[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
AL-QAEDA'S EXPANSION IN EGYPT: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM
AND INTELLIGENCE
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 11, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-52
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Tulsi Gabbard, Hawaii
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Steven A. Horsford, Nevada
Steve Daines, Montana Eric Swalwell, California
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Mark Sanford, South Carolina
Vacancy
Vacancy, Staff Director
Michael Geffroy, Deputy Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Brian Higgins, New York
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania, Vice Loretta Sanchez, California
Chair William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Vacancy (ex officio)
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex
officio)
Mandy Bowers, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dennis Terry, Subcommittee Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence.............................. 1
The Honorable Brian Higgins, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
Witnesses
Mr. Steven A. Cook, Senior Fellow, Middle Eastern Studies,
Council on Foreign Relations:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Mr. Thomas Joscelyn, Senior Fellow, Foundation for the Defense of
Democracies:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Mr. Mohamed Elmenshawy, Resident Scholar at the Middle Eastern
Institute:
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Prepared Statement............................................. 23
AL-QAEDA'S EXPANSION IN EGYPT: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY
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Tuesday, February 11, 2014
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:15 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Representative Peter T.
King [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives King and Higgins.
Also Present: Representative Jackson Lee.
Mr. King. Good afternoon. The Committee on Homeland
Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
will come to order.
Ranking Member Higgins will be here in a few moments. He
has very kindly consented to allow us to start the hearing
before he gets here, but he will be here just in a matter of
moments.
The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony
examining al-Qaeda's expansion in Egypt and the implications
for U.S. homeland security, and I will now recognize myself for
an opening statement.
Let me say at the outset, I really appreciate the witnesses
coming in. I certainly regret the mix--the changes in the
schedule today. Combination of the weather and trying to get
enough people to vote on some key legislation involved the
schedule for the day being changed around and, as usual,
somebody else ends up being the victims.
You guys were the collateral damage, unintended victims
here, but I appreciate your patience. Certainly--from going
through your opening statements, I certainly appreciate the
thoughtfulness you have given to this issue.
I will cut back on part of my opening statement other than
to say that there is--there has been much speculation and
thought that al-Qaeda somehow has been disseminated.
Many of us believe that, actually, the core al-Qaeda has
been severely damaged. There are new franchises, there are
affiliates, there are stand-alone organizations who share the
same philosophy as al-Qaeda, and that really is the new threat
that we face today.
We have seen that, obviously, in Yemen with al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula. We have seen it in Iraq with al-Qaeda in
Iraq. We have seen it with Boko Haram. We have seen it, to some
extent, with al-Shabaab, who carried out the vicious attack in
Kenya recently.
Even though we have had many counterterrorism successes in
Afghanistan, diminishing the foothold and control of al-Qaeda
there, even there, senior leaders are still present and waiting
for the U.S. withdrawal of forces this year.
Of course, in our own country, we have many self-starters,
we have self-radicalized and those who have been radicalized
over the internet. But today's hearing is focused on the
dangerous surge of terrorist activity in Egypt.
There has been significant reporting over the last few
years about jihadist networks taking hold in the eastern Sinai
Peninsula. These groups have launched attacks against the
Egyptian military, against Israel, civilian shipping in the
Suez Canal and other targets.
As is often the case with such safe havens, there are many
gaps in our understanding of these groups. Their size, their
relationship to one another, and their operational capability
are not clear.
However, in the last month alone, terrorists have
assassinated a senior Egyptian official, bombed the Cairo
police headquarters, shot down a military helicopter, and fired
rockets into Israel.
The speed with which these groups have gathered strength
and conducted sophisticated operations not only in the Sinai,
but in central Cairo, is noteworthy.
The apparent sophistication of these groups and indications
that they are linked to al-Qaeda raise serious counterterrorism
issues and emerging homeland security concerns. Egypt's role in
the formation and history of al-Qaeda has made it a target for
many years.
The Egyptian Ayman Zawahiri has led al-Qaeda since the
death of bin Laden, and the ideology that inspired al-Qaeda was
developed in Egypt by Zawahiri, who I said is an Egyptian.
His brother Muhammed was arrested outside of Cairo in
August 2013 with speculation that he was working with jihadist
networks in the Sinai.
Just last year, the Egyptian Muhammad Jamal Network was
designated a foreign terrorist organization by the Department
of State for its ties to al-Qaeda and for using the AQAP
network to smuggle fighters into training camps.
However, what is perhaps most important is that these
groups give strong indications of being allied and aligned with
al-Qaeda's global jihad.
In his recent open testimony before the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, when asked whether al-Qaeda
affiliates in Syria presented a threat outside of Syria, the
director of the CIA acknowledged ``Any group that has its
origins in al-Qaeda or are still associated with al-Qaeda
presents a threat.''
If this is true, working with the Egyptian Government to
effectively fight jihadist networks in the Sinai should be a
primary objective in our relationship with Cairo.
Unfortunately, the administration's decision to cut
military aid in September has only hampered this effort and, I
believe, displays a dangerous indifference to our shared
interests with Egypt, which is defeating jihadist networks
operating in the Sinai and throughout the country.
These groups threaten innocent Egyptians, American
interests, and our ally Israel. Given what we have witnessed
with the growth of AQAP, which prior to 2009, the United States
did not consider posing a threat to the U.S. homeland, we have
to monitor al-Qaeda elements in the Sinai for emerging threats
to the homeland.
Furthermore, the instability caused by the Egyptian
revolution has provided a period of time in which large groups
of people moved into, out of, and around the country with less
stringent oversight. Even so, removing a person's weapons and
other illicit goods across Egypt's border with Libya and Sudan
continues unabated.
For these and for other reasons, the potential exists that
al-Qaeda-linked extremists could take advantage of a permissive
operating environment to plan attacks against the United
States.
This has heightened the need for the United States to work
with the Egyptian and Israeli Governments on defeating and
disrupting jihadist networks. Perhaps more than ever before,
ensuring that Egypt can fight al-Qaeda is in the best interest
of the United States.
As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and
Intelligence of this Homeland Security Committee, I feel it is
necessary to begin a discussion on this emerging threat.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and who
these groups are, what they are capable of, and how to work
with our partners to defeat them.
Now, with perfect timing, I am pleased to recognize for an
opening statement the Ranking Member of the committee, Mr.
Higgins of New York.
Mr. Higgins. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will
suspend with my opening statement and submit it for the record.
I know these gentleman have been waiting. So why don't we dive
right into it.
[The statement of Mr. Higgins follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Brian Higgins
February 11, 2014
The United States relationship with Egypt is fractured and as we
wait and see where Egypt's current political state leads the country,
we must be mindful of our past relationship with Egypt while keeping an
eye on any emerging threats from the region.
The United States has provided significant military and economic
assistance to Egypt since the late 1970s. Between 1948 and 2011 the
United States has given Egypt about $71.6 billion in bilateral military
and economic aid.
Last month, this Congress voted to restore $1.5 billion in aid to
Egypt. Aside from Israel, that is more money than the United States has
given to any country. The United States has invested in Egypt to
attempt to maintain regional stability.
In 2011, the Egyptian uprising caused the world to stop and watch
as Egyptians revolted and caused the 30-year regime of Hosni Mubarak to
end. In June 2012, there was hope for Egypt as it held a democratic
election and elected Mohammed Morsi.
However, during his presidency, Morsi brought the nation to the
brink of collapse and was not a legitimate ruler in the eyes of the
majority of Egyptians. In July 2013, the Egyptian military removed its
democratically-elected President Morsi and replaced him with its own
regime.
Throughout the past months, there have been a series of deadly
attacks in the region. Including a coordinated attack in Cairo last
month. Additionally, freedom of the press remains stifled. Journalists
have been detained.
The Egyptian economy is extremely unstable and the people do not
feel safe in their own communities. One group that has emerged as one
of Egypt's biggest threats is al-Qaeda-inspired Ansar Beyt al Maqdis
(ABM).
ABM first emerged in 2011, amid a security vacuum caused by the
fall of former President Hosani Mubrak. The group is based in the Sinai
desert, next to the Israeli border. The group's operations expanded
drastically after Mori was overthrown in July.
Egypt is a country in turmoil and our relationship with the country
demands that there be some significant oversight given to the aid that
we are providing.
This subcommittee also has the responsibility to examine what
impact if any that ABM or any other terrorist organization operating in
the Egypt has on the United States.
It is imperative that we examine these threats and their relevance,
if any, to the United States interests in Egypt. It is also imperative
that we hear from both the Government and private sector in open forum
about Egypt and al-Qaeda's presence in that region and I hope future
hearings will have Government witnesses.
Mr. King. Thank you, Ranking Member. As I said, he is
really a courteous, cooperative guy, before you got here.
Other Members of the committee, if they are not here today,
are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
February 11, 2014
For the past 3 years, the world has watched and witnessed change in
Egypt. Since the Egyptian uprising, the country has been overcome with
protest, unrest, and rapid political change. On February 10, 2011,
after 18 days of fierce protests, former Egyptian president Hosni
Murbak stepped down, ending a 30-year regime. In June 2012, Egypt had
an historic election. The people elected Mohammed Morsi by a majority
vote. In July 2013, the Egyptian military ousted Morsi.
In the months following the ousting of former President Morsi, the
Obama administration suspended aid to Egypt while the State Department
reviewed the military takeover and the new government's commitment to
democracy during the transition. In addition to the United States
cutting off funding to the government, there have been sophisticated
attacks in Egypt. For example, in January 2014, coordinated attacks in
Cairo killed 6 and injured 100.
According to the Egyptian government, Egyptian forces have arrested
over a thousand terrorists since its transition from the Morsi regime.
Violent attacks in a country that has been in turmoil and that has
several extremist groups that call Egypt home should be of concern.
What is also of concern is the recent crackdown by the Egyptian
government on journalists and academics who have not been able to
freely do their jobs in Egypt. The White House has asked the Egyptian
government to drop the charges of the journalists and academics that
are being held.
Last month, this Congress restored $1.5 billion in annual aid to
Egypt. As an oversight body, this subcommittee is right in being
concerned about the turmoil in Egypt and whether the fallout from this
turmoil creates any direct threats to the United States or its
interests abroad.
It is also a Constitutional mandate for this Congress to ask
questions about the United States military and diplomatic actions in
Egypt. However, this subcommittee's hearing strategy is ineffective.
Like many of the hearings this committee and subcommittee have held
this Congress, no one from the intelligence community has been invited
to inform the Members about the threat and if there is imminent risk to
the United States.
Nor is there anyone from the State Department here to testify and
let the subcommittee know if the Egyptian government has successfully
fulfilled the Congressional requirements to for the country to receive
aid from the United States. While I look forward to the witness
testimony today, I believe we are doing ourselves a disservice by not
speaking with the appropriate administration officials in an open
forum.
Mr. King. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of
witnesses before us today on this important topic. Again, in
the interest of time, I will limit my introduction of you,
other--let me just emphasize and add how the Ranking Member and
I are so privileged to have you--all of you here today and
thank you for your contributions over the years.
We will begin with Dr. Steven Cook, who is a senior fellow
for Middle Eastern studies of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Dr. Cook.
STATEMENT OF STEVEN A. COOK, SENIOR FELLOW, MIDDLE EASTERN
STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Mr. Cook. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
the invitation to appear before you today to discuss the
situation in Egypt.
For today's hearings, I will address what is happening in
Egypt--oh, I am sorry. Rarely do I need a microphone. I am a
New Yorker like you, sir--what is likely to happen in Egypt,
the situation in the Sinai Peninsula, the potential effect on
American interests, and what the United States can do about it.
A little more than 3 years ago today, I returned home after
witnessing first-hand the exhilaration and hope of protesters
in Tahrir Square.
Unfortunately, over the course of the last 36 months,
Egypt's political development has not lived up to those
aspirations. On the third anniversary of Hosni Mubarak's
ignominious fall, political disappointment, enormous economic
challenges, and an insurgency are Egypt's present and future
reality.
The intention of those currently in power is to reengineer
a political system in a way that makes it impossible for
January 25, 2011, to happen again. The reconstituted political
order is likely to be more brutal and more adept than its
predecessors. Still, Egypt's leaders face obstacles to
achieving those goals.
If there is one thing--one revolutionary thing that has
happened in Egypt over the last 3 years, it is an emergence of
large groups of people who are determined to continue to make
demands on the Government through street politics and protests.
Second, based on experiences of the last 3 years, Egyptian
politics can change very, very quickly. The political consensus
around now Field Marshal Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi may be more
apparent than real. That means that Egyptian politics are
likely to be more contested going forward.
The authorities' only answers to this political ferment are
authoritarian tools, notably, coercion and violence. This
brings me to the situation in the Sinai Peninsula. The security
problems there have become deeply, deeply worrisome.
It is important to note that it is the scale of violence
that is new, not the problem of terrorism nor its cause. Egypt
is, in many ways, a crucible of transnational jihad, as you
noted in your opening remarks, and has produced a long list of
notorious terrorists.
For at least a decade before the January 25 uprising,
Israeli and American officials raised concerns to their
Egyptian counterparts over the drug trade, the flow of weapons,
human trafficking, and the presence of various extremist groups
in the Sinai.
There is no evidence that President Mubarak took American
Israeli concerns seriously. Even if he had, there are important
political and structural impediments that would have prevented
him from taking any--any effective action.
After the January 25 uprising, the Ministry of Interior was
badly battered and the Ministry of Defense was consumed with
running the country. This almost immediately resulted in the
deterioration of security in Northern Sinai.
Attacks on police stations, bombings of the Trans-Arab and
El Arish-Ashkelon pipelines, kidnapping of security personnel,
efforts to infiltrate Israel, and brazen attacks on state
facilities in the region's capital became frequent. This is a
conflict that the Egyptian military is not well-equipped to
fight.
Over the last 3 decades, with American help, Egypt's senior
command had focused on developing a heavily-mechanized force
complemented with air power. In addition, the officers have
been resistant to American advice on how best to prepare for
21st Century threats.
Since the July 3, 2013, coup d'etat, there have been many,
hundreds, of terrorist attacks in the Sinai and a series of
attacks in major population centers in the Nile Valley,
including Ismailiyya, Mansoura, the Sharqiya governate, and
Cairo.
Ansar Bayt Al Maqdis is the primary al-Qaeda-affiliated
group that has taken responsibility for those attacks, but
other groups, including previously unknown--Ajnad Misr,
Soldiers of Egypt, Jund al Islam, Soldiers of Islam--have also
targeted the Egyptian state. Most ominously, in late July and
again in early September, an extremist organization called al-
Furqan fired on ships in the Suez Canal.
The Sinai is not yet an area of foreign jihadi activity.
Like the low-level insurgency of the 1990s, however, the
evidence suggests that violence in the Sinai is largely an
Egyptian affair.
It may yet attract foreign jihadists, but thus far, the
Sinai has enticed Egyptian nationals who have been fighting in
Syria and Iraq to return home in order to wage war against what
they believe to be an illegitimate government. Ayman Zawahiri,
Egyptian leader of al-Qaeda, has offered his support to Ansar
Bayt Al Maqdis and has encouraged Egyptians to take up arms
against the state.
The best thing that the United States can do at this time
is not cut aid from Egypt, but to support the Egyptians in this
fight against al-Qaeda. The suspension of aid has not made
Egypt more democratic and has not made Egypt less unstable.
The United States has a role to play in standing shoulder-
to-shoulder with the Egyptians in this fight against terrorism
going forward. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cook follows:]
Prepared Statement of Steven A. Cook
February 14, 2014
Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee: Thank you for this
invitation to appear before you to discuss the situation in Egypt and
how it affects U.S. National interests. For today's hearing, I will
address broadly what is happening in Egypt, what is likely to happen in
that country, the situation in the Sinai Peninsula, its potential to
affect American National security interests, and what the United States
can do to help the Egyptians meet the challenges they confront.
A little more than 3 years ago today, I returned home after
witnessing first-hand the exhilaration and hope of protesters in Tahrir
Square. Contrary to much of the commentary about that moment, economic
grievances were not the primary factor that brought Egyptians into the
streets. Rather, the crowd of tens of thousands that grew to hundreds
of thousands 2 weeks later was demanding freedom, justice, dignity, and
national empowerment.
Unfortunately, over the course of the last 36 months, Egypt's
political development has not lived up to the aspirations of those
heady 18 days in Tahrir Square. Instead, what we are seeing in Egypt is
the reconstitution of a version of the old political order. The
intention of those currently in power is to re-engineer the political
system in a way that makes it harder for events like the January 25
uprising to happen again. This reconstituted order is likely to be both
more brutal and more adept than its predecessor. Yet Egypt's leaders
face significant obstacles to achieving their goal of stabilizing the
political arena. The events of January-February 2011 do not constitute
a revolution, but if there has been one revolutionary development in
Egypt over the last 3 years, it is the emergence of large groups of
people who are determined to continue making demands on the government
through street politics and protest. Much attention has been paid to
the Muslim Brotherhood in this regard, but opposition to the new order
exists among the non-Muslim Brotherhood, non-religious end of the
political spectrum. It is important to point out that although the
January referendum on the new constitution earned overwhelming support,
only 38.6 percent of eligible voters participated.
In addition, based on the experiences of the last 3 years, Egyptian
politics can change very quickly. The Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and
Justice Party won a plurality of votes in the parliamentary elections
in 2011-2012, but now many of its members are in jail or on the run.
Egyptians applauded when Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, the former head
of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, ceded power to Mohammed
Morsi after the June 2012 presidential elections, but a year later
millions mobilized against Morsi, culminating in the coup d'etat of
July 3, 2013. The political consensus since the military's intervention
and the wide-spread popularity of Field Marshal Abdel Fattah al Sisi
may be more apparent than real. This means that Egyptian politics will
continue to be contested. The authorities' only answers to this
political ferment are authoritarian tools--notably, coercion and
violence. On the third anniversary of Hosni Mubarak's ignominious fall,
political disappointment, enormous economic challenges, and an
insurgency are Egypt's present and future reality.
This brings me to the situation in the Sinai Peninsula. The
security problems there have become deeply worrisome. It is important
to note that it is the scale of violence that is new, not the problem
of terrorism nor its cause. Egypt is in many ways a crucible of
transnational jihad and has produced a long list of notorious
terrorists. For at least a decade before the January 2011 uprising,
Israeli and American officials raised concerns to their Egyptian
counterparts over the drug trade, the flow of weapons, human
trafficking, and the presence of various extremist groups in the Sinai.
There is no evidence that then-president Mubarak took American and
Israeli disquiet seriously, but even if he had, there were important
political and structural impediments that would have prevented him from
taking any effective action.
First, the leadership in Cairo was not inclined politically to
address to grievances of the population of northern Sinai, whether they
be related to the lack of economic opportunity and development or to
the poor treatment of the population at the hands of the Ministry of
Interior. Although the Sinai is critical to a set of national myths
related to past conflicts with Israel and national redemption, the area
has not been incorporated into the political and economic life of the
country. Given this neglect and the cultural differences between the
largely Bedouin population of the Sinai and other parts of the country,
residents of the Sinai do not feel Egyptian. To be fair, this situation
is not necessarily unique to the Sinai. The same can be said of
residents who live in the Nile Valley who also feel disconnected from
the far-flung capital and its leaders who care little about
developments outside the major population centers.
Second, Egyptian-Israeli security coordination was not as robust in
the late 1990s and 2000s as it is now. During the mid-2000s, for
example, there was considerable mistrust between the two security
establishments in addition to thinly-veiled Egyptian anger over the
efforts of Israel and its U.S.-based supporters to draw attention to
Cairo's lackluster approach to the problem of underground smuggling
from the Egyptian frontier to the Gaza Strip.
Third, and most importantly, the primary state organizations that
were (and remain) responsible for the Sinai--the Ministry of Defense,
the Ministry of Interior, and the General Intelligence Service (GIS)--
have maintained different views on how to deal with problems there,
have distinct missions, and are in competition with each other. Due to
restrictions built into the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, the armed forces
were only permitted in certain locations in the Sinai and only with
certain pre-determined types of weapons. As a result, stability in the
Sinai was largely left to the Ministry of Interior, which, as alluded
to above, pursued its police functions with zeal and little regard for
due process or human rights. For its part, the GIS was less interested
in the quiescence of the population than it was in running intelligence
operations in the Sinai. The inevitable result was the development of
an environment conducive to crime, extremism, and violence.
After the uprising, the Ministry of Interior was badly battered and
the Ministry of Defense was consumed with running the country. This
almost immediately resulted in the deterioration of the security
situation in northern Sinai. Attacks on police stations, bombings of
the Trans-Arab and the al Arish-Ashkelon pipelines, kidnapping of
security personnel, efforts to infiltrate Israel, and brazen attacks on
state facilities in the region's capital al Arish all became frequent.
Military operations during the summer of 2011 and 2012 did little to
arrest this instability and violence. It is not accurate to suggest, as
many in the media have, that the Sinai Peninsula is ``lawless.'' There
are informal legal institutions in the Sinai: Sharia courts are now
taking the place of the tribal `Urf court system, which the government
under Mubarak was widely believed to have infiltrated. The spread of
Sharia courts has become a way to propagate and institutionalize
extremist ideologies and worldviews.
As the Egyptians celebrate today the third anniversary of Hosni
Mubarak's fall, the insurgency that they are now confronting in the
Sinai Peninsula is only one of many challenges, but perhaps the most
serious one, that they face in the struggle to build a new and more
just society. This is a conflict that the military is not well-equipped
to fight. Over the last 3 decades, Egypt's senior command have focused
on a heavily-mechanized force complemented by air power. The officers
have also been resistant to American advice about how best to prepare
for 21st Century threats. Since the July 3, 2013 coup d'etat, there
have been at least 22 terrorist attacks in the Sinai and a series of
attacks in major population centers in the Nile Valley, including
Ismailiyya, Mansoura, the Sharqiya governorate, and Cairo. A group
called Ansar Bayt at Maqdis (Supporters of Jerusalem) have taken
responsibility for most of the attacks, but other groups including the
previously-unknown Ajnad Misr (Soldiers of Egypt) and Jund al Islam
(Soldiers of Islam) have also targeted the Egyptian state and security
forces. Most ominously, in late July and again in early September, an
extremist organization called al-Furqan Brigade fired on cargo ships in
the Suez Canal with rocket-propelled grenades, though no damage was
reported.
Observers have speculated that the Sinai Peninsula will or already
has become a haven for foreign fighters intent on carrying out jihad.
Like the low-level insurgency of the 1990s, however, the evidence
suggests that the violence in the Sinai Peninsula is largely an
Egyptian affair. The Sinai may yet attract foreign jihadis, but thus
far the Sinai has enticed Egyptians nationals who had been fighting in
Syria and Iraq to return home in order to wage war against what they
believe to be an illegitimate government. Ayman Zawahiri, the Egyptian
leader of al-Qaeda, has offered his support to Ansar Bayt al Maqdis and
has encouraged Egyptians to take up arms against the state. There is
currently a debate in Washington about Zawahiri and the extent of his
control over al-Qaeda and its affiliates, but it seems clear that he
maintain influence among Egyptian jihadists.
Mr. Chairman, this brief overview depicts a profoundly worrying
situation of political uncertainty, economic deterioration, and
extremist violence. This instability poses a threat to American
National security interests including navigation of the Suez Canal,
providing logistical support to U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf,
overflight rights, and the preservation of Egypt-Israel peace. Since
Hosni Mubarak's departure, the analytic community has been debating how
the United States can best help Egypt. There have been many good ideas.
Much of this work has, however, focused on promoting democratic
development in Egypt. This is a laudable goal--one that I share--but
Egypt's current trajectory suggests an unstable and authoritarian
future.
In an environment where the Egyptian leadership and its supporters
have characterized domestic politics as an existential struggle, there
is little that the United States can do to help secure a democratic
outcome. Washington should speak out forcefully and clearly against,
for example, human rights violations, attacks on press freedoms, and
policies that contradict the rule of law, but policymakers must
understand that this is unlikely to have a decisive effect on the
quality of Egyptian politics. Some observers have advocated suspending,
delaying, or outright cutting U.S. military assistance to punish the
military for the July 3 coup and to compel the officers to put Egypt on
a democratic path. It is hard to understand how such a policy would
advance democratic change or help improve Egypt's security situation.
The Obama administration has already withheld important weapons systems
from the Egyptians, including F-16s and Apache helicopters in response
to the military's intervention, but this has not had a salutatory
effect on Egyptian politics. Critics also argue that U.S. support for
the military will further destabilize Egypt, reasoning that the
officers' harsh crackdown is contributing to polarization and violence.
This ``repression-radicalization dynamic'' is real, but whether the
United States provides assistance or not, the military and the Ministry
of Interior seem likely to continue to try to establish political
control through coercion and violence. Withdrawing American support
will not make Egypt less unstable.
Against the backdrop of this difficult debate, the United States
has security interests in Egypt that virtually all observers agree
remain important in the short run. The Egyptians have come to terms
with the fact that they are likely to be battling extremists in the
Sinai Peninsula for the foreseeable future. The Ministry of Defense is
not always amenable to American advice because they fear that the
United States wants to transform the military into a gendarmerie. There
is no basis for this concern, but the Egyptians must break out of their
outdated conception of security and rethink their doctrine to respond
to the very real threats before them. This is where the United States
can be most helpful, but to be successful, American policymakers will
need to reassure Egyptian officers that Washington stands with them in
the fight against terrorism and extremism. Specifically, the
administration and the Congress should give the Egyptian military the
tools and technology it needs to counter extremist violence; release
suspended weapons systems, especially the Apache helicopters; establish
a standing group of American and Egyptian officers to coordinate
assistance coherently; and develop a trilateral American-Egyptian-
Israeli security/intelligence/counter-terrorism mechanism that
facilitates the flow of information among the security establishments
of all three countries.
Mr. Chairman, my comments no doubt give rise to many questions and
concerns and I look forward to discussing them with Members of the
subcommittee. I am grateful to you for inviting me today and for
holding this hearing on the difficult situation in Egypt.
Mr. King. Thank you, Dr. Cook.
I should point out on the issue of--on the case of full
transparency that Dr. Cook is a former constituent and his
mother remains a constituent.
So I hope you report back to your mother and tell her I was
okay.
Mr. Cook. I am hoping she will report back to you that I
was okay, sir. Thank you.
Mr. King. Thank you very much.
Our next witness is Tom Joscelyn, who has actually been a
witness before this committee and subcommittee a number of
times. He is a senior fellow with the Foundation for the
Defense of Democracies and has been a strong fighter in the--
and analyst in the war against terrorism.
Mr. Joscelyn, it is good to have you back again. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS JOSCELYN, SENIOR FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR THE
DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
Mr. Joscelyn. Thank you, Congressman King and Congressman
Higgins, for having me back again to testify before you about
al-Qaeda and Egypt.
Now, real quick, the way I look at the threat in Egypt is
that, after the revolution against Mubarak, what we witnessed
were a number of al-Qaeda actors sort-of return to Egypt or got
established in Egypt. This includes very senior al-Qaeda
members who returned to Egypt or were released from prison.
Some of these al-Qaeda leaders actually returned from Iran,
where they were harbored for years. Some of these leaders were
actually referenced in Osama bin Laden's files as top al-Qaeda
leaders that he wanted to protect and keep alive.
So that, I think, is a very underreported dynamic of what
is going on in Egypt, that there are very senior al-Qaeda
leaders who are, as far as I can tell, at large today.
I will just add this. We saw the threat of some of these
senior al-Qaeda leaders actually on September 11, 2012. If you
go back to the video footage of the assault on the U.S. embassy
in Cairo, four--I have identified at least four very senior al-
Qaeda jihadists who were involved in instigating those protests
and shaping that event into a pro-al-Qaeda event, which led to
the American flag being torn down and the al-Qaeda flag being
raised over our embassy.
The second point that I would like to make is that what is
happening in the Sinai right now is not necessarily confined to
the Sinai, that it is actually part of an international network
that is tied to other al-Qaeda actors both in Libya, Syria, and
elsewhere. So it is not something that is just sort-of confined
into what--in the Sinai Peninsula today.
We saw the threat that is emanating from the Sinai against
U.S. interests already, I would argue, and one of the ways we
saw that is that this group, Muhammad Jamal Network, which
answered to Ayman Zawahiri, actually gauged some of the
fighters to participate in the attack in Benghazi on September
11, 2012. There are--the Muhammad Jamal Network actually has
camps in the Sinai--established camps in the Sinai, established
camps in Eastern Libya and elsewhere.
Another threat that I think is underreported to American
interests actually occurred last year, which is that the U.S.
embassy in Cairo and other Western interests were actually--
there was a plot to attack them by al-Qaeda terrorists,
according to the Interior of Ministry in Egypt.
Again, the last time I testified before you gentlemen, we
talked about al-Qaeda in Iran. What is interesting about this
is that the same network that we talked about the last time I
testified that gave us that plot to blow up a train from New
York City to Canada was tied to this plot and to Egyptian
actors that were targeting the U.S. embassy in Cairo.
So I think it is important to show the interconnectivity of
all this and how the Sinai and these actors are not just sort
of operating in isolation.
The third and final point involves what happens to the
actors in the Sinai and Ansar Jerusalem, the main actor that
has claimed responsibility for a lot of attacks.
Very carefully, if you go through the group's history, if
you go through its operations, if you go through its
statements, if you go through what senior al-Qaeda leaders have
said about the group, it is, I would say, at a minimum, a pro-
al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda-inspired type-of group.
I suspect that it is actually already operating as part of
the al-Qaeda network. Why I say that is because, when you look
at the specific operators involved, you look at the very
granular details, you find all this connectivity to al-Qaeda's
international network.
In September of last year, a suicide bomber, a former major
in the Egyptian Army, blew himself up trying to attack a top
Egyptian official and, when you go through his biography and
the details of what we know about him or what the Egyptians say
about him, I count at least five or six major points of
connectivity to the al-Qaeda international network. This shows
you that this group is actually operating as part of what al-
Qaeda wants, basically, in Egypt.
When you go through Ayman Zawahiri and senior al-Qaeda
leaders' statements about the group, it is pretty eerie to see
that they continually approve of the group's operations, they
continuously single out bombings on pipelines, rocket attacks,
any--what have you, to say that this is basically what they
want and what Muslims should be doing in Egypt, what jihad
should be doing in Egypt, to carry the fight forward.
So when you look at it from that perspective, I think that,
as the story of Ansar Jerusalem has evolved over time, its ties
to al-Qaeda's international network are getting stronger. The
evidence is those ties are getting stronger, not weaker. Okay?
So this isn't necessarily--it could be just an al-Qaeda-
inspired group that was an upstart that is trying to gain the--
basically, support of the al-Qaeda network. I think that it may
be something other than that. I think it may be sort-of a group
that has basically been implanted by al-Qaeda actors to grow
and operate.
On that last point, I will say this, too. Congressman King,
you mentioned al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. As you can see
in my written testimony, I think there is strong evidence that
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is actually operating in the
Sinai, that, in fact, they have ties to terrorists in the
Sinai. I gave you a number of reports in my written testimony
along those lines.
That is obviously important for the reasons you pointed
out, which this is a group that has sort-of carried the banner
of the fight against the United States and has launched
numerous attacks against the United States. This may be
something that they see the Sinai as a crossroads for sort-of
further operations in the future.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Joscelyn follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas Joscelyn
February 11, 2014
Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins, Members of the committee,
thank you for inviting me here today to discuss al-Qaeda's presence in
Egypt. The uprisings throughout the Muslim world that began in late
2010 and early 2011 brought hope to millions of people. Al-Qaeda did
not instigate these revolts, but in the years since the group has
exploited the security vacuums created in their wake.
Al-Qaeda's theory of the revolution in Egypt, and the subsequent
overthrow of Mohamed Morsi's Islamist regime, is predicated on its
deeply anti-American and anti-Semitic worldview. Al-Qaeda's senior
leaders portrayed Mubarak's fall as a defeat for the United States and
its interests in the region. For instance, al-Qaeda head Ayman Zawahiri
portrayed the toppling of dictators in Egypt and Tunisia as comparable
to America's military losses and the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks. America ``was defeated in Tunisia and lost its agent there,''
Zawahiri said in an October 2011 recording, and ``it was defeated in
Egypt and lost its biggest agent there.''\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ SITE Intelligence Group, ``Zawahiri Praises Libyan Rebels,
Eilat Attackers; Urges Algerians to Revolt,'' October 11, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even though al-Qaeda has long disagreed with the Muslim
Brotherhood's approach to politics, sometimes vehemently so, the group
did not call for jihad against Morsi or his government. Instead, most
of post-Mubarak Egypt became a land for proselytization. In ``Egypt and
Tunisia, the opportunities have opened up for preaching [but] only
Allah knows how long they will last,'' Zawahiri said in an August 2011
message. ``Therefore,'' Zawahiri continued, ``the people of Islam and
jihad should benefit from them and take advantage of them to report the
clear truth and make the Ummah come together around the primary issues
that no Muslim can dispute.''\2\ Accordingly, from early 2011 through
the middle of 2013, Zawahiri's henchmen and allied jihadists set up
organizations to spread al-Qaeda's ideology. They preached in Tahrir
Square, appeared on national television, and openly operated in a
country where they had once been hunted and harassed by security
services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ SITE Intelligence Group, ``Zawahiri Rallies for Jihad; Calls
for Intellectual Debate, Advocacy,'' August 15, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In some respects, however, the Sinai was different. The jihadists
saw it as a new front for confronting Israel and a base for their
operations. Various al-Qaeda-linked or inspired groups grew. When
Egyptian security forces conducted counterterrorism raids, they became
viable terrorist targets. Indeed, al-Qaeda's leaders repeatedly
condemned Egypt's military even prior to Morsi's ouster. When Morsi was
deposed in early July 2013, the landscape changed once again. No longer
was the Islamist regime, which al-Qaeda saw as doomed to fail, in
power. Al-Qaeda has consistently portrayed the Egyptian military as a
servant of an imaginary Zionist-Crusader conspiracy, making the
government a legitimate target for jihad.
Egypt continues to pose of a variety of counter-terrorism
challenges and threats to American interests. I address several of
these areas of concern in my testimony today.
Al-Qaeda likely has ``core'' leaders inside Egypt today.--
During and after the 2011 uprisings, senior jihadists allied
with al-Qaeda were freed. Others returned from abroad,
including from Iran, which offered Egyptian jihadist leaders a
form of safe haven for years. Not all of these jihadists
returned to terrorism, but some influential jihadists did. The
September 11, 2012, protest in front of the U.S. Embassy in
Cairo, which turned into an all-out assault, was instigated by
``old school'' jihadists who are part of al-Qaeda's network and
were freed after Mubarak's fall.
After President Mohamed Morsi's regime was overthrown, the military
and security forces re-arrested a number of senior jihadist
figures. However, some likely remain active and may hold
leadership roles in new al-Qaeda-allied terrorist
organizations.
The Muhammad Jamal Network (MJN), which was established in
2011, is an international threat and part of al-Qaeda's
network.--One of the ``old school'' Egyptian Islamic Jihad
(EIJ) jihadists released from prison in 2011 is Muhammad Jamal,
a long-time subordinate to Ayman Zawahiri. Despite Jamal's re-
imprisonment in late 2012, the MJN remains active today in the
Sinai, mainland Egypt and elsewhere. The MJN clearly operates
as part of al-Qaeda's international network and has ties to
terrorists in Europe. Some of its members participated in the
September 11, 2012, terrorist attack in Benghazi, Libya.
Egyptian authorities have alleged that the MJN was connected to
an al-Qaeda plot against Western embassies and other interests
in Cairo in 2013.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Thomas Joscelyn, ``Egyptian interior minister: Al Qaeda cell
plotted suicide attack against Western embassy,'' The Long War Journal,
May 11, 2013. (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/05/
egyptian_interior_mi.php)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is strong evidence indicating that al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which is headquartered in Yemen, is
operating in the Sinai.--This is an important development
because AQAP has repeatedly attempted to attack the U.S.
homeland since 2009 and is increasingly managing al-Qaeda's
assets far from its home base of operations. The head of AQAP,
Nasir al Wuhayshi, is the general manager of al-Qaeda's global
network.
The Sinai Peninsula has become home to multiple al-Qaeda
actors, as well as al-Qaeda-inspired groups.--Osama bin Laden's
former doctor is reportedly a senior al-Qaeda leader in the
Sinai today. Several groups proclaiming their allegiance to al-
Qaeda have emerged in the Sinai since 2011.
Ansar Jerusalem (Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis), the most prolific
Sinai-based jihadist organization, is pursuing al-Qaeda's
agenda.--Al-Qaeda's leader, Ayman Zawahiri, has repeatedly
praised the group's attacks. Ansar Jerusalem shares al-Qaeda's
ideology, employs al-Qaeda's tactics, and routinely refers to
and praises al-Qaeda's leaders in its statements. There is much
we do not know about Ansar Jerusalem's operations, but a
growing body of evidence suggests it is tied to al-Qaeda's
international network.
The Muslim Brotherhood, or at least elements of the
organization, may have already turned to violence.--The
overthrow of Mohamed Morsi's regime was an ``I told you so''
moment for al-Qaeda. The organization's senior ideologues have
long argued that an Islamist regime would not be allowed to
rule Egypt. Brotherhood members are certainly disillusioned
following Morsi's ouster, and al-Qaeda may, therefore, be more
appealing to them. We know that groups such as Ansar Jerusalem
are already poaching from the Brotherhood's ranks. Egyptian
officials have leveled a number of allegations against the
Brotherhood, saying that it is deeply involved in supporting
terrorist activities. These allegations may be false and
designed to further delegitimize the Brotherhood at home and
abroad. However, some of the allegations are specific and can,
therefore, be either verified or rejected. During the
Brotherhood's brief reign, Morsi and others did cooperate with
jihadists in some ways. This entire subject is murky and
requires more analysis.
Finally, it is worth stressing that al-Qaeda views the Sinai
as a base of operations for fighting an imaginary ``Zionist-
Crusader'' conspiracy.--That is, al-Qaeda sees the Sinai as a
launching pad for attacks against both American and Israeli
interests. Today, Israel faces more of a challenge from
jihadists allied with al-Qaeda than ever before. This threat
comes not just from the Sinai, but also from other countries,
including Syria.
Below, I have divided the rest of my written testimony into three
sections. In the first section, I outline how key al-Qaeda leaders
(including ``core'' members) became active in Egypt following the
revolution. Some of them are still active to this day. In the second
section, I give a brief overview of the leading al-Qaeda-linked
organizations in the Sinai. In the third and final section, I look at
Ansar Jerusalem more closely, demonstrating that the organization is
clearly pursuing al-Qaeda's agenda.
post-revolution: al-qaeda leaders become active in egypt
For decades, the main terrorist challenge to the Egyptian
government came from the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and Gamaa
Islamiyya (IG), two groups that were allied with al-Qaeda and
responsible for high-profile attacks on both Egyptian leaders and
civilians. The EIJ was headed by Ayman Zawahiri and merged with Osama
bin Laden's venture prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
While some IG leaders renounced violence from behind bars in Egypt,
others did not and remained loyal to al-Qaeda. Long-time IG spiritual
leader Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, a.k.a. ``the Blind Sheikh,'' remains a
popular figure in jihadist circles 2 decades after his imprisonment in
the United States.
Under Hosni Mubarak's regime, many EIJ and IG leaders were
imprisoned. Some avoided confinement by staying abroad, either in
Afghanistan-Pakistan, Iran, or elsewhere. After Mubarak's fall, dozens
of EIJ and IG leaders were freed from prison. Still others returned to
their home country, where they were suddenly acquitted of long-standing
terrorism charges.
One such key al-Qaeda leader is Mohammad Islambouli, the brother of
Anwar Sadat's assassin. Islambouli lived in Iran for years after 9/11.
While living in Iran, he was a part of an IG contingent that formally
merged with al-Qaeda. In fact, Islambouli's ties to al-Qaeda leadership
go back decades. His importance can be seen in the limited number of
documents released from Osama bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad,
Pakistan. In one document, dated October 20, 2010, bin Laden stresses
the importance of protecting Islambouli, who had apparently evacuated
northern Pakistan (after leaving Iran) for Kunar, Afghanistan. ``He
should be informed of the nature of work and he should be consulted on
things that are being discussed,'' bin Laden writes, in reference to
some on-going projects.\4\ An earlier document, dated March 28, 2007,
is addressed to an individual known as ``Adnan Hafiz Sultan,'' who is
also referred to as the ``maternal uncle.''\5\ The latter phrase
(``maternal uncle'') is al-Qaeda's coded reference for Islambouli.\6\
If this letter is addressed to Islambouli, and it certainly appears
that it is, then its contents show how Islambouli is a part of al-
Qaeda's senior leadership and he has been involved in managing the
group's operations in Iraq and elsewhere.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ SOCOM-2012-0000015. Islambouli is referred to as Muhammad
Shawqi Abu-Ja'far in the document.
\5\ SOCOM-2012-0000011.
\6\ Bill Roggio, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, and Tony Badran,
``Intercepted Letters from al-Qaeda Leaders Shed Light on State of
Network in Iraq,'' The Long War Journal, September 12, 2008. (http://
www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/intercepted-letters-from-al-qaeda-
leaders-shed-light-on-state-of-network-in/).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After returning to Egypt, Islambouli was reportedly freed by an
Egyptian military court in 2012 despite having been convicted of
terrorism charges in absentia decades earlier.\7\ It is not clear where
Islambouli is today, or if he has been re-arrested. But Islambouli's
re-emergence demonstrates how an Egyptian al-Qaeda leader, important
enough for bin Laden to protect, suddenly found his home country to be
hospitable once again. And Islambouli was not the only IG member turned
senior al-Qaeda leader to return from abroad in 2011 and 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ ``Egypt military court releases the brother of Sadat's
assassin,'' Ahram Online, February 27, 2012. (http://
english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/35491/Egypt/Politics-/Egypt-
military-court-releases-the-brother-of-Sadat.aspx).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, a contingent of EIJ leaders loyal to al-Qaeda's leader
became especially active inside Egypt after their release from prison.
They were led by Mohammed Zawahiri, the younger brother of Ayman
Zawahiri. Until he was re-arrested in 2013, Mohammed Zawahiri used the
permissive environment following the fall of Mubarak to proselytize,
often under the banner of ``Ansar al Sharia Egypt.'' This group was
established by one of his former EIJ comrades, Ahmed Ashush. In
interviews, Ashush proclaimed his allegiance to al-Qaeda, saying that
he was ``honored to be an extension of al-Qaeda.''\8\ Although Mohammed
Zawahiri spent much of his trying to win new converts for al-Qaeda's
ideology, he likely returned to terrorist operations and was in contact
with his brother as well.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Thomas Joscelyn, ``Ansar al Sharia Egypt founder `honored to be
an extension of al Qaeda','' The Long War Journal, November 27, 2012.
(http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/11/
ansar_al_sharia_egyp.php) For additional articles concerning Ansar al
Sharia Egypt's ties to al-Qaeda-linked terrorists see: http://
www.longwarjournal.org/tags/Ansar%20al%- 20Sharia%20Egypt/common/.
\9\ For example, see: Siobhan Gorman and Matt Bradley, ``Militant
Link to Libya Attack,'' The Wall Street Journal, October 1, 2012.
(http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10000872396390444549204578020373444418316) Some of Zawahiri's
recruits went on to carry out suicide operations. See: Thomas Joscelyn,
``Follower of Mohammed al Zawahiri dies in attack in Mali,'' The Long
War Journal, May 10, 2013. (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/
2013/05/follower_of_mohammed.php)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mohammed Zawahiri was one of the chief instigators of the September
11, 2012, protest in front of the U.S. Embassy in Cairo. The protest
turned into an all-out assault on the compound, with the stars and
stripes being ripped down and replaced by al-Qaeda'a black banner. The
protest-turned-assault was a pro-al-Qaeda event from the first, with
protesters openly praising Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. I have
identified at least three other senior al-Qaeda-linked jihadists who
helped spark the protest: Tawfiq Al `Afani, `Adel Shehato, and Rifai
Ahmed Taha Musa.\10\ Al `Afani and Shehato are long-time EIJ ideologues
and leaders. Shehato has since been re-arrested and charged with
leading the so-called Nasr City Cell, which had multiple ties to al-
Qaeda.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Thomas Joscelyn, ``Al Qaeda-linked jihadists helped incite 9/
11 Cairo protest,'' The Long War Journal, October 26, 2012. (http://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/10/al_qaeda-linked_jiha.php)
\11\ See: Thomas Joscelyn, ``Egypt arrests pro-al Qaeda jihadist
tied to Benghazi suspect,'' The Long War Journal, November 2, 2012.
(http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/11/
egyptian_islamic_jih.php) and Thomas Joscelyn, ``More al-Qaeda links to
Cairo terror cell reportedly found,'' The Long War Journal, November 9,
2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rifai Ahmed Taha Musa once led the IG and was a close confidante of
the Blind Sheikh. He was very close to Osama bin Laden and Ayman
Zawahiri. He even signed al-Qaeda's 1998 fatwa declaring the formation
of a ``World Islamic Front for Confronting the Jews and
Crusaders.''\12\ The CIA considered Taha Musa to be such an important
terrorist that he was tracked down in Syria, where he was detained and
deported to Egypt in late 2001.\13\
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\12\ Taha Musa would later claim that his name was mistakenly
included on the fatwa.
\13\ For an overview of Taha Musa's al-Qaeda role, see: Thomas
Joscelyn, ``Al Qaeda-Linked Jihadists Incited Cairo Protest,'' The
Weekly Standard, October 26, 2012. (http://www.weeklystandard.com/
blogs/al-qaeda-linked-jihadists-incited-cairo-protest_657859.html)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dozens of other senior al-Qaeda-linked jihadists either returned to
Egypt or were freed from prison following the revolution. This raises
several concerns going forward.
First, these jihadists were able to build up their operations with
only occasional interference from security forces for approximately 2
years. They likely established terrorist cells and played a role in
establishing some of the groups now based in the Sinai.
Second, while some of these leaders have been re-imprisoned, there
are unconfirmed reports that top jihadists such as Mohammed Zawahiri
and Muhammad Jamal continue to communicate with the outside world from
prison. Others remain free.
Third, al-Qaeda's senior leadership is filled with Egyptians
(including Saif al Adel, an al-Qaeda leader still wanted for his role
in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings), who know their home country well
and have thick roots in the jihadist scene there. This gives al-Qaeda's
leaders a clear opportunity to leverage their historical ties with any
jihadists who remain free.
al-qaeda groups in the sinai peninsula
The Sinai has long been plagued by terrorism, among its many other
problems. But since the ouster of Mohamed Morsi there has been a
stunning increase in the violence. As my colleague at the Foundation
for the Defense of Democracies David Barnett has documented, there have
been more than 300 reported attacks in the Sinai from July 3, 2013
through February 6, 2014. This violence has spilled over into the
mainland, as Sinai-based groups are increasingly executing high-profile
attacks in Egypt's densely-populated urban areas.
There are credible reports of contacts between terrorists in the
Sinai and al-Qaeda's senior leadership. In late July 2013, Ayman
Zawahiri joined a ``conference call'' of more 20 al-Qaeda operatives
around the globe that included ``aspiring al-Qaeda affiliates operating
in the Sinai.''\14\ Zawahiri's contact with the Sinai jihadists
reportedly prompted the closing of the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv. Other
U.S. diplomatic facilities around the globe were closed because of the
possibility of an impending terrorist attack. There are unconfirmed
reports of handwritten communications from Zawahiri to terrorists in
the Sinai.\15\ Egyptian security officials have alleged that the
interrogations of terrorist suspects have revealed ties between the
Sinai jihadists and ``groups which operate in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
as well as other countries not just Gaza.''\16\ As I discuss more
below, Muhammad Jamal, who established training camps in the Sinai, was
in direct contact with Zawahiri.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Eli Lake and Josh Rogin, ``Exclusive: U.S. Intercepted Al
Qaeda's `Legion of Doom' Conference Call,'' The Daily Beast, August 7,
2013. (http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/07/al-qaeda-
conference-call-intercepted-by-u-s-officials-sparked-alerts.html) The
``conference call'' actually utilized a sophisticated internet-based
communications system.
\15\ ``Egypt's North Sinai Security Chief: We Are Chasing Ghosts in
the Sinai,'' Al-Dustur Online (Cairo), November 11, 2012.
\16\ Al-Misri al-Yawm, August 1, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several al-Qaeda-inspired and/or al-Qaeda-linked groups operate in
the Sinai today. These include Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (Ansar Jerusalem),
al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula (AQSP) and Ansar al Jihad, the Muhammad
Jamal Network (MJN), the Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of
Jerusalem (MSC), Al Salafiya Al Jihadiya in Sinai (Salafi Jihadist
Movement in the Sinai), and al Tawhid wal Jihad, among others. In
addition, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has established a
presence in the Sinai. Untangling this web of groups is extremely
difficult, if not impossible. There is collusion between at least some
of these groups. And it is possible that some of these organizations
overlap, sharing a common infrastructure while operating under
different names.
In this section, I provide a brief overview of four of these
organizations, before moving on to a longer treatment of Ansar
Jerusalem. These five organizations are the most operationally
relevant.
Al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula (AQSP) and Ansar al Jihad
In late July 2011, masked gunmen attacked a police headquarters in
Arish and a gas pipeline. By some accounts, approximately 100
terrorists were involved in the attack. During the initial arrests, 10
Palestinians were identified as being among the attackers.\17\ Shortly
after the assault, a statement was issued by a group calling itself al-
Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula (AQSP). The statement called for the
creation of an Islamic emirate in the Sinai. AQSP also called on the
Egyptian Army to disregard the Camp David Accords and to end the
``siege'' in Gaza.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Jailan Halawi, ``Egypt: Al-Qaeda in Sinai?,'' Al-Ahram Weekly,
August 4, 2011.
\18\ ``Security operation continues in North Sinai,'' Daily News
Egypt, August 17, 2011.
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The reported emir of AQSP, which has been blamed for a string of
attacks, is Ramzi Mowafi, Osama bin Laden's former physician.\19\
Mowafi is believed to be an explosives expert and to have worked on
chemical weapons for al-Qaeda. Mowafi is another example of the
phenomenon of ``old school'' jihadists returning to the fight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ David Barnett, ``Former bin Laden doctor reportedly heads al
Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula,'' The Long War Journal, July 17, 2013.
(http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/07/
former_bin_laden_doc.php).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another group calling itself Ansar al Jihad in the Sinai Peninsula
is believed to be the military wing of AQSP. Ansar al Jihad announced
its formation in December 2011, saying it vowed to ``fulfill the oath''
of slain al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.\20\ Ansar al Jihad swore
allegiance to al-Qaeda emir Ayman Zawahiri the following month.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Bill Roggio, ``Ansar al Jihad in the Sinai Peninsula announces
formation,'' The Long War Journal, December 22, 2011. (http://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/12/ansar_al_jihad_in_th.php)
\21\ Bill Roggio, ``Ansar al Jihad swears allegiance to al Qaeda's
emir,'' The Long War Journal, January 24, 2012. (http://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/01/ansar_al_jihad_- swear.php)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I find it curious that more attacks have not been claimed by AQSP
and Ansar al Jihad. It is possible that the group is working in concert
with one of the other jihadist organizations in the Sinai.
The Muhammad Jamal Network (MJN)
Muhammad Jamal, who was first trained by al-Qaeda in the late
1980s, was released from prison in 2011 and quickly got back to work.
Jamal, who has long been a subordinate to Ayman Zawahiri, became so
prolific that his operation was eventually designated by both the U.S.
Government and the United Nations.\22\ Those designations make it clear
that that the MJN operates as part of al-Qaeda's international network.
The State Department revealed that Jamal has ``established links with
terrorists in Europe.'' In addition to al-Qaeda's senior leadership,
the MJN has strong ties to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ The State Department's announcement of the designation can be
found here: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/10/215171.htm. The
UN's designation can be found here: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/
2013/sc11154.doc.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jamal was re-arrested in late 2012. Egyptian authorities discovered
on a seized laptop that he had been communicating directly with Ayman
Zawahiri.\23\ Jamal mentions in the letters that he sent an emissary to
meet with Zawahiri after he was blocked from traveling abroad. Jamal
claims to have trained several Yemenis who went on to form AQAP and
says that AQAP has provided financing for his operations. Jamal writes
that he has established training camps in both eastern Libya and the
Sinai.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Thomas Joscelyn, ``Communications with Ayman al Zawahiri
highlighted in `Nasr City cell' case,'' The Long War Journal, February
10, 2013. (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/02/
communications_with.php)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jamal tells Zawahiri that he formed ``groups for us inside Sinai,''
which is an especially interesting revelation given that some jihadist
groups there have openly proclaimed their allegiance to al-Qaeda. He
also describes the Sinai as the ``the next confrontation arena with the
Jews and the Americans.'' In addition to the Sinai, counterterrorism
investigations have revealed that Jamal was a leader of the so-called
``Nasr City cell'' in Cairo and that his network operates elsewhere in
Egypt.
As with al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula (AQSP), I find it curious
that the MJN has not claimed any attacks inside Egypt. Jamal's letters
reveal that he has procured a significant amount of arms at great
expense, including rockets, from Libya and has transported them into
the Sinai. Who is using these arms today? What are Jamal's operatives,
many of whom remain at-large, doing today?
I surmise it is likely that the MJN is cooperating with other
jihadist groups in the Sinai.
Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC)
The MSC operates in both Gaza and the Sinai. The MSC claimed
responsibility for a June 18, 2012, cross-border attack in Israel.\24\
One Israeli civilian was killed during the attack, which targeted
construction workers building a security fence. The group identified an
Egyptian and a Saudi as the lead attackers. The MSC dedicated the raid
to Osama bin Laden and made its adherence to al-Qaeda's ideology
unmistakable.\25\ ``We announce the formation of the Mujahideen Shura
Council in the Environs of Jerusalem, as a base for jihadist work . . .
to be part of the global project that aims to re-establish the
Caliphate,'' the group announced in its video claiming responsibility
for the attack.\26\ ``To the Jews, the enemies of Allah, we say: you
should know, you infidels, that the future is different from the past .
. . The time of negotiations and compromises is over,'' one MSC member
said in the video.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Thomas Joscelyn, ``Al Qaeda-linked group claims responsibility
for attack in Israel,'' The Long War Journal, June 19, 2012. (http://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/06/al_qaeda-linked_grou.php)
\25\ Ibid.
\26\ ``Unknown Islamists Claim Border Attack on Israel,'' NOW
Lebanon (with Agence France Presse), June 19, 2012.
\27\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Months later, the MSC released a martyrdom video praising the lead
Egyptian in the June 2012 attack. The MSC's advertisement for the video
portrayed him as an al-Qaeda martyr, similar to lead 9/11 hijacker
Mohammed Atta and al-Qaeda ideologue Anwar al-Awlaki.\28\ Also featured
in the advertisement was Ahmed Ashush, the long-time ally of the
Zawahiri brothers. In a separate video released on July 27, 2012, the
MSC again claimed responsibility for the attack and said it was ``a
gift to our brothers in al Qaeda and Sheikh Zawahiri,'' as well as
retaliation for the death of Osama bin Laden.\29\ The MSC referred to
Zawahiri as ``our sheikh'' and said it was ``continuing with our pledge
of allegiance on the path of jihad.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Thomas Joscelyn, ``Egyptian involved in cross-border attack on
Israel portrayed as al Qaeda `martyr','' The Long War Journal's Threat
Matrix, February 8, 2013. (http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/
archives/2013/02/egyptian_involved_in_cross-bor.php)
\29\ Bill Roggio, ``Mujahideen Shura Council calls attack in Israel
a `gift' to Zawahiri and al-Qaeda `brothers','' The Long War Journal,
July 30, 2012. (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/07/
egyptian_jihadist_gr.php) A translation of the video was provided by
the SITE Intelligence Group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in the Sinai
Citing ``American officials,'' The New York Times recently reported
that AQAP ``has regular contact with jihadist groups in Lebanon and in
the Sinai Peninsula.''\30\ This is not surprising given that AQAP help
establish Muhammad Jamal's operations in the Sinai and elsewhere.
Numerous published reports point to the presence of a significant
number of Yemeni militants in the Sinai. It is likely that many of them
are working on behalf of AQAP, which has also established a presence in
Libya.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Robert F. Worth and Eric Schmitt, ``Jihadist Groups Gain in
Turmoil Across Middle East,'' The New York Times, December 3, 2013.
(http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/04/world/middleeast/jihadist-groups-
gain-in-turmoil-across-middle-east.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&hp-
&pagewanted=all&)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In August 2012, CNN reported that ten ``Yemeni militants'' had
``infiltrated Egyptian soil two months ago and trained local Jihadi
cells in the Sinai Peninsula.''\31\ CNN cited a ``senior security
official associated with Egypt's North Sinai's border guards'' as the
source for this revelation. This anonymous official said intelligence
reports showed the Yemenis ``were in communication with Jihadist cells
in Al Mukataa, a remote area south of Sheikh Zuweid in Northern
Sinai.'' CNN also cited two Bedouin leaders who were aware of the
Yemeni militants' presence in the Sinai. One of these local Bedouins
said that the Yemenis had been smuggled into the Sinai from Sudan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Mohamed Fadel Fahmy, ``Official: Yemeni militants infiltrated
Egypt before Rafah attack,'' CNN.com, August 17, 2012. http://
www.cnn.com/2012/08/17/world/meast/egypt-yemen-militants/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In early September 2013, the Associated Press reported that the
Sinai ``has seen an influx of foreign fighters the past two months,
including several hundred Yemenis.''\32\ The AP also reported that a
Yemeni suspected of serving Ramzi Mowafi, the aforementioned head of
AQSP, had been arrested. Three months later, in December 2013, a
journalist for Al-Monitor published his account of an interview with a
powerful tribesman in the Sinai who said that Libyans, Palestinians,
and Yemenis were all operating in the Sinai.\33\ ``There are around
1,000 al Qaeda fighters here in the Sinai Peninsula, operating under
the different groups, and a lot of them are foreigners,'' the tribal
leader claimed. (Estimates of the number of fighters vary greatly.) He
also said that several of the major jihadist groups ``coordinate and
sometimes run shared operations'' and they ``are affiliated to al Qaeda
in one way or another.'' In early January 2013, the Daily Beast
reported that ``Western officials believe that foreign jihadis,
possibly from Yemen and Somalia, are among the several hundred
extremists operating'' in the Sinai close to the Israeli border.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ ``Local, foreign Islamic militants turn Egypt's Sinai [into] a
new front for jihad,'' Associated Press, September 3, 2013. (http://
www.foxnews.com/world/2013/09/03/local-foreign-islamic-militants-turn-
egypt-sinai-new-front-for-jihad/)
\33\ Mohannad Sabry, ``Al-Qaeda emerges amid Egypt's turmoil,'' Al-
Monitor, December 4, 2013. (http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/
2013/12/al-qaeda-egypt-sinai-insurgency-growing-influence.html)
\34\ Alastair Beach, ``In the North Sinai, Jihadis Stand Down the
Egyptian Government,'' The Daily Beast, January 6, 2013. (http://
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/01/06/in-the-north-sinai-jihadis-
stand-down-the-egyptian-government.html)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ansar jerusalem (ansar bayt al-maqdis)
Ansar Jerusalem is the most prolific of the Sinai-based jihadist
organizations. In recent months, its operations have become more daring
and sophisticated. And its attacks have stretched into the heart of
mainland Egypt. Noteworthy attacks by the group include: A complex
multi-stage assault in August 2011 that left eight Israelis and several
Egyptians dead, successful and unsuccessful attacks on Egyptian
officials (including car bombings), and the downing of an Egyptian
military helicopter in late January. The attack on the helicopter
involved a shoulder-fired missile, which indicates that the group's
capabilities have greatly increased since its inception.
Little is known about Ansar Jerusalem's inner workings, however. We
do not know, based on open-source information, the extent of Ansar
Jerusalem's connections to al-Qaeda's international network. Little is
known about the identities and biographies of the group's founders or
current leaders. Nor do we know how many members the group has, or how
it is financed.\35\ Ansar Jerusalem's precise ties to other jihadist
groups in Egypt, including the recently-formed Ajnad Misr, are also
murky. (Ansar Jerusalem refers to Ajnad Misr as ``our brothers.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Undoubtedly, U.S. intelligence officials have additional,
Classified information on Ansar Jerusalem.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, counterterrorism analysts cannot know for certain the extent
of the group's operational ties (if any) to al-Qaeda's senior
leadership or al-Qaeda's official branches. This does not mean that
such ties do not exist. In the past, al-Qaeda has groomed organizations
and so-called affiliates without recognizing them, at least at first,
as formal al-Qaeda entities.\36\ It could be the case, therefore, that
Ansar Jerusalem is already acting as a clandestine arm al-Qaeda. We
just do not know for certain one way or the other.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ For instance, Osama bin Laden instructed Shabaab, which became
a formal affiliate of al-Qaeda in 2012, to hide its organizational ties
to al-Qaeda. Jabhat al Nusrah hid its allegiance to Ayman Zawahiri at
first and was branded in such a manner as to disguise its al-Qaeda's
role in its creation. Senior al-Qaeda operatives have been leaders
within organizations that are not officially recognized as al-Qaeda
entities, such as Ahrar al Sham in Syria. And al-Qaeda employs multiple
brands to increase its influence. In Yemen, for example, al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) began using the name Ansar al Sharia.
Other al-Qaeda-linked organizations have also adopted the same name,
including Ansar al Sharia Egypt, which is headed by jihadists loyal to
Ayman Zawahiri.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Late last year, Egyptian officials alleged that a long-time
Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) leader named Ahmed Salama Mabrouk plays a
leading role in Ansar Jerusalem.\37\ If true, then this is a major red
flag. Mabrouk has been a subordinate to Ayman Zawahiri for decades. He
also served al-Qaeda after the EIJ became a part of Osama bin Laden's
joint venture. After his release from prison in Egypt, Mabrouk starred
at Ansar al Sharia Egypt events alongside Mohammed Zawahiri.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ See: http://www.shorouknews.com/news/
view.aspx?cdate=22122013&id=84d10683-9c61-44fc-a97a-08d4b8c3f954.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With those uncertainties in mind, a survey of the available
evidence shows that Ansar Jerusalem is, at a minimum, pursing al-
Qaeda's agenda and al-Qaeda's senior leadership approves of the
organization.
Ayman Zawahiri has repeatedly praised Ansar Jerusalem's operations.
And the group routinely references senior al-Qaeda leaders in its
propaganda videos. This is one reason why the group is commonly
described as ``al-Qaeda-inspired'' in the press. The group has adopted
al-Qaeda's tactics, including suicide bombings. And there are various
other threads of evidence pointing to Ansar Jerusalem's international
ties.
My informed hunch is that Ansar Jerusalem has, at the very least,
coordinated its activities with parts of al-Qaeda's international
network. Below, I summarize some of the evidence connecting Ansar
Jerusalem to the al-Qaeda network.
Propaganda distributed through al-Qaeda's channels
Ansar Jerusalem distributes its propaganda through al-Qaeda's
official on-line channels. In October 2013, the group issued a
statement denying ``any connection to any account on social networking
pages,'' adding that ``the only source of our statements and
productions are the jihadi forums from al Fajr Media Center (Shumukh al
Islam Network and al Fida' Islamic Network).''\38\ Al Fajr is al-
Qaeda's propaganda distribution arm, while the other two sites are al-
Qaeda-accredited. Ansar Jerusalem's messages are often ``stickied'' at
the top of Shumukh, showing that they are considered important by the
administrators on al-Qaeda's top websites.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ SITE Intelligence Group, ``Ansar Jerusalem Claims Bombing at
Military Intelligence HQ in Ismailia,'' October 21, 2013. The group
repeated this statement about his distribution channels on January 24,
2014.
\39\ BBC Monitoring, ``Web monitoring report for 8-10 September
2012,'' September 10, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ansar Jerusalem frequently includes clips of al-Qaeda's top leaders
in its videos. Clips of Osama bin Laden and Abu Yahya al Libi (a top
al-Qaeda operative killed in June 2012) discussing martyrdom were
included in a video honoring a member of the group who had participated
in the August 2011 attacks in Eilat.\40\ Another video, honoring a
suicide bomber who blew himself up inside the South Sinai Security
Directorate on October 7, 2013, included an audio clip of Ayman
Zawahiri.\41\ Still another video featured a clip of deceased al-Qaeda
in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ SITE Intelligence Group, ``Ansar Jerusalem Video Eulogizes
Fighter, Shows Spy Interrogation,'' November 7, 2012.
\41\ SITE Intelligence Group, ``Ansar Jerusalem Releases Video on
Suicide Bombing at South Sinai Security Directorate,'' November 19,
2013. The video also includes a clip of the deceased leader of the
Islamic State of Iraq, Abu Omar al Baghdadi.
\42\ SITE Intelligence Group, ``Ansar Jerusalem Releases Video of
Training, Attacking Egyptian Soldiers,'' December 2, 2013. Also shown
in the video is the spokesman for the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Sham (ISIS).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In January 2014, Ayman Zawahiri directed part of a message ``to our
people in Sinai.'' A clip from an Ansar Jerusalem video, showing a
funeral for some of its members, was included in this section of
Zawahiri's message.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ David Barnett, ``Zawahiri's message `to our people in
Sinai','' The Long War Journal, Threat Matrix blog, January 27, 2014.
(http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2014/01/
zawahiris_message_to_our_peopl.php)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ansar Jerusalem's rocket attacks on Israel, gas pipeline bombings, and
other operations
Ansar Jerusalem has repeatedly launched rockets at Israel and
attacked the Arish-Ashkelon pipeline. In an August 2011 audio message,
Zawahiri praised the gas pipeline attacks, which Ansar Jerusalem has
claimed as its own. ``Not only does the siege of Gaza continue, but
also continues the provision of Israel with Egyptian gas at prices
lower than the market price,'' Zawahiri said in the video. ``Were gas
sold to Israel at a price higher than the market price, it would be a
crime. What can [you] then say about this compound crime?!'' Zawahiri
continued: ``I here commend the heroes who blew up the gas pipeline to
Israel. I ask Allah to reward them for their heroic act, for they have
expressed the anger of the Islamic Ummah against this continuing crime
from the reign of Hosni Mubarak to the rule of the Military Council . .
. ''.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ SITE Intelligence Group, ``Zawahiri Charges America with
Hijacking the Egyptian Revolution,'' August 8, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two months later, in a video released in October 2011, Zawahiri
lauded Ansar Jerusalem's attacks on Eilat, Israel. Ansar Jerusalem
claimed responsibility for the attacks in a statement released on
September 7. The attacks were carried out on August 18 and killed eight
Israelis. ``And just as I congratulated our people in Libya for their
great victory,'' Zawahiri said in his video, ``I congratulate our
mujahideen brothers who carried out the two Eilat operations.''
Zawahiri claimed that one ``of the gains of [Ansar Jerusalem's]
operation was exposing the treason of the ruling military council,
which was quick to send its troops to chase [Ansar Jerusalem's
terrorists] in order to protect Israel's security, and then begging
from Israel to increase the forces in the area so as to pursue Israel's
enemies.''\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ SITE Intelligence Group, ``Zawahiri Praises Libyan Rebels,
Eilat Attackers; Urges Algerians to Revolt,'' October 11, 2011.
Zawahiri further claimed that the United States had ``commissioned''
Egypt's ruling military council. His statement was recorded sometime in
August or September 2011, meaning it could have been recorded either
before or contemporaneous with Ansar Jerusalem's claim of
responsibility for the Eilat attacks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zawahiri has trumpeted Ansar Jerusalem's gas pipeline attacks on
multiple other occasions. In a June 2012 video, Zawahiri heaped praise
on the group, calling Ansar Jerusalem members ``brave lions'' and
saying that they should serve as the ``guiding example'' for Muslims.
``I take this opportunity to salute the brave lions, the mujahideen,
who blew up the gas pipe to Israel for the thirteenth time,'' Zawahiri
said in the video. Al-Qaeda's emir continued: ``May Allah salute you as
lions who do not let justice go in vain, or accept humiliation, and do
not accept for the fortunes of the Muslims to be given to their
enemies. Therefore, go on the path of Jihad and count what you meet in
the Cause of Allah, who does not let the reward of His workers go to
waste. Be the guiding example for every free, honorable person who is
passionate for Islam in the Egypt of Islam and jihad.''\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ SITE Intelligence Group, ``Zawahiri Demands Shariah in Egypt,
Remarks on Razing of Bin Laden House,'' June 17, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In July 2012, Ansar Jerusalem issued a video claiming 13 attacks on
the pipeline. Several clips of Ayman Zawahiri were played throughout
the video. The clips show Zawahiri praising the pipeline bombings on at
least three separate occasions. In one scene, terrorists are shown
planting an explosive device at the pipeline while an audio clip from
Zawahiri is played in the background: ``Just giving gas to Israel is a
crime even if it is for the market price, so imagine that it is below
the market price. Thus, it is a crime by Mubarak that is continued by
the ruling military council.'' As the bomb explodes, Zawahiri
continues: ``The greeting goes to the heroes who blew up the gas
pipeline and who represent the dignity of the Egyptian people. May
Allah bless them, until they see the Islamic Caliphate ruling over the
countries of Islam. I ask Allah to grant them patience and
determination, and to reward them in the best way in this life and the
hereafter.'' Subsequent clips of Zawahiri in Ansar Jerusalem's July
2012 video show the al-Qaeda master praising the gas pipeline attacks
after the ``tenth'' and ``twelfth'' such attacks.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ SITE Intelligence Group, ``Ansar Jerusalem Releases Video of
Bombing Arish-Ashkelon Pipeline,'' July 24, 2012. Like other Ansar
Jerusalem messages, the video was released on al-Qaeda's Shumukh al-
Islam forum.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Used the video ``Innocence of Muslims'' as a pretext for terrorism
Ansar Jerusalem has claimed responsibility for a cross-border raid
that killed an Israeli soldier on September 21, 2012.\48\ Three
jihadists were also killed in the attack, which was dubbed the ``raid
of punishment.'' Ansar Jerusalem claimed the assault was retaliation
for the video ``Innocence of Muslims'' and necessary ``to discipline
those insulting the beloved Prophet.''\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ Bill Roggio, ``Ansar Jerusalem claims attack on Israeli troops
in the Sinai,'' The Long War Journal, September 23, 2012. (http://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/09/ansar_jerusalem_clai.php)
\49\ ``Egypt jihadi groups say behind deadly Israeli border
attack,'' Al-Masry Al-Youm Online, September 23, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As I've reported, multiple known al-Qaeda actors seized upon the
anti-Islam video as a pretext to justify protests and assaults on U.S.
diplomatic facilities beginning on September 11, 2012.\50\ Ansar
Jerusalem's use of the video to justify an attack in Israel is a good
example of how the video was used as a pretext, not a true motivation,
by jihadists allied with al-Qaeda. Ansar Jerusalem blamed Jews for
producing the film, even though there was no Jewish involvement in its
production. And, in reality, Ansar Jerusalem did not need the video
justify its attacks as it struck Israel both before and long after the
video became widely known.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ See: Thomas Joscelyn, ``Al Qaeda Lives,'' The Weekly Standard,
December 24, 2012. (http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/al-qaeda-
lives_666594.html)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On January 11, 2013, Ansar Jerusalem released a video in which it
once again claimed that the attack in Israel was in response to
Innocence of Muslims. The group cited Osama bin Laden as saying, ``If
the freedom of your expression has no limit, then your chests should
bear the freedom of our actions.''\51\ This quote, or a similar one,
was used by jihadists with known al-Qaeda ties to justify the protest-
turned-assault on the U.S. Embassy in Cairo on September 11, 2012.\52\
Indeed, the Ansar Jerusalem video contains footage from that pro-al-
Qaeda event. The video also contains an audio clip of Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, the former leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq who was killed in
2006.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ SITE Intelligence Group, ``Ansar Jerusalem Releases Video on
9/2012 Cross-Border Attack,'' January 14, 2013.
\52\ Thomas Joscelyn, ``CIA Warned of `Jihadist' Threat to Cairo
Embassy,'' The Weekly Standard, May 15, 2013. (http://
www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/cia-warned-jihadist-threat-cairo-
embassy_724570.html)
\53\ SITE Intelligence Group, January 14, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Threatened retaliation for Israel's killing of two top terrorists in
Gaza
On October 15, 2012, Ansar Jerusalem threatened retaliation against
Israel for the killing of two jihadist leaders, Hisham al Saedni
(a.k.a. Abu al Walid al Maqdisi) and Ashraf Sabah (a.k.a. Abu al Bara'a
al Maqdisi). Al Saedni, an Egyptian, was the founder and leader of the
Tawhid and Jihad Group, which is, at a minimum, al-Qaeda-inspired.
Al Saedni reportedly fought with al-Qaeda in Iraq. Although he was
based in Gaza and even detained for a time by Hamas, the Israeli
military accused al Saedni of planning operations from inside the
Sinai. His biography shows, therefore, that al Saedni had been a
transnational terrorist throughout his career and it is possible that
he cooperated with Ansar Jerusalem. There are numerous other accounts
pointing to collusion between Ansar Jerusalem and terrorists based in,
or traveling to, Gaza.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ Just recently, Israeli forces claimed to have killed a
terrorist in the Gaza Strip who had ``cooperated'' with Ansar
Jerusalem. See: Elior Levy, ``IAF strikes Gaza; Israel says member of
Global Jihad wounded,'' ynetnews.com, February 9, 2014. (http://
www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4486138,00.html) Egyptian security
officials have also claimed that Ansar Jerusalem members have escaped
security operations in the Sinai by fleeing to Gaza. See: ``Ansar Bayt
al-Maqdis members escape to Gaza, Marsa Matrouh,'' Al-Masry Al-Youm,
September 12, 2013. (http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/ansar-bayt-
al-maqdis-members-escape-gaza-marsa-matrouh)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is possible that the Tawhid and Jihad Group is more than merely
inspired by al-Qaeda as well. Ayman Zawahiri released a eulogy for al
Saedni, praising him as ``our brother.'' Zawahiri also cited al-Qaeda's
guidelines, which was named as a ``Document for Supporting Islam,'' and
said that al-Qaeda had called on Muslims ``to unite under the word
Tawhid.'' Thus, Zawahiri implicitly connected al Saedni and his group
to al-Qaeda's plans. Indeed, al Saedni was working to unite jihadist
groups in Gaza under one banner. The praise for al Saedni from both al-
Qaeda and Ansar Jerusalem is yet another example of how the two count
the same terrorists among their ``brothers.'' Both al Saedni and Sabah
were reportedly leaders in the Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs
of Jerusalem as well.
Assassination attempt on Egyptian Interior Minister
Ansar Jerusalem has claimed responsibility for the September 5,
2013 assassination attempt on Egyptian Interior Minister Mohammed
Ibrahim. On October 26, 2013, the group released a video dedicated to
the suicide bomber responsible for the operation, a former major in the
Egyptian army named Walid Badr. The video is framed by an audio clip
from Ayman Zawahiri at the beginning and a video clip of Zawahiri at
the end.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ SITE Intelligence Group, ``Ansar Jerusalem Releases Video on
Assassination Attempt on Egyptian Interior Minister,'' October 27,
2013. Also included in the video is a clip of a spokesman from the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS), which was then a branch of
al-Qaeda but has since been disowned by al-Qaeda's senior leadership.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the closing scene Zawahiri says that the conflict in Egypt is
``a struggle between political parties, but a struggle between
Crusaders and Zionists on one side and Islam on the other side.''\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ Liam Stack and Robert Mackey, ``Egyptian Jihadists Cite
Zawahiri in Video Claiming Responsibility for Cairo Attack,'' The New
York Times, The Lede blog, October 29. 2013. (http://
thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/29/egyptian-jihadists-cite-zawahiri-
in-video-claiming-responsibility-for-cairo-attack/
?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Badr's story demonstrates how Ansar Jerusalem is connected to the
al-Qaeda-led global jihadist network. The video by Ansar Jerusalem
celebrating his ``martyrdom'' says he traveled to Afghanistan and
participated ``with his brothers in deterring the Crusader campaign
against the proud land of Khorasan.'' This is a reference to the
America-led campaign in Afghanistan that began in late 2001. Badr
attempted to fight in Iraq as well, but he ``was arrested in Iran,
where he was put in prison for about a year,'' before he returned to
Egypt. At some point, he traveled to Syria to fight Bashar al Assad's
regime, only to return to Egypt once again and become a suicide
bomber.\57\ This sequence of events shows that Badr managed to fight in
three different theaters (Afghanistan, Syria, and Egypt), making him a
global jihadist.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ SITE Intelligence Group, October 27, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are still additional details in Badr's story that connect him
and Ansar Jerusalem to the al-Qaeda network. Egyptian officials alleged
that he was trained by the Muhammad Jamal Network in one of its Libyan
camps.\58\ And, in late October 2013, Egyptian security sources
arrested Nabil al Maghraby, whom they described simply as ``a key al-
Qaeda operative.''\59\ Al Maghraby is one of the old school jihadists
let out of prison in the wake of the Egyptian revolution. He had been
imprisoned for the 1981 assassination of Egyptian president Anwar
Sadat, but was freed by a presidential pardon from Mohamed Morsi in
2012. Egyptian authorities described al Maghraby as ``a close
associate'' of Badr.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ ``Jihadists see Sinai as `next frontier' in war against U.S.,
Israel,'' UPI, October 30, 2013. (http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/
2013/10/30/Jihadists-see-Sinai-as-next-frontier-in-war-against-US-
Israel/UPI-44931383144187/)
\59\ ``Egypt arrests al Qaeda militant previously jailed for Sadat
murder,'' Reuters, October 29, 2013. (http://www.reuters.com/article/
2013/10/29/us-egypt-militants-idUSBRE99S0WP2013- 1029)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thank you again for inviting me to testify today. I look forward to
answering your questions.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Joscelyn.
Our next witness is Mr. Mohamed Elmenshawy, who is a
resident scholar and a director of languages at the regional
study program at the Middle East Institute.
Mr. Elmenshawy, we certainly look forward to your
testimony, and you are recognized. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MOHAMED ELMENSHAWY, RESIDENT SCHOLAR AT THE MIDDLE
EASTERN INSTITUTE
Mr. Elmenshawy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member
of the committee, for inviting me to speak about this important
topic today.
It is rather demoralizing that we are having this
conversation exactly today, February 11. Actually 3 years ago,
exactly as Steven mentioned, millions of Egyptians celebrated
the resignation of former President Hosni Mubarak after 30
years of autocratic rule.
For a moment, some believed that forcing such a strong
regime to surrender to the desire of nonviolent protestors
meant a huge setback for al-Qaeda and other militant groups'
ideologies that advocate violence and use of terrorism as only
tool for change. Yet, the events in Egypt, however, continue to
unfold.
The first-ever democratically-elected president of the
country's history was brought to office later on. Exactly a
year later, on June 30 last year, massive protestors flooded
the streets of Egypt asking for early retirement, and that
triggered--triggered the military to intervene and oust the
President on July 3. This is the context in which we are
examining our topic today.
I would like to address three major indicators that affect
the counterterrorism efforts in Egypt: First, the potential for
political revolution for Egypt's existing political crisis;
second, the increased trend to resort to violence; and the
perception of the United States and its role in these events.
Egypt, as we know now, they have no potential for political
solution--resolution at this moment. We have witnessing huge
polarization in Egyptian social and political forces. It is a
zero-sum game between the two competing bodies of Egypt, the
military and the Muslim Brotherhood. Meanwhile, the security
solution continue to gain upper hand, thus culminating by
designing the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group in
December 25 last year.
Currently, the majority of the Muslim Brotherhood's
leadership are behind bars and awaiting trial and the President
himself is facing serious charges, including espionage. If
convicted, he would face capital punishment.
Some Egyptian independent sources indicate that civilians
killed since the ousting of Morsi reach number 2,421 as well as
174 police officer and 70 from the military, in addition to 11
journalists in this 7 months.
Second important issue I would like to call--to talk about
today is the resort to violence by all political forces in
Egypt. Where the political avenues is closed, there is trend to
use violence by al-Qaeda militant group and other people
especially they use recently.
It is very important to distinguish between the two
emerging form of militants in Egypt. One is the terrorist fight
operating in Sinai, especially the Ansar Bayt al Maqdis--and in
Sinai it is multi-dimensional group that operating using
violence, and some of them are local Bedouin who are fighting
marginalization by the Cairo government and some of them
extensive organized crime--criminals who are doing smuggling
and trafficking of men and woman and weapons--and most
importantly, in Sinai, of course, as our colleague said, the
Ansar Bayt al Maqdis, which in Arabic is Companion of
Jerusalem, which has been the champion of violence in Sinai in
last few months.
In talking about these people, they have, in last 2 months,
changed their tactic dramatically. They moved their operation
outside Sinai to, we believe, an area in Egypt, in Cairo, in
Dakahlia and in Mansoura and Ismailiyya and others, and they
show some sophistication of this capability by downing a
military helicopter a few weeks ago and killing the 5 crew
members.
In addition to this violent militant group, there is a new
trend of violence by use of the revolution. We have a group
called ``Walaa','' which is ``burn,'' and Molotov Movement,
which claimed responsibility for burning a lot of cars and
bikers of the military and the police officers.
How this affects the United States force. Within this
brutalized society in Egypt now, the only issue that unites
Egyptians is blaming United States for lots gone wrong.
Islamists believe Washington supported the coup against
President Morsi, while pro-military Egyptians believe
Washington has a special relation with the Brotherhood that was
instrumental in installing Morsi as President.
Some of this negativity towards the United States is result
of conspiracy theories based on unsubstantiated accusations
that are propagated by sensational media, which is widely
influential in Egypt today.
A lot of claims, which are ridiculous in some sense, are
all over Egypt media, such as the United States wants to divide
Egypt into small states and Brotherhood takes its orders
directly from the White House and from President Obama.
This negativity perception of the United States so far
doesn't translate to any direct threat to U.S. interest in the
region. These different violent trends I described, including
al-Qaeda and Sinai and others, have focused on hard Egyptian
targets, mainly military and police so far.
But there is no doubt, this current popular mood in Eqypt
towards the United States and lack of political openness is
creating an environment less hospitable to the United States in
the region.
My assessment is there is no reason to believe at this
stage that there is an imminent risk of violence within the
United States emanating from its current position in Egypt;
however, I believe that the deadlock of Egyptian politics today
make it very difficult to cooperate with other countries in
countering terrorism.
I will be happy to answer any question.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Elmenshawy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mohamed Elmenshawy
11 February 2014
Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee, thank you very much
for inviting me here today to discuss this important issue. It is
rather demoralizing that we are having this conversation today. Exactly
3 years ago, millions of Egyptians celebrated the resignation of former
president Hosni Mubark after 30 years of autocratic rule.
For a moment, some believed that forcing such a strong regime to
surrender to the desire of non-violent protestors meant a huge set-back
to al-Qaeda and other groups with militant ideologies that advocate the
use terrorism and violence as the only tool for change.
Events in Egypt, however, continued to unfold. After bringing down
former President Mubarak, the first-ever democratically-elected
president in the country's history was brought to office. Exactly a
year later, on June 30, 2013, massive protests flooded the streets
calling for early presidential elections and triggering a military
intervention that ousted the elected president on July 3.
These events have ushered in a period of unprecedented use of
violence by militant groups (especially in Sinai) as well as by the
state.
This is the context in which we are examining our question today.
To address it, I will look at three relevant indicators:
(1) The potential for political resolution.
(2) The trends and characteristics of the resort to violence.
(3) The perceptions of the U.S. role in the events.
First: The potential for political resolution.
The potential for political resolution at the moment is in my
assessment negligible. While the position of the Egyptian government is
centered around accepting the roadmap declared on July 3, the
opposition groups led by the Muslim Brotherhood continue to demand the
reinstatement of the ousted president. Well-known international efforts
led by the European Union, the United States, and some other Arab
governments have failed to achieve any rapprochement in these opposing
positions.
Meanwhile the security solution continued to gain the upper hand
and culminated in the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a
terrorist organization on the 25th of December 2013. Currently, the
majority of the Muslim Brotherhood's leadership is in prison and the
ousted president is on trial for a growing list of offences that
recently expanded to include espionage. If convicted he faces mandatory
capital punishment. Independent figures estimate the total numbers in
prison to be thousands from the ranks of the Brotherhood and its
sympathizers. The number of civilians killed in confrontations with the
security apparatus is estimated to be 2,421, as well as 174 from the
police, 70 from the military, and 11 journalists according to
independent Egyptian source ``Wikithawra''.
The recent wave of arrests of journalists and the lack of response
to mounting international pressure further illustrate the security bias
and the shrinking influence of the moderate voices within the current
government. The security approach has been constantly expanding and
reaching political activists that were in opposition to the MB
government and supportive of the roadmap. It is also expanding to
ordinary forms of political activism.
On the other hand, the protests by the Brotherhood and its ``Anti-
Coup alliance'' continue to totally reject the roadmap. Reinstituting
the ousted president remains their position.
The potential for political resolution is further hindered by the
unparalleled level of social and political polarization. A ``zero-sum''
attitude is prevalent among all the main players. A poll conducted by
Zogby International in September 2013 revealed that 50% of Egyptians
want the Brotherhood completely banned from political life. The few
political figures from the supporters of the current government who
called for reconciliation have faced severe backlash by the media that
amounted to character assassination.
Second: The trends and characteristics of the resort to violence.
As political avenues continue to close, the trend towards
violence--including by al-Qaeda-style groups--is on a steady rise. Here
it is helpful to distinguish between violence emerging out of militant
groups in the Sinai Peninsula and the new trend towards violence
amongst youth protestors.
Militant presence in Sinai is not new. From 2004 through 2007, a
wave of terrorist attacks was carried out against tourist resorts in
southern Sinai that killed about 200 people. Violence in Sinai is
multifaceted. Some is carried out by local Bedouin groups against the
central government in retaliation for marginalization and heavy-handed
security practices. Some is linked to the Arab-Israeli conflict and
aims to undermine Egypt's peace treaty with Israel. Other violence is
linked to extensive organized criminal activities including drug and
human trafficking and smuggling of weapons. Finally, most of the
violence is the result of Qaeda-style militant groups taking refuge in
Sinai because of its topography that defies policing.
After the temporary collapse of the police force on 28 January
2011, violence increased significantly in Sinai as illustrated by the
regular attacks on the gas lines transporting gas to Jordan and Israel
and police stations.
Since the ousting of president Morsi, a group called the Ansar Beit
Al Maqdes Arabic for ``Companions of Jerusalem'' came to prominence
with a constant stream of attacks inside Sinai against military and
policy targets, which resulted in the death of dozens policemen and
military personnel.
Since November 2013, we should note two emerging trends in the
violence by ``Companions of Jerusalem'' group: They have begun to carry
out operations in the densely-populated areas of the Nile Delta and
Cairo. This included the bombing of the Security Headquarter in
Mansoura on December 24, which led to the designation of the MB as a
terrorist group the next day. It also included a number of attempted
and successful assassinations of senior police figures, such as the
attempted assassination of the Minister of Interior on September 5.
The other trend is the increased sophistication and capabilities of
the group in Sinai. This was clearly illustrated when the group claimed
responsibility for downing a military helicopter in Sinai in late
January killing all 5 crewmembers on board. Based on a video released
by the group purporting to show the attack, the militants used a
shoulder-fired missile which required serious training and are
considered to be more advanced than weapons systems previously seen
among militant groups.
Equally significant is the trend towards the use of violence by
youth groups that do not fit the typical profile of militant
organizations. The Facebook pages of two unknown groups: Walaa' Arabic
for ``Burn'' and ``Molotov Movement'' claimed responsibility for some
recent attacks against police and military assets. ``Walaa' '' states
on its Facebook page that it is a popular movement aiming to resist the
oppressive state. The movement also states that it has no political or
religious affiliation. These Facebook-formed groups call for burning
and destroying the newly rising ``repressive state'' by targeting
police and military vehicles. The burning of police vehicles has become
a daily event in the news in Egypt in recent weeks.
Third: The perceptions of the U.S. role in the events.
It seems that the perception of the United States is the only issue
that unites highly-divided Egyptians at this stage. Islamists believe
that Washington supported a coup against the elected president, while
pro-military Egyptians believe that Washington has a special
relationship with the Brotherhood and was instrumental in installing
Morsi as president.
The Egyptian public is overwhelmingly negative toward the United
States and few Egyptians say it is important to have a strong bilateral
relationship with Washington. More than half of the public thinks U.S.
financial assistance has a negative impact on Egypt.
A poll conducted last summer by Pew Research showed that 81% of
Egyptians have expressed an unfavorable opinion about the United States
with only 16% favorable. Negative perceptions of the United States have
been consistent in recent years. These numbers reflect attitudes that
are more negative today than during much of President George W. Bush's
time in office.
According to the same poll, few in Egypt find having a good
relationship with the United States a priority. Only 24% say it is
important for Egypt to have a strong partnership with America, while 9%
think it is very important. Nearly 7 in 10 (69%) say a good bilateral
relationship is not very important or not at all important.
Some of the negativity towards the United States, to be sure, is
the result of conspiracy theories and unsubstantiated accusations that
are propagated by sensational media. They include claims such as the
``the United States wants to divide Egypt'' into several states; that
``Morsi was an American spy''; and that ``the Brotherhood takes its
orders directly from Obama''.
Conversely, some Islamists retain anger against the United States
for tolerating the repressive tactics of Mubarak's regime. Currently,
almost all Islamists believe America has abandoned Morsi and
``electoral legitimacy'' after his July 3 overthrow. Of course, many
also still retain the belief that the United States is against any form
of Islamism by default. They see the recent policy on events in Egypt
as proof.
So far this negative perception of the U.S. role has not translated
into violence against U.S. interests. The different violent trends that
I described today, including al-Qaeda-related groups, have focused so
far on ``hard'' Egyptian targets mostly linked to the security
apparatus. There is no doubt however that the current popular mood in
Egypt and the lack of genuine political openness is creating an
environment less hospitable to the United States in the region. It is
my assessment that there is no reason to believe at this stage that
there is an imminent risk of violence within the United States
emanating from the current situation in Egypt.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the opportunity to testify
before your committee today. I look forward to answering any questions
you or your colleagues may have.
Mr. King. Thank you very much, all of you, for your
testimony.
There is many new names and groups being mentioned. I would
just state for the record that Ansar Bayt al Maqdes, ABM, and
Ansar Jerusalem are the same organization. They're just
different terms, same organization, just to get them in the
record.
It seems there is a consensus that there is an emerging
threat there, something we--something we have to be very
concerned about. This is a fertile area and, ultimately, it
could be used as an attack against the homeland or just an
attack against our interests in the Middle East.
I would ask each of you actually two questions, and you can
just go around among yourselves.
First of all, do you believe that other intelligence
agencies in the region who are allied with us share this
concern that you have--we have?
Second, what advice would you give to the United States in
its dealings with Egypt to effectively move against these
groups?
We'll start with Dr. Cook and go across.
Mr. Cook. Thank you very much. Those are two important
questions.
I think the relevant and most important intelligence agency
in the region is, obviously, the Israelis. As I mentioned in my
testimony and as I have submitted in my written testimony,
Israelis have expressed concern about the deterioration of
security in the Sinai for quite some time and are particularly
concerned about the turn of events there; so, I think that they
do share the assessment.
They are primarily concerned with the destabilization of a
country of almost 90 million people on their border, but I
think that they see a broader view of it in the same way that
my colleague Mr. Joscelyn sees it, as an emerging threat that
has the potential to not only threaten them, but to threaten
the United States as well.
In terms of what the United States can do to be helpful for
the Egyptians--this is something that I started to get into in
my remarks--I think that we have had a robust debate here in
Washington about how best to help Egypt become a more
democratic country.
I think the trajectory of Egyptian politics is clearly an
authoritarian one, not a democratic one. Suspending or delaying
military aid isn't going to make Egypt more democratic at this
moment. It's also not going to make Egypt less unstable. It is
also not going to help Egypt's security situation.
We need to work very closely with the Egyptian armed forces
who, as I said, have been reluctant to rethink their doctrine
for 21st Century threats, but have been more open to it more
recently.
In my written testimony, I have specific recommendations
for this, but I think that the only way--the only way that the
Egyptians will really listen to the United States in this area
is if we reassure them that we do stand with them.
The proposals to suspend aid, to delay certain important
pieces of equipment, like Apache helicopters, actually do
damage to the trust that we have tried to build up between the
United States and the Egyptian armed forces over many, many
years.
If we were to resume--if we were to resume the aid
relationship the way it has been, we do have an opportunity to
work with the Egyptians in developing their doctrine in a way
that will be more responsive to these threats.
That is not to suggest that this is a--this is an easy
situation. I think everybody supports Egypt becoming a
democracy. That is a laudable goal. I have written quite a bit
about that.
But if we are thinking in the current environment what the
United States can do and what our security interests are, it
means working with the Egyptian armed forces specifically in
countering this threat.
Thank you.
Mr. King. Mr. Joscelyn.
Mr. Joscelyn. I think you can tell by press reporting that
a number of intelligence agencies around the region and the
world are worried about the growing threat, in particular,
Israel, as my colleague here says.
Israel is concerned because what is happening in the Sinai
is connected with what happens in Gaza. There is movement back
and forth, obviously. Israel has come under attack from Council
of Jerusalem or ABM a number of occasions.
In August 2011, there was a sort of sophisticated Mumbai-
style attack against Israeli tourists and others that,
basically--what happened was Israelis then had to chase
Egyptian assailants back into Sinai and this created a major
problem for Israel because it sparked outrage and protests
leading to the Israeli embassy basically being assaulted.
On your latter point--latter question about what we should
do about it, I think that what we have to understand is that
Ansar Jerusalem, ABM, these groups, they are terrorist
organizations, but they are more than that. They are insurgents
and they are operating as a low-grade, right now, insurgency.
So Egypt's policies, in terms of combatting them, has to
take that in mind in understanding that, if you get too heavy-
handed in your tactics, too sort-of cavalier in what you are
doing, you can actually feed into what these groups want to do
in terms of winning over new recruits.
This is something, as you know, Congressman, that it took
the United States a number of years to get right in Iraq and
elsewhere to--understanding how to work with local partners to
basically counter the threat of these groups.
I think that is really the main issue in the Sinai, is that
there are definitely groups that be can embraced by the state
there to try and work against these emerging al-Qaeda threats.
Mr. King. Mr. Elmenshawy.
Mr. Elmenshawy. I believe a lot of intelligence agency are
interested in what is wrong with Egypt, of course, Israeli in
the top, and Arab countries as well, because what is happening
in Egypt won't stay in Egypt and they know that for the soft
power Egypt enjoy and are still enjoying over the region.
As for the United States, I believe they have big dilemma
here. It is very difficult to cooperate with Egyptian
government in the current situation because the democratic
process imposed by the military is not inclusive to all
political forces, especially the Muslim Brotherhood.
The mission of the Brotherhood as terrorist group on
December 25 hurts counterterrorism effort because they put them
in the same group with real radical militant groups such as
Ansar Bayt al Maqdis, which is the focus of everybody today.
Motion the government of Egypt privately and publicly to
have a real democratic process that include everybody,
include--with concerns to have unity within Egyptian and having
the Muslim Brotherhood to be a legal and legitimate player will
help counterterrorism efforts.
But excluding them, it's very golden opportunity to use by
al-Qaeda and other militants to recruit angry young Muslim
Brotherhood and besides that are members who will find
democracy doesn't serve their goal and their aspiration, and
they may resort to terrorism and violence.
Besides that, I believe in this atmosphere where United
States is blamed by everybody in Egypt, Islamists, pro-
military, pro-everybody and, at any action, some of this
ridiculously orchestrated, I believe United States should say
publicly: We are dealing with the ruler of Egypt. We are not
choosing who is in charge. We dealt with Mubarak and with
Tantawi, with Morsi, with Sisi, and we are not responsible for
whoever in charge of Egypt. We just deal with whoever ends up--
had their ballots--the presidential ballots to Egypt and stay
away from calling repeatedly in conferences here, we encourage
or ask government of Egypt to do X and Y and Z. That should be
private, and they should meet, too. Egyptian people, it is
clear, we are dealing with whoever in charge. We are not
influencing whom you choose.
Mr. King. Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, just to step back for a moment, you know, the
shame here is that, in 2011, during the uprising, in the final
days in Tahrir Square, you had 8 million people, 10 percent of
the Nation's population, which really represented the largest
pro-democracy movement in the history of world.
To have such a disastrous outcome, I think, you know, you
can certainly look to the Muslim Brotherhood in their
misreading the situation by trying to impose Islamists'
identity on Egypt, which is really a nationalist, you know,
population. It is 90 percent Sunni, 10 percent Coptic
Christian.
So Morsi is thrown out, creates all kinds of instability.
Sinai Peninsula, which is very strategic to us because of its
close proximity to Gaza, because of its close proximity to
Israel, seems to be overtaken by an al-Qaeda-influenced
affiliate. Their activity seemed to be spreading to the
mainland. They have surface-to-air missile capability or are
believed to, which enhances, you know, their threat moving
forward.
You know, who is winning this thing? Is the military, in
this period of flux, able to keep in check this al-Qaeda
affiliate or al-Qaeda-encouraged or -endorsed activity? I mean,
what is--what is the situation?
Because there is two--there is two problems here. There is
two problems here. You know, one is a failed state in Egypt is
disastrous for Israel and the United States. Disastrous.
So, you know, what is being done in the short term to stem
this tide of al-Qaeda-influenced activity? You know, right
beyond that, you know, what is--what is the way forward in
terms of some kind of functioning government that can respect
the rights of minorities, that can respect a separation of
powers, that gives the people of that country that I think
legitimately stood up 3 years ago for the things that we wanted
them to embrace?
That is a rule of law, that is minority rights, that is all
the things that we value or at least, you know, a semblance of
a democracy.
How do we get back to that, I suppose, you know, is the
question?
Mr. Cook. Thank you very much, sir.
You raise a number of very interesting and interconnected
questions, and I think what I will do is I will answer them in
backwards order, if you don't mind.
It strikes me that we are in for a very long period of
political tumult and political contestation in Egypt. We will
not come back here on February 11, 2015, and talk about a
stable political order in Egypt.
Everything in Egypt now is contested and, as I said in my--
in my testimony, the authorities currently only have one answer
to this, and that is the use of force and coercion, which has a
dynamic effect on politics.
There is something called the repression radicalization
dynamic. So in a way, not to suggest that what is happening in
the Sinai is a function of the July 3 coup, as I said, this is
a situation that has been festering for quite some time, but
the repression in the political system does create an
environment where primarily angry young men may decide to take
up arms to--in a way to redress their grievances because they
are not able to do so through the political institutions of the
state. That is a very dangerous situation.
As I said, the Egyptian government is really--it is saying
that it is pursuing a political process that will lead to a
democratic opening. It is hard to see how that is the case with
the kinds of repressive mechanisms and policies that they are
pursuing at this point.
In terms of your question, what is the capacity of the
Egyptian armed forces to deal with the threat in the Sinai, it
is actually limited. I think that they come to the--they come
to the conclusion that they are in for a long, hard slog.
But in many ways, we have helped create a situation through
our military aid program that has made it difficult for the
Egyptians to fight in the Sinai. That was a strategic goal of
the United States. We didn't want the Egyptians to have an
ability to fight in the Sinai.
Now, 30 years on, they are confronted with a threat, a
threat that we have raised with them any number of times over
the course of the last decade, but they have been unwilling to
prepare for it for their own reasons.
So we can offer as much advice as we have, and they seem to
be taking some of it. We can reassure them of our support for
them, although I think that the administration's approach to it
has not exactly reassured the Egyptians on this front. We can
continue to encourage the rather robust security cooperation
between Egypt and Israel. We can seek to institutionalize that
security cooperation.
But let's make no mistake about it. The low-level
insurgency that is in the Sinai and that has reached into the
Nile Valley and the connections to al-Qaeda that Mr. Joscelyn
made clear is something that we are going to be living with for
quite some time, and it is going to take time for the Egyptian
military to be able to effectively deal with this--with this
challenge. It took us many years in Iraq and Afghanistan. They
are starting from a position way behind where we were in those
conflicts.
Thank you.
Mr. Joscelyn. Well, Congressman, I think you have hit on
the fundamental dilemma in all of this, which is the tension
between sort-of short-term counterterrorism interests and what
our long-term political or democratic interests should be in
any country, really.
Too often we get caught in this box between a dictator,
sort-of, or a tyrannical regime and, you know, basically chaos,
or--you know, or some bogeyman government. That is really the
problem.
I think, basically, as we move forward here, America's role
should be to encourage, however we can, to opening up the
political process, which, as my colleague here said, it doesn't
look like, despite the promises, that is going to happen.
You know, as you pointed out, they had millions of people
in Tahrir Square and elsewhere rise up. You know, these were
not al-Qaeda operatives. These were not jihadists. These were
people who just wanted to escape Mubarak's regime.
Really, in this fight, what we have learned in Iraq, what
we have learned in Afghanistan, what we have learned elsewhere,
is that is the center of gravity against this ideology that
threatens us and threatens them, the al-Qaeda ideology and the
al-Qaeda organization.
To the extent the real answer is to make sure that the--we
put pressure on the Egyptian government to not use too heavy of
a hand to try and find the actors that they can basically work
with against these entities in the Sinai, opening up the
political process, but, also, you know, not using their power--
the Egyptian government's power to crack down legitimate
political descent under the rubric of security operations. We
have seen that now with journalists and others being arrested
sort-of wholesale in Egypt, and a lot of that has nothing to do
with security.
So I think it is tough to do and it is easy to say that
America should use its leverage to try and influence things
along those lines, but that is basically what we have to do.
Mr. Elmenshawy. Congressman, I believe a failed state in
Egypt is bad news for all Egyptians and everybody except the
terrorist group; and, therefore, we have to take this issue
seriously.
I believe the way forward here is to have inclusive
government that will include everybody, including the Muslim
Brotherhood, because they have huge base of Islamic-minded
views, will be a golden opportunity for al-Qaeda to recruit
them if they are not included in the political process Egypt is
witnessing now. I believe we should talk to Egyptian government
privately to convince them of the wisdom to be inclusive in
terms of the political process way forward.
I believe, as we--as it is believed for everybody, Sinai is
the hub for terrorism in Egypt. A lot of jihadists return from
Iraq and from Syria, and a lot of people coming from Libya and
Sudan as well, and I believe Sinai is a time bomb.
Without serious development effort inside Sinai and
populating Sinai--Sinai is having only half million people in a
land bigger than Jordan and Israel combined--this issue will
live there. Terrorism will be a routine in Sinai without having
serious development.
Cairo elites used to ignore Sinai for decades after we get
back from Israel in 1970s, after the big treaty in 1979, and
since then it is marginalized, ignored. No serious development
there. Needs just to visit any school in northern or southern
Sinai or popular coastal to know what kind of qualities they
have, the locals there. I believe, without developing it and
populating Sinai, there is no easy solution for the issue of
radical Islam and militancy inside the Peninsula.
Mr. King. Should have at least one more round of questions.
Again, I would ask each of you: What is the threat of
foreign fighters or, if not foreign fighters, just Egyptians
who are fighting in Syria now coming back to Egypt as more
skilled terrorists, if you will? How much of a threat do you
see that being?
Mr. Cook. Thank you, sir.
I think it is a very significant threat. Congressman
Higgins raised the issue of terrorists having access to
surface-to-air missiles. We know that an Egyptian helicopter
was taken down by one.
I think that--and it is believed that those who perpetrated
this and a number of other attacks specifically on the minister
of interior and others are Egyptians who have returned from
jihad in Syria.
The fact that Ayman Zawahiri, an Egyptian who is the head
of al-Qaeda, has essentially extended his support to Ansar Bayt
al Maqdis is an important development. Although there is a
tremendous debate about where Zawahiri sits in terms of
influence over al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, he is
Egyptian. His entire life has been engaged in an idealogical
battle against the Egyptian state.
His extension of support, his call to Egyptians to fight
this illegitimate government, risks significant numbers of
Egyptians who have fought in Syria and Iraq now for many years
back to Sinai and poses a very significant threat.
Mr. King. Mr. Joscelyn.
Mr. Joscelyn. Well, the September 5, 2013, suicide bombing
that targeted the Egyptian interior minister was executed by a
terrorist who had fought in Afghanistan, tried to fight in
Iraq, and had fought in Syria.
Just yesterday, actually, Egyptian officials said that they
have been tracking the connections between his fellow plotters
and what is happening in Syria, saying some of them fought with
the Nusra Front, which is al-Qaeda in Syria, and that they have
been tracking actually Syrians in Egypt as well.
So these threats are--we have already seen them sort of
metastasized. We have already seen this happen where the threat
from the dynamic play between Syria and other nations in the
region, including Egypt, is well in effect.
The problem is, with the Sinai and all these things, as we
have seen and, I think, principally what you are concerned
about and what we have witnessed is that the threat to American
interests can really manifest themselves across this network at
any time. Okay?
We have seen that now with al-Qaeda in Iran, with the plot
against the train going into Canada. We have seen that with
Pakistani Taliban, who had a bomber placed in Times Square. We
have seen that with AQAP.
The problem is that the Sinai is linked into this global
network--okay?--as this Walid Badr, the suicide bomber, shows,
as history shows, and the problem is that this basically means
that a new threat can manifest itself through this network,
through the Sinai, through Egypt, really at any time.
Mr. Elmenshawy. I believe, Chairman, when we talk about
foreign fighters or Egyptian hold forth in Syria and places
like Iraq and Afghanistan, we should talk about Egyptian
borders.
Egypt border Libya and Sudan and Gaza and Israel, and I
believe giving aid to Egyptian soldiers to control the border
and give some training will help very much by eliminating this
threat to a large extent.
Of course, intelligence hearing about these people who move
freely to and from Egypt, it is very important issue. That
shouldn't be neglected to fight these cross-border terrorists.
Mr. King. One country we haven't mentioned is Jordan, which
is certainly in that neighborhood, which right now is
overwhelmed with refugees from Syria, surrounded by hostile
countries.
Do you see any threat from any of these groups that could
destabilize Jordan or any activity there just being so close in
the neighborhood?
Again, Dr. Cook and Mr. Joscelyn and Mr. Elmenshawy.
Mr. Cook. Mr. Chairman, I will defer, in terms of
expertise, on what is happening specifically in Jordan, but I
think that it is----
Mr. King. I was thinking more of potential threat.
Mr. Cook. Right.
I think that the huge numbers of refugees in Jordan, the
pressure on that country and--combined with the very
significant fight on its borders in Syria and Iraq poses a
significant threat because of these--these networks.
Remember that Jordan was a target of al-Qaeda during the--
our occupation--invasion and occupation of Iraq. I think that
these jihadist groups see the region, broadly speaking, as one
battlefield.
So I think that there is as much--the threat in Egypt is
certainly far more acute because of the political situation
there, but I certainly don't think that we could talk about
stability in the region. I think we need to talk about relative
instability.
I certainly would include Jordan and the fact that there
are so many foreigners now in that country. Obviously,
jihadists, as I said, see the region as one battlefield, that
we have to include it as a potential--a potential problem area.
Mr. King. Mr. Joscelyn, I guess, in addition to what Dr.
Cook said, I am thinking about the ripple effect or the carry-
on effect of what would happen in the Sinai affecting Jordan,
even though it is not directly involved, how that could have an
impact.
Mr. Joscelyn. Well, that is certainly possible. We have
already seen it the other way with Syria's ripple effects into
Jordan because, in late 2012, there was actually a very
complicated multi-staged attack that was planned by Nusra
Front--Nusra Front fighters who were re-purposed for a
terrorist attack on the U.S. embassy.
Basically, this was supposed to be a cascading attack where
they were going to attack numerous targets on their way to the
embassy and, as sort of security forces scrambled, then they
were going to up the ante and attack our embassy. That was--
that was launched by fighters who had trained and fought in
Syria.
As I said a couple of times now, the point is that what is
happening in Sinai is not distinct from any of these other
networks. They are tied in. They are linked in. So the problem
is that this can manifest itself very quickly across the
network.
Mr. King. Mr. Elmenshawy.
Mr. Elmenshawy. I would just add that Jordan used to have
and still hundreds of thousands of refugees in Iraq and
recently in Syria.
Now I look at Syria and Iraq and I believe they manage it
very well so far. We don't see any Jordan-related terrorist
attack in big magnitude in last few years or few months.
However, the proximity of Sinai to Jordan makes, of course,
a concern, especially that militants in Egypt attack the gas
line that was fought in Jordan before and Israel as well. I
believe it is something we should be aware of about.
Mr. King. My understanding is that that attack on the
pipeline is--caused tremendous economic damage in Jordan.
Mr. Joscelyn, you want to say something?
Mr. Joscelyn. Actually, that is a central feature of the
propaganda that comes out of ABM and Ayman Zawahiri on the
pipeline attacks. They list off a number of reasons.
One of the ABM videos I reviewed just recently has some
commentator from Egypt going through all the economic damages
that caused Israel and others, including Jordan.
This is a central feature in Ayman Zawahiri's talking
points, that, basically, this causes great economic calamity
on--you know, now, some of it is hype, but this is basically
their central message.
Mr. King. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, I thought when bin Laden was captured and killed
that it was going to be the end of al-Qaeda. At least some had
argued that because bin Laden was the charismatic leader and,
much like, you know, Nazis with Hitler, members of al-Qaeda,
you know, gave a blood oath to bin Laden that, you know, he
would--they would--they would follow his rule.
But it seems as though--you know, obviously, we have not
had the end of al-Qaeda, but al-Qaeda-ism has seemed to have
perpetrated a lot of really troubled spots, and they don't all
seem to be in alignment. You know, you had that one al-Qaeda
leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in Fallujah, not entirely aligned
with some of the leaders that we are traditionally familiar
with.
So I suppose, you know, the one question is: In the short
term, what do we fear most? Do we fear a consolidation of al-
Qaeda in targeting a specific strategic area like Egypt or
recruitment of new members in the short term?
Mr. Joscelyn. Well, actually, again, I think you have hit
on a fundamental question about, really, what is al-Qaeda and
what it is all about.
The fundamental misunderstanding, I think, in the United
States and in the West has been to always conceive of them as
solely terrorists who are interested in the big mass-casualty
attack.
The truth of the matter is, if you go through the strategic
doctrine, if you go through what bin Laden was about, what
Zawahiri is about, they have always conceived themselves as
political revolutionaries. Attacking us and our interests was
always a step in their long game to try and acquire political
power for themselves and ideology.
Now the question becomes: How are they doing in that
regard? Unfortunately in Syria, the Sinai, and elsewhere, they
are doing quite well, because what is happening is they are
winning new converts.
You mentioned Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the head of ISIS. The
reason he was basically excommunicated from al-Qaeda was he
didn't get that. He wasn't playing that revolutionary game very
well, whereas, the guys in al-Qaeda senior leadership wanted to
play that game and have designated as their appointees in Syria
to play that game are playing it much better. That is the
concern.
So what I say is, if you look back through the history of
al-Qaeda and how mass-casualty attacks on us are manifested--
okay?--including like the 9/11 plot, the pilots for the 9/11
were recruited initially to fight in Chechnya. That is what
they were recruited for, an insurgency that al-Qaeda had a hand
in. A couple of the musclemen for that plot actually fought in
Bosnia, as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of it.
So the point is that, if you look at these terrorist
attacks against us, historically, they have been very much
connected to these insurgencies that al-Qaeda had its footprint
in.
That is really the danger, that, basically, the next Khalid
Sheikh Muhammed, the next muscle hijackers, the next guys like
this, could be fighting in Syria today, could be fighting in
the Sinai, could be fighting somewhere else. That is what the
real danger is.
Mr. Cook. If I might add, I don't disagree with anything
that is said, but I think it is important, because we are
talking about the Sinai, we are talking about Egypt, to
recognize that in many ways Egypt is a crucible of trans-
national jihadists, that the intellectual framework for the
kind of terrorist threat that we are seeing now were laid in
Egypt in the 1960s and 1970s.
It has come to fruition in important ways in that Egypt has
produced a veritable all-star list of trans-national jihadists,
and that is why Sinai and Egypt have a special place, in
addition to the fact that Ayman Zawahiri is now the leader of
al-Qaeda.
Certainly al-Qaeda adherents swore a blood oath to Osama
bin Laden, but in many ways this is--you know, in a big way, an
Egyptian organization, and that is why I think the threat from
the Sinai, the support that Zawahiri has given to Ansar Bayt al
Maqdis, in particular, suggests that we are going to be
observing a very significant fight there for quite some time.
Mr. King. Okay. The gentleman yields back.
Ms. Jackson Lee is here. I would just--if she has
questions, we have to adjourn a hard time of 4:15. So if you--
--
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I didn't know if the Ranking Member had posed questions
already. Thank you both very much for the opportunity.
Let me just, having not sat in on the testimony--and I
thank the gentlemen very much for your presence here today.
Let me go with Dr. Elmenshawy. Do I have it almost correct,
Professor?
Just in light of what I am gleaning from the growing
presence of al-Qaeda--I would hesitate to say epicenter--what
impact will the potential elections and the potential candidacy
of the head of the military, which I understand may still be a
potential viable candidate, have?
Second: What is the impact of the trial of the former
President Morsi with respect to the Muslim Brotherhood and its
connection to al-Qaeda?
Is there--we have always looked to the agreement that we
have had with Egypt and Israel for a very long time and the
then-stability, at least as it relates to the relationship and
the stability in the Mideast, and it does not reflect on how
the Egyptians were being treated.
But what--how unstable is that area, particularly as we are
looking at the negotiations between Israel and the
Palestinians?
Mr. Elmenshawy. Thank you, Madam Congresswoman, for your
question.
As for first point which Field Marshal El-Sisi expected
declaration of running candidacy--his candidacy run for the
president, I believe it won't affect Egypt's effort to fight
terrorism at any level. I believe it is beyond the president
of--the next president of Egypt.
But if the military-declared roadmap is taking place
without including all political forces, it will be short of the
expectation of most Egyptians and it makes--the mission and the
goal of al-Qaeda is much easier to recruit angry and frustrated
Brotherhood views who expected democracy to provide some
opening, some place to express their wish, their desire and
expectations, and now they will be banned from the political
game in Egypt, which I am afraid it will let them find another
way, which will be to join the militant groups in Egypt and
Sinai.
So I believe the name of the next president is irrelevant
to our discussion and to the threat Egypt is facing in term of
growing terrorism.
As I tried for the former President Morsi, I believe it is
another good tool to convince these angry Egyptians or people
who believed in Morsi and voted for him, democracy doesn't
work.
I believe one serious issue, he is facing serious crime,
espionage, and the only punishment in Egyptian law is capital
punishment.
So assuming the elected president not only in Egypt, in the
entire Arab world, for the case will never have elected head of
state to stand such a trial and be executed, that is what kind
of message would send for young Arabs and young Egyptians?
I believe it would be a wrong message. So I hope insurgents
in Cairo will be more wise to deal using political solution for
this crisis, not military solution or security solution, as
they do so far.
As for the Israeli, as I mention here, I believe it--the
biggest group we have in Egypt now is--militant group using al-
Qaeda-style attacks is Ansar Bayt al Maqdis. Its name given
tell us the relation with Israel and Arab-Israeli conflict.
``Ansar Bayt al Maqdis'' means ``companion of Jerusalem.''
So Jerusalem is still in the minds and the recruiting tool
for this jihadist. As long as Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-
Israeli conflict is not resolved totally and fairly, I believe
it will be a good opportunity to recruit more radicals and more
young angry Arab and Palestinians to join the fight for al-
Qaeda.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Joscelyn, if I could quickly, then, as
you listen and, I guess, as you are articulating here today,
whether--whoever might be running for office in Egypt, the
witness, Mr. Elmenshawy, indicated that, if you are not
embracing--you still have this contingent of angry Egyptians,
is that what you are speaking to in terms of the fuel for al-
Qaeda and that that then can spill over into actions against
the United States that we should be very wary of?
Mr. Joscelyn. I think that is absolutely part of the
problem. I think----
Mr. King. Mr. Joscelyn, if you keep your answer to 2
minutes because we do have to adjourn at a hard time.
Mr. Joscelyn. I will do it real quick.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Joscelyn. I think we have already seen some poaching by
ABM--that's Ansar Jerusalem--and Sinai of Muslim Brotherhood
members. You can see that in some of their videos. They are
capitalizing off the anger of what is going on inside Egypt.
You mentioned the trial of former President Morsi there. I
think this is an important opportunity. Some of the allegations
that have been made by the new Egyptian ruling regime really go
far and beyond what I think are probably plausible.
They have--one of the allegations is that Morsi was
actually on the phone with Ayman Zawahiri, the head of al-
Qaeda, and was involved in all sorts of conspiring. This is the
type of thing, I think, if you are in the U.S. Government, you
should be able to challenge the Egyptian regime on and say,
``Okay. Show me the transcript. Show me the audio of this
alleged phone call that you are talking about.''
Because it is one thing to talk about legitimate sort-of
problems and legitimate security concerns. It is another to use
those as tools to sort of squash political dissent.
Mr. King. Let me----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. King. Ms. Lee yields back. Thank you.
I want to thank the witnesses for your testimony today.
Again, I apologize for the delay at the start. It was--just
turned out to be one of those days, and I certainly regret that
because I know the staff put a lot of work into this and the
Ranking Member and I.
But you certainly--again, the testimony you provided is
going to be in the record. I certainly found it very, very
enlightening, very sobering, also. So I want to thank you for
that and for the time you have given us.
Members of the subcommittee may have some additional
questions. So if they submit them to you in writing, we would
greatly appreciate you responding to them.
Ranking Member, have----
Mr. Higgins. That's all.
Mr. King. Okay. Without objection, this subcommittee stands
adjourned. Thank you again.
[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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