[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TSA INTEGRITY CHALLENGES: EXAMINING
MISCONDUCT BY AIRPORT SECURITY PERSONNEL
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND
MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY
and the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 31, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-29
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Tulsi Gabbard, Hawaii
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Chris Stewart, Utah Steven A. Horsford, Nevada
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Eric Swalwell, California
Steve Daines, Montana
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Mark Sanford, South Carolina
Greg Hill, Chief of Staff
Michael Geffroy, Deputy Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina, Chairman
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Ron Barber, Arizona
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steve Daines, Montana Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Ryan Consaul, Subcommittee Staff Director
Deborah Jordan, Subcommittee Clerk
Tamla Scott, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
Richard Hudson, North Carolina, Chairman
Mike Rogers, Alabama Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Eric Swalwell, California
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Amanda Parikh, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dennis Terry, Subcommittee Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Jeff Duncan, a Representative in Congress From the
State of South Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight and Management Efficiency:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Ron Barber, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Arizona, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight
and Management Efficiency:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Richard Hudson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
The Honorable Cedric L. Richmond, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Transportation Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Witnesses
Mr. John W. Halinski, Deputy Administrator, Transportation
Security Administration, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
Mr. Stephen M. Lord, Director, Forensic Audits and Investigative
Services, Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
Ms. Deborah L. Outten-Mills, Acting Assistant Inspector General
for Inspections, Office of Inspector General, Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 24
Prepared Statement............................................. 26
TSA INTEGRITY CHALLENGES: EXAMINING MISCONDUCT BY AIRPORT SECURITY
PERSONNEL
----------
Wednesday, July 31, 2013
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Oversight and
Management Efficiency, and
Subcommittee on Transportation Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Jeff Duncan
[Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Management
Efficiency] presiding.
Present: Representatives Duncan, Hudson, Rogers, Miller,
Barletta, Daines, Brooks, Thompson, Jackson Lee, Richmond,
Barber, and Payne.
Also present: Representative Mica.
Mr. Duncan. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittees on Oversight and Management Efficiency and
Transportation Security will come to order. It is a joint
hearing today with Members from both subcommittees. The purpose
of this hearing is to examine the misconduct by airport
security screening personnel and the effects that misconduct
has on the integrity of TSA. I now recognize myself for an
opening statement.
The Transportation Security Administration was created
after the horrific terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in
an effort to strengthen the security of our Nation's
transportation systems, especially our airports. Considering
the nature of the attacks and the other terrorist attempts,
like the 2009 Christmas day underwear bomber, the 2001 shoe
bomb plot, the American public looks to TSA to keep them safe
while flying.
However, with countless TSA misconduct cases spread
throughout the country, confidence in airport security is
quickly waning. For example, in 2011 a transportation security
officer at Newark Airport pleaded guilty to stealing thousands
of dollars in cash and other valuables from unsuspecting
travelers. In March of this year, a wanted rape suspect made
his way through a security checkpoint at JFK carrying a 3,800K-
volt stun gun, which is definitely on the list of banned items
for airplane travel.
In February this year, TSA improperly detained a 3-year-old
disabled wheelchair-bound girl, suffering from spina bifida, on
her way to Disney World with her family. It is a terrible
YouTube video to watch that reminds us of some of these
incidents. This instance specifically was heartbreaking. TSA
must do more to focus on the true threats and stop the invasive
screening of low-risk travelers.
The TSA lists integrity as one of its core values, but
unfortunately integrity has been lost in many cases. When
workers on the front line fail to live up to TSA's established
guiding principles and standards of conduct, management must
step up and hold individuals accountable. TSA created the
Office of Professional Responsibility to promote timeliness,
accountability, and consistency within the disciplinary
process. However, according to the Government Accountability
Office's--GAO--report on TSA misconduct that was just released
yesterday, timeliness, accountability, and consistency are
still major issues for TSA when misconduct arises.
For example, while TSA has established standards for
investigating and adjudicating misconduct cases, TSA does not
track how long it takes to complete and adjudicate
investigations. As a result, TSA could miss systemic problems
across airports, allowing misconduct to go unchecked.
Furthermore, according to TSA data, out of 56 cases of theft
from fiscal years 2010 through 2012, 31 resulted in
termination, 11 resulted in letters of reprimand, 11 resulted
in suspension of a defined period, and 2 resulted in indefinite
suspension, and 1 resulted in resignation. Stealing is
stealing, and these are incidents of stealing from American
travelers.
According to recommended penalty range on TSA's table of
offenses and penalties for theft or unauthorized taking, a
letter of reprimand is not included. Additionally, when
questioned by the former Transportation Security Subcommittee
Chairman last year, Deputy Administrator Halinski stated that,
and I will quote: ``When we have personnel that have committed,
let us say, stealing, drugs, or lack of security that we can
immediately identify, those personnel are terminated. They are
walked out the door.''
Well, which is it Deputy Administrator? Are they removed
from employment or sent home with a slap on the wrist? I would
hope that a Federal employee that engages in theft of trusting
American travelers would be disciplined with more than just a
letter. These statistics tell the American people that TSA
isn't terribly concerned if its employees steal from the
traveling public. TSA should have no tolerance for such
behavior. The American people demand accountability.
In addition, of the 1,936 cases in fiscal year 2012 that
fall in the misconduct category of screening and security,
around 4 percent of those cases involve sleeping while engaged
in security-related duties. I believe that is about 77 cases,
and I will tell you, that is 77 cases too many.
Yet, rather than punishing these employees using standard
penalties, TSA chose to go easy on those who find it hard to
stay awake while protecting the American people. GAO reported
that about half of the penalties for sleeping on duty didn't
even fall into the recommended range, which is a 2-week
suspension to termination. Instead, half of the cases were
resolved with a reprimand letter or a 1- to 3-day suspension.
Unfortunately, this is symptomatic of the larger problem.
According to GAO's analysis of fiscal year 2012 data on
screening and security offenses that include failing to follow
standard operating procedures, sleeping on duty, and allowing
individuals to bypass screening, again, 1,936 cases, 55 percent
of the offenses result in a letter of reprimand even though a
letter of reprimand is not part of the recommended penalty
range for any of those offenses. So where is the consistency?
While I know that there are many thousands of hard-working,
dedicated employees working at airports throughout the country,
and it is unfair to generalize to the whole workforce,
unfortunately, a few bad apples can ruin the bunch. These
findings are especially hard to stomach since so many Americans
today are sick of being groped, interrogated, and treated like
criminals when passing through checkpoints. If integrity is
truly a core value, then, TSA, it is time to prove it. Stop
with the napping, the stealing, the tardiness, and the
disrespect, and earn Americans' trust and confidence.
Disciplinary action should be standardized, tracked, and
processed in a timely manner so that the agency can compare
performance Nation-wide, analyze significant differences in
data, and make changes where changes are due, whether that is
through additional training or stricter enforcement of policies
and procedures.
The TSA plays a vital role in the security of our country
and it is time that the American people look to TSA favorably
instead of with disdain and distrust. One important step in
achieving this is to fully respect American civil liberties
when flying.
I appreciate the participation of our distinguished
witnesses here today, and I am eager to hear about the
Transportation Security Administration's process and progress
for handling misconduct cases within its workforce. It is
critical that our airports are secure and that the tarnished
reputation of the agency is turned around and the traveling
public can once again trust and appreciate those working the
front lines to keep our country safe.
The Chairman will now recognize the Minority leader of the
subcommittee, the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Barber, for an
opening statement that he may have.
[The statement of Chairman Duncan follows:]
Statement of Chairman Jeff Duncan
July 31, 2013
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was created after
the horrific terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in an effort to
strengthen the security of our Nation's transportation systems,
especially our airports. And considering the nature of the attacks, and
other terrorist attempts, like the 2009 Christmas day underwear bomber
and the 2001 shoe bomb plot, the American public looks to the TSA to
keep them safe when flying.
However, with countless TSA misconduct cases spread throughout the
country, confidence in airport security is quickly waning. For example,
in 2011, a Transportation Security Officer at Newark Airport pleaded
guilty to stealing thousands of dollars in cash and other valuables
from unsuspecting travelers. In March of this year, a wanted rape
suspect made his way through the security checkpoint at JFK carrying a
3,800K-volt stun-gun, which is definitely on the list of banned items
for airplane travel. And, in February of this year, TSA improperly
detained a 3-year-old disabled, wheelchair-bound child suffering from
spina bifida on her way to Disney World with her family. This instance
specifically was heart-breaking. TSA must do more to focus on the true
threats and stop with invasive screening of low-risk travelers.
The TSA lists ``Integrity'' as one of its core values, but
unfortunately, integrity has been lost in many cases. When workers on
the front line fail to live up to TSA's established guiding principles
and standards of conduct, management must step up and hold individuals
accountable.
TSA created the Office of Professional Responsibility to promote
timeliness, accountability, and consistency in the disciplinary
process. However, according to the Government Accountability Office's
(GAO) report on TSA misconduct that was just issued yesterday,
timeliness, accountability, and consistency are still major issues for
TSA when misconduct arises. For example, while TSA has established
standards for investigating and adjudicating misconduct cases, TSA does
not track how long it takes to complete and adjudicate investigations.
As a result, TSA could miss systemic problems across airports allowing
misconduct to go unchecked.
Furthermore, according to TSA data, out of 56 cases of theft or
unauthorized taking from fiscal years 2010-2012, 31 resulted in
termination, 11 resulted in letters of reprimand, 11 resulted in
suspension of a defined period, 2 resulted in indefinite suspension,
and 1 resulted in resignation. According to the recommended penalty
range on TSA's Table of Offenses and Penalties for theft/unauthorized
taking, a letter of reprimand is not included. Additionally, when
questioned by the former Transportation Security Subcommittee Chairman
last year, Deputy Administrator Halinski stated that ``when we have
personnel that have committed, let us say, stealing, drugs, or lack of
security that we can immediately identify, those personnel are
terminated. They are walked out the door.'' Well, which is it, Deputy
Administrator? Are they removed from employment or sent home with a
slap on the wrist? I would hope that a Federal employee that engages in
theft of trusting travelers would be disciplined more than with just a
letter. These statistics tell the American people that TSA isn't
terribly concerned if its employees steal from the traveling public.
TSA should have no tolerance for such behavior. The American people
demand accountability.
In addition, of the 1,936 cases in fiscal year 2012 that fall in
the misconduct category of ``Screening and Security,'' around 4 percent
of those cases involved sleeping while engaged in security-related
duties. I believe that's about 77 cases. That's 77 cases too many. Yet
rather than punishing these employees using the standard penalties, TSA
chose to go easy on those who find it hard to stay awake while
protecting the American people. GAO reported that about half of the
penalties for sleeping on duty didn't even fall into the recommended
range (which is a 2-week suspension to termination). Instead, half of
the cases were resolved with a reprimand letter or 1- to 3-day
suspension.
Unfortunately, this is symptomatic of the larger problem. According
to GAO's analysis of the fiscal year 2012 data on ``Screening and
Security'' offenses that include failing to follow standard operating
procedures, sleeping on duty, and allowing individuals to bypass
screening--again of 1,936 cases, 55 percent of the offenses resulted in
a letter of reprimand even though a letter of reprimand is not part of
the recommended penalty range for any of those offenses. Where is the
consistency?
While I know there are many--thousands--of hard-working, dedicated
employees working at airports throughout the country, and it's unfair
to generalize to the whole workforce, unfortunately, a few bad apples
can ruin the bunch. These findings are especially hard to stomach since
so many Americans today are sick of being groped, interrogated, and
treated like criminals when passing through checkpoints. If
``Integrity'' is truly a core value, then, TSA, prove it. Stop with the
napping, the stealing, the tardiness, and the disrespect. Earn
Americans' trust and confidence.
Disciplinary actions should be standardized, tracked, and processed
in a timely manner so that the agency can compare performance Nation-
wide, analyze significant differences in data and make changes where
changes are due--whether that's through additional training or stricter
enforcement of policies and procedures. The TSA plays a vital role in
the security of our country and it's time the American people look to
TSA favorably instead of with disdain and distrust. One important step
to achieving this is to fully respect Americans' civil liberties when
flying.
I appreciate the participation of our distinguished witnesses here
today and am eager to hear about the Transportation Security
Administration's process and progress for handling misconduct cases
within its workforce. It is critical that our airports are secure and
that the tarnished reputation of the agency is turned around and the
traveling public once again trust and appreciate those working the
front lines to keep our country safe.
Mr. Barber. Well, thank you, Chairman Duncan, for convening
this hearing, and it is a critical area that we are examining
today because the American public every single day, the flying
public at least, deals with the TSA officers, and we need to
make sure that they are treated properly.
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, those terrorist
attacks resulted in the formation or creation of the
Transportation Security Administration, and the main purpose
was to protect air travel and keep the traveling public safe.
In order to implement its mission, the TSA employs thousands of
TSOs, transportation security officers, and on a daily basis
screen almost 2 million passengers at 450 airports throughout
the United States.
These dedicated and hard-working civil servants perform
their duties in the face of frustration. I have seen it in my
many travels back and forth between my home and Washington,
face frustration from weary travelers and critics of the TSA's
often-changing policies. They serve as our front line of
defense in aviation security and we rely on them and the
technology that they use to keep us safe from harm.
As I mentioned, I have now been in Congress for 1 year. I
fly back home almost every weekend. I have gone through TSA
security lines at least 100 times in this last year. I would
have to say that I look and observe what is going on around me
with other passengers, and almost always, with few exceptions,
the public is treated with respect and professionalism. But
there are problems that remain.
According to media reports, from December 2010 through
February 2013, 108 transportation security officers have been
arrested and 93 crimes related to their employment have been
committed. According to the GAO, from 2010 through 2012, the
annual number of TSA misconduct cases increased from 2,691 to
3,408. The GAO also reported that 1,936, or 20 percent of the
aforementioned misconduct cases, were classified as security
and screening violations. These pertain to incidents that do
not include conducting security or equipment checks and
allowing people or baggage to bypass the screening.
TSA's most important responsibility is to ensure the safety
and the security of travelers in a professional manner. We
cannot allow one bag or one person to go unscreened. This
percentage of unscreened baggage and people is absolutely
unacceptable.
When compared to the TSA workforce in total, which numbers
more than 55,000 employees, the overall misconduct numbers
indicate that around 6 percent of TSA's employees were involved
in wrongdoing. These statistics clearly show that more work can
and must be done to properly train and effectively hire
transportation security officers.
It should be noted that this data from the GAO also
indicates that the vast majority of TSO, transportation
security officers, are law-abiding citizens and professional in
carrying out their most important duties and fulfilling the
mission of the Department of Homeland Security.
According to GAO, TSA has made some progress in improving
the professionalism and accountability of its workforce. For
example, having a table of offenses with clearly-defined ranges
of penalties ensures that consistency and fairness exist in
what was previously a very ad hoc, arbitrary process.
Furthermore, the creation of TSA Office of Professional
Responsibility has resulted in reduced backlog of cases and
quicker decisions for employees waiting to resolve their
matters. The TSA has also added additional training classes for
its airport-based personnel so that managers and supervisors
are better able to identify and investigate misconduct.
While these steps are good and important, they do not rule
out the need for the TSA to improve weaknesses that still exist
in the agency. Risks or weaknesses such as ensuring that
misconduct cases are recorded in TSA's centralized database,
and making sure--making sure--that misconduct cases are
properly handled in accordance with TSA policies and
procedures.
Furthermore, when addressing misconduct, Congress and TSA
have a responsibility to ensure proper oversight over the
entire TSA workforce, including management and supervisors.
According to a recent Department of Homeland Security Office of
Inspector General report, supervisors at TSA's Transportation
Threat Assessment and Credentialing Office have exhibited a
pattern of poor management practices and inappropriate use of
formal--informal administrative processes to assess and address
misconduct.
This report is yet one more example of why an examination
of TSA's misconduct should be extended beyond the TSO
workforce. I therefore look forward to hearing from both GAO
and the OIG this morning on how TSA can improve its processes,
and from TSA on how it intends to comply with GAO and OIG
recommendations. I thank our witnesses for being here.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening the meeting. I yield
back the balance of my time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Barber follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Ron Barber
July 31, 2013
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was created in an effort
to protect air travel and keep the travelling public safe.
In order to implement its mission, TSA employs thousands of
Transportation Security Officers that on a daily basis screen almost 2
million passengers at 450 airports throughout the United States.
These dedicated, hardworking civil servants perform their duties in
the face of frustration from weary travelers and critics of TSA's often
frequently-changing policies.
They serve as our first line of defense in aviation security and we
rely on them, and the technology they utilize, to keep us safe from
harm.
Most organizations have experiences where employees do not live up
to an organization's work standards. Unfortunately, this is also true
sometimes for the Transportation Security Administration.
According to media reports, from December 2010 through February
2013, 108 TSOs have been arrested and 93 crimes--related to their
employment--have been committed.
According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), from 2010
through 2012, the annual number of TSA misconduct cases increased from
2,691 to 3,408.
The GAO also reported that 1,936, or 20 percent, of the
aforementioned misconduct cases, were classified as security and
screening violations. These pertain to incidents that include not
conducting security or equipment checks and allowing people or baggage
to bypass screening.
TSA's first and foremost responsibility is to ensure the safety and
security of travelers in a professional manner. We cannot allow one bag
or one person go unscreened and this percentage is simply unacceptable.
When compared to the TSA workforce in total, which numbers more
than 55,000 employees, the overall misconduct numbers indicate around 6
percent of TSA's employees were involved in wrongdoing.
These statistics clearly show that more work can and must be done
to properly train and effectively hire Transportation Security
Officers.
It should be noted that this data from GAO also indicates that the
vast majority of TSOs are law-abiding citizens, seeking to carry out
the mission of the Department of Homeland Security.
According to GAO, TSA has made some progress in improving the
professionalism and accountability of its workforce.
For example, having a table of offenses with clearly defined ranges
of penalties ensures that consistency and fairness exists in what was
previously an ad hoc and arbitrary process.
Furthermore, the creation of the TSA Office of Professional
Responsibility has resulted in a reduced backlog of cases and quicker
decisions for employees waiting to resolve their matters.
TSA has also added additional training classes for its airport-
based personnel so that managers and supervisors are better able to
identify and investigate misconduct.
While these steps are important, they do not rule out the need for
TSA to improve weaknesses that still exist, such as ensuring that
misconduct cases are recorded in TSA's centralized database and making
sure that misconduct cases are properly handled in accordance with TSA
policies and procedures.
Furthermore, when addressing misconduct, Congress and TSA have a
responsibility to ensure proper oversight over the entire TSA
workforce, including management and supervisors.
According to a recent Department of Homeland Security Office of
Inspector General (OIG) report, supervisors at TSA's Transportation
Threat Assessment and Credentialing Office, have exhibited a pattern of
poor management practices and inappropriate use of informal
administrative processes to assess and address misconduct.
This report is but one example of why an examination of TSA
misconduct should extended beyond the TSO workforce.
I therefore look forward to hearing from both GAO and the OIG on
how TSA can improve its processes and from TSA on how it intends to
comply with GAO and OIG recommendations.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the Ranking Member.
I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Florida,
Mr. Mica, be permitted to participate in today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
The Chairman now recognizes the Chairman of the
Transportation Security Subcommittee, the gentleman from North
Carolina, Mr. Hudson, for any statement he may have.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Chairman Duncan.
I would like to thank our panel of witnesses for being here
today to discuss this very important issue. As we work this
week in the House to hold Government accountable to the
American people, I appreciate your willingness to address these
issues before the subcommittee.
I recognize that TSA screeners have a tough job. Screeners
spend all day inspecting hundreds of people, and their personal
possessions, trying to find--to stop a disaster, but never
knowing exactly what the threat looks like or when it will
strike. It is precisely the nature of the job that leaves
absolutely no room for misconduct at screening checkpoints. At
best, misconduct is a distraction to the screeners who are
actually focused on preventing a bomb from getting on an
airplane and killing thousands of innocent people. At worst, it
is gross negligence and undermines the security of the United
States and the confidence of the citizens in our Government.
Earlier this year, my subcommittee held a series of
hearings on TSA's efforts to advance risk-based security where
we discussed the seriousness of the threats we face and what it
will take for TSA to successfully implement PreCheck and other
risk-based screening initiatives. Now more than ever, as TSA
continues its much-needed transition towards risk-based
security, the agency must fine-tune its hiring practices to
ensure that it is employing the best qualified candidates to
secure our Nation's airports, and that once hired each employee
is held to the highest possible standard.
It is critically important that as TSA moves towards a more
concentrated and agile screening process, it also focuses in
quality over quantity of the screening personnel. It is no
secret that TSA's image with the American public has been
tarnished and security has been compromised with certain cases
of wrongdoing among a few TSA employees. These instances may
not represent the majority of TSA employees, but they do have a
direct impact on TSA's relationship with travelers and the
overall screening environment. Reports that cases of employee
misconduct have increased by nearly 30 percent over the last 3
years do little to instill confidence in an agency that is
already fighting an uphill battle.
Today's hearing will provide the opportunity to hear from
TSA and from the Government Accounting Office about what steps
can be taken to reduce employee misconduct, improve consistency
in how these cases are handled by TSA, and identify new
opportunities to promote integrity and professionalism within
the workforce. GAO's recent report makes several important
recommendations to TSA on ways to improve how it handles
employee misconduct, and I look forward to discussing those
recommendations and what steps TSA has already taken to address
those here today.
Finally, I am concerned that TSA's attention to conduct
stops short in addressing the issue of failing a covert test.
TSA conducts covert testing at airport checkpoints as a way to
identified security weaknesses. If a screener fails a covert
test, he or she is taken off the line and instructed on what
part of the test he or she failed. However, there is apparently
no consequence or penalty. Instead, the person is retrained and
allowed to go back to the checkpoint to screen for explosives.
I think this issue is worth exploring further. If someone
fails multiple tests and a simulated bomb is able to get
through security and onto an airplane, what should be the
penalty for that individual if our ultimate goal is maximizing
the security that is being provided?
I look forward to the witnesses' perspective on this, as
well as the other areas for improvement identified by the GAO
in its report. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the
balance of my time.
[The statement of Chairman Hudson follows:]
Statement of Chairman Richard Hudson
July 31, 2013
I recognize that TSA screeners have a tough job. It is hard to
imagine spending all day inspecting hundreds of people and their
personal possessions, trying to stop a disaster from happening, but
never knowing exactly what the threat looks like or when it might
strike.
It is precisely the nature of the job that leaves absolutely no
room for misconduct at the screening checkpoints. At best, misconduct
is a distraction to the screeners who are actually focused on
preventing a bomb from getting on an airplane and killing thousands of
innocent people; at worst it is gross negligence that undermines the
security of the United States and the confidence of citizens in
Government.
Earlier this year, my subcommittee held a series of hearings on
TSA's efforts to advance risk-based security, where we discussed the
seriousness of the threats we face, and what it will take for TSA to
successfully implement Pre-Check and other risk-based screening
initiatives.
Now, more than ever, as TSA continues its much-needed transition
toward risk-based security (RBS), the agency must fine-tune its hiring
practices to ensure that it is employing the best-qualified candidates
to secure our Nation's airports and that once hired, each employee is
held to the highest possible standard. It is critically important that
as TSA moves toward a more concentrated and agile screening process, it
also focuses in quality over quantity of its screening personnel.
It's no secret that TSA's image with the American public has been
tarnished, and security has been compromised with certain cases of
wrongdoing among TSA employees. These instances may not represent the
majority of TSA employees, but they do have a direct impact on TSA's
relationship with travelers and the overall screening environment.
Reports that cases of employee misconduct have increased by nearly 30
percent over the past 3 years do little to instill confidence in an
agency that is already fighting an uphill battle.
Today's hearing will provide the opportunity to hear from TSA and
GAO about what steps can be taken to reduce employee misconduct,
improve consistency in how these cases are handled by TSA, and identify
new opportunities to promote integrity and professionalism within the
workforce. GAO's recent report makes several important recommendations
to TSA on ways to improve how it handles employee misconduct, and I
look forward to discussing those recommendations here today.
Finally, I am concerned that TSA's attention to conduct stops short
of addressing the issue of failing a covert test.
TSA conducts covert testing at airport checkpoints as a way to
identify security weaknesses. If a screener fails a covert test, her or
she is taken off the line and instructed on what part of the test he or
she failed. However, there is apparently no consequence or penalty;
instead the person is retrained and allowed to go back to the
checkpoint and screen for explosives.
I think this issue is worth exploring further: If someone fails
multiple tests and a simulated bomb is able to get through security and
onto an airplane, what should be the penalty for that individual, if
our ultimate goal is to maximize the security that is being provided?
I look forward to the witnesses' perspectives on this, as well as
the other areas for improvement identified by the GAO in its report.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the gentleman from North Carolina.
The Chairman will now recognize the Ranking Minority Member
of the Transportation Security Subcommittee, the gentleman from
Louisiana, Mr. Richmond, for a statement he may have.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I trust that this
hearing will be used to facilitate a constructive discussion
regarding TSA's application of its disciplinary policies and
not a platform for demeaning TSA's front-line workforce.
Transportation security officers have an undeniably hard
job and the overwhelming majority of them conduct themselves
honorably and in accordance with TSA's protocols. With any
large agency and organization, instances of misconduct and the
failure to follow standard operating procedures will occur.
This principle applies to CBP, ICE, the Secret Service, and the
TSA alike.
The distinction with TSA however, is the broad latitude the
administrator has been provided to discipline the screener
workforce. When TSA was established, Congress granted the
administrator sweeping powers to set the terms of employment
for screeners, notwithstanding any other provision of law. That
means TSOs do not have the right to appeal adverse employment
actions to the Merit Systems Protection Board, commonly
referred to as the MSPB. This is the case despite the fact that
managers and supervisors have the right to appeal to the MSPB
themselves should they face disciplinary action. It also means
TSOs do not enjoy the protections of the Rehabilitation Act,
Equal Pay Act, and a litany of other employment laws.
This dynamic makes it critical for TSA to handle
allegations of misconduct in a fair and consistent manner.
According to the GAO report released yesterday, TSA lacks the
controls necessary to do just that. The result is a
disciplinary system for TSOs that results in what happens--what
appears to be arbitrary punishment.
I am pleased that TSA has concurred with all of the GAO
recommendations contained within the report. If implemented
properly, these recommendations will provide both the public
and the transportation security officers assurances that
discipline is uniform and allegations of misconduct are
properly adjudicated.
I look forward to hearing from Deputy Administrator
Halinski on the steps TSA intends to take to implement GAO's
recommendations. I also look forward to hearing from Mr.
Halinski on the challenges TSA faces in ensuring Nation-wide
uniformity as it relates to discipline for screeners who engage
in misconduct in light of the Screening Partnership Program.
While TSA has the authority to set the terms of employment
and propose disciplinary action for TSOs, its ability to do so
for contract screeners is subject to the terms of the various
contracts it has with private screening companies. This leads
to both Congress and TSA lacking visibility into the
disciplinary policies of companies providing passenger
screening at over a dozen airports across the country.
I also look forward to hearing from Mr. Lord of the GAO
office during the hearing today. His expertise on matters of
aviation security and TSA's policies continue to be of great
value to the committee as it conducts its oversight of TSA.
Finally, I look forward to hearing from Ms. Outten-Mills--
and I hope I didn't mess that up too bad--of the Department of
Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General. Her testimony
will provide insight into how the OIG and the TSA work
collaboratively on allegations of misconduct.
Mr. Chairman, before yielding back, I would like to
reiterate my appreciation for you holding this joint hearing
today. Approximately one-quarter of the transportation security
officer workforce are veterans, and a vast majority of
screeners wake up every day with one goal in mind: Protecting
our transportation systems from terrorist attacks. Despite
Congress neglecting to provide these men and women the standard
employment protections afforded to their colleagues in the
Federal Government, we should not settle for a system of
arbitrary and ad hoc discipline by TSA. Both the screeners and
the flying public deserve better.
I would also like to point out that while there is a
tendency to focus on allegations of misconduct, we should not
ignore the instances of exemplary conduct by TSOs. Earlier this
year a TSO in Georgia discovered a total of $1,000 left
unattended in an ATM's cash dispenser. She turned it in. A TSO
in New York who was on her way to the baggage room noticed an
envelope on the ground with over $500 inside. Like her
colleague in Georgia, she turned the money in. Hopefully, the
detour did not result in her being disciplined for tardiness,
the most common charge against TSOs, according to the GAO
report.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Richmond follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Cedric L. Richmond
July 31, 2013
I trust that this hearing will be used to facilitate a constructive
discussion regarding TSA's application of its disciplinary policies and
NOT a platform for demeaning TSA's front-line workforce.
Transportation Security Officers have an undeniably hard job and
the overwhelming majority of them conduct themselves honorably and in
accordance with TSA's protocols. With any large agency or organization,
instances of misconduct and the failure to follow standard operating
procedures will occur.
This principle applies to CBP, ICE, the Secret Service, and TSA
alike. The distinction with TSA, however, is the broad latitude the
administrator has been provided to discipline the screener workforce.
When TSA was established, Congress granted the administrator
sweeping powers to set the terms of employment for screeners
notwithstanding any other provision of law. That means TSOs do not have
the right to appeal adverse employment actions to the Merit Systems
Protection Board--commonly referred to as the MSPB. This is the case
despite the fact that managers and supervisors have the right to appeal
to the MSPB themselves--should they face disciplinary action. It also
means TSOs do not enjoy the protections of the Rehabilitation Act,
Equal Pay Act, and a litany of other employment laws.
This dynamic makes it critical for TSA to handle allegations of
misconduct in a fair and consistent manner. According to the GAO report
released yesterday, TSA lacks the controls necessary to do just that.
The result is a disciplinary system for TSOs that results in what
appears to be arbitrary punishments. I am pleased that TSA has
concurred with all of GAO's recommendations contained within the
report. If implemented properly, these recommendations will provide
both the public and Transportation Security Officers assurances that
discipline is uniform and allegations of misconduct are properly
adjudicated.
I look forward to hearing from Deputy Administrator Halinski on the
steps TSA intends to take to implement GAO's recommendations. I also
look forward to hearing from Mr. Halinski on the challenges TSA faces
in ensuring Nation-wide uniformity as it relates to discipline for
screeners who engage in misconduct in light of the Screening
Partnership Program.
While TSA has the authority to set the terms of employment and
propose disciplinary action for TSOs, its ability to do so for contract
screeners is subject to the terms of the various contracts it has with
private screening companies.
This leads to both Congress and TSA lacking visibility into the
disciplinary policies of companies providing passenger screening at
over a dozen airports across the country.
I also look forward to hearing from Mr. Lord of the Government
Accountability Office during the hearing today. His expertise on
matters of aviation security and TSA's policies continue to be of great
value to the committee as it conducts oversight of TSA.
Finally, I look forward to hearing from Ms. Outten-Mills of the
Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General. Her
testimony will provide insight into how the OIG and TSA work
collaboratively on allegations of misconduct.
Mr. Chairman, before yielding back, I would like to reiterate my
appreciation for you holding this joint hearing today. Approximately
one-quarter of the Transportation Security Officer workforce are
veterans and the vast majority of screeners wake up every day with one
goal in mind--protecting our transportation systems from terrorist
attack. Despite Congress neglecting to provide these men and women the
standard employment protections afforded their colleagues in the
Federal Government, we should not settle for a system of arbitrary and
ad hoc discipline by TSA.
Both the screeners and the flying public deserve better. I would
also like to point out that while there is a tendency to focus on
allegations of misconduct, we should not ignore the instances of
exemplary conduct by TSOs. Earlier this year, a TSO in Georgia
discovered a total of $1,000 left unattended in an ATM's cash
dispenser. She turned it in. A TSO in New York who was on her way to
the baggage room noticed an envelope on the ground with over $500
inside. Like her colleague in Georgia, she turned the money in.
Hopefully, the detour did not result in her being disciplined for
tardiness, the most common charge against TSOs according to the GAO
report.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the gentleman from Louisiana.
The Chairman will now recognize the Ranking Member of the
full committee, Mr. Thompson, gentleman from Mississippi, for
an opening statement.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. At the
outset, I would also remind you that the Democratic Caucus is
meeting and the President of the United States is speaking with
them at the exact time that we are holding this hearing. So I
know why a number of my Members are absent, and I am certain
one or two of the Members of this committee might slip out
during the hearing also.
Thank you for holding today's hearing. In the aftermath of
the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, multiple layers of
security were put in place to protect our aviation system from
terrorists and those who seek to do us harm. One of those many
layers include the passenger and baggage screening conducted by
transportation security officers, commonly referred to as TSOs.
Every day, over 400 airports across the country, 47,000 TSOs
utilize their training and available technologies to screen
passengers and their baggage for weapons and explosives.
The vast majority of TSOs are hard-working, dedicated,
diligent Federal employees who take their role within the
homeland security enterprise seriously and carry out this
mission of the Transportation Security Administration in
exemplary fashion. However, as many organizations have, there
are some bad apples in the bunch.
Yesterday, the Government Accountability Office released a
report entitled ``Transportation Security: TSA Could Strengthen
Monitoring of Allegations of Employee Misconduct.'' According
to the report, although TSA has improved training and taken
steps to improve investigations of misconduct, it still does
not have a system in place to ensure that allegations of
employee misconduct are adjudicated consistently and uniformly.
The bulk of employee misconduct cases are handled at the
airport level, meaning that what happens at one airport may
differ from what happens at another.
Fortunately, TSA concurred with the full recommendations
made by GAO that seeks to improve TSA's procedures and bring
consistency to its actions. Some steps, such as establishment
of the Office of Professional Responsibility and the creation
of a table of offense and penalties, have already been put into
action. I look forward to hearing from TSA on how it plans to
implement the recommendations made by GAO.
It must be noted, however, that the misconduct that served
as the basis for the GAO report covered a wide range of
offenses. Fortunately, the largest percentage of cases examined
by GAO, 32 percent, covered TSO attendance and leave issues as
opposed to matters directly related to security. Those matters
which did involve screening and security, accounting for 20
percent of the examined cases, range from sleeping on duty to
subjective enforcement of violations of standard operating
procedures.
While not making light of these matters, it is important to
view them in the proper context and also bear in mind that
these incidents were committed by less than 1 percent of the
TSO workforce. This is important to highlight because there are
some who advocate for doing away with the vital TSO workforce
and replacing them with contract screeners. However, there is
no indication that displacing 47,000 Federal employees would
result in less misconduct or result in lower costs. In fact,
contractor screeners are fully funded by taxpayer dollars that
would simply be transferred from public to private-sector jobs.
Moreover, cost analysis indicate that contract screeners
cost taxpayers 3 to 9 percent more than the cost of Federal
screeners at the same airport, and there is no indication that
instances of misconduct would decrease. To the contrary, in a
December 2012 report released by GAO it was noted that
misconduct occurs among contract screeners as well. In
particular, GAO found that, among other things, contract
screeners have mishandled sensitive security information.
Furthermore, we have a clear picture of a TSO's misconduct,
insight into how to rectify current situations, and a direct
avenue for exercising oversight of the process. The same is not
true when it comes to contractors. In attempting to conduct
oversight of the employment practices and discipline policies
of contract vendors who provide screening services, I have made
repeated requests to the company policies that govern screener
activities and the number of instances of misconduct that have
occurred among contract screeners. Instead of being provided
with this information, the committee was informed that
corporate rules prevented the release of this information
because it was considered to be proprietary in nature.
If every airport was populated by these contract screeners,
that would be the answer Nation-wide, and hearings like the one
we are conducting this morning would be an exercise in
futility. Moreover, while we are conducting a hearing to
publicize the missteps of a very small number of more than
47,000 TSOs, misconduct continues to flourish at other TSA
offices outside of the airport environment.
For example, at my request, the Department of Homeland
Security Office of Inspector General, whom we will also hear
from this morning, found TSA's Transportation Threat Assessment
and Credentialing Office, TTAC, exhibited a pattern of poor
management practices and inappropriate use of informal
administrative processes to assess and address misconduct. They
also found that when TTAC personnel attempted to report
managerial misconduct, such as workplace bullying, a hostile
work environment, and discrimination based on gender, race,
religion, age, and disability, they were prevented from filing
their actions in some instances, and in other instances
remained silent due to fear of retaliation or damage to their
careers.
As a result of the OIG report, I requested the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission to dig deeper into these
allegations and conduct their own review to determine if these
problems exist across the entire TSA. I look forward to hearing
from OIG on whether the TSA has followed up on the
recommendations. I thank the witnesses for appearing today and
yield back the balance of my time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
July 31, 2013
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
multiple layers of security were put in place to protect our aviation
system from terrorists and those who seek to do us harm.
One of those many layers included passenger and baggage screening
conducted by Transportation Security Officers (TSOs). Every day, at
over 400 airports across the country, 47,000 TSOs utilize their
training and available technologies to screen passengers and their
baggage for weapons and explosives.
The vast majority of TSOs are hard-working, dedicated, diligent
Federal employees who take their role within the homeland security
enterprise seriously and carry out the mission of the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) in exemplary fashion.
However, as with any organization, there are some bad apples in the
bunch. Yesterday, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a
report entitled: ``Transportation Security: TSA Could Strengthen
Monitoring of Allegations of Employee Misconduct.'' According to the
report, although TSA has improved training and taken steps to improve
the investigations of misconduct, it still does not have a system in
place to ensure that allegations of employee misconduct are adjudicated
consistently and uniformly.
The bulk of employee misconduct cases are handled at the airport
level meaning that what happens at one airport may differ from what
happens at another. Fortunately, TSA concurred with the four
recommendations made by GAO that seek to improve TSA's procedures and
bring consistency to its actions.
Some steps such as the establishment of the Office of Professional
Responsibility and the creation of a Table of Offense and Penalties
have already been put into action. I look forward to hearing from TSA
on how it plans to implement the recommendations made by GAO.
It must be noted, however, that the misconduct that served as the
basis for the GAO report covered a wide range of offenses. Fortunately,
the largest percentage of cases examined by GAO--32%--covered TSO
attendance and leave issues, as opposed to matters directly related to
security. Those matters which did involve screening and security,
accounting for 20% of the examined cases, ranged from sleeping on duty
to subjective enforcement of violations of standard operating
procedures.
While not making light of these matters, it is important to view
them in the proper context and also bear in mind that these incidents
were committed by less than 1% of the TSO workforce. This is important
to highlight because there are some who advocate for doing away with
the vital TSO workforce and replacing them with contract screeners.
However, there is no indication that displacing 47,000 Federal
employees would result in less misconduct or result in lower costs. In
fact, contractor screeners are fully funded by taxpayer dollars that
would simply be transferred from public to private-sector jobs.
Moreover, cost analysis indicates that contractor screeners cost
taxpayers 3 to 9 percent more than the cost of Federal screeners at the
same airports.
And there is no indication that instances of misconduct would
decrease. To the contrary, in a December 2012 report released by GAO,
it was noted that misconduct occurs among contract screeners as well.
In particular, GAO found that, among other things, contract screeners
have mishandled sensitive security information.
Furthermore, we have a clear picture of TSO misconduct, insight
into how to rectify current situations, and a direct avenue for
exercising oversight of the process. The same is not true when it comes
to contractors.
In attempting to conduct oversight of the employment practices and
discipline policies of contract vendors who provide screening services,
I have made repeated requests for the company policies that govern
screener activities and the number of instances of misconduct that has
occurred among contract screeners.
Instead of being provided with this information, the committee has
been informed that corporate rules prevented the release of this
information because it was considered to be proprietary in nature.
If every airport was populated by these contract screeners, that
would be the answer Nation-wide and hearings like the one we are
conducted this morning would be an exercise in futility.
Moreover, while we are conducting a hearing to publicize the
missteps of a very small number of the more than 47,000 TSOs,
misconduct continues to flourish at other TSA offices outside of the
airport environment.
For example, at my request, the Department of Homeland Security
Office of Inspector General, whom we will also hear from this morning,
found TSA's Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing Office
(TTAC) exhibited ``a pattern of poor management practices and
inappropriate use of informal administrative processes to assess and
address misconduct.'' They also found that when TTAC personnel
attempted to report managerial misconduct, such as workplace bullying,
a hostile work environment, and discrimination based on gender, race,
religion, age, and disability, they were prevented from filing their
actions in some instances, and in other instances, remained silent due
to fear of retaliation or damage to their careers.
As a result of the OIG report, I have asked the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission to dig deeper into these allegations and conduct
their own review to determine if these problems exist across the entire
TSA.
I look forward to hearing from the OIG on whether TSA has followed
up on its recommendations.
Mr. Duncan. Okay. Thank the Ranking Member for being here.
I know you all will need to step out, but we will continue
the hearing and welcome you back when you come.
I just want to pause for a minute and give much thanks to
both the Majority and Minority staff who helped prepare these
hearings, prepare the witnesses, and prepare the Members. So I
thank you guys for the tremendous work you do for the
committee.
Other Members of the subcommittees are reminded that
opening statements may be submitted for the record.
We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses
before us today on this important topic. Let me remind the
witnesses that their entire written statement will appear in
the record. I will introduce each of you first and then
recognize you individually for your testimony.
Our first witness is Mr. John Halinski, currently serving
as deputy administrator for the Transportation Security
Administration. Mr. Halinski has joined TSA in July 2004, and
served as assistant administrator in the Office of Global
Strategies before assuming his role as deputy administrator. As
assistant administrator from 2010 to 2012, Mr. Halinski was
responsible for enhancing international transportation security
through compliance, outreach, and engagement and capacity
development. Previously, Mr. Halinski served 25 years in the
Marine Corps in a variety of positions.
As I have said before, thank you, sir, for your service to
our Nation in the United States Marine Corps.
Mr. Stephen Lord is director in the Government
Accountability Office, GAO Forensic Audit and Investigative
Services team. Until recently he was a director of homeland
security and justice issues responsible for overseeing and
directing the GAO's various engagements on issues related to
aviation and surface transportation. His recent reviews of
TSA's screening programs for passengers, checked baggage, and
air cargo led to significant improvements in the agency's
operations. Before being appointed to this position in 2007,
Mr. Lord worked with the GAO on a number of important issues
related to international security, trade, and finance.
Ms. Deborah Outten-Mills currently serves as the acting
assistant inspector general for inspections for the Department
of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. Ms. Outten-
Mills has been with DHS OIG since 2006, also served as chief
inspector. Prior to her service at DHS, Ms. Outten-Mills was
the director of Department of Housing and Urban Development's
Quality Assurance Division with the responsibility for offices
located Nation-wide. Since her Federal career began in 1980,
she has served in multiple leadership positions for various
offices of inspectors general, including Department of
Agriculture, the Naval Audit Service, and the Department of
Labor.
I want to thank you all for being here today. I will now
recognize Mr. Halinski for his opening testimony.
STATEMENT OF JOHN W. HALINSKI, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Halinski. Good morning. I am not sure it is working,
sir. Good morning, sir. Good morning, Chairman Hudson, Chairman
Duncan. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I
appreciate the committee's interest in helping TSA develop,
achieve, and maintain the highest professional standards for
the diverse National workforce we employ.
Every day, our agency's employees screen 1.8 million air
travelers, vetting more than 14 million passengers and over 13
million transportation workers against terrorist watch lists
each week. As public servants dedicated to protecting the
Nation's vital transportation network, the TSA workforce must
adhere to the highest standards of conduct, integrity,
professionalism.
Mr. Duncan. Director Halinski, we are going to just ask you
to pause for just a second. Let's see if we can get that mike
going. We do have--it is running on some broadcasts, so we want
to make sure we get that going.
Mr. Halinski. I can use Mr. Lord's if it makes it easier.
Mr. Duncan. Okay, you can continue. I apologize.
Mr. Halinski. All right, sir.
As public servants dedicated to protecting the Nation's
vital transportation network, the TSA workforce must adhere to
the highest standards of conduct. Integrity, professionalism,
and hard work are more than the principles to guide employee
behavior. They are the expectations we have for every TSA
employee.
The overwhelming majority of TSA employees are good people
doing good work. Nonetheless, misconduct occurs, and when it
does TSA takes prompt and appropriate action. Accountability is
vital to our success. Our reputation is tarnished any time a
TSA employee violates the public trust and fails to live up to
TSA's high standard of conduct.
As Administrator Pistole and I have shared in previous
testimony, excellence in the workplace begins with a dedicated
and professional workforce. With this in mind, Administrator
Pistole established two new offices within TSA, the Office of
Training and Workforce Engagement and the Office of
Professional Responsibility.
Shortly after Mr. Pistole was confirmed, he led a series of
town hall meetings at which employees expressed concern
regarding the consistent application of the agency's
disciplinary process. To address their concerns, Administrator
Pistole established the Office of Professional Responsibility
to ensure that allegations of misconduct are thoroughly
investigated and that discipline is appropriate, consistent,
and fair across the agency.
Since it was established the Office of Professional
Responsibility has brought greater efficiency, timeliness, and
objectivity to the discipline process. To complement these
fundamental improvements, the office developed a table of
offenses and penalties which is published and available to all
TSA employees. Our Office of Professional Responsibility
promotes greater efficiency by implementing and tracking time
lines associated with adjudicating allegations of misconduct.
With recent improvements, TSA welcomes GAO recommendations
on how we can further refine these important efforts. A recent
GAO audit reviewed a total of 9,622 cases over 3 years where
individuals failed to meet TSA's standard of conduct. The
majority of these cases involved administrative issues such as
attendance and leave, and issues associated with not following
management directives.
Instances involving threat from 2010 to 2012 were less than
0.07 percent of our total workforce. Issues involving sleeping
accounted for less than 0.1 of 1 percent of our workforce or
1.3 percent.
While even those cases are too many, the agency
investigates all allegations of misconduct and takes
appropriate action, which can include referral to law
enforcement and termination of employment. In most serious
cases of workforce misconduct, involving drugs, threat, and
intentional security breaches, TSA uses an expedited removal
process. As GAO noted, TSA responds to instances of misconduct
through a series of actions ranging from letters of reprimand
to suspension from work, and in instances where the nature of
the misconduct is more serious, removal from the TSA workforce.
To maintain a high-caliber workforce, TSA recognizes that
all aspects of its employment system must be reviewed,
including the methods used to monitor allegations of employee
misconduct. As such, TSA concurs with the four recommendations
GAO provided and is undertaking these efforts to achieve those
objectives. Some of these efforts are discussed in greater
detail in the written statement I have submitted for the
record.
Towards the end of 2012, Administrator Pistole directed the
TSA Office of Inspection to begin conducting covert integrity
tests at airports around the country, noting we cannot and do
not tolerate theft and will take swift action to hold
accountable any employees engaged in criminal activity. The
tests are on-going, and since December the Office of Inspection
has conducted more than 640 integrity tests in 76 airports
around the country. Only three TSA employees, each in a
different airport, have been caught stealing during the Office
of Inspection's integrity testing and were subsequently
terminated within 24 hours.
If you consider how many employees Nation-wide were exposed
to the test items throughout the screening process, many
employees had the opportunity to do the wrong thing but only
three did. TSA's workforce has a fundamental role in providing
security for the traveling public. The public has every right
to expect the TSA workforce to adhere to the highest
professional standards.
On a personal note, let me be clear that Administrator
Pistole and I maintain a zero tolerance policy with respect to
employee misconduct. We appreciate the opportunity to work with
each of you to strengthen the quality of our workforce. Thank
you, and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Halinski follows:]
Prepared Statement of John W. Halinski
July 31, 2013
Good morning Chairmen Hudson and Duncan, and Ranking Members
Richmond and Barber. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today
about the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) role in
promoting a strong counterterrorism workforce to safeguard the
traveling public and secure our Nation's transportation systems. TSA
appreciates the committee's interest in helping TSA achieve the highest
professional standards for our workforce.
Both in the field and at headquarters, the TSA workforce is
vigilant in ensuring the security of people and commerce that flow
through our Nation's vast transportation networks. TSA employs risk-
based, intelligence-driven operations to prevent terrorist attacks and
to reduce the vulnerability of the Nation's transportation system to
terrorism. Our goal at all times is to maximize transportation security
to stay ahead of evolving terrorist threats while protecting privacy
and facilitating the flow of legitimate travel and commerce. TSA's
security measures create a multi-layered system of transportation
security that mitigates risk. We continue to evolve our security
approach by examining the procedures and technologies we use, how
specific security procedures are carried out, and how screening is
conducted.
The TSA workforce occupies the front line in executing the agency's
transportation security responsibilities in support of the Nation's
counterterrorism efforts. These responsibilities include security
screening of passengers and baggage at 450 airports in the United
States that facilitate air travel for 1.8 million people per day;
vetting more than 14 million passengers and over 13 million
transportation workers against terrorist watch lists each week; and
conducting security regulation compliance inspections and enforcement
activities at airports, for domestic and foreign air carriers, and for
air cargo screening operations throughout the United States and at last
point of departure locations internationally.
TSA also ensures the security of surface transportation operations.
To date, we have conducted more than 29,000 Visible Intermodal
Prevention and Response or VIPR operations in surface transportation.
We have 37 multi-modal VIPR teams working in transportation sectors
across the country to prevent or disrupt potential terrorist planning
activities. Since 2006, TSA has completed more than 290 Baseline
Assessments for Security Enhancement for transit, which provides a
comprehensive assessment of security programs in critical transit
systems. We are seeing the benefits of how these important steps--
combined with our well-trained and highly-motivated workforce and our
multiple layers of security including cutting-edge technology--keep
America safe every day.
TSA is committed, not only to improving the effectiveness of
security, but to doing so in the most cost-effective manner possible.
Through advancements in workforce efficiency, TSA has been able to
accommodate the increased workload that has accompanied the current
practice of many airlines to charge fees for all checked baggage, the
restrictions on liquids aerosols and gels we had to implement to
counter a known terrorist threat, and the screening required for the
significant increase in the number of laptops carried by passengers. By
employing smarter security practices in developing and deploying our
people, processes, and technologies we are delivering more effective
security in a more efficient manner, and we will continue to do so.
maintaining a workforce of the highest caliber
A dedicated TSA workforce assures the traveling public that they
are protected by a multi-layered system of transportation security that
mitigates risk. An effective workforce must be properly trained while
good management and appropriate pay are key ingredients in preserving a
motivated and skilled workforce. To this end, TSA has implemented
employee development initiatives like the Leaders at Every Level (LEL),
through which TSA identifies high-performing employees and fosters
commitments to excellence and teamwork, and the Associates Program,
which builds morale and provides the workforce an opportunity to
enhance technical and non-technical skills through formal training and
education programs. The implementation of a new four-tier performance
management program for non-Transportation Security Officers (TSOs)
enables the workforce to actively engage in developing their annual
performance goals in collaboration with their supervisors, while
promoting two-way communication between employees and their supervisors
throughout the performance year. Providing a mechanism to proactively
identify opportunities to improve their performance has increased
employee morale.
As public servants, TSA employees must adhere to the highest
ethical and personal conduct standards. All aspects of our workforce
regimen--hiring, promotion, retention, training, proactive compliance
inspections, investigations, and adjudications--are driven by adherence
to the highest ethical standards. In 2011, Administrator Pistole
established two new offices within TSA--the Office of Training and
Workforce Engagement (OTWE) and the Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR). In order to strengthen training and ensure that
it continues to receive the appropriate level of attention, OTWE
oversees the development and delivery of training, learning, formal
development, and workforce engagement programs for employees. New hire
training modules feature an introduction to TSA's employee
responsibilities and conduct while leadership training is designed to
prepare candidates to address conduct issues through required rotations
in the Office of Inspection (OOI) and OPR.
Through a series of town hall meetings with field employees, TSA
recognized the need for consistent application of the agency's
disciplinary process. As a result, Administrator Pistole established
OPR to ensure that allegations of misconduct are thoroughly
investigated and that discipline is appropriate, consistent, and fair
across the agency. In addition, OPR developed a Table of Offenses and
Penalties in September 2011, which is available to all TSA employees
and identifies TSA policies and possible consequences of violation
including penalties for each type of offense. OPR also promotes greater
efficiency for disciplinary actions by implementing and tracking time
lines for adjudicating allegations of misconduct. OPR officials are
required to issue closure letters, corrective actions, and proposal
notices within 30 days from receipt of the report of investigation, and
OPR must issue a decision within 21 days from receipt of the employee's
reply.
``insider threat'' program addresses potential vulnerability
While the vast majority of TSA employees are hard-working,
professional, and abide by the highest ethical standards, a single bad
act by one employee can create a security vulnerability. TSA has also
developed and implemented an Insider Threat Program aimed at deterring,
detecting, and mitigating insider threats to TSA's personnel,
operations, information, and critical infrastructure. The Insider
Threat Program conducts a multi-layered approach to gather and analyze
information identifying possible vulnerabilities involving personnel or
information systems; coordinates with DHS and other counterintelligence
programs to assess and mitigate allegations of insider threat activity;
and conducts employee awareness training to educate TSA personnel and
airport stakeholders regarding insider threats. TSA employees are
encouraged to report any suspicious encounters, activities, or
behaviors that might constitute an insider threat to their immediate
supervisor or through an available Insider Threat Program website or
phone number.
gao review of tsa employee misconduct
A recent audit by the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
reviewed data from TSA that found a total of 9,622 cases over a 3-year
period (fiscal years 2010 through 2012) where individuals failed to
meet TSA's standards of conduct. It is important to note the report
covers a broad range of misconduct ranging from tardiness to serious
security risks. Of the total cases reviewed by GAO, 3,117 involved
attendance and leave, which are issues that challenge all employers in
both the public and private sectors. The most serious categories
including neglect of duty, integrity, and ethics, and falsification
represented 11% or 1,122 cases. TSA investigates all allegations of
misconduct and takes appropriate action, which can include referral to
law enforcement and termination of employment. In the most serious
cases of screening workforce misconduct involving drugs, theft, and
intentional security breaches, TSA uses an expedited removal process
while ensuring due process.
The majority of misconduct cases are handled by the Office of
Security Operations (OSO) management officials at the airports. These
cases include attendance and leave, security and screening violations,
and alcohol-related violations involving TSOs, Lead and Supervisory
TSOs, Transportation Security Managers, Transportation Security
Inspectors, Behavior Detection Officers, and other airport staff. TSA
responds to instances of misconduct through a series of actions,
ranging from Letters of Reprimand to suspension from work, and in
instances where the nature of the misconduct is egregious, removal from
the TSA workforce. Generally, to effect these actions, TSA management
officials issue a Notice of Proposed Action and provide the employee
the opportunity to review the evidence supporting the charge and the
opportunity to respond orally and/or in writing. Management officials
then consider the input from the affected employee prior to issuing a
written decision.
conclusion
As we review and evaluate the effectiveness of TSA's aviation
security enhancements, we must always be cognizant of the fact that
these enhancements are only as good as the people who operate, staff,
and manage them. As we strive to continue strengthening transportation
security and improving, whenever possible the overall travel experience
for all Americans, we must always remember that our success is defined
in the final analysis by our people. Whether it is for business or for
pleasure, the freedom to travel from place to place is fundamental to
our way of life, and to do so securely is a goal to which everyone at
TSA is fully committed.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I will be
happy to address any questions you may have.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you.
The Chairman will now recognize Mr. Lord for an opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN M. LORD, DIRECTOR, FORENSIC AUDITS AND
INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Lord. Chairmen Duncan and Hudson, Ranking Member
Thompson, thanks for inviting me here today to discuss the
results of our TSA misconduct report released yesterday. I
think this is a timely hearing given recent press accounts
about these types of incidents, and also TSA's recent efforts
to address them.
I think it is important to note as context that TSA manages
a transportation security officer workforce of 56,000 spread
across 450 airports. In some ways it is a difficult workforce
to address, and it also underscores the need to have clearly-
defined and consistently-applied procedures to not only
investigate, but adjudicate instances of misconduct.
Today I would like to discuss two issues highlighted in our
recent report. The first is the magnitude of the problem; and
second, it is a little more insight on how TSA investigates and
adjudicates these allegations.
Regarding the numbers, TSA investigated, adjudicated 9,600
cases over the last 3 years. That is an average of about 3,200
per year. As Mr. Halinski noted, about half of these cases
focused on two areas, attendance and leave, as well as security
and screening. It is interesting when you look at how TSA
responded to these cases, of the 9,600 cases, about half
resulted in letters of reprimand; 31 percent resulted in
suspensions; and 17 percent resulted in the employee's removal
from TSA.
It is important to note that TSA has taken some positive
steps to address these issues recently. For example, they
established the Office of Professional Responsibility and also
rolled out a new training program for airport staff. However,
as we highlighted in the report issued yesterday, they still
need to enhance the current process by taking four key actions.
First, they need to verify that airport staff complied with
the procedures for adjudicating these cases. Why is that the
case? We found that the TSA review board, once they have
reviewed some of these misconduct cases, they either overturned
or rolled back the penalty in 15 percent of the cases. We
looked at over 800 of these cases, and again, this suggests the
need for more consistency in the process.
A second key point is TSA needs to do a better job of
recording the results of its adjudication in its so-called
Integrated Database. We found when we visited seven airports,
five of the airports we interviewed the staff, they weren't
using the so-called Integrated Database to record all the
incidents. Recording the outcome of these cases is important,
especially when TSA employees move across airports. You really
need to know what their track record is if you are going to
have any disciplinary issues with them.
Third, TSA needs to do a better job of tracking the time
taken to not only investigate the cases, but adjudicate them. I
call that the start-to-finish time. You really need a little
more awareness of how long it has taken to close these cases.
It is interesting to note, while TSA has standards it expects
its staff to comply with, it really doesn't track performance
against these standards in terms of timeliness. We think
tracking these cycle times would really give management some
good insights on what airports--if there are any special issues
or what types of cases are problematic.
Finally, we recommended that TSA establish so-called
reconciliation procedures. That means once you complete an
investigation you need to adjudicate it. That is, apply the
appropriate penalty. We noticed they weren't, they didn't close
the loop on a few cases. We looked at 50. We found two that
hadn't been fully adjudicated. That is a small number, but, you
know, given the numbers involved, we thought that could be
symptomatic of a larger problem.
In closing, as we highlighted in our report released
yesterday, TSA still needs to take some key actions to enhance
the current process, and this will help instill greater public
confidence in the TSA staff interacting with the public at over
450 airports. As Mr. Halinski and some Members already noted,
you do not want the misdeeds of a few bad apples to sully the
reputation of a lot of hard-working, dedicated employees.
The good news, as Mr. Halinski said, is TSA has endorsed
our recommendations, and we will work with them closely over
the next few months to see how they implement them in practice.
Chairman Duncan, this concludes my prepared statement. I
look forward to responding to any questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lord follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen M. Lord
July 31, 2013
gao-13-756t
Chairmen Duncan and Hudson, Ranking Members Barber and Richmond,
and Members of the subcommittees: I am pleased to be here to discuss
the findings of our report issued yesterday assessing the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) efforts to address
employee misconduct.\1\ TSA employs approximately 56,000 transportation
security officers (TSO) and other TSA personnel to ensure the security
of the traveling public at more than 450 TSA-regulated airports Nation-
wide.\2\ News stories in recent years have highlighted several high-
profile allegations of misconduct by TSA employees, including TSOs
being involved in theft and drug-smuggling activities, as well as
circumventing mandatory screening procedures for passengers and
baggage. For example, in 2011, a TSO at the Orlando International
Airport pleaded guilty to Federal charges of embezzlement and theft for
stealing more than 80 laptop computers and other electronic devices,
valued at $80,000, from passenger luggage. TSOs engaging in misconduct
raise security concerns because these employees are charged with
helping to ensure the security of our Nation's aviation system.
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\1\ GAO, Transportation Security: TSA Could Strengthen Monitoring
of Allegations of Employee Misconduct, GAO-13-624 (Washington, DC: July
30, 2013).
\2\ The total number of TSA employees at TSA-regulated airports
represents personnel within the Office of Security Operations, such as
TSOs, supervisory TSOs, lead TSOs, transportation security managers,
transportation security inspectors, and behavior detection officers.
This statement is focused on TSA personnel at TSA-regulated airports.
We excluded TSA employees at headquarters, the Federal Air Marshal
Service, regional offices, and other non-airport locations, and do not
include private-sector screeners employed by contractors providing
screening services at airports participating in TSA's Screening
Partnership Program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The process of addressing TSA employee misconduct involves various
components within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). For
example, depending on the facts and circumstances of a case, the DHS
Office of Inspector General (OIG), TSA Office of Inspection (OOI), or
TSA Office of Security Operations (OSO) may conduct an investigation
into allegations of TSA employee misconduct. OSO generally adjudicates
cases at airports--that is, determines whether the evidence is
sufficient to propose and sustain a charge of misconduct and determines
the appropriate penalty. The Office of Professional Responsibility
(OPR), an independent office that TSA established in 2010 to provide
greater consistency in misconduct penalty determinations, adjudicates a
more specialized set of cases, such as misconduct involving senior-
level TSA employees at airports and other locations.
My testimony this morning will address the key findings from the
report on TSA's efforts to address employee misconduct that we issued
yesterday.\3\ Specifically, like the report, my statement will address:
(1) Data on TSA employee misconduct cases and (2) TSA efforts to manage
and oversee the investigations and adjudications process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ GAO-13-624.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the report, we reviewed standard operating procedures, policy
statements, and guidance for staff charged with investigating and
adjudicating allegations of employee misconduct, and analyzed TSA
misconduct data from fiscal years 2010 through 2012. While we
identified some limitations with the data, we found the data
sufficiently reliable for providing general information on the nature
and characteristics of employee misconduct. We compared TSA processes
for investigations and adjudications with TSA policies and procedures
and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.\4\ In
addition, we selected a sample of 7 airports, based on variances in
number and type of past cases of employee misconduct and geographic
dispersion, from the approximately 450 TSA-regulated airports Nation-
wide, and conducted site visits and interviews with TSA officials
responsible for addressing employee misconduct. While not
generalizable, the airport interviews provided us with the perspectives
of TSA officials responsible for conducting TSA employee misconduct
investigations or adjudications. We also analyzed a random,
nongeneralizable sample of 50 allegations referred from the DHS OIG to
TSA to identify follow up actions. We conducted this work in accordance
with generally accepted Government auditing standards. More detailed
information on the scope and methodology can be found in our published
report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, DC: Nov. 1, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
tsa investigated and adjudicated approximately 9,600 misconduct cases
from fiscal years 2010 through 2012
In July 2013, we reported that TSA investigated and adjudicated
approximately 9,600 cases of employee misconduct from fiscal years 2010
through 2012, according to TSA employee misconduct data that we
analyzed.\5\ Two offense categories accounted for about half of all
cases--(1) Attendance and leave, which accounted for 32 percent; and
(2) screening and security, which accounted for 20 percent. Charges for
screening and security-related incidents pertain to violating standard
operating procedures, including not conducting security or equipment
checks, and allowing patrons or baggage to bypass screening. TSA
developed a Table of Offenses and Penalties that delineates common
employee charges, along with a suggested range of penalties. Of the
cases that we analyzed, 47 percent resulted in letters of reprimand,
which describe unacceptable conduct that is the basis for a
disciplinary action; 31 percent resulted in suspensions of a definite
duration; and 17 percent resulted in the employee's removal from TSA.
The remaining cases covered a variety of outcomes, including
suspensions of an indefinite duration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Employee misconduct cases refer to allegations for which TSA
has completed an investigation and adjudication.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
tsa has taken steps to help manage the investigations and adjudications
process, but could develop additional procedures to better monitor
employee misconduct cases
In our July 2013 report, we found that TSA has taken steps to help
manage the investigations and adjudications process, such as creating
OPR in 2010 to provide greater consistency in misconduct penalty
determinations and providing training for TSA staff at airports
responsible for investigating and adjudicating allegations of employee
misconduct. While TSA has taken these steps, we reported weaknesses in
four areas related to monitoring of employee misconduct cases: (1)
Verifying that TSA staff at airports comply with policies and
procedures for adjudicating misconduct, (2) recording case information
on all adjudication decisions, (3) tracking the time taken to complete
all phases of the investigations and adjudications process, and (4)
identifying allegations not adjudicated by the agency.
Verifying that TSA staff comply with policies and procedures for
adjudicating misconduct.--TSA does not have a process for reviewing
misconduct cases to verify that TSA staff at airports are complying
with policies and procedures for adjudicating employee misconduct.
According to TSA policies and procedures, adjudicating officials need
to collect sufficient evidence to support penalty charges and consider
factors, such as an employee's disciplinary track record, in making a
penalty determination. However, some misconduct cases have been
overturned or the penalties reduced through the appeals process because
staff at airports had not supported the charges with sufficient
evidence, among other things. For example, from January 2011 to June
13, 2013, the OPR Appellate Board--which reviews appeals made by TSOs
on certain actions, such as suspensions of 15 days or more--either
overturned or reduced the penalty in 125 out of 836 cases (15 percent).
A senior TSA official agreed that TSA would benefit from a review
process to help verify that staff at airports are making adjudication
decisions in conformance with policies and procedures. Without a review
process, it is difficult for TSA to provide reasonable assurance that
cases have been adjudicated properly and that risk to the agency is
mitigated accordingly. Therefore, in our July 2013 report, we
recommended that TSA establish a process to conduct reviews of
misconduct cases to verify that TSA staff at airports are complying
with policies and procedures for adjudicating employee misconduct. DHS
concurred and stated that TSA is developing a process to provide
increased auditing of disciplinary records. TSA expects to develop this
process by March 31, 2014.
Recording case information on all adjudication decisions.--TSA does
not record the results of all misconduct cases that have been
adjudicated by TSA airport staff in its Integrated Database, which is
TSA's centralized system for tracking and managing employee misconduct
cases. For example, the agency does not record all cases that resulted
in a corrective action, which are actions that are administrative in
nature, such as a letter of counseling. Specifically, we found that 5
out of the 7 airports included in our sample do not consistently track
corrective actions in the Integrated Database. A senior TSA official
agreed that there is a strong need for TSA to clarify that TSA staff at
airports should record corrective actions in the database. Recording
all outcomes in the Integrated Database would help provide a
centralized, institutional record on past misconduct. It would also
enable managers to follow a progressive discipline approach, which is
the process of taking progressively more severe action, when
appropriate, until the unacceptable conduct is corrected or the
employee is removed from the agency. Thus, in our July 2013 report, we
recommended that TSA develop and issue guidance to the field clarifying
the need for TSA officials at airports to record all misconduct case
outcomes in the Integrated Database. DHS concurred and stated that TSA
will develop and disseminate additional guidance to the field to ensure
that all outcomes are recorded in the database. TSA expects to develop
and disseminate additional guidance to the field by August 30, 2013.
Tracking the time taken to complete all phases of the
investigations and adjudications process.--While TSA has established
standards for the amount of time to complete the investigations and
adjudications process, the agency has not required TSA staff at
airports to track their performance against the standards.
Specifically, our review of TSA data from the Integrated Database on
misconduct cases handled by TSA airport staff identified that TSA does
not capture information on the amount of time taken to complete the
investigations and adjudications process, including the number of days
to complete an investigation and issue a notice of proposed action.
Tracking cycle times would provide TSA with operational information,
such as differences in processing time by, among other things, type of
case, and could allow the agency to identify any delays, such as
challenges associated with evidence collection. According to TSA senior
officials, tracking cycle times for investigations and adjudications
completed by airport staff would also provide valuable information on
the differences in case processing time frames across airports. In our
July 2013 report, we recommended that TSA establish an agency-wide
policy to track cycle times in the investigations and adjudications
process. DHS concurred and stated that TSA will develop a process and
mechanism to track cycle times for misconduct cases handled by TSA
airport staff. TSA expects to develop a process and mechanism by March
31, 2014.
Identifying allegations not adjudicated by TSA.--TSA does not have
reconciliation procedures--that is, procedures to follow up on
completed misconduct investigations to ensure that the agency has
identified cases requiring adjudication. According to a random sample
of 50 allegations referred from DHS OIG to TSA in fiscal year 2012, we
found that 2 were not adjudicated by TSA. As a result of our review,
TSA made adjudication decisions on these allegations, one of which
resulted in a 14-day suspension for the employee because of disruptive
behavior in the workplace. The results from our sample cannot be
generalized to the entire population of over 1,300 allegations referred
from DHS OIG to TSA in fiscal year 2012; however, it raises questions
as to whether there could be additional instances of allegations
referred to TSA in this population that the agency has not adjudicated.
A senior TSA official agreed that a reconciliation process would offer
benefits to TSA as there may be other allegations the agency is unaware
of that have been investigated but not adjudicated. Therefore, in our
July 2013 report, we recommended that TSA develop reconciliation
procedures to identify allegations of employee misconduct not
previously addressed through adjudication. DHS concurred and stated
that TSA will implement a reconciliation process to ensure that
completed misconduct investigations are adjudicated. TSA expects to
implement a reconciliation process by March 31, 2014.
Chairmen Duncan and Hudson, Ranking Members Barber and Richmond,
and Members of the subcommittees, this concludes my prepared statement.
I look forward to responding to any questions that you may have.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Lord.
The Chairman will now recognize Ms. Outten-Mills for 5
minutes. Am I pronouncing that correctly, Outten-Mills?
Ms. Outten-Mills. Outten-Mills.
Mr. Duncan. Outten? Okay. I apologize for mispronouncing it
earlier. Ms. Outten-Mills is recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DEBORAH L. OUTTEN-MILLS, ACTING ASSISTANT
INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INSPECTIONS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Outten-Mills. Thank you. Good morning, Chairmen Hudson
and Duncan and Ranking Member Thompson. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify on integrity and misconduct challenges
in TSA.
To protect the American people in their homeland, it is
paramount to maintain employee integrity and accountability.
Within DHS, OIG maintains primary law enforcement authority to
investigate allegations of employee misconduct and fraud
involving DHS programs, operations, and activities. Other
Departmental internal affairs units investigate allegations of
employee misconduct that OIG either refers back to them or that
do not require referral to OIG. These allegations generally
relate to administrative or noncriminal matters.
For fiscal year 2004 through 2012, DHS received
approximately 130,000 allegations through the OIG hotline and
from various internal affairs offices within the Department,
and we initiated investigation on about 10,000 allegations. OIG
investigations hotline staff processes all complaints that come
to the OIG. When OIG declines a case, it is referred back to
the applicable component agency for further inquiry or
investigation. Unless specifically requested, OIG does not
track what happens to the complaint after it is referred to the
component.
Within TSA, the Office of Inspection is responsible for
conducting internal investigations of employee misconduct. This
office operates under a blanket waiver that waives referrals to
OIG for certain alleged offenses. The waiver was based on our
observation that we had accepted for investigation about 3
percent of these types of referred allegations and had
requested reports of results for only 10 percent of the cases
referred back to TSA for investigation.
In fiscal year 2012, OIG received approximately 16,400
complaints of misconduct. Of these cases, 1,358 were related to
TSA. OIG initiated investigations for approximately 90 cases
and referred about 1,268 complaints to TSA's Office of
Inspection.
While none of our work focused primarily on TSA's
challenges in dealing with misconduct issues, we identified
reports that may provide some insight into TSA's efforts to
address allegations of employee misconduct and strengthen their
ability to monitor employee misconduct.
In October 2012, we issued a report, ``Personal Security
and Internal Control at TSA's Legacy Transportation Threat
Assessment and Credentialing Office,'' TTAC, to determine
whether personnel with critical roles in transportation
security had sufficient oversight. TTAC was established as the
lead for conducting security threat assessments and
credentialing initiatives for domestic passengers,
transportation industry workers, and individuals seeking access
to critical infrastructure.
We determined that within the legacy TTAC office there has
been a pattern of poor management practices and inappropriate
use of informal administrative processes to assess and address
misconduct. Senior legacy TTAC leaders sought to address
allegations of misconduct through training and informal
internal administrative processes, but its efforts were not
successful. Employee complaints channelled through TSA's formal
grievance processes were managed and documented appropriately,
but not all employees had sufficient information to access
formal redress options.
We recommended that TSA, for a minimum of 2 years, that the
legacy TTAC office refer all personnel-related complaints,
grievances, disciplinary actions, investigations, and
inspections to appropriate TSA or DHS offices with primary
oversight responsibility.
We also recommended that they provide employees with a Know
Your Rights and Responsibilities website, and that they
establish an independent review panel through which legacy TTAC
employees may request a review of desk audits. We also
conducted a review of allegations of misconduct and illegal
discrimination retaliation in the Federal Air Marshal Service.
In 2010, CNN reported allegations of misconduct and illegal
discrimination and retaliation in the FAMS Orlando field
office. While our review did not find widespread discrimination
and retaliation within FAMS, we identified inconsistencies in
how field offices handle and report misconduct incidents to
headquarters, the severity of discipline decisions for employee
misconduct, and timeliness issues for executing various
portions of the discipline process.
We recommended that TSA provide guidance regarding the
types of incidents that should be reported to the Office of
Inspections, that they provide clarification about discipline
actions, and develop a comprehensive tracking system.
This concludes my prepared remarks, and I welcome any
questions that you or the Members may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Outten-Mills follows:]
Prepared Statement of Deborah L. Outten-Mills
July 31, 2013
Good morning Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, Chairman
Hudson, and Ranking Member Richmond. Thank you for the opportunity to
testify on integrity and misconduct challenges in the Transportation
Security Administration.
To protect the American people and their homeland, it is paramount
to maintain employee integrity and accountability. Within the
Department of Homeland Security, the Inspector General Act of 1978 and
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 give the Department's Office of
Inspector General (OIG) primary law enforcement authority to
investigate allegations of employee misconduct and contractor or
grantee fraud involving DHS programs, operations, and activities. Other
Departmental internal affairs units investigate allegations of employee
misconduct that OIG either refers to them, or that do not require
referral to OIG. These allegations generally relate to administrative
or non-criminal matters.
For fiscal years 2004 through 2012, DHS OIG received about 130,000
allegations through the OIG Hotline, and from various internal affairs
offices within the Department, and initiated investigations on about
10,000 allegations.
OIG Office of Investigations (INV) hotline staff process all
complaints that come to the OIG. Allegations are logged into the
Enterprise Data System (EDS), which links OIG headquarters to its field
offices. When OIG headquarters sends an allegation to a field office,
the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the field office has 5 days to
retain or decline the case. Cases declined by field offices are
returned to the hotline staff for transmittal to applicable component
agency for further inquiry or investigation. Unless specifically
requested, INV does not track what happens to the complaint after
referring it to the component.
When OIG INV refers a matter to a component, the component uses its
personnel to investigate. Within TSA, the Office of Inspection (OOI) is
responsible for ensuring: (1) The effectiveness and efficiency of TSA's
operations and administrative activities through inspections and
internal reviews, and (2) the integrity of TSA's workforce. OOI is
delegated authority to conduct internal investigations of employee
misconduct.
Management Directive 0810.1 requires that OOI, immediately upon
receipt, refer to OIG all allegations of criminal misconduct by a DHS
employee; allegations of misconduct by a GS-15 level (K band) or
higher, or OOI employee; allegations of serious noncriminal misconduct
against a law enforcement officer; discharges of firearms resulting in
injury or death; and allegations of fraud involving contractors,
grantees, or DHS funds. OOI must notify OIG of all other allegations
within 5 days. OIG assigns investigative responsibility for allegations
by: (1) Initiating an investigation, (2) referring allegations back to
OOI for handling, or (3) administratively closing matters without
further action.
OOI operates under a blanket waiver that waives referrals to OIG
for certain alleged offenses. These offenses include: (1) Thefts from
TSA checkpoints of less than $2,000, (2) time, attendance, and travel
fraud; (3) domestic violence by employees who were not law enforcement
officers; (4) accidental firearms discharge not involving injury; (5)
workers' compensation fraud; (6) local criminal charges such as failure
to appear, (7) traffic offenses and driving under the influence; and
(8) other local misdemeanors (provided they involve employees below K
band, and the offenses are not indicative of systemic problems). The
waiver was based on our observation that we had accepted for
investigation about 3 percent of these referred allegations, and had
requested reports of results from only 10 percent of such cases
referred to TSA for investigation.
In fiscal year 2012, OIG received approximately 16,400 complaints
of misconduct. Of these cases, 1,358 were related to TSA. OIG INV
initiated investigations for approximately 90 cases, and referred
approximately 1,268 complaints to TSA's Office of Inspection.
Categories for complaints received include employee corruption, civil
rights and civil liberties, program fraud, and miscellaneous.
The effectiveness of TSA and the safety of the flying public
depend, in part, on the agency's ability to curtail and prevent
corruption within its workforce. While none of our work focused
primarily on TSA's challenges in dealing with misconduct issues, we
identified two reports that may provide some insight into TSA's efforts
to address allegations of employee misconduct, and strengthen their
ability to monitor employee misconduct across the agency.
In October 2012, we issued a report, Personnel Security and
Internal Control at TSA's Legacy Transportation Threat Assessment and
Credentialing Office. The objective of this review was to determine
whether personnel in the legacy Transportation Threat Assessment and
Credentialing Office with critical roles in transportation security had
sufficient oversight.
personnel security and internal control at tsa's legacy transportation
threat assessment and credentialing office
Congressman Bennie G. Thompson, Ranking Member of the House
Committee on Homeland Security, requested that we review the background
investigations and suitability determinations conducted for personnel
within TSA's Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing (TTAC)
Office. TTAC was established as the lead for conducting security threat
assessments and credentialing initiatives for domestic passengers on
public and commercial modes of transportation, transportation industry
workers, and individuals seeking access to critical infrastructure. In
2010, TSA began a restructuring initiative that included an
administration-wide review of personnel position descriptions and a
reorganization of TSA, which realigned TTAC functions among three
different TSA operational organizations. We reviewed the potential
effect of these changes on oversight of legacy TTAC personnel, but did
not review oversight of personnel from any other TSA offices or
programs.
We determined that TSA employee background investigations met
Federal adjudicative standards, but were not timely. We also determined
that within the legacy Transportation Threat Assessment and
Credentialing Office, there has been a pattern of poor management
practices and inappropriate use of informal administrative processes to
assess and address misconduct. Legacy TTAC employees made allegations
of improper conduct through formal and informal processes, including
allegations of poor management practices and violations of Equal
Employment Opportunity laws. While all employees said they would report
National security vulnerabilities, some feared retaliation for raising
other concerns.
Senior legacy TTAC leaders sought to address allegations of
misconduct through training and informal internal administrative
processes, but efforts were not successful. For example, use of
informal administrative processes did not address or expose the extent
of workplace complaints and eventually led to internal investigations
being managed inappropriately. Employee complaints channeled through
TSA's formal grievance processes were managed and documented
appropriately, but not all employees had sufficient information to
access formal redress options. Unaddressed workplace complaints of
favoritism, discrimination, and retaliation hindered TSA's efforts to
streamline its operational structure and align compensation with
appropriate authorities and responsibilities.
Of the eight recommendations we made in this report, three were
related to monitoring allegations of employee misconduct:
For a minimum of 2 years, direct legacy TTAC offices to
refer all personnel-related complaints, grievances,
disciplinary actions, investigations, and inspections to
appropriate TSA or DHS offices with primary oversight
responsibility.
Provide employees a Know Your Rights and Responsibilities
website and brochure that compiles appropriate directives on
conduct, processes, and redress options.
Establish an independent review panel reporting to the
Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer through which legacy
TTAC employees may request a review of desk audits and
reassignments.
allegations of misconduct and illegal discrimination and retaliation in
the federal air marshal service
In January 2010, CNN reported allegations of misconduct and illegal
employment discrimination and retaliation in the Federal Air Marshal
Service's Orlando field office. The reports included descriptions of an
agency rife with cronyism; age, gender, and racial discrimination; and
unfair treatment in promotions, assignments, and discipline. Senator
Bill Nelson and Congressmen Edolphus Towns and Darrell Issa requested a
review of these allegations in Orlando and throughout the Federal Air
Marshal Service.
While our review did not find widespread discrimination and
retaliation within the Federal Air Marshal Service, we identified
inconsistencies in regards to: (1) How field offices handle and report
misconduct incidents to headquarters; (2) the severity of discipline
decisions for employee misconduct; and (3) the timeliness for executing
various portions of the discipline process.
Of the 12 recommendations in this report, 3 were aimed at improving
TSA's handling of misconduct cases:
Provide guidance regarding the types of incidents the
Federal Air Marshal Service should and should not report to the
Office of Inspection in an incident tracking report.
Provide guidance and clarification regarding how long prior
corrective or discipline actions should be considered and for
which types of incidents.
Develop a comprehensive system to track individual cases
through the discipline process.
At the time of our review, various components within TSA (Office of
Professional Responsibility (OPR), Office of Human Capital (OHC), and
OOI) were working together to develop a shared database to track all
misconduct cases.
Chairman Duncan and Chairman Hudson, this concludes my prepared
remarks. I welcome any questions that you or the Members of the
subcommittees may have.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Ms. Outten-Mills.
We are going to begin the questioning portion, and Members
are reminded we will adhere to the 5-minute rule. I now
recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.
First off, let me just say that I understand the tremendous
challenge that TSA has in keeping Americans safe as they travel
through the Nation's airports. But Americans expect that TSA
will practice best management practices and that their officers
will experience some sort of consistency in disciplinary
action. I think that is what we owe to the employees of TSA.
Mr. Halinski, last year you gave your word that TSA would
take appropriate action to deal with misconduct. Over the past
2 years, about half the misconduct cases have been closed by
issuing reprimand letters. Do you feel that that is an
appropriate action?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, what I talked about last year was if we
can prove an individual is stealing, if we can prove that an
individual is taking drugs, if we can prove that an individual
is intentionally subjugating the security system, and we can
prove it, immediately they are out the door. What happens if we
can't immediately prove it is we give them the due diligence
any American is able to get through a process, sir, and that
is, we run an investigation, we look at the circumstances, a
recommendation is made for punishment, if it is appropriate,
and then that individual has an appeal process. That is taken
into account.
So if the individual is given a letter of reprimand, sir,
then it meant that he is innocent until proven guilty and we
couldn't prove that he did that, sir. That is the various
degrees that we have. I think it is important to note, if there
is X number of allegations of theft, if I can prove that they
are stealing, we are going to walk them out the door. If I
can't, then we are going to run an investigation. I have to
give that person the fact that they are innocent until proven
guilt, and we have to let an investigation run its course. I
think that is the way we do business in this country.
If there is a letter of recommendation or suspension, it
means that we couldn't unequivocally prove that he had done
that, or he may have done it and there were some mitigating
circumstances that means that he wasn't stealing. I am using
the case stealing right now, but in all of these cases of
misconduct that we are talking about, we labeled this
misconduct, over one-third of these cases, time and attendance.
People showed up late for work, sir. We are classifying it as
misconduct.
We have a very good workforce. We look at the process. We
investigate it if we can't prove it. I have given you my word,
if they are stealing, they are doing drugs, or they are
breaching the security system intentionally and I can prove it,
they are out, and we have taken those actions.
The rest of the time, sir, I think it is what we have to do
as Americans, and give them the due process, and let them go
through the investigation process. We have shortened that. Let
it go through an appeal process, and give them the rights they
deserve, sir.
Mr. Duncan. Well, I appreciate everything you said. Just
understand that I think your workers want to see a set of
guidelines followed. They want to see some consistency in
disciplinary action. When you come up with a set of guidelines
that this is the disciplinary action that is going to happen
for XY&Z infractions, then there has to be some sort of
consistency with that. I think that is important. I think
Americans see a slap on the wrist for some of those infractions
as not enough disciplinary action being taken.
So I would just say that going forward implementing a lot
of things GAO has recommended is the right thing, and I
appreciate your comments that you are working on that. I look
forward to hearing back from you in the future about how that
is working out.
According to GAO, 4 percent of the screening and security
misconduct cases involve sleeping on duty. I understand some of
that may have been in the break room while they were on break,
and I get some of that. But, you know, officers that are
sleeping on duty, and as you mentioned those that just fail to
show up for work on time, that frustrates Americans because,
the way I understand it, if an officer fails to show up on time
or fails to call their supervisor and say, look, I am taking a
leave day or a family day, it takes X number of persons to open
up a checkpoint. Any delay of someone not showing up on time or
not showing up at all causes delay for the American travelers
by that checkpoint not being opened on time and properly
screening in an expedited manner.
So how do you go forward with that sort of idea, that we
have got to have employees show up on time, we have got to have
them actually show up for work, and if they don't, if they fail
to let their supervisor know, that is important to America's
safety and security. So what is the disciplinary action you
would take at that point?
Mr. Halinski. Well, sir, first I would like to say that it
starts with training and education, and we have put together
through our Office of Training and Workforce Engagement a very
robust ethics and integrity training program, and also a
training program for our entire workforce, because that is how
we get to an efficient workforce in the future, a high-
performance workforce. We have put together a very substantial,
required training that all TSOs have to go through.
Mr. Duncan. How do you train? I am baffled. How do you
train someone to know to call their supervisor and tell them, I
am not going to be at work, or I may be a little late? That is
common sense.
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir, it is common sense. I would tell
you that we have ethics training, we have integrity training,
we have situational training on videos for our people. We are
trying to train a workforce that is about 47,000 screeners, and
they have to do their job and they have to be trained. They hit
that training on an annual basis. We stress it, sir. We put out
messages.
I will tell you, sir, on the issue of tardiness, you are
right. I am not going to disagree with you. Everybody should be
on time when they come to work. If they are not, they can be
disciplined in the case of TSA. I don't think it is an offense
that they need to be fired of unless it is the third, fourth,
or fifth time and it is a consistent pattern. Hopefully, the
first time gets the word. A letter of reprimand, it is not
something you should take lightly. A letter of reprimand means
that you are not going to get a bonus that year, possibly. You
are not going to get promoted. It is going to stay in your
jacket. It is a serious thing, sir, and it escalate from there.
A suspension, it is a serious thing, and we take this serious,
sir, I mean we do.
When you look at the numbers and the percentages, I do have
a large workforce, sir, and I can't control the behavior of
everybody. We can train them. We can hold them accountable.
That is what I believe we are doing, and we have a good
workforce, sir.
Our people take an oath when they come into service, it is
the same oath that you take, sir, as a Congressman. We raise
our right hands and we commit to that. The one thing that I
find very good about our workforce is year in and year out
there is that Federal employee survey that they have. TSA
morale-wise, people will say, well, you are in the low
percentages. But do you know what we are every year, sir, 80
percent and above? The belief in our mission. That mission is
to protect the traveling public.
We will have people that will do stupid things, guarantee
it, sir. I was a Marine for 25 years, we had knuckleheads that
did stupid things on the weekends or other times. That is going
to happen. We will hold them accountable, sir. I have told you
that, and I am committed to it. So is Mr. Pistole.
Mr. Duncan. Well, I look forward to hearing about how they
are held accountable going forward based on some of the things
we are hearing.
I am out of time, so I am going to yield now to--since we
don't have the Ranking Member of the subcommittee--to Mr.
Thompson, the Ranking Member of the full committee.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Outten-Mills--hope I pronounced it okay--last fall the
OIG reported on the mishandling of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission complaints within TSA's legacy
Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing office. Now,
in response of the allegations of favoritism and EEO
violations, the Inspector General recommended that TSA
establish an independent review panel through which legacy TTAC
employees could request a review of desk audits and
reassignments. Why did the Inspector General believe this
recommendation was important?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, is that for me or the IG?
Mr. Thompson. The IG.
Mr. Halinski. Thanks.
Ms. Outten-Mills. During our review of TTAC we found that
there was favoritism being shown for various different
employees. We found that TTAC had--there is a formal TSA
process in place for handling allegations and complaints, but
within TTAC they had developed a system that circumvented the
formal process where employees, many of the employees weren't
even aware of what the TSA's formal process entailed. As part
of that, as part of what we found was happening in TTAC,
employees were being removed from their positions into other
positions that had no responsibilities.
Now, TSA started in 2010 a restructuring and realignment
which included legacy TTAC employees. So for those employees
that in past years had been downgraded when their position
descriptions and their current roles are reviewed, it might
result in downgrades. So our recommendation would--what we
wanted to address was the fact that there could be seen as no
favoritism, that there could be an equal playing field in
reviewing TTAC's current positions and the roles, and that
there would be some fairness in the system.
Mr. Thompson. Now, can you tell me whether or not since
that recommendation was put out, have you worked with TSA and
have some of your concerns been satisfied?
Ms. Outten-Mills. We have worked with TSA, and the formal
written response that TSA provided is responsive to our
recommendation to create this independent review panel over the
desk reviews. What we are waiting for right now, we are
monitoring what TSA is doing, but the response that they
provided to us did address our concerns if they put that in
place.
Mr. Thompson. Okay. Mr. Halinski, you can take the other
part of that. What you have just heard, is that basically where
you are?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir. In fact, I would like to say also
that TTAC does not exist any longer. That organization was
integrated into our Office of Intelligence, that the
individuals at the senior level no longer work for our agency.
We took those recommendations on board, we believe we have
worked with the IG on this, and we will continue to work with
it.
The piece on the desk audits, we did go through a
restructuring transformation within our headquarters over the
last 2-year process where we have done desk audits of
individual positions. We think that is in line with Government
policy. We believe that that also met those requirements from
that particular case, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
I want to talk a little bit about the mishandling of
sensitive security information. In July 2010, a new hire
training manual containing sensitive security information about
screening practices was stolen after a private security company
employee removed it from the San Francisco International
Airport without authorization.
Mr. Halinski, what is the recommended penalty for a TSO who
mishandles sensitive security information?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, for a TSO that mishandles SSI
information it can range from a letter of reprimand to a 14-day
suspension, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Letter of reprimand----
Mr. Halinski. There is a range in between, from a 14-day
suspension to a letter of reprimand, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Okay. What is the recommended penalty for a
contract screener who mishandles sensitive security
information?
Mr. Halinski. For a contract screener, sir, we do not deal
directly with the contract screener. We deal with the company
under contractual procedures. The contracting company could be
fined for that particular type of incident, sir.
Mr. Thompson. So you fine the company but you don't deal
with the employee?
Mr. Halinski. No sir.
Mr. Thompson. I yield back.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the Ranking Member.
The Chairman will now recognize the Chairman of the
Transportation Security Subcommittee, Mr. Hudson, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Halinski, one of the things in the GAO report that
concerned us was the idea of staff not complying with policies
and procedures for adjudicating misconduct. Some of the cases
have even been overturned because staff at airports did not
document sufficient evidence or properly apply penalty factors.
Whose responsibility is it to review misconduct cases at
airports?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir. Let me give you a two-prong answer
on that. It depends on the severity of the case, sir. But I
also want to say that the transportation security officers, if
they are found guilty of anything, have the right to appeal
under our OPR Appellate Board. So if there is an incident and
it is, let's say, tardiness for work, the process is handled at
the airport at the local level. If it is a more severe case, it
will be handled with our Office of Investigation. It will be
looked at through our Office of Professional Responsibility. If
it is a serious case and a recommendation will be made, then
the individual has a right to appeal that.
There is one difference, sir, as was mentioned earlier. Our
TSOs, under ATSA, do not have the right for MSPB appeal. But
what we have created to ensure that there is equity in the
process is we have given them the ability--and we have had 800-
plus TSOs use this--appeal to our OPR Appellate Board. It was
mentioned by Mr. Lord that about 15 percent there was a
turnover of those appeals. That is about the same amount,
roughly the same percentage that MSPB has. So we believe we are
in line with that.
We have to give our people an appeal process. So we put
that in place. But there is a process. We recognize what GAO
said, sir, and we are putting into place, by and large, most of
the four recommendations that they have made we have put into
place, we feel that they will be complete some time by the end
of September, beginning October. We welcome GAO to come back
and take a look at what we have done. I think it is a much
tighter system with a lot more oversight at this point, sir.
Mr. Hudson. Great. Well, just to understand, so the Federal
security director's role then would be to sort of determine is
this violation important enough to kick it upstairs or do I
deal with it here? Is that----
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hudson [continuing]. That sort of the role?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hudson. Okay. What steps has TSA taken to remedy this
problem in particular of the failure to document correctly
these incidents?
Mr. Halinski. Well, I think, sir, one of the things we had
to do was we had to clean up the database and we had to make it
a much more efficient database. It is one of those things that
sometimes you run into Government where you have multiple
databases. So we have combined it into one, which we call our
Integrated Database. We have made it a much stronger process.
We have professionals who are trained, H.R. people who are
trained to input it in. Then there is oversight to make sure
that it is being inputted in correctly.
Our FSD is responsible for auditing all inputs. We also
have our legal field counsel there to help with inputting those
offenses into the system, and then our Office of Investigation
and our Office of Human Capital are responsible for doing spot
audits. We have asked that they put out a regular schedule on
that and increase that. So we have four levels of oversight
now. We think that will fix the problem that was identified by
the GAO.
Mr. Hudson. Great. Pivoting a little bit, how does TSA
recruit airport personnel, and what are some of the key
qualifications that TSA looks for? Has this evolved over time?
Has this changed?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I would tell you we use a variety of
methods to recruit personnel. We use the normal USAJobs, we use
social media to recruit our personnel. But let me talk a little
bit, because I think in the context of this hearing, what is
important is how we hire our personnel.
First off, they are fingerprinted. There is an NCIC check,
a Federal criminal record check that is done. There is a credit
check done of our personnel before they come in. Then there is
an interview with a manager for suitability. Then, at a certain
point, there will also be an interview by our personnel
security people because we want all of our people to have the
potential to hold a security clearance.
That being said, sir, as you have seen and as evidenced by
the GAO, we are going to have people that sometimes do stupid
things. I think that is endemic with the entire system when you
have security clearances or anything else. We believe that we
do the due diligence through two different types of interviews,
fingerprinting, credit checks to bring people on-board to work
as TSOs.
Mr. Hudson. I thank you for those answers.
As my time is running down I will go ahead and yield back,
and then hopefully we will have a second-round opportunity to
ask questions. Thank you.
Mr. Duncan. The Chairman will recognize the gentlelady from
Indiana, Mrs. Brooks, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This question is to you, Mr. Halinski. I understand that
there is a table of offenses that is provided to all of the
airports and the supervisors that sets out kind of appropriate
suggested discipline for offenses and penalties for misconduct
cases. However, the GAO report indicated that there have not
been, it has been fairly inconsistent in the manner in which it
is used among the airports when issuing the penalties. Can you
talk about that lack of consistency in the use of this table of
offenses and the recommended penalties?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am. I think it was important when Mr.
Pistole came in, he created the Office of Professional
Responsibility modeled on the office that is in the FBI. Quite
frankly, we built the table of offenses and penalties based on
many systems that are in the Government and other agencies, not
just within DHS, but other outside departments. It goes, once
again, back to the seriousness of the offense.
What you have is a range of options. What is the offense?
It may go from this level to the most extreme level. If it is a
serious offense, it is taken out of the hands of the local
airport and it is given to our Office of Investigation, which
is then adjudicated by our Office of Professional
Responsibility. If it is an offense such as you are out of
uniform when you come to work, you are late for work, you may
have mouthed off to a supervisor, then it is handled at the FSD
level.
Now, I think what is important to remember is before we had
this table, before we had OPR, the TSO had no appeal rights in
any case that was out there. Now they have the right to appeal,
and they can go to that OPR Appeals Board and say, I believe
based on my time in service, by my clean record, by the
evidence I have provided you, that I shouldn't be held
accountable for this. So there is an appeal process which is
based on OPR, based on that table that was built. It has been a
very helpful tool for us.
Mrs. Brooks. I think my concern might be, and I have also
been Federal Government, I was a U.S. attorney and often
working with the AOUSA, if there were any discipline issues
with respect to my employees at the time, they often wanted to
compare what our discipline might be to other U.S. attorney's
offices' discipline, and that is very important when you have
large agencies like TSA. So I guess the concern is: How often
are airports issuing penalties that are varying from those
tables and how are you keeping track of that? Because I think
that opens the agency up for a lot more problems beyond the
appeals process, the inconsistency of penalties. So to your
knowledge how often are the airports, you know, wavering from
that table?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am. What we are trying to do through
that process that was recommended by the GAO is we have made a
much stronger Integrated Database so that we can track that
information now. The one piece that I think is very important
is the ability to do trend analysis. Basically what you are
talking about is one airport not doing things similar to
another airport. We believe some time in the fall, I think end
of September, early October, we are going to have that
capability to do trend analysis. The key is oversight, it is
oversight by the headquarters. We have our Office of
Investigation and our Office of Human Capital. It is dedicated
to that type of analysis and those spot audits, which I think
are very important, ma'am.
Mrs. Brooks. Is that how you determine if people, though,
aren't using the Integrated Database that you are referring to,
that I heard that some--that was also part of the GAO report,
is that some airports aren't using it----
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am. What we found was--and I think
when you go in, and Mr. Lord can correct me on this--but when
you went in, it wasn't that they weren't using the system for
serious offenses. What we found when we went back in is the
lower the offense, or if it wasn't--we need to have that
information so if someone moves across airports, as was
mentioned earlier, we can keep track of that. At some airports
it wasn't being done. It has been tightened in a management
directive that has gone out and it is inspected when we inspect
our airports.
I might also add one other thing which I think is very
important. Our Office of Professional Responsibility now puts
out a newsletter every month, and it lists for our entire
workforce what the offenses were and what the actions were and
what the adjudication was. We also include the number of covert
tests that we do for integrity. I think it is important because
it sends a signal to the workforce that if you do this, this is
what happens. But I think it also sends a signal to the
workforce that we have consistency across the board.
Mrs. Brooks. I think that is a great way to communicate
with your workforce, and I applaud you for doing that.
I yield back.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chairman will now recognize the gentleman from Florida,
Mr. Mica, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Mica. Well, thank you so much. I want to thank you and
also for Mr. Hudson for holding this hearing.
I had been an original requester of this report by GAO
because, again, having been involved in creating TSA, I was
concerned that some of the public reports we had of misconduct
were mounting. This report does, in fact, confirm that TSA
employee misconduct has spiraled almost to an unbelievable
level, and that is very disappointing.
Mr. Halinski, you pointed out that TSA actually with Mr.
Pistole's ascension instituted two offices. What were they?
Mr. Halinski. The Office of Professional Responsibility and
the Office of Training and Workforce.
Mr. Mica. When did he institute those?
Mr. Halinski. Approximately 2 years ago, sir.
Mr. Mica. Okay. In the last 3 years, Mr. Lord, you reviewed
this. What is the increase in incidents over that 3-year
period? Percentage of increase?
Mr. Lord. It is 27 percent.
Mr. Mica. I have used 26, but 27 percent. So maybe we
should go back to not having that office. We were probably
doing better before. But you have instituted, again, these two
offices and we have actually had a 27 percent increase.
I mean some of the incidents have been totally
embarrassing, embarrassing to the thousands of TSA employees
that get up and do a good job every day. Orlando airport, they
featured--which is one of my airports, local airports--an
employee was caught in a media sting stealing a computer. There
is another case I think in your report, Mr. Lord, of, again,
theft there. We have the Newark situation was so embarrassing,
the supervisor was advising the TSA employee on how to steal
contents of passengers' luggage. Again, this has been totally
embarrassing for everyone.
So I think one of the Members on the other side said this
involves about 6 percent of the employees given the 9,000
incidents over 3 years? I mean, that is the figure that was
used by the other side. Not to mention how many criminal
incidences and arrests of TSA employees, which isn't
acceptable.
Now, the other thing this report identifies, and it was
sort of glossed over, it is just I guess 32 percent of the
offenses are attendance and leave, unexcused or excessive
absences. Is that right Mr. Lord?
Mr. Lord. Yes.
Mr. Mica. Okay. These aren't just missing a day or two,
these are more extensive offenses. Would that be correct?
Mr. Lord. Actually I think it varies, but it does include
some more egregious cases.
Mr. Mica. Well, the problem you have, too, is you don't
have standard reporting, which your report said. Is that right?
Mr. Lord. Yes, that was one of the issues.
Mr. Mica. So actually I think that the number of incidents
that are reported, 9,600, because we have such a variance
probably underreports what is actually taking place. Would that
be an appropriate assumption, Mr. Lord?
Mr. Lord. That is one of the issues we identified in our
report, a lack of consistent reporting.
Mr. Mica. But it would indicate that they are not all
reported. This 32 percent doesn't sound like much of an impact,
an unexcused absence, but it throws the whole system into
chaos. People don't show up for work. How can you properly
screen folks? Mr. Lord, for the record, is shaking his head in
the affirmative.
Mr. Lord. I think it depends on particular facts and
circumstances. It does have the potential to disrupt screening
operations.
Mr. Mica. Right. The other thing, too, is the cost. Mr.
Halinski, do we still have a National screening force that we
send in at great taxpayer expense to make up where you don't
have screeners?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, we do have a National screening force.
Mr. Mica. How many millions of dollars does that cost us a
year? I asked you this I think at another hearing and you
couldn't answer. Can you answer today?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir, I can answer today. I would tell
you that that screening force has been reduced to approximately
250 personnel.
Mr. Mica. What is the cost? Again, for the record, and, Mr.
Chairman, I would like in the record the cost of this National
screening force, if you could provide it to the committee, for
the past 3 years. Because, again, it is disgraceful that people
don't show up for work, there is great cost to the taxpayers
and great disruption.
A couple of quick closing comments. Are you still
recruiting people from ads on the top of pizza boxes and ads on
discount gas pumps for employment at TSA?
Mr. Halinski. No, sir, we are not.
Mr. Mica. Okay. That has stopped. Then the fingerprint
check and all of that, I would like to--I will put in the
record a letter from one of my sheriffs that notified me that
two people he disciplined for misconduct he next found employed
at the Daytona Beach airport. If you would, I would like that
made part of the record. Thank you.
Mr. Duncan. Without objection, so ordered.*
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* The information was not available at the time of publication.
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Mr. Duncan. The gentleman's time has expired, so we will
enter into a second round of questioning here.
Mr. Lord, the other side of the aisle was talking about
private companies that are doing security screening. Is there
an incentive for the private companies to keep folks employed
that have stolen or continue to show up at work not on time?
Mr. Lord. I don't think there is an incentive if the
company is private or Federal, if you have problematic
employees.
Mr. Duncan. Mr. Halinski just testified a few minutes ago
that there is a financial penalty for companies that, you know,
someone in their employ has stolen or show up not on time and
that sort of thing. So I would say for the record there is a
disincentive for the private companies to continue those
practices.
Mr. Lord, many of the offenses that the TSA employees have
been accused of could have led to severe aviation security
risk. Is there any evidence that due to an employee's direct or
indirect action security at an airport was breached?
Mr. Lord. Well, by definition 20 percent of the cases we
looked at were labeled security- and screening-related. So
obviously we believe those cases do have some nexus to
security. But again it all depends on the particular
circumstances of the case. But those are the ones I view as
more serious compared to the cases related to time and
attendance.
Mr. Duncan. Of the 56 cases of theft and unauthorized
taking from 2010 to 2012, 31 resulted in termination, 31 of the
56 resulted in termination, 11 resulted in letters of
reprimand, 11 resulted in suspension of a defined period, 2
resulted in indefinite suspension, and 1 resulted in a
resignation.
Mr. Lord, despite the recommended penalty range for these
offenses, not including termination, Deputy Administrator
Halinksi told the committee last year that TSA took that
seriously and TSA could prove it, the TSA would terminate those
who would steal. Do you see that happening in your report?
Mr. Lord. Yeah, that is a good question. I believe under
the updated guidelines if there are mitigating circumstances a
letter of reprimand is one possible option. But, again, it
depends on the circumstances. So I think there is some leeway
there under the new----
Mr. Duncan. I understand extenuating circumstances and some
of the appeals process and proving it and whatnot. I guess
Americans would be frustrated continuing to see letters of
reprimand versus termination when theft is proven. I want to
make sure that TSA does follow through with their protocol.
I want to go back to the private screening, the private
contractors issue. I came from the private sector and there was
an incentive to do things right and also to have customer
satisfaction with people we did business for, to apply the best
management practices, and there was a disincentive if we failed
to do what we said we were going to do. There was a
disincentive for me if one of my employees didn't show up at
work on time and we weren't able to conduct--we did auctions--
and we weren't able to conduct those in the time that we said
we were going to and there were delays, both on the buyer's
side and the seller's side.
So I think prompt and appropriate action and consistency is
very, very important. I think that is what your GAO report
points out over and over, that we need to be consistent. I
think in the private sector you see when companies don't
provide consistency with regard to disciplinary action then
that opens them up to a possibility of lawsuits, because I
think in a personnel situation you have to have consistency.
You can't show preferential treatment from one employee to the
next. We shouldn't be able to do that in the public sector as
well.
So I don't really have anything further. So with that I
will recognize the gentleman from Mississippi for 5 minutes.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
interest in my question. What I want to do is make sure we keep
it in the right lane.
My only question dealt with sensitive security information.
It did not deal with time and attendance or anything like that
in the private sector. It is sensitive security information.
That kind of information, we all agree, is something that is
far more serious than someone not showing up for work.
Now, as important for me in this conversation is whether or
not, Mr. Halinski, you saw the fact that in the contracting
with TSA with private contractors, because you did not have the
ability to deal with personnel found guilty of that, have you
now changed the contracting document with TSA to get you to
where you need to be?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir. We have changed the contract for
all new contracts for SPP airports, and there is a clause in
there that requires them to report any type of misconduct
activities of their workforce, and we also require in this new
language that if an employee is identified as with misconduct
that appropriate action needs to be taken by that company, sir.
Mr. Duncan. Will the gentleman yield?
Do you have the ability to terminate a contract--it is
following up on what he was asking--of a private contractor if
you find misconduct on the employees?
Mr. Halinski. No, sir. I do not believe that we do. But I
could get you a more thorough answer. I am not an expert on
contracting. I wish I could give you a better answer. But I
will get you one on that one, sir.
Mr. Duncan. I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Ms. Outten-Mills, we have talked a lot about TSA. What has
been your analysis in reviewing other components of DHS with
respect to claims of misconduct? Is TSA higher? Lower? In the
middle? Can you provide some direction to this board?
Ms. Outten-Mills. Sir, the body of work that we have
conducted in OIG at this point has not focused on misconduct
and allegations. Even with the TTAC job and the FAM project
that we conducted, we basically looked at pre-adjudication and
the policies and procedures that were in place to make sure
that credible allegations were able to enter the process. As
far as how agencies have----
Mr. Thompson. So you really can't.
Ms. Outten-Mills. No, we have not.
Mr. Thompson. Okay. Well, Mr. Lord, the reference to this
increase in complaints, did you change the matrix for review or
is it the same matrix all along?
Mr. Lord. I am not sure I understand your question, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Well, you say you had a 26 percent increase,
I believe.
Mr. Lord. Over 3 years, yeah, that is what the data clearly
shows. It is actually 27 percent.
Mr. Thompson. All right. Is that the same that you
generally do?
Mr. Lord. Oh, you mean when compared to other DHS
components?
Mr. Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Lord. We didn't do that analysis, but I think it is
important to recognize all the other, for example, Customs and
Border Protection, that they have a different mission,
different organizational setup, it would be difficult to make
direct comparisons, but for purposes of our report we did not
include that information. That was outside the scope.
Mr. Thompson. Comparison with coming to work, that is in
any agency, right?
Mr. Lord. Oh, on time and attendance. I thought you meant
screening- and security-related violations. I have no
comparative data available to----
Mr. Thompson. Would you, if you did CBP or anybody, would
you do time and attendance as part of the review?
Mr. Lord. Oh, yeah, definitely, definitely.
Mr. Thompson. So you have not in your capacity performed
any have those time and attendance reviews for any other
agency?
Mr. Lord. We have not done that currently. We would be
happy to work with your staff if you are interested in having a
follow-up review conducted on that.
Mr. Thompson. Well, I am concerned about the increase at
TSA. But if this situation is peculiar to other agencies, I
would like to know it also.
Mr. Lord. Understood.
Mr. Thompson. So I yield back.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairman will recognize the gentleman from North
Carolina, Mr. Hudson, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Halinski, in terms of the amount of time it takes to
get through an entire investigation and adjudication process,
what has TSA done to streamline this process? Can TSA be doing
more? What is the maximum amount of time a TSA employee can
remain on the job while his or her case is being investigated?
If, for example, a screener was accused of failing to follow a
standard operating procedure at a checkpoint, would that
individual be allowed to continue to work the checkpoint or
would they be given other responsibilities until the
investigation is completed? How does that process work?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir. It depends on the seriousness of
the offense. If you are talking about an offense that is on the
administrative side and not the criminal side, then the local
airport will conduct its investigation, they will take
statements, they will put the evidence together. It is not a
long process, sir, quite frankly. We are not talking about an
investigation where you are going in and it takes months at a
time.
The more serious offenses that come up, that is when you go
to our Office of Investigation. We have made great strides in
that area since last year. In those cases we are running, in
more than 50 percent of the cases, under 90 days to conduct a
full criminal investigation on these folks and send it to our
Office of Professional Responsibility.
Mr. Hudson. So if someone is in one of these serious
investigations, are they reassigned to a different duty point?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir. While they are in that status they
can be put on administrative leave, they can be suspended, they
can be put on at a different part of the airport in a
nonscreening role. There is a variety of ways. If the
allegations are serious enough, they are not kept on the line,
they are moved out while the process takes place, sir.
Mr. Hudson. Okay. How many TSA employees are currently on
administrative leave for a process like this?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I do not have that number. I will get
back with you. I would tell you that we don't like to put
anybody on administrative leave because that means that people
are getting paid for not working. So we do try to find other
duties for them. But I will get back with you on that number. I
don't have that number right off-hand, sir.
Mr. Hudson. Okay. Appreciate that.
Shifting gears a little bit, as I understand current
policy, if a screener fails a covert test conducted by TSA's
inspectors, the screener is retrained and allowed to continue
screening passengers at the checkpoint. If a screener fails a
covert test conducted by GAO inspectors, the screener is
neither notified right away nor pulled off the line. In both
cases, the screener in question does not receive a suspension
or other penalty.
I recognize there could be a variety of reasons why someone
fails one of these tests. However, there are certain cases
where after careful review of the circumstances it would be
appropriate for a screener who failed a covert test to be
suspended. After all, TSA's sole purpose is security and the
tests are in place to identify security weaknesses.
As TSA makes its headway towards risk-based security, I am
concerned that a security failure at a checkpoint or the
genuine--or a test--could set us back tremendously. It only
takes one mistake to get a bomb on a plane, for instance.
Now, the ability of screeners to detect explosives and
other threats and the confidence of the American public is
fundamental to the success of risk-based security. Would you
agree, Mr. Halinski, to revisit the policies and procedures for
holding accountable those screeners who fail a covert test?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir. Let me talk a little bit about
covert testing. Covert testing I think is one of the very solid
quality assurance programs that we have had. I believe the
numbers are over 6,000 covert tests that we have done over the
last several years. The other thing about covert testing, like
any red team organization in any organization, you know exactly
where the weaknesses are, you know how to build the devices so
you can make it as difficult as possible.
I am not going to go into a whole lot of detail
specifically about the tests but I will address your question
because we keep that classified for a reason. Because threat,
they pay attention to what we do, and they will use it against
us. We have seen it consistently.
Now, when we have someone who fails a covert test, we try
to--particularly with our covert testing--we take them off the
line and try to do immediate quality assurance. If we see a
trend, sir, we understand people can make a mistake. Let me
give you an example, sir. If someone puts a test device, let's
say in a groin area, and it is a small device, sir, I think you
have seen that device, and they do a pat-down and it is clearly
not a pat-down that is going to find that device, then we take
immediate action and tell that individual, look, you need to do
a better job on that pat-down.
We will look at that, sir. I will tell you that anybody who
fails tests consistently is going to be in trouble in the
organization, sir.
Mr. Hudson. I appreciate that, but obviously one failed
pat-down could lead to a horrible disaster for the public.
Mr. Halinski. We do understand that, sir, and that is one
of the reasons why we have, and I think it is important to
recognize, that we have a system of security that is multiple
layers. It is a defense in depth. We have to have that. Because
if we only have one point and we based it on one point, it is a
single point of failure. That is why we have our dogs, that is
why we have our BDOs, that is why we have our FAMS, that is why
we have our intelligence system that vets beforehand. You have
to have a defense in depth. Anybody that has been involved in
security understands this. It is like football, sir. If you
only have one person on the line and you don't have backs or
you don't have linebackers, you are going to be in trouble.
That is what we have, a defense in depth. So we try to overlap
that, sir, and ensure that that one failure doesn't happen,
every single day, 1.8 million times a day, sir.
Mr. Hudson. I appreciate that.
My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairman will now recognize and welcome back the
Ranking Member, Mr. Barber, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Barber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Halinski, I would like to ask you a few questions about
the procedures that were addressed or referred to by the GAO in
their recent report. The GAO indicated that the TSA does not
have procedures to identify allegations of misconduct that have
not been adjudicated. In other words, there could be
allegations of misconduct that have never been resolved. So I
have a series of questions related to that.
Can you say how many there are remaining that have not been
adjudicated? Second, an average length of time that those have
been pending? How does the agency plan to address this issue
going forward?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, to the best of my knowledge, we have
taken what the GAO said to heart. We have made those changes. I
don't believe we have any cases that are outstanding.
The process we use now is automatic. With this Integrated
Database, if you go through the process, there is a system of
checks and oversight by our Office of Human Capital, by our
Office of Investigations, and by other Office of Professional
Responsibility. When a case is closed, the system now
automatically goes back to every one of those offices so
everybody understands that the case has been adjudicated and is
put in their records. We took that to heart, we made that
correction, and it is in place, sir.
Mr. Barber. The standard procedures that are now in place
so that we have what we hope is non-arbitrary or fair across-
the-board actions being taken, can you say what a one strike
you are out looks like?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir. We catch an individual--now, let me
go back to covert testing, sir, that we are doing for
integrity. We have a screener on the line, we have one of our
covert testers go through, he has an iPad that he decides he is
going to put in his pocket. As I said earlier, the vast
majority of our people are good people that don't do that. But
when that happens, sir, and we have absolutely proof that he
stole that item, it is 24 hours he is out the door. We have put
that into effect, sir.
Drugs, another case. You are caught with drugs, on the spot
we can put you out and we have done that. Now, if it involves
an investigation in drugs, there is an investigation involved,
if I can't immediately prove it, sir, we have to do due
diligence for our people. They are innocent until proven
guilty. That takes a little bit of time. But we do give them
the benefit of the doubt in those cases until the proof shows
otherwise, sir.
Mr. Barber. What if the infraction has to do with putting
the public at risk? In your covert investigations someone came
through with essentially an explosive, is that a one strike you
are out?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, if someone is intentionally trying to go
against the security practices, if he is intentionally trying
to bypass that system, yes, sir, it is. We have had instances
of that in the last year, sir, and those people have been
removed.
Mr. Barber. Well, let me go to a different aspect of this.
This is a question or an issue we have raised before in other
hearings with the Department, and that is the concern that I
have and I think the public has about transparency and
accountability with the Department, or on behalf of the
Department. I guess I am really concerned about how it is that
we have transparency in ensuring the public that these matters
are investigated. I realize there are personnel restrictions or
privacy concerns but, you know, the GAO report is now a public
document. People have a right to say, that is not good, what
are we doing about it? What can the Department do more than it
has already done to ensure transparency with the American
people?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, and I will get to that that question,
sir, but first let me say we are a very large organization and
we are an organization probably that is in the public eye more
than any other Government organization right now. We see the
traveling public 1.8 million times a day, so we are very
visible. Every time, sir, and we have very good people who do a
good job every day, every single time we have one knucklehead
who decides he is going to do something bad it tarnishes the
image of our organization.
But at the same time, sir, let me point out the fact that
last year over 10 of our TSOs saved people's lives either in
the airport through CPR, by helping accident victims, by
pulling people from burning cars, by talking down a pilot in a
general aviation aircraft. You never hear those stories, sir.
You very rarely hear them. I think that is important when you
are talking about image and you are talking about transparency,
you have to take the good with the bad. When you look at the
actual percentages they are very low and comparable to any
other Government organization. I have my people on the line 365
days of the year. They know if they fail, someone could die.
Mr. Barber. Can I just make sure we have the answer to the
question about transparency? The GAO report is public. The
media has it. The public will soon understand what is in it.
What can you do to assure the American people that the issues
that are raised in that GAO study and report have been properly
dealt with? Transparency in that regard is what I was really
referring to.
Mr. Halinski. All right, sir, I appreciate that. What I
would tell you is what I said earlier, is that we absolutely
embrace the comments made by the GAO. We are in the process and
have almost completely taken those on-board and completed
those; we believe they will be complete by the end of
September, October. There is one big piece that we are looking
working on as far as trend analysis. I am sitting here on C-
SPAN and I am telling you that we embrace them and we are going
to do them, sir.
Mr. Barber. Thank you.
Mr. Hudson [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired.
At this time the Chairman will recognize the gentlelady
from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, for 5 minutes for any questions
she may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, let me thank you very much
for what I think is a vitally important hearing. Let me thank
the Ranking Members and the Chairman, Mr. Duncan, and the full
committee as well.
The American people deserve the sense of trust and respect,
both as they travel, but also for the employees and the
officers, as I call them, that they work for. I am very pleased
that post-9/11 we can actually that say that we have a trained,
uniform, professional workforce called transportation security
officers with SOPs, standard operating procedures which they
must abide by, that we can even have an assessment of the bad
apples versus the good apples.
Now, I would offer to say, as I have always said, Mr.
Halinski, to Administrator Pistole, you have heard me say this,
let's print the good stories, let's not hide the good stories.
That should be part of an obligation of management, that should
be an SOP, standard operating procedure, report the good
stories, because I think it balances what, as you have
indicated, the difficulty, but also the numbers that come up
for those who are bad apples with the mountain of success
stories and operational excellence that occurs in the airports
every single day, even as we speak today.
I have a series of questions that relate to that, and I
just want you to go quickly please because my time is short.
It is my understanding that you can contract with an SPP,
let everybody know that is a private contract, privatization,
you can contract with that contractual entity, but you can
enforce various rules against them in the contract or against
that workforce. Is that correct?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. If you saw something and you were in the
middle of a contract it would be difficult to cancel, is that
correct, there is a contractual relationship?
Mr. Halinski. There is a contractual process that has to be
done.
Ms. Jackson Lee. That has to go through. So we can't
compare what we suffer if we privatize or continue to privatize
versus your ability being able to work with the professional
public workforce under the Transportation Security
Administration with the airports that are under your
jurisdiction, you can focus on those individuals, is that
correct?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We have worked on this committee, it has
been my cause to work on the issue of professional development
and to make sure TSO officers have the able to rise up, that
they are complimented as well as criticized. As I noticed the
numbers, there has been an increase on the study in terms of
issues dealing with time and attendance, we find that in the
private workforce, of course, and then some people not
following procedure.
Are you here to suggest or have you sort-of looked and seen
that it is not excessive beyond the workforces around the
country or other agencies? Is that something that you attest
to?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am. I think when you look at this
number of 27 percent arise, I am going to go back to the
figured numbers. You can take any number out there and make it
any way you want to look at it. Quite frankly, with the 27
percent, does that mean there it has been an increase in our
personnel, that we are doing more accountability actions of
misconduct?
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think that is important. Because my time
is short I want to get you to the kind of things that you are
doing in the interest of professional development. As I do that
let me just cite for the record that there was an investigation
in Newark of individuals and it was ultimately determined, when
the facts came out, that the penalty was too high or that they
shouldn't have been assessed because there are additional facts
that come out. So we have to sort of balance when we review the
facts with make sure the disciplinary action meets the facts. I
think in Newark it found out that they were cleared of all
wrongdoing, certain incidents that occurred.
So my question is: Are you concerned about and do you have
a matrix for professional development, and are you recognizing
the important trust that the American people place in TSOs
because they are one of the front-liners, if you will, one of
the front-liners that deals with saving lives? They weren't in
place on 9/11, were they? TSA was not in place on 9/11.
Mr. Halinski. No, ma'am, it wasn't.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So they are the front-liners. Can you say
that your professional development includes sensitivity to the
elderly, the disabled, as well as SOPs? Could you answer that
please?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am. We have made an effort to true to
ensure that we don't have instances where we are conducting
ourselves inappropriately. We have do ethical training, we do
integrity training for our workforce, we have professional
development for our workforce, and we try to be consistent in
the way we do our mission.
Once again I am going to say it and I think it is important
to say: Our mission is to protect the traveling public 1.8
million times a day. It is a big job. It sounds easy. There are
many complexities to it, not just screening. We have air
marshals, we have inspectors. We have to worry about foreign
flight students. We have to worry about general aviation. We
have a lot on our plate to secure that system. Easy mission in
name, very complex in execution. I think we do a pretty good
job of it, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, let me just indicate to Mr.
Halinski that I think this committee is holding this hearing,
No. 1, to contribute to the trust that the traveling public
should have. I would believe that we could work together,
Republicans and Democrats, and even provide an added
professional development structure, if you will, that will,
one, enhance the training, and I have spoken to those who have
gone to the training in Georgia. They found it to be one of the
best training that they could have ever had. I am not sure, I
assume you are familiar with the class in Georgia.
But I would like to see an opportunity for legislative
structure of training to help, and to again reinforce that they
are out there to save lives and to build the trust that I think
you are due as servants of the American people, more
importantly as officers of the Transportation Security
Administration.
So I yield back. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Duncan. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The Chairman will recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Mica, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Mica. Let me pick up on training. Mr. Halinski, are you
aware how much we have spent on training of TSA personnel,
TSOs?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I don't have that figure.
Mr. Mica. You know it exceeds $1 billion. Are you aware
also, sir, that we have actually trained--employed and then
trained--recruited, employed, and trained more people than we
have actually in the workforce, that more than that number have
left the workforce, we spent that much money on people who are
no longer employed. Are you aware of that?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, like any organization that is out there,
we have been in existence about 10 years, sir, and----
Mr. Mica. I think you baked the cake on that one.
Well, first of all, Mr. Halinski, you said in response to
Mr. Thompson talked about the private screening operation in
San Francisco and one employee who had misplaced
inappropriately some sensitive information, you said the
penalty would be a letter of reprimand and a 14-day suspension
for a TSA employee. Is that correct?
Mr. Halinski. What I said, sir, was a TSO could receive
from a letter of reprimand to a 14-day suspension for
mishandling of SSI material.
Mr. Mica. Okay. Mr. Thompson wondered what had happened, so
I checked, and that individual was suspended in 10 days, there
was an investigation, and he was fired. I am telling you, I
helped set up TSA, and we never intended, first of all, we
never intended for it to be continually an all-Government
operation. It was only set up for 2 years. But the intimidation
and all the other things TSA has done to secure its
bureaucracy.
Those who are interested in helping the poor workers, if
there is any TSA workers or union folks here, first of all, you
should know the private screening operations can actually pay
and retain people more. Second, that we never intended to have
some appeal method in place where the lax enforcement that you
would have and just mentioned by the Deputy Administrator here,
of a letter, 14 days. We wanted those people fired. We are
firing some of them, not all of them.
Are you aware, Mr. Halinski, the similarity between
Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland and the United States?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I lived in Europe for 11 years. I
actually escorted you twice to Europe.
Mr. Mica. Yes, I know. Are you aware of the similarity as
regarding airport security?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I know the airports internationally
pretty well.
Mr. Mica. Well, those three airports are the only three in
the Western world that still retain an all-Federal screening
force.
Mr. Halinski, TSA personnel, the TSOs, are they sworn law
enforcement personnel?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, our officers----
Mr. Mica. Are they sworn law enforcement----
Mr. Halinski. No, sir. They are not law enforcement
personnel.
Mr. Mica. They are not. Okay. They are screening. They are
not law enforcement personnel. You know, since you all hijacked
TSA, then you come here and tell us that you have put in place
all of this professional organization, Mr. Pistole has opened
two offices to ensure integrity. Now, didn't you just hear the
testimony that there has been a 27 percent increase in the
incidence of misconduct? Did you hear that?
Mr. Halinski. I did hear that, sir.
Mr. Mica. Okay. Do you think there is still something wrong
then with the way TSA is handling this misconduct?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, we have looked at the GAO report, we
have taken those to task, and we are doing what the GAO asked
us to do, sir.
Mr. Mica. Okay. You talked about the one-point-million
people a day. Here is something I want for the record. Your FSD
in Orlando just bragged about, we have 55,000 people a day that
we screen. Then he said, we have 1,200 TSA employees. Would you
confirm for me and the committee if that is correct? If that is
correct that means each employee is screening 50 people a day.
Would you say that is a productive workload?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I don't have those figures in front of
me----
Mr. Mica. I just asked, could you provide that information,
back it up to the committee?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, would you let
the witness answer the question?
Mr. Mica. Well, he doesn't have the information, Ms. Lee,
and I didn't interrupt you. But what I would like him to do is
respond to the committee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, I just would like him to be
able to answer the question. I appreciate it.
Mr. Duncan. If the witness would just provide the answer in
writing to Mr. Mica's question that would be sufficient.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. I think, again, Mr. Thompson--he is
not here, I apologize--but he had said that they indicated it
is a 3 to 9 percent in a GAO study extra costs for private
screening, and that report was actually an early report. I had
another report done, investigation, I don't know if you did
that, Mr. Lord, did you do that one to check, and didn't they
cook the books? That is how I termed it. But in fact you found
that there was not correct, they did not include other factors
as to the cost. Is that correct?
Mr. Lord. Yes, that is correct, sir.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. I will point out, for example, just go
to Rochester, for example, where they have 18 TSA personnel
that they don't need, most of them making on average $100,000
with a private screening force. Go to San Francisco and observe
the TSA monster overhead that they impose on top of private
screening that you do not need.
So, again, this is an agency that is unfair to the
employees. We spend $1.2 billion on the administrators, and you
have somewhere between, you can't tell, because Mr. Thompson
said we have 47,000 screeners, you had 56,000, someone else had
57,000, but we have 66,000 employees in TSA. So we have $1.8
billion being spent on screeners, $1.2 billion on unnecessary
and costly bureaucracy.
I yield back the balance of my time. Thanks for letting me
participate today.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Mica. I appreciate you
participating today.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Duncan. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I would like to take a brief second round
please. I think everyone had a second round. I will be very
brief, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
I think those were important questions that Mr. Mica
answered. I would like for you to come back in writing, first
of all, you will have to do the research so we can submit into
the record, the costs to the American people of 9/11.
My recollection, you can get those numbers I am sure
because you have a good research arm, in terms of the impact of
New York and its immediacy, Boston, Pennsylvania, and beyond.
The airline industry that I understand, it is my recollection,
was also hindered for a period of time. Just bring those
numbers back and submit it to the complete committee please.
Secondarily, I would like to have an assessment of the
professional development training that each TSO member gets and
what you plan to do going forward.
I would also like to have a response to--a more official
response to Mr. Thompson's letter.
I will just ask the question on the record, are you dealing
forthrightly with cases of discrimination, complaints of
discrimination by your employee base, and taking those
discrimination complaints seriously?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am, we are.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you have a process that indicates to
personnel or to employees of a process, an open and conspicuous
process, that they know where to go if they feel that they have
been discriminated against where they will not suffer
retaliation?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am. We have an Office of Civil Rights
and Liberties. We also put that as part of our annual training
for all employees. We have it on our website, ma'am. We have a
formal process. We adhere to the standards that the U.S.
Government has to in this case, ma'am.
Mr. Duncan. The Chairman will note that we have had a
period of question and answering. She has asked for these items
in writing. I have allowed a little leeway, but if we could
wrap it up.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I will, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.
The last question I will ask is: Are you using a billion
dollars for training, and why, and where does that money go?
Mr. Halinski. Ma'am, there are multiple questions that were
asked that I didn't get the opportunity to explain.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Go ahead.
Mr. Halinski. We have a very large workforce training over
a period of time. You are going to spend money for training for
that workforce.
If you want a professional workforce that is going to keep
and protect the transportation system, I have to be able to
train them. I can't give you the exact amount. I will get that
to you.
On the question of the SPP, it is a voluntary program. It
has been a voluntary program for years. There are 16 airports
in the SPP program. Any airport in the United States, quite
frankly. We don't see a major issue between either. If you talk
about costs, we don't see a big cost difference. We don't see
it in operations. We don't see a big difference any way. The
point is, it is a voluntary program. Any airport can apply.
There are 16 that have done it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much. There is no great
benefit for the SPP as saving money versus the professional
transportation security office, is that correct? There is no
benefit--there is no cheaper process through the SPP. You don't
see any great savings through the SPP versus the transportation
security.
Mr. Halinski. Ma'am, we have tried to abide by what the GAO
has told us. No, ma'am, we don't. We see no difference in the
cost, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you.
I thank the Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the gentlelady.
Since Mr. Payne showed up we are just going to continue
with the line of questioning.
Mr. Hudson, do you have a question?
Mr. Hudson. I do.
Mr. Duncan. Okay. The Chairman will recognize Mr. Hudson
for a line of questioning.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize, I wasn't
prepared for the next round, but I appreciate this opportunity.
I guess my question, Mr. Halinski, is: How is customer
satisfaction measured by TSA, and the customer being the flying
public? Do you have any metrics by which you are measuring
this?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I guess the best metric I am going to
use is the one that was done by the Gallup Poll last year, and
it is on-line, anybody that wants to look at it, where over 60
percent of those polled, the traveling public, say that they
were--at least felt that TSA was satisfactory to good in their
operations. I think that is probably the best metric we can do
for the traveling public.
We have customer service reps now at the airport. We are
making an effort in our training. We are making an effort in
our engagement with our workforce to ensure that they do good
public relations.
We are going to have the one-off, sir. I am going to be
straight up with you. I am going to have somebody that is going
to do something stupid, and it is going to get in the press and
it will probably make 20 rounds in the press. But for every one
of those stories, sir, I will tell you, there is probably 10
more great stories about what our people do.
Mr. Hudson. I appreciate that. I guess the question is:
Should there be some formal process where you set up metrics
where you can judge the customer satisfaction? I believe what
you are telling me, that there are a lot of good actors there,
a lot of people who are dedicated to the job, committed to
their mission. But if there is a way to measure this, it may
bear out and be a good tool to show the American people that a
lot of folks who travel do have a good experience. It might be
useful to measure that. It might be helpful to sort-of identify
where the problems are in the public perception. That is just
something you may want to think about.
Mr. Halinski. We will work on that, sir.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Duncan. The Chairman thanks the gentleman from North
Carolina and the Chairman of the Transportation Security
Subcommittee for being part of this today.
The Chairman will now recognize the gentleman from New
Jersey, Mr. Payne, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, and I
apologize for my getting here a bit late, but I felt it was
important that I did show up and get the questions I have on
the record.
This is, you know, basically for all the witnesses. You
know, I have met with TSOs and the managers at Newark Liberty
Airport. I found them to be really dedicated to their job and
service, and they strive to keep our aviation system secure on
a daily basis. They tell me, too, that there are many instances
where TSOs are disciplined for doing the very thing that they
were trained to do. So do you believe that the training of the
TSOs has kept up with the disciplinary actions and procedures?
Mr. Halinski.
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I believe that we have been consistent
in that. In specific cases, I am not sure, sir, if there were
specifics I could answer that. But I believe that we do have a
consistent policy. I believe that we have consistent training.
One thing I would say is, we do shift some of our
procedures on a regular basis, and that is based on threat. We
are an organization that bases our operations on threat. What
was the standard procedure last year may not be a standard
procedure this year. If somebody is following a procedure
because they weren't up on the newest procedure, it is based on
threat, but they may be held accountable for that, sir. That
may be an inconsistency, sir.
Mr. Payne. Right. But if they haven't been trained for it,
how can they be held accountable for it?
Mr. Halinski. Well, everybody, if we make a change in the
policy, sir, or a change in the standard operating procedure,
everybody is retrained on it. But I am going to go back to
human nature, sir. Everybody is not on their game 100 percent
of the time, unfortunately. In those cases we will take
appropriate action for that, and that is what this whole
hearing has been about, and we are committed to doing that. Our
people generally don't do that, sir. I mean, there are a lot of
numbers that were thrown around out here today, but by and
large we do a good job every single day, sir.
Mr. Payne. Okay.
Mr. Lord.
Mr. Lord. That is a difficult question to answer lacking
specifics, but I do know that TSA has invested a substantial
amount of money and resources and time in training staff. I
think it is important to note the SOPs do change. For example,
the enhanced pat-down, when that went into effect, I think not
only were TSA employees, but the traveling public, you know,
they had to make a--they had to adjust to that as well. So I
think that is important to note, the procedures change. People
have to be trained in that. Sometimes there is a lag between
when they master that and how they actually apply it in
practice. So to me it is not surprising that some staff may
object to that occasionally.
Mr. Payne. Okay.
Ma'am.
Ms. Outten-Mills. The OIG, we did conduct one review of the
Honolulu airport in 2012, where we were coming up with reasons
why certain screeners may have not been screening as they
should have. One of the reasons that that could possibly have
been was because of the changing SOPs, and perhaps TSOs weren't
aware, fully aware of what that policy entailed. We did make a
recommendation to TSA to ensure that staff were aware of SOPs
that changed based on the rate of flights coming in, and they
have worked to do that.
Mr. Payne. Okay. Let's see. In your opinion, do you believe
that the standard disciplinary actions or additional training,
or some combination thereof, is the most effective way in
disciplining TSOs? You know, I guess in terms of the
procedures, you have to be up on them because this is
important. But if you find someone that might have made a
mistake or been lacking in one of those areas, don't you feel
that prior to disciplining them that maybe making sure that
they understand what their obligation is, is the best way to
go?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I would say that when we train our
workforce, one of the ideas is communication, constant
communication with the workforce if there are changes. If there
is a failure with one of our TSOs in some area like that we try
to take remedial action. One of the differences now with our
table of offenses and penalties is, we have enough leeway that,
based on what the penalty is, that it can be from a low end to
a high end depending on what the mitigating circumstances is
for there, for that particular offense. Consistent training,
consistent messaging is what will get them to where they need
to be.
We try to be consistent in the way any kind of misconduct
is handled. That is why we created an appeals board for our
TSOs with our Office of Professional Responsibility, and they
have an automatic 7-day period to write an appeal for anything
that is handed down if they feel that the punishment did not
meet what they thought that they did. There is an appeal
process. In some cases, about 15 percent, we find that actually
it has been lowered because, with the circumstances and the
appeals, it has worked to their benefit in that case because we
didn't have all the facts.
I am going to go back to what I said earlier, sir. By and
large, if we absolutely catch somebody doing something they
shouldn't be doing, we take very strong action. But the
presumption is people are innocent until they are proven
guilty, and we have to go with that, sir, because that is the
way we do business.
Mr. Payne. Okay. Thank you. I see my time is up. There was
another question, but I will submit it to the committee, in
terms of the difference between the private contractors and how
our TSOs are disciplined, and the oversight that we have over
the private contractors. I think there is a discrepancy in the
manner in which the two entities operate, but I will submit
that to the committee. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the gentleman from New Jersey for his
questioning and for submitting written questions. We ask the
witnesses will respond to those written questions in a timely
manner.
First off, in wrapping up the hearing today, I want to
thank Mr. Lord and the GAO for your report and for your
continued work in investigating not only TSA, but all of the
agencies that GAO works with Congress the oversight capacity
on.
I also want to thank the gentlelady, Ms. Outten-Mills, for
your involvement in the Inspector General's office, because you
are having to deal with and investigate some of the things that
go on. So I certainly appreciate your service to our country.
Mr. Halinski, in no way did the line of questioning today
question your service to our country, and I understand the
challenges that you face in trying to keep our air travel
secure. America is counting on you. America is counting on TSA
to stop any sort of 9/11-type attack and make sure that this
country and the homeland is secure. So I appreciate what you
do, and I appreciate the service.
In our oversight capacity, we have oversight over DHS and
TSA. We expect that TSA and DHS will have oversight over the
private contractors as well. I am interested to find out more
about that oversight relationship.
I don't know that we have the oversight ability to bring
the private contractors in and question them the way we have
questioned you today. But somebody needs to as well, because
America is counting on them as well if they are acting in that
capacity as security screeners. So this is a multi-faceted and
multi-layered approach to keeping the country safe. I fully
understand that.
I want to make sure that, and I think America expects, that
if someone has violated either the civil liberties, or slept on
the job, didn't show up for work, delayed their air travel
because a checkpoint not being open, or someone has stolen from
the American public, the traveling Americans, that they will be
disciplined. I appreciate your responses to those questions
today.
So I want to thank the witnesses for your valuable
testimony and the Members for their questions. I thought we had
very good participation today, even from some Members not on
the committee. The Members of the committee do have additional
questions, as you have heard, from both Ms. Jackson Lee, from
Mr. Mica, and from Mr. Payne, and we ask you respond to those
in writing in a timely fashion.
So without objection, the subcommittees will stand
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]