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HEARING

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

ON

THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

HEARING HELD
MARCH 15, 2013



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THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

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THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Friday, March 15, 2013.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. "Buck" McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. "BUCK" MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Committee will come to order. I would like to welcome everyone to today's hearing on the posture of the U.S. European Command and the U.S. Africa Command. We have two men that have devoted their lives to the service of this country, and this will be their last hearing.

Gentlemen, thank you for many years of service that we can never repay you for, but your country is in your debt.

You know, we are going to have votes about 11:15, so I am going to just put my statement in the record. It was wonderful. And anybody interested can read it. Mr. Smith is not with us here today. And in his place that seat is looking up a lot prettier, Ms. Sanchez.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 31.]

Ms. SANCHEZ. Smarter, Mr. Chairman, smarter.

With respect to time, of course, gentlemen, thank you for your service. I think it is the last time you are before us. With respect to that, I will submit the opening statement for Mr. Smith into the record and go straight to the hearing. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Very good. And with that, Admiral Stavridis.

STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, NATO SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I will follow your lead, as I always do, and simply say three things. One is thank you to the members of the committee, the chairman, to Congresswoman Sanchez for sitting in and being part of this today. Secondly, I think Europe continues to matter greatly for the United States, and I hope in our discussion today I can illustrate why that is a bit. And then thirdly, on behalf of the men and women of U.S. European Command and the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] alliance, again I say thank you to the committee for the terrific support we receive. With that I will, with your permission, enter a statement in

the record also, Chairman, and I will turn to Carter Ham, my very good friend.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis can be found in the Appendix on page 33.]

The CHAIRMAN. General.

STATEMENT OF GEN CARTER F. HAM, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

General HAM. Thanks, Mr. Chairman and Congresswoman Sanchez. I had about a 20-minute opening statement, but I think I will follow the lead of all, which makes a lot of good sense. But it is great to have the opportunity to talk about what the women and men of AFRICOM [Africa Command] have done. We are the newest of the combatant commands. This year is our fifth year in existence and we have changed a lot over those 5 years, and I look forward to have the opportunity to talk with you a bit about that. We are in the midst, obviously, all of us, of some serious resourcing challenges as we move forward. That is going to take all of our best efforts to address those to ensure that all of us collectively can meet the national security needs of our country.

I would join with my great friend and colleague, former boss, Admiral Stavridis. We are closely joined between Africa Command and European Command. In just about every endeavor in Africa I rely on European Command for support. That support has been unwavering and enduring. And similarly, the support from this committee for our troops, for their families, for our civilian employees has been similarly unwavering, and for that, we are deeply appreciative.

I will depart the command in about a month and be replaced most ably by General David Rodriguez, again an old friend and exemplary leader who will take Africa Command and its women and men to even greater heights, and I look forward to that. And again thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ms. Sanchez, for your great support.

[The prepared statement of General Ham can be found in the Appendix on page 99.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Both your records, without objection, will be submitted to the record. So ordered.

Admiral, you are our senior combatant commander. You will be leaving your command shortly. And one of the things that we are hearing a lot around the Hill here is maybe we don't need forces in Europe anymore. You know, we are so far advanced there, maybe we could pull all those troops home, and it would be a big money savings, and the way things are going right now financially that would probably be a great thing. That is what we are hearing. I would like you to, from your experience on the ground, tell us why it is important to have troops in Europe. And with four combat brigade teams you have supported, and now that has changed, if you could tell what you think we do need there, why, and address that in light of the fiscal constraints that we have.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Chairman, I will be glad to. To put the discussion in context, I think it is worth looking back to the Cold War, when we had 450,000 troops in Europe and we had 1,200 bases in Europe. That is the height of the Cold War. We have reduced that by 80 percent. So we have come down very significantly in the

forces in Europe. I would argue that our current level is roughly right, and I will give you four or five reasons why I think it is important to continue to be forward in Europe.

The first is really the most basic, it is values. We share with democracies in Europe freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, freedom of education. Nowhere else in the world will we find a pool of allies who share our values.

Secondly, it is the economy. There is a $4 trillion trade route across that Atlantic Ocean. And that binding of our economic interests will continue to make Europe our most important trading partner collectively.

Thirdly, it is geography. You know, Robert Kaplan just wrote this terrific book, "The Revenge of Geography." Geography matters. Europe, in that regard, is critically important. People sometimes say, you know, those bases in Europe, they are kind of the bastions of the Cold War. They are really not. They are the forward operating bases for 21st century security. They allow us to support Carter Ham in Africa. They allow us to support Jim Mattis in the Levant, in the near Middle East, and indeed in Central Asia. So geography matters as well.

Fourthly, it is the alliance, it is the NATO alliance. Fifty-one percent of the world's GDP [gross domestic product], 28 nations, 24,000 combat aircraft, 800 oceangoing ships, 50 AWACs [Airborne Warning and Control] aircraft. This is a powerful, capable alliance that has stood with us, most obviously at the moment in Afghanistan, where today we see 90 percent of the non-U.S. troops are indeed from Europe. So the alliance matters.

And then, fifth and finally, I would say nowhere else in the world will we find so many trained, capable soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who will stand with us on missions from the Balkans, to Libya, to the Levant, to Afghanistan, and indeed around the world.

In terms of posture, we are about right now. We have reduced the numbers of brigade combat teams. But, Mr. Chairman, we are going to rotate forces in to make up that shortfall. And I think we are about in balance. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

General Ham, your special ops force unit was established on the 1st of October of last year. The committee has learned that this force doesn't have the necessary enablers to operate in certain environments. Obviously, if this is correct, this is extremely concerning, as it would appear that we are not postured for the next crisis in the region, like the attack in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11 of last year. What is the projected timeline to get your special ops forces outfitted with the appropriate enablers?

General HAM. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. You are correct in that the Commander's In-extremis Force was formally established on the 1st of October of 2012. It had been about a year or more in building that capability. Prior to the 1st of October, Admiral Stavridis and I shared a Commander's In-extremis Force. It was assigned to European Command, but available to AFRICOM should that be necessary.

Today, that force is home-based in Colorado, but always with an element forward stationed in Europe. We have also deployed elements of it already to Africa on occasion. It has most of the

enablers that are required, but not all. The principal shortfalls are in dedicated special operations aviation. Again, I rely on Admiral Stavridis on a sharing arrangement with special operations aviation forces that are forward stationed in Europe. It is my preference to have those elements dedicated.

Then there are some other enabling capabilities, such as special operations surgical teams and some others, that I would prefer to have dedicated exclusively for that force, and at present we borrow those forces from other organizations. So we have a better capability, and a quite good capability now, but not the full capability that I think is necessary in the long term. Ongoing dialogue with Admiral McRaven at Special Operations Command as to when we might be able to build those capabilities and station those capabilities. I think for the next year, we will probably be in a sharing arrangement.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I think as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Dempsey, pointed out, that if we have any further cuts in defense it will have to change our strategy, we won't be able to carry out the strategy that they devised when we were hit with the $487 billion in cuts. And then with the sequestration on top of that, we are going to have to revise that strategy, and we will not be able to respond quickly in all parts of the world at all times. So I think that it is a reality that we are going to have to decide if that is what the American people want. Thank you.

Ms. Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you again, Admiral and General, for being before us.

You know, I am from California, so I have always thought that the United States was pivoted towards the Pacific, you know, but there seems to be a lot of consternation, especially among our allies out in the European theaters, that somehow we are going to slip away from this very critical alliance that is not only NATO, but all our European allies there. And, you know, it has really gone from having our troops there in order to defend Europe and now really being pretty integrated and having their own troops doing their thing.

One of those things that is important is, you know, the interoperability and the training and the mission readiness for a decision that is made to go and intervene in places that are important for stability around the world, like Libya, for example, or other places. So my question to you, Admiral, is how are the Europeans feeling? Where are they with respect to their defense spending given that they are watching us lower our defense and most of them have not met the 2 percent threshold over the last few years? And how is that affecting our interoperability and our readiness for missions should new fires erupt out in an area that we would think together we should handle the situation?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you, Congresswoman. And as you know from our discussions in Munich at the Security Conference there, the Europeans are indeed watching the United States, both in regard to our rebalancing to Asia and in our potential significant reductions in defense spending. To kind of put it in perspective, the United States spends $600 billion, roughly, on defense base budget. Europeans actually spend about $300 billion per year collectively.

So it is a very significant expenditure on their part. It is more than China and Russia spend combined. So they spend a fairly significant amount.

The bad news is, in my view, and we have discussed this, and as you alluded to, they are not meeting their own targeted 2 percent of GDP, which I think is a minimum in order to continue to maintain the appropriate level, as you said, of interoperability with the United States. So on the one hand we want to have full advantage of their spending and their integration with us. On the other hand, we need to encourage them to step up and to spend appropriately so that we are in balance with them. We continue to do that. I work that very hard within both NATO, in my hat as the Supreme Allied Commander, but also in the U.S. European Command context.

Lastly, as to the rebalancing to Asia, again, as you and I have both seen in Munich, the Europeans themselves are kind of rebalancing toward Asia. And I think the key is that we maintain both military integration and interoperability as well as the diplomatic, cultural connections that we have.

So on balance, I continue to be pushing of the Europeans to get their spending levels up. But we should recognize they already spend a fairly significant amount, and they have, as you said, stood with us, Afghanistan, Libya, the Balkans. Today the forces in Mali, in Carter Ham's region, are essentially all European. So it is a balance. We need to continue to encourage them.

Ms. SANCHEZ. And with respect to Bosnia and Kosovo and some of what I call the unfinished business there, can you give us an update of where are our allies there and where Europe seems to be going, and if the current economic conditions that we are experiencing and others, and how that is affecting that? What do you think we need to do to really make that, the Balkans work? I know that is a big question in 2 minutes.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. It is, and I will do it quickly. Whenever we think about the Balkans, it is instructive to look back 10 to 15 years when the Balkans of 15 years ago looked a lot like Syria today. Fifteen years ago in the Balkans we saw 100,000 killed, we saw 2 million pushed across borders, we saw open combat across Bosnia-Herzegovina, we saw a definite follow-up in Kosovo, which continues today to have a lot of tension. So we have come a long way in 10 to 15 years. At one time collectively there were about 50,000 Allied troops in and around the Balkans.

Here is the good news. Today we are down to only about 6,000 troops total, and of those only about 700 are from the United States. So this is now about an 85, almost 90 percent European mission. There are about 2,000 to 3,000 European Union troops that are in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where there are no U.S. troops. So the good news is the Europeans have stepped up and are doing this. What we need to do is continue the dialogue, notably between Kosovo and Serbia, as well as between Croatia and Serbia, so that in the Balkans, instead of reaching for a gun to solve their disputes, as they did 10 years ago, they reach for the telephone for a negotiation. I think it is moving in that direction.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased that there are so many of our members here today for this hearing. And for that

reason, even though I have many, many more questions, I will end. And thank you so much for the time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you both for being here, for your service to the country, and for your families' service to the country over many years.

Let me start with just something brief that has come to my attention. I understand we have an airfield in the Azores that we are going to mothball by the end of 2014. Some people are concerned about that because of its proximity to North Africa, and especially not having to have overflight rights and so forth.

General Ham, are you comfortable with where we are headed with this? Or is it on your radar screen at all?

General HAM. It is, sir. One of the things that we are always concerned about is access. I think losing access to one place won't be a show-stopper. But we have got to look at this more holistically, and I know Admiral Stavridis does that and spends a lot of time on making sure that we have enough points of entry and enough redundancy so that we can have the access that is needed when it is needed. So I am not overly worried about one particular case, but I do think it is important that we look more broadly.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. I just raise the point because I think there are some people concerned.

If I can ask you one other question right quick. We had a hearing earlier this year about the various authorities to build partnership capacity. Nowhere is that more important than your region. If you had to give us two or three improvements in current law, whether they be tweaks or major reforms, what would you suggest we at least consider to make our existing authorities more effective in building partnership capacity across the region that you are responsible for?

General HAM. First, I would thank the committee and all for providing the authorities that you have. That is a significant improvement over past years.

I think as we look to the future, though, we probably need to look at something that is akin to today's overseas contingency operations, authorities and fundings that are not specifically tied to Afghanistan and to Al Qaeda, but rather give us some broader authorities to address a growing number of violent extremist organizations that don't necessarily fit neatly under the Al Qaeda umbrella. So I think that would be the first one.

And secondly, probably some increased authorities for some of the geographic regions. So the Global Security Contingency Fund I think is a good step in that direction, and authorities to apply some of DOD's [Department of Defense] capabilities, in partnership with State, in new partners. Libya, I think, is a great example of that. So I think there are some minor tweaks, but I think we are moving in the right direction.

Lastly, I happen to be a fan of the so-called dual key authorities, where both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State have vested interests. I think that ensures a closer alignment of Defense and State as we move forward.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you.

Admiral Stavridis, you have been not only combatant commander in Europe, but in the southern region as well. This is an unfair question with such limited time, but if you were to give us on this committee the top three things you think we ought to be focused on in the years ahead from our standpoint, not just for Europe but for our total responsibilities, what would they be?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Very quickly, I would actually put cyber at the top of the list. I think in cyber we find the greatest mismatch between our level of preparation and the level of danger. I think that, in other words, we prepare an awful lot for counterterrorism, for spread of weapons of mass destruction, for many conventional scenarios we are very well prepared for. But I think cyber we have a lot of work to do. I mean the big we, not just DOD, obviously. This is something that cuts across all parts of government and all parts of society. So I put cyber at the top.

Secondly, may or may not surprise you, I think trafficking is an enormous problem. The movement of narcotics, weapons, humans as in slaves, humans as in terrorists, cash, and God forbid, the weapons of mass destruction. So countertrafficking, which means ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance], intelligence, understanding what is moving in the seas and the ways around you, both land, sea, and air, I think is critically important.

And then I would say my third thing would be special operations. I believe that as we move forward, that is going to be the comparative advantage for the United States. And I think we should continue to focus on how we can use, improve, and interoperably work with our allies in the special operations zone. Thanks.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Langevin.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for your service to our country and for appearing here this morning.

General Ham, if I could just start with you. East Africa remains, obviously, a key operating and training area for Al Qaeda and associates, and specifically the Somali-based terrorist group Al Shabaab. How concerned is the Department about Al Shabaab's ability to attract and train foreign fighters, including recruits from the United States, who may project violence outward from East Africa? And what exactly is the Department doing to counter this threat?

General HAM. Al Shabaab is, in my assessment, significantly weakened from where they were a year ago, and that is because of the concerted effort of African forces, certainly supported and enabled by the United States and others. But there has been good progress. We are seeing Al Shabaab continuing to have strong linkages with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, in Yemen, specifically, and we have seen continued effort by Al Shabaab to recruit foreigners from other parts of Africa, from the Mideast, to a lesser degree in Europe and the United States. But there are certainly those efforts.

We think we are most effective in countering that approach by supporting the African-led approach to countering Shabaab by the restoration of a legitimate government, which the United States now recognizes, focusing on development, countering the under-

lying causes that has allowed Shabaab to gain traction. There are some specific efforts in the information domain that we work in partnership with other nations and with the Government of Somalia, again, to help convey the legitimacy of the African-led effort in Somalia, and we hope that that is helping to diminish the ability of Shabaab to recruit externally.

And lastly, sir, we are seeing, because of the increased pressure on Shabaab, we are seeing a bit of a split between the foreign fighters who are there and those who are native Somalis who are part of Shabaab. The foreign fighters are very rapidly losing influence inside that organization.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, General. I think that is so important, that if we can get to some of the root causes of why Al Shabaab had been able to adequately recruit fighters we can obviously further degrade their ability to be an effective fighting force. So I think that is important, especially working with local populations.

Let me ask you this. Do we have a sufficient amount of Department resources, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets working on the problem? And is AFRICOM adequately resourced in general? Do you have to beg, borrow, and steal too much from the other area commands or do you feel you are adequately resourced?

General HAM. I have significant shortfalls in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. So that causes us to apply a pretty sharp prioritization. Unsurprisingly, Somalia has been near the top of that prioritization because of the effort against Al Shabaab. And so we have conducted a lot of reconnaissance missions in support of the African-led effort in Somalia. That has been pretty effective. But it has left us short in other areas across the continent. So that would be at the top of my list, sir, is shortfalls in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, General.

Admiral, let me turn to you, if I could, before my time expires. Previously you have shared, you touched on something that is very important, something that I spend a lot of time on, is the issue of cyber. Can you further summarize for us EUCOM's [European Command] evolution in this area over the course of your tour and where you believe more work needs to be done on cyber from a EUCOM perspective?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I can very quickly, Congressman. We have worked very closely with my very good friend, General Keith Alexander, at U.S. Cyber Command to create a cyber center within U.S. European Command, a kind of a nascent version of the Special Operations Command that we enjoy. I think having such centers in each of the combatant commands is important, and we should move forward.

Secondly, we have worked very closely with NATO to build a NATO cyber center in Tallinn, Estonia, a nation which has experienced a cyber attack, as you know quite well, being an expert in this area.

And thirdly, we are working operationally across the alliance to have an appropriate NATO cyber incident response center mirroring what we have here in the United States. So those are three

quick things, and I would like to add, for the record, a few more for you.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. I would appreciate that.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Admiral and General, thank you again, as everyone else has said, for your service to our Nation. You all are real heroes to America. You really are.

General Ham, I want to read you a statement, and then I will get to my question.

"Africa cannot be thought of as a monolith. It is a hugely complex landmass with a hugely diverse population. The nature of the people, the diversity of cultures and religions, and the tribal factions all combine to make Africa far more dangerous than Afghanistan. We need to be wary of being drawn into a morass."

Would you agree with that statement?

General HAM. Yeah, I agree with the first part, about the complexity and the diversity. I don't think that the threats that are present in Africa yet rise to the seriousness that existed with Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan or in—or in Afghanistan, pardon me—and in the Federally Administered Tribal Area, but the trend is not good.

Mr. JONES. Okay. Your statement, and thank you, has not at this point risen to a situation where maybe we would have to start thinking about committing more men and women to Africa. As you begin to leave your service and become a citizen outside of the military, do I understand you correctly that you would not want to see this Nation make such a commitment that we begin then to be in a situation, as we have been in Afghanistan for 12 years, in a failed policy that will not lead to any success at all? History says that, not me, but history.

I mean I understand the intelligence importance of having a presence in Africa. I have no problem with that at all. But to see the footprint get larger, where we are committing more than 300 or 400 troops to be there primarily as advisers and intel officers. But to see this thing start to grow and expand, would you rather not see that happen?

General HAM. Congressman, I believe that if the threat that is present in Africa is left unaddressed it will over time grow to an increasingly dangerous and imminent threat to U.S. interests and certainly could develop into a threat that threatens us in other places. We have already seen from some places in Africa, individuals from Nigeria, for example, attempt to enter our country with explosives. I think we have an opportunity now to work preventive effort, in concert with African forces and with allies and friends globally, to suppress the threat, to reverse the trend, which is increasingly worrisome to me. And that does not necessitate a large commitment of U.S. forces, and I do not believe that a large commitment of U.S. forces is either necessary nor appropriate under the current circumstance.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the admiral and the general again. And I appreciate you indicating that you would hope that we will not get into a situation where it would be Congress

funding a larger military presence. As long as we can work with other countries, which, you know, the situation in Afghanistan of the coalition forces at best was limited. And what I am concerned about is that we are here cutting every program for the American people and the military is getting hit very hard by sequestration. And I would like to believe that as time goes forward that we would have leaders like yourself and the admiral to say that we need to really limit our commitment to these countries, where we can let other countries come in and take the lead instead of America. So I thank you very much for your question.

My time is about up. And again, I thank you both for your service to our Nation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Garamendi.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you.

Admiral and General, thank you for your service. My wife and I recently returned from a trip to South Sudan. General Ham, could you please give us your assessment of the situation there, considering the financial near bankruptcy of the country, the presence of Lord's Resistance Army in the southwestern part of the country, and the overall outlook as you see it for South Sudan?

General HAM. I had the great pleasure and honor, Congressman, of on the 9th of July of 2011, of attending as a member of the U.S. delegation the independence celebration for South Sudan in Juba, and it was an exuberant moment. But one of the lasting memories from that was after the celebration, the chief of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army, the South Sudan's Army, we were having a discussion, and he rightfully said, now the hard work begins. Independence is important, we are glad, the U.S., obviously, has been supportive of that for a long time. There are many, many challenges that South Sudan faces. The army is far too large. It consumes an exorbitantly large portion of the national budget, upwards of 40 percent. That is obviously not sustainable.

So one of the key priorities that we and those in the State Department are helping with South Sudan is defense structure and reform, which is very important. In the same time, we are also working with the South Sudanese on some specific leader development training. We think that is probably an area where we can provide a very positive influence. I am concerned about the continuing inability of Sudan and South Sudan to resolve their lingering border conflicts. It is promising to see now indications that South Sudan will soon begin oil production. That will help both countries, frankly, Sudan and South Sudan.

And to your point, sir, about the Lord's Resistance Army, the South Sudanese have been very supportive in terms of supporting the African Union-led effort. They have welcomed us, our advisers, and the capabilities that the U.S. team brings in terms of aviation support, logistics support, and advisers. And they have been an active and supportive participant with the other nations, Uganda, Central African Republic, and Democratic Republic of Congo, in the effort for the Africans to resolve the Lord's Resistance Army challenges.

Mr. GARAMENDI. I thank you for that. On a different line, there are numerous violent extremist organizations in the Sahel. It is argued and pointed out by many NGO [non-governmental organization] groups, wildlife groups and the rest, that the organizations are supported through the slaughter of elephants and the ivory trade. Do you have authority to assist the governments in the Sahel in dealing with this issue? And do you need authority if you don't have it?

General HAM. Congressman, we have very limited specific authorities to help with the specific challenge of poaching. But we do have some, and we work with State Department and with the U.S. ambassadors in that regard. But where we can have an effect and are having an effect is many African militaries do have responsibilities within their own nations for countering poaching. And I would cite as one example in Cameroon the Rapid Intervention Battalion, a special operations organization which we have had a long relationship with. It is an exceedingly capable force. They have been designated by their President to take on a counter-poaching role. So our support for them extends, while not directly to counter-poaching, the equipment, the training, the advising that we have provided helps enable that force.

And so I think our best efforts, again, probably will be in a more indirect approach. The one exception, sir, would be if we see that financing has a direct relationship, financing from poaching has a direct relationship, then there are some law enforcement authorities that the United States possesses in terms of addressing the finance aspect of that which could be helpful.

Mr. GARAMENDI. I thank you. In my last 9 seconds, I am told by wildlife organizations operating in the region that they do in fact have evidence that these violent extreme organizations are using ivory and other animal parts as a financing mechanism.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Miller.

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, General, thank you very much for being here. I apologize for missing some of your opening statements. General Ham, I would like to know a little bit about the cooperation of Boko Haram and AQIM [Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb], Al Shabaab. Talk to me about the level of cooperation between those organizations, if you will.

General HAM. Congressman, it is very worrisome to me. The three organizations which you mentioned, Al Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in northern Nigeria for the most part, and Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb in Mali and in that region, each individually presents a significant challenge. But when they collaborate, and we are seeing them increasingly collaborate, I am very worried about that, particularly the relationship between Boko Haram and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, as you mentioned. We have seen indications of sharing of financing.

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is, we believe, Al Qaeda's best-funded, wealthiest affiliate, if you will, mostly from kidnappings for ransom, but also through drug trade. And we believe they have provided financing directly to Boko Haram. We believe that they have shared training, to include explosives training. And we be-

lieve that fighters from Nigeria, Boko Haram-sponsored fighters have found their way over the past year to training camps in northern Mali. So the relationship, sir, is very worrisome to me.

Mr. MILLER. Do you assess that Boko Haram has it within their desires to come to the United States and do something here on our continent?

General HAM. Sir, Boko Haram, like most terrorist organizations, is not monolithic. There are a couple of different elements within Boko Haram, some of which are exclusively focused on domestic Nigerian issues, but there are others who more closely align, while not directly part of Al Qaeda, but an Al Qaeda-like global ideology. And so I would say that in my view there are elements of Boko Haram who aspire to a broader regional level of attacks, to include not just in Africa, but Europe and aspirationally to the United States. And I think that is why it is important for us, in partnership with Nigeria and others, to help them counter this before their capability matches their intent.

Mr. MILLER. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Duckworth.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Ham, my question pertains to Mali. My understanding is that when the coup happened, the United States, all non-humanitarian aid had to be pulled out of Mali because technically it is a military junta and a coup and not a legitimate government because there was an overthrow of the government. I am interested to know if there are any future training plans or any other types of engagement that we may be thinking about into the future with the military in Mali, even though it is technically not a legitimate government.

General HAM. Congresswoman, we do want, we very much would like to reengage on a military-to-military basis with Mali, but it is premature to do so. But we are starting to think now what we would like to do when there is a legitimate government in Mali, and we have gotten some indications that the Malians are very interested in restoring that normalized military-to-military relationship. I think our efforts probably will initially focus perhaps on helping the Malians develop a capable counterterrorist force, but there are other aspects of an enduring relationship that I think would be helpful.

I would just note also, ma'am, that while we are prohibited from having a direct relationship, as Admiral Stavridis mentioned, the European Union and others are already present and are working with the Malians to good effect.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. If I could, Congresswoman, just to amplify quickly, the European Union has 200 soldiers. They are going to ramp that up very quickly. And they are stepping up in this. And I am encouraged to hear what General Ham says about potentially us as well. Thank you.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. General Ham, I have a slightly different follow-up question. This is really with regard to trying to use our forces more wisely and with greater cost savings. And specifically, I would like to talk about the State Partnership Program, which in the admiral's testimony really talks about the success of the program

being used by the European Command. Do you have any plans, looking to the future, to really capitalize on this? I see that, for example, California, which participated in the State Partnership Program in 1993, later, 10 years later took on the role of helping work with the Nigerians. North Carolina, after 12 years' experience working with Moldova, is now working with Botswana since 2008. For a program that has demonstrated its successfulness and its cost savings by using the National Guard and that institutional knowledge and those long-term relationships that can be established by the cadre of the National Guard in particular States, are you looking to expand this program in AFRICOM?

General HAM. I would like to think that you probably have the co-chairs of the State Partnership Program fan club seated here. It is an extraordinarily effective and low-cost effort to achieve our national security objectives. We have eight partnerships presently in Africa. I think we are close to having a few more. Don't have any in East Africa. We have had discussions with some East African countries, and I think we are close to getting a couple to formally request. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau is already, you know, working with the state adjutants general to see who might be willing to take on some relationships.

Another aspect, ma'am, that I would highlight, we have a couple of instances where States have State partnerships both in Europe and in Africa. And I think that is something that we can leverage to a further extent in the future.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yeah, if I could, three I would really highlight. Illinois-Poland is terrific. Kosovo is married up with Iowa. And Georgia, imaginatively enough, is married up with Georgia. And they are bang for the buck one of the best things going. We had an earlier question about authorities and what we could do. Anything that enhances State partnership is money in the bank for the regional combatant commanders, ma'am.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. That is good to hear. I, too, am a fan of State Partnership Programs because of two things. One, that long-term institutional knowledge. I am, of course, biased being from Illinois, but also because of the great cost savings. You do not have to have Active Duty troops carry that load for the whole time. So thank you for your answers, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And Admiral, General, thank you for your service.

General, each year I am always interested in finding out what the latest is on potentially relocating AFRICOM command. I know that last October there was a determination not to relocate because of one-time relocation costs, even though there could be a savings from $130 million to $60 million to $70 million to relocate back in the United States. I have information from the Charleston Metro Chamber of Commerce that puts in perspective a benefit of relocating AFRICOM back to the United States. It is clear that in Charleston, with the joint military complex, there are assets to support the command. The Charleston Air Force Base already supports the African air cargo channel missions. It is the largest C–17 wing, and the only C–17 special operations unit. SPAWAR

[Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command] at Charleston is already an integrator of joint communications for DOD, Department of Homeland Security, State Department, and other Federal agencies. The Port of Charleston provides approximately 50 percent of import-export seagoing container traffic between the United States and Africa. The Department of Homeland Security's Project SeaHawk command and control center in Charleston integrates nearly 50 Federal, State, and local law enforcement, intelligence agencies, technologies, and assets. With two-thirds of Africa's nations having sea access, SeaHawk could be a major contributor to AFRICOM's training and security missions. The Charleston Federal Law Enforcement Training facility can accommodate maritime and law enforcement training for African nations, and currently operates an international training site at Botswana. Charleston and the State of South Carolina already have close ties with African nations in the field of medicine, agriculture, education, religious institutions, business, as well as a shared heritage with a large percentage of the Lowcountry Charleston population originating in West Africa.

In light of the defense cutbacks, particularly sequestration, will this be looked at further, to relocate the AFRICOM command?

General HAM. Congressman, I am uncertain. As you are aware, Congress did require the Department of Defense to conduct a study. They did. That was led by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Obviously, Africa Command had an operational role in that. The Department did respond, and it was the Department's determination that the command is best retained in its current location in Stuttgart, Germany. But clearly, having been part of the discussion, the cost factors were a significant aspect of this, and I know that Secretary Panetta, as he was in office at the time, wrestled hard between many of the attributes that you spoke of, the cost savings and the operational impact. But the Department's conclusion was that the command is best retained in its current location.

Mr. WILSON. Well, and do understand that we appreciate what you have done so much and recognize how important it is. That is why we would love for you to relocate to South Carolina. And we like to point out we have the right climate. It is meteorological, and you would appreciate that. And then the people are very warm and would be very supportive.

Admiral, at the last several posture hearings before this committee you strongly advocated for retaining four Army brigade combat teams in Europe. How has the decision to withdraw two of the brigade combat teams affected your ability to meet operational and training requirements?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Obviously, it decrements them. What we are doing to substitute for them, Congressman, is instituting a rotational policy so we can bring a brigade combat team that is located back in the United States. As you were just talking about, Charleston is a good place to be located, we are rotating out of Georgia. They will come to the European theater, they will train, operate, interoperate, be part of NATO exercises, and be part of assurance, reassurance, and deterrence. So we are substituting a rotational structure. And so far, so good.

Mr. WILSON. And would it be rotating out of Fort Stewart or——

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Initially, that is the indications we are getting. It will probably bounce around within the United States. But we would like to see it centralized in a particular unit so we could build the experience base working that piece of it.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Castro.

Mr. CASTRO. Thank you, Chairman.

Thank you, Admiral and General. The question I have is one that I asked on my other committee, which is Foreign Affairs, and the answer there was that it would be more appropriate for you guys at Defense. That is, as we try to understand the emerging terrorist groups, in North Africa in particular, how do we distinguish between those with legitimate ties to Al Qaeda and those that are simply posers trying to take advantage of the credibility and the prestige that comes to wrongdoers who are attached to Al Qaeda.

General HAM. It sometimes can be a tough challenge, Congressman, because, again, many of these organizations have multiple personalities. So some of them are relatively easy. So Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, they are very clearly an Al Qaeda-associated organization. They have said so, Al Qaeda senior leaders have said so. So that makes it pretty easy.

But others have not quite so clear views. Some of them originate with dissatisfaction with the host government. And then sometimes an element of that group may get co-opted by an ideologically motivated entity. And so there are a number of those types of organizations that operate in North Africa that make it very difficult.

What that necessitates for us is that we cannot paint with too broad a brush to say that every VEO [violent extremist organization] has an Al Qaeda-like ideology. We really have to be very precise in our application. It requires us to work very carefully with host nation governments, particularly with their intelligence organizations, so that we can more clearly understand where are the hard-core, ideologically committed extremists that require one approach, and where are those others who have perhaps unfulfilled expectations or have been a long-disaffected population whose concerns can be addressed through nonmilitary means.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. If I could add a thought on that, it is the importance of cyber and the social networks as tools that allow us to do the kind of discriminatory analysis. So it is another aspect to this. Traditional intelligence has its merits, obviously, but here you can learn more about these groups by getting inside them because so many of them are using the cyber world in articulating their vision, as well as actually conducting operations.

Mr. CASTRO. Thank you, gentlemen. And I think we all agree that our understanding of those relationships affects the United States engagement with those different groups and the level of resources and energy we attend to those groups. So thank you all very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Stavridis, thank you for being here. And I want to thank you also not just for the confidence that we here in this committee have in you, but also the confidence that you have earned with our NATO allies. And it certainly is, I think, very important both for the credibility of the United States and for our relationships that you have such high regard from our NATO allies.

I want to talk about an issue of which I have concern about that relationship with our NATO allies. I serve on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee and have served as chair, and missile defense is one of those areas where you have worked very diligently to obtain support from our NATO allies for adding missile defense as a NATO mission. As you and I have talked previously, I was very concerned with the way the Obama administration ended the Bush plan to put ground-based missiles in Poland, both because I thought it was going to be essential for the protection of our mainland United States, but also because of the way in which the Poles were treated in that retreat. They had made a political commitment, and I think it was done in a way that was detrimental to our relationship.

Now we are to the Phased Adaptive Approach, which I have some concerns about, and the GAO [Government Accountability Office] has recently issued a report that the SM–3 IIB [Standard Missile-3 Block IIB] missile may have, I believe their view is, very little national missile defense contribution from land-based sites in Poland and Romania. My concern from that report is it begins to signal again that perhaps we could disappoint our allies in commitments that we have made.

Secretary Miller recently said in remarks to the Atlantic Council that the Pentagon, in view of the internal DOD reports, was looking very hard at the future of the SM–3 IIB missile. And I am concerned about the DOD commitment to this missile and the administration's commitment to this missile. Now, I don't see this as an alternative to ground-based sites, because I believe that they are complementary and they could be both used together, but in looking at the SM–3 IIB, I mean this Republican House has always funded the IIB missile. The Senate Democrat appropriators have cut funding for that. And when the Department of Defense in the conference report issued its objections of the appeals with respect to the appropriations, defense of the SM–3 IIB was not there. So we have the administration saying they are going to the SM–2, the SM–3 IIB funding being cut from the Democratic-controlled House, the administration not objecting, the Republicans on the House side funding it, and now technical issues having been raised. I am concerned about the DOD's commitment both to our allies, the Romanians and Poles, with respect to this missile, but also the protection of the mainland United States.

What is the Department of Defense's commitment to the SM–3 IIB? And how do you see its role both with our allies and in protecting the homeland?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, as you know, Congressman, from our long conversations about this, let me start with the Poles and Romanians. At the moment, in my conversations with my interlocutors, military to military, and indeed conversations with ministers of defense, ministers of foreign affairs, they appear to me to be comfortable with the EPAA [European Phased Adaptive Approach]

and the upcoming addition of shore-based sites, as you know, coming into Romania and then into Poland 2015 and 2018 and so forth.

So my sense is the allies have adjusted to EPAA, and they are in fact looking for ways to contribute. The Dutch, the Spanish, the Italians are all looking at maritime-based contributions. The Germans and Italians are looking at point defense solutions. Germany is providing command and control. So I think the structure under the NATO hat that you know from your time as a NATO Parliamentarian, sir, is in fact coming together.

In terms of where we are going through this progress, as you know, SM–3 IIB is scheduled to come online in 2020, so that is 7 years from now. I suspect there will continue to be technical discussions regarding it. What I would like to do is take that for the record and come back to you with a defined departmental position that includes some technical analysis, because I sense that is what you are hungry for, and I will obtain that from MDA [Missile Defense Agency] and come back.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 123.]

Mr. TURNER. Admiral, I would appreciate that. But the other aspect of this is that, as we look to the emerging threats we are going to need to make certain that we have every technological available means to address it. The SM–3 IIB certainly has additional capabilities. I am concerned by the press reports that seem to indicate that Congress is the one that is cutting it because this side of Congress has been funding it. The administration, if it really wants it, certainly has influence with the Democratic Senate to be able to obtain it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, good to see you again, sir. We were just recently in Europe, visited EUCOM headquarters, and I want to thank you and your staff for your outstanding support during that trip. And I also have a little egg on my face because I think I assured you that there is no chance that sequestration would kick in. And I have got egg on my face. Really it is more like manure on my face, I feel. And so, bam, it is what it is.

But the chairman asked you during his questioning about the need for troops in Europe, and you mentioned that from the height of the Cold War we have decreased by 80 percent the troop strength in Europe. I have heard questions from those who would question why we need those other 20 percent troops in Europe: Why can't we just bring them all home and let Europe take care of itself? Can you rebut that assertion?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I think I can give you the view from U.S. European Command. I mentioned earlier values, the economic base we share, the significant geography and access we enjoy in Europe, as well as the alliance itself, which is a treaty obligation which goes back and forth across the Atlantic for mutual defense. And finally this very pragmatic reason: that Europe is this largest pool of allies we have in the world, trained soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, as well as high technology. So I think that basket of reasons is very strong.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, what threat, though, is posed to our allies and ourselves that require us to maintain such a presence in Europe?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think as you look around the periphery of Europe, particularly, as Carter Ham knows extremely well, look to the south, along the Sahel, and the northern rim of the Mediterranean, as well as the Levant——

Mr. JOHNSON. And the Levant, for those who don't know, is what?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Near Middle East, Syria and that region, sir. So that arc of crisis, if you will, that runs today from Syria down through and across the northern part of Africa, I think represents threats to the United States, as well as to our allies. So I would argue that we continue to have enduring presence needs, enduring interoperability needs, and a treaty obligation that would require some level of forces in Europe. Again, we have come down 80 percent. I think that is probably about right for the moment, but we should keep looking at it as we go forward.

General HAM. Mr. Johnson, may I?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

General HAM. Sir, I would make two points to that, hardly as a guy who is reliant upon Europe-based forces to a large degree. And I would make two points.

One, in terms of near-term response, when the President, when our President made the decision to commit forces initially in Libya, that simply would not have been possible on the timelines that were required absent Europe-based air and maritime forces. Had those forces been in the continental United States the timelines would have been significantly different and we don't know what might have happened if we had not been able to respond on timelines.

Second is, one of the many missions which combatant commanders are given is to assure access for the United States and for others in the global trade. And so as we look to Europe, the Straits of Gibraltar, a strategic chokepoint, the Suez Canal, further down, the Bab el-Mandab, access through the Gulf of Guinea, all important economically not just to our country but to many others, and the presence of U.S. forces nearby helps assure that access that is vital to our economy.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. I will yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, gentlemen, thank you both for your service and for being here today.

Admiral, could you give us a rough order of magnitude as to the size of our nuclear weapons in Europe, forward deployed.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes. Sir, if I could, that is classified, so I will take that for the record and provide you with a precise number.

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. ROGERS. Let me ask this then. Can you tell us how many so-called tactical or nonstrategic weapons that Russia has that are forward deployed in Europe?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think you will find press reports that Russia possesses some low number of thousands of tactical nuclear weapons. They are on Russian territory. The United States possesses orders of magnitude, smaller numbers than that. Again, I will respond on a classified basis.

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. ROGERS. And I understand, and I appreciate it. And you have painted the picture that I was after.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Okay, sir.

Mr. ROGERS. As you know, I have taken over the chairmanship of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROGERS. So I am concerned about press reports about the administration's intent to pursue reduction talks with the Russians and not through a treaty structure, which I find disturbing. Is it your professional opinion that if those talks were to proceed, that they should include tactical weapons as well as strategic weapons parity?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I would obviously defer to the State Department for negotiations and treaties. I will say from a military perspective we have a small number of weapons, as you know, that are in Europe, and that any changes to that structure would need to be first and foremost negotiated within NATO so we had an overall position before we could even move to a discussion with Russia.

Mr. ROGERS. Well, it is my observation that as we continue to discuss reductions in our strategic weapons, not only with Russia but our position in the world, Russia, China, and other countries continue to dramatically increase their tactical weapons and we don't seem to ever take account for that. And I think that is mistaken.

But the next question, on the subject of tactical weapons, are you familiar with the Presidential Nuclear Initiative of 1991 between President Yeltsin and George H.W. Bush?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir, in general terms.

Mr. ROGERS. In 2006, then Assistant Secretary Stephen Rademaker noted President Yeltsin committed to similar reductions in Russian tactical nuclear weapons but considerable concern exists that the Russian commitments have not been entirely fulfilled. What are your thoughts about that? Do you think the Russians are fulfilling their commitments and are we able to verify that?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, you are correct that we are not able to verify that. With some treaties, as you know, in a treaty structure you have verification regimes, think Nunn-Lugar. Here we don't have that. So it is difficult to say with certainty. I think you are correct in the assumption that there is a wide disparity in terms of numbers of such weapons. And at the moment there is no mechanism for monitoring, verifying, or following up on those discussions.

Mr. ROGERS. I appreciate that. I do want to follow up on a couple of things. Mr. Turner talked about the SM–3 IIB. I completely concur with his position. I think that it appears that the administration and some in the Congress on the other side of the Hill have lost their enthusiasm for that program and my concern is that the DOD may be in a similar situation. When you do respond to him in a follow-up, I would appreciate a copy of that.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROGERS. Like to know what your perspective is about the DOD's long-term commitment——

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROGERS [continuing]. To that weapon system.

And then lastly, you talked a little bit about Romania and Poland. I fear that what happened in Poland is about to happen in Romania. I am very concerned about that and our credibility going forward to negotiate with our European allies. So I would urge you to be sensitive to making sure that we don't leave the Romanians feeling like that we left them at the altar, as we did the Poles.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir. Understood.

Mr. ROGERS. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you to both of you for your extraordinary service. I have enjoyed working with you.

General Ham, I wonder if you could just take a moment and talk about our partnership capacity. We have certainly dealt with that on this committee, but I am referring particularly to our humanitarian assistance missions. And I know that San Diego was very proud last evening, or I guess Wednesday evening, they honored the USNS [United States Naval Ship] *Mercy* for its work. This was the Center for Conflict Resolution, which usually honors individuals, but in this case they honored the *Mercy*. And certainly from my experience in working with them in Papua New Guinea, I really appreciate that honor to them.

But I also know that the USNS *Comfort* has not been deployed to the coast of Africa. And I am wondering, you know, number one, where you feel that this humanitarian mission lies in terms of the needs that we have to support our friends around the world. We have already talked about the importance of cyber, trafficking, special operations. I know that those are certainly high priorities, but I wondered where humanitarian assistance lies in this, but also whether or not we should be using the tools that we have better, and particularly the USNS *Comfort* as part of that growing partnership.

General HAM. Both ships and their crews are extraordinary. *Comfort* and *Mercy* have been great symbols for the people of the United States in a wide variety of contingency operations and other engagements globally. And so I think they do offer great capability. But it is also a capability that is best applied when there is some host nation capability to reciprocate and can build upon the capabilities that *Comfort* or *Mercy* provide. So we do look at that and we look for opportunities to deploy those ships. We haven't found,

frankly, quite the right circumstance just yet where in an engagement purpose it might be useful.

But rather our humanitarian assistance, and I would wrap into that umbrella also disaster response, is a high priority for us in Africa. There are many circumstances in which African military forces are required for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. And a large number, the preponderance of the exercises that we do both bilaterally and regionally with African forces, are built on a humanitarian assistance or disaster relief scenario. We have seen some improvements in their regional capabilities and I think that is an area of enduring effort for us.

I think there are ways we can improve that. We have a good relationship with USAID [United States Agency for International Development]. I have a senior development adviser at my headquarters; also folks from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. They are hugely beneficial. I have got a planner embedded at USAID that helps as well. And we have got to tighten the relationship with the many nongovernmental organizations that do such good work in humanitarian assistance missions.

So I think there is significant room for improvement. And for us the trick is how do you bring the African militaries and capabilities so that they are increasingly capable of responding. I think Admiral Stavridis had a point.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. In my previous life, when I was commander of U.S. Southern Command for 3 years, I was lucky enough to have *Comfort* deploy several times to Latin American and the Caribbean. I cannot overstate the impact of that. When you see a little 8-year old boy who has hiked through the jungle with his mother for 3 days to get to the *Comfort* put on his first set of eyeglasses and say, "Mama, veo el mundo—Mom, I see the world"—multiply that times 400,000 patient treatments, that creates security for the United States because it portrays us in a very different and positive way.

Mrs. DAVIS. As we grapple with budgetary concerns, is this a place that you think people would naturally go to and think we should just cut out this kind of assistance? And how would you respond?

General HAM. I don't think so, because for us on the military side it is pretty low cost. I mean, it is typically small teams of medical experts, whether they are preventive medicine or veterinarians, or as Admiral Stavridis mentioned, deployable eye surgical teams that can go into the heart of Africa. I think we will be okay, ma'am.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. And can I add that on the *Comfort* about a third of the personnel are volunteers from the private sector. So this is a good example of private-public partnering.

Mrs. DAVIS. Right. Thank you. And the *Mercy* as well.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you.

Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen. You know, we always want to take the opportunity to express appreciation because we know that American freedom is anchored in the freedom that is alive in your hearts, that you dedicate yourself to that end for your whole lives.

Admiral Stavridis, I know that it is difficult to kind of have a dual-hatted challenge of being in the role of SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander of Europe; that is not an easy challenge, and I would commend you on that. And I am, like so many others on this committee, committed to seeing a robust missile defense capability against whatever enemies might challenge us. And with that in mind, would you provide us with an update on your command's missile defense capacity and force structure requirements, specifically highlighting any concerns that you might have about our ability to meet the European Phased Adaptive Approach policy and its requirements?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir. As you know, we are in phase one, which means we have an Aegis ship deployed, typically to the Eastern Mediterranean. We have what is called a TPY–2 [Transportable Radar Surveillance], it is a phased-array radar. That is hosted by Turkey. The command and control that lashes it together is in Ramstein, Germany. It is a NATO command and control structure. At the moment it is manned by the nations of NATO with a very strong U.S. underpinning to it. So that is phase one, and it relies on the SM–3 IA missile system, which can be launched from the Aegis ship.

The next phase, phase two, will add a land-based side in Romania, which we discussed earlier this morning. It will upgrade the missile. That will come in, in about 2015, and it will include an enhanced command and control structure, tying more exactly to overhead systems.

The third phase, which will come in, in 2018, will include a land-based site in Poland, another upgrade to the missile, a further upgrade in the overhead sensor system. And then it gets a little less defined as you get into that fourth phase, but the current plan, as we have been discussing this morning, is to add another upgrade to the missile system. So that is kind of the flow of this over the next 7 years, sir.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you. Let me, if I could, ask you about the Russian missile defense system. Is it true—and I am asking these questions sort of like a lawyer does, you know, you have some perspective of the answer already, but for the sake of the record and the committee—is it true that Russia is undertaking a significant modernization of its system? Is it true that they use nuclear-armed interceptors? And have we, the United States, gotten assurance that Russia's missile defense system is not aimed at our nuclear deterrent? You know, I suppose that is a pretty relevant question since we witnessed Russia's hysteria about our relatively small non-nuclear-armed missile defense system when Russia deploys one that seems so clearly aimed at deterring ours. So I have given you a lot to shoot at there, but I might not get a chance to rephrase the question.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, let me begin by saying I will respond for the record in a classified manner to several elements of what you say.

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Admiral STAVRIDIS. It is very true that Russia is expanding generally in their defense spending to include missile systems, sea-

going systems, as well as advanced air and so forth. So Russia is increasing their defense budget by about 12 percent this year, for example. I am sure that will include enhanced systems. Beyond that we would probably get into a classified realm there that I would like to address for the record.

I want to state for the record that the U.S. missile defense system, and therefore the NATO missile defense system, poses no threat to Russian strategic systems, and the science and the kinematics of that are very clear.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I guess I would just close by suggesting that during the Bush and Obama administration both of them have spent much time and political capital in trying in good faith, in my opinion, to assuage the Russian concerns or its stated concerns about our missile defense system. At the same time Russia has this extensive missile defense system in place that seems clearly aimed at our deterrent, and at some point we need to realize that Russia may be playing us to some degree. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The vote has been called. It looks like we are going to be 45 minutes to an hour. What I am going to try to do is get Mr. Enyart and Mr. Conaway, if we can get those questions in, and we probably will conclude the hearing at that time.

Mr. Enyart.

Mr. ENYART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Ham, it is good to see you again.

Admiral Stavridis, good to see you again.

You know, I was certainly glad to hear that you are the co-chairs of the State Partnership fan club, and I would like to think that that may be in large part due to the great partnership you saw between the Illinois National Guard and Poland.

I would like to ask you a couple of questions about the State Partnership Program, and I know it is a very small part of the budget. You know, at $22 million it is really dust, but I think it is a very effective program and I know that you do, too. So I would ask that you relay your thoughts on that to your incoming commanders when you get replaced eventually.

Now, the State Partnership Program has been such a great success because what we tried to do was take those Eastern European nations that were formerly part of the Warsaw Pact and bring them close to the West and eventually integrate them into NATO, which we have successfully done. And of course we align States like Illinois with Poland because of cultural ties. Chicago is the second-largest Polish city in the world. And so we had some very firm bases there to work with. Do you believe that that model would translate also to Africa?

General HAM. I do, Congressman. And we have some clear examples of that with the eight partnerships that we do have. And I think you are exactly right, the real benefit in the State Partnership Program is the enduring nature of the relationship, that sergeants and lieutenants and captains grow up together and have multiple engagements. So I think the premise is exactly right.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. If I could, because I have seen State Partnership both in Europe and in Latin America and the Caribbean, I can

tell you it is easily transportable from significant and advanced to developing nations. It is a very powerful tool, and bang for the buck it is unmatched.

Mr. ENYART. Has there been any thought given to what is called a multilateral partnership, where you would take a long-established partnership, like Illinois and Poland, which has been in existence for 20 years, and pairing that partnership then with an African nation? Has there been any thought given to that?

General HAM. There has, and we have one good example of that with Michigan and——

Mr. ENYART. Latvia.

General HAM. Estonia and Liberia. So that three-part relationship I think is a model for what might be possible in the future.

Mr. ENYART. Admiral Stavridis, you indicate that the brigade combat teams [BCTs] that are leaving will be replaced on a rotational basis. Can you tell me how long a period of time you are talking about rotating the BCTs into Europe?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Very much still under discussion. We are starting with a big exercise later this year called Steadfast Jazz. We will bring in headquarters elements and probably company level-size formations to do this. Then we will build it up to a battalion level phase the following year, and then we are hopeful to bring in the first brigade-size unit in about 3 years. So we are building up to doing this. I am very confident of the support from the U.S. Army, they are enthusiastic about this, and we will mature the process as it goes along and make sure, Congressman, that it plugs into the NATO exercise schedule so we are getting the maximum bang for the buck both bilaterally, as well as within the alliance.

Mr. ENYART. Any thought to using National Guard BCTs as part of those rotational forces?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think it is a terrific idea. And I am sure the Army is looking at a wide variety of different units to support this over time.

Mr. ENYART. It sounds like what we are talking about is essentially a 2-week, maybe a 3-week training exercise.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes.

Mr. ENYART. Not any kind of permanent rotational.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Correct, correct. Probably longer than 2 to 3 weeks so that would get the efficiencies out of bringing them over, but probably a couple of months on the ground type of thing.

Mr. ENYART. The Kosovo and Sinai peacekeeping missions have been a National Guard mission for the last 10 years, and I think that has been great for the Guard in terms of training. It has also saved our country money when you consider the fully burdened cost. Do you envision those missions continuing to be a Guard presence or are those going to become an Active Duty?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think that is up to the Army to sort through that. I noticed the next rotation in Kosovo is going to be an Active Duty unit. You are correct that for the previous decade it has been National Guard. I think the Army really values that flexibility.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time expired.

Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you both for your long, distinguished service to our country, and it is a heartfelt thank you.

General Ham, you have had forces in Congo and Uganda for a little better than a year now on the hunt or helping hunt some folks. Can you give us a quick couple of sentences on whether that is working or not or how you see the value of those resources?

General HAM. Congressman, I think the U.S. presence both in terms of the 100 or so special forces advisers, some other enabling capabilities, aviation, intelligence, logistics, medical, I think has provided a valuable service. We have seen significant increases in the number of defections from the Lord's Resistance Army, we have helped enable the Ugandan People's Defense Forces to conduct long-range patrols that have resulted in capturing some, to include some senior leaders from the Lord's Resistance Army. So positive steps. But Joseph Kony remains at large.

Mr. CONAWAY. Right. The dustup in Mali, the collapse of the Mali armed services, what appeared to be, in the face of whatever fight—I don't know who trained them, if we were involved in any of the training in that regard. But are there lessons learned from what happened with the Mali forces that we can extend across Africa, to say, here is how we train, here is how we don't train, here is what works and doesn't work?

General HAM. There are, Congressman. And certainly we looked introspectively in the aftermath of the military coup. First of all, from an intelligence perspective, did we miss indicators? We don't think so. We think this was very much a spur of the moment thing. Secondly, did we miss something in our training, in our engagement? I am glad to say that the units with which we were primarily engaged in Mali did not participate in the coup.

Mr. CONAWAY. How did they perform in the fight?

General HAM. They didn't. The units that we were mostly engaged with were largely suppressed by those who did participate in the coup.

My greatest disappointment, though, sir is with the senior leaders, senior military leaders in Mali, who neither supported the coup, but they didn't resist it either. And this goes from the former chief of defense and to some other senior leaders. It is my belief that because this was not long planned, this was a very junior level-led coup, it could have been stopped relatively quickly had senior leaders in the Malian armed forces taken positive steps to counter the coup. They didn't, and that is a failure on their part. We are looking at ourselves to say, in our engagements with leaders we have got to continually emphasize the military ethos, the professionalism, the subordination to legitimate civilian control, operating according to the rule of law, and that military coups are not anywhere within the realm of possibility of a professional military.

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. Let me take one for the record on the fight that they had with the Tuaregs and the extremists in the north.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 123.]

Mr. CONAWAY. That was really the subfocus of the question. Great answer to the other part because that was a big deal as well.

Your forces in extremis, given the tyranny of distance and geography that Stavridis mentioned earlier with respect to Africa, is it rational for you to have the kind of enablers and others available to respond to the next Benghazi-like event in Africa.

General HAM. Congressman, what we are seeking to do is to have forces postured regionally. So one in East Africa, Djibouti, one in West Africa, maybe maritime-based, maybe something ashore, and then a Southern Europe force that can respond to North Africa. In conjunction with the State Department, the Department of Defense is looking at what are the other capabilities. Do there need to be more Marines in more places at U.S. diplomatic facilities?

Mr. CONAWAY. Have we dealt with the chain of command issues and the ability of whoever has AFRICOM's command, that you will be able to use those forces when you need them without having to go through other layers?

General HAM. Yes, sir. The Secretary of Defense is my boss and that is who tells me where and when we can use forces. There is always a diplomatic aspect in terms of access. But I think we are clear. The chain of command has never, in my view, never been in question.

Mr. CONAWAY. When in the Benghazi issue and the excitement about trying to respond there, there was clear lines of authorities and clearly operational issues that didn't—or were there—that got in the way of the response?

General HAM. Sir, there was no lack of clarity on my part as to chain of command and no impediment.

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. Thank you.

Yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. If we hurry, we can make the vote.

Gentlemen, thank you very much. And if you could leave your entire statement it will be taken into the record. But I would also like staff to make copies and get them to all of the members of the committee, because you were so expeditious.

I know I had requests from members that they wanted to hear that whole testimony, so that we will get it to them so they can read it. Thank you again for your great service to this Nation.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:36 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 15, 2013

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 15, 2013

Statement of Chairman Howard P. "Buck" McKeon,
House Committee on Armed Services

Hearing on
The Posture of the U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command

March 15, 2013

I'd like to welcome everyone to today's hearing on the posture of the U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command. And thank you to our two witnesses for agreeing to testify before the committee this morning. We have Admiral James Stavridis, Commander of EUCOM and Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, and General Carter Ham, Commander of AFRICOM.

Admiral Stavridis, you are currently the longest serving combatant commander. I understand that you'll be retiring after more than 36 years of service in the coming months, once your successor is nominated and confirmed. On behalf of a grateful nation, thank you for your service and dedication to this country and our men and women in uniform.

General Ham, you also have said that you intend to retire this year. You have served as an enlisted infantryman and as a senior leader in our nation's military. The nation owes you a great debt of gratitude for your selfless years of service and dedication to this nation and the men and women in uniform.

Admiral Stavridis, many believe Europe is now one of the most secure regions in the world. Even the President's Defense Strategic Guidance says "most European countries are now producers of security rather than consumers. In keeping with [the] evolving strategic landscape, our posture in Europe must also evolve." I think it's important to recognize that many of our European allies are also NATO allies, and they have been an integral part of the ISAF effort in Afghanistan. However, Russia still remains a serious concern—to U.S. national security interests and to our regional allies and partners. Some may also forget that Europe is strategically located in the vicinity of the Middle East and North Africa.

So, I'd like you to fully explain why Europe is still relevant, why the U.S. should remain engaged with and forward deployed in Europe, and how the ongoing instability in the Middle East and North Africa affect Europe and NATO. Especially given the events of the last 6 months, I firmly believe the U.S. cannot further reduce its presence or engagement in Europe. Our forward presence helps facilitate a more rapid response, not only to emerging regional threats but to the defense of Israel. I'd also like to hear your thoughts on the impact of the current

fiscal environment on your ability to execute your missions and respond to crises.

General Ham, the AFRICOM area of responsibility remains a critical focal point for U.S. vital national security interests—particularly over the last year. The attack in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11th, 2012; the resurgence of Al Qaeda in the north; the ascending threat in Central Africa; and the lingering terrorist threat in the Horn of Africa reminds us that Al Qaeda, its affiliates, and associated forces continue to pose a threat to the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests in the region.

To that end, AFRICOM must be sufficiently postured—both strategically and operationally—as well as capable to execute combat operations if called upon to do so. Yet even after the events of September 11th, AFRICOM still lacks an organic special operations force that can effectively deploy into non-permissive environments on the continent. In addition to deployable forces, I would like to gain a greater understanding of: 1) the assumptions underpinning the decision to maintain the totality of the AFRICOM headquarters in Europe and 2) the approach of disaggregating the AFRICOM intelligence analytical capacity from the headquarters. It is not clear to me whether these are the right approaches. We must continue to evaluate both the assumptions and analysis shaping our view of the threat picture as well as our posture in the region—in order to ensure that we can effectively respond to the next Benghazi attack or other operational requirements on the continent.

Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to observe that these questions of strategy, missions, and US force posture are not unique to Europe and Africa. Last year, the Department issued its new strategic guidance. We have been told that with further cuts to the military, that strategy is no longer supportable. But this year the Department will conduct a Quadrennial Defense Review and has the opportunity to re-examine these issues. While I gather that the QDR may be getting off to slow start given the budget issues DOD is dealing with, I want to encourage DOD to proceed with the independent National Defense Panel, now that all Congressional panelists have been appointed. There is significant expertise in this group and there should be no delay in allowing them to start their work.

With that, I want to thank you both again for being with us today.

HOUSE AND SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES

TESTIMONY OF:

ADMIRAL JAMES STAVRIDIS, UNITED STATES NAVY

COMMANDER, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND


BEFORE THE 113TH CONGRESS, 2013


HEADQUARTERS
United States European Command

INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Distinguished Members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear again before you today. For nearly four years now, I have commanded the exceptional men and women of the United States European Command and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Allied Command Operations. It has been the privilege of a lifetime, for a mission I deeply believe in: one that directly links U.S. national security and the American way of life with our most steadfast allies and partners in vital strategic partnerships that produce global security and stability. I can report to you today that we continue to make strong progress—in military operations, theater security cooperation, strategic rebalancing efforts, and important initiatives with our international, interagency, and public-private partners—to protect America's vital national security interests and provide stability across Europe and Eurasia. In meeting this enduring mission, most recently endorsed and mandated in the Department's 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, these exceptional men and women continue to provide for the forward defense of the United States and ensure the collective security and continued viability of the NATO Alliance.

Today, thanks to decades of sustained leadership, tireless devotion, and ironclad commitment on both sides of the Atlantic, the United States and our historic allies enjoy an unprecedented degree of freedom, interconnectedness, economic opportunity and prosperity, and interdependence toward achieving these common goals of global security and stability. Indeed, as former Secretary of State Clinton remarked in assessing the legacy of the last century and its impact on the current one: "Today's transatlantic community is not just a defining achievement of the century behind us. It is indispensable to the world we hope to build together in the century ahead."



The lights of 21st Century freedom and prosperity; A Transatlantic Bridge

This partnership and investment, made in the twentieth century, continues to pay us considerable dividends in the twenty-first. For even as the global economy fights through its current perturbations, the fact remains that the transatlantic partnership—rooted in the stability that flows from security—constitutes nearly half the world's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and a third of global trade. The transatlantic economy is valued at nearly $31 trillion,[1] generates approximately $4 trillion in annual trade revenue, and supports 15 million jobs.[2] Acting together, the United States and Europe still command the heights of the global economy, and maintain the advantage that position offers.

1 *CIA World Factbook*, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html.
2 European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, "Report on European trade with the United States," http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/united-states/.

In support of that position, our European partners continue to make important financial and military contributions to our shared security. For, in spite of recent and oft-repeated criticisms focused exclusively on single national contributions, the fact is that, collectively, our European allies and partners are annually investing nearly $300 billion on defense, second only to the United States ($600 billion) and well ahead of available figures on annual defense expenditures by China ($140 billion) and Russia ($70 billion).[3]

It is also a fundamental reality of the modern security environment—one recognized in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance—that these defense contributions and NATO's continued evolution have transformed Europe, in the span of a single generation, from a security consumer to one of the world's most important security producers. Today, NATO militaries include 750 ships, 24,000 aircraft, and over three million active duty personnel. Over the past decade, as these assets were vigorously put to use, our European allies and partners made conscious national decisions to set aside the security paradigms of the previous century and stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States, making unprecedented deployments on out-of-area expeditionary operations to confront 21st century threats. And it remains one of history's more ironic twists that NATO's only Article 5 declaration was made by our NATO allies in the defense of the United States after the events of September 11, 2001.

In the decade of war and military operations that followed, European military personnel comprised 80% of non-U.S. forces in Iraq and 90% of non-U.S. forces in Afghanistan—essentially a third of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In addition, our European partners provided substantial military support—in command and control, basing, air sorties, and maritime interdiction—to execute Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR in Libya successfully in 2011. They also sustain 90% of the mission in Kosovo, provide 6,000 troops for U.N. peacekeeping operations across the world, and continue providing important support to current missile defense and counter-piracy operations. These are extraordinarily valuable contributions, both diplomatically and in terms of their relief on U.S. force generation requirements. They represent burden-sharing unparalleled in any other region of the world, showcasing the vital importance of our European allies and partners to U.S. national security interests and the viability of coalition warfare as we continue moving into the 21st century.

Yet, even as we acknowledge these extraordinary contributions and commitments, the fiscal realities and current inflection point that follow a decade of war have prompted necessary national deliberation to reconsider the U.S. defense strategy and rebalance global U.S. posture. Indeed, the Cold War and its strategic imperatives are long over. And, as the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance makes clear, after ten years of combat operations "our nation is at a moment of transition" requiring us to put "our fiscal house in order here at home and renew our long-term economic strength." These considerations have increased scrutiny of U.S. posture in Europe. Yet, the reality is that U.S. posture in Europe has been steadily declining for more than two decades.

3 *The Guardian*, "Military Spending: How Much Does the Military Cost at Each Country, Listed," http: www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2012/apr/17/military-spending-countries-list.

At the height of the Cold War, more than 450,000 U.S. forces were stationed across 1,200 sites on the European continent. Today, U.S. forces on the continent have been reduced by more than 85% and basing sites reduced by 75%. Indeed, shortly after release of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, European Command announced further significant force structure cuts, phasing out the Army's V Corps Headquarters, the 170th and 172nd Brigade Combat Teams, three forward-stationed Air Force squadrons, and a host of Army and Air Force enablers in concert with the Department's strategic rebalancing effort. Additionally, over the past six years, the U.S. Army has dramatically consolidated its theater footprint, closing six garrisons and over 100 sites across Europe to consolidate and align its much smaller presence with enduring 21st century missions.

In light of these reductions, European Command is today comprised of approximately 64,000 joint forces—representing less than 5% of the military—strategically located across 21 main operating bases and smaller supporting sites. The command is sharply focused on the goals outlined by the Secretary of Defense in his own preface to the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. That guidance seeks to ensure that 'Joint Force 2020' is capable of: "maintaining our defense commitments to Europe; strengthening alliances and partnerships across all regions; deterring and defeating aggression by our adversaries, including those seeking to deny our power projection; countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD); effectively operating in cyberspace, space, and across all domains; maintaining a safe and effective nuclear deterrent; and protecting the homeland." For European Command, these remain our existing and most critical missions, performed from forward-stationed locations that protect the United States through strategic depth and distance, while providing our nation the strategic agility and responsiveness to deal rapidly with 21st century crises and complex contingencies in an environment of unforgiving speed.

Despite these realities, there persists in some quarters a notion that the strategic rebalance represents a zero-sum game for U.S. global posture, recalling debates from the last century pitting advocates of 'Europe first' or 'Asia first' against each other. Yet, what that century taught us, and what the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance makes clear, is that the United States must retain its global reach, access, and prerogatives to maintain its status and influence as a global superpower, particularly in regions vital to U.S. economic well-being such as Europe and the Middle East. Power, like nature, abhors a vacuum. A zero-sum withdrawal or substantial diminishment of U.S. presence, influence, and supporting infrastructure across these vital regions provides opportunity for other rising powers to displace the United States, and gain the geostrategic benefits from that substitution.

The new strategic guidance is also clear in identifying the nation's evolving strategic challenges, as well as its enduring strategic partnerships. While the guidance directs that the U.S. military will "of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region," it also articulates that, in addition to working with America's allies in the Pacific, Europe remains "our principal partner in seeking global and economic security, and will remain so for the foreseeable future." Chairman Dempsey echoed this point at the strategy's roll-out:

"Our strategic challenges are shifting, and we have to pay attention to those shifts. But what we do will always be built on the strong foundation of our traditional strategic partnerships, and NATO is chief among them." Thus, NATO remains an essential vehicle, given its more than 60 years of security experience, strong and progressive direction from the Lisbon and Chicago summits, and a decade of sustained investment and gains in expeditionary out-of-area operations, capabilities, and interoperability. Within this construct, European Command remains the essential catalyst, driving and strengthening that principal partnership through vital theater security cooperation and multilateral training events, particularly at places like U.S. Army Europe's full-spectrum Joint Multinational Training Command, centrally located and accessible in southern Germany.

Geographically, Europe provides the critical access and infrastructure to meet the Defense Strategic Guidance's priorities and expand U.S. global reach across half the world, to Europe and on to Eurasia, Africa, and the Middle East. America's enduring presence and leadership in Europe provides our nation with an indispensable geostrategic platform—a metaphorical forward-deployed "unsinkable aircraft carrier"—to facilitate and conduct global operations in direct support of NATO, six U.S. Combatant Commands (European Command, Central Command, Africa Command, Transportation Command, Special Operations Command, and Strategic Command), a wide host of U.S. Government interagency organizations, and 51 U.S. Embassies. In accordance with the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, our evolved but enduring presence will continue to support these missions, assure our allies, deter potential adversaries, promote enhanced capabilities and interoperability for future coalition operations, support and provide leadership for NATO's continued progressive evolution, and provide critical forward defense against the rising threats of the 21st century.

The timing of the U.S. strategic rebalance—coming simultaneously with a number of other rapidly unfolding events in and around our theater, in places like Israel, Turkey, Syria, North Africa, the wider Middle East, and Afghanistan—has also provided the command with a strategic inflection point of our own to consider and to focus on as we move into the future.

European Command has aggressively leveraged this opportunity to undertake a significant strategic review last fall, guiding our implementation of the Defense Strategic Guidance and ensuring the responsible utilization and maximum efficiency of increasingly precious defense resources. That strategy acknowledges the environment we are witnessing: one characterized by decreasing resources and increasing instability; one that endorses the Department's emphasis to work with America's "most stalwart allies and partners" to maintain our commitments to allied security; one that promotes enhanced allied capacity and interoperability, ensuring that a decade of sustained investment and combat experience with these partners is not lost; and one that leverages resource pooling and sharing opportunities—such as NATO's 'Smart Defense' program—to economize our efforts as we meet the challenges of the 21st century.

In light of this environment and the path forward, European Command's new strategy tightly aligns our enduring posture with the command's most pressing 21st century missions and priorities. Those priorities include: the command's readiness to execute NATO Article 5 missions and other priority U.S. contingency plans; preservation of our strategic theater partnerships, both to enable a successful ISAF transition and to preserve the return on past U.S. investment in partner capability and interoperability; and European Command's charge to defend the homeland forward against rising threats from ballistic missiles, international terrorism, WMD proliferation, transnational illicit trafficking, piracy, and malevolence in cyberspace. European Command's new strategy will serve to ensure that our resources are harmonized effectively and efficiently across the command, that we are prepared to address conflict across the spectrum of operations with a focus on the most likely scenarios, and that we are meeting the growing need, based on fiscal realities, to align high-end training opportunities, capability development, and sustained outreach with our allies and partners on future coalition operations and military burden-sharing.

The transatlantic alliance is and will remain an essential foundation for sustained global security, stability, and freedom. It is a precious and profound generational inheritance from those who preceded us; a tool forged in the fire of the last century to provide us the edge we need in this one. In candid remarks on his departure, outgoing Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned against the growing devaluation among American leadership of this inheritance: "The policymakers who will follow us will not have the same historical, personal, and, indeed, emotional ties to Europe and may not consider the return on America's investment in Europe's defense worth the cost…and that will be a tragedy." Former Secretary Panetta has also stated it clearly: "We live in a world of growing danger and uncertainty where we face threats from violent extremism, nuclear proliferation, rising powers, and cyber attack. We cannot predict where the next crisis will occur. But *we know we are stronger when we confront these threats together.* It is precisely because of these growing security challenges and growing fiscal constraints that we need to work more closely than ever as partners."

To summarize, there are five key responses to the question: "Why is Europe of such importance to the United States?" First, Europe is home to most of the world's progressive democracies; nations with which we share the fundamental values that are a critical element in building effective coalitions. Second, with a GDP of $19 trillion—a quarter of the world's economy—and approximately $4 trillion in annual trade with the United States, Europe's importance to the U.S. and global economies cannot be overstated. Third, the European theater remains critical geostrategic terrain, providing the United States with the global access it needs to conduct worldwide operations and crisis response. Fourth, Europe is the backdrop for NATO, history's most successful and effective alliance, and a vital partner for dealing with the challenges of the 21st century. Fifth, Europe is today a security exporter, possessing among the most highly trained and technologically advanced militaries in the world. No other region possesses such a comparable pool of capable and willing partners able to conduct global operations with the United States.

Therefore, our nation must take care—even as we grapple with significant economic challenges and chart the necessary strategic reorientations—to protect, preserve, and continue evolving this extraordinary partnership. We must keep the transatlantic light burning brightly. It will help guide us as we continue navigating the shadows, complexity, and continuous evolution of the 21st century security environment. And it will prove, as we persevere and rise to meet today's economic and security challenges, that we are still, and will remain, STRONGER TOGETHER.

"Over a decade of war, from the mountains of Afghanistan to the shores of Tripoli, this alliance has proven its relevance in the security challenges of the 21st century. We have moved closer to realizing a vision for the Atlantic community articulated by President John F. Kennedy 50 years ago, envisioning that one day the U.S. would partner with a revitalized Europe 'in all the great and burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free nations.'"

- Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta


MISSION, VISION, PRIORITIES

Mission: The mission of the U.S. European Command is to conduct military operations, international military engagement, and interagency partnering to enhance transatlantic security and defend the United States forward.

Vision: We serve the nation as an agile security organization executing full-spectrum activities in a whole-of-government framework to deliver solutions that contribute to enduring security and stability across the world.


2013 THEATER PRIORITIES

1. Ensure readiness to execute European Command's NATO Article 5 commitment and other contingency plans.
2. Preserve our strategic partnerships.
   - Sustain relationship with our allies to ensure a strong NATO Alliance;
   - Preserve recently developed allied and partner capability and interoperability;
   - Maintain regional stability and security.
3. Enable ISAF's transition to Afghan security lead.
4. Counter transnational threats, focusing on: missile defense; weapons of mass destruction; counter-terrorism; illicit trafficking; counter-piracy; and cyberspace.
5. Maintain U.S. strategic access across Europe in support of global operations.
6. Maintain particular focus on four key countries: Israel, Poland, Russia, and Turkey.



SUCCESS & PROGRESS:
Meeting the Chairman's Strategic Priorities
Aligned and Supporting Joint Force 2020

The Defense Strategic Guidance provides a blueprint for optimizing the U.S. Joint Force by the year 2020. This blueprint provides a 21st century fighting force that sustains U.S. global leadership, is postured to protect America's vital national security interests, stands ready to confront and defeat aggression anywhere in the world, and maintains the missions, capabilities, and capacity to prevail in the complex security environment of the 21st century. As part of that blueprint, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has outlined ten critical mission areas for Joint Force 2020:




1. Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare
2. Deter and Defeat Aggression
3. Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent
4. Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities
5. Project Power Despite Anti-Access / Area Denial Challenges
6. Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction
7. Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space
8. Provide a Stabilizing Presence
9. Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations
10. Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations

U.S. European Command is closely aligned with, and executing, all ten of these mission areas. Every day, through a wide array of operations, exercises, and supporting initiatives, conducted in conjunction with our allies and partners, European Command is providing the forward defense of the United States and preserving America's vital national security interests across multiple continents in each of these priority areas. Over the past year, we have achieved significant progress in line with the Chairman's strategic priorities. Highlights include:

1. Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare

Afghanistan. European Command continues a wide range of activities to enable a successful transition to Afghan security lead at the end of 2014. Our European allies and partners, who constitute a third of ISAF, have made an "in together, out together" commitment, with some countries, including Georgia, Hungary, and Romania, having recently increased their ISAF contributions to address critical shortfalls. Allied and partner special operations forces, working in concert with Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) under the Partnership Development Program, have demonstrated a particularly noteworthy level of commitment, indicating their willingness to continue contributing to Afghan stabilization efforts beyond 2014 should this requirement exist. European Command leverages a number of essential programs and authorities, including Section 1206 (global train & equip), the Coalition Support Fund, the Coalition Readiness Support Program, and the SOCEUR Partnership Development Program to assist our allies and partners with necessary pre-deployment training and equipment needs. Through these vital programs, we have provided training in critical combat skills and specialized equipment to enhance our partners' downrange interoperability and operational effectiveness. The continued availability of these programs is essential to support the transition and post-2014 missions in Afghanistan.




Essential programs and authorities are instrumental to sustaining progress and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan.

In quarterly training rotations this year through U.S. Army Europe's Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany, European Command has also prepared a total of 72 Security Force Assistance Teams from 16 countries for ISAF deployment. Additionally, we provided life-saving Counter-Improvised Explosive Device training to 2,481 personnel from 22 countries. To date, the command's Expeditionary Intelligence Training Program has developed counterinsurgency intelligence, analysis, and operational skill sets for over 1,000 personnel from 26 countries. And European Command has expanded our 'Georgia Deployment Program' to support the simultaneous deployment of two Georgian battalions every six months to ISAF's Regional Command Southwest, where they operate in conjunction with the U.S. Marines without caveats. U.S. Air Force Europe's Warrior Preparation Center has also contributed to the ISAF mission by training 60 Joint Tactical Air Controllers from 19 partner nations. Finally, in 2012, European Command obtained and delivered critical life-saving equipment for deploying partners from ten Central and Eastern European countries.

Theater Counterterrorism. Exercise JACKAL STONE is U.S. European Command's premier Special Operations Force (SOF) training event. In 2012, this theater-wide SOF exercise was conducted in Croatia involving over 1,700 personnel representing 15 countries: Canada; the Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Hungary; Italy; Lithuania; Latvia; Norway; Poland; Romania; Slovakia; and the United Kingdom. Exercise JACKAL STONE honed theater SOF capabilities in all mission sets from counterterrorism to high-intensity conflict. The exercise validated Special Operations Task Force-Europe's ability to conduct special operations, and enhanced SOF relationships with these key partners who continue deploying to ISAF and fully support our strategy of active security.

2. Deter and Defeat Aggression

AUSTERE CHALLENGE. In its eighth year as European Command's premier joint force headquarters exercise, AUSTERE CHALLENGE 12—the largest and most significant exercise ever to take place in U.S. European Command since the end of the Cold War—continued to provide world-class training opportunities for U.S. European Command Headquarters, our Service Component Commands, and the Israel Defense Forces. An extensive, multi-phased event, AUSTERE CHALLENGE 12 exercised existing U.S. European Command plans and capabilities in the Levant, focused on combined missile defense training and interoperability with a critical partner in a challenging strategic environment. The exercise involved 3,500 U.S. personnel from all four military services, integrating U.S. Army Patriot batteries, Air Operations Center command and control capabilities, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) ships, and other air defense systems to sharpen combined defensive capabilities against a variety of threats. As part of the broader AUSTERE CHALLENGE event, European Command also conducted the largest of our combined exercises and engagements with Israel, Exercises JUNIPER COBRA and JUNIPER FALCON. These exercises also sustain the U.S.-Israeli political-military relationship, exercise important theater capabilities, and provide further demonstration of the United States' strong commitment to the security of Israel.



Israeli Minister of Defense Ehud Barak speaks with U.S. forces during Exercise AUSTERE CHALLENGE in October, 2012. AUSTERE CHALLENGE was the largest exercise conducted in EUCOM since the end of the Cold War. It involved 3,500 U.S. and 1,000 Israeli forces exercising critical air and missile defense capabilities.

The Combatant Command Exercise and Engagement Fund continues to be a linchpin for theater-wide Joint and Coalition training. In 2012, the fund supported 31 Joint and Coalition exercises, training European Command Headquarters staff and more than 25,000 U.S. military personnel across a full spectrum

of critical missions from integrated air and missile defense to counterterrorism. This funding enables European Command and NATO to be a net exporter of security, from ISAF operations to the defense of Israel, and was instrumental in ensuring the success of Exercise AUSTERE CHALLENGE 12, demonstrating a fully-rehearsed, seamlessly integrated missile defense capability and clear U.S. commitment to a key ally during a critical period.

3. Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent


Theater Nuclear Forces. U.S. European Command maintains a safe, secure, and effective theater nuclear deterrent in support of the NATO Alliance and enduring U.S. security commitments. Through rigorous and effective training, exercises, evaluation, inspection, operations, and sustainment, European Command ensures U.S. nuclear weapons, dual-capable aircraft, nuclear command centers, materials, procedures, and personnel are fully ready to support national strategic nuclear directives. Our annual program includes command-only exercises, such as FIG LEAF and CLOVER LEAF, as well as participation in the NATO STEADFAST exercise series, and multiple Joint Staff, NATO, and U.S. European Command assessments and inspections.

4. Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities

Collective Security Defends the U.S. Homeland. In 2012, U.S. European Command continued its mission to defend the homeland forward by expanding our planning efforts with, and in support of, NATO. Through America's fulfillment of its Article 5 commitments, and a strong and enduring NATO Alliance, we support our national and collective security, manifested so clearly in NATO's historic and only Article 5 declaration, made in the wake of September 11, 2001.

Supporting the Fight against Transnational Organized Crime. Additionally, through the work of European Command's Joint Interagency Counter Trafficking Center (JICTC), we continue to provide strong support to the President's Transnational Organized Crime Strategy, the U.S. Government interagency, and numerous U.S. Country Teams working to counter global transnational illicit trafficking and terrorism. With profits from illicit enterprises estimated in the trillions, these efforts focus on disrupting versatile illicit networks who traffic in a wide host of destabilizing influences, including narcotics, terrorism, weapons (from small arms to WMD), human trafficking, and illicit finance. These networks pose a growing threat to the U.S. Homeland, as well as the security of our allied and partner nations. Through these efforts, we are contributing to U.S. interagency efforts to disrupt and dismantle these networks, and assisting our partner nations develop and refine the counter-trafficking and counterterrorism skills and capacity needed to keep these threats as far as possible from American shores.

5. Project Power Despite Anti-Access / Area Denial Challenges



A critical component of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense, this graphical depiction portrays what the Aegis Ashore facilities will look like in Romania and Poland.

Ballistic Missile Defense. Throughout 2012, European Command continued to improve its ballistic missile defense (BMD) readiness for the defense of Israel and Europe. In particular, 2012 saw the AN/TPY-2 radar—on-line at Kürecik, Turkey, since 2011—transition to NATO control as part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense. Additionally, important EPAA Phase Two progress was made last year, as we successfully completed all international negotiations to forward-station four U.S. Navy Aegis BMD warships in Spain, and continued to prepare the Aegis Ashore site in Romania.

European Command has also taken a number of proactive steps to set the theater and increase our readiness in response to heightened instability in the Levant. Increased Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations enable the command to maintain a close watch on that region. As the situation in the Levant became increasingly serious last year, we significantly increased our coordination and collaborative planning with our counterparts in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). European Command also took steps to increase our force posture and readiness during this time frame, in order to be prepared to rapidly execute operations in the Levant should it become necessary.

6. Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction

European Counter-Proliferation Stakeholders. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the hands of a rogue state or non-state actors continue to represent a grave threat to the United States, our allies, and partners. In confronting this high-stakes challenge, one that possesses far-reaching and highly destabilizing consequences, several factors intersect across European Command's theater: the bulk of the world's WMD resides here; European population centers and U.S. military installations present numerous targets for terrorist organizations; and European ports and terminals are the last line of defense for much of the commercial traffic that enters the U.S. port system.

Our allies and partners share these concerns, and we continue to leverage their capabilities as we pursue efforts, both bilaterally and regionally, to reduce the potential for successful WMD trafficking. We

have increased our preparedness through several military-to-military and military-to-civilian engagements, joint training events, NATO's annual consequence management exercise (conducted in conjunction with over 30 European nations), U.S. interagency cooperation, defensive consequence management planning with Israel, the work of the Joint Interagency Counter Trafficking Center, and other partnering to bolster our collective capabilities in this critical mission area.

7. Operate Effectively in Space & Cyberspace

Cyberspace Operations. European Command is pursuing a cyber posture that ensures mission assurance by protecting the command's critical data, information systems, and networks against an expanding number of increasingly sophisticated cyber threats. Over the past year, European Command has refined the organization and functionality of its Joint Cyber Center (JCC), which serves as the focal point for coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing the theater's cyber activities. It is an integral part of the command's contingency planning efforts and operations, working closely with U.S. Cyber Command and Service cyber components to ensure responsiveness to priority mission requirements in the cyber domain.

In an effort to enhance the security of its networks and enhance their operational effectiveness, European Command is also working with U.S. Africa Command and the U.S. Army to implement the initial increment of the Joint Information Environment. This is a multi-phased effort supporting the Department's migration from Service-centric networks to a single information technology infrastructure and common network architecture. This undertaking will allow analysts at each combatant command to assess potential cyber threats on a near-real time basis and react to potential adversary activity in a more cohesive and effective manner.

Cyber Defenses. European Command's cyber posture also includes military engagement to strengthen coalition networks and the cyber defense capabilities of our NATO Allies and Partnership for Peace nations. Thirty-seven European Command country cooperation plans include activities that help partners strengthen their cyber defense programs and exchange information about cyber threats and vulnerabilities. Successful again last year, European Command conducted Exercise COMBINED ENDEAVOR 12, the largest communications and information systems interoperability exercise in the world. The event drew delegates from 40 nations (26 NATO and 14 Partnership for Peace countries) focused on partnership capabilities, operational preparation of deployable command, control, communications, and computer forces, cyber training and professional development, and the development of interoperability standards for cyberspace.

European Command also hosted Exercise CYBER ENDEAVOR, which promotes a common standard for network defense processes and procedures. The exercise involved 175 participants from 32 countries, including NATO members and Warsaw Initiative Fund-resourced Partnership for Peace nations. It focused on malware analysis and reverse engineering, cyber incident response, and network and computer forensics. Through this capstone event with NATO, partner nations, academia, and industry, European Command is

enhancing theater-wide cyber capabilities, and building strong defense partnerships to ensure that the U.S. and NATO are prepared to prevail in this critical domain.


8. Provide a Stabilizing Presence

Israel and the Levant. European Command's sustained engagement with Israel, through our theater security cooperation program and numerous annual military-to-military engagement activities, continues to strengthen our nations' enduring ties and military capabilities. European Command chairs four bilateral, semiannual conferences with Israel addressing planning, logistics, exercises, and interoperability. Additionally, the U.S.-Israeli exercise portfolio includes eight major recurring exercises. Through these engagements, our leaders and staff maintain uniquely strong, recurring, personal, and direct relationships with their IDF counterparts.

U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority. European Command's comprehensive engagement strategy with Israel complements other U.S. government security cooperation initiatives, including the important work of the U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (USSC). USSC's mission is to help Israel and the Palestinian Authority meet security conditions to support a two-state solution; to transform and professionalize the Palestinian Authority's security sector; and to support U.S. and international whole of government engagement, with both the Israelis and the Palestinians through security initiatives designed to build mutual trust and confidence. Continued U.S. support for this engagement and the progressive capacity and capabilities of the Palestinian Authority Security Forces remain in the interest of overall Israeli-Palestinian regional security.

Kosovo. In advance of the Serbian elections last year, for which there were indications Serbia would attempt to organize illegally in the territory of Kosovo, European Command worked closely with Senior Department of Defense officials to identify Kosovo Force (KFOR) capacities, capabilities, and risks to mitigate against a deterioration in security resulting from such an effort. We prepared ground forces, forward-stationed in Germany, to deploy rapidly to reinforce KFOR if required. Though this augmentation was ultimately not needed as a diplomatic solution was found to allow the OSCE to administer polling sites where dual national Kosovo Serbs could vote, the proximity and presence demonstrated important U.S. resolve to continued stability in the Balkans.

Caucasus. With U.S. assistance, Georgia conducted cross-border Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response training with Armenia in 2012, and also continued to develop their biohazard threat analysis capabilities to enhance regional stability. Further south, European Command facilitated Armenia's participation in Exercise COMBINED ENDEAVOR and the U.S. Marine Corps' Black Sea Rotational Force, efforts focused on regional security, while also providing non-commissioned officer training to the




Pennsylvania National Guard Soldiers participating in a live-fire drill with Lithuanian soldiers during Exercise SABER STRIKE held in Adazi, Latvia. Lithuania is paired with Pennsylvania under the State Partnership Program. Lithuanian troops joined with 2,000 other forces from Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Canada, France and the United Kingdom for this important Baltic-focused multinational security exercise.

Armenian military. In Azerbaijan, European Command also involved Azerbaijan forces in the Black Sea Rotational Force, coordinated training events at the Joint Multinational Training Center in Germany, and provided Section 1206-funded explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training to Naval Special Operations Forces.

9. Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations

Baltic States. In support of this priority, focused on stability and expanding military-to-military cooperation to strengthen partner capabilities and reduce reliance on U.S. forces, European Command sponsored the 42nd annual Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) engagement, a maritime exercise which has grown to become the largest military-to-military event in the region. BALTOPS '12 continued America's highly visible outreach and engagement in the Baltic region, supporting development of Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian maritime capabilities, enhancing regional and NATO Alliance unity of effort, and exercising a host of key military competencies focused on joint and combined air, land, and sea training. The exercise brought together 12 European nations—including Russia—27 ships, 33 aircraft, and one submarine to conduct tactical unit actions, in-port and at-sea events, and a culminating exercise employing multi-national sea and air forces. The exercise was important in promoting assurance and stability in this key maritime region, and expanding our engagement with Russia, one of European Command's leading priorities.

State Partnership Program. The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) remains one of European Command's most effective and efficient programs to enhance theater stability and influence the development of partner nation military capabilities. Launched in 1993 to reach out to former Warsaw Pact and Eastern European countries after the Cold War, the program accounts for 25% of European Command's theater security cooperation and military-to-military engagement programs with these nations. In the European Command Theater,



Dr. Darko Nisavic, a member of Montenegro's emergency medical team is hoisted aboard a UH-60 Black Hawk MEDEVAC helicopter by Sgt. Joseph Campbell of U.S. Army Europe's 12th Combat Aviation Brigade during last year's humanitarian assistance mission to rescue stranded Montenegrins affected by severe weather.

SPP partners U.S. National Guard forces from 21 participating states with 22 allied and partner nations. SPP in the theater leverages other programs and authorities, such as National Guard annual training and Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid program activities to conduct military training and education, pursue key theater security cooperation objectives, and foster positive relationships among junior and mid-grade military professionals. These relationships pay dividends as these professionals progress to ever higher positions of responsibility in their militaries. The program has also delivered a significant operational return on investment, with 19 participating nations contributing forces to ISAF, and nine of these nations training, deploying, and serving side-by-side with participating U.S. National Guard units in Security Force Assistance Teams and Provincial Reconstruction Teams across Afghanistan.

10. Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations

Disaster Relief. In 2010, in coordination with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), European Command provided critical firefighting support to control wildfires raging across Russia and Israel. A year later, in August 2011, the Command provided significant disaster relief to Turkey in the wake of a devastating earthquake. Last year, in response to a particularly harsh winter, European Command provided rapid disaster response across the Balkans. In February 2012, blizzard conditions caused widespread power outages across Bosnia and Herzegovina, prompting officials to request emergency assistance from the international community. On short notice, European Command delivered badly needed parts and supplies to repair degraded military helicopters so that Bosnians could respond to isolated mountain communities. A short time later, Montenegro declared a similar state of emergency. European Command again answered the call, providing intra-theater lift to transport required material, personnel, and equipment to Montenegro, and dispatched two U.S. Army UH-60 helicopters to assist the government with emergency resupply and medical evacuation operations.

Humanitarian Assistance. European Command also supports civil-military engagement programs that focus humanitarian assistance and disaster response along four key lines of operation: disaster preparedness; education; health; and water and sanitation. These programs provide training and construction support to develop disaster preparedness in poorer regions of southeastern Europe and Eurasia. This program, also coordinated with USAID, generates significant 'soft power' for the United States, as efforts to renovate clinics, schools, orphanages, and water lines build tremendous goodwill and leave a lasting positive American legacy for a relatively modest investment. In 2012, the program obligated $9 million across 17 countries in the region to help build and reinforce stability.

To summarize, through the execution of the command's combined operations, theater exercises, interagency outreach, and security cooperation across each of these ten national mission areas, European Command is protecting and preserving every one of America's vital national security interests. These interest, defined by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs are:

- Survival of the nation (deterrence of nuclear attack);
- Survival of the global economic system (enabling physical and virtual flow of global commerce);
- Prevention of catastrophic attacks on the nation (from ballistic missiles, WMD, or terrorists);
- Freedom of action for the United States (facilitate the exercise of American power);
- Secure, confident, and reliable allies and partners (fulfilling obligations to our partner states);
- Protection of American citizens abroad (defending diplomatic facilities and conducting hostage rescue, counterterrorism, and evacuation operations);
- Preserving and, where possible, extending universal values (human rights, democracy, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief).


Supporting each of these vital national security interests, European Command is making a difference, keeping America safe, and ensuring the nation's defenses are ***Stronger Together*** with our European allies and partners.

CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES, and INITIATIVES

"European security remains an anchor of U.S. foreign and security policy. A strong Europe is critical to our security and our prosperity. Much of what we hope to accomplish globally depends on working together with Europe."
– Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton

The most important challenge facing U.S. European Command is maintaining our readiness to conduct unilateral operations, as well as combined operations with our European allies and partners, to support our collective NATO Article 5 responsibilities, out-of-area operations, and other contingency missions. Today, rising tensions—stemming from declining resources, long-simmering ethnic strife, regional hegemonic desires impacting U.S. European Command area of responsibility partners' security, and a host of demographic, social, political, and economic forces—pose challenges and risk to security and stability in and around our theater. Enduring U.S. presence and engagement remains critical to preventing destabilizing influences or simmering resentments from erupting into violence or escalating into open conflict. While these challenges are real, European Command remains vigilant, proactive, and engaged to seek out opportunities in each of these challenges and leverage our presence, leadership, and capabilities to continue to protect U.S. vital national security interests and meet our collective security commitments.

Afghanistan. We have entered the critical transition period in Afghanistan. Over the next 20 months, ISAF must continue to fully recruit and field the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), both army and police, in order to shift the main security effort to the Afghans later this year. We must also prepare to support the Afghan presidential election and the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), while planning to redeploy thousands of ISAF forces and restructure our basing readiness to ensure that European Command is postured to support this redeployment and the post-2014 mission.



A Turkish UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter is loaded onboard a U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, for deployment to Kabul. EUCOM will provide indispensable logistical capacity and collaboration with U.S. Transportation Command to conduct significant U.S. and allied retrograde and redeployment operations from Afghanistan in 2013 and 2014.

European Command is involved in a wide range of supporting activities to enable a successful transition in Afghanistan in accordance with the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and NATO's Chicago Summit Declaration. As mentioned, European Command continues to leverage Section 1206, Coalition Support Fund, Coalition Readiness Support Program, and a host of other security assistance programs to provide the critical training and equipment that enable our European allies and partners—particularly Central and

Eastern Europeans who are punching far above their weight in ISAF—to continue contributing to security and stability in Afghanistan. The continued availability of these authorities, particularly Section 1206, is essential to helping us meet the transition timeline and our post-2014 responsibilities. European Command is also providing critical logistical support to the mission in Afghanistan. We are working closely with U.S. Transportation Command to ensure the existing capacity, versatility, and responsiveness of redeployment mechanisms, routes, and infrastructure can cover the size and scope of the Afghanistan redeployment mission. To that end, European Command's recently established multi-modal logistical hub at U.S. Forward Operating Site Mihail Kogalniceanu Airfield in Romania represents an extremely valuable addition to this logistical capacity, helping to mitigate risk from existing logistical ground and sea lines of communication in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

NATO Evolution. While progress continues, in step with the Lisbon and Chicago summit declarations, budget pressures and the transition in Afghanistan will continue to affect NATO's ongoing evolution. This challenge is characterized by several elements. First, NATO will discover new force capacity when troops, both U.S. and European, return home from Afghanistan as we move closer to 2014. This will facilitate support to the NATO Response Force (NRF), which provides the alliance with Article 5 and other crisis response capabilities. Second, the allies will naturally re-focus on training, exercising, and initiatives inside alliance borders, even as they seek to retain hard-earned counterinsurgency and expeditionary capabilities. The Department's decision to reinvigorate U.S. participation in the NRF offers a significant opportunity to ensure America's allies and partners sustain their expeditionary capabilities and maintain their interoperability with U.S. forces. European Command is working to implement this decision, through support to rotational U.S. battalion task forces participating in NRF exercises and important training events with our European allies and partners. Third, the importance of counterinsurgency skill sets will give way to other priorities, including missile defense, cyberspace, and regional stability. Fourth, NATO will continue to adjust to its recently reduced command structure. Fifth, the alliance will seek to integrate increasingly capable allies, such as Turkey and Poland, into high-end planning, command structures, and exercises. Lastly, the alliance will become more aware of, and focused on, evolving transnational challenges, including illicit trafficking, piracy, terrorism, WMD proliferation, and energy security.

The challenge to NATO presented by the current evolution is to develop a capable force structure to ensure enduring alliance credibility. European Command continues to support NATO's ongoing evolution through our bilateral and multilateral engagements, exercises, training, theater security cooperation programs, participation in the NATO Centers of Excellence, and a wide variety of other initiatives. One of the most effective enablers in this effort continues to be the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Through this invaluable program, the United States has trained and educated a number of our partner nations' top performing military personnel and future leaders, increasing international understanding, cooperation, and interoperability. IMET beneficiaries have risen to the highest echelons of their defense establishments, which today include three Eastern European Chiefs of Defense, eleven partner

nation Service Chiefs, and eight Sergeants Major of our partner nations' militaries. The IMET program continues to build and expand on these vital relationships, strongly supports NATO's continued evolution, and provides the U.S. with considerable advantage in outreach and connection as we maintain these relationships over the years. Through these programs, European Command reinforces U.S. leadership in NATO and reenergizes our enduring commitment to the alliance's collective security. These efforts sustain confidence in NATO's aggregate strength, shared democratic values, recognition of global responsibilities, and continued adherence to operational competence.

By supporting NATO's continued viability and success, the United States encourages European nations to approach global security issues from within the alliance, ensuring that European and U.S. viewpoints are shared, considered, and weighed together in the decision-making process. Today, NATO stands at a second major crossroads, similar to the decision point that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall. Our challenge is to work diligently to support the broader U.S. government effort to demonstrate tangible U.S. commitment to the alliance, ensuring that the correct choices are made to maintain NATO's capabilities, capacity, and credibility.

"NATO not only serves to protect our collective nations but our Homeland as well."

- Congressman Michael Turner (R-OH), House Armed Services Committee

Israel and the Levant. The 'Arab Spring' movement is significantly reshaping leadership across the Middle East and North Africa. New strategic challenges are emerging. Several Arab countries are undergoing major internal changes resulting in a more dynamic, less predictable region. For Israel, a country inside European Command's area of responsibility, these movements bring increased uncertainty for enduring stability in the region. The Sinai's growing instability is of increasing concern to Israel. Over the past three decades, Israel has made significant military reductions along its southern border based on a stable Egyptian/Israeli border. Internal developments in Egypt have now put the stability of that border into question. Additionally, aggressive actions by elements inside Gaza eventually compelled Israel to launch its 7-day 'Pillar of Defense' operation last November. To the north, events in Syria have severely destabilized Israel's northern border. Israel must be prepared to deal with the actions of the current Syrian regime as well as a range of possible successors. In addition, Lebanese Hezbollah continues to grow as a powerful actor on the Israel/Lebanon border, possessing lethally accurate rockets and missiles with the potential to severely damage Israeli infrastructure. To the east, Iran continues to increase its ballistic missile stockpile and pursue a nuclear weapons program, further narrowing Israel's strategic depth and decision space. Given this situation, it is feasible that increasing violence or war could erupt from multiple directions within the Levant with limited warning and grave implications for regional stability, Israeli security, and U.S. interests.

Accordingly, European Command continues to work with our IDF partners to ensure strong U.S. support to the defense of Israel. European Command works closely with U.S. Central Command to keep abreast of all emerging threats and intelligence regarding Iran, Syria, the Sinai, Hamas, and Hezbollah, ranging from missile threats to terrorist activity. Lastly, European Command continues a robust program of security cooperation and military-to-military activities with Israel to demonstrate U.S. resolve and ensure a high degree of defense synchronization between our two nations.

Russia. Though a significant actor who at times disagrees with U.S. and NATO policies, Russia still presents potential for future engagement. The military component of the relationship exists principally in the annual bilateral U.S.-Russian Military Cooperation Work Plan. Since its re-establishment in 2008, focused on 'zones of cooperation' where our interests overlap and that avoid enhancing Russian combat capabilities, our bilateral activities have increased from 10 events in 2009 to 110 events and exercises in 2012, in areas of mutual interest including: combating terrorism; counter-piracy; counter-trafficking; crisis response; maritime capabilities; search and rescue; the Arctic; and support to coalition stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. Despite recent disagreements over missile defense, we continue to seek out additional areas for cooperation, such as security for the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics and Russia's recent request for assistance developing its new Military Police organization, which the U.S. Army is working diligently. The ability to effectively work together not only provides important strategic access for ongoing NATO and coalition operations, but continues to satisfy our mutual strategic goals.



USS Normandy (CG 60) and Russian Federation Ship (RFS) Kaliningrad (LSTM 102) conduct anti-piracy training on the high seas. Naval operations, from counter-piracy to counter-trafficking to search-and-rescue, remain an important zone of cooperation for continued constructive U.S.-Russian engagement.

Militarily, Russia seeks to enhance its regional influence and leverage through participation with former Soviet states in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (membership includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan), as well as a robust defense build-up through its 'State Armament Plan.' That plan calls for the construction and modernization of: naval surface combatants and submarines; air defense brigades; attack helicopters; developments in fifth generation fighters; and the continued maintenance of its existing strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. At the same time, Russia faces many challenges, including declining demographics, a high rate of drug and alcohol abuse, a relatively narrow economic base stemming from oil and gas, and uneven infrastructure. While appropriately anticipating these developments, European Command will continue to seek and leverage existing and emerging zones of cooperation as a priority and focus for our current and future engagement with Russia.

Turkey. A NATO ally since 1952, Turkey continues to make important contributions to vital U.S. national security interests, particularly in its support for regional missile defense with the AN/TPY-2 radar site located in eastern Turkey as well as ongoing counter-terrorism operations. Turkey is an indispensable partner in addressing the increasingly complex challenges in the Levant and across the broader Middle East. Turkey's own challenges include a growing refugee crisis on the Syrian border, threat of Syrian ballistic spillover (hence NATO's Patriot deployment to southern Turkey), and increased terrorist activity, specifically with the Kongra-Gel (KGK, formerly the Kurdistan Workers Party or PKK) along their border with Iraq.

We continue to support U.S. efforts with the Government of Turkey to ensure optimum cooperation and outcomes given the Assad regime's uncertain future in Syria. European Command and the Turkish General Staff are engaged in a dialogue that will serve as the foundation for deeper cooperation as the situation requires. Turkey's status as a stable, democratic nation, its sizable security resources, and its influence as a regional power broker combine to make this NATO ally a critical component in achieving U.S. regional objectives. In return, Turkey is raising its expectations for U.S. cooperation and partnership, specifically with access to high-end Foreign Military Sales (FMS), cooperation on counter-terrorism activity, and increased leadership opportunities in NATO and coalition political/military structures. That said, Turkey's eroding relationship with Israel bears special emphasis. Resumption of good relations between these two U.S. allies, and willingness to facilitate these relations on a military-to-military level, remain a priority for European Command.

Poland. Poland remains a pivotal nation in our theater, and an emerging leader in eastern Europe and the NATO Alliance. The strong cooperation between the United States and Poland remains important to overall regional security. European Command sees value in the increased visibility and presence of U.S. forces in Poland, through military engagements and regionally-hosted exercises, to assist Poland in realizing its full potential as a capable and reliable security partner, able to contribute forces that can operate side-by-side with the United States in future NATO and coalition operations. U.S. military engagement with Poland is multi-faceted. Recent cooperation across a variety of initiatives, to include missile defense, Patriot battery rotations, the establishment of the U.S. Air Force aviation detachment, and multinational exercises, has allowed the United States to maintain strong defense ties with this important regional power.

Balkans. In the Balkans, the overarching U.S. goal is to achieve stability and advance Euro-Atlantic integration. However, strong enmity remains between former warring factions, especially within Bosnia and Herzegovina and between Serbia and Kosovo. Bosnia and Herzegovina possesses a stagnant economy. Public sector spending accounts for an unsustainable 40% of GDP. Efforts at post-conflict economic revitalization have proven fitful at best. The complex governmental structures created by the Dayton Peace Accords are inefficient and prone to obstruction by political interference, and resistant to reforms promoted by the international community. European Command continues its outreach and engagement with Bosnia and Herzegovina through theater exercises, humanitarian assistance activities, disaster readiness training, theater exercises, and the State Partnership Program. We are also energizing defense reform efforts to address chronic problems in logistics, procurement, and defense institution building.

Serbia's efforts to realize its aspirations to join the European Union, as well as advance military-to-military relations with the United States, will be strained until and unless Belgrade makes real progress to normalize relations with Kosovo and reach durable solutions on northern Kosovo. European Command is looking to the EU-facilitated Pristina-Belgrade dialogue to deliver progress in these areas, while further engaging Serbia in regional exercises and engagement to encourage a constructive relationship.

Serbia's refusal to date to normalize relations with Kosovo – as well as actions by hardliners and criminal elements in northern Kosovo – have hampered Pristina's ability to extend its authority to its northern borders without significant international presence. Tensions in northern Kosovo remained high in 2012, including at least one serious violent incident that required the rapid deployment of KFOR personnel to control the situation. Accordingly, despite earlier NATO plans to continue drawing down alliance force levels in Kosovo, of which U.S. troops comprise only 15%, KFOR should remain at current levels until further progress is made. In addition to KFOR support, European Command continues to facilitate State Partnership Program engagement between Kosovo and the Iowa National Guard, as well as traditional military-to-military efforts aimed at professionalizing the Kosovo Security Force's training program and non-commissioned officer corps. These efforts are designed to assist in the eventual transition of international security responsibilities to Kosovo institutions.



U.S. and German Soldiers assigned to the Kosovo Force (KFOR) provide perimeter security during roadblock removal operations on June 1, 2012 near Mitrovica, Kosovo. Border tensions in northern Kosovo continue to bear close watching, and require KFOR to maintain current force levels for now to ensure stability and support the ongoing Pristina-Belgrade dialogue.

Overall in the Balkans, European Command continues its work to encourage greater collaboration among partners in regional venues such as the Adriatic Charter. The Adriatic Charter serves as the flagship forum for regional cooperation, and builds on U.S.-provided support toward the goals of eventual integration into NATO and other Euro-Atlantic institutions. European Command's objectives remain focused on facilitating regional solutions to challenges, promoting regional stability, protecting and strengthening borders through counter-trafficking and counter-proliferation initiatives, and promoting a safe and secure environment in Southeast Europe's most fragile countries.

Caucasus. Similar to the Balkans, instability and fragility in the Caucasus will continue. That instability is highlighted by Russia's continued non-compliance with the August 2008 cease-fire agreement with Georgia, as well as the ongoing political struggle between Georgia and Russia over the occupied regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The North Caucasus may very well experience more violence in the near term, as persistent economic stagnation, lack of government investment (outside of Sochi, the site of the 2014 Winter Olympics), social instability, and wholesale emigration by ethnic Slavs seeking safer territories all take their toll, resulting in challenges to governance and susceptibility to the increasing influence of radical Islamists. Though not as volatile as the North Caucasus, the South Caucasus remains a concern

in the absence of an agreed political resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and continued violent incidents on the Line of Contact separating the opposing forces.

European Command continues vigorous engagement across the Caucasus, given the region's strategic importance as a global energy corridor, key node on the Northern Distribution Network, source of national contributions to ISAF, potential for narcotics and illicit weapons trafficking, interest area for both Russia and Iran, and location of frozen conflicts that have potential to flash into wider and more destabilizing wars. In 2012, Armenia deployed a platoon of peacekeepers to serve alongside the United States in KFOR, and Georgia remains a key partner in the region, one who continues to make extraordinary ISAF contributions. European Command is involved in defense cooperation assessments and efforts with Georgia as directed in the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act. Additional security cooperation program priorities in the South Caucasus are focused on developing and sustaining relationships that: ensure U.S. access and freedom of action (focused in the near term on Northern Distribution Network areas); counter regional and transnational threats, especially violent extremist organizations, counter-WMD proliferation, and illicit trafficking; solidify defense institutional reforms; and sustain partner capacity to enhance regional security while not hindering diplomatic efforts to settle the region's frozen conflicts.

European Economic, Social, and Demographic Dynamics. Europe will continue to feel the cumulative effects of several economic and associated socio-cultural stresses for the foreseeable future. These stresses include: the lasting impact of the Euro zone debt crisis; the aging and retirement of a large segment of the population, with its attendant pressure on already stressed social services; increased labor demand that exceeds worker supply, with a resultant pressure to assimilate a growing immigrant work force; and the draining of human resources and intellectual capital in countries experiencing slow or no growth. These economic and demographic forces pose a challenge to European economic and political clout in the near term, stress transnational and national governance structures, including the European Union and NATO, and increase the potential for instability around the continent. The result of these forces is also magnified on European militaries, as national GDPs have fallen and governments reduce the GDP percentage dedicated to defense spending in order to deal with increasing deficits and reduced revenue. European Command's response is a campaign of active engagement with allied and partner Ministries of Defense across the theater to keep national defense funding at effective levels, encouraging wise investment of available defense spending and supporting the broader U.S. interagency effort to assist newly democratic nations develop well-crafted government institutions and reduce the effects of corruption.

Pooling Resources, Sharing Capabilities. In response to this climate of fiscal austerity and corresponding defense cuts, European Command is working with NATO to make the most of available defense expenditures by pooling resources, sharing capabilities, setting priorities, and enhancing coordination of effort—in initiatives like the NATO Centers of Excellence—that sustain the required military capabilities that underpin the alliance's core tasks, evolving needs, and priorities set in Lisbon and Chicago. Additionally, we must also continue to strongly encourage our allies to meet the minimum NATO goal of spending at least 2% of their GDP on defense.

Ballistic Missile Defense. Unfortunately, our adversaries continue efforts to procure, develop, and proliferate advanced ballistic missile technologies, posing a serious threat to U.S. forces and installations in the theater, as well as to the territory, populations, and forces of our European allies and partners.

Accordingly, European Command continues to make significant progress in implementing the President's European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense. EPAA Phase One is complete, with the AN/TPY-2 land-based radar established and operating from eastern Turkey, U.S. Navy Aegis BMD warships on-station in the Mediterranean, and NATO's declaration last May in Chicago of its interim ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability. EPAA Phase Two is currently in progress, with planning and construction efforts on track to home port four forward-deployed U.S. Navy Aegis BMD warships at Naval Station Rota, Spain, and with work progressing on the first of two Aegis Ashore facilities, with the first site located in Romania. The BMD agreement with Poland for the second Aegis Ashore site, as part of EPAA Phase Three, is signed and in force.



Admiral James Stavridis, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, describes shipboard capabilities for the NATO Ballistic Missile Defense program to NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO Military Committee Chairman General Knud Bartels, and other officials during the NATO Summit in Chicago last May.

The BMD mission also offers another excellent example of the tangible benefits of cooperative resource pooling with our allies and partners in a critical collective security mission. At last year's European Command-sponsored BMD conference in Berlin, the U.S. and our allies conferred on existing advanced maritime air defense systems that could be upgraded to provide European-procured upper-tier BMD surveillance or interceptor contributions to NATO's BMD mission, augmenting the U.S. national contribution. The conference also explored ways to burden-share through a multi-national interceptor pool. This is an important dialogue that, adequately supported, can generate ideas and realize initiatives to increase allied upper and lower-tier BMD contributions complementary to, and interoperable with, existing high-demand, low-density U.S. assets. European Command efforts in this area are already achieving results, as we contributed to the recent Dutch decision to procure upper-tier maritime surveillance BMD systems.

Terrorism & Violent Extremism. With more than 700 kinetic terror incidents occurring in the theater over the past several years, ongoing instability and terrorism (both international and indigenous) existing in, and transiting through, our theater will continue to threaten Europe and the United States. The diversification of the threat landscape in Europe combined in some cases with the destabilizing social and economic factors described earlier will increase the number of disaffected groups across the political and cultural spectrum that may support extremist groups or seek to express their growing frustrations through violence. The concern is that, stretched increasingly thin by fiscal and policy constraints, theater national governance mechanisms, including law enforcement and intelligence agencies, may be hard-pressed to

respond to these trends. Meanwhile, Al-Qaida and other Islamist extremist groups, with extensive ties to individuals and groups in Western Europe, continue to pose a significant regional threat. These groups regard Europe as an important venue for recruitment, logistical support, financing, and the targeting of U.S. and Western interests. Additionally, Iran's Qods Force continues to operate in Europe, and the rising influence and actions of Lebanese Hezbollah in our theater also operates against U.S. and partner interests.

In addition to designating Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) as the lead organization for theater counter-terrorism efforts, and the associated creation of the SOCEUR CT-Core Cell organization described in the SOCEUR appendix, European Command continues to work closely with theater-based U.S. Intelligence Community partners, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and U.S. Northern Command to track terrorist threats across Europe and the Levant which may pose a risk to the security of the Homeland, forward-stationed or deployed U.S. forces, or our allies and partners.

In fighting back against theater terrorism and extremism, influence operations constitute a key element of the command's 21st century strategy and military activities. In the literate and wired societies of Europe, these operations provide us with the ability to communicate and influence key target audiences using traditional print and broadcast media, as well as increasingly pervasive 21st century tools, including web sites, social media, and cell phones. Our ongoing influence program, Operation ASSURED VOICE, is a vital contributor to the pursuit of our military objectives and theater campaign plan. Through these increasingly necessary 'soft power' activities, we seek to counter violent extremist messaging and mitigate the potential loss of influence given reduced force presence in Europe. We must be able to compete effectively in the information environment, confront violent extremist ideology and recruitment, and reach out to fence sitters wherever ideas compete. Success on the front lines of the information age is critical to preserving stability in our theater and shaping the information environment should a crisis occur.

Transnational Organized Crime & Illicit Trafficking. In addition to, and often in collusion with, terrorist and extremist threats is another source of growing instability inside the European Command theater: the expanding reach and influence of transnational organized crime. Transnational organized crime networks are using increasingly sophisticated business models, operations, and networks to perpetrate global illicit activities. These networks are highly adaptable, bold in technique, ruthless in execution, and are expanding and diversifying their activities at an alarming rate. Some estimates project their revenue at 8-15% of the $70 trillion in global GDP.[4] The result is a convergence of well-funded transnational organized crime networks that can destabilize entire economies, undermine good governance, and create national security threats to the United States, our allies, and partners.

There is also growing evidence of an evolving relationship among terrorists, criminals, and financiers, as each group attempts to exploit the seams that exist in national policies to further this growing illicit global enterprise. Additionally, the pace and scope of 21st century global commercial activity is increasing smuggling venues and innovation to facilitate the movement of a wide range of threats from small arms to threat finance to human trafficking to, in a worst-case scenario, WMD agents and delivery systems.

4 U.S. National Defense University, "Final Report of the Trans-Atlantic Dialogue on Combating Crime-Terror Pipelines," June 25-26, 2012.

Continued pressure on European security budgets, along with Europe's open borders and eased customs checkpoints, could increase the difficulty in combating these threats. Yet, as the President's strategy makes clear, we must continue our collective efforts to understand, disrupt, and dismantle these growing threat networks. In an increasingly interconnected world, the threat from transnational organized crime represents a 21st century national and global security imperative.

Joint Interagency Counter-Trafficking Center. In support of the President's National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (TOC), European Command has stood up the Joint Interagency Counter-Trafficking Center (JICTC). It is important to note that JICTC is a facilitator in support of U.S. Country Teams, and that JICTC is not a law enforcement organization and does not conduct law enforcement activities. Created from existing European Command personnel and infrastructure, JICTC uses existing legal authorities to support U.S. security cooperation activities conducted by U.S. Embassy personnel, operating in countries within the European Command area of responsibility. All of the support and training provided to any particular European nation is done at the request, and through the auspices, of the U.S. Country Team in that nation. JICTC's operations are focused security cooperation activities in the areas of counter-narcotics and support to law enforcement. JICTC provides a single point of contact for U.S. Country Teams to provide training to host-nation partners in these areas. The emphasis on counter-narcotics is consistent with NATO's priorities, and has been a European Command mission for many years.



U.S. European Command's Joint Interagency Counter-Trafficking Center (JICTC) supports the President's National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) by working with U.S. interagency and international partners to fight global illicit trafficking networks. These networks raise an estimated $7 trillion in annual revenue from drugs, weapons, human trafficking, material support to terrorists, and threat finance.

In support of these objectives, JICTC supports U.S. Country Team and interagency efforts, and collaborates with similar European organizations, to assist our partner nations build self-sufficient counter-trafficking skills, competencies, and capacity to defend the United States and Europe from rising TOC threats. Importantly, JICTC does not seek a leadership role for combating organized crime; rather it simply serves as an important forward, theater-based facilitation platform for U.S. agencies and international partners to synchronize counter-trafficking efforts in a collaborative, whole of government approach. In a recent example of its contributions and effectiveness last year, JICTC partnered with Southeastern Europe nations to implement biometric screenings at border entry ports in order to rapidly identify potential terrorists and TOC figures. In just the first day in operation, these enhancements netted two arrests, including a known terrorist.

Whole of Government Approach. Given the likelihood of reduced budgets for years to come, a 'whole of government' approach to finding and implementing solutions to sources of instability and conflict is more important than ever. Partnering unlocks efficiencies and avoids costly duplication of effort. European Command's J-9 Interagency Partnering Directorate, a model that is also in use at numerous other U.S. combatant commands, applies the multiple perspectives of U.S. Government interagency partners to address complex 21st century problems that transcend military-only solutions. For three years, European Command has diligently worked to assemble a diverse team of representatives from eleven U.S. Government agencies, including the Departments of State, Justice, Treasury, Energy, Homeland Security, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the U.S. Agency for International Development. Their expertise, skills, and direct linkage to their Washington D.C.-based headquarters make these team members an invaluable resource in taking a more probative look at sources of regional instability across our theater, including terrorism and extremism, and applying the collective wisdom and intellectual resources of the interagency community to form more comprehensive long-term solutions.

Public-Private Partnering. 'Whole of society' solutions are the next evolution to build upon 'whole of government' success. European Command continues to support the Department of Defense initiative to integrate the capabilities and expertise of the private and non-profit sectors, in coordination with our interagency partners, to support theater objectives. Our long-term strategic partnership with the Business Executives for National Security (BENS) group continues to enhance our partner nations' abilities to provide for their own security. This year, BENS sent a delegation of volunteer business executives to the Azores in Portugal to help identify economic development opportunities in anticipation of projected force structure reductions at Lajes Airfield. BENS also teamed with cyber experts to assist the Government of Iceland cope with a host of cyber security challenges.

In direct support of the transition mission in Afghanistan, European Command has developed strategic partnerships with the private sector, non-profit organizations, and U.S. interagency partners to improve access and economic opportunities for countries along the Northern Distribution Network. Additionally, we are working with partner nations in the South Caucasus to develop and improve treatment capabilities for their wounded warriors who have suffered complex amputations from combat in Afghanistan. Lastly, these public-private efforts are focused on assisting partners improve their disaster preparedness and response capabilities by working with private sector and non-profit partners to enhance the ability of local commercial sectors to assist national recovery efforts in vulnerable areas.

Cyberspace. Cyberspace remains largely indifferent to national borders and traditional security arrangements. Continuous technology evolution and the relative ease of employing disruptive effects in cyberspace have elevated its strategic significance in the military arena. Challenges in attribution and identity management in cyberspace make it difficult to differentiate between state-sponsored and non-state threat actors, while employment of non-state proxies in cyberspace allows states to mask their involvement in malign activity. Traditional deterrence strategies and defensive concepts still need to be adapted to the

unique character and functions of this increasingly vital operational domain, without negatively impacting the vital global connectivity, commerce, and free flow of information that cyberspace provides.

Apart from developing technologically superior defensive countermeasures and seeking multinational commitment to ensuring fundamental freedoms, privacy and the free flow of information in cyberspace, European Command continues to work collaboratively with regional allies and partners in a whole of government effort to build strong and resilient collective cyber security. These efforts include assisting our partners develop and sustain information assurance and cyber defense programs, capable cyber defense workforces (including a cyber incident response capacity), and promoting shared situational awareness about existing threats and the best practices to mitigate them. The command pursues these initiatives through our annual cyber exercise program, COMBINED ENDEAVOR, our ongoing coordination with U.S. Cyber Command, and our participation in the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia.

Energy. Reliable access to affordable energy remains a core issue for countries across the European Command theater, whether they are energy exporters, importers, or transit states. The reality is that dependence on Russian natural gas will continue to drive energy security considerations for many of our European partners. We continue to support alternatives and monitor changes to the energy status quo in Europe, including changes in global oil markets, the potential large-scale development of unconventional gas resources, alternate hydrocarbon supply lines (such as those from the Caspian Sea region), and the increased supply of liquefied natural gas.

European Command's J-9 Interagency Partnering Directorate assists our partners in this area by working with the U.S. Department of Energy and other U.S. agencies to investigate and expand alternative opportunities, primarily in support of partner nation military forces and facilities. Advances in hydrocarbon exploration and extraction, developments in current and next-generation renewable energy technologies, and improvements in energy efficiency all combine to provide European states a significant opportunity to reduce their energy dependence. The J-9 Directorate continues to work closely with these nations to explore these issues and identify energy solutions. Last fall marked a milestone, as European Command's bilateral engagement and 2011 Memorandum of Understanding with Lithuania's Energy Security Center assisted in elevating the importance of that Center's work; one which was recently certified by the North Atlantic Council to become NATO's fully-accredited Energy Security Center of Excellence. Closer to home, J-9 continues its work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to implement the Department's Operational Energy Strategy Implementation Plan, focused on energy security and efficiency for U.S. forces, defense installations, and critical infrastructure.

THEATER POSTURE

"For Europe, the U.S. defense strategy reaffirms the lasting strategic importance of the transatlantic partnership with the United States. Although it will evolve in light of strategic guidance and the resulting budget decisions, our military footprint in Europe will remain larger than in any other region in the world. That's not only because the peace and prosperity of Europe is critically important to the United States, but because Europe remains our security partner of choice for military operations and diplomacy around the world."

- Former Secretary Panetta

Force Laydown. The United States will sustain a military presence in Europe that meets our NATO Article 5 commitment, enables execution of our likely European Command contingency plans, continues to support America's leadership position in NATO, ensures a credible deterrent against aggression, and is sufficiently robust to maintain and sustain the strategic access, infrastructure, and lines of communication that enable the United States to conduct global operations. Global access through Europe remains a critical aspect of America's ability to execute our existing contingency plans in and beyond Europe. This strategic access is dependent upon continued success in sustaining the long-term relationships we enjoy with our European allies and partners, who remain our hosts. We recognize the challenges of the fiscal environment and, in accordance with the Defense Strategic Guidance, continue to consolidate our installations and seek additional efficiencies in U.S. overseas posture while maintaining the necessary capacity to meet our mission requirements. We will continue to advocate for a deliberate and balanced approach to posture in Europe to ensure that future changes meet minimum requirements to conduct U.S. contingency operations, support U.S. global strategic access, and meet our NATO commitments.

U.S. posture in Europe provides unparalleled proximity and access to three continents (Europe, Asia, Africa), stands ready to support U.S. and NATO operations on extremely short notice, and is critical to U.S. planning, logistics, and operations in support of U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and U.S. Strategic Command. Forward-stationed active duty service members, forward-deployed rotational units, and reserve forces remain the nation's primary tool to maintain influence across our theater and, when called upon, to project power quickly within and beyond it. U.S. posture in Europe is an incontestable manifestation of our commitment to the region, preserving strategic relationships and trust, helping build interoperability with our allies and partners, and facilitating progressive transformation within European militaries. The U.S. approach throughout the recent defense strategy review was guided by our enduring need for, and commitment to, these objectives.

There are approximately 64,000 military personnel authorized for the support of U.S. European Command and our Service component commands. Additionally, there are approximately 10,000 additional U.S. personnel supporting U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Transportation Command, NATO, and other U.S. Government and Department of Defense activities in Europe. Moving forward into the future, European Command's mission focus for our enduring forces is as follows:

• **Ground Forces:** U.S. Army Europe will retain a deployable Contingency Command Post, two Brigade Combat Teams (BCT), and theater enabling forces to include aviation, signal corps, medical, engineers, air and missile defense, logistics units, and the Joint Multinational Training Command. From a pool of globally available forces, the U.S. Army will also allocate a BCT, with rotational assignments described previously, to be part of the NATO Response Force (NRF) beginning this year.

• **Air Forces:** U.S. Air Forces Europe will retain the capability to conduct air superiority, theater nuclear support, suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), and strike missions. In addition, the Air Force will maintain its current capability in terms of operational and tactical-level command and control, theater airlift, air refueling, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, special operations forces, and base operations support.

• **Naval and Marine Forces:** U.S. Naval Forces Europe will retain the USS MOUNT WHITNEY and provide command and control of rotational naval forces. Additionally, the U.S. Navy will begin to base four Aegis destroyers at Naval Station Rota beginning in FY 2014. U.S. Marine Corps presence includes the U.S. Marine Forces Europe Headquarters, the USMC Prepositioning Program in Norway, and rotational forces, including those assigned to the Black Sea Rotational Force.

• **Special Operations Forces:** Special Operations Command Europe will retain a headquarters element, along with an Army Special Forces Battalion, an Air Force Special Operations Group, and a Naval Special Warfare (SEAL) unit.


Strategic Rebalance. In accordance with the Defense Strategic Guidance, U.S. European Command continues to rebalance its force levels and base footprint in order to help the Department of Defense divest itself of legacy forces, reapportion forces toward regions of greater instability, and save money. Several recent inactivation decisions will make significant changes to our posture. The most notable change is the inactivation of the U.S. Army's V Corps Headquarters (2013), 170th Brigade Combat Team (2012), and 172nd Brigade Combat Team (2013). Additionally, as the U.S. Army reduces force structure in the coming years, there will be an additional reduction of approximately 2,500 enabling forces and their equipment. Lastly, the Air Force de-activated an air support operations squadron (2012), and plans to inactive an A-10 squadron and an air control squadron.

Consistent with the Defense Strategic Guidance and the new NATO Strategic Concept, we will also continue to adapt and develop our theater requirements by: 1) reinvigorating our contribution to the NATO Response Force, allocating elements of a rotational BCT to train in a multi-national European environment and leveraging the premier U.S. Army training facilities located at the Joint Multinational Training Center in Germany; 2) meeting the objectives of the European Phased Adaptive Approach by supporting the AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey, home-porting four Aegis BMD-capable ships in Spain, and establishing land-based Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland; 3) enhancing regional SOF responsiveness by stationing CV-22 aircraft in the United Kingdom, and continuing our strong partnership with the NATO SOF Headquarters in Belgium; and 4) continuing C-130 and F-16 aircraft rotation to the newly established aviation detachment in Poland to enhance Eastern European aviation training and interoperability.

Military Construction. Thanks to strong and continued Congressional support, previous annual military construction authorizations and appropriations have enabled us to address a balanced mix of our most pressing requirements to support the missions and priorities articulated above. The goal of our FY 2014 military construction program is to support our posture initiatives, recapitalize key infrastructure, and consolidate at enduring locations. Of particular importance in the coming year is support for our EPAA missile defense projects and the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center / Rhine Ordnance Barracks theater medical consolidation and recapitalization project.

Congressional support for EPAA Phase One projects, including approval to replace expeditionary facilities in Turkey with semi-permanent facilities, was critical to achieving a high degree of readiness at the AN/TPY-2 radar site. In FY 2013, the command will begin EPAA Phase Two projects, including an Aegis Ashore site in Romania. Additionally, a request for an EPAA Phase Three Aegis Ashore site in Poland is being developed in FY 2015 as part of the budget submission and will provide the U.S. and our allies improved deterrence against rogue BMD activity.

The Landstuhl / Rhine Ordnance Barracks Medical Center replacement project remains one of the command's highest military constructions priorities. FY 2012 and 2013 funding support have greatly facilitated the project's progress to date. The new facility consolidates duplicative medical facilities in the Kaiserslautern Military Community, and provides a vitally important replacement to theater-based combat and contingency operation medical support from the aged and failing infrastructure at the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center. This recapitalization project will provide life-saving intervention, combat trauma,



The aeromedical evacuation system and trauma care provided at U.S. medical facilities in Germany have saved thousands of lives and driven U.S. combat-related deaths to historic lows. Sustaining these capabilities is critical to ensuring their continued availability for U.S. military personnel serving across half the globe, including areas of persistent conflict in Africa and the Middle East.

emergency care, and other medical support to warfighters operating in the U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Africa Command theaters, as well as forward-stationed U.S. forces in Europe and their families. Continued support and progress with this critical project will ensure the continued availability of the highest level trauma care to future U.S. warfighters at this medically significant half-way point between the United States and areas of persistent conflict in the Middle East, Africa, and other regions across half the globe.

European Command continues to carefully assess our investments at enduring locations. We have reduced our footprint dramatically over the past 22 years, consolidating all operations to approximately 21 main operating bases, with smaller supporting sites. As mentioned earlier, this represents a 75% reduction in installation inventory since the end of the Cold War. Additionally, the command is on a trajectory to reduce our footprint further, to 17 main operating bases with the closure of the U.S. Army communities at Heidelberg, Mannheim, Darmstadt, Schweinfurt, and Bamberg. While further theater consolidation at enduring locations remains a command priority, it is important to note that continued reductions and consolidations to gain greater efficiencies may require additional military construction.

OUR MOST IMPORTANT RESOURCE

"We will keep faith with our troops, military families, and veterans who have borne the burden of a decade of war and who make our military the best in the world. Though we must make hard fiscal choices, we will continue to prioritize efforts that focus on wounded warriors, mental health, and families. And as our newest veterans rejoin civilian life, we continue to have a moral obligation—as a government and as a nation—to give our veterans the care, benefits, and the job opportunities they deserve."

- President Obama

Taking Care of our People & their Families. As the Department of Defense continues to deal with the effects of more than a decade at war, we have a solemn obligation and responsibility to continue successful programs and seek new and innovative ways to support our forces and families. In that effort, European Command's 'Force and Family Readiness' priorities are closely aligned with the Administration's 'Strengthening Our Military Families' initiative.

While maintaining our focus on mission readiness, we continue to seek avenues and resources to respond to the significant stress placed on our forces and families due to protracted combat operations and cyclical unit and personnel deployments. There remains a need for sustained behavioral health services to support our warriors and their families, particularly in an overseas environment with few private sector options. It remains a command priority that the members of our all-volunteer force and their families continue receiving the quality care and responsive support they need in a stigma-free environment.

European Command also supports the efforts being led by the Department of Defense Education Activity to transform and modernize our 1950s-era, aged and, in some cases, failing overseas school infrastructure. European Command is fortunate to have some of the best and most committed teachers at work in our theater. We are committed to providing the resources these educators need to ensure the children of our military and DoD civilian families receive a first-rate education.

Lastly, as total force levels continue to change, service members must transfer more often than originally expected, placing yet another burden on the military family. The inability of the military spouse to remain in his or her chosen career field is a part of that burden, adding further economic strain in difficult times. Of the 26,000 active duty and reserve spouses who live in our theater, 25% possess a college degree and 10% hold graduate degrees. Accordingly, in order to support greater spouse employment, European Command launched our first-ever 'Spouses Virtual Job Fair' last year. Part of the wider 'Military Spouse Employment Partnership' program, this initiative provided key assistance by linking military spouses with employers seeking a highly qualified 21st century workforce.

NATO & ALLIED COMMAND OPERATIONS (ACO)

NATO's Strategic Direction. The NATO Alliance remains the center of a transatlantic framework focused on the strategic concept of 'Active Engagement, Modern Defense.' The core principles of collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security contribute to the peace and safeguarding of the United States and our European allies and partners. The alliance has evolved from a Cold War construct, consisting of a few nations, to twenty-eight member nations today with a shared vision and growing interoperability to provide expeditionary capabilities for out-of-area operations. To safeguard the alliance against the evolving challenges of 21st century security, including ballistic missile defense, cyber attack, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism, NATO is evolving through institutional reform, programs and initiatives, and increased interoperability and partnerships.

NATO Command Structure Reform. The Lisbon Summit set the glide path for a new NATO command structure that is leaner, more affordable, and more effective at conducting operational and transformational tasks across the full range of alliance missions. NATO Command Structure reform is on track to reduce its staff manpower from 13,000 to 8,800 and cut major headquarters from eleven to six. Organized under two Strategic Commands (Operations and Transformation), it will include two deployable joint force headquarters (JFHQs), land, air, and maritime components, and the NATO communications and information systems group. The NATO command structure links the alliance's over three million active military personnel, 24,000 aircraft, 750 ships, and 50 AWACS to operate stronger together in the 21st century.

NATO Forces 2020. NATO's vision for future capability improvement was unveiled at the Chicago Summit as a framework to build the concepts of 'Smart Defense' and the 'Connected Forces' initiative. NATO's Smart Defense initiative provides the path to develop the capabilities; the Connected Forces initiative is how NATO will employ these capabilities.


Smart Defense. The Smart Defense initiative is a means to provide access to crucial capabilities while collectively taking multinational and innovative approaches to pooling resources. As mentioned, this initiative creates opportunity for the alliance to work together, wisely using individual defense budgets to make NATO greater than the sum of its parts. In critical areas—such as sustainment, training, engagement, ballistic missile defense, force protection, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—Smart Defense gives nations the ability to contribute to projects and acquire capabilities that they may otherwise be unable to afford individually. To date, the Europeans participate in every one of the 147 Smart Defense projects. More importantly for the transatlantic partnership, they lead over two-thirds of them. Smart Defense aims to assure continued capability development commensurate with global security challenges in order to meet NATO's Strategic Concept, even in the prevailing resource-constrained global economy.

"We will ensure that our Alliance has the modern, deployable, and connected forces that we need for the next decade and beyond. We will do this through a renewed culture of cooperation called 'Smart Defense'....We call it 'Smart Defense' because it is about spending defense money in a smarter way. The smarter way is to prioritize, to specialize, to cooperate, to focus on not just what we cut, but on what we keep. And to choose multi-national solutions instead of unilateral solutions."

- NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen

Connected Forces Initiative. The Connected Forces initiative presents an opportunity to contribute to the 'NATO Forces 2020' vision and goal, by building on alliance experience in recent operations, and maintaining and enhancing NATO's combat effectiveness—hard earned over the past decade—through expanded education and training events, increased exercises, and the better use of technology.

Major Operations. Over the past year, NATO and Allied Command Operations have executed multiple major operations, demonstrating the alliance's impressive capabilities. Today, roughly 150,000 military personnel are engaged in NATO missions around the world, successfully managing complex ground, air and naval operations in every type of environment. Every day, NATO forces are operating in Afghanistan, Kosovo, the Mediterranean, with the African Union, in the skies over the Baltic and North Seas, and in the waters off the Horn of Africa.



International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) efforts continue to build the strength, confidence, and competencies of Afghan National Security Forces, supporting the transition of security responsibilities to Afghans in 2013 and 2014. Asia Foundation's 2012 Survey of the Afghan People reflected Afghans' continued confidence in the Afghan National Army and National Police as the country's most trusted public institutions.

Afghanistan. NATO's operation in Afghanistan continues to remain the top priority and operational commitment of the alliance and our partner nations comprising ISAF. There are 106,000 troops from 50 troop-contributing nations sharing the combined burdens and sacrifices of the Afghanistan mission as we press forward with a balanced drawdown of combat forces and provide sustainment post-2014. The sacrifices shared by ISAF and our Afghan partners will ensure that Afghanistan will never again become a safe-haven for terrorists. Since NATO's intervention, the lives of Afghan men, women, and children have significantly improved with respect to security, health care, education, and opportunity. Today, over 80% of

Afghans have access to health care. Since 2002, school enrollment for children has increased from two million to eight million with girls representing 38% of this enrollment, up from a dismal low of 3% under the Taliban. Infant, child, and maternal mortality rates have decreased by over 34% since 2002, and adult life expectancy has gone from 42 to 62 years of age. NATO's goal remains to turn over full responsibility for security to Afghanistan by December 31, 2014.

The strategy outlined at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, assured at the May 2012 Chicago Summit, and reinforced at the July 2012 Tokyo Conference is on track to build the capacity, capability, and professionalism of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Today, ANSF stand at a force level of 335,000: 182,000 from the Afghan National Army; 6,000 from the Afghan Air Force; and 147,000 from the Afghan National Police. In October 2012, ANSF reached their recruiting goal of 352,000. The transition—which started in 2011, and is being sequentially expanded through five tranches of selected districts and cities to encompass all of Afghanistan by mid-2013—is underway in some part of all 34 provinces, all provincial capitals, and two-thirds of all districts. The ANSF have assumed lead responsibility for areas that encompass 76% of the Afghan population, and conditions in these areas have remained stable or improved. In fact, civilian casualties have fallen for the first time in six years, down 12%, and ISAF casualties are down 27% compared to last year. Last December, the 'Tranche 4' announcement transitioned security responsibility for the remaining internal and border areas. Once the full transition is complete by the end of 2014, the ISAF mission will end.

In support of post-2014 operations in Afghanistan, NATO will launch the NATO Train, Advise, and Assist Mission, tentatively named 'Resolute Support' in Afghanistan. In October 2012, NATO Defense Ministers approved the North Atlantic Council (NAC) Initiating Directive for developing the concept of operations for the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. It is due this spring. This demonstrated resolve ensures the gains made during the transition are irreversible.


Tangible signs of the gains in Afghanistan continue to be shown. In findings recorded by the Asia Foundation in their 2012 *Survey of the Afghan People*, 52% of Afghans polled conveyed their belief that the country is "headed in the right direction," up from 46% last year.[5] It is worth noting that this statistic is higher than the percentage found in most Western countries. Moreover, the survey noted a moderate decrease in the percentage of Afghans who fear for their safety, while reflecting Afghans' continued confidence in the Afghan National Army and National Police as the country's most trusted public institutions. NATO will not leave a security vacuum in Afghanistan.

Kosovo. The international supervision of Kosovo has ended four and a half years after it became independent. The situation remains outwardly calm, but there remain underlying tensions and fragility while Serbia and Kosovo proceed within the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue to resolve their differences peacefully. To ensure this outcome, the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission maintains 5,600 troops

5 The Asia Foundation, "Afghanistan in 2012: A Survey of the Afghan People," http://asiafoundation.org/publications/pdf/1155.

from 30 contributing countries in Kosovo. KFOR will be staying there for the time being, along with the 1,250 international legal experts and police supporting the EU's rule of law mission. While progress will require committed political dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, KFOR continues to create positive conditions for this dialogue by helping to maintain a safe and secure environment and facilitate freedom of movement.

Counter-Piracy and Operation OCEAN SHIELD. Operation OCEAN SHIELD is NATO's counter-piracy mission, consisting of up to seven ships working alongside EU and U.S. task forces to counter piracy in waters surrounding the Horn of Africa. These relationships and the shipping companies' use of armed security teams and industry best practices have notably reduced piracy. During the first six months of 2012, there were 69 incidents involving Somali pirates, down from 163 during the same period in 2011, a reduction of over 40%. Today, 2 vessels and less than 100 hostages are being held, compared with 30 ships and 682 mariners in 2011.



A vessel burns off the Somali coast after being used by pirates to attack the Dutch warship HNLMS Rotterdam. NHLMS Rotterdam, NATO's counter-piracy flagship, returned fire, disabling the vessel and scattering the attackers. NATO's Operation OCEAN SHIELD, in coordination with shipping industry best practices, continues to reduce episodes of piracy in waters off the Horn of Africa.

Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR. As NATO's only current Article 5-based operation, Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR provides maritime situational awareness through operations in the Mediterranean to demonstrate NATO's resolve to deter, defend, disrupt, and protect against terrorism. Ongoing since 2001, ACTIVE ENDEAVOR is on a path to transform from a platform-based to a network-based operation, based on an intelligence and information-sharing network among the 63 nations and regional partners that contribute to the Maritime Safety and Security Information System.


NATO Members Defense Commitments & Budgeting Outlook. The European financial crisis has had a security impact on NATO and partner nations. Few allies currently meet the NATO goal that each ally commits 2% of GDP to defense spending. The Smart Defense Initiative, Connected Forces Initiative, and NATO Forces 2020 all strive to fill capacity and capability gaps. However, at a time of uncertain security challenges and severe fiscal austerity it remains difficult, but still critical, to adequately fund defense spending.

Enduring 21st Century Impact & Relevance. The 2012 U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance addresses Europe and NATO prominently, noting: "Europe is home to some of America's most stalwart allies and partners, many of whom have sacrificed alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere." One of NATO's most important priorities is to maintain working relationships, at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, with those allies who have recently developed capabilities and interoperability with each other and with U.S. Forces. The NATO Response Force (NRF) is a key way to meet this priority.

> "Today, I can announce that the United States will make a new commitment to the security of our NATO partners by reinvigorating our contribution to the NATO Response Force that we value so much. The NRF was designed to be an agile, rapidly deployable, multinational force that can respond to crises when and where necessary. The United States had endorsed the NRF but has not made a tangible contribution due to the demands of the wars—until now."
>
> - Former Secretary Panetta, Munich Security Conference, February 2012

As announced by the Secretary of Defense last year, our commitment of U.S. forces to the NRF is a means to reinvigorating and bolstering the NRF. By providing a rapid demonstration of force or an early establishment of NATO military presence in support of Article V or crisis response operations, NRF mitigates force structure reductions in Europe by improving interoperability and capitalizing on flexibility. Over the long term, NRF will be a vital asset for post-ISAF interoperability ensuring adherence to, and constant improvement of, Standing NATO Agreements (STANAGS). The NRF will also serve as both a key training resource and valuable tool for evaluating the status of European forces. As they remain our most likely companions in any security effort—from humanitarian assistance to full-spectrum conflict—the U.S. must have confidence in the interoperability and readiness of European forces.

Ballistic Missile Defense. The protection of NATO European territory, populations, and forces against ballistic missiles from increasing threats to the alliance is vitally important. NATO declared an Interim Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability at the May 2012 Chicago Summit. As mentioned, the U.S. AN/TPY-2 surveillance radar based in Turkey has been declared to NATO as a part of EPAA's Phase One implementation. The initial operational capability of NATO BMD is anticipated in 2016, with full operational capability in 2020.




USS The Sullivans (DDG-68), a guided missile destroyer, conducts at-sea training with Royal Netherlands Navy frigate HNLMS De Ruyter (F804). Allied maritime support includes 'riding shotgun' to protect U.S. Aegis BMD platforms, an important contribution to the Ballistic Missile Defense mission. The Netherlands Navy is also pursuing maritime upper-tier BMD tracking capabilities for their vessels.

Moreover, NATO's recent decision to provide Patriot missiles to defend Turkey against the threat of Syrian ballistic missiles is yet another sign of the alliance's solidarity and effectiveness in this area.

Cyber Defense. NATO's policy on cyber defense focuses on the protection of cyber assets and sharing of cyber situational awareness among NATO nations. The fielding of the NATO Computer Incident Response Center was a significant milestone as we progress towards full operational capability in 2013 to support alliance operations and missions.

NATO Special Operations Forces. U.S. leadership of the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) remains instrumental in driving the rapid transformation of NATO Special Operations Forces (SOF) and creating a NATO allied and partner SOF collaborative network. A deployable core of the NATO Special Operations Component Command Headquarters will achieve initial operational capability in 2013, providing an assured, responsive, and agile command and control entity for NATO SOF under the operational command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. This core will be capable of coordinating NATO military operations within the complex and asymmetric environments of the 21st century. Today, over 2,000 NATO allied and partner SOF are conducting SOF missions in Afghanistan. Additionally, NSHQ is moving forward with several initiatives to develop interoperable SOF standards. NATO SOF brings unprecedented opportunities to leverage partnerships, improve interoperability, and deliver expanded capabilities for NATO to ensure peace and stability for the alliance and our partner nations.



NATO exercises remain a critical venue to align and sustain high-end capabilities among NATO's most developed partners for continued burden-sharing; preserve a decade of hard-earned Alliance expeditionary capabilities; and support newer Allies' capability development for current and future NATO operations.

Keeping the Edge through Exercises. The planned reduction of NATO forces supporting ISAF, combined with U.S. reinvigoration in the NRF, provides a unique opportunity for NATO to modify and align exercise programs with U.S. combatant commands and regional partners. After ten years of combat deployments against an asymmetric enemy, NATO will need to dedicate itself to flexible training that emphasizes traditional skill sets, while incorporating lessons learned from recent conflicts. Additionally, these exercises provide the opportunity for newer members of the alliance, as well as our other NATO partners, to pair with some of the highly-capable founding members, continuing to burden-share collective defense while raising the overall quality of NATO forces.

"The NATO Alliance continues to wield unprecedented influence in our world, and remains a critical element of U.S. and European security."

– Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Senate Armed Services Committee

CONCLUSION

Every day, the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and Civilians of U.S. European Command and NATO Allied Command Operations are making vital contributions to the forward defense of the United States, the preservation of America's vital national security interests, and the continued evolution and effectiveness of NATO. As they continue their work, through the seamless execution of combined military operations, interagency cooperation, and whole of society activities, I ask that you keep faith with these extraordinary men and women, and their families, to ensure they receive the care and benefits they have earned and so rightly deserve.

I entered Annapolis and joined the Navy over forty years ago. Among the many things I have learned, one of the clearest lessons is that the most reliable constant in this world is change. But in today's world of accelerating change, connectivity, and complexity, another anchor has also held remarkably constant, recognized by national leaders time and again, for providing the essential foundation of continued security and stability in the 21st century. That anchor is the transatlantic alliance. It is simply a fact, one bridging two centuries and continuing to evolve in a dynamic security environment, that Europeans remain our most steadfast, reliable, battle-tested, and important global partners as we confront the strategic risks and military challenges of the 21st century. No other region so readily combines the same commitment to shared values, high-end military capabilities and capacity, and willingness to stand with America—as our European Allies and partners have demonstrated at great cost and sacrifice over the past decade—in this century's fight for freedom and the pursuit of global security and stability. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance states it clearly: "Europe is our principal partner in seeking global and economic security, and will remain so for the foreseeable future."

The world is changing again. Yet, as we consider the contributions and future of the transatlantic alliance, the numbers are worth repeating, especially in an era of significant fiscal pressure and austerity: Together, the U.S. and Europe generate *half the globe's* GDP. Our European partners collectively spend $300 billion on defense, second only to the United States and well ahead of China and Russia. As essential contributors to an alliance comprised of 750 ships, 24,000 aircraft, and over three million active-duty forces, and with over 40,000 European forces currently devoted to NATO and UN operations, our European allies and partners are significant and necessary global security providers, fielding forces for combat and stability operations that have stood shoulder-to-shoulder with the U.S. in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Kosovo, and other hot spots across the world. Europeans have willingly shared the burden of war over the past ten years, consistently comprising the bulk of non-U.S. coalition forces for the missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Libya.

Even as we acknowledge these facts, the convergence of several factors last year—the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, rising tensions in the Levant, North Africa, and the Balkans, and the global tightening of defense resources—has provided an opportunity for European Command to reconsider and rebalance our present priorities and enduring capabilities to ensure that we are providing the most efficient and effective support to the nation and to NATO. This effort offered several conclusions. First, European Command is actively contributing to every one of the Defense Department's ten national missions for Joint Force 2020, protecting America's vital national security interests, and defending the nation against the threats of the 21st century: ballistic missiles; WMD proliferation; terrorism; piracy; cyber attack; and transnational illicit trafficking. Second, U.S. presence and infrastructure in Europe, which continues to be right-sized for these enduring missions and the future security environment, provide the United States with an indispensable strategic platform for engagement across the globe, directly supporting the operations of six U.S. Combatant Commanders, numerous U.S. Government Interagency functions, and 51 U.S. Country Teams. Third, U.S. leadership and commitment to the NATO Alliance continues to support the evolution of that institution into the world's premier security organization, contributing highly capable and interoperable forces to Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Kosovo, and preparing them for future coalition expeditionary operations. As such, the alliance has also become a hub for continued cooperation and outreach with like-minded partners in the Pacific, including Australia, South Korea, Singapore, New Zealand, and Japan, essential in the years ahead. In this capacity, the transatlantic partnership—one the President calls the "cornerstone of global security"—remains one of the nation's most valuable and enduring strategic investments. Properly sustained, it will continue providing critical security dividends in the challenging decades ahead.

To safeguard that investment, European Command continues to leverage the funding and authorities that Congress has provided to preserve our strategic partnerships and maintain the essential warfighting capabilities and interoperability that our allies and partners have gained, with our help, over a decade of sustained deployment and combat operations. In the near term, European Command is working to enable a successful ISAF transition and preserve partner capability and commitment to the post-2014 mission in Afghanistan. To that end, we request that Congress continue supporting Section 1206 (Global Train and Equip) and other ISAF coalition support programs, in order to meet our goals to transition security responsibility in Afghanistan over the coming year and, in concert with our allies and partners, to continue training, advising, and assisting the ANSF after they assume full security responsibility in 2014.

Over the longer term, we seek your assistance and support to sustain the value of the transatlantic alliance and its continued contributions to global security. As you know, the key to that future is ensuring our European allies and partners can and will continue contributing deployable, capable, and interoperable forces for future conflicts and coalition military operations. Despite the economic constraints we all face, this future is within reach if we sustain the necessary investments to maintain critical gains in expeditionary

capabilities and interoperability that have been achieved in recent years, and preserve the vital strategic relationships that have been painstakingly built over the past six decades. The preservation and future employment of these capabilities represent the impending return on our investment when crises arrive on our doorstep at their unscheduled hour, seeking urgent, multilateral, and coalition-based solutions.

Mitigating the risks posed by the fiscal environment to U.S. influence in the region and NATO's enduring strength and cohesion also requires a clear and unequivocal U.S. commitment to our theater and Article V responsibilities. Those responsibilities require that we maintain a balanced and enduring U.S. presence in Europe; reinvigorate U.S. participation in the NATO Response Force; continue resourcing important security assistance programs such as Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, the Warsaw Initiative Fund, and the Combatant Commanders' Exercise and Engagement Fund; and support NATO's Smart Defense, Connected Forces, NATO 2020, and related initiatives.

History may not repeat itself, but its patterns are clear. After a decade of war, and facing significant fiscal challenges, we stand once again at the crossroads: on one side, the military retrenchment and risk that has traditionally accompanied the end of every period of American war; on the other, a belt-tightening but balanced approach that sustains U.S. leadership and engagement in the world, with a focus on continued global security and prosperity. Each choice entails risks, and the future is hard to see. But one thing history has also shown us, time and again, is the enduring value of this remarkable transatlantic alliance.

Though the strategic and fiscal challenges are very real on both sides of the Atlantic, this historical moment offers us a critical opportunity, one acknowledged by former Secretary Panetta: "I believe that today's strategic and fiscal realities offer NATO the opportunity to build the alliance we need for the 21st century—an alliance that serves as the core of an expanding network of partnerships around the globe in support of common security objectives. But it is an alliance that remains rooted in the strong bonds of transatlantic security cooperation and collective defense."

The men and women of U.S. European Command and NATO Allied Command Operations are building, strengthening, and preserving those vital bonds to provide for the forward defense of the United States, our collective security, and the viability of this critical partnership. This is critical work, as the transatlantic partnership continues to serve as the security foundation for the world's economic center of gravity, America's secure Eastern flank, and the "vital cornerstone of global security and stability" to deal with the challenges of a rapidly changing century and security environment. Through this work, European Command and NATO form that vital "core" of an "expanding network of partnerships"—through joint and coalition forces, civil-military security partnerships, and international security structures—that provide us with what I call the "sum of all security."

In his remarks at last year's NATO summit in Chicago, President Obama reiterated and reinforced the importance of this security and an enduring truth of the global security environment; one that bridges the past and current centuries in order to guide us into the future. In that statement, the President acknowledged: "NATO has been the bedrock of common security, freedom and prosperity for nearly 65 years. It hasn't just endured—it has thrived—because our nations are stronger when we stand together."

For nearly four years now, the motto of U.S. European Command has been that we are, clearly and unequivocally, 'Stronger Together.' For nearly 65 years, this has been NATO's historic organizing principle. It is even truer today in light of the economic challenges and increasing threats we face. We must continue to work together, trust each other, and continue building and evolving this historic partnership to meet the needs and challenges of the 21st century. In doing this, we will not only endure; we will prevail, we will thrive, and we will continue to grow and to be **STRONGER TOGETHER**.

"Our transatlantic partnership is the most successful alliance and the greatest catalyst for global action. I am determined to keep it that way."

- President Obama

APPENDIX

EUROPEAN COMMAND SERVICE COMPONENTS



Service Component Commands. Except when assigned to a joint task force for military operations or participating in joint exercises, European Command forces are managed, trained, and equipped by our five Service component headquarters: U.S. Army Europe; U.S. Marine Forces Europe; U.S. Naval Forces Europe/Naval Forces Africa; U.S. Air Forces Europe/Air Forces Africa; and U.S. Special Operations Command Europe. These organizations provide forces for our military-to-military engagements, serve both an assurance and deterrence function in the region, deploy units for contingency operations, and, when necessary, may be tasked to provide a tailored joint task force headquarters. Understanding our service component commands is essential to understanding European Command, as they conduct the majority of our steady-state activities. A brief description of each Service Component Command, and its recent activities, is provided in this appendix.


U.S. Army Europe
Wiesbaden, Germany

Introduction & Overview: United States Army Europe leads Army forces in support of U.S. European Command and the Department of the Army by training and preparing for unified land operations, strengthening alliances, and conducting theater security cooperation. Executing this mission, U.S. Army Europe supports numerous U.S. combatant commands around the world as America seeks to prevent conflict, shape the global environment with our international partners, and win any contemporary fight. U.S. Army Europe plays a critical role in strengthening and preserving European Command's strategic partnerships, specifically by increasing interoperability, building partner capacity, and enhancing allied and partner expeditionary capabilities.

Major Accomplishments: In 2012, U.S. Army Europe provided trained and culturally aware units and enabling forces, capable of conducting full-spectrum operations in support of ISAF and other contingency operations. Supporting ballistic missile defense in Europe, U.S. Army Europe played a leading role in operating and maintaining the ground-based AN/TPY-2 radar site in Turkey. Theater enabler units also provided vital intelligence, logistics and sustainment support to U.S. European Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. Special Operations Command forces operating across Europe and Africa.

In accordance with the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, U.S. Army Europe is aggressively continuing consolidation efforts and theater force rebalancing. As mentioned, key modifications include the inactivation of the 170th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (BCT) last year, and the inactivation of the 172nd BCT and U.S. Army V Corps Headquarters this year. As a result of ongoing reductions, the U.S. Army will have closed 102 theater sites from FY 2006 to FY 2012. The closure of an additional 30 sites, including the entire communities of Heidelberg, Mannheim, Darmstadt, Schweinfurt, and Bamberg, has also been publicly announced and is on track for completion by FY 2015.

Operations & Operational Support: U.S. Army Europe stands ready to support contingency operations and meet future global threats. Though some operations have been ongoing for years, others are completely new and unexpected, requiring flexibility and innovation to support. Last year, an average of 20% of U.S. Army Europe's forces were deployed to support to U.S. Central Command and ISAF. In 2012 alone, the U.S. Army's V Corps, 173rd Airborne BCT, and 12th Combat Aviation Brigade all deployed to Afghanistan.




Soldiers from U.S. Army Europe's 1st Battalion, 503rd infantry, 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team fire an 81-mm mortar while executing operations at Combat Outpost Kherwar, Afghanistan, on August 6, 2012.

Critical to supporting operations in Afghanistan, U.S. Army Europe has established and maintained a transportation node in Romania. Located at Mihail Kogalniceanu Airfield and operated by U.S. Army Europe's 21st Theater Sustainment Command, this transportation node is a critical link in the Northern Distribution Network. Since its establishment, this facility has supported over 130 flights, transporting nearly 10,000 service members and approximately 800 tons of equipment between the United States and Afghanistan. In addition, U.S. Army Europe personnel have established a trans-shipment point at Naval Station Rota, Spain, transporting 141 helicopters out of Afghanistan and redeploying them by sea to the United States.

In cyberspace, U.S. Army Europe's 5th Signal Command is addressing the array of rising challenges while, at the same time, providing the backbone for communications between deployed forces and the United States. Already partnered with multinational experts, 5th Signal Command is incorporating simulated cyber threats into U.S. and multinational training exercises and improving operational approaches to these threats.

Exercises, Theater Security Cooperation, and Partnerships: The U.S. Army Europe exercise program remains critical to the pre-deployment training of U.S. and coalition forces supporting ISAF and other contingency operations. It serves to prepare these same forces for future operations across U.S. European Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. Central Command. In 2012, U.S. Army Europe prepared two Polish brigades, two Romanian battalions and, in close cooperation with the Marine Corps, two Georgian battalions for deployment to ISAF.



U.S. Army Europe's Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC) is a strategic national asset, providing U.S. forces and our multinational partners an unparalleled training venue to prepare for ISAF deployments and exercise critical theater security skills. Here, Polish Special Operations Forces conduct search-and-rescue drills as part of a downed-aircraft exercise in Hohenfels, Germany.

Leveraging U.S. Army Europe's forward deployed brigades and America's long-standing investment in the premier training facilities at the Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC) in Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels, Germany, U.S. Army Europe trained and mentored 2,481 multinational soldiers from 22 countries in counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) skill sets, and trained 1,204 multinational drivers on Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. U.S. Army Europe teams also mentored and advised the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. In partnership with NATO, four mission rehearsal exercises were conducted at JMTC in 2012, training 72 mentoring and advisory teams from 16 European partner nations to support ISAF. U.S. Army Europe also enabled 190 National

Guardsmen to co-deploy as part of 14 advisory/mentoring and embedded support teams, deploying with over 4,200 multinational personnel in support of ISAF operations.

Additionally, U.S. Army Europe participated in 21 Joint and combined Army exercises last year, including four major mission rehearsal exercises conducted in 14 countries with 44 participating nations. Highlights from those highly successful events include:

• AUSTERE CHALLENGE 12, supported by the 10th Air and Missile Defense Command, which partnered with the Israeli Defense Forces to exercise missile defense capabilities.

• ATLAS VISION 12, conducted with forces from the Russian Ground Forces Central Military District as an important confidence-building measure and the first exercise of its kind since 2006. The exercise supported European Command's priority for increased cooperation with Russia.

• SABER JUNCTION, a decisive maneuver action training event conducted last October by the 2nd Calvary Regiment (2CR) with over 1,800 multinational soldiers from 19 partner nations—the largest and most sophisticated such exercise in 20 years.

Way Ahead: With approximately 90% of multinational forces in Afghanistan contributed by our European allies and partners, European armies remain our most likely, willing, and able coalition partners. Accordingly, it is critical that we maintain the strong alliances that U.S. Army Europe has forged over the past 60 years. Forward-based U.S. Army forces in Europe do this, and continue making major contributions to U.S. vital national security interests by extending U.S. strategic reach, assuring access, preserving strategic partnerships in Europe in a post-ISAF environment, addressing a wide array of hybrid threats, and maintaining regional security and stability. Importantly, the consolidation of U.S. Army Europe's command leadership continues, with U.S. Army Europe Headquarters finishing its move from Heidelberg to Wiesbaden this year, the inactivation of V Corps, and the reduction of 2,500 enabler forces. Also in 2013, the Army will commit a CONUS-based brigade to reinvigorate U.S. participation in the NATO Response Force (NRF). As part of this commitment, elements of this brigade will rotate twice annually to Europe to train with our NATO and non-NATO partners. JMTC will play an important role in hosting and supporting this U.S. component as we implement the Department's pledge to reinvigorate U.S. participation in the NRF.

U.S. Marine Forces Europe
Stuttgart, Germany

Introduction & Overview. Marine Forces Europe leverages rotational expeditionary Marine Forces and prepositioned capabilities-based equipment to reassure allies, deter potential adversaries, and maintain strategic access while supporting rapid response to crises and contingencies. Throughout 2012, Marine Forces Europe strengthened strategic partnerships, assured access, enhanced interoperability, and prepared forces for operations in Afghanistan through three critical programs: the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force, Black Sea Rotational Force; the Georgia Deployment Program for the International Security Assistance Force (GDP ISAF); and the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program Norway (MCPP-N); as well as an aggressive annual exercise program. Additionally, Marine Forces Europe's 2012 security cooperation activities focused on the Caucasus, Black Sea, Balkan, and Baltic regions, contributing to European stability and the forward defense of the United States.

Major Accomplishments. During the summer of 2012, Marine Forces Europe coordinated with Naval Forces Europe to support three simultaneous theater requirements: configuring vessels in the Mediterranean to posture for contingency operations; supporting Exercise Baltic Operations (BALTOPS 12) with Baltic NATO partners; and trans-loading vital equipment and ammunition from a Military Sealift Command vessel in support of the MCPP-N initiative. This concurrent planning and execution demonstrated extraordinary in-theater flexibility, organization, and teamwork.

Marine Forces Europe also continues to serve as a vital and integral contributor to U.S. relations with Georgia. Following last year's meeting between the U.S. and Georgian Presidents, Marine Forces Europe was tasked with leading assessments of the Georgian junior officer and non-commissioned officer professional development programs as well as Georgian combat engineer training and education. These efforts have informed the ongoing development of U.S. security cooperation engagement plans directed in the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act. Marine Forces Europe is also coordinating Georgian field grade officer augmentation to deploy Marine Regimental Combat Teams. This effort will support enhanced security cooperation for Georgian Brigade command and staff development. Finally, Marine Forces Europe enhanced the Black Sea Rotational Force in 2012 by adding capabilities to support non-combatant evacuation operations, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief missions.


Georgia Deployment Program—International Security Assistance Force (GDP-ISAF). In support of nationally directed theater strategic end states, Marine Forces Europe is leading European Command's mission to train the Georgian Armed Forces. Performing this mission since 2010, Marine Forces Europe has developed and implemented a program that applies the USMC organizational model for Security Force Assistance, using general purpose forces and security cooperation organizations to train

Georgian battalions for full-spectrum counterinsurgency operations supporting ISAF. The program's first iteration, GDP-ISAF 1, contributed four battalions to the fight in Afghanistan. GDP-ISAF 2 is contributing an additional nine battalions, making Georgia one of the largest non-NATO contributors providing full-spectrum counterinsurgency support to ongoing ISAF coalition operations.

In order to simultaneously train two battalions, the Georgians have added the Vaziani South Training Area (VSTA) to enduring training activities at the Krtsanisi Training Area (KTA). Pre-deployment training at these locations have incorporated lessons learned from previous deployments, and optimized the training curriculum to include biometrics, counter-IED tactics, Pashtu language training, blue force tracker, medical training, driver training, and improved squad and small unit level tactics. This highly successful program continues to develop Georgian institutional capacity to conduct its own full-spectrum counterinsurgency training. It also takes advantage of proximity to the training facilities at U.S. Army Europe's Joint Multinational Training Center for mission rehearsal exercises prior to ISAF deployment. This program's success is clear, as deployed Georgian battalions currently constitute half of the ground combat power in ISAF's Regional Command Southwest. GDP-ISAF Rotations 10 and 11 are currently conducting their pre-deployment training evolutions for subsequent rotation into Afghanistan later this year.

U.S. Marine Corps' Black Sea Rotational Force. Marine Forces Europe also deploys and supports the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force, Black Sea Rotational Force (BSRF), a program that demonstrates U.S. commitment and maintains strategic access across the Caucasus and Black Sea regions through theater security cooperation and security force assistance. The BSRF uses the well-placed U.S. Forward Operating Site at Mihail Kogalniceanu Airfield in Romania as its staging base.

BSRF focuses its partner engagement on tasks that prepare and train these regional partners for out-of-area operations. The program builds enduring trust while enhancing U.S. strategic objectives in the region. In 2012, BSRF supported European Command crisis response requirements through its capabilities to conduct non-combatant evacuation control center actions and provide support to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. Equipped by the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program Norway (MCPP-N), BSRF executed 97 engagement events with 20 countries (15 of which contribute forces to ISAF), participated in three Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercises, and conducted five community relations projects. This year, BSRF will continue supporting European Command's crisis response mission, is scheduled for 85 engagement events with 22 countries, will participate in four JCS exercises, and will conduct at least five community relations projects.




Macedonian soldiers participating with U.S. Marines from the Black Sea Rotational Force in the Marine Corps Combat Marksmanship Program sharpening their tactics, techniques, and procedures in essential military skills.

Marine Corps Prepositioning Program Norway (MCPP-N). In 2012, the Marine Corps began transforming this program from the current Marine Expeditionary Brigade prepositioning objective to an equipment set capable of supporting an ashore-based, balanced Marine Air Ground Task Force, built around the core of an Infantry Battalion Task Force. This Marine Air Ground Task Force, equipped through the MCPP-N for crisis response, can support operations up to the mid-intensity conflict level. European Command has supported MCPP-N's transformational effort in coordination with the Norwegian Ministry of Defense, the Department of State, Joint Staff, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, and Marine Forces Europe to obtain the necessary Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) entitlements to store USMC combat vehicles in Norway. MCPP-N transformation mitigates, but does not replace, the divestiture of the theater's Maritime Prepositioning Squadron which occurred last September. MCPP-N also continues to support the reinforcement of Norway, reaffirming America's strategic relationship with this important partner.

Exercises. Marine Forces Europe participated in 18 joint, bilateral, and multilateral exercises in 2012, reassuring theater allies and deterring potential adversaries by demonstrating rapid assembly, deployment, and maritime expeditionary capabilities. Noteworthy exercises last year included:

- AGILE SPIRIT, a Warsaw Initiative Fund (WIF)-resourced pre-deployment training workup for Georgian Battalions slated for the Georgia Deployment Program;
- BALTOPS 12, training important amphibious assault, arrival, and assembly skills with our Baltic NATO partners; and
- NOBLE SHIRLEY, building and maintaining critical interoperability with our Levant partners.



U.S. Marines and amphibious forces from Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, the Netherlands, and Germany hit the beach during Exercise Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) 2012. BALTOPS '12 reinforced key theater security cooperation efforts through joint maritime, air, and land operations conducted across the Baltic region.

Way Ahead. Marine Forces Europe will continue to pursue an innovative task-organized expeditionary force presence in the European Command theater to meet crisis and contingency response requirements. We will provide bilateral combined arms and amphibious training with key partners, including Israel, Turkey, France, and the United Kingdom. Establishing and exercising expeditionary presence supports important theater reassurance and deterrence objectives. Marine Forces Europe will continue to support Service-led efforts to transform the MCPP-N, while maintaining our commitment to the reinforcement of Norway. Additionally, Marine Forces Europe will continue to evolve BSRF's crisis response capability, fully aligning this force with maritime crisis response capabilities inside the European Command theater.

Commander Naval Forces Europe / Commander Naval Forces Africa
Naples, Italy

Introduction & Overview: Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Africa is a unified organization that reports to both U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command. It is responsible for leading full-spectrum maritime operations in concert with allied, coalition, joint, and interagency partners to advance U.S. interests and enhance maritime security and stability in Europe and Africa. U.S. Naval Forces Europe performs Navy Component Commander functions that support daily fleet operations and Joint Force Maritime Component Commander/Joint Task Force Commander missions, strengthen U.S. relationships with enduring allies, and provide leadership for the development of maritime capabilities with emerging partners, particularly in European Command's southern and eastern regions.


Major Accomplishments: U.S. Naval Forces Europe met all mission requirements in 2012 and retained its certification as Joint Force Maritime Component Commander. By concentrating on key theater security cooperation initiatives, the command advanced vital U.S. and partner-nation skills in maritime domain awareness, security, and sea control in the European Command area of responsibility. The command also supported numerous global security and stability operations in 2012, including U.S. Central Command's Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and U.S. Africa Command's Operation JUKEBOX LOTUS, while maintaining its readiness posture for regional crisis response operations.

Operations & Operational Support:

North Africa**.** Responding last September to attacks on U.S. facilities in Libya, U.S. Naval Forces Europe's forward-stationed and rotational forces played a critical role in the response mission. The availability of Naval Air Station Sigonella, Italy, and Naval Support Activity Souda Bay, Greece, enabled U.S. forces to be rapidly postured, employed, and sustained as tasking evolved over the course of the crisis response, designated Operation JUKEBOX LOTUS. U.S. Navy and Joint force operations could not have occurred without these bases and the direct support they provided. Additionally, the command flagship, USS MOUNT WHITNEY, operating from international waters with the Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet, embarked, provided command and control, planning, and support coordination during the initial phase of the crisis.

Ballistic Missile Defense. Through the deployment of U.S. Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)-capable surface combatants, Naval Forces Europe supported Phase One implementation of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to the ballistic missile defense of Europe. The command also supported EPAA Phase Two, with efforts to complete implementing agreements and prepare for construction of an Aegis Ashore site in Romania. U.S. Naval Forces Europe facilitated NATO's declaration of interim BMD capability through its participation in the European Air and Missile Defense Exercises and NATO Exercise RAPID ARROW, which was the first live fire test of NATO's BMD capability. Weekly BMD exercises with NATO participants are being conducted to sustain the proficiency gained through these events and others, and are expected to continue for the foreseeable future.


Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). U.S. Naval Forces Europe supported theater ISR objectives with persistent coverage of vital operating areas, using air, surface, and subsurface assets. U.S. Navy surface combatants conducted active radar surveillance of airspace over or near regions of potential volatility to provide indications and warnings of aircraft activity as well as surveillance of surface and subsurface vessels. In addition, P-3 Maritime Patrol Aircraft and EP-3 Reconnaissance Aircraft operating from bases in Italy, Spain, and Greece, as well as ship-based Remotely Piloted Aircraft missions (SCAN EAGLE and FIRE SCOUT), also provided mobile, flexible ISR coverage in areas of interest within the theater. Employing a mix of these platforms and capabilities, U.S. Naval Forces Europe was able to support NATO forces in Kosovo, Operation JUKEBOX LOTUS, and operations in the Baltic Sea.



USS McFAUL (DDG-74), an Arleigh-Burke class guided missile destroyer launching a 'Scan Eagle' UAV during Operation JUKEBOX LOTUS last September. These versatile platforms cover multiple theater missions, from Ballistic Missile Defense to maritime interdiction to expanded U.S. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.

Forward Deployed Naval Forces, Spain. The decision to station four Aegis destroyers at Naval Station Rota, Spain, will significantly increase the availability of these multi-mission surface platforms for training, interoperability, and crisis response operations in the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea. Tasking will include theater BMD, maritime security operations, humanitarian missions, and bilateral and multilateral exercises in support of regional security and stability.

Theater Submarine Operations. U.S. submarine forces provided assurance, deterrence, and unique ISR capabilities, while maintaining their readiness to execute anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare



USS GEORGIA (SSGN-729) heads out on patrol in the Mediterranean, on-call for missions supporting multiple U.S. Combatant Commands.

operations, ensure undersea dominance, deliver precision strike weapons, and provide high-value unit protection.

Exercises, Theater Security Cooperation, and Partnerships: U.S. Naval Forces Europe participated in seven JCS exercises and 15 NATO and European Command exercises in 2012. As mentioned, Exercise BALTOPS 2012 brought together 12 European nations, including Russia, to conduct maritime operations and interoperability training in the Baltic Sea. Exercise SEA BREEZE 12, another WIF-funded event, aggregated 13 ships and personnel from 15 nations to train in and around the Black Sea. Exercise FRUKUS (France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States)—led by Russia in 2012—joined maritime forces from all four nations for a high-end multi-lateral engagement focused on maritime capabilities and interoperability. U.S. Sixth Fleet also led Exercise NORTHERN EAGLE, which involved Russia and Norway, and culminated in a successful U.S. ship visit to Severomorsk in northern Russia.



U.S. Sailor greeting a Ukrainian Marine at the launch of Exercise SEA BREEZE '12. Co-hosted by the U.S. and Ukrainian Navies, SEA BREEZE brought together naval, air, and land forces from Algeria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Canada, Georgia, Germany, Israel, Moldova, Norway, Qatar Sweden, Turkey, UAE, Ukraine, and the United States. The largest multinational exercise conducted in the Black Sea region, SEA BREEZE provides an important venue for U.S. allies and partner nations to improve maritime safety, security, and stability in this vital area.

U.S. Naval Forces Europe continued to lead Eurasia Partnership Capstone, an initiative designed to integrate numerous efforts across Eurasia into a comprehensive maritime partnership. Training with naval forces from Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Israel, Russia, Poland, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine, U.S. Naval Forces Europe focused on non-commissioned officer development, maritime interdiction operations, visit/board/search/seizure, search and rescue, maritime law enforcement, and environmental protection. In associated outreach to the Caspian Sea region last year, U.S. Naval Forces Europe coordinated with U.S. Central Command to include participation from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan as well. The Partnership of Adriatic Mariners, a similar regional effort, was led by U.S. Naval Forces Europe and joined by Albania and key partners along

the Adriatic Sea to increase maritime domain awareness and enhance counter-illicit trafficking capabilities.

Way Ahead: U.S. Naval Forces Europe remains focused on maintaining maritime safety, security cooperation, and crisis response capabilities to defend the nation and secure its interests across Europe and Africa. The command will support, develop, and expand BMD capabilities afloat and ashore in synchronization with other European Command Service component commands and NATO. U.S. Naval Forces Europe will continue to exercise command and control of forward-stationed and rotational forces, focus on its primary mission of warfighting, and provide the nation with robust power projection capabilities across two combatant commands. Equally important, the command will continue to strengthen allied and partner maritime capabilities in foreign humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and other operations, while responsibly balancing these initiatives within a fiscally constrained environment.

U.S. Air Forces Europe / U.S. Air Forces Africa
Ramstein Air Base, Germany

Introduction & Overview: U.S. Air Forces Europe / U.S. Air Forces Africa is a unified organization that reports to both U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command, postured to provide forward-based, full-spectrum airpower in support of global, national, alliance, and coalition operations. U.S. Air Forces Europe provides credible, capable, and responsive air forces for U.S. European Command prepared to defend the Homeland forward and respond at any time to crises across the world. Furthermore, U.S. Air Forces Europe maintains critical infrastructure to provide mobility and communications throughput, logistical support, contingency bed-down, and command and control capabilities in support of global operations. Additionally, Europe is a critical entry and relay point for all cyber activities across U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Africa Command, including 90% of all ISR feed data. Our forward posture allows us to project U.S. power globally, support the NATO Alliance and multilateral coalitions, and reduce the burden on U.S. forces while providing ready access to European bases, as required.

Major Accomplishments: U.S. Air Forces Europe flew over 37,500 hours in support of ongoing European Command operations in FY 2012. Forward-based air forces were essential to the U.S. rapid response to emergent requirements following the attacks on our diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya, providing forces to support U.S. Africa Command's Operation JUKEBOX LOTUS. The command leveraged its strong international partnerships to facilitate the basing of CONUS forces in Europe in less than five days. U.S. Air Forces Europe's forward-based presence and partnerships also enabled execution of aeromedical evacuation and subsequent security missions in Libya.


U.S. Air Forces Europe has made major contributions to ongoing operations in Afghanistan, deploying aircraft for multi-role ground attack, refueling, combat search and rescue, and operational support missions. Airmen from across the command have deployed in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and U.S. Air Forces Europe continues to provide critical lift and sustainment for the deployment and redeployment of forces and equipment into and out of the U.S. Central Command theater to support current operations and the future transition in Afghanistan.

U.S. Air Forces Europe supported four nuclear logistics missions, successfully conducted three nuclear surety inspections of its nuclear-capable units, as well as two joint safety and security inspections, and a strike evaluation in concert with NATO. All of these events ensured that the United States and NATO maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear capability.

A critical global communications hub, U.S. Air Forces Europe provides vital data links for worldwide communications, unmanned aerial system command and control, intelligence collection, and space operations. U.S. Air Forces Europe has worked diligently to implement new technologies and expanded

systems enhancing European Command's air component capabilities. In support of EPAA, the command acts as a force provider and performs vital command and control (C2) functions for U.S. BMD forces. Last year, U.S. Air Forces Europe transitioned the NATO European territorial missile defense C2 mission from a U.S. capability to an alliance interim operating capability, and is working with NATO to develop initial operating capability requirements. In other areas, the command's land mobile radio capabilities matured into radio over internet protocol terrestrial connections, maximizing the resources available to emergency services across the region and enabling real-time crisis notification. U.S. Air Forces Europe has also become a defense leader in the improvement of base infrastructure and investment to develop a resilient command, control, communications, computer, and information (C4I) architecture, providing improved support to flight operations and contributing to the BMD mission in Europe.

Operations & Operational Support: U.S. Air Forces Europe supports the operations of U.S. European Command, U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Transportation Command, and NATO, while conducting combat deployments at the same or higher rate than U.S.-based air forces, and maintaining the throughput of over 60% of global air mobility missions. U.S. Air Forces Europe maintains combat air patrols supporting NATO's Icelandic and Baltic air policing and surveillance missions, and conducts ISR missions across the greater Levant.



An F-15E Strike Eagle conducts in-flight refueling with a KC-135 Stratotanker over the Atlantic Ocean. U.S. Air Forces Europe conducts operations for 4 U.S. Combatant Commanders—European Command, Africa Command, Central Command, Transportation Command—and supports U.S. commitments to NATO.

Recent combat support operations in North Africa highlighted the importance of our ability to interoperate with NATO and non-NATO coalition partner nations in all phases of the ISR mission. To this end, we have dramatically increased our contact with potential partners to build partner ISR capacity. Leading the success in this area is the joint U.S. / U.K. 'Project Diamond' initiative, begun in 2007, which seeks to develop a Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) ISR imagery processing, exploitation, and dissemination capability. This capability, located in the United Kingdom, is tied to the 693rd ISR Group at Ramstein Air Base. A significant success story, Project Diamond has resulted in U.K. analysts conducting processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) of U.S. Predator and Reaper Unmanned Aerial System operations in Afghanistan since April 2011. These efforts have supported ISAF warfighters while demonstrating the high degree of cooperation that exists between the U.S. and U.K. ISR communities. Building on these lessons, we have launched the Coalition ISR / PED Integration Initiative. This initiative seeks to build and integrate partner ISR capacity among key partner nations in the U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command theaters. These efforts will enhance cooperation, facilitate greater burden-sharing,

share ISR information and methodologies, and incorporate important PED objectives and capabilities into NATO and non-NATO exercises in order to ensure the alliance is better postured in these critical mission areas for future contingency operations.



November 9, 2012: Members of the 52nd Operations Group, Detachment 1, conduct the activation ceremony for U.S. Air Force Europe's AVDET on the flight line at Lask Air Base, Poland. Comprised of 10 U.S. Airmen supporting the periodic rotation of U.S. F-16 and C-130 aircraft, the AVDET will make important contributions to Poland's defense modernization and NATO interoperability.

Exercises, Theater Security Cooperation, and Partnerships: In addition to our operational missions and support, U.S. Air Forces Europe participated in 21 JCS exercises, to include Exercises AUSTERE CHALLENGE, BALTOPS, and RAPID TRIDENT, and accomplished over 1,870 outreach, engagement, and training events with 21 U.S. allied and partner nations in direct support of U.S. European Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. Central Command. These efforts sustained America's strategic partnerships and achieved a number of significant milestones in 2012. First, engaging one of NATO's newer and increasingly important allies, U.S. Air Forces Europe personnel activated the Aviation Detachment (AVDET) at Lask Air Base, Poland, last November. The AVDET will support the rotation of U.S. military aircraft to Poland, enable cooperative training events between U.S. and Polish Airmen, enhance the capabilities and interoperability of our nations' air forces, and ultimately increase the air resources available for future NATO operations.

Second, U.S. Air Forces Europe achieved initial operational capability at the newly established European Integrated Air and Missile Defense Center, the only one of its kind, dedicated to advancing BMD education, training, and wargaming for our European partners. Third, supporting Joint Force 2020's emphasis on humanitarian and disaster relief operations, we recently celebrated the 20-year anniversary of our 'Eagle Vision' Program, a cooperative agreement with France that has provided imagery for numerous disaster relief operations over the past year. Fourth, eying efficiencies, U.S. Air Forces Europe continued its successful 'Tactical Leadership Program,' preparing next-generation combat air leaders from ten allied nations for worldwide operations augmenting, or in some cases reducing the need for, U.S. Airmen. Finally,



General Philip Breedlove, Commander, U.S. Air Forces Europe and U.S. Air Forces Africa, briefs German Chancellor Angela Merkel and U.S. Ambassador to Germany Philip Murphy during a tour of U.S. military aircraft at the Berlin Air Show in September 2012.


U.S. Air Forces Europe continues to help develop a strong cadre of non-commissioned officers through engagement and training, at the Kisling Non-Commissioned Officer Academy, with senior enlisted leaders from nations across Europe and Africa.

Way Ahead: Recognizing the current inflection point and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, U.S. Air Forces Europe continues to implement significant efficiencies executing its mission to support two combatant commands. Most notably, U.S. Air Forces Europe has consolidated its subordinate numbered air forces and their associated Air and Space Operations Centers to create an extremely lean, agile, and flexible headquarters with leadership and staff supporting both U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command while maintaining essential service support to forces in and across the theater. As we look to the near term, U.S. Air Forces Europe will continue aggressively implementing EPAA and associated BMD initiatives, and support U.S. global reach and access to achieve national and military objectives through our forward-based forces and infrastructure. Europe's strategic location and our strong international relationships remain critical enablers for rapid unilateral, joint, and multinational response to contingency missions across Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

U.S. Special Operations Command Europe
Stuttgart, Germany

Introduction & Overview: Special Operations Command Europe operates from two main forward-deployed locations, in Stuttgart, Germany, and the Royal Air Force (RAF) station at Mildenhall, England. The Command is comprised of three assigned components: 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne); Naval Special Warfare Unit 2; and the 352nd Special Operations Group (Air Force Special Operations Command). Special Operations Command Europe continues to focus on expanding theater-wide special operations forces (SOF) capabilities, mainly by developing and enabling allied and partner nation SOF to deploy to Afghanistan in support of ISAF. Through the development of allied and partner SOF skills, we seek to enable niche capabilities which, taken together, can translate into unified SOF actions that support U.S. national security objectives, NATO, and our shared security interests.

Major Accomplishments: Special Operations Command Europe focused its efforts to deliver significant results across multiple areas in 2012. First, as mentioned above, the command maintained its emphasis on engagement activities with allied and partner nation SOF preparing them for deployment to Afghanistan. Additionally on this front, the command conducted numerous Joint Combined Exchange Training and other bilateral training activities, Partnership Development Program events, bilateral counter narco-terrorism training, an intelligence conference on Iranian activities in Europe, and numerous key leader and staff engagements to sustain partner SOF development. Second, Special Operations Command Europe continued to develop its important counterterrorism-related bilateral relationships with Russian and Turkish SOF. Third, Special Operations Command Europe was tasked to lead the theater counterterrorism (CT) mission and is responsible for monitoring, facilitating, coordinating, and synchronizing all CT efforts across the European Command area of responsibility.



By Sea, Air, or Land: Participants in Special Operation Command Europe's Exercise JACKAL STONE display the uniforms and tools of their trade. The purpose of this capstone exercise is to enhance Special Operations Forces (SOF) capacity and interoperability among 15 participating Allied and partner nations, simultaneously building cooperation and key partnerships for current and future coalition SOF missions.

Exercises, Theater Security Cooperation, and Partnerships: Special Operations Command Europe continued to facilitate SOF interoperability and prepare partners for current and future contingency missions through an intensive 2012 exercise schedule. Last September, Croatia hosted JACKAL STONE '12, our capstone SOF exercise, including 15 nations and over 1,700 participants,


with Croatian President Ivo Josipovic making a personal appearance to observe joint U.S.-Croatian exercise projects. Other JACKAL STONE activities included a vigorous aviation component featuring Slovakian and Croatian Mi-17 helicopters, and U.S. MH-60 Blackhawks facilitating exercise movements and parachute operations.

Special Operations Command Europe has also developed and strengthened important theater CT bilateral relationships across a wide range of FY 2012 activities, including:

Russia: The U.S. Army's 10th Special Forces Group hosted Russian airborne forces at Ft. Carson, Colorado. This is the first time U.S. SOF have worked together with Russian forces since 2008. This three-week tactical training event fostered positive relationships, helped to further important interoperability goals, and developed a mutual understanding and working knowledge of each other's CT capabilities. This successful bilateral training event culminated with the stated intention to conduct similar training events annually, another potential area for continued U.S.-Russian engagement.

Turkey: After a two-year hiatus to develop a new memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Turkey, we are once again working closely with our Turkish SOF counterparts. The establishment of the MOU with Turkish Army Special Forces will greatly improve the U.S.-Turkish bilateral SOF relationship, enabling exchanges that will continue to pay strong dividends for both countries in the near future. Special Operations Command Europe key leader engagements with CT forces from the Turkish Ministry of the Interior have also increased potential for important future cooperation.

Operations & Operational Support: Special Operations Command Europe continues to lead European Command's SOF support to U.S. Central Command and the mission in Afghanistan. For the sixth year in a row, Special Operations Command Europe has provided U.S. forces, directly supporting ISAF through the deployment of Combined Special Operations Task Force 10 (CSOTF-10), providing military assistance to five Afghan Provincial Reaction Companies. Notably, CSOTF-10, commanded by Special Operations Command's 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group, is comprised of multinational special operations forces from eight European nations: Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Additionally, Special Operations Command Europe continues to provide advisory assistance to Polish SOF in ISAF. By coordinating the Special Operations Command Europe Partnership Development Program with other security cooperation resources, we have been able to



SOCEUR's Partnership Development Program provides valuable support and pre-deployment training for partner-nation SOF forces, including Poland (shown above). These nations have made, and continue to make, vital contributions to ISAF.

assist these developing allies and partners with their concerted national effort to create SOF capabilities that are, at the tactical level, on par with U.S. Special Operations Forces. Once developed, these allies and partners have demonstrated the willingness to employ these forces in a manner that supports and enables heavily-tasked U.S. SOF. Most importantly, these combined efforts have made critical contributions to the Government of Afghanistan and the transition effort, mentoring Afghan National Security Forces and reinforcing their sustained progress into a self-run, confident force capable of contributing to security operations across sizable Afghan population centers.

Special Operations Command Europe also chairs the Stuttgart Effects Group, a multi-headquarters interagency forum established to increase understanding of transnational threats and de-conflict associated efforts with U.S. combatant commands and U.S. Government interagency partners.

As the European Command lead for all theater CT execution, Special Operations Command Europe is focused on intelligence, information-sharing, and developing partner capabilities in step with the Department's highest prioritization for Joint Force 2020's 'Counterterrorism and Irregular Warfare' mission. To meet these responsibilities and synchronize the theater's CT Regional Campaign Plan, the command established the Special Operations Command Europe CT-Core Cell. The CT-Core Cell monitors, facilitates, coordinates, and synchronizes CT efforts across the theater, in concert with other U.S. Government agencies and our partner nation counterparts, in order to disrupt violent extremist organizations and promote an environment inhospitable to terrorism. These efforts, and ongoing coordination with the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), have assisted investigations in more than 80 countries to date. Special Operations Command Europe continues to work closely with our allies and partners, the U.S. Intelligence Community, and other U.S. combatant commands to identify and counter threats to the United States and U.S. forces originating from Europe, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

Lastly, Special Operations Command continues to refine and adapt theater-wide strategic SOF requirements while also taking care of our people. Operational concepts, to include the Distributed SOF Network and ongoing coordination with allied and partner SOF through our U.S. Country Team SOF liaison elements, continue to pay dividends. Importantly, after a decade of sustained combat operations, the command remains focused on ways to take care of our warriors and their families. We continue to prioritize several family events and increase service member awareness regarding comprehensive health and well-being.

Way Ahead: Special Operations Command Europe will continue to focus its Partnership Development Program (PDP) efforts on contributing to ISAF SOF preparation beyond 2014. In 2012, the command increased its footprint from a company-size U.S. Special Forces element to a battalion-size task force, while increasing partner nation participation through staff positions, special operations task units, and special operations task groups. Beyond ISAF, Special Operations Command Europe will coordinate

and direct its critical security cooperation resources and authorities (PDP, 1206, etc.) toward working with our allies and partners to develop the national and institutional mechanisms required to sustain the SOF capacity that we have collectively built over the past decade. Our European allies and partners have proven their willingness, with relatively minimal assistance, to deploy their SOF to combat and other operations important to the United States. Our strategic objective is to ensure that we sustain this vital investment in order to have world-class, interoperable SOF available for employment where our national security interests converge in the future, without having to begin capacity building efforts anew. Looking forward, Special Operations Command Europe will continue to support U.S. European Command, national, and NATO objectives, maintain our combat edge, further develop allied and partner SOF, and always be ready for crisis response—a vanguard force for the forward defense of the United States.

United States Navy
Biography

Admiral James G. Stavridis
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander, United States European Command



Admiral Stavridis assumed duties as commander of European Command and as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe in early summer 2009.

Stavridis is a 1976 distinguished graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and a native of South Florida.

A Surface Warfare officer, he commanded the Destroyer USS *Barry* (DDG 52) from 1993-1995, completing UN/NATO deployments to Haiti and Bosnia, and a combat cruise to the Arabian Gulf. Barry won the Battenberg Cup as the top ship in the Atlantic Fleet under his command.

In 1998, he commanded Destroyer Squadron 21 and deployed to the Arabian Gulf, winning the Navy League's John Paul Jones Award for Inspirational Leadership.

From 2002-2004, he commanded *Enterprise* Carrier Strike Group, conducting combat operations in the Arabian Gulf in support of both Operation *Iraqi Freedom* and Operation *Enduring Freedom.*

From 2006-2009, he commanded U.S. Southern Command in Miami, focused on Latin America and the Caribbean.

Ashore, he has served as a strategic and long range planner on the staffs of the chief of Naval Operations and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He has also served as the executive assistant to the secretary of the Navy and the senior military assistant to the secretary of Defense.

Stavridis earned a PhD and MALD from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in International Relations in 1984, where he won the Gullion Prize as outstanding student. He is also a distinguished graduate of both the National and Naval War Colleges.

He holds various decorations and awards, including two awards of the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Defense Superior Service Medal and five awards of the Legion of Merit. He is author or co-author of several books on naval ship handling and leadership, including Command at Sea, Destroyer Captain, and Partnership for the Americas about Latin America.

Updated: 2 November 2010

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF GENERAL

CARTER HAM, USA

COMMANDER



UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND

BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

15 MARCH 2013

Mission Statement

United States Africa Command protects and defends the national security interests of the United States by strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and regional organizations and, when directed, conducts military operations, in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to provide a security environment conducive to good governance and development.

INTRODUCTION

This year marks the fifth anniversary of the formation of the command. Since our standup in 2008, our operational capabilities and capacities have markedly increased. In parallel, our relationships with African partners and our security cooperation engagements have matured in both focus and effectiveness. Our integrated approach seeks to address the greatest near-term threats to our national security while simultaneously building long-term partnerships and fostering regional cooperation.

The past year has witnessed both positive developments and sobering reminders of the threats in the U.S. Africa Command Area of Responsibility. Many African partners are more capable of addressing national and regional security challenges today than they were a year ago, and we have strengthened both new and enduring partnerships. In Somalia, sustained operations by African forces, with enabling assistance from the United States and the international community, significantly weakened al-Shabaab, providing space for Somalia's transition to a constitutionally based government. We are deepening our relationship with the Tanzanian military, a professional force whose capabilities and influence increasingly bear on regional security issues in eastern and southern Africa and the Great Lakes region. Senegal and Ghana, anchors of regional stability in West Africa, held peaceful, democratic elections last year and remain important U.S. partners in efforts to counter transnational threats. Similarly, in Botswana, a highly capable partner and positive influence throughout southern Africa, we are strengthening an enduring partnership grounded in shared commitments to

democracy and the rule of law. Liberia is progressing toward the establishment of a professional, capable military that is a force for good, as demonstrated by its border deployment in response to Cote d' Ivoirian rebel activities last fall. In Libya, a nation that witnessed its first election of the General National Congress since the overthrow of Qadhafi, we are developing a strong partnership with the new military.

Despite these positive trends, the regional security environment continues to challenge U.S. interests and increase the operational demands on U.S. Africa Command. In the past year, the United States lost four Americans in deadly attacks in Benghazi and three more in the terrorist attack on a British Petroleum facility in Algeria; al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emerged stronger and better armed following the coup d'état in Mali; and Boko Haram continued its campaign of violence in Nigeria.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Emerging Terrorist Networks

As al-Qa'ida has syndicated its ideology and violence, its affiliates and adherents in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula have become increasingly networked and adaptable in their recruiting, training, financing, and operations. Violent extremist organizations, insurgents, and criminal organizations are exploiting weak governance and under-governed spaces, and remain determined to harm the United States, our partners and Allies, and innocent civilians. The need to put pressure on al-Qa'ida affiliates and adherents in East, North, and West Africa has never been greater. The September 2012 attack on the U.S. Special Mission Compound and Annex in Benghazi and the January 2013 attack on the British Petroleum oil facility in Algeria illustrate the growing threat posed by violent extremist organizations in Africa to U.S. citizens and interests. This network of al-Qa'ida affiliates has already developed into a threat

to U.S. regional interests and if left unchecked, could pose a threat to Europe and the U.S. Homeland. Coordinated approaches that integrate diplomatic, development, and military efforts are needed to achieve both short- and long-term counter-terrorism objectives, including the disruption of terrorist financing and undermining of recruitment efforts by violent extremist organizations.

Arab Awakening

The Arab Awakening redefined the North African political landscape and continues to impact countries across the region. Two years ago, the actions of a single Tunisian citizen catalyzed a wave of change that continues to reverberate throughout North Africa and the Middle East. The post-revolutionary transitions currently underway in Tunisia and Libya are extraordinarily important to the future of these countries and to the region and have had significant consequences for regional security. The flow of fighters and weapons from Libya to violent extremist organizations in northern Mali serves as one example of how political instability in one nation can have a profound effect across a broad region. The United States has a stake in the success of these transitions, not least of all for their potential to serve as a powerful repudiation of al-Qa'ida's false narrative that only violent extremism can drive change. U.S. Africa Command's relationships with the Tunisian and Libyan militaries have important roles in supporting these transitions as new governments in Tunisia and Libya work to develop accountable and effective institutions, strengthen civil society, and improve security.

Increased Regional and International Integration

The rising political and economic influence of emerging powers is transforming the

international system, and this change is evident in Africa. Asian economic expansion is inflating global commodities prices, a major driver of strong economic growth in some African nations. Increased Chinese engagement in pursuit of economic development is deepening China's political and economic influence and increasing its access in the region. Other rapidly growing economies, including Brazil and India, are similarly increasing their engagement and investment in Africa. As Africa becomes more fully integrated into the global economy, African maritime security is growing in importance to the free flow of global commerce. In parallel with Africa's continuing integration into global political and economic systems, African nations are strengthening their regional economic and political integration. African nations and regional organizations are increasingly taking a lead role in multilateral responses to regional security threats, both within and outside the structure of the African Union and the regional standby forces that comprise its continental security architecture.

COMMAND APPROACH

U.S. Africa Command's approach reflects strategic guidance provided in the National Security Strategy, the Defense Strategic Guidance, the National Military Strategy, the Presidential Policy Directive for Political and Economic Reform in the Middle East and North Africa (PPD 13) and the United States Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa. Based on this strategic guidance, U.S. Africa Command protects and advances vital U.S. national security interests in Africa, including protecting the security of the global economic system, preventing catastrophic attacks on the homeland, developing secure and reliable partners, protecting American citizens abroad, and protecting and advancing universal values. These universal values include the respect for and protection of human rights, the prevention of mass atrocities, and the provision of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In Africa,

military-to-military engagement plays a limited but important role in sustaining progress in countries undergoing democratic transitions, as well as those emerging from conflict.

In support of advancing regional peace and security, U.S. Africa Command focuses on priority countries, regional organizations, and programs and initiatives that build defense institutional and operational capabilities and strengthen strategic partnerships. Cooperative security arrangements are key to addressing transnational threats, and U.S. Africa Command utilizes operations, exercises, and security cooperation engagements to foster multilateral cooperation and build the capacity of regional and sub-regional organizations. U.S. assistance, including focused military support, has contributed to significant progress by African forces in the past year in both peacekeeping and combat operations.

U.S. Africa Command's strategic approach addresses both threats and opportunities. We simultaneously address the greatest near-term threats to our national security while building long-term partnerships that support and enable the objectives outlined in the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa: strengthening democratic institutions; spurring economic growth, advancing trade and investment; advancing peace and security; and promoting opportunity and development. Countering terrorism is the Department of Defense's (DoD) highest priority mission in Africa and will remain so for the foreseeable future. While prioritizing addressing emerging security challenges through both direct and indirect responses, U.S. Africa Command views these challenges also as opportunities to deepen enduring relationships, strengthen partner capabilities, and foster regional cooperation.

Our theater strategy and four subordinate regional campaign plans guide our operations, exercises and engagements, which focus on five functional areas: countering violent extremist organizations; strengthening maritime security and countering illicit trafficking; strengthening defense capabilities; maintaining strategic posture; and preparing

for and responding to crises. These activities are primarily executed by U.S. Africa Command's components: Army Forces Africa, Air Forces Africa, Naval Forces Africa, Marine Forces Africa, Special Operations Command Africa, and Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa. Our headquarters interagency representatives from nine Federal agencies and liaison officers from eight countries are integral to the success of U.S. Africa Command's efforts.


U.S. AFRICA COMMAND PRIORITIES

COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS

The September 2012 attack on the U.S. Special Mission Compound and Annex in Benghazi and the January 2013 attack on the British Petroleum oil facility in Algeria are evidence of the growing threat posed to Americans and U.S. interests by African violent extremist organizations (VEO) and the global VEO network. In the past year, U.S. Africa Command worked closely with regional and interagency partners to strengthen counter-terrorism partnerships grounded in shared security interests, assisted partner military forces and U.S. interagency partners in discrediting and defeating the appeal of violent extremism, and strengthened partner capabilities to provide security as an element of responsive governance.


Three violent extremist organizations are of particular concern in Africa: al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), active in northern and western Africa; Boko Haram in Nigeria; and al-Shabaab in Somalia. Although each organization individually poses a threat to U.S. interests and regional stability, the growing collaboration of these organizations heightens the danger they collectively represent. Of the three organizations, AQIM, which exploited the instability that followed the coup d'état in Mali and seeks to

establish an Islamic state in northern Mali, is currently the most likely to directly threaten U.S. national security interests in the near- term.




To counter AQIM and support the restoration of governance in Mali, U.S. Africa Command is providing support to French and African military operations in northern Mali, which are achieving gains against AQIM and other terrorist organizations. We are supporting French efforts with information, airlift, and refueling, and are working with the Department of State (DoS) to support the deployment of west African forces to the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). Recently, we began unarmed, remotely piloted aircraft operations from Niger in support of intelligence gathering efforts in the region. Although French, Malian, and AFISMA forces are achieving success in removing AQIM fighters from population centers, eliminating the long-term threat posed by AQIM will require the restoration of Malian governance and territorial integrity, political

reconciliation with northern indigenous groups, the establishment of security, and the sustained engagement of the international community.




While international focus is currently on Mali, AQIM is not solely a Malian challenge. The organization is spread across the Sahel region and requires a regional approach to effectively address the threat. U.S. Africa Command continues to work closely with the Department of State (DoS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to support regional counter-terrorism efforts under the umbrella of the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). A partnership between 10 northern and western African nations and the United States, TSCTP is designed to support the development of partner nation military counter-terrorism skills and capabilities and foster regional cooperation among participating nations to address the evolving threat of AQIM and related extremist groups. One aspect of TSCTP's impact can be seen in the troop contributions of five participating countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal) to AFISMA. Although Mali has historically been a TSCTP partner, U.S. Africa Command is not currently engaged in capacity-building with the armed forces of Mali,

consistent with U.S. legal prohibitions on the provision of security assistance to any military force that has been involved in a military overthrow of a democratically elected government.



In Nigeria, where Boko Haram is conducting a destabilizing campaign of violent attacks focused on the northern part of the country, U.S. Africa Command engages with the Nigerian Armed Forces to improve their military capabilities. We seek to support the development of a professional military that will support a coordinated Nigerian Government effort to address Boko Haram and provide the citizens of Nigeria with responsive governance and improved economic opportunity. Boko Haram is in contact with al-Qa'ida and recently kidnapped a French family in retaliation for French actions against AQIM in Mali. If pressure on Boko Haram decreases, they could expand their capabilities and reach to pose a more significant threat to U.S. interests.



In Somalia, al-Shabaab has been greatly weakened by the operations of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Ethiopian, and Somali forces. While al-Shabaab is less effective, the group is still dangerous and capable of conducting unconventional attacks to disrupt AMISOM operations and the newly formed Somali government.

The significant gains achieved by AMISOM forces over the past year were critical in providing space for the political process that resulted in Somalia's transition to a government now formally recognized by the United States. While Somalia faces many challenges ahead, it is on a positive path. As military-to-military relations are normalized with Somalia, U.S. Africa Command will work with the DoS to develop security cooperation activities to assist with the development of a unified Somali security force. For the foreseeable future, focus must be maintained on Somalia to sustain security progress made to date.

Overall, we believe that our efforts to counter violent extremist organizations are having a positive impact. Our African partners are demonstrating strengthened capabilities

and are increasingly cooperating with other nations to address shared security challenges, including supporting African Union and United Nations operations and programs. The leadership of the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States in addressing the security challenges in Mali is indicative of the growing willingness and capability of Africans to address African security challenges.

MARITIME SECURITY AND COUNTER ILLICIT TRAFFICKING

Multilateral cooperation in addressing regional maritime security challenges continued to improve over the past year. Maritime security is not only vital to countering terrorism and illicit trafficking, but is also a critical enabler of trade and economic development. Coastal nations contend with a range of challenges off their coasts including trafficking in narcotics and arms, human trafficking; piracy and armed robbery at sea; oil bunkering; and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU). Piracy and armed robbery at sea in the western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Guinea elevated insurance rates and shipping costs, resulting in increased costs to consumers. IUU fishing devastates African fisheries, which play a vital role in African economic growth and food security. Criminal organizations leverage ungoverned maritime space that could also be exploited by violent extremist organizations.

African partners are making progress in addressing challenges in the maritime domain through cooperative regional approaches supported by the international community. U.S. Africa Command and our Naval and Marine components work closely with the U.S. Coast Guard in the execution of our two primary maritime security programs, the African Partnership Station program (APS) and the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP), which are contributing to strengthening regional maritime capabilities and interoperability. African maritime forces used skills gained through participation in AMLEP

and APS to conduct operations that resulted in the seizure of over $100 million worth of cocaine and the levying of over $3 million in fines. Benin and Nigeria now conduct joint maritime patrols while South Africa, Tanzania, and Mozambique signed a counter-piracy agreement codifying their efforts and reflective of the trend of increasing regional cooperation in addressing maritime security challenges.

Countering illicit trafficking is linked to the challenge of increasing African maritime security. Illicit trafficking in the maritime, air, and land domains provides income to international criminal networks, has a destabilizing influence on governance, and is increasingly exploited by violent extremist organizations as a source of financing. U.S. Africa Command coordinates closely with U.S. government agencies and embassy law enforcement teams to conduct programs to counter illicit trafficking. Our efforts focus on increasing partner nation capacities to detect and interdict illicit trafficking throughout the African continent. Counter- trafficking skills are applicable to combating a wide range of criminal activity, including poaching.


As part of our enduring partnership with Liberia, we are supporting the development of the Liberian Coast Guard and recently renovated the coast guard's pier to enable operations. U.S. Africa Command constructed a new Senegalese maritime operation center with follow on training and assistance to the new center's staff and advanced training to the Cape Verde Counter Narcotics and Maritime Operations Center. The U.S. Africa Command also assisted Cape Verde and Senegal in developing maritime operations centers that have facilitated the interdiction of suspect vessels.

STRENGTHENING DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

Strengthening partner defense capabilities enables African nations to provide for

their own security and helps U.S. Africa Command to develop enduring relationships that support freedom of movement and assured access for U.S. forces. We assist African nations in developing capable, accountable, self-sustaining military forces and defense institutions. Our capacity-building activities complement DoS programs and are planned in close coordination with embassy country teams and partner nations. Our engagements, which span the range of essential military capabilities, include combined humanitarian and medical assistance programs conducted in coordination with the USAID.

The success of AMISOM forces against al-Shabaab illustrates the positive impact of U.S. defense capacity-building efforts in the region. AMISOM forces receive pre-deployment training through the DoS Global Peace Operations Initiative's Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. U.S. forces support and complement ACOTA activities with specialized training in skills that have played a critical role in enhancing the operational success of AMISOM forces, including intelligence analysis and countering improvised explosive devices. To date, the forces of five AMISOM troop contributing countries (Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Uganda) were trained through the ACOTA program.



Advice and assistance from U.S. forces enhanced the capabilities and cooperation of military forces of Uganda, South Sudan, Central African Republic, and Democratic Republic of the Congo currently engaged in operations to counter the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Operational gains made by regional forces over the past year, combined with civilian efforts, resulted in increased LRA defections, the capture of key LRA leaders, and decreased LRA attacks on civilian populations. The formation of an African Union Regional Task Force will facilitate further cooperation among counter-LRA forces.

U.S. Africa Command is broadly supporting U.S. commitments to countries undergoing democratic transitions by assisting in the development of professional militaries that respect civilian authority, are respectful of the rule of law, and are increasingly capable of securing their borders and combating mutual threats, including transnational terrorism. We continue to develop our and strengthen partnerships with the armed forces of Libya and South

Sudan. In South Sudan we have developed a comprehensive program that supports the ongoing DoS security assistance program. Our current focus is on education of key institutional-level personnel and small-scale civil action projects with the South Sudanese military. Our engagement with the Libyan Armed Forces similarly focuses on education and also emphasizes the strengthening of Libyan counter- terrorism capabilities. As these relationships continue to develop, we look forward to deepening our partnership with both militaries.

U.S. Africa Command's engagements with African land forces will be enhanced as the command becomes the first combatant command to be supported by a brigade through the Army's Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) concept. Beginning in March 2013, 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division will support U.S. Africa Command in developing enduring relationships and cooperation with partner nation land forces. RAF engagements will likely range from small travelling contact teams to support to major exercises. Initial planning for the RAF includes support to State Department-led ACOTA training for African forces deploying in support of United Nations and African Union peacekeeping operations.

An area of emerging focus is strengthening partner defense capabilities in air security and safety. Last year, our dual-hatted Air Force component, USAFE-AFAFRICA, launched the African Partnership Flight (APF) program, which promotes regional cooperation and strengthens the capabilities of partner nation air forces to provide airlift support to United Nations and African Union peacekeeping operations. 150 airmen from five African nations participated in APF's initial event last year, which addressed air mobility and logistics for peacekeeping operations, priority areas in which African air forces have very limited capabilities. APF will expand this year to include 175 students from eight nations.

The State Partnership Program (SPP) provides unique capabilities that augment our

ability to build enduring relationships with strategic partners in the region. SPP engagements build mutual U.S. and partner nation capacity to address shared security challenges. SPP activities currently contribute to our security cooperation with eight partner nations; Botswana, Ghana, Liberia, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Tunisia. SPP engagements account for over 40 percent of military-to-military engagements each year. Expansion of the State Partnership Program, particularly in East and North Africa, would assist in developing stable and enduring relationships with additional strategic partners, providing a foundation for capacity-building efforts by rotational forces.

Over the past year, U.S. Africa Command increased activities in support of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security, including integrating gender training, which is tailored to partner nation socio-cultural dynamics, into our security sector reform activities. Liberia has established a goal of 20 percent female representation in its armed forces, a development that reflects the increasing regional interest in expanding opportunities for women in the armed forces. We are also working with the Botswana Defence Forces to assist in its efforts to expand the integration of women into their forces.

PREPARING AND RESPONDING TO CRISIS

U.S. Africa Command stands ready to respond to crises across the continent. Several incidents in the last year caused the Command to act to ensure the safety and security of American citizens including the January 2012 rescue of American citizen Jessica Buchanan and Danish citizen Poul Thisted from captors in Somalia. In November 2012, when rebel activities in the Central African Republic required the suspension of U.S. Embassy operations, we assisted the DoS in evacuating U.S. Embassy personnel and American citizens.

The dynamic security environments that followed the Arab Awakening have increased requirements for crisis response capabilities. U.S. Africa Command capabilities to respond to crisis have matured over the past year, including the establishment of a headquarters Command Center and the allocation of a Commander's In-extremis Force in October 2012. The Commander's in-Extremis Force is currently based in Colorado, with a rotational element forward in Europe. Forward basing in Europe would increase the capability of the command to rapidly respond to incidents on the continent. Our Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force, which previously focused on supporting security cooperation activities, will be expanded to allow support to crisis response, further increasing our capabilities in this regard.

HOW CONGRESS CAN HELP

Sequestration and potentially, a year-long extension of the current continuing resolution, will have a negative impact on the command. The combined effects may force significant reductions in theater security cooperation activities and joint and combined exercises, potentially endangering progress in strengthening partner defense capabilities, gaining access to strategic locations, and supporting U.S. bilateral policy objectives. Meeting Africa's many challenges requires the collaboration and support of all agencies of the U.S. government and the support of Congress. Enactment of full year appropriations for defense, military construction, DoS, and USAID programs is critical to effective program planning and mission execution. Because U.S. government efforts are interconnected and often mutually dependent, fully resourcing one of these pillars without the others compounds the difficulties of planning and execution, and hinders mission completion.

Many of our programs use a mix of DoS and DoD authorities and funding. For example, DoS peacekeeping operation authority provides for training our African partner

nation forces, while DoD section 1206 authority provides for equipping those forces. The use of dual authorities requires close coordination between departments, and full funding of the DoS's security assistance programs is critical to success. We work with our interagency partners to ensure the resources provided by Congress are appropriately tied to our defense and foreign policy priorities.

We are keenly aware of the current fiscal environment and support all ongoing DoD efforts to decrease spending and ensure funds are wisely utilized. Our efforts under the Campaign to Cut Waste resulted in budget plans which reflect a savings of $1 million in both monetary and process efficiencies. We have also taken a hard look at our staffing levels, contracts, and conferences to determine where savings can be realized. We applied a self-imposed 5 percent personnel reduction for both FY13 and FY14 and are on a path to all but eliminate temporary hires and overhires. But sequestration and a possible year-long extension of the current continuing resolution will have serious negative consequences for our efforts.

I thank this committee and Congress for its support of our team and our mission. You have provided key authorities at appropriate times, as in extending through FY14 the temporary authority to build the counter-terrorism capacities of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and countries engaged in AMISOM. Pursuant to this authority, we have worked with the DoS to plan and execute our support to counter-terrorism capacity-building at a critical time. We are currently providing logistical equipment to Djiboutian and Kenyan forces participating in AMISOM. We appreciate this authority and believe it will enable AMISOM forces to continue their progress against al-Shabaab.

We also appreciate the enhanced train and equip authority under section 1206 of the FY 2006 NDAA, as amended in the FY 2013 NDAA, to permit small scale military construction among the authorized elements.

Your annual reauthorization of the temporary, limited authority to use operation and maintenance funding for military construction in support of contingency operations in our area of responsibility has permitted us to meet critical operational support needs in a timely fashion, and we appreciate your recognition of its importance.

The recent volatility in North and West Africa demonstrates the importance of sufficient Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets to cover multiple crises simultaneously. ISR capabilities are required to protect American interests and to assist our close allies and partners. We appreciate the authorization in the FY 2013 NDAA of an additional $50 million for ISR in support of our counter-LRA efforts.

We appreciate your continued support for the Combatant Commander Exercise and Engagement Program. This program is the foundation of our exercises in Africa and funds strategic lift requirements as well as providing Service Incremental Funds to our components, ensuring we can provide the forces to work and exercise alongside our African partners.

Finally, we welcome visits by Congressional Members and their staffs. The Members and staff who have had the opportunity to travel in Africa gain a deeper appreciation for the challenges and the many opportunities that are presented in this large and diverse continent.

CONCLUSION

The African continent will continue to present a complex and fluid set of challenges and opportunities. African nations, the African Union, and regional economic communities are increasingly demonstrating their willingness to address African security challenges. At U.S. Africa Command, we will continue to engage with our African partner militaries to strengthen their skills and capabilities, so they are better able to address shared security concerns and are

able to contribute to regional stability and security. We also look forward to strengthening our existing partnerships and developing new partnerships, such as we have with the Libyan military.

Our contributions to protecting and advancing our national interests would not be possible without our interagency partners across the government, including the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, the incredibly dedicated women and men of the U.S. intelligence community and others. Our team of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Coastguardsmen – and our DoD and interagency civilian teammates – is dedicated to our mission and their achievements would not be possible without the strong support of their families.

Thank you for your enduring support to our men and women in uniform and for your interest in this increasingly important region of the world.

United States Africa Command
General Carter F. Ham
Commander, United States Africa Command



General Carter F. Ham became commander of U.S. Africa Command headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany on March 9, 2011. U.S. Africa Command is one of six unified geographic commands within the Department of Defense unified command structure.

General Carter F. Ham served as an enlisted Infantryman in the 82nd Airborne Division before attending John Carroll University in Cleveland, Ohio. He was commissioned in the Infantry as a Distinguished Military Graduate in 1976.

His military service has included assignments in Kentucky, Ohio, California, Georgia, Italy and Germany to name a few. He has also served in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Macedonia, and Iraq.

He has held a variety of positions to include Recruiting Area Commander; Battalion Executive Officer at the National Training Center; Advisor to the Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigade; Commander, 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry; Chief of Staff, 1st Infantry Division; Commander, 29th Infantry Regiment; commander, Multi-National Brigade, Mosul, Iraq; Commander, 1st Infantry Division; Director for Operations, J-3, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC.

His previous assignment was Commanding General of U.S. Army Europe and 7th Army.

His military education includes the Armor Officers Advanced Course, Naval College of Command and Staff, graduating with distinction, and the U. S. Air Force's Air War College.

General Ham's awards and decorations include Army Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters, the Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters, the Bronze Star Medal, and the Joint Service Commendation Medal.

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING

MARCH 15, 2013

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER

Admiral STAVRIDIS. As of 15 MAR 2013, Secretary Hagel announced U.S. policy changes with regard to ballistic missile defense (BMD), including European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) Phase 4. Phase 4 was cancelled and the prime component of Phase 4, the SM–3 Block IIB, was put on hold. This hold allows for SM–3 Block IIB engineering development to continue, but no acquisition milestones will be met. EPAA Phases 1–3, including Polish and Romanian sites, will provide the BMD resources to meet U.S. requirements to defend U.S. interests and support American commitments to our Allies in the 2018 timeframe. The loss of EPAA Phase 4 will have no effect on EUCOM's regional BMD requirements. [See page 17.]

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY

General HAM. The 2012 Tuareg rebellion was the latest of several Tuareg rebellions intended to gain economic resources and greater political autonomy from Bamako. In mid-January 2012, Tuareg rebels from the National Movement of the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) and Ansar al-Din groups conducted a series of attacks on Malian Armed Forces (MAF) outposts in northern Mali in reaction to the MAF's increased presence in the region. Weapons and fighters associated with the 2011 Libya crisis enhanced Tuareg rebel military capabilities against the MAF. Rebel forces isolated and overwhelmed the inadequately supplied MAF outposts in northern Mali. The 22 March coup d'état led by Malian soldiers in Bamako expedited the MAF's retreat from northern Mali. Islamic violent extremist organizations al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb and Tahid wal Jihad in West Africa, in alliance with Ansar al-Din, took advantage of the Tuareg rebellion, and expanded their control throughout northern Mali—largely expelling the MNLA—until early January 2013. [See page 25.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MARCH 15, 2013

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON

The CHAIRMAN. General Dempsey has stated that "recognizing longer-term uncertainty, I've also begun to reassess what our military strategy should be as well as institutional reforms necessary to remain an effective fighting force." Given the fact that the Department of Defense is undertaking a reassessment of military strategy due to sequestration, what would be the implications for EUCOM? Through this reassessment, what aspects of EUCOM's strategy will you be able to execute, and what aspects will you not be able to conduct under sequestration? What are the implications for U.S. force posture in Europe?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. EUCOM is participating in the Secretary's Strategic Choices and Management Review, but the implications of this reassessment of military strategy are not yet clear. However, the fundamental importance of our strategic partnership with Europe to U.S. military strategy remains unchanged. This includes the strategic access that European Allies and partners provide for crisis response and global operations, the military forces that Europeans contribute to operations worldwide, and the military operations they lead around the globe. Therefore, preserving the U.S. strategic partnership with Europe and adapting it to meet the challenges of the 21st century will remain central elements of EUCOM's strategy. Being ready to fulfill our commitment to Article 5, which underpins the strategic partnership with Europe, and execute other contingency plans will also remain an enduring EUCOM mission. While these core tenets of EUCOM's strategy will persist, a reassessment of that strategy and potential impact of sequestration could affect how we execute the strategy and the level of risk to achieving our strategic objectives.

The CHAIRMAN. To what extent is EUCOM adjusting the command's size and structure in light of the January 2012 strategic guidance? To what extent is EUCOM adjusting the command's size and structure in light of the current fiscal environment?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. DOD's strategic guidance, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," looked out over the next 10 years and identified the plan for strategic rebalancing of U.S. defense posture in Europe. The Strategic Guidance also recognized that "Europe is our principal partner in seeking global and economic security, and will remain so for the foreseeable future." In keeping with this evolving strategic landscape, our posture must also evolve to ensure we have the right force posture in Europe for the next 10–20 years. Our planned reductions include V Corps headquarters, two heavy brigades (one is already inactivated), an A–10 squadron, an Air Control Squadron, and approximately 2,500 Army enabler forces. This reduction of general-purpose forces is offset by the addition of four ballistic missile defense capable destroyers at Main Operating Base (MOB) Rota, Spain; a CV–22 squadron at MOB Mildenhall, United Kingdom; a small aviation detachment in Poland which was established in late 2012; and potentially, more special operations forces in Germany to support contingency requirements. There are also plans to enhance rotational force presence to include elements of a U.S.-based brigade combat team to support the NATO Response Force (NRF). This strategic rebalancing ensures the U.S. has the right capabilities needed to accomplish military missions within and from the United States European Command Area of Responsiblity (USEUCOM AOR).

The CHAIRMAN. As the second largest geographic combatant command, EUCOM appears to have a close to half its authorized staff dedicated to providing intelligence support or performing security cooperation activities. Given DOD's recent strategic guidance and the shift in priorities to the Pacific and Middle East, please explain EUCOM's continued requirements for these personnel in further detail.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the committee files.]

The CHAIRMAN. To what extent, if any, has EUCOM been affected by sharing Navy and Air Force component commands with U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The sharing of Navy and Air Force Component Commands between AFRICOM and EUCOM is an imperfect but manageable command and control compromise caused by a resource constrained environment. Because it violates the principal of "Unity of Command" it has occasionally created operational, organi-

zational, resource and doctrinal friction. The EUCOM staff, AFRICOM staff, and service components continue to overcome the associated challenges to provide effective oversight, direction, and control of subordinate organizations in pursuit of national and theater strategic objectives. This sustained success is a testimony to the leadership of the component commanders as well as the hard work, can-do attitude, and professionalism of the EUCOM, AFRICOM, and component staffs.

The CHAIRMAN. How does the command manage personnel within its directorates and the directorates of its subordinate unified commands to ensure that resources are being efficiently allocated and that there is no unnecessary overlap in functions?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. USEUCOM is manned via the Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) and managed via the Organization and Functions Manual. These two documents ensure the exact number of personnel required to perform specific duties are allocated to each directorate, and the functions of those directorates are outlined in the Organization and Functions Manual. The Personnel Strength function within the J1 works specifically with each Service Personnel headquarters to man the billets outlined in the JTD with qualified personnel at the specific service manning rate.

The CHAIRMAN. DOD issued Instruction #1400.25 in July 2012 establishing procedures and guidelines for civilian employment in foreign areas. The instruction also stated it was DOD policy that "Civilian employment in the competitive service in foreign areas shall be limited to a period of 5 continuous years unless interrupted by at least 2 years of physical presence in the United States or nonforeign area." a. Is this DOD policy part of the calculus for EUCOM staff drawdown? If not, why not? Is EUCOM on track to meet its projected reduction in staff without following the DOD policy? b. How many EUCOM civilians have transitioned back to the U.S. because of the 5-year policy? c. How many EUCOM civilians have asked for an extension? d. How many EUCOM civilians have been given an exception to the policy and allowed to stay beyond the 5-year policy?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. a. The DOD five-year policy is always part of the calculus when planning any staff drawdown or restructuring. EUCOM is on track to meet its projected reduction in staff.

b. From July 2012 to present, 21 individuals have transitioned back to the U.S. because of the five year policy.

c. From July 2012 to present, management requested 62 tour extensions.

d. 40 of the 62 extension requests were approved; 22 requests are pending decision.

The CHAIRMAN. General Dempsey has stated that "recognizing longer-term uncertainty, I've also begun to reassess what our military strategy should be as well as institutional reforms necessary to remain an effective fighting force." Given the fact that the Department of Defense is undertaking a reassessment of military strategy due to sequestration, what would be the implications to AFRICOM's strategy? Through this reassessment, what aspects of AFRICOM's strategy will you be able to execute, and what aspects will you not be able to conduct under sequestration?

General HAM. Our strategic approach entails the synchronous execution of operations, exercises, and security cooperation programs which contribute to increased security, stability, and prosperity across the expanse of the African continent. U.S. Africa Command, while remaining vigilant to threat to U.S. National Security Interests emanating from the region, specifically those posed by al-Qa'ida, violent extremist organizations, and illicit trafficking, undertakes a range of activities focused on strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and regional organizations so that over the long run African partners are able to address African security challenges.

We believe that we will be sufficiently resourced and capable of planning and executing counterterrorism related activities. However, we are concerned about the impact of reduced resources as we see an increase in threat activity in Africa. Specifically, we are concerned with:

- The availability of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to maintain awareness across a large area of threat activity.
- The availability of Personnel Recovery capability as our engagement and presence on the African continent increases.
- The availability of Special Operations Forces and enablers to rapidly respond to crisis and contingency operations on the African continent.
- The impact of resource degradation on our interagency partners since we leverage interagency resources to accomplish objectives on the continent. Cuts to other agencies could potentially impact the execution of our theater strategy. Specifically, budgetary reductions associated with the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a suite of Global Peacekeeping Operations

Initiative (GPOI) programs, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and pandemic response.

Increased—but modest and focused—investments today in counterterrorism and in strengthening the defense capabilities of our African partners will contribute to the conditions for a stable and prosperous Africa and reduce the risk to our National Security Interests. U.S. Africa Command's ability to sustain gains already made in East Africa, while responding to emergent security challenges in North and West Africa, depends upon adequate resources and responsive partner building authorities.

The CHAIRMAN. The Committee understands that AFRICOM is in the process of conducting an internal review of its size and structure. a. What is the status of the study? Do you anticipate any changes in military, civilian, or contractor positions? b. Can you provide details of any potential areas of concern for the command in terms of staffing? Please describe how these staffing needs will fulfill ongoing mission requirements.

General HAM. AFRICOM is currently conducting our annual internal organizational review to ensure manpower and personnel are aligned appropriately to support our mission critical needs. This review is the Combatant Commander's title 10 responsibility for organizing to meet mission requirements. We are currently 75% complete on the study. Once the study is complete we will align manpower to ensure mission critical needs are being met. We will not make any staffing decisions until the study is complete.

The CHAIRMAN. AFRICOM has several temporary task forces that are not reflected in its permanent authorized personnel numbers. To what extent is AFRICOM considering realignment and staffing of its temporary joint task forces (Special Operations Command and Control Element–Horn of Africa, Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans Sahara, and Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa)? a. To what extent has AFRICOM evaluated whether these are enduring missions? b. Given the command's initial focus on phase zero/interagency activities, what is the command doing to prepare itself to respond to the growing conflicts occurring in northern and eastern Africa? Do you see an expansion in the role of any of these task forces?

General HAM. In coordination with the Director of the Joint Staff, we are conducting a mission analysis of CJTF–HOA to determine what missions are enduring. We do not anticipate an expansion of CJTF–HOA; however, we are currently working through the Joint Manpower Validation Process to pursue a permanent force structure for CJTF–HOA and SOCCE–HOA. Given recent events in Northwest Africa, we continue to assess the mission requirements and structure of OEF–TS.

The CHAIRMAN. To what extent, if any, has AFRICOM been affected by sharing Navy and Air Force component commands with U.S. European Command (EUCOM)?

General HAM. We have shared our Navy component command since the inception of the command and our Air Force component command for the past two years. There has been no change in support for U.S. Africa Command operations, exercises, and theater security cooperation engagements attributable to sharing component commands.

The CHAIRMAN. How does the command manage personnel within its directorates and the directorates of its subordinate unified commands to ensure that resources are being efficiently allocated and that there is no unnecessary overlap in functions?

General HAM. As part of the Command's annual review process we strive to ensure appropriate resources are allocated efficiently to support our mission critical requirements. During the annual review we assess our core and non-core functions to identify overlap and duplication of functions. Through this annual review process, we determine the best allocation of our resources by assessing priority of and risk associated in not resourcing the function. Where sufficient manpower is not available, we accept risk in lower priority mission areas. The Command also uses a Joint Resources Board (JRB) to prioritize and make resourcing determinations to support emerging manpower requirements throughout the year.

The CHAIRMAN. DOD issued Instruction #1400.25 in July 2012 establishing procedures and guidelines for civilian employment in foreign areas. The instruction also stated it was DOD policy that "Civilian employment in the competitive service in foreign areas shall be limited to a period of 5 continuous years unless interrupted by at least 2 years of physical presence in the United States or nonforeign area." a. What is the role of DOD policy as AFRICOM reviews and manages its personnel structure? b. How many AFRICOM civilians have transitioned back to the U.S. because of the 5-year rule? c. How many AFRICOM civilians have asked for an extension? d. How many AFRICOM civilians have been given an exception to the policy and allowed to stay beyond the 5-year policy?

General HAM. Response A: The five-year limitation on foreign area employment provides headquarters, U.S. Africa Command the necessary flexibility to accommodate the ever-changing foreign area workforce requirements. It provides developmental and career-enhancing opportunities for employees in the U.S. as well as periodically renews the knowledge and competencies of the overseas workforce. The DOD-wide policy provides consistency of application between the many commands in the Stuttgart area.

Response B: Since July 2012, 46 extension requests have been denied. Of those, eight employees transitioned back to the U.S., 10 employees were denied extension and are currently registered in the DOD Priority Placement Program (PPP) for job placement assistance in CONUS, and 28 were denied extension, but have yet to register in DOD PPP or make plans for departure due to non-extension. This last category is primarily due to the delay between when employees are notified about whether they will be extended (a year in advance of their scheduled departure date) and when they are allowed to register in the PPP program (six months in advance of their scheduled departure date).

Response C: Since July 2012, 66 overseas tour extension requests were submitted by either the employee or the management/supervisor. Seven requests were approved for compassionate reasons (1–6 months), 13 requests were approved for mission related reasons, and 46 requests were denied.

Answer D: Since July 2012, 20 overseas tour extensions beyond five years were approved based on mission related reasons and compassionate reasons (allow dependents to finish the school year).

***Snap Shot of Overseas Tour Extension**

Approved Overseas Extension beyond 5 years	13
Extension approved for Compassionate Reasons	7
Extension requests that were denied (10 on PPP/8 departed HQ USAFRICOM)	46
Overall Number of Extension Requests	66

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

Mr. LANGEVIN. Admiral, are the lines of command, control, communications, and information sharing adequately defined between EUCOM, CYBERCOM, STRATCOM, NATO and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence, as well as those allies with whom we work on a bilateral basis on cyber? What, in your view, can we do to better integrate our allies into network operations?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The current lines of Command, Control, Communications and information sharing between EUCOM and STRATCOM/CYBERCOM are strong and getting stronger everyday through continual exchanges to include EUCOM's daily participation in CYBERCOM's morning J3 update and CYBERCOM's participation in EUCOM's weekly Cyber Defense Working Group. As to NATO and allies with whom we work on a bilateral basis, EUCOM is the Executive Agent for a number of DOD Information Assurance agreements with NATO and select countries in the Area of Responsibility (AOR). These formal agreements govern both what and how cyber-related information is shared and has been sufficient to date. In regards to the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence, while numerous informal exchanges have occurred between EUCOM and the Center to discuss how we can best support each other's efforts, there only exists a Memorandum of Agreement on administrative support to U.S. military members embedded in the Center. EUCOM is working on multiple lines of effort to achieve greater cyber integration with allies to include: participating in a number of bilateral/multinational network operations exercises, sponsoring seminars on best cyber defense practices, and working with NATO to establish a framework for coalition communications operations based on the lessons learned from ISAF's Afghan Mission Network.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Admiral, we understand the Department is considering a legislative proposal that would increase the authorized funding amount of the NATO Special Operations Headquarters from $50 million per year to $75 million per year. Can you tell us why this increase is needed in a time of declining budgets and sequestration? When can the committee expect to see this legislative proposal and what priority would your command assign to this proposal?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. As you know, section 1272 of the FY 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 112–239) amends section 1244 of Public Law 111–84 to authorize $50 million per year from the Operation and Maintenance, Army

account for the NATO Special Operations Headquarters for fiscal years 2013 through 2015. At this point, the President has not approved a legislative proposal that would increase that amount, so that any such proposal would be pre-decisional. I am not at liberty to address pre-decisional matters and, respectfully, must decline to discuss this matter further at this time.

The Department is currently working with the White House to begin providing the Committee with legislative proposals in the very near future, and with as much of the Department's legislative program as possible before the Committee begins to mark up the fiscal year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act in late May.

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, do you feel that your building partnership capacity missions have a proper amount of oversight and control, or does this committee need to consider additional authorities?

General HAM. Under current oversight requirements, I see no risk to the development and submission of building partner capacity proposals. We are able to develop and submit proposals to meet our highest priorities for near-term, emerging partner capacity building.

In general, I believe oversight is sufficient, but more flexible authorities that enhance our ability not only to respond to emerging challenges, but to provide stability and consistency in our approach, would be of strategic and long-term benefit.

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, how does your command currently address building partnership capacity (BPC) missions in a country where counter-terrorism functions may be carried out by forces other than the military, such as a gendarmerie or Interior Ministry?

General HAM. We strive to develop programs in coordination with non-Department of Defense (DOD) agencies who can work with the police and border security in support of numerous militarized border security forces. Department of State led programs such as Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) include non-DOD agencies who can work with the police and border guards. The Global Security Contingency Fund provides for an integrated approach to border security where U.S. Africa Command's military requirements can be blended with interagency law enforcement initiatives.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN

Mr. WITTMAN. The Readiness Committee was recently told by a Departmental witness that the Secretary of Defense has initiated a European Infrastructure Consolidation. We were also told that force structure drives infrastructure. Can you provide us the future force structure numbers that will be used for this European Infrastructure Consolidation and indicate how this diminished force structure will provide you sufficient forces to meet your Phase 0, peacetime stability operations? I would particularly like to understand the risks associated with this diminished force structure.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The Secretary of Defense directed the European Infrastructure Consolidation analysis to provide a basis for reducing long-term expenses through footprint consolidation. The consolidation of our footprint in Europe will take into account DOD's strategic guidance for a shift in strategic focus to the Pacific, the planned inactivation of the two Brigade Combat Teams and associated support forces, reductions in Air Force units, and decreasing requirements for support to Afghanistan. This rebalancing also includes the addition of four ballistic missile defense capable destroyers, a CV–22 squadron, a small aviation detachment to Poland, potentially more special operations forces in Germany, and anticipated support to USAFRICOM for crisis response to meet the new challenges in their AOR. Because the European Infrastructure Consolidation analysis is ongoing, we cannot anticipate what impact it will have on our future force structure and assigned personnel. We also cannot anticipate what impact it will have, if any, to our Phase 0 steady state tasks.

Mr. WITTMAN. From an Army perspective, what will be the primary purpose of U.S. troops based in Europe once the regular deployments to Afghanistan are done? What kind of threats will they be responding to? Why should the U.S. continue to forward deploy our troops to Europe?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Army forces provide a diverse crisis response capability for the uncertain security environment to include the Levant and NATO contingency plans; they serve as a demonstration of U.S. commitment and deterrence, they underpin our NATO Article 5 commitment, and are key to sustaining interoperability among Allies and partner nations. As I told the Committee, our European bases are the forward operating bases for 21st century security.

Their primary purpose of our forces is to provide immediate response to the full spectrum of operations including global contingencies, peacekeeping, noncombatant evacuations, humanitarian assistance and more. They support seven combatant commanders and NATO with strategic reach into three continents, capitalizing on the existing European infrastructure.

The threats these forces may respond to include the continued political unrest in the Middle East, European based terrorism, ballistic missile threats, and the frozen conflicts in the Caucasus and Balkans. Land forces in Europe contribute to maneuver and enabler force capabilities to support a full range of military operations, while meeting a wide array of engagements to build partner capacity and meet interoperability objectives. The return on investment of U.S work with our European partners is enormous, with more than 90% of our coalition partners in Afghanistan coming from Europe. That equates to 40,000 personnel actively shouldering a common burden in our global defense. All those nations train with and have close long-term relationships with European assigned Army units from the strategic to the tactical level. They also remain a visible symbol of U.S. commitment to European security and the NATO Alliance.

Mr. WITTMAN. The Army has announced the reduction of 2,500 "enablers" as part of our force structure footprint reduction in EUCOM. During my recent visit to EUCOM, several unit commanders expressed concerns about the number of enablers being tied to force structure reductions rather than COCOM missions or crisis response. Do you share those concerns? Why or why not?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. No. Our posture in Europe, and these attendant changes, reflects our recent strategy guidance and budget decisions and are sufficient to meet our current assigned missions. Consistent with DOD's Strategic Guidance and NATO's Strategic Concept, we continue to adapt our posture in Europe to meet new threats while maintaining the forces necessary to fulfill our Article 5 commitments and strengthen Allied and partner capabilities.

Mr. WITTMAN. Earlier this year, the Department provided us notice about the intent to expand airbase operations in Djibouti at a nearby airfield in Chabelley. Can you explain the current state of aviation operations at Djibouti and ensure our committee that additional measures are in place to preserve this critical mission?

General HAM. Currently, civilian and military aviation operations continue normally at Djibouti's international commercial airport while talks continue to work out technical arrangements for operations at Chabelley. We will continue to work with the Department of State as they complete necessary agreements with the Government of Djibouti for aviation operations at Chabelley.

We appreciate the reauthorization of the temporary, limited authority to use operations and maintenance funding for military construction in support of contingency operations in our area of responsibility which will permit us to complete necessary construction at Chabelley.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN

Mr. COFFMAN. Admiral, I understand we are reducing our military footprint in the European theater. What is the current force lay-down for the United States military in Europe? Provide details on the number, type, and location of all our troops in Europe.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. There are approximately 64,000 military personnel authorized for the support of U.S. European Command and our Service component commands. Additionally, there are approximately 10,000 additional U.S. personnel supporting U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Transportation Command, NATO, and other U.S. Government and Department of Defense activities in Europe.

2013 Navy/Marines Force Lay Down

Unit	Approx. #	Location(s)	Comments
NAVEUR HQ	600	Naples, Italy	Includes NAVAF and 6th Fleet
MARFOREUR/MARFORAF	170	Stuttgart, Germany	
NSWU–2	60	Stuttgart, Germany	
NSWU–10	25	Stuttgart, Germany	
EOD Mobile Unit 8	160	Rota, Spain	

2013 Navy/Marines Force Lay Down—Continued

Unit	Approx. #	Location(s)	Comments
Rota Security Forces	125	Rota, Spain	
Commander Task Force 67	160	Sigonella, Italy	
Other Navy/Marine Forces	5,700	Various locations (primarily Rota, Spain; Naples and Sigonella, Italy; and Souda Bay, Greece)	Includes Navy personnel for EUCOM, AFRICOM, NATO billets, etc.
Total Navy/Marines	7,000		

2013 Air Force Lay Down

Unit	Approx. #	Location(s)	Comments
USAFE HQ	1,100	Ramstein, Germany	Includes support to AFRICOM
3rd Air Force	500	Ramstein, Germany	
31st Fighter Wing	3,800	Aviano, Italy	Includes 2 F–16 Sqdns and an Air Control Sqdn which inactivates in FY13
48th Fighter Wing	4,600	Lakenheath, UK	Includes 3 F–15 Sqdns
52nd Fighter Wing	3,600	Spangdahlem, Germany	Includes F–16 Sqdn and an A–10 Sqdns which inactivates in FY13
39th Air Base Wing	1,200	Incirlik, Turkey	
MUNSS Units	550	Various Locations	
65th Air Base Wing	600	Lajes, Portugal	
86th Airlift Wing	5,000	Ramstein, Germany	
100th Air Refueling Wing	1,800	Mildenhall, UK	
435th Air Ground Ops Wing	1,300	Ramstein, Germany	
603rd Air and Space Ops Center	450	Ramstein, Germany	
MUNSS Units	540	Various locations	
501st Combat Support Wing	800	Various locations in UK	
352nd Special Ops Group	900	Mildenhall, UK	
521st Air Mobility Ops Wing	1,000	Ramstein, Germany	
Other Air Mobility Forces	400	Various locations	
Other Air Forces	3,360	Various locations throughout Europe	Includes Air Force personnel for EUCOM, AFRICOM, NATO billets, etc.
Total Air Force	31,500		

2013 Army Force Lay Down

Unit	Approx. #	Location(s)	Comments
USAREUR HQ	700	Heidelberg/Wiesbaden, Germany	
V Corps	775	Wiesbaden, Germany	Inactivates in FY13
JMTC	1,500	Grafenwoehr, Germany	
173rd IBCT (A)	3,500	Bamberg/Schweinfurt, Germany and Vicenza, Italy	
2nd CR	4,000	Vilseck, Germany	
172nd Inf Bde	4,000	Schweinfurt/Grafenwoehr, Germany	Currently Inactivating
12th Combat Avn Bde	2,700	Ansbach, Germany	
Theater Spt Avn	570	Mannheim/Stuttgart, Germany and Chievres, Belgium	
10th Air Missile Defense Detachment	150	Kaiserslautern, Germany	
5–7 Air Defense Bn	575	Kaiserslautern, Germany	
21st Theater Sustainment Command	3,000	Various locations throughout Europe (HQs in Kaiserslautern)	Includes 16th Sustainment Bde
18th Engineer Bde	1,300	Various locations in Germany (HQs in Schweinfurt)	Includes 2 Eng Bns
18th MP Bde	1,800	Various locations throughout Europe (HQs in Sembach, Germany)	Includes 2 MP Bns
66th MI Bde	1,000	Wiesbaden/Hohenfels, Germany	
5th Signal Command	1,800	Various locations throughout Europe (HQs in Wiesbaden)	Includes 2 Signal Bdes
Medical Command	2,800	Various locations throughout Europe (HQs in Heidelberg)	Includes Landstuhl Regional Med Ctr
IMCOM-Europe	400	Various locations throughout Europe (HQs in Heidelberg)	
1–10 Special Forces BN	450	Stuttgart, Germany	
Other Army	3,980	Various locations throughout Europe	Includes Army personnel for EUCOM, AFRICOM, NATO billets, etc.
Total Army	35,000		

Mr. COFFMAN. Admiral, how many of our troops in Europe are combat element troops?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Although there is no doctrinal definition of a "combat element" force, EUCOM does have several assigned units that exercise and employ a direct combat mission. Those units are listed below. The combined total FY13 military authorizations for these units are approximately 27,000 personnel; however, several of these units are deactivating as noted.

Unit	Service	Approx. #	Location(s)	Comments
Naval Special Warfare Unit–2	USN	60	Stuttgart, Germany	
Naval Special Warfare Unit–10	USN	25	Stuttgart, Germany	
31st Fighter Wing	USAF	3,800	Aviano, Italy	Includes 2 F–16 Sqdns and an Air Control Sqdn which inactivates in FY13
48th Fighter Wing	USAF	4,600	Lakenheath, UK	Includes 3 F–15 Sqdns
52nd Fighter Wing	USAF	3,600	Spangdahlem, Germany	Includes F–16 Sqdn and an A–10 Sqdns which inactivates in FY13
352nd Special Ops Group	USAF	900	Mildenhall, UK	
1–10 Special Forces BN	USA	450	Stuttgart, Germany	
173rd IBCT (A)	USA	3,500	Bamberg/Schweinfurt, Germany and Vicenza, Italy	
2nd Cavalry Regiment	USA	4,000	Vilseck, Germany	
172nd Inf Bde	USA	4,000	Schweinfurt/Grafenwoehr, Germany	Currently Inactivating
12th Combat Avn Bde	USA	2,700	Ansbach, Germany	

Mr. COFFMAN. Admiral, how many of our troops in Europe are there to support ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. U.S. troops are stationed in Europe to enable ongoing operations in Afghanistan as well as other global missions. First, just like CONUS based forces, U.S. forces in Europe deploy worldwide. In the case of Afghanistan, U.S. Army Europe deployed on average approximately 20% of its forces (roughly 7,400 personnel) to ISAF and U.S. Central Command in 2012. This included the 173rd Airborne BCT, 12th Combat Aviation Brigade, and V Corps. Currently, we have approximately 3,500 personnel deployed in support of operations in Afghanistan. Second, U.S. troops in Europe provide critical logistical support to global operations. With regard to Afghanistan, this includes Ramstein AB airmen conducting airlift operations, the movement of cargo along the Northern Distribution Network, and life-saving urgent care for wounded warriors at the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center. Third, our European assigned forces enable Allies and partner nations to deploy forces in support of U.S. operations. For example, U.S. Army Europe personnel at the Joint Multinational Training Command in Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels, Germany conduct pre-deployment training for Ally/partner nation forces deploying to Afghanistan. U.S. forces in Europe have provided these same types of support to operations in Iraq and Libya, and will be required to do so in future global operations.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. VEASEY

Mr. VEASEY. I know you have worked to foster and maintain great relationships with our NATO allies. And you have encouraged our partners to build their capabilities as we face challenges across the globe. Thank you for your efforts. I know that in 2011, you wrote to the Senate Appropriations Committee in support of the Medium Extended Air Defense System—MEADS—the next generation Air and Missile Defense system we are developing in partnership with Germany and Italy. How important is it, in your view, that we complete our financial commitment and develop missile defense capabilities for the U.S. and our partner nations?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. It is very important, and we are grateful that the Congress passed H.R. 933 (now Public Law 113–6), which provides that crucial funding. Completion of MEADS development will reassure our allies by avoiding a situation

where the U.S. could have been viewed as an unreliable partner. Further, this comes at an exceptionally crucial point in time where EUCOM is working with NATO and multiple nations to build missile defense capabilities and capacity to allow European nations to bear more of the load for the defense of Europe.

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