[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PASSPORT FRAUD: AN INTERNATIONAL VULNERABILITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER
AND MARITIME SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 4, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-62
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Filemon Vela, Texas
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Eric Swalwell, California
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Vacancy
Steve Daines, Montana Vacancy
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Mark Sanford, South Carolina
Vacancy
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Michael Geffroy, Deputy Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Chairwoman
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Loretta Sanchez, California
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Vacancy
Vacancy Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Paul L. Anstine, II, Subcommittee Staff Director
Deborah Jordan, Subcommittee Clerk
Alison Northrop, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Candice S. Miller, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Michigan, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security................................... 1
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Witnesses
Mr. Alan D. Bersin, Assistant Secretary of International Affairs
and Chief Diplomatic Officer, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 9
Mr. John P. Wagner, Acting Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office
of Field Operations, Customs and Border Protection, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 9
Ms. Brenda S. Sprague, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Passport
Services, Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Mr. Shawn A. Bray, Director, Interpol Washington, U.S. National
Central Bureau, U.S. Department of Justice:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
For the Record
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security:
Letter......................................................... 34
Appendix
Questions From Honorable Eric Swalwell for Alan D. Bersin........ 39
Questions From Honorable Eric Swalwell for Jack P. Wagner........ 40
Questions From Honorable Eric Swalwell for Brenda S. Sprague..... 41
Questions From Honorable Eric Swalwell for Shawn Bray............ 42
PASSPORT FRAUD: AN INTERNATIONAL VULNERABILITY
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Friday, April 4, 2014
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:02 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Candice S. Miller
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Palazzo, Jackson Lee, O'Rourke.
Also present: Representative Swalwell.
Mrs. Miller. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, will come to
order.
This subcommittee is meeting today to examine the issue of
passport security.
We are certainly pleased to be joined by Mr. Alan Bersin,
who has been with this committee in the past, and we certainly
appreciate his attendance here today. He is the assistant
secretary for international affairs at the Department of
Homeland Security.
Mr. John Wagner, who has also been before this subcommittee
before. We appreciate his attendance today. He is the deputy
assistant commissioner at U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
Ms. Brenda Sprague, who is the deputy assistant secretary
for passport services at the Department of State.
Mr. Shawn Bray, who is the director of INTERPOL Washington,
United States National Central Bureau.
I will more formally introduce them in just a moment. But
let me recognize myself for an opening statement here this
morning.
First of all, of course, let me start by saying, all of us,
our thoughts and prayers are with the families of those killed
and wounded at Fort Hood. This is a terrible, terrible incident
that happened in my Ranking Member's State of Texas.
Certainly, as we begin the very difficult task of finding
what went wrong there, we have to be mindful to support the men
and women who wear the uniform not only when overseas, but
certainly when they return home here as well.
This morning we are going to be talking about travel
document security, which is a cornerstone of the United States
effort to secure our homeland. It is integral to pushing our
borders out.
The ability of terrorists and others who would seek to do
us harm hinges, in large part, on the ability to travel, and if
you make it hard for terrorists to cross our borders without
being detected, future acts of terrorism hopefully can be
prevented.
I want to begin by commending the Department of Homeland
Security and the Department of State for the great progress
made as we have strengthened the so-called outer ring of border
security.
Today we conduct more vigorous vetting earlier in the
process. We station DHS personnel in high-risk countries to
prevent persons of concern from boarding the plane or getting a
visa, and we are using biometrics to detect visa fraud.
In the past 3 years, this subcommittee has actually held
six various hearings on visa and document security because we
certainly understand the importance of 9/11 Commission's
recommendations, and one of their conclusions, actually, as
they said in that report, is that, for terrorists, travel
documents are as important as weapons.
Vulnerabilities in our document security can be exploited
by those who would do us harm. So we must have robust measures
in place to deter and to ultimately detect those traveling on
false documents.
To that end, we were certainly dismayed to learn from press
reports that two of the passengers on the Malaysian Flight 370
boarded the aircraft using stolen passports.
While, of course, as has been reported, we don't have any
reason to believe that these individuals were involved in an
act of terrorism, it certainly highlights the vulnerability in
the aviation systems abroad.
Our hearts, of course, and thoughts and prayers go out to
the families who are still waiting to learn what has happened
to their loved ones, and we certainly hope and pray that that
plane will soon be found.
In the United States, through the work of the Department of
Homeland Security, we have made the necessary changes to keep
the flying public secure, and the ability of passengers to
board a flight bound for the United States with a known lost or
stolen passport is very, very low.
In the years after 2001, the international community,
through INTERPOL, created a lost and stolen travel document
database that gives countries a mechanism to both send the
information to a central depository and to check against that
database to make sure no one could enter a country or board a
plane with a known lost or stolen passport.
Unfortunately, only three countries in the world routinely
check flight manifests against that database: The United
States, of course; the United Kingdom; and the United Arab
Emirates.
So there is no question that more countries should follow
our lead. Otherwise, international travelers, including
Americans who travel internationally, are at risk.
According to INTERPOL, in 2013, travelers boarded
international flights more than a billion times without having
their passport numbers checked against the database.
Tools are in place to easily determine if a passport has
been reported missing, and we should use every avenue at our
disposal to encourage countries to do the right thing,
including offering technical assistance where appropriate.
In addition to not consistently checking the lost and
stolen passport database, most countries are also not
consistently sharing lost and stolen passport information with
the INTERPOL database.
The overwhelming majority of the 40 million records in the
lost or stolen database comes from Visa Waiver Program
countries in large part because it is conditioned for visa-free
travel to the United States.
However, those countries do not routinely check their
flight manifests against the database and, as a result, I will
be introducing legislation and legislative solutions to
encourage countries within the Visa Waiver Program to do so.
Because without timely reporting of lost and stolen travel
documents, it becomes very difficult for CBP, through their
advanced targeting system, to determine if someone is flying on
a false document before they present themselves to a Customs
Officer at an airport.
If a terrorist is intent to hijack an airplane, it might be
too late. Even though the United States has a robust screening
and vetting process for travelers, it doesn't mean that our
work in this area is done.
I understand that CBP just recently began to check
passengers on out-bound flights against the lost and stolen
database, and we certainly are interested in hearing from our
witnesses today why that wasn't done before.
Finally, I want to get an update on the work that the
Department of Homeland Security and CBP and the State
Department and INTERPOL have done since 9/11 to prevent those
with lost, stolen, and fraudulent passports from getting on a
plane bound for the United States.
While Americans should be confident that DHS is doing good
work vetting all of the appropriate databases, we can and
should work with our international partners to strengthen
aviation security for Americans who travel abroad. This
subcommittee stands ready to assist in any way that we can.
The Chairwoman would now recognize my Ranking Member on the
subcommittee, the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, for
her opening statement.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
Good morning to the witnesses. Thank you so very much for
your presence here today.
Thank you again, Madam Chairwoman, for reminding us, as I
intended to do, of the tragedy that occurred in my home State,
my neighbors at Fort Hood, Texas, and to again offer to those
men and women who have been brave enough to put on the Nation's
uniform to fight in far-away places our deepest concern and
sympathy, certainly for the families who have lost their loved
ones who, as I indicated, are willing to serve in the United
States military and certainly those who are injured.
This is the second time that this tragedy occurred at Fort
Hood and the second time that we have had to embrace those who,
as I said, are our neighbors. I mourned with them in 2009 and
will continue to do so now.
I hope this committee will have an opportunity to address
the question of protecting, even as this is a military issue--
protecting our men and women while they are on domestic soil
and view it as a cause for zero tolerance for these kinds of
incidences on the Nation's domestic military bases.
Again, my sympathy to not only the men and women at Fort
Hood and the leadership, but also to the people of the State of
Texas.
This is another tragedy that we are facing and trying to
find solutions, and I would make mention that, even as this has
gone into many, many days, that we still express our concern
for the families of the passengers of Malaysia Airlines Flight
370. I hope that it will not be their final end that there has
been no determination as to what occurred to that particular
flight.
But today I am appreciative that we are holding this
hearing, as I spoke to the Chairwoman in the immediacy of the
hours of determining that there were passengers on that flight
that had fraudulent passports.
Certainly there have been continuing investigations, and
whether or not we have concluded that there was no connection,
we do know that passengers traveled with fraudulent passports
and as well that American citizens were on that flight.
While many questions remain unanswered regarding the tragic
disappearance of Flight 370, we do not know, as I indicated,
what connection those two passengers may have had to its
demise, if any.
Two Iranian nationals were allowed to travel using Italian
and Austrian passports that had been entered into INTERPOL's
Stolen and Lost Travel Document database in 2012 and 2013.
Reports suggest that these individuals were not criminals
or terrorists, but, rather, asylum seekers hoping to reach
Europe.
Nevertheless, the fact that at least in certain countries
travelers can readily board aircraft using passports that do
not belong to them is a cause for concern. If a couple of
asylum seekers can do it, so can terrorists or criminals.
After 9/11 and even in other countries before that, we know
that we live in a different territory with different actors and
different reasons for their actions. In fact, there are known
examples of terrorists traveling on fraudulent documents.
According to INTERPOL, Ramzi Yousef, convicted of
masterminding the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York,
committed his crimes after traveling internationally on a
stolen passport.
Also, Samantha Lewthwaite, the so-called ``White Widow'' of
a London July 2005 suicide bomber, is wanted in Kenya and
currently at large with aliases linked to a fraudulent passport
and a passport reported stolen--evidence that this is a
problem.
It is my understanding that the United States is ahead of
most of the rest of the world when it comes to preventing
individuals from traveling on lost, stolen, or fraudulent
documents.
The Department of Homeland Security systematically checks
all travelers' documents against appropriate lost and stolen
databases. These checks yield results.
For example, in fiscal year 2013, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, CBP, reviewed 17,710 possible hits against lost and
stolen databases, resulting in 496 individuals being denied
from boarding planes to the United States. Already in fiscal
year 2014 CBP has reviewed 10,806 possible hits, resulting in
159 individuals being denied boarding.
I also want to thank Homeland Security and the various
agencies relevant to the issue of our border security for the
extended perimeters and the improved security that we have had
post-9/11.
We are clearly, as I have often said, in a better place
than we were. We thank them again for their service and what we
have been able to benefit from.
Since the Flight 370 incident, DHS has expanded its checks
to include not just arriving passengers, but, also, those
departing this country. While overdue, this step should close a
remaining loophole regarding travelers using fraudulent
documents to fly to or from this country.
I hope to hear from our DHS witnesses today about why
departing passengers had not previously been included in their
checks and whether any analysis had been done subsequently to
determine whether passengers had been departing the United
States on documents that do not belong to them.
I also hope that we will be able to embrace and include the
airline industry as we move forward on a number of ways to
ensure the safety and security of the traveling public.
I hope to hear from all of our witnesses about how we can
encourage our international partners to follow the lead of the
United States and a handful of other countries that regularly
check travel documents against INTERPOL's SLTD database.
It is my understanding that traveling on lost, stolen, or
otherwise fraudulent travel documents is already commonplace in
certain parts of the world. Doing so is made possible because
fewer than 20 of INTERPOL's 190 countries systematically check
passports against SLTD.
Although the Flight 370 incident has focused attention on
the vulnerability, it was already known to INTERPOL. In fact,
speaking at the seventh Annual ID WORLD Summit in February just
before flight the Flight 370 incident, INTERPOL Secretary
General Ronald K. Noble lamented that only a handful of
countries are systematically using SLTD to screen travelers
when that technology and device is available, leaving our
global security apparatus vulnerable to exploitation by
criminals and terrorists.
The world is getting smaller. We travel from all over the
world to all over the world. This is simply unacceptable.
I hope to hear from our witnesses today about how we can
encourage other countries, particularly those we work closely
with on aviation security matters, to begin regularly screening
passenger documents against INTERPOL's database.
It is in that vein that I will be looking to draft
legislation dealing with the enforcement aspect of this
particular aspect of aviation travel.
The security of the traveling public, including U.S.
citizens, traveling between foreign countries could well be at
stake, as well as those traveling from foreign countries to the
United States, as well as Americans leaving our soil and
traveling elsewhere around the world.
Again, I thank Chairwoman Miller for holding today's
hearing and the witnesses for joining us.
At this time I ask unanimous consent to allow Mr. Swalwell,
a Member of the full committee, to sit and question the
witnesses at today's hearing.
Mrs. Miller. Without objection.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I acknowledge Mr. O'Rourke as being
present at the hearing today.
I yield back, Madam Chairwoman.
[The statement of Ranking Member Jackson Lee follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Sheila Jackson Lee
April 4, 2014
Good morning. At the outset, I would like to say that my thoughts
and prayers are with the passengers of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 and
their loved ones.
I would like to thank Chairwoman Miller for holding today's hearing
to discuss security concerns regarding individuals traveling on lost,
stolen, or fraudulent passports.
While many questions remain unanswered regarding the tragic
disappearance of Flight 370, we do know that two passengers on that
flight boarded the aircraft using stolen passports. Two Iranian
nationals were allowed to travel using Italian and Austrian passports
that had been entered into INTERPOL's Stolen and Lost Travel Document
(SLTD) database in 2012 and 2013. Reports suggest that these
individuals were not criminals or terrorists, but rather asylum seekers
hoping to reach Europe.
Nevertheless, the fact that at least in certain countries travelers
can readily board aircraft using passports that do not belong to them
is cause for serious concern. If a couple of asylum seekers can do it,
so can terrorists or criminals. In fact, there are known examples of
terrorists traveling on fraudulent documents.
According to INTERPOL, Ramzi Yousef, convicted of masterminding the
1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York, committed his crimes after
traveling internationally on a stolen passport. Also, Samantha
Lewthwaite, the so-called ``White Widow'' of a London July 2005 suicide
bomber, is wanted in Kenya and currently at large with aliases linked
to a fraudulent passport and a passport reported stolen.
It is my understanding that the United States is ahead of most of
the rest of the world when it comes to preventing individuals from
traveling on lost, stolen, or fraudulent documents. The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) systematically checks all travelers' documents
against appropriate lost and stolen databases. These checks yield
results.
For example, in fiscal year 2013, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) reviewed 17,710 possible hits against lost and stolen
databases, resulting in 496 individuals being denied from boarding
planes to the United States. Already in fiscal year 2014, CBP has
reviewed 10,806 possible hits, resulting in 159 individuals being
denied boarding.
Since the Flight 370 incident, DHS has expanded its checks to
include not just arriving passengers, but also those departing this
country. While overdue, this step should close a remaining loophole
regarding travelers using fraudulent documents to fly to or from this
country.
I hope to hear from our DHS witnesses today about why departing
passengers had not previously been included in their checks, and
whether any analysis has been done subsequently to determine whether
passengers had been departing the United States on documents that do
not belong to them.
I hope to hear from all of our witnesses about how we can encourage
our international partners to follow the lead of the United States and
a handful of other countries that regularly check travel documents
against INTERPOL's SLTD database.
It is my understanding that traveling on lost, stolen, or otherwise
fraudulent travel documents is relatively commonplace in certain parts
of the world. Doing so is made possible because fewer than 20 of
INTERPOL's 190 countries systematically check passports against the
SLTD. Although the Flight 370 incident has focused attention on this
vulnerability, it was already known to INTERPOL.
In fact, speaking at the seventh Annual ID WORLD Summit in
February, just before the Flight 370 incident, INTERPOL Secretary
General Ronald K. Noble lamented that only a handful of countries are
systematically using SLTD to screen travelers, leaving our global
security apparatus vulnerable to exploitation by criminals and
terrorists. This is unacceptable.
I hope to hear from our witnesses today about how we can encourage
other countries, particularly those we work closely with on aviation
security matters, to begin regularly screening passengers' documents
against INTERPOL's database. The security of the traveling public,
including U.S. citizens traveling between foreign countries, could well
be at stake. Again, I thank Chairwoman Miller for holding today's
hearing and the witnesses for joining us.
I yield back.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentlelady.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements might be submitted for the record.
We are pleased today to have, as I mentioned, four very
distinguished witnesses joining us today.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Madam Chairwoman, would you just allow me
to indicate that I am called to be part of a quorum in a markup
and I will be away for just a moment. I thank the Chairwoman
for her courtesy.
Mrs. Miller. Certainly.
It is a busy morning here on the Hill and we are going to
be having votes a little after 10:00. So we will move along
here.
Mr. Alan Bersin is the assistant secretary of international
affairs and chief diplomatic officer for the Department of
Homeland Security. Previously, Mr. Bersin served as
commissioner for the U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
Mr. John Wagner is the acting deputy assistant commissioner
for the office of field operations in U.S. Customs and Border
Protection. Mr. Wagner formerly served as executive director of
admissibility and passenger programs with responsibility for
all traveler admissibility-related policies and programs.
Ms. Brenda Sprague serves as deputy assistant secretary of
state for passport services in the Bureau of Consular Affairs,
a position she has held since July 2008. In this capacity, Ms.
Sprague oversees a network of 28 agencies and centers that are
responsible for the acceptance, adjudication, and issuance of
U.S. passports.
Mr. Shawn Bray is the director of INTERPOL Washington, the
United States National Central Bureau, a position he has held
since 2012. As director, Mr. Bray acts on behalf of the
attorney general as the official U.S. representative to
INTERPOL. Mr. Bray has been focused on improving partnerships
between the other 189 INTERPOL member countries and their U.S.
Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement counterparts.
The full statements of all of the witnesses will appear in
the record.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Bersin for his statement.
STATEMENT OF ALAN D. BERSIN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND CHIEF DIPLOMATIC OFFICER, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Bersin. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, Mrs. Miller,
Congressmen O'Rourke and Swalwell. I appreciate this
opportunity on this subject.
The International Criminal Police Organization, or
INTERPOL, is the world's largest transnational police
association with 190 member countries today. Each member
country has a National Central Bureau to conduct INTERPOL
activities and coordinated services within its national
territory.
Among the services INTERPOL provides to the law enforcement
entities of every member country is access to its SLTD, Stolen
and Lost Travel Document database. This database contains over
40 million records provided by nearly 170 of the organizations'
members.
On March 9, INTERPOL confirmed that two of the passports
used by passengers to board Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 had
been recorded in its Stolen and Lost Travel Document database.
As noted by the Ranking Member, INTERPOL's Secretary
General Ron Nobel noted, to the surprise of many, that very few
countries systematically query the SLTD database for the
purpose of verifying whether a passport has been reported as
lost and stolen.
Even more troubling is the minuscule rate at which
countries outside of Europe, Canada, and the United States
visa-waiver countries are contributing information to the
database.
Madam Chairwoman, as you noted, since 9/11, the United
States Government and the American people have addressed the
security vulnerabilities exposed so tragically on that day.
In the 12 years since, in a thoroughly bipartisan fashion
in which this committee has played a significant role, we have
together constructed a multi-layer, fully-automated interagency
approach to homeland security.
As additional vulnerabilities have been revealed and are
revealed, we examine and respond to them appropriately in
concert with the Congress, as we do so today in the context of
lost and stolen passports.
When an individual seeking admission to the United States
presents a foreign passport, whether he or she seeks admission
by land, by commercial air or by sea, that passport is screened
against the SLTD database prior to admission, in fact, in many
cases on multiple occasions. Now, as Mr. Wagner will explain,
we also screen out-bound passports in the same way.
Unfortunately, most countries in the INTERPOL community do
not screen travelers against the database as thoroughly as we
do in the United States. Many, not at all.
More disturbing is the alarming number of countries that
report very few and, in some cases, no lost or stolen passport
data to the SLTD database. As a condition for participation, as
the Chairwoman noted, visa waiver countries are required to do
so.
The United States, Canada, and Europe, as well as the other
VWP partners, accordingly have provided the vast majority of
the 40 million records in the SLTD database.
Some of the most populous countries in the world, notably
including China, India, and Indonesia, have contributed few, if
any, records to the database.
Despite the remarkable development of the database, 40
million records added in the past 12 years, the lack of data
provided by many INTERPOL member countries remains significant.
I have had the honor of serving on the INTERPOL executive
committee and as vice president for the Americas since November
2012, and I have been urging the organization to prioritize the
SLTD program and other border security efforts as core
functions of INTERPOL.
To be sure, Madam Chairwoman, Congressmen, there are real
and current challenges to this vision. Despite the fact that
DHS and the United States National Central Bureau have worked
to incorporate recommendations for data reporting and response
times into INTERPOL's standard operating procedures, many
countries have not been able to connect their agencies and
INTERPOL does not require them to do so.
The task ahead is encouraging our partners to more fully
utilize the SLTD database and to engage in these kinds of
border screening and security efforts. This can only add to its
value from the standpoint of American security.
I look forward to exploring with you how we may best
approach this latest challenge. It will not be the last, Madam
Chairwoman and Congressmen, but I take from our past experience
that we can forge and resolve this matter in a satisfactory
cost-effective way.
Thank you for this opportunity again, and I look forward to
responding to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Bersin and Mr. Wagner
follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Alan D. Bersin and John P. Wagner
April 4, 2014
introduction
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for holding this important
hearing today to discuss document security in the context of
international air travel.
On March 9, the International Criminal Police Organization
(INTERPOL) confirmed that two of the passports used by passengers to
board Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 had been recorded in its Stolen and
Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) database. INTERPOL's Secretary General,
Ron Noble, noted that very few countries systematically query the SLTD
database for the purposes of verifying whether a passport has been
reported as lost or stolen. INTERPOL has said that in 2013 travelers
boarded flights more than a billion times without having their passport
numbers checked against the SLTD database. This number does not include
any flight to the United States, but it is striking nonetheless. Even
more troubling is the poor rate at which countries outside the U.S.
Visa Waiver Program (VWP) are contributing information on lost and
stolen passports to the SLTD database.
At the moment, our thoughts and prayers are with the missing
passengers and crew who were on Malaysia Airlines Flight 370. DHS
appreciates the opportunity to discuss the important steps that we--in
coordination with our partners at the Department of State and the U.S.
National Central Bureau (USNCB)--have taken to mitigate vulnerabilities
associated with persons attempting to travel on lost or stolen
passports, which has been highlighted by the recent tragedy, and to
talk about the importance of information exchange to the homeland
security enterprise.
the stolen and lost travel document database
INTERPOL is the world's largest international police organization
with 190 member countries today. INTERPOL's primary goal is to ensure
that police around the world have access to the tools and services
necessary to do their jobs effectively. Among the services INTERPOL
provides to the law enforcement entities of every member country is
access to the SLTD database. The SLTD database is maintained by
INTERPOL, and it contains over 40 million records provided by nearly
170 of the organization's members.
It is important to note that when an individual seeking admission
to the United States, presents a passport, whether by land from Canada
or Mexico, by commercial air, or by sea on a cruise ship, that passport
is screened against the SLTD database prior to admission--in fact in
many cases, they are screened against the database on multiple
occasions. Unfortunately, most countries in the INTERPOL community do
not screen travelers against the SLTD database as thoroughly as we do
in the United States. The ability to screen travel information in
advance--be it against the SLTD database or a national watchlist that
included, for example, terrorist information--is an important element
of effective border and transportation security.
More disturbing is the alarming number of countries that report
very little--and in some cases no--lost and stolen passport data to
INTERPOL for inclusion in the SLTD database. As a condition for
participation, VWP countries are required to provide lost and stolen
passport data to INTERPOL for inclusion in the SLTD database or to make
such data available to the United States through other means as
designated by the Secretary, and DHS continuously monitors that data to
ensure compliance by our partners. The United States, Canada, and
Europe, as well as our other VWP partners have provided the vast
majority of the 40 million records in the SLTD database.
Alarmingly, some of the most populous countries in the world
including China, India, and Indonesia, have contributed few--if any--
records to the SLTD database. Despite the incredible development of the
SLTD database since its inception following the September 11 attacks--
40 million records added in the past 12 years is a truly noteworthy
accomplishment--the lack of data provided by many INTERPOL member
countries remains significant.
We firmly believe, based on DHS's operational experience since 9/
11, that the automated and depersonalized screening of traveler data
against derogatory administrative, counterterrorism, and law
enforcement records is an essential part of the future for homeland
security efforts around the world. The INTERPOL SLTD database is the
quintessential example of one way countries can collaborate in
preventing fraud and subsequent criminal activity. There is no reason
why a passport should not be scanned every time an individual boards a
plane to verify that the document provided is valid. These sorts of
queries can be done almost instantaneously, occur completely
automatically, and provide a first indicator of suspicion that can
guide a law enforcement response in concert with the relevant passport
issuing authority. The process provides significant confidence in the
legitimacy of the document (assuming of course that the participating
countries properly and accurately report their data into the SLTD
database).
how the united states uses sltd
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) uses the SLTD database and
data from the Department of State's (DOS's) Consular Lost and Stolen
Passport (CLASP) and the Consular Visa Lookout and Support System
(CLASS) in the air, land, and sea environments to verify the validity
of both U.S. and foreign passports. For VWP travelers, CBP vets all
Electronic System for Travel Authorization applications against the
SLTD database. In the land environment, when a traveler arrives at a
land border port of entry, CBP officers will query the document in
TECS,\1\ which includes Lost and Stolen U.S. Passports and the INTERPOL
SLTD for foreign passports. If CBP receives a hit, it refers the
individual to secondary inspection for questioning. During the
secondary inspection, CBP determines if the individual is a mala fide
traveler or if the individual is the true bearer of the reported lost
or stolen passport.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ TECS (no longer an acronym) is a key border enforcement system
supporting the vetting of travelers entering the United States and the
requirements of other Federal agencies used for law enforcement and
immigration benefit purposes. TECS supports the sharing of information
about people who are inadmissible or may pose a threat to the security
of the United States through the creation and query of ``lookout
records.'' TECS is used by more than 70,000 users, including users from
more than 20 Federal agencies that use TECS in furtherance of their
missions. TECS receives and processes traveler manifests from carriers
and supports primary and secondary inspections for almost a million
travelers and almost half a million vehicles at United States ports of
entry each day.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the air and sea environments, when CBP receives inbound and
outbound carrier advance passenger information system (APIS) data for
travelers with a foreign passport, it queries the INTERPOL SLTD
database for any matches to the document type--passport, number, and
issuing country. For U.S. citizens utilizing U.S. passports, CBP
queries TECS for matches to lost, stolen, and revoked U.S. Passports.
In the air environment, if CBP detects lost, stolen, or revoked
passports prior to boarding through CBP's pre-departure vetting or
through the Immigration Advisory Program (IAP), CBP would make a
recommendation to the air carrier not to board the passenger. If CBP
notified the carrier, but the traveler was still allowed to board with
the document that was the subject of a lost or stolen passport lookout,
the carrier would be subject to a fine for violation of Section
273(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
CBP has also developed the Carrier Liaison Program (CLP), which
enhances border security to the airlines and their security companies
by identifying improperly documented passengers destined to the United
States. CLP training enables participants, including airline check-in
personnel, boarding agents, and security company staff, to receive
hands-on instruction in fraudulent document identification, passenger
assessment, impostor identification, and traveler document
verification. When carriers encounter a lost or stolen travel document,
CLP training instructs the carriers to contact CBP's Regional Carrier
Liaison Groups (RCLGs). The RCLG offices are 24/7 operations maintained
at the airports in New York, Miami, and Honolulu, with each RCLG
maintaining responsibility for specific areas of the world to respond
to carrier concerns. The RCLGs will respond in real-time to carrier
inquiries concerning the validity of travel documented presented. After
an RCLG determination of the lost/stolen travel document has been made,
the RCLG will make a recommendation to board the passenger or to deny
boarding. To date, the CLP has trained 33,600 airline and security
personnel.
interpol and information sharing
The I-24/7 global police communications system, which our colleague
Mr. Shawn Bray, the Director of the USNCB, can speak to at great
length, is a marvel in today's world, and it is one that has largely
gone unnoticed. Each of INTERPOL's 190 member countries has a National
Central Bureau (NCB) that is typically housed within that country's
National police agency. And most significantly, each of these NCBs is
connected to the I-24/7 secure communications system. By using the
INTERPOL network, the U.S. law enforcement community can exchange
information in real time and in a secure manner with our police
counterparts in every other INTERPOL member country around the world.
This is an exceptional capability, and we have only begun to tap the
potential it embodies.
To be sure, there are real and current challenges to this vision.
Despite the fact that DHS and the USNCB have worked to incorporate
recommendations for data reporting and response times into INTERPOL's
approved SLTD standard operating procedures, INTERPOL does not require
its member countries to implement them. With regard to screening
passengers against the SLTD database, many countries do not have
advance passenger information capabilities to screen travelers prior to
arrival, or they have been unable to connect their immigration agencies
to their NCBs in order to screen documents at the time of arrival. Many
countries have been unable to connect their agencies that record lost
or stolen passport information to their NCBs, so reporting that data
has been a challenge. This may be due to a lack of the proper
information technology systems within the country, internal
restrictions on data sharing between agencies, or simple bureaucratic
complexity (for example, some countries record lost identity documents
at local police stations). These are all best practices that we employ
here in the United States that we shall continue to encourage our
partner countries to adopt.
To help address these challenges among its member countries,
INTERPOL--with assistance from DHS--has recently established the
Integrated Border Management Task Force (IBMTF). The IBMTF is charged
with assisting member countries in their approach to border management,
and how to utilize the tools and services INTERPOL offers to that end.
The project has included, for example, trainings for immigration
officials on using the SLTD database to screen in-bound passengers. The
intent is to help member countries move toward more systematic
approaches to the use of the SLTD database in daily operations. DHS
remains supportive of INTERPOL's efforts in this regard.
INTERPOL understands, as we do at DHS, that sharing data on lost
and stolen passports is an essential and fundamental part of protecting
people against crime and terrorism. Whenever you are pulled over by
State or local law enforcement, your driver's license is vetted to
verify its validity and to determine any derogatory information for
you. The SLTD database operates on the same principle, just on a global
scale, and all countries should be encouraged to adopt similar
measures. INTERPOL's SLTD database provides them with that opportunity.
It is already built, already in use, and the United States has already
proven it is a reliable repository for lost and stolen passport data
that can effectively be used during border screening. The task ahead is
encouraging our partners to more fully utilize it, which will in turn
only further add to its value.
conclusion
DHS has instituted procedures to vet all U.S. in-bound and out-
bound international travelers against the SLTD database. Any person
with a travel document that has been reported lost or stolen to
INTERPOL, who attempts to board a plane to or from the United States,
will be denied boarding until he can verify his identity.
The ability to screen for lost or stolen travel documents, however,
hinges upon foreign countries reporting their data to INTERPOL. This is
why DHS has invested significantly in ensuring that all VWP countries
report lost and stolen passports to INTERPOL, since the SLTD database
is only as valuable as the data it contains.
DHS's engagement strategy going forward is based on ``Three P's'':
Populate, Process, and Promote. We will continue to ensure that all VWP
countries populate the SLTD database effectively, and we will emphasize
to our other foreign partners the critical importance of populating the
SLTD database with their lost and stolen passport data. We will work
closely with INTERPOL to ensure that effective processes exist to
coordinate an appropriate law enforcement response when a lost or
stolen passport is encountered. Lastly, we will work bilaterally and
multilaterally to promote effective use of the SLTD database based on
DHS's experiences. As the ``Three P's'' are implemented, DHS hopes to
be even more effective in helping to secure the global aviation system,
and U.S. citizens will have greater confidence in their safety abroad.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, for your continued
support of the Department, and for your attention to this important
issue. We would be pleased to answer any questions at this time.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much, Mr. Bersin.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Wagner for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF JOHN P. WAGNER, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT
COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Wagner. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee,
and distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear today and discuss the role of U.S.
Customs and Border Protection in passport security.
I appreciate the opportunity to join my colleagues in
speaking on this very important issue which supports the core
mission of CBP.
Today I would like to discuss the sources of information
available to CBP, how we query this information, as well as our
operational responses in the different travel environments.
The ability for CBP officers to access real-time and
reliable information on all travelers seeking admission to the
United States is critical to our anti-terrorism and anti-fraud
efforts.
However secure modern documents may be today, CBP must
ensure that a traveler isn't fraudulently presenting another
individual's valid passport or other travel documentation,
whether the document is stolen or intentionally provided, to
enter the United States.
CBP uses INTERPOL's Stolen and Lost Travel Document
database, the SLTD, and Department of State's Consular Lost and
Stolen Passport and Consular Lookout and Support Systems in the
air, land, and sea environments to verify the validity and
status of travel documents.
CBP also uses the SLTD data when a citizen of a Visa Waiver
Program country applies for a travel authorization through the
Electronic System for Travel Authorization, also known as ESTA.
CBP has denied over 98,000 ESTAs since 2008 for lost and stolen
records.
In all travel environments--air, land, and sea--CBP
officers query travel documents against TECS, which is our
primary database that includes access to many enforcement
systems, including lost and stolen passport data, and against
our automated targeting systems.
In the air and sea environment, CBP has the extra advantage
of receiving airline traveler information prior to departure
from the foreign location. This enables CBP to address
potential risk factors and admissibility issues prior to
boarding the aircraft.
CBP will coordinate through our National Targeting Center
and our assets overseas in the Immigration Advisory Program or
in preclearance or we may coordinate directly with the airline
through our regional carrier liaison groups to prevent boarding
in cases where the ESTA has been denied or if a traveler does
not have a replacement document to the one reported lost or
stolen. CBP has recommended over 650 no-board recommendations
to carriers in the last 18 months.
In all environments, CBP coordinates with INTERPOL when
matches to document queries are returned from the SLTD. Many of
the cases are actually travelers with no mollified intent. They
are simply travelers that have reported a lost document, but
later found it and are trying now to use it for travel.
In this case, CBP will verify the person's identify and, if
the passport is a U.S. passport, we will allow the traveler to
proceed, but will seize the passport and return it to
Department of State.
In other cases, the traveler will have a valid replacement
document for the lost and stolen one and CBP will verify that
they are the true bearer and allow the traveler to proceed.
This often occurs in the air environment when the traveler has
not updated their airline profile with an airline and the old
passport data has been transmitted to us.
If the traveler is found to be presenting the lost or
stolen passport as an imposter or has altered and tampered with
the passport in any form, CBP will take appropriate law
enforcement action against that traveler. In the last 18
months, CBP has seized over 300 lost and stolen documents used
in an attempt to enter the United States fraudulently.
To enhance passport security operations, CBP has also
developed the Carrier Liaison Program, which provides training
to airlines and their security companies on identifying
improperly documented passengers destined to the United States.
CLP training provides airline personnel hands-on
instruction in fraudulent document identification, passenger
assessment, imposter identification, and traveler document
verification. To date, the CLP has trained 33,600 airline and
security personnel.
When carriers encounter a lost or stolen document, CLP
training instructs the carriers to contact CBP's regional
carrier liaison groups that are 24/7 operations maintained at
the airports in New York, Miami, and Honolulu.
The RCLGs will respond in real time to carrier inquiries
concerning the validity of the travel document presented. After
an RCLG determination of the lost and stolen travel document
has been made, the RCLG will make the recommendation to board
the passenger or deny boarding.
So in concert with our partners, CBP strives to ensure that
travelers who present a risk are appropriately interviewed or
vetted before boarding a flight bound for the United States and
that any document deficiencies are addressed before traveling
to the United States.
CBP has placed officers in strategic airports overseas to
work with carriers and host nation authorities and has built
strong liaisons with airline representatives to improve our
ability to address threats as early as possible and effectively
expand our security efforts beyond the physical borders of the
United States.
These efforts seek to keep our transportation sector safe
and prevent threats from ever reaching the United States. These
efforts also enhance efficiency and create savings for the U.S.
Government and the private sector by preventing inadmissible
travelers from traveling to the United States.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I am
happy to answer your questions.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much, Mr. Wagner.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Ms. Sprague for her
testimony.
STATEMENT OF BRENDA S. SPRAGUE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
PASSPORT SERVICES, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
Ms. Sprague. Chairwoman Miller, distinguished Members of
the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today
about the many things the Department of State does to promote
the security of the U.S. passport and deter passport fraud. I
appreciate your focus on this important topic.
We at the Department of State believe, to prevent passport
fraud, you need to focus on five areas: A sophisticated
document with technically advanced security features; a robust
and vigorous adjudication system; real-time sharing of data; a
proactive anti-fraud program; and outreach to U.S. citizens to
educate them about the important form of identification.
Because of the access the passport provides, we have spent
years creating products with high-tech security features,
including photo biometrics, secure laminates, microprinting,
color-shifting ink, and enhanced electronics, that render these
documents virtually impossible to counterfeit.
But as the sophistication of the U.S. passport increases,
so do the efforts of those attempting to commit passport fraud.
Today's passport fraud most often involves fraudulent birth
certificates, fake identities, and look-alike photos.
Passport adjudicators spend hours annually in mandated
training to make certain that they have the skills to identify
various types of fraud. We also integrate several real-time
front-end database checks into our adjudication system. But
this is not enough.
As recent events have shown, even a well-designed, well-
adjudicated passport is still a vulnerability in the wrong
hands.
Domestically, we counter this by reporting lost, stolen,
and revoked passports to TECS, the system Custom and Border
Protection uses to screen arriving passengers at U.S. ports of
entry.
In turn, CBP TECS sends us U.S. passports it seizes at U.S.
borders so that we can identify patterns and determine whether
the bearer submits a fraudulent passport application.
Internationally, we lead the way in reporting lost, stolen,
and revoked passport data to the INTERPOL Lost and Stolen
Travel Documents.
We provide INTERPOL with real-time data, including the
passport number and date of issue, so it is accessible to
member law enforcement authorities world-wide.
We also require all countries in our Visa Waiver Program to
report lost and stolen data to INTERPOL if they wish to
maintain VWP status.
The Departments of State and Homeland Security use the SLTD
to vet visa applicants, in-bound flight and vessel manifests,
and people crossing land borders at all U.S. ports of entry.
If used consistently by international law and border
enforcement agencies, the SLTD effectively prevents imposters
from using lost and stolen passports they bought or obtained
fraudulently for travel.
Though I believe our documents and systems are strong,
there is never time to rest on our laurels. The U.S. passport
is one of the most sought-after documents in the world.
Not only is it an international travel document, it is also
a legal form of identification and might be used to determine
eligibility for entitlement benefits, to apply for a driver's
license, to confirm employment eligibility, to qualify for a
mortgage, or to open a bank account.
This means that we must continually assess the passport
security features and design for potential vulnerabilities and
incorporate new measures as technology advances.
Through our website, travel.state.gov, and through
community outreach by our 29 passport agencies, we remind U.S.
citizens of the importance of safeguarding their passports and
provide guidance for reporting to us if the documentation is
lost or stolen.
We continually review our methods to improve our passport
issuance system and fraud detection capabilities and look for
new ways to partner with other agencies, educate the public and
strengthen existing procedures.
We welcome opportunities to expand these efforts with
Federal, State, local, and international agencies to protect
our citizens and promote safe, secure, and legal travel
throughout the world.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you
today. I am happy to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Sprague follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brenda S. Sprague
April 4, 2014
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today about the many things the Department of
State does to promote security through interagency cooperation,
international data sharing, and integrity of the U.S. passport.
First, I'd like to offer my thoughts and prayers to the family and
loved ones of those on Malaysia Airlines Flight 370. Our heartfelt
thanks go out to the international effort of men and women working
around-the-clock to solve the mystery of this plane's disappearance.
The initial investigation uncovered a troubling case of imposters
using stolen Austrian and Italian passports to board the Malaysian
jetliner. Although it might not be related to the plane's ultimate
fate, this episode underscores the importance of continued and
comprehensive data sharing among the Federal and international
communities to prevent acts of international terrorism, illegal
immigration, and other serious forms of international crime, as well as
theft or misuse of passports.
The State Department works closely with our colleagues at the
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and other
agencies to ensure our documents, and reports of their
misappropriation, are shared broadly and quickly.
Domestically, we do this through data sharing of U.S. lost, stolen,
and revoked passport data to TECS, a system used by the U.S. Customs
and Border Protection to screen arriving travelers at ports of entry.
We also send to TECS information we receive about lost and stolen
foreign passports.
Internationally, we have been in the forefront of a significant
push to promote reporting of lost and stolen passport data to the
INTERPOL Stolen and Lost Travel Document--or SLTD--database. The State
Department provides INTERPOL with comprehensive, real-time data on
lost, stolen, and revoked U.S. passports--including the passport number
and date of issue--so it is accessible to member law enforcement
authorities world-wide. Annually, about 300,000 U.S. passport books and
20,000 passport cards are reported by U.S. citizens as lost or stolen--
resulting in more than 3.2 million reports to the SLTD database since
we began participating in 2004. The Department chose to add revoked
passport data to the SLTD in 2010, and since then, have reported more
than 3,500 revoked passports.
The Departments of State and Homeland Security use SLTD to vet visa
applicants, in-bound flight and vessel manifests, and land border
crossers at U.S. ports of entry. U.S. Customs and Border Protection
officers at U.S. ports of entry send to the Department seized U.S.
passports which we analyze to look for patterns and determine whether
the bearer submitted a fraudulent passport application. Applications
that exhibit evidence of fraud, complicity in alien smuggling, or other
derogatory information are then referred to Fraud Prevention Managers
in the domestic passport agencies and centers, and Diplomatic Security
field offices for further investigation and possible prosecution. Where
warranted, this information might be input into internal systems to be
used if the bearer of the passport applies for another passport.
On the international front, the State Department works with member
countries of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) alliance to
detect documents reported as lost or stolen. This program, called the
Regional Movement Alert System--or RMAS--is geared toward preventing
criminals from boarding flights to participating countries. We are also
engaging Taiwan--a non-INTERPOL member--to provide direct two-way
transmission of lost, stolen, and revoked U.S. and Taiwanese passport
data.
Perhaps most importantly, U.S. law requires all 37 countries
participating in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), as well as Taiwan, to
report lost and stolen passport data to the United States Government
via INTERPOL or through other means designated by the Secretary of
Homeland Security. We believe approximately 70 percent of the SLTD's
current data comes from VWP countries. The Department of State cannot
compel foreign countries to check against this database; however, the
Department does automatically screen against the SLTD database--i.e.,
electronic applications of immigrant and nonimmigrant visa applicants
are screened against the INTERPOL database to ensure they are not using
a passport that was reported lost or stolen.
Despite the Department's important domestic and international
efforts to track reports of lost, stolen, or revoked documents,
challenges remain which must be addressed. That's why the State
Department must have other fraud prevention tools to help us verify
citizens' identity and entitlement to a U.S. passport.
The U.S. passport is one of the most sought-after documents in the
world. Although primarily used for international travel, it is also a
legal form of identification and might be used to verify eligibility
for Social Security, health care, or entitlement benefits. It can also
be used to apply for a driver's license, obtain a mortgage, and verify
employment eligibility. A passport is also one of the few photo
identification documents available to minors and can be used in support
of school enrollment or educational assistance. These key points, along
with the message of keeping the passport secure, are communicated to
the public at outreach events, through the travel.state.gov website,
and through social media tools.
Because of the access a passport provides, we have invested in
high-tech security features including photo biometrics, secure
laminates, micro-printing, color shifting security ink, and enhanced
electronics that render these documents virtually impossible to
counterfeit.
As the sophistication and complexity of the U.S. passport has
increased, so have the efforts of those attempting to commit passport
fraud. The days of carefully peeling back the cover to replace the
photo in a U.S. passport are long past. Today's passport fraud most
often involves fraudulent supporting identity (``breeder'') documents:
Fraudulent birth certificates, false identities, and look-alike photos
(sometimes with the cooperation of the legitimate bearer), are a few of
the methods employed by imposters and other criminals.
To counter breeder document and identity fraud, we employ a robust
fraud prevention strategy that includes in-depth training to our
adjudicators, verifying information against Government and commercial
databases, and technology, such as facial recognition. Our employees
receive twice-monthly training to identify various types of fraud and
highlight current trends in this type of fraud. We also integrate
several real-time, front-end database checks into our adjudication
system including facial recognition, Social Security, and death record
verifications.
During the adjudication process, we use the National Law
Enforcement Telecommunications System network to verify drivers'
licenses. We run checks against files from the FBI to identify people
on probation, parole, or pre-trial release who might be trying to
obtain a U.S. passport to flee the country. Additionally, we use the
services of several commercial data providers which allow our employees
to verify an applicant's social footprint and detect fraudulent
addresses, phone numbers, and other discrepancies in their application
information.
Though I believe our systems and processes are strong, none is ever
invulnerable. That's why we continually review our methods to improve
issuance and fraud detection and look for new ways to strengthen
existing procedures.
In this vein, we are currently developing a system that will allow
citizens to report lost and stolen passport books and passport cards
on-line immediately, thereby speeding the information-sharing process.
We chair an interagency working group that meets weekly developing a
next generation passport product that might include--among other
advanced features--laser-perforated pages to prevent page
substitutions.
The Department engages actively with State vital records bureaus to
encourage contributions to a National centralized database of birth and
death records provided by The National Association for Public Health
Statistics and Information Systems. We are implementing a Memorandum of
Understanding with the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and engaging State
corrections agencies to share parole and pre-trial data.
To protect our citizens and promote safe, secure, and legal travel
throughout the world, we welcome opportunities to continue to expand
these efforts with Federal, State, local, and international agencies.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I
am happy to answer any questions you might have.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much, Ms. Sprague.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Bray for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF SHAWN A. BRAY, DIRECTOR, INTERPOL WASHINGTON, U.S.
NATIONAL CENTRAL BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Bray. Thank you, Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member
Jackson Lee, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee.
It is an honor to be here today to provide you with an
interview of INTERPOL's Stolen and Lost Travel Documents
database, or SLTD, and how INTERPOL Washington and our partner
agencies utilize this global resource to combat transnational
crime and terrorism.
Before I get started, I would like to echo the previous
statements of the panel regarding the tragic disappearance of
Malaysia Airlines Flight 370. At INTERPOL Washington, our
thoughts and prayers remain with the families and loved ones of
the flight's passengers and crew. This incident certainly
serves to underscore the need for coordination and
collaboration across international borders to create a safer,
more secure world for us all.
As you are aware, the International Criminal Police
Organization, commonly known as INTERPOL, is the largest police
organization in the world. Its membership is comprised of the
national police authorities from 190 member countries, all of
which participate in the organization on a voluntary basis.
INTERPOL exists to ensure and promote the widest possible
mutual assistance between these police authorities. In order to
achieve this high level of cooperation, each INTERPOL member
country is required to establish and maintain a National
Central Bureau.
INTERPOL Washington is that National Central Bureau for the
United States. A component of the Department of Justice, we are
unique in that we are also co-managed by the Department of
Homeland Security.
In our 46th year of operation, INTERPOL Washington is
supported by a multi-sector workforce consisting of a full-time
staff from the Department of Justice and additional senior
personnel representing more than 30 U.S. law enforcement
agencies.
Simply stated, our mission is to facilitate international
police cooperation, communication, and investigations through
INTERPOL on behalf of the United States.
We support and heavily utilize INTERPOL's databases and
resources, its secure global police communications system, the
I-24/7, in order to accomplish this mission.
It is the I-24/7 that connects the U.S. directly with
INTERPOL, its resources, but, also, directly with our 189 other
country member partners.
The use of its databases and I-24/7 are governed by
INTERPOL's rules on the processing of data. It is these rules
that allow INTERPOL Washington to extend the services and data,
including the SLTD to U.S. law enforcement.
In accordance with our internal information-sharing
strategy, INTERPOL Washington has now extended the ability to
query SLTD to all Federal, State, local, and Tribal authorities
through existing U.S. law enforcement data systems.
The SLTD itself is essentially a searchable repository of
stolen and lost passport visa and identity document information
designed to help prevent illicit international travel and false
impersonation by criminals and terrorists.
A query against the SLTD database in which there is a match
will result in the return of only information about the suspect
document itself, but will not include personally identifiable
information about the document holder.
Although strongly encouraged by INTERPOL, participation in
SLTD is voluntary and does vary country by country. The United
States has embraced SLTD in its efforts as a critical component
of its border security and transportation strategies.
In the United States, the Bureau of Consular Affairs at the
Department of State is our designated partner and source for
the stolen and lost passport data that is populated into the
Stolen and Lost Travel Documents database.
Currently, the United States maintains over 3 million of
the more than 40 million records contained in the SLTD. U.S.
participation in SLTD is managed at INTERPOL Washington by our
operations and command center.
Working on a 24-by-7 basis, we coordinate the entry of that
U.S. passport data into the SLTD and, also, verify and resolve
any matches against the database by either foreign or domestic
authorities.
In 2013, U.S. law enforcement, border security and consular
authorities queried the SLTD more than 238 million times,
accounting for approximately 30 percent of all query activity
world-wide.
These queries resulted in more than 25,000 matches against
the database, the overwhelming majority of which were resolved
administratively.
A small number of these hits, however, represented a
serious potentially criminal concern and were immediately
referred to appropriate law enforcement authorities for further
investigation.
As you can see, INTERPOL Washington has aggressively
pursued the use of SLTD to enhance and support our National
security and investigations.
We will also continue to explore additional applications
for SLTD to further assist our law enforcement community and
ensure the safety of the American people.
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, I sincerely
appreciate the opportunity to testify about our role in this
important program, and I would be pleased to answer any
questions you have at this time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bray follows:]
Prepared Statement of Shawn A. Bray
April 4, 2014
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to be here today to provide
you with an overview of the INTERPOL Stolen/Lost Travel Document
Database, or SLTD, and how INTERPOL Washington, the United States
National Central Bureau, and its partner agencies utilize this
international resource to combat transnational crime and terrorism.
background
INTERPOL
The International Criminal Police Organization--INTERPOL--is the
largest international police organization in the world. Its membership
is comprised of the respective national police authorities of its 190
member countries, which participate on a voluntary basis.
INTERPOL is a world-renowned brand in the international law
enforcement community, but one that is often misunderstood by the
public at large. Simply put, INTERPOL exists to ensure and promote the
widest possible mutual assistance between the criminal police
authorities of its member countries, and it seeks to `` . . . establish
and develop all institutions likely to contribute effectively to the
prevention and suppression of ordinary law crimes.''\1\ INTERPOL is
both mindful of the differing national laws of its member countries and
active in its protection of human rights.
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\1\ Article 2, Constitution of the International Criminal Police
Organization--INTERPOL.
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INTERPOL National Central Bureaus
Under INTERPOL's constitution, each member country is required to
establish and maintain a ``National Central Bureau'', or NCB,
responsible for ensuring the ``constant and active cooperation'' of the
particular country.\2\ An NCB serves as a critical link between the
national law enforcement authorities of an INTERPOL member country, its
foreign counterparts, and the INTERPOL General Secretariat.\3\ Except
for certain general guidelines and conditions of membership in
INTERPOL, the structure, placement, and operation of an NCB is entirely
within the control and discretion of the respective member country.
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\2\ Ibid, Article 31.
\3\ Ibid, Article 32.
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INTERPOL Washington--The United States National Central Bureau
Located in Washington, DC, INTERPOL Washington is the United
States' National Central Bureau (USNCB). Our agency is unique in that
it is a component of the U.S. Department of Justice and co-managed with
the Department of Homeland Security under a Memorandum of
Understanding.\4\ INTERPOL Washington's mission is well-defined by
statute and regulation and includes facilitating international police
cooperation; transmitting information of a criminal justice,
humanitarian, and other law enforcement related nature, and
coordinating and integrating information in international criminal
investigations.\5\ Staffed entirely by U.S. law enforcement agents,
officers, and analysts, INTERPOL Washington provides the means for over
18,000 Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement agencies in
the United States to communicate and collaborate with police globally.
Just to clarify any potential ambiguity, let me underscore that the
USNCB is not a part of the INTERPOL organization. It is a U.S.
Government agency that serves as the U.S. link to INTERPOL.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of Justice Pertaining to U.S.
Membership in the International Criminal Police Organization
(INTERPOL), Management of the INTERPOL-U.S. National Central Bureau,
and Related Matters.
\5\ 22 U.S.C. 263a; Title 28 CFR Subpart F-2 0.34.
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Sharing INTERPOL Information
Fundamental to INTERPOL are its core functions to provide its
member countries with secure global police communication services and
access to its operational data services and databases. This is achieved
through an encrypted, virtual private network known as the ``I-24/7''
secure communications system. INTERPOL ensures the quality of its data
and the efficiency with which it is processed by adhering to a
transparent set of operating guidelines known as INTERPOL's Rules on
the Processing of Data, or RPD.
Under the RPD, NCBs may directly access INTERPOL's Information
System. This access permits an NCB to manage its data contained in the
system; query INTERPOL's databases; transmit messages; obtain and use
INTERPOL Notices, and follow up on positive database query results. The
RPD also allows NCBs to extend system access to their respective
national authorities. In the United States, INTERPOL Washington extends
query access to INTERPOL's investigative databases, which includes the
Stolen/Lost Travel Documents Database, or SLTD, to all U.S. law
enforcement, border protection, and consular authorities in support of
their official duties.
The Stolen/Lost Travel Document Database (SLTD)
Terrorist attacks over the last few decades gave rise to the
realization that many of the perpetrators were known suspects who had
been traveling internationally while concealing their identity through
the use of false passports. To address this threat, INTERPOL conceived
the idea of creating a technology that would allow the real-time
verification of travel documents that had been reported lost, stolen,
or revoked by their respective national issuing authorities.
Developed in 2000 as a database of blank passports that had been
reported stolen, SLTD rapidly expanded to include travel documents
reported as stolen from, or lost by, the bearer. Becoming fully
operational in July 2002, SLTD has grown from housing less than 300,000
records to more than 40,000,000 records in 2014, searchable in real
time via fixed or mobile network database solutions. Using either
solution, query results are available to authorized law enforcement and
border security users in mere seconds.
The SLTD is one of the largest INTERPOL databases and it is
considered among the world's primary tools for detecting stolen and
lost travel documents in order to prevent illicit international travel
and false personation by criminals and terrorists. Specifically, SLTD
is a searchable repository of non-personal information drawn from
passports, visas, and identity documents that have been reported stolen
or lost by issuing authorities of INTERPOL member countries. It also
includes information about stolen passport blanks and travel documents
that have been revoked by an issuing national authority.
SLTD-authorized users are able to query specific passport numbers
against the database in support of investigative or border security
functions. A positive ``hit'' against the database will return data
elements about a suspect document that include the issuing country,
document type, date of the theft or loss, and a limited amount of
information related to the circumstances of the theft or loss, as
provided by the INTERPOL reporting country. SLTD data does not include
Personally Identifiable Information about passport holders, as defined
under U.S. law, nor does the database provide access to information
about all U.S. passports--only those that have been reported as stolen,
lost, or revoked by issuing national authorities.
Only a member country's passport issuing authority, in coordination
with its corresponding NCB, is authorized to enter and modify records
in SLTD pertaining to the theft, loss, or revocation of its national
travel documents. In the United States, the Department of State's
Bureau of Consular Affairs is the designated source for lost, stolen,
or revoked U.S. passport data submitted to SLTD through INTERPOL
Washington. Currently, more than 3 million of the more than 40 million
records contained in SLTD pertain to U.S. passports.
Although strongly encouraged by INTERPOL, participation in SLTD is
voluntary on the part of INTERPOL member countries. While levels of
participation vary on a country-by-country basis, the United States has
embraced SLTD as a critical part of its strategy to combat illicit
international travel and enhanced border security.
United States Utilization of SLTD
United States participation in SLTD is managed through our
Operations and Command Center. Working 24/7/365, INTERPOL Washington
partners with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the
Department of State to make SLTD available for vetting against all in-
bound and out-bound international travelers and visa applicants. With
respect to international air travel, CBP receives Advance Passenger
Information System (APIS) data from the carriers for those travelers
in-bound to and out-bound from the United States. CBP queries the
foreign travel document data it receives via APIS data against SLTD for
any matches to the listed travel documents. As an additional security
measure, INTERPOL Washington also makes available all INTERPOL Notices
and lookouts for fugitives, persons of interest, missing persons, and
career criminals to CBP and all U.S. law enforcement via DHS's TECS and
the National Crime Information Center database administered by the FBI.
In the event of a hit, our command center staff immediately seeks
to verify and resolve all matches against SLTD on foreign travel
documents with our foreign partners. Conversely, command center staff
also coordinates with our international counterparts to resolve cases
involving matches on U.S. passports presented at foreign border control
points and to coordinate the appropriate administrative or law
enforcement action.
In 2013, U.S. law enforcement, border security, and consular
authorities queried SLTD more than 238 million times through INTERPOL
Washington, which accounted for approximately 30 percent of all queries
conducted by authorities world-wide. Of the more than 25,000 hits
against the database that occurred during that time, the overwhelming
majority were resolved administratively. A small number of these hits,
however, represented a serious, potentially criminal concern, and were
referred to the appropriate law enforcement authority for further
investigation and resolution.
For example, INTERPOL Madrid coordinated with INTERPOL Washington
last year to prevent an imposter, a Gambian national using stolen or
lost U.S. passport, from traveling to New York. Investigation revealed
the passport had been issued less than 30 days earlier. The subject was
denied entry to the United States and the passport was recovered by
Spanish authorities for return to U.S. authorities. The matter was
referred to Spanish authorities for further investigation.
In another example, INTERPOL Sofia intercepted an Iranian national,
who was traveling on a stolen or lost U.S. passport and posing as a
U.S. citizen. INTERPOL Washington coordinated with U.S. and Bulgarian
authorities to determine the subject's true identity, which resulted in
his arrest and the recovery of the passport.
In addition to the large-scale, systematic screening of
international travelers, SLTD may also be queried in support of an
investigation or other official matter. Building upon our Law
Enforcement Information Sharing Strategy, we have now extended the
ability to query SLTD to all local, State, Federal, and Tribal law
enforcement agencies through nationally-available systems such as Nlets
and N-DEx, the FBI's National Data Exchange.
Continuing Challenges
Notwithstanding the considerable progress that has been achieved
since SLTD was first introduced, significant challenges remain in
realizing its full potential. Of the INTERPOL member countries that
participate in SLTD, many do not routinely contribute data on lost/
stolen documents and fewer still regularly screen travel documents
against the database. This participation varies on a country-by-country
basis as a consequence of such factors as national policy, lack of
connection or cooperation between law enforcement, issuing, and border
control authorities, and capacity, i.e. cost of deployment and existing
IT infrastructure.
The Way Forward
Just as the use of SLTD continues to grow, so too does INTERPOL's
vision for detecting and deterring the illicit international travel of
criminals and terrorists. Building upon I-24/7, its proven and highly
adaptable global police communications network, INTERPOL is today
implementing additional tools and services to assist law enforcement.
Recently made operational, INTERPOL's TDAWN--Travel Documents
Associated With Notices--enables law enforcement officers to identify
wanted criminals that are subject to INTERPOL Notices when checking
associated travel documents.
TDAWN, as well as other operational and forensic databases that now
form the ``INTERPOL Travel ID and Document Center'', hold promise to
further enhance efforts to combat the illicit international travel that
threatens our public safety, transportation, commerce, and national
security. And, just as INTERPOL Washington has aggressively exploited
the use of SLTD, we will continue to explore the potential applications
of these new and promising capabilities.
Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, distinguished Members
of the subcommittee; I sincerely appreciate the opportunity to testify
about this important program and our role in it. I would be happy to
answer any questions you may have.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much.
I certainly appreciate all of the witnesses. You have been
very, very informative on this, I think, very interesting issue
and something that I think the United States Congress needs to
be looking at a bit more.
Because, really, the purpose of this hearing--first of all,
we have a great story to tell, as has been mentioned here this
morning.
The United States has a great story to tell about how
significantly we have ratcheted up our security--our document
security, et cetera, for our American citizens, particularly
flying domestically here since 9/11. It really is a remarkable
achievement by our Nation, I think.
So I want to make sure that our United States citizens do
recognize and have a high degree of confidence and comfort
level in the fact of what is happening with our various
Government agencies when our citizens are traveling
domestically here.
But as we are very aware now--and I think the American
citizens are much more aware because of the tragedy of
Malaysian Flight 370--that, if you are an American citizen and
you are traveling internationally, particularly from one
international country to another, they don't have the same type
of security with their data documentation that we do.
I suppose we know that, but, yet, we need to look at what
types of things we could do, perhaps, to incentivize others to
improve a bit, particularly when we see in the Malaysia Flight
370 there were American citizens traveling on that aircraft.
So, since that has happened, as the world continues to
search for that flight, we decided to have this hearing this
morning really to look into this issue a bit and explore what
types of options we might have.
Certainly one that comes to mind immediately--and it has
been mentioned here, of course, extensively in the testimony
today and in our opening comments, both myself and my Ranking
Member.
I mean, we have 38 countries--we have a list of the 38
countries that do--these are our friends. These are our allies,
these nations--that are under the visa-free travel, the VWP
program.
This is a program the United States started back in the
1980s, really, as a way to expedite travel from our allied
countries into the United States for tourism, for commerce, et
cetera.
Since 9/11, we have had great success with them certainly
checking--or giving us information if there are lost or stolen
passports. So that is all good.
However, it is interesting--and it really has come to
light, I think, because of the Malaysia flight--that these same
countries are not really checking as they could for the
potential of stolen or lost passports on their database when
people are getting on their flights.
So, again, these are other nations. I think the United
States--obviously, they are our friends. They are our allies,
et cetera. But we do have this particular program with them.
I am just wondering--as I mentioned in my opening
statement, it is my intention--we are looking at introducing
legislation that would require them, as a participant in this
program, to really not only just regularly submit information
on lost and stolen passports, but, really, for these countries
also to routinely check the database for passengers who are
boarding these flights.
I mean, you look at the list of the countries here. As I
say, these are our friends and allies--our closest allies in
the world, really. I mean, you look at France and Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, et cetera, and this information is
available.
Really, in some ways, it would seem to me that many of
these countries don't need to be incentivized by the United
States. Perhaps they will start doing it on their own after
what has come to light with the Malaysia flight.
But I guess I would throw that question out. Maybe start
with Mr. Bersin.
What is your thought about actually legislation about
something like that? What do you think would be the reaction of
our allied countries for something like that? Would they
consider it an intrusion? What would your thought be on
something like that?
Mr. Bersin. Madam Chairwoman, so, of course, you recognize
that, pending the submission of legislation, this is a--in
which the department would have a formal review process----
Mrs. Miller. Right.
Mr. Bersin [continuing]. This is a good-faith response to
your inquiry based----
Mrs. Miller. I appreciate that. Yes. There has not been
legislation introduced. But, as I say, it is my intent to do
so.
Mr. Bersin. So looking at the way in which visa waiver
countries operate now, we do require them to populate the
database so that every time someone comes on the way to the
United States we can query that database maintained by
INTERPOL, operated, as Ms. Sprague indicated, by the NCB and
find lost and stolen documents. The number is great because of
the requirement.
Also, when you get on a foreign airline and they come to--
someone is coming on a foreign airline from those countries, we
get the same benefit because the advanced passenger information
requirement pertains to any flight from any country, whether
visa waiver or else, coming toward the United States.
The question you raised, which is whether, as a condition
of participating in the Visa Waiver Program, they ought to be
compelled to screen against the database with regard to all
flights, regardless of whether they are coming toward us or
going elsewhere, poses an interesting policy question.
It does address the issue that we see highlighted by
Malaysia Airline Flight 370 and the two Iranians using the lost
or stolen passport issued in Italy and Austria. It is a
legitimate issue.
I believe, though, that we are going to have to assess
whether, of all the things that we would require that do not
have a direct impact on us--whether that would be one of them I
think is an open question, speaking frankly. It is an important
question, but I don't think that the answer is a
straightforward ``yes.''
Thank you.
Mrs. Miller. I appreciate that.
Anyone else have a comment on that?
Mr. Wagner.
Mr. Wagner. We do encourage many nations to develop their
own advanced passenger information systems, and we work with
them to help them do that. You know, we try to put some
consistency in the format and the data elements so the airlines
don't have many different systems to provide to many different
countries.
But it starts with collecting passenger manifest
information at an appropriate time in the airline process so a
government can take a response and, you know, a lot of
countries don't have the capacity to even do that. Some of them
do in varying degrees.
Then the ability to run that set of data against the
different databases that are there, you know, for that
government to access and--you know, it really becomes a
technology and a resource issue for a lot of the governments to
do.
In the cases where we have had some of our close partners
develop these type systems, we have also brokered some
arrangements to help them target that information and help them
review it and exchange information in that, and we have located
some of our personnel on the ground to work with their
authorities to help them adjudicate a lot of those passenger
manifests. We have officers in Panama. We have officers in
Mexico. It is an extension of our Immigration Advisory Program.
But we can work with travelers traveling--we can work with
those governments to identify travelers traveling into those
countries to help them to identify that.
We have had some success with the use of lost and stolen
documents entering Panama and entering Mexico to be able to do
that. So we will continue to push certain countries to expand
on those agreements and, really, on those capabilities.
Mrs. Miller. Following up, Mr. Wagner, because it was in
your testimony, I think--or one of you--that testified that CBP
was going to be--it just started a screening for lost and
stolen passports on the out-bound flights, and I know you have
been doing that on the in-bound flights.
Could you explain to the subcommittee here exactly what we
have been doing in the past and what we are doing now and why
we are doing that and how it advantages us from a security risk
standpoint?
Mr. Wagner. Yes. We do get 100 percent of the commercial
air and sea passengers departing the United States, their
manifests in advance of departure.
Historically, we have screened them for some of our top
threats that we face, terrorist screening, database hits, no-
fly hits, some of our targeting and analysis hits. We have
recently added the lost and stolen database query to those
manifests and the screening of those manifests.
We are looking now--I want to say we get about 60 to 80
hits a day total. We are looking to program our systems to be
able to see if we can administratively reconcile some of those
hits so we are not chasing down, you know, some administrative-
type action.
So in cases where a person hasn't updated their airline
profile and the airline has transmitted the old data to us or
the person has entered on a different document and we have
allowed that and we can see that, we can reconcile that because
they had a replacement document legitimately.
As we have seen on the in-bound, the majority of our hits
are reconciled in an administrative manner because the person
has a replacement document or they have lost and found their
document then.
So we are seeing ways we can program our system to help us
better pinpoint the ones that truly have some mollified intent
and depart the United States on a true lost and stolen
document.
Then we are working with TSA, also, to see if there is a
way we can build in working with the airlines to put some
indicators and potentially even prohibiting printing the
boarding pass when we do get these hits to give us time to
reconcile this information and respond.
We do rely a lot on the work the airlines and TSA already
does to check the photo documentation of the traveler and
ensure that traveler is properly credentialed and the work they
do through the screening activities before that person does
board as well, too. So we leverage a lot of those actions as
well.
Mrs. Miller. I appreciate that.
Even though we are talking about visa security and passport
security, I think INTERPOL is such an interesting organization
and has done just such remarkable work over the years.
You mentioned all the member countries, Mr. Bray, and the
kind of information sharing you have. But let me just ask you:
For instance, if you had--if somebody in Germany who was a sex
offender in Germany got on an aircraft and was flying into the
United States, would they be sharing that kind of information
through INTERPOL with us?
I am not just talking about terrorism, but other kinds of
threats to security here in the United States. Is that--just so
I understand, sir, how the information sharing works through
the organization.
Mr. Bray. Yes, Madam Chairwoman. That type of information
can be received, maybe--from Germany, from other countries. We
routinely receive information regarding traveling sex
offenders--generally, registered sex offenders in many of the
countries that have a registry for that, but certainly from
countries that may be just simply notifying us that a sex
offender from their country is traveling.
We communicate that information immediately to our border
control authorities, to CBP, so a determination can be made as
to admissibility in the United States. But that is one story.
I mean, there is information regarding criminals,
terrorists, modus operandi that are transmitted on a daily
basis. The command center at INTERPOL Washington, as I said, is
24/7/365.
This past month they processed over 30,000 messages to and
from the international law enforcement community. This is the
work that we do every day. The SLTD has been just, honestly, a
very key component of our work that we do and that we continue
to do to enhance U.S. security.
INTERPOL Washington, as we spoke about, is a Department of
Justice concern. There are no foreign law enforcement officers
there.
It is strictly U.S. law enforcement, and it is us using
INTERPOL and its tools to help overcome linguistic, legal, and
sometimes geographic and cultural barriers that inhibit U.S.
law enforcement cooperation with other foreign countries.
It has been, as you said, a great success story and it is
one that I think we will be able to build upon soundly in the
future.
Mrs. Miller. Yes, Mr. Bersin.
Mr. Bersin. The clarification--and I asked--Mr. Bray
indicated that we can receive information on foreign criminal
records and, in fact, the NCB is the vehicle through which 190
countries can communicate.
There are sex offender--registered sex offenders, but
routinely that information actually would not come unless there
is a specific case or a specific law enforcement inquiry.
Because, in fact, when a German gets on an airplane to the
United States, CBP knows that he is coming, but the German
authorities don't know that he is coming.
Unless that German sex offender or murderer--unless that
record is in the FBI database, we have no routine insight into
what is in the criminal data records of other countries.
That is the issue that--Mr. Bray is entirely right, that,
if there is a specific case or a specific inquiry, NCB would
receive that information.
But the point is, it is not a routine data exchange because
we don't have routine access to German criminal records any
more than they have routine access, unless there is a case, to
our criminal records.
Mrs. Miller. You know, one other question.
This subcommittee and our full committee is interested in
pursuing some legislation in regards to biometrics for visas,
et cetera, and certainly that is the only surefire way of
verifying somebody's identity, I suppose, particularly for--in
this case, we are only talking about foreign travelers into the
United States.
Does anyone have any thoughts--again, I know we are talking
about passport security, but visa security as well--in regards
to how biometrics are an important tool for something like
that?
Perhaps even, Ms. Sprague, from the Department of State, do
you have any comment on that?
Ms. Sprague. I would never pretend to be an expert on
visas. But, as you know, all visa applicants do provide 10
fingerprints, and, of course, those can be verified by CBP at
entry. So probably the most reliable biometric generally
accepted is fingerprints, and they are already collected.
Mrs. Miller. Anyone else have any comment on the
biometrics?
Mr. Bersin. Part of the Visa Waiver Program, Madam
Chairwoman--one of the requirements Congress imposed was that
we enter into something called the Preventing and Combating
Serious Crime, the PCSC, agreement. There is also a national
security agreement that is required that would facilitate the
exchange of information.
We do have--with each of the 38 countries, we do have a
PCSC agreement, and, in fact, with some countries that are not
VWP members, we have those agreements. But we are just at the
very dawn of creating a mechanism to exchange.
But one of the exchanges that is provided is biometric. We
can query each other's fingerprint databases and then, if there
is a red light or an alert, we can then follow up in the way
that Ms. Sprague suggested, by having the NCB or attaches
abroad say--call the police authority and say, ``What is that
red hit about?'' and then we get the information. But we are
just at the dawn of that development.
Mrs. Miller. Well, thank you very much.
Certainly information is power. Right? Information and the
sharing of information is such a critical component of our
security here. So we appreciate that.
With that, the Chairwoman recognizes the Ranking Member.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the Chairwoman and the
witnesses again.
In my opening statement, I mentioned two individuals, and I
am going to mention them again because, in the present
circumstances of the Malaysian Flight 370, the investigation
initially has not pointed to the two individuals as having
criminal intent or any intent to bring the plane down.
The initial facts--or at least what is attributed to these
two individuals with false passports is a benign, but certainly
important, issue of asylum and their desperation and
frustration, and they might even draw empathy or sympathy.
I don't want that initial determination to cloud how
serious this hearing is and how crucial it is that we have a
construct that will let the world know and all the entities
involved that this is a very serious issue.
I remind the witnesses, who I know already know, that Ramzi
Yousef, who, in actuality, was convicted of masterminding--not
just being a traveling soldier or standing by the wayside, but
masterminding the 1993 World Trade Center bombing--and many who
are in this business have been told and have made note of the
fact that that was something that did not wake America up.
It was so unusual that we did not attribute it to a
beginning change in the psyche of those who want to do America
harm. But he was traveling internationally on a stolen
passport.
The ``White Widow,'' who is now wanted in Kenya, again, is
linked to a fraudulent passport and a passport reported stolen.
We don't know how many others.
So I think this hearing is crucial because we must leave
here with the idea that solutions are possible.
I would like to, Mr. Bersin, put on the record that
INTERPOL has taken note that travelers have boarded flights
more than 1 billion times without having their passports
checked against INTERPOL's stolen and lost travel documents. I
think that is very much a wake-up call.
So I would ask you: What impediments do you think with
respect to technology, infrastructure, privacy concerns are
blocking or keeping countries from using the SLTD? What is your
view of how the United States might be able to be helpful to
these countries?
Mr. Bersin. Thank you, Ranking Member.
You are correct with regard to the INTERPOL observation on
the 1 billion----
Ms. Jackson Lee. That is a large number.
Mr. Bersin. A very large number, ma'am.
In your question, you indicate some of the difficulties
that countries have. These include not only resource restraints
in terms of lacking the money, in terms of priority of a budget
decision, it also involves the lack of technological know-how
and the ability to set up the kinds of sophisticated
information technology systems that are required to create this
kind of automated checking.
It also involves, as you indicate, the invisible
requirements or constraints of privacy views and the lack of
coordination between immigration authorities and police
authorities at the local or provincial levels in foreign
countries. All of those together create an institutional
incapacity to operate the kinds of automated vetting systems
that we have.
Having said that, as Mr. Wagner indicates, we have to have
a strategy with regard to those countries that are critical to
our security to ensure that they at the very least populate the
Stolen and Lost Travel Document database. The most important
requirement for us in the near term is that we actually have
the data that we can vet to be able to see who may be traveling
toward the United States.
The second requirement is to figure out, again, based on
flows of passengers, what strategic capacity-building efforts
we ought to engage in to help countries build up the kinds of
technological, legal, and human capital requirements to build
up these systems.
While we do that to some extent, we don't, for example, at
the Department of Homeland Security have capacity-building
funding, security sector assistance funding, in which to do
that.
So when we go out to do that, absent a grant from the State
Department or the Defense Department, we actually have to do
that so-called out-of-hide, which we regularly do. But that----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Excuse me.
But you have no budget line item that would allow you to
dip into those funds and be engaged in that kind of capacity
building?
Mr. Bersin. That is correct, Ranking Member.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So when the Secretary, Napolitano,
remember, went to visit with countries dealing with TSA's
responsibilities in country, meaning in foreign countries, what
outreach was that?
Mr. Bersin. So with regard to TSA, TSA, because of the
responsibilities for cargo screening and airport security, has
a limited separate line budget with regard to providing
technical assistance on airport security. No other component to
my knowledge in DHS, has a separate line item that would permit
the kind of capacity building that we have talked about here
this morning.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, you have raised an important issue.
Let me quickly pursue this very briefly, Mr. Bersin.
In your testimony, you state that despite the fact the
United States has worked to incorporate recommendations for
data reporting and response time in Interpol's approved
standard SLTD standard operating procedure, INTERPOL does not
require its member countries to implement them.
Do you have any recommendations on this and any fixes on
this?
Mr. Bersin. With regard to--as I said in response to the
Chairwoman's question at the outset, Ranking Member, requiring
other countries to screen the database is an open issue, in my
mind, one that we need to debate, but populating the database
has a direct and immediate impact on our security, so that if
we go down that route, both in terms of mandates or capacity-
building efforts, I would focus on getting data into the
database that we could then screen as the top priority.
Whether and how we can cooperate with INTERPOL and other
international organizations, such as ICAO, the International
Civil Aviation Organization, is also one that we need to
explore as we move forward.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me quickly raise a question with Mr.
Wagner and conclude with a comment. Mr. Wagner--thank you very
much, Mr. Bersin.
Mr. Wagner, CBP, has long screened arriving passengers. You
have not screened departing passengers. I think you started
doing it after Malaysia 370.
Two questions as to why, and then Mr. Bersin said that he
doesn't believe any other agency within DHS has capacity
building; does your agency have that funding? I just need a yes
or no on that, and then with this passport enhancing our
ability to deal with fraudulent passports also help you in the
human trafficking and human smuggling and human slavery issue,
because I would imagine that that is also a possibility for
individuals being smuggled, they may be on a fraudulent
passport as well.
But the question is, you have just started doing the
exiting passengers, will you continue to do it; why haven't you
done it? Then what about the impact at getting our hands around
stolen passports, impact on human smuggling?
Mr. Wagner. Well, yes, we have recently added the lost and
stolen documents to the outbound manifest screening that we do.
We will focus primarily on before on, you know, terrorist
screening database hits and other types of national security
hits, but we have added those, and now we are working through
to try to refine our targeting systems to help out, really to
cull out some of the administrative hits that we do get----
Ms. Jackson Lee. So will you continue?
Mr. Wagner. Absolutely. We will be working with TSA to try
to come up with a better process in that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Does this help you, do you believe, with
issues dealing with human smuggling, human trafficking?
Mr. Wagner. Absolutely.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Or would it help?
Mr. Wagner. Absolutely. Ensuring people are properly
credentialed and we know who they are is a key piece of that.
As far as your capacity-building answer, I don't believe we
have a specific line item for it, but we do put a lot of
resources into doing that around the world or working with
Department of State to be able to fund those activities.
Like I mentioned just before, that helping these
governments build these types of advanced passenger information
systems, to get the manifest, to get the P&R, to do the
targeting and the analysis like we do, and then eventually
helping exchange that information is really critical to a lot
of our priorities.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just thank the Chairwoman and just
say that I have questions for Ms. Sprague that I will put in
the record and ask for a response for the entire committee.
Mr. Bray, I will be asking you about how you discern these
resolving of possible hit, what do you do if a possible hit is
discerned?
Mrs. Miller. We will make sure the----
Ms. Jackson Lee. We will look forward to it.
Mrs. Miller [continuing]. Witnesses have that and----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mrs. Miller [continuing]. For the committee. Thank you.
Thank the gentlelady.
Mrs. Miller. Now the Chairwoman recognizes the gentleman
from Mississippi, Mr. Palazzo.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
In an effort to share information related to lost and
stolen passports as a criteria for participation in the visa
waiver program, countries wishing to participate must sign
agreements with the United States regarding the sharing of lost
or stolen passports with DHS and INTERPOL. Through
participation in the visa waiver program, 38 nations have
agreed to share lost or stolen passport information.
Dr. Bersin, do all the visa waiver program countries
routinely share information on lost or stolen passports with
DHS and INTERPOL?
Mr. Bersin. Yes, they do, Congressman Palazzo, and there is
regular checking that we do to see that that requirement is
met. Periodically there will be a review of how many entries
have been made by visa waiver countries, and if a problem
arises, we work to remedy that with a country, yes, sir.
Mr. Palazzo. Are there any countries that are in non-
compliance?
Mr. Bersin. At this time, no. In fact, as several of us
have noted in the testimony, of the 40 million records, 96
percent of them come from either visa waiver countries or E.U.
countries or aspiring E.U. countries in which the requirement
to populate the database is set.
Mr. Palazzo. If a country does become in non-compliance,
what actions would you take?
Mr. Bersin. The first step would be a communication between
our visa waiver program office working with components at CBP
and his if necessary, to point out the deficit, and over time,
we have not met this situation yet, but over time, there would
be authority in the Secretary's office with Secretary Johnson
to take steps to see that that effort was enforced according to
the law.
Mr. Palazzo. Okay. Because you haven't had this incidence
happen yet, what would be what you think a realistic amount of
time? I mean, 3 months, 6 months, dependent on the severity of
the non-compliance or----
Mr. Bersin. Because of the importance to our security
vetting, we would not want that to be an extended period of
time.
Mr. Palazzo. Okay. Do you see any--I mean, I know that
everybody seems to be in compliance right now, but are there
any impediments or hurdles to actually providing the
information that you hear from the partner nations?
Mr. Bersin. With regard to the visa waiver nations,
Congressman, as the Chairwoman pointed out at the outset, you
know, these are our closest allies, these are the countries
with whom we share the most experience in this area, and all of
them have developed fairly sophisticated information technology
systems, operating through the NCB, as Mr. Bray indicated, or
independently of INTERPOL. So I think with regard to the VWP
countries, we have the infrastructure in place.
Mr. Palazzo. As a result of the requirement, do you think
the sharing has been increased and do you think the program has
been successful?
Mr. Bersin. No question about that, yes.
Mr. Palazzo. Well, thank you, Mr. Bersin.
I yield back.
Mrs. Miller. The Chairwoman recognizes the gentleman from
Texas, Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I appreciate you convening this hearing and so quickly
exploring legislative options so soon after these
vulnerabilities have been exposed, and look forward to working
with you on this, and appreciate the testimony that we have
heard from our experts today.
Want to thank Mr. Wagner for, and Mr. Bersin for, DHS's
quick response and now querying out-bound passengers from the
United States in light of the Flight 370 tragedy and everything
else that you have described that we can work on, but to build
upon something the Ranking Member has been asking about in
terms of capacity building with other countries around the
world, you responded that there is not a line item currently,
but can you talk a little bit more, and perhaps starting with
Mr. Bersin and then continuing with Mr. Wagner, about the
wisdom of funding this capacity and efforts--in other words,
providing another carrot for these other countries to
participate in this?
Then my second question that you may also want to address
is, in the same way that we are holding this hearing today and
exploring legislative options and some of the administrative
fixes that you have already put in place, maybe talk a little
bit about what other countries have done over the last 3 weeks
in the wake of the Flight 370 tragedy.
So, Mr. Bersin, if you would start.
Mr. Bersin. So starting with the second question,
Congressman O'Rourke, in the aftermath of the INTERPOL
statements, Secretary General Ronald Noble, has been
publicizing the issue, and countries around the world have
taken note of the problem, and while we haven't--it is too soon
to say that it has actually resulted in changes, it has created
an awareness, a consciousness of the problem that simply did
not exist before, and I think we will be seeing different
countries within the constraints of their systems and cultures
and laws taking action, and we should continue to encourage
both the populating of the database, but also the screening of
it.
With regard to capacity building, there are instances in
which the Department of Homeland Security has received State
Department grants through a variety of programs to help
countries build a capacity. My point is that that is always on
a grant basis and there is no long-term capacity-building line
item for DHS to say, we are going to do this and encourage all
of the countries in North America, from Columbia or Panama to
the Arctic, to build a system so that any time someone comes
into the North Americans' airspace or to a North American port,
we will have insight into who is on those planes. To do that
would take a large budget.
Mr. O'Rourke. Any idea, ballpark, scope?
Mr. Bersin. So Mr. Wagner is in a better position----
Mr. O'Rourke. Okay.
Mr. Bersin [continuing]. Case-by-case to give us the
experience in Panama, perhaps Mexico and others, but the larger
strategic vision here is that we would say over the next 10
years, while we can't build the entire panoply of measures that
we have built here, we can put a minimally required and
satisfactory system in place from Panama to the Arctic, working
with our partner countries to do that, but that would take a
budget appropriation that does not now exist.
Mr. O'Rourke. I would think every country in the world and
every person in the world who gets on an airplane has a shared
interest in us resolving this, so, you know, naturally we have
our allies that we have already described, the United Kingdom
is already, you know, vigorously pursuing this, but we also
have countries like Iran, other countries who have similar
concerns about the safety and security of their citizens, and
so in any way that we can provide resources or encourage
others, especially wealthy countries, to share the burden to
make sure everyone is participating, I would like us to explore
that and would love to find either from you or from Mr. Wagner
just what that cost is so that we know what we are talking
about.
Mr. Wagner, do you have any thoughts on this?
Mr. Wagner. Yeah. I don't have the cost with me today, but
we did a lot of work with Mexico, Panama, and the Caribbean,
too, to help these countries, with their authorities and their
own internal laws and regulations, to collect airline manifest
information, and then we worked with them and helped fund them
in buying the systems and deploying the systems to actually go
through and screen that information. We have our personnel on-
site with them working with this, and then we have agreements
to exchange information or take some of their information and
run it through our systems and share what we can with them on
that.
So there is a lot of work to do with other developing
countries, and then there is also the developed world and
getting a lot of our allies out there to also take like
approaches to how we do this. You will find varying degrees of
capacity and authorities and privacy issues with different
governments doing this. We have done a lot of work with it, but
really it is the consistent message that, you know, all of our
allies should be doing it in a similar fashion.
Mr. O'Rourke. As a follow-up to today's hearing, would you
be able to come up with a ball-park figure and share that with
the committee so that we understand, and maybe just based on,
you know, past experiences with these other countries, what it
would take to fund the necessary capacity globally? Not that
the United States needs to bear that burden on its own, but
just so that we know what that number is, and perhaps that is
the basis for engaging other countries who might be able to
help us to fund that, because it is in everyone's interest.
Mr. Bersin, yes.
Mr. Bersin. Just one additional comment, and Mr. Bray can
describe this in finer detail. Actually, there is an
infrastructure backbone. There is one single that connects the
190 countries of INTERPOL, and it is the beginning of the kind
of system that you are talking about, but perhaps Mr. Bray can
explain a little more what the I-24/7 system is and why it is
such a potentially important link in the area you are
exploring.
Mr. O'Rourke. Madam Chairwoman, is that all right?
Mrs. Miller. Yes.
Mr. O'Rourke. I am short on time.
Mrs. Miller. I note that we have votes in about 5 minutes.
Mr. Bray. Yes. I will be brief, sir.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you.
Mr. Bray. The I-24/7 is a backbone that connects the 190
member countries to not only INTERPOL and its resources, its
databases, but to each other and directly. The ability of a
country to utilize this is centered upon its National Central
Bureau, so the National Central Bureau becomes a cornerstone
for making sure that these utilities, these tools are made
available.
With that said, the United States has been very supportive
of the INTERPOL membership and the communities, specifically in
Central America. We helped install sites not only at the NCB's,
at specialized police units there, but also at border control
points as well. We are continuing to work, as a matter of fact,
prior to the airline disaster, we have been working with our
counterparts in Mexico and other countries, Caribbean as well,
to determine how we can better and most effectively assist them
in fully realizing how those utilities and tools may be better
serviced in their countries.
We will obviously work with INTERPOL to determine how we
can best come up with a more global strategy for engaging
countries, sharing best practices and certainly lessons learned
from this process. It has been an iterative process for the
United States. It has been one that has taken time to develop,
and we would like to enable other countries to ramp up as
quickly and efficiently as possible.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you for your answer.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Yield back.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you.
Recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Swalwell.
Mr. Swalwell. Thank you.
Mrs. Miller. First the Ranking Member has a comment.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, I just wanted to put on the record,
thank you very much for your leadership on this issue and the
letter that you joined with Mr. Hudson on. This is not taking
from your time, but I do appreciate. I hope that you will
submit, I would like to submit your letter into the record.
Mr. Swalwell. Yes, please.
Mrs. Miller. Without objection.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Dated on March 13, 2014. Again, thank you
for your leadership.
Mr. Swalwell. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I yield. Thank you.
[The information follows:]
Letter Submitted by Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
March 13, 2014.
The Honorable Jeh Johnson,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 3801 Nebraska Avenue,
NW, Washington, DC 20528.
The Honorable John F. Kerry,
Secretary, U.S. Department of State, 2201 C Street, NW, Washington, DC
20520.
Dear Secretaries Johnson and Kerry: We write with great concern
regarding the security loophole highlighted by the on-going incident
involving Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 (``Flight 370'').
While we are still awaiting details on what happened to Flight 370
we do know that two individuals, Delavar Seyed Mohammad Reza and Pouri
Nourmohammadi, were able to board an international flight carrying
American passengers by using stolen passports. While these passports
were in the Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) database of
INTERPOL, they were not cross referenced against it by either the
airline or the appropriate authorities. This dramatically illustrates a
serious flaw in airline security, one that INTERPOL has raised for
years, but has not been appropriately dealt with by the international
community.
While many countries, including the United States, routinely access
the STLD database, many others do not. In fact, according to INTERPOL,
passengers boarded airplanes more than one billion times in 2012
without having their passports screened against its databases. Allowing
people to use stolen passports to travel about the world puts lives,
including those of Americans, at risk.
It is imperative for passenger safety and aviation security that we
close this loophole to help ensure the safety of the traveling public.
Beyond assuring us, our colleagues, and the American people, that every
passport used in international travel to and from the United States is
always checked against the INTERPOL STLD database, we further request
details on any type of program or ongoing negotiations encouraging
other countries to use this database for all travelers on international
flights.
While we understand that the United States is limited in its
ability to alter other nation's travel and security procedures, if
there are ways that Congress can get involved in encouraging
responsible behavior that increases the safety of the global flying
public, we hope that you will let us know.
We look forward to your prompt response. Thank you.
Sincerely,
Eric Swalwell,
Member of Congress.
Richard Hudson,
Member of Congress.
Candice S. Miller,
Member of Congress.
Sheila Jackson Lee,
Member of Congress.
Mrs. Miller. The gentleman from California.
Mr. Swalwell. Thank you to Madam Chairwoman for allowing me
to participate, and thank you to the Ranking Member for
supporting that request.
As others have stated, my prayers and wishes go out to the
families of Malaysia Flight 370, but as we have often learned
from aviation disasters, if there is any hope that has come out
of it, it is that we learn a lot about our own security and how
to make passenger safety much better.
I also want to note that we did, Ms. Jackson Lee and I and
Chairwoman Miller and Hudson, submit a letter to the
Departments of Homeland Security and State, and we both--we
appreciate the swift response that we received back.
Also, I am working on legislation with Senator Schumer on
the Senate side to create an incentive for countries to use
this SLTD database, which is that if they don't, we simply
won't issue them visas, and I hope that I can work with the
Chairwoman and the Ranking Member on such legislation.
Now, Mr. Bersin, you alluded to North America as being a
concern. That is my concern as well, because I believe that the
countries we should principally be tracking are ones who have
airports near our borders: For example, in my colleague's
district, he has Juarez, Mexico, which has a large
international airport; in San Diego, you have Tijuana just to
the south; in Washington State, you have Vancouver airport; and
of course New York, Montreal, and Toronto are not too far away.
So my first question is: To what degree are our bordering
countries to the north and south, Canada and Mexico, and then
of course in the hemisphere, Panama and other countries, what
percentage of passengers are being screened against the
database traveling in and out of those countries?
Mr. Bersin. So with regard to Mexico, the figure, Mr.
Wagner can confirm, would be 100 percent in terms of people
entering Mexico. People could then cross the border and come
into the United States.
With regard to Canada, the Canadians are fully cooperative
with us. They screen. We are in discussions with them about the
extent of the full screening. They do screen for their own
citizens, and I think as a result of this incident, we will see
a complete screening from our neighbors to the north.
Mr. Swalwell. So does that mean that a flight originating
in Venezuela and landing in Mexico, 100 percent of the
passengers would be checked against the database on that
flight?
Mr. Bersin. That is correct. With regard to the stolen and
lost travel document database, yes.
Mr. Swalwell. Suppose a flight originating from Germany and
going to Vancouver, would 100 percent be checked on that
flight?
Mr. Bersin. Yes, with regard to foreign--with regard to--
against the Canadian database, yes, and against the SLTD when
there is a secondary inspection, there would be a complete
check. As I say, we are engaged and Canada is engaged in seeing
what it can do to complete that cycle.
With regard to just your point on North America, the reason
I focus on North America, presumably as you, it is not just the
neighboring airports, as Juarez and El Paso, San Diego and
Tijuana, Matamoros and Brownsville, but it is people coming in
from outside the hemisphere into Central America, for example,
then traveling overland to the border, so it is important for
us to actually look at this as a continental problem, not a
national one.
I think President Obama certainly in the Beyond the Border
action plan with Prime Minister Harper and with Canada
recognizes perimeter security as a critical issue, and I
believe our Mexican colleagues and partners share this notion
of perimeter security on a continental basis.
Mr. Swalwell. Great. Thank you, Mr. Bersin.
Mr. Bray, we are beginning to learn about I-Checkit, which
is a point of purchase program with INTERPOL, and what is the
participation of U.S. airlines and hotels and other tourism
companies right now as far as checking passports against
INTERPOL's database at the point of purchase rather than 72
hours before the flight? I am just talking about the United
States right now.
Mr. Bray. With respect to the United States, I would ask
Mr. Wagner. I believe that all passports are being screened,
not by the airlines necessarily at the point of purchase, but
certainly by CVP in the United States. Domestic purchases is
what we are referring to.
Mr. Swalwell. Right. But I-Checkit is a program intended to
have cooperation with the vendors, right, the----
Mr. Bray. Correct.
Mr. Swalwell [continuing]. The airlines, the hotels?
Mr. Bray. Right. So with that, the relationship, that
public-private partnership relationship exists in the United
States and has existed for quite some time, and as a matter of
fact, it is probably a model for the world, and it is one that
we have taken to INTERPOL and the I-Checkit working group. I-
Checkit is currently in a very developmental stage. INTERPOL is
beginning to look at how to balance the requirements and the
concerns of 190 countries with a public-private partnership.
Having said that, the first models that have rolled out
have been with hotels, I believe in Montenegro and Monaco, and
they have seen successes there.
They are now looking specifically following the Malaysian
airline disaster at the transportation sector and----
Mr. Swalwell. But is every purchase within the United
States to travel outside the United States or every purchase
outside the United States to travel into the United States
checked against the database at the point of purchase or is it
checked closer to the departure or arrival of the flight?
Mrs. Miller. This will be the final question.
Mr. Swalwell. Thank you.
Mr. Bray. It can be--they are checked when the tickets are
purchased and they are also checked at the counter when they
are purchased.
Mr. Swalwell. 100 percent of the time?
Mr. Bray. In-bound flights to the United States, yes, 100
percent of the time.
Mr. Swalwell. Great.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Yield back.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much.
I certainly want to thank the witnesses for all being here
today. Obviously the Members, I think almost all of us, have
additional questions, so I would invite you all, of course, to
submit those for the witnesses, and we will ask for a written
response to the questions.
Again, I appreciate you coming really on pretty short
notice. We convened this hearing, I had an idea to do it and
convened it pretty quickly, particularly for how things move
here around Capitol Hill, so we appreciate all the witnesses
coming this morning.
Pursuant to the Committee Rule 7(e), the hearing record
will be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, the committee now stands adjourned.
Thanks again.
[Whereupon, at 10:25 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Honorable Eric Swalwell for Alan D. Bersin
Question 1. Assistant Secretary Bersin, with respect to Canada, you
appeared to testify that right now Canada only screens its own citizens
going to and from Canada on international travel against the Stolen and
Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) database on a routine basis. Is that
correct? What percentage of all passengers flying to Canada are checked
against SLTD database by Canada? What percentage of all passengers
leaving Canada by air are checked against the SLTD database by Canada?
Answer. To clarify, presently Canada screens all travelers'
documents against a Canadian database of lost/stolen/fraudulent
documents when they enter Canada. Canada's database is comprised of
data from Passport Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, and
provincial authorities, and also includes data provided by foreign
authorities and Canadian overseas liaison officers. Currently, Canada
does not screen travelers against the INTERPOL SLTD database during
primary inspection, but Canadian officers at secondary inspection can
access the SLTD database and query it when necessary. At present,
Canada does not systematically screen out-bound travelers against its
database of lost/stolen/fraudulent documents, but will have the
capability to do so with the implementation of Interactive Advance
Passenger Data and Entry/Exit in the air mode.
Question 2. You also suggested Canada is moving toward 100 percent
international air passenger screening against the SLTD database. What
work is the United States doing to help encourage Canada to get to 100
percent screening? Would this include in-bound and out-bound passengers
traveling by air? What is your understanding of Canada's current plan
to reach this goal? When will Canada reach it?
Answer. Canada has not yet formally committed to 100 percent
international air passenger screening against the SLTD database. DHS
has, however, begun initial outreach to our Canadian counterparts to
discuss this matter and share related best practices that the United
States has adopted.
Question 3. Besides Canada and Mexico, which countries in North
America and Central America, if any, check travel documents of 100
percent of international travelers entering their country by air travel
against the INTERPOL SLTD database? Which check 100 percent of such air
travelers leaving the country?
Answer. DHS can confirm that the travel documents of all
international travelers entering the following countries are checked
against the SLTD database: Antigua and Barbuda; Barbados; Dominica;
Grenada; Guyana; Jamaica; Mexico; Panama; St. Kitts and Nevis; Saint
Lucia; St. Vincent and the Grenadines; and Trinidad and Tobago.
Unfortunately DHS does not have detailed information regarding the
specific screening practices of all INTERPOL member countries,
including whether they screen against the SLTD database. However,
INTERPOL Washington is best positioned to be able to assist in
gathering this information from the INTERPOL General Secretariat.
Question 4. In your prepared testimony you note that ``many
countries do not have advance passenger information capabilities to
screen travelers prior to arrival.'' Is this lack of infrastructure the
most significant impediment to use of the STLD database? If not, what
is? If so, how can the United States help address that problem? What
else should the United States be doing to encourage countries to scan
international air passengers against the SLTD database?
Answer. Many countries lack an advance passenger information system
and the required infrastructure, which significantly hinders their
ability to screen in-bound air passengers against the SLTD database
prior to their arrival. The United States can help address this problem
through capacity-building efforts and the promotion of international
security standards. Moreover, the United States can strongly encourage
countries to routinely report lost and stolen passport data to INTERPOL
for inclusion into the SLTD database. DHS screens every person seeking
admission into the United States (whether by air, land, or sea) against
the SLTD database, so prompting countries that do not currently report
lost and stolen passport data to do so is critical.
Question 5. In your prepared testimony you mention that one way the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is helping encourage countries to
use the SLTD database is through the establishment of the Integrated
Border Management Task Force (IBMTF). Beyond training officials, what
is the IBMTF doing to promote the use of SLTD? What else is DHS doing
in this regard?
Answer. The IBMTF primarily conducts training operations for border
management and law enforcement officials regarding utilizing INTERPOL
tools that are available to them. For example, as part of a 2-week
program, INTERPOL officials will bring mobile devices to an
international airport, so that immigration officers can check passports
against the SLTD and INTERPOL's other datasets. These programs often
yield positive results including the arrest of wanted persons or the
denied entry of suspected criminals. DHS is committed to helping
INTERPOL build and operate the IBMTF, by offering expertise and best
practices in border management.
As part of the biennial reviews of VWP countries, DHS evaluates the
effectiveness of their border screening procedures and immigration
controls. Among other things, DHS verifies that VWP countries report
lost and stolen passports to INTERPOL, as required by the VWP statute.
DHS also used the biennial reviews to encourage the border control
authorities in VWP countries to search the SLTD database in the
screening of all international travelers.
Question 6. Beyond its participation in IBMTF, what specific
actions has DHS undertaken in the past to encourage other countries to
use the SLTD database for international air travel? What specific
actions are planned by DHS to do this in the future?
Answer. At numerous INTERPOL events and conferences, DHS senior
leadership has encouraged INTERPOL member countries to use the SLTD
database to enhance security across the global travel continuum.
Looking ahead, DHS plans to engage partner countries bilaterally and
through multilateral fora to further encourage them to report data into
the SLTD database and to adopt enhanced screening procedures.
Questions From Honorable Eric Swalwell for Jack P. Wagner
Question 1. Assistant Commissioner Wagner, I sent a letter to
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Jeh Johnson, asking in
part about U.S. screening practices. From the response I received from
DHS, I take it that every single traveler coming into the United States
is checked against the INTERPOL Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD)
database. I want to understand more about the process.
How much time before a flight is scheduled to take off does U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) receive information about passenger
lists to be able to screen against the SLTD database?
Question 2. When, after CBP receives information about passengers,
does it begin screening against the SLTD database? When does it finish
the check?
Question 3. According to your testimony, if a hit is found and an
airline boards the passenger regardless, the airline can be fined. Can
CBP do anything else to prevent the plane from landing in the United
States? Or, can it act to prevent the passenger in question from
disembarking if the plane does come here with that passenger?
Question 4. I understand what happens if CBP finds a hit in its
screening. But, what happens if the screening is not completed before
the scheduled take-off?
Answer. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
(IRTPA) of 2004 required the Federal Government where practicable to
conduct Terrorist Watch List screening prior to departure. To meet
IRTPA requirements, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) modified
the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) and developed
interactive communications to provide carriers with real-time terrorist
watch list screening results. CBP now starts receiving available APIS
data from airlines 72 hours prior to departure and, under 19 CFR
122.49a and 122.75a, airlines must transmit all passenger data no later
than the time of securing the aircraft doors for departure.
Passenger data that contains a passport number is immediately
screened against the SLTD upon receipt. Any re-submission of passport
data prompts a re-screening through the SLTD. The initial check is
completed electronically in a matter of seconds and a new query is
executed each time passport data is submitted.
CBP has the authority per 19 CFR 122.14(d) to revoke landing rights
of a carrier, though this should not be invoked absent exigent
circumstances. CBP has a ``detain on-board'' process for vessels but
not for aircraft since, in many cases, the aircraft might not
immediately return to its destination or the aircraft may fly on to
another location. In these cases the traveler would be detained at the
port of entry for processing and, if they are found inadmissible, the
airline would return the traveler on the next flight to the point of
embarkation.
The SLTD query is designed to repeat until results are received. If
a response to a SLTD query is not received electronically within 7
minutes, the query is considered ``timed out'' and a new query is
executed. If results were received after departure, (for example, if
the INTERPOL SLTD connection was down for a significant amount of
time), the hit would be displayed for CBP officers at the port of entry
and adjudicated at the time of arrival.
Questions From Honorable Eric Swalwell for Brenda S. Sprague
Question 1a. What specific actions has the State Department taken
to encourage other countries to check passports by travelers used in
international flights against the SLTD database, as opposed to merely
share data with INTERPOL?
Answer. On April 18, the Department of State, on behalf of the
Department of Homeland Security, reached out to INTERPOL member
countries to gather information about their practices related to the
access and use of the Stolen and Lost Travel Document Database (SLTD).
We also used this as an opportunity to remind member countries of the
importance to both input their lost/stolen data into the SLTD and to
use the SLTD when screening travelers. A survey targeting specific
usage practices has been forwarded to INTERPOL members to solicit how
and under what circumstances border control officials utilize the SLTD.
The results of this survey will help the State Department tailor our
efforts to encourage elimination of weaknesses or inconsistencies in
the usage and access of the SLTD.
Question 1b. In light of the Malaysia Air incident, what specific
steps does the State Department plan to further encourage countries to
check the passports of passengers in international flights against the
SLTD database?
Answer. The goal of sharing lost and stolen passport data with
governments has been endorsed repeatedly as an international objective,
including through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,
and G-8 processes. The Department of State is active and engaged with
each of these multilateral organizations. We continue to support
international efforts and encourage all governments to share and use
this vital information.
We believe that the best way to encourage other countries to check
the passports of all passengers on international flights against the
SLTD database is through an active engagement with the ICAO. The next
opportunity for discussions on this issue is at the next ICAO Technical
Advisory Group on Machine Readable Travel Documents Meeting on May 21
in Montreal, Canada.
Question 2a. I want to ask about reasons the SLTD database may not
be used.
The State Department automatically screens visa applicants against
the INTERPOL database. Does it find this to be burdensome or otherwise
difficult?
Answer. Visa processing posts see an average of only around 90
applications per month world-wide with passport hits from the Stolen
and Lost Travel Document (STLD) database. This is a small fraction of
the visa workload, considering that the Department has over 220
overseas posts that processed more than 11.5 million visa transactions
in fiscal year 2013.
Consular officers are required to definitively resolve all hits
returned by SLTD checks before issuing visas. In the majority of cases
involving visa applicants with SLTD hits, posts found that passports
were reported as lost or stolen when they were misplaced by holders who
later recovered them, or lost or stolen passports were listed on the
visa application, but applicants presented a new passport in support of
the application.
While the number of visa applicant passport hits in the SLTD is
small, the State Department finds that the process and the investment
in information technology to establish the capability to conduct
clearances against the SLTD is not unduly burdensome, given the
potential to deter mala fide travelers.
Question 2b. What problems have other countries cited to the State
Department for not checking passports against the SLTD database? Do you
think these problems are legitimate or are they just excuses for not
having the will or desire to follow through? If the problems are
legitimate, what can and should the United States do to assist?
Answer. The Department of State believes that accurate answers to
these two questions can only come from INTERPOL--the organization
charged with operating the SLTD. However, in the Department of State's
interactions on this and other similar issues, many countries voice
concerns about resources and available technological infrastructure.
Weak governance structures might also impede the development of
improved reporting mechanisms within some member countries.
Questions From Honorable Eric Swalwell for Shawn Bray
Question 1. Do you believe checking passports at the point of
purchase would be an improvement over our current system? Why or why
not?
Answer. Unless the process remained inherently governmental,
INTERPOL Washington would not recommend this course of action. Point-
of-purchase sales, particularly for airlines, can occur as far as a
year in advance. The overwhelming majority of SLTD hits are
administrative in nature as opposed to involving persons committing
criminal acts. Of these hits, most fall into two main categories:
Individuals traveling on passports previously issued to them but
reported as lost or stolen, and individuals using travel agencies or
automated systems, and whose stored passport information has not been
changed since the document was reported lost or stolen. Point-of-
purchase sales, particularly for airlines, can occur as far as a year
in advance. Transactions made months or days in advance will therefore
continue to generate administrative hits, creating additional resource
strains on border and law enforcement officials.
On the other hand, if airlines or cruise lines were made directly
aware that a passport used to make a reservation was not valid, they
could reconcile the issue with the traveler without the need for law
enforcement intervention. The number of administrative hits would be
thereby greatly reduced, allowing law enforcement authorities to
concentrate on unresolved SLTD hits, including those that are
potentially criminal in nature. The guidelines for how this process
would work would need to be clearly defined.
Question 2. What is the status of the I-Checkit system? What is
your projection for when it will be widely available? What impediments
are there to its development and use?
Answer. INTERPOL's I-Checkit Program is still in the developmental
stage. An initial, small-scale pilot of the program has been scheduled
for some time in late 2014 or early 2015. A time line for full
implementation has yet to be announced.
While I-Checkit is meant to encompass a variety of areas, it is
presently focused on the transportation sector. Impediments largely
stem from differences in national legislation and policies among the
INTERPOL member countries and primarily include privacy issues
surrounding the use of travel document data and the direct engagement
with private-sector partners by INTERPOL.
Question 3. Which countries rarely, if ever, screen international
passenger against the INTERPOL SLTD database?
Answer. In 2013, approximately 91 percent of all queries made
against INTERPOL's SLTD database by INTERPOL member countries were made
by the United States, United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, and Japan.
While many of the 167 signatory countries and international
organizations participating in the program search the database on a
regular basis, the majority of them do not use the database to screen
international passengers; however, they do use it for investigative
purposes.
Question 4. With respect to countries in North America and Central
America, when, if ever, are travel documents checked for 100 percent of
international travelers entering by air travel against the INTERPOL
SLTD database? For which countries are 100 percent of such air
travelers leaving the country checked?
Answer. The United States is currently the only country known to
perform SLTD checks on 100 percent of all passengers traveling in-bound
or out-bound by air.
Question 5. What percentage of the times when international air
travelers are screened against the INTERPOL SLTD database is a hit
found which suggests possible criminal theft?
Answer. On average, only a handful of SLTD hits are the result of a
criminal act. The exact number is hard to obtain since many countries
do not report the final disposition of SLTD hits that occur in their
countries. INTERPOL Washington is currently proposing INTERPOL require
greater visibility and accountability by its member countries for the
final disposition of all SLTD hits.
Question 6a. Which of these reasons (national policy; lack of
connection or cooperation between law enforcement, issuing, and border
control authorities; and capacity, i.e. cost of deployment and existing
infrastructure) is the primary one for why countries do not screen
international air travelers against the SLTD database?
Answer. The reasons for not screening international air travelers
against the SLTD database vary from country to country. For some,
particularly underdeveloped countries, the lack of an adequate
information technology (IT) infrastructure creates communication and
capacity issues that hamper implementation of the system. Other factors
that have been cited include cost, national policy, privacy concerns,
and various bureaucratic obstacles--regardless of the state of the
country's IT infrastructure. Any combination of these factors makes
this problem correspondingly more complex and challenging to address.
It should also be noted that merely being connected to the database
does not optimize its use in screening international air travelers. The
timely resolution of hits against the database is also indispensable in
preventing potentially illicit travel. For some countries with limited
law enforcement and border control assets and capabilities, this
presents a particularly difficult and continuing challenge.
It's important that the United States work closely with INTERPOL
and its member countries to share best practices and determine where we
might be able to assist in capacity building. To that end, INTERPOL
Washington is currently working with the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and the Department of State (DoS) on a global initiative
to gain a better understanding of the obstacles impeding other
countries' ability to use the SLTD database on a consistent and regular
basis.
Question 6b. What can the United States do to help countries
address this primary reason? What can we do to address any of the other
obstacles?
Answer. Supported by the Department of Justice and DHS, INTERPOL
Washington is partnering with DoS to establish a whole-of-government
approach to encourage those foreign ministries responsible for the
issuance of travel documents to work with INTERPOL and their respective
National Central Bureaus (NCB) to improve cooperation and fully
participate in the SLTD program. Regionally speaking, INTERPOL
Washington is working with personnel from the U.S. Embassy in Mexico
City, the government of Mexico, and NCB Mexico City to identify the
specific issues that impact them and neighboring countries from fully
participating in the SLTD program. Once clearly identified, INTERPOL
Washington intends to seek support for the requisite technical and
diplomatic assistance. The results of this initiative will then be used
as an example of best practices that could be adopted globally.
Additionally, we are encouraging the INTERPOL General Secretariat
in Lyon, France to enhance the management and oversight of the SLTD
Program in order to foster improvements that would ensure SLTD and its
technology remains current and increases the ease of access and use by
more INTERPOL member countries. Our leadership and efforts to improve
the SLTD program were recently recognized when INTERPOL Washington was
voted to chair INTERPOL's multi-national SLTD Advisory Committee in
Lyon, France. This leadership position on the advisory committee will
provide the United States with a unique platform to share best
practices, influence policy, and help guide operations pertaining to
INTERPOL's SLTD program.
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