 23-page decree ordering the Supreme Court to accelerate investigations and his ministries, prosecutors, and judiciary to institute a list of government reforms battling bribery, cronyism, and nepotism.

Mr. COOPER. In your opinion, what will determine ANSF success? What factors could undermine ANSF capability and success in the future?

General TOWNSEND. The ANSF has made tremendous strides in their development as a force capable of providing security for Afghanistan. Continuing to develop ANSF leadership, improving the overall quality of the force, and further developing enabler capabilities, such as logistics, close air support, medevac, and intelligence will affect the long-term success of security transition and the ANSF's ability to provide security for the Afghan people.

Factors which will challenge the success of the ANSF in the future include limited resources to fully implement current development plans, sourcing the right mix of Security Force Assistance Teams to mentor/advise ANSF units, development of

ANSF enabler capability, and improving ANSF retention and attrition rates to sustain overall force quality.

Mr. COOPER. Can the Afghan Local Police (ALP) be sustained when we leave? Who will fund and train? Does the Afghan Ministry of the Interior have the ability to effectively oversee and control the ALP sites and units in the absence of USSOF?

General TOWNSEND. The Afghan Ministry of Interior will continue to administer the Afghan Local Police program after security transition is completed at the end of 2014. The Commander of ISAF has submitted a request through CENTCOM to SECDEF, requesting enduring ALP funding post-2014. ALP is an Afghan-owned program commanded and controlled by local Provincial and District Chiefs of Police (COP) that was established by a 2010 Afghan Presidential Decree. Pay, uniforms, and equipment are all distributed through the Afghan National Police system. U.S. Special Operation Forces and Coalition Forces continue to develop capacity in the ALP, District COPs, and Provincial COPs to maintain a sustainable program. These overwatch efforts are part of a long term engagement plan to transition security to Afghan control, ensuring that ALP will have effective oversight in the absence of daily coalition presence.

Mr. COOPER. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the ALP?

General TOWNSEND. The program's primary strength lies in the local selection process of ALP members. They are handpicked by the local village elders to protect the villages they come from. This differs from the ANP and ANA model where the majority of soldiers and police officers come from different regions of Afghanistan to perform their duties.

The ALP program has significant Afghan and coalition oversight through the Village Stability Operations initiative, and links together the local elders, GIROA (for pay and weapons), and the Chiefs of Police. Additionally, the National Directorate of Security (NDS) performs background checks during in-processing adding another layer of quality control. The success of the program is dependent upon the leadership and when needed, tactical support by the District and Provincial Chiefs of Police. ALP works best in areas where police leaders understand and embrace the program as part of the fabric of Afghan National Security Force composition in rural areas. High casualty rates among ALP and local leaders at the sub-national level continue to be a challenge as well.

Mr. COOPER. As ALP is part of MOI, is ALP officially considered part of ANSF? If not, why is ALP funded through ANSF?

General TOWNSEND. The Afghan Local Police are validated by and report to the Ministry of Interior. They are not part of the Afghan National Police tashkil and do not count toward the approved Afghan National Security Force approved level of 352,000. However, they are a legitimate GIROA security force and eligible for funding from the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund.

Mr. COOPER. General Allen has stated there are three key factors for successful transition in Afghanistan: 1) security, 2) governance, and 3) development. Do you agree? Are there any other factors that you believe are significant?

General TOWNSEND. Yes, I agree with General Allen. Security, governance, and development are the three pillars of the Inteqal "Transition" Framework, which governs the transition process, and are carefully evaluated and monitored to judge the readiness of an area for each successive stage of transition. Improvements in security conditions and the performance of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have been the keys to success so far in the transition process, but good governance and development will help ensure that those gains result in sustainable self-reliance. While there are many factors influencing the success of transition, another critical one is regional security and cooperation. The insurgency's safe haven in Pakistan remains one of the biggest threats to a durable and sustainable Afghanistan. Strengthening border coordination and cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbors will be necessary for any long term success.

Mr. COOPER. LTG Bolger stated that if the ANSF is reduced below 352,000 he believed many of those that leave ANSF will go into civilian positions with the Afghanistan government. Do you agree? Will there be any program to facilitate such placements? Do those personnel have skills that would be directly applicable to such positions? Can GIROA support such an increased number of personnel?

General TOWNSEND. Plans for the managed force reduction of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) from 352,000 to 230,000, which includes contingency plans for the "reintegration" of demobilized personnel, are still in development. A common feature of reintegration programs during demobilizations in the past is job training and job placement to ensure that reintegrees have the appropriate knowledge and skills to pursue alternate livelihoods. It is unknown at this time what GIROA's civilian workforce requirements will be 3-4 years from now and whether they will be able to absorb any of these personnel. However, any job training and placement re-

integration program for demobilized ANSF will take into account these market demands.

Mr. COOPER. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Taliban insurgency?

General TOWNSEND. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. COOPER. Please explain the corrective actions and investigations taken regarding the alleged loss of \$42 million at the Dawood hospital.

General TOWNSEND. Since 2010, the governments of the United States and Afghanistan have conducted a series of investigations, including several by the Department of Defense Inspector General for Special Plans and Operations (DOD IG-SPO), on the management, medical care services, and logistics capability and accountability at Dawood National Military Hospital. These investigations arose from concerns raised by the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) regarding the status of the medical logistics system within the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the alleged mismanagement and corruption at Dawood Hospital.

At the urging of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) leadership, the Afghan Ministry of Defense moved to replace key leadership at both Dawood Hospital and the Medical Command, including the ANA Surgeon General and Commander of Dawood Hospital, General Ahmed Zia Yaftali, in December 2010. New leadership was brought in to establish more stringent planning and oversight to advance the professional conduct and accountability of the medical staff and administrators.

Based on the findings and recommendations of DOD IG-SPO, NTM-A medical advisors and mentors have worked in close coordination with their Afghan counterparts to stand up systems and processes that have significantly improved logistics and supply management and have introduced greater transparency and efficiency. These changes have improved accountability while reducing theft, misappropriation, unauthorized use and improper distribution.

Numerous oversight mechanisms are in place to ensure continued progress. The Logistics Training Advisory Group (LTAG) and Medical Training Advisory Group (MTAG) conduct continuous "Battle Field Circulations" to provide daily follow up and ensure compliance. The Logistics Validation Team provides quarterly assessments. DOD IG and the Afghan MOD continue to monitor the progress and provide frequent reviews.

Additionally, the allegations of corruption and mismanagement at Dawood hospital are currently under criminal investigation by an Afghan inter-ministerial investigative team with the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOOAC), supported by sustained ISAF and the interagency engagement and overseen by a joint Afghan-international Special Cases Committee. These investigations are still ongoing.

Mr. COOPER. Please describe in detail the operational assessment process used to evaluate the ANSF. What data is collected? Who evaluates the data? What method of analysis is used to evaluate the data? Who makes the final decision as to a CUAT determination?

General TOWNSEND. The CUAT, a method used to assess progress in the development of the ANSF, was developed in early 2010 by the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) with the first reported cycle (referred to as Cycle 1) being released in May 2010. It was implemented to inform Coalition commanders on progress of the ANSF in their area of operations and to provide input to the multiple reporting requirements of the ISAF headquarters. The CUAT was developed through interaction between the staffs of ISAF, IJC, and the Regional Commands (RCs) and was based on existing reporting constructs in place at the time. The CUAT was developed because assessment tools in place at the time were not providing sufficient detail on the development and progress of the ANSF.

The CUAT is completed by the commander of the partnered Coalition unit or advisor team that has responsibility of an ANSF unit. Once completed by the partnered Coalition unit, the CUAT is reviewed by the partnered Coalitions unit's chain of command and is entered into the CIDNE database. IJC reviews the CUATs with the Regional Commands and compiles a summary table of the CUAT cycle results which are forwarded to ISAF headquarters for use in various reporting requirements.

The primary purpose of the CUAT is to rate an ANSF unit's effectiveness by assigning the unit a rating on a five-level scale (known as Ratings Definition Levels, or RDLs) based on the unit's ability to operate independently. An RDL rating reflects an ANSF unit's overall operational effectiveness; however, this overall rating is derived from a more detailed assessment of each unit. The overall score is based on nine capabilities-based functional areas: leadership, operations, intelligence, lo-

gistics, equipping, personnel, maintenance, communications, and training and education.

While the CUAT in and of itself is an incomplete assessment, it has aided in meeting the requirement to track the ANSF's growth and development towards a capable fighting force. ISAF and its subordinate commands are continuously scrutinizing both the CUAT and their overall approach to assessing the ANSF.

