[Senate Hearing 113-179]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-179
A DANGEROUS SLIDE BACKWARDS: RUSSIA'S DETERIORATING HUMAN RIGHTS
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS,
HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY,
AND GLOBAL WOMEN'S ISSUES
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 13, 2013
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut RAND PAUL, Kentucky
TIM KAINE, Virginia
Daniel E. O'Brien, Staff Director
Lester E. Munson III, Republican Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND
ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY,
AND GLOBAL WOMEN'S ISSUES
BARBARA BOXER, California, Chairman
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois MARCO RUBIO, Florida
TIM KAINE, Virginia RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
------------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut, Chairman
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Aron, Leon, resident scholar and director of Russian studies,
American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC.................. 11
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Articles submitted for the record:
Washington Post--``Putin's War on Russian Civil Society
Continues''............................................ 48
Wall Street Journal--``The Widening Putin Clampdown''.... 49
Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from California, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Submitted for the record--``Pussy Riot Collective Statement'' 39
Cohen, Ariel, senior research fellow for Russian and Eurasian
studies and international energy policy, Heritage Foundation,
Washington, DC................................................. 16
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Jannuzi, Frank, deputy executive director of advocacy, policy,
and research, interim coexecutive director, Amnesty
International, New York, NY.................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Submitted as attachments to prepared statement:
Appendix: Chronicle of Rights Violations in Russia....... 39
Additional Resources: Reports Available from Amnesty
Internal's International Secretariat................... 43
Johnson, Hon. Ron, U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, opening statement 3
Murphy, Hon. Christopher, U.S. Senator from Connecticut, opening
statement...................................................... 4
Nemtsov, Hon. Boris, cochairman of Republican Party of Russia-
People's Freedom Party, Moscow, Russia......................... 22
Prepared statement........................................... 24
Paul, Hon. Rand, U.S. Senator from Kentucky, opening statement... 5
Sestanovich, Hon. Stephen, senior fellow for Russian and Eurasian
affairs, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC.......... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 15
(iii)
A DANGEROUS SLIDE BACKWARDS: RUSSIA'S DETERIORATING HUMAN RIGHTS
SITUATION
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THURSDAY, JUNE 13, 2013
U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on International
Operations and Organizations, Human Rights,
Democracy, and Global Women's Issues and
Subcommittee on European Affairs, Committee on
Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:26 a.m.,
in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Barbara
Boxer and Hon. Christopher Murphy (chairmen of the respective
subcommittees) presiding.
Present: Senators Boxer, Murphy, Paul, and Johnson.
Also Present: Senator McCain.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. Good morning, everybody, and welcome. We
apologize for starting late. We had a vote, which happens
around here. We are hoping we will have a little bit of a
breather, here, so we can hear from all of you before we have
to run off again. But, thank you for your patience.
I want to welcome everyone to today's hearing on the
deteriorating human rights situation in Russia. This is a joint
hearing of the Subcommittee on International Operations and
Organizations, Human Rights, and Democracy, and Global Women's
Issues and the Subcommittee on European Affairs.
In particular, I wanted to thank Senator Murphy for really
working on this very closely with me, and our ranking members,
Senators Paul and Johnson, and very happy to see Senator
Johnson here with us.
I want to extend a warm welcome to all of our distinguished
witnesses.
We are here today to examine the current state of human
rights in Russia and to better understand what is taking place
within that country today. Let me be clear, I want to see a
strong and productive United States relationship with Russia.
Russia's been an important partner on a range of issues, from
Iran sanctions to Afghanistan to reducing the number of nuclear
weapons in the world, and will continue to play a strong and
influential role on the global stage.
But, Russia's partnership on a number of issues does not
preclude us from taking a hard look at what appears to be a
systematic crackdown on internationally recognized basic
freedoms, including freedom of association, expression, since
President Putin assumed the Presidency for a third time, last
year.
Sadly, it appears that no one is immune. President Putin
has targeted both Russian NGOs and highly respected
international NGOs, including Amnesty International, Human
Rights Watch, and Transparency International. He has made it
profoundly difficult for any political opposition to organize
or to have their voices heard. Most recently, he has targeted
public health and environmental advocacy organizations and
groups working for the protection of LGBT individuals. He has
even put musicians in jail.
And I want to place in the record a statement from several
of these musicians, and just read from the last paragraph, ``We
urge the United States to take notice of what is happening in
Russia, of how we're slipping backwards, not towards progress,
but toward repression. We ask you, members of the Senate, to
work for the release of our friends, who aren't hooligans or
criminals, but women who have strong views and the courage to
voice them. Thank you.'' That is a quote, and I would ask
unanimous consent if I could put this whole statement into the
record. At this time, I will do that.
[Editor's note.--The statement mentioned above can be found in
the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section at
the end of this hearing.]
Senator Boxer. In short, it appears that President Putin
has little tolerance for anyone who appears to disagree in any
way with the policies of his administration. This is a most sad
development, particularly for those of us who were encouraged
by the opening up of political space in Russia, and we are
curious about whether there are any opportunities to help
reverse this troublesome tide. And that is what we hope to
explore today.
Our first witness is Mr. Frank Jannuzi. Mr. Jannuzi spent
over 15 years advising the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
as a policy director and working with then-Chairman Kerry on a
broad range of issues. He comes to us now as the deputy
executive director of Amnesty International USA and the head of
the Washington, DC, office.
And then we will hear from Dr. Leon Aron. Dr. Aron was born
in Moscow. He came to the United States as a refugee, in June--
from Russia, from the Soviet Union--in June 1978, at the age of
24. He is resident scholar and director of Russian studies at
the American Enterprise Institute. The author of 3 books and
over 300 scholarly articles and essays, Dr. Aron is an expert
on matters concerning Russia.
And then we are pleased to have the former U.S. Ambassador
at Large for the former Soviet Union, Stephen Sestanovich. In
this role, Ambassador Sestanovich was the State Department's
principal officer responsible for policy toward Russia and
other states of the former Soviet Union from 1997 to 2001.
Currently, he is the George F. Kennan senior fellow for Russian
and Eurasian Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and a
professor of international diplomacy at Columbia University.
Our fourth witness is Dr. Ariel Cohen, a senior research
fellow for Russian and Eurasian studies and international
energy policy at the Heritage Foundation. A leading expert on
Russia, Eurasia, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East, Dr. Cohen
has authored numerous books and has written many articles on
Russian, foreign, and domestic policy.
And finally, it is certainly our great pleasure to have the
Honorable Boris--oh, I have to say it right--Nemtsov. In
addition to being a former Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, Mr.
Nemtsov is cochairman of the Republican Party of Russia--
People's Freedom Party. In January 2011, he was sentenced to 15
days in jail after taking part in a New Year's Eve opposition
rally.
We are grateful for the wealth of knowledge and breadth of
experience that our panel members will offer to share with us
today.
And I now turn to Senator Johnson, then Senator Murphy,
then Senator Paul, for their opening statements.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RON JOHNSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I want to
thank all the witnesses for appearing here.
In February 2009, Vice President Biden said it was ``time
to press the reset button with Russia.'' Secretary Clinton and
the administration went out of their way to repair the United
States-Russian relationship, some would say at the expense of
our European allies. For example, the United States agreed to
an unnecessary nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia which
is weighted heavily in Russia's favor. President Obama even
offered President Medvedev more flexibility on U.S. missile
defense in Europe after his election. It appears that the
President has fulfilled that promise.
Despite these accommodations, relations between our two
nations have continued to deteriorate. Just this week, in an
effort to gain favor with other anti-American leaders, the
President proactively offered to considering an asylum request
for the American who leaked NSA programs to the press, but no
requests have been received for asylum.
Just to name a few issues that we have had with Russia in
recent years is Russia's assistance to Iran's nuclear programs
and watering down Iran's sanctions of the United States--or,
the U.N. Security Council, individual Russian entities
providing assistance to Iran's ballistic missile programs, the
Russian invasion and continued occupation of Georgia, Russia's
war games simulating a nuclear attack on our NATO ally, Poland,
and energy disputes with its neighbors, and arms to the Syrian
regime, the most recent and probably most damaging example.
Russia could be an extraordinary force for good in the
world, but I am troubled by the direction it is turning. It is
time to reexamine our policies and learn from our mistakes.
Given the current internal situation and the relationship
between our governments, it would be hard for anyone to argue
that our strategy is working. Americans are truly concerned
with the decline of basic fundamental freedoms in Russia.
Freedoms of speech and assembly, free and fair elections, and
the rule of law are all under assault. The level of corruption
makes it hard for businesses to operate.
One of the most troubling issues is the treatment of civil
society. Instead of moving toward a more democratic and
prosperous nation, the government is backsliding, becoming more
authoritarian, corrupt, and hostile to its neighbors.
Today, we have a panel of experts to help Congress as we
examine these issues.
Thank you all for being here today. I look forward to
learning more about Russia's deteriorating human rights
situation and ways in which the U.S. Congress and the
administration can work together to adapt our strategy in order
to make a difference.
Thank you.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
Senator Murphy.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER MURPHY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Murphy. Well, thank you very much, Senator Boxer.
And thank you, to your subcommittee, for joining our
Subcommittee on European Affairs in this very important
hearing.
Thanks to our witnesses for being here, and we want to get
to your testimony.
You know, in the 1930s, Josef Stalin carried out a sweeping
campaign of political repression in order to consolidate his
power--locked up hundreds of thousands of political opponents
across Russia. It was called ``The Great Purge.'' What we are
witnessing today in Russia, as President Putin cracks down on
political dissent and shutters much of civil society, is not
yet ``The Great Purge,'' but this hearing will draw light on
the dangerous trendlines in Russia that are beginning to
suggest that this great nation is backsliding to a part of its
history that it should not and cannot repeat.
The question of civil society's role in Russia matters to
us because, as Senator Boxer has said, Russia matters to us. It
is one of the world's top energy producers, it has got a U.N.
Security Council veto, it is a--got a stockpile of 10,000
nuclear warheads in--strategically located at the crossroads of
Europe and Asia. More than 1,000 American companies do business
in Russia, and Russia is a growing market for American goods
and services. The European Union, our largest trading partner,
relies on Russia for one-third of its oil and gas imports. We
need Russia to be an ally, but it cannot be if the government
is constantly continuing this pattern of scaring off or locking
up political opponents.
One particularly egregious example of the Russian
Government's overreach has been its recent treatment of NGOs.
In July of last year, Russia approved a law requiring NGOs that
receive any foreign funds, no matter how small the amount, to
register as a, ``foreign agent.'' Any NGO that fails to comply
would be fined thousands of dollars. And, in addition to
limiting NGOs' activities, in a practical manner, the laws have
an enormous chilling effect by signaling that groups will be
subject to extra scrutiny by the government.
Now, Americans do not provide financial assistance to civil
society groups, either individually or collectively through
government, in order to undermine other democracies. We do it
because we want to help strengthen them. We do it because we
want to help empower people to shape their communities, engage
with their governments, and ultimately leave their children a
better place to live. I strongly hope that the Russian
Government will reconsider its approach and allow organizations
to operate transparently and receive support in accordance with
international norms.
Russia is not yet holding another ``Great Purge,'' but, as
the trumped-up arrests mount of the government's political
opponents, it is interesting to note that, during ``The Great
Purge,'' a Russian brought to court on political charges
actually was 20 times more likely to be exonerated than he is
today under similar charges. For Russia to be a full-fledged
card-carrying member of the international community, this
cannot continue.
And I look forward to today's hearing.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Paul.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RAND PAUL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM KENTUCKY
Senator Paul. I want to thank the Chairwoman for convening
this hearing on human rights in Russia, and I look forward to
hearing from the experts.
Thank you.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much.
So, we are going to start off with our first witness, Mr.
Frank Jannuzi, deputy executive director of Amnesty
International.
STATEMENT OF FRANK JANNUZI, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF
ADVOCACY, POLICY AND RESEARCH, INTERIM COEXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, NEW YORK, NY
Mr. Jannuzi. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Thank you,
members of the panel. It is my honor to appear before you this
morning on this side of the table. It feels a little different
than being on the other side of the table, but I am very
pleased to be here.
As all of the members of this panel have pointed out,
freedom is under assault in Russia. New bills passed just this
week restrict nongovernmental organizations, criminalize
actions that are committed, ``to insult religious feelings of
believers,'' and they outlaw activism by lesbian, gay,
transsexual individuals, and their supporters. These new laws
are coming at a time when political expression, freedom of
assembly, freedom of speech in Russia are already deeply
constrained.
Amnesty International has developed a timeline infographic
that tracks the major clampdown on freedom of expression in
Russia. And this infographic tool visually illustrates that
arrests and other measures to stifle public dissent are
widespread and systematic, and that they have accelerated
greatly since Putin's inauguration in 2012.
The clampdown coming as Russia prepares to host the 2014
Sochi Winter Olympics should be a matter of grave concern to
all Americans. Moscow's lack of respect for basic human rights
speaks volumes about its reliability as an international
partner on vital national security issues, whether those are in
Syria or nuclear nonproliferation concerns on the Korean
Peninsula.
It is not just individuals who are under assault. As
Chairwoman Boxer has already said, nongovernmental
organizations are coming under enormous scrutiny, labeled as
foreign agents, and we are concerned that this is just ``round
one.'' Not every organization has the kind of international
support and strength that Amnesty International enjoys. We are
not worried about our operations in Russia. We are very worried
about the more vulnerable groups, especially in Russian civil
society.
Let me underscore two important points. The first is that
this crackdown is not about silencing opponents only on the
political fringes. This is about stifling all who would
question consolidation of power under President Putin and his
Siloviki allies. President Putin's network is consolidating the
power over, not only economic matters, but also political
matters. And the influence of his KGB-trained operatives, and
their willingness to use force to maintain their status, should
not be underestimated.
The second point is that this repression is arguably more
pronounced in certain regions of Russia, especially the North
Caucasus, where authorities use the excuse of counterterrorism
operations to justify all manner of serious human rights
violations, from disappearances, torture, or even extrajudicial
killings.
I want to try to put a human face on this problem. That is
what Amnesty International is known for. Russia's most famous
prisoners of conscience at the moment are the members of the
band Pussy Riot. Now, inside Russia, and here in Washington,
they can be a polarizing group. I am more of a Sondheim fan
than I am of their music. But, we should all agree that their
brief performance in Christ the Savior Cathedral should not be
the cause of years of imprisonment. Amnesty International has
developed a viewer guide to accompany the just-released HBO
documentary about the band. It is called ``Pussy Riot of Punk
Prayer.'' And our viewer guide illustrates how the band members
were singled out for their political protest against Putin, and
how they were systematically denied a fair trial. We are
calling on the Russian authorities to immediately release the
two imprisoned band members, Marie Alekhina and Nadya
Tolokonnikova.
A quick word about Nadya. I was pleased to host her and her
daughter, Ghera, in Washington, DC, last fall. Her daughter,
Ghera, is 5 years old. She just wants her mother back. This is
the face of the repression in Putin's Russia. It is 5-year-olds
taken from their mothers because of 1-minute rock performances.
I know time is short at this hearing, and so let me
summarize by going to what I believe you can do.
First, continue to shine a spotlight on what is happening
in Russia. To paraphrase the motto of Las Vegas, ``What happens
in Moscow must not stay in Moscow.''
Second, insist that President Obama does not give President
Putin a get-out-of-the-doghouse-free card when he travels to
Russia in September. There should be no reset button on
political repression.
Third, join Amnesty International's Defenders of Freedom
Program. This is a cooperative joint venture we launched with
the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission last fall. Every Member
of Congress is invited to adopt an amnesty prisoner of
conscience. Your voices can unlock cell doors.
And finally, as Senator Murphy has said, find ways to
support Russia's budding civil society sector. This is not
about turning Russia's civil society activists into foreign
agents. It is about recognizing them as foreign partners
striving for human rights, rule of law, environmental
protection, and other laudable goals.
These steps can make a difference.
I look forward to your questions and thank you for your
attention.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jannuzi follows:]
Prepared Statement of Frank S. Jannuzi
Thanks for inviting me to testify before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on the subject of Russia's deteriorating human
rights situation. I have submitted my full testimony for the record,
and request permission to briefly summarize my remarks.
overview
In recent months, Russian authorities have intensified their
assault on basic freedoms and undermined rule of law. The assault takes
many forms. New bills--passed just this week by the country's lower
House of Parliament and expected to be approved in the near future by
the upper House of Parliament and signed into law by President Vladimir
Putin--restrict the activities of nongovernmental organizations,
criminalize public actions ``committed to insult the religious feelings
of believers'' and outlaw activism by lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) individuals and their supporters. I
would note that the new law criminalizing ``propaganda of
nontraditional sexual relations,'' passed 436--by the rubber stamp Duma
this week, comes as much of the world marks Pride month.
New controls over the media are being used to smear government
critics and bolster the government's policy line. Authorities use
secret detention facilities and torture, especially in the North
Caucuses region, to silence critics and deny them access to counsel.
These measures are widespread and systematic. They are being imposed on
domestic and international civil society groups alike.
This crackdown, coming as Russia prepares to host the 2014 Winter
Olympics in Sochi, should be a matter of grave concern to the U.S.
Government. Moscow's lack of respect for human rights speaks volumes
about its reliability as a potential partner to the United States and
Europe in addressing pressing international security concerns, from the
conflict in Syria to the danger of nuclear proliferation. Moreover, it
marks an ominous turn in a country that had been making progress toward
developing more open, transparent, and accountable governance.
Many of you may be aware that Amnesty International has itself been
subjected to various forms of harassment. For some NGOs, the
significance of this particular brand of harassment is that it can
result in self-censorship, restriction of activities, or flight. John
Dalhuisen, Amnesty International's Europe and Central Asia Director,
has expressed our concern that Russia's new NGO law will be used to
target prominent civil society organizations. Already 43 Russian
nongovernmental organizations in 16 regions are undergoing inspections
and investigations, with devastating effect. Many prominent
organizations, such as Golos (Voice) Association which monitors
elections, the Levada Center for sociological research, the Moscow
School for Political Research, and the Human Rights Center Memorial,
have been labelled by prosecutors as ``Foreign Agents.'' Our biggest
concern is that this is just ``round one,'' and that forced closures
are likely to follow.
Indeed, the National Democratic Institute and the International
Republican Institute--arms of the National Endowment for Democracy
funded by Congress--have already suspended operations in Russia given
the threat that their employees might be charged with treason or
espionage. This is because the NGO law passed late last year provides
for sentences of up to 20 years for individuals ``providing
consultative assistance to a foreign organization'' if that group was
involved in ``activities aimed against Russia's security,'' a catch-all
phrase that could be used to criminalize almost any activity the
government deems hostile.
prisoners of conscience
Amnesty International coined the term ``Prisoner of Conscience'' to
describe individuals who have been imprisoned for the peaceful
expression of their beliefs or identity. These individual cases are
often emblematic of systemic problems, so let me briefly highlight some
cases to underscore two key points:
(1) First, Russia's crackdown is not just about silencing
opponents at the political fringes. It is about stifling all
who would question the consolidation of power under President
Putin and his Federal Security Service (FSB) siloviki
associates. This network of former and current state security
officers is consolidating control over all key political and
economic levers of power in Russia. The influence of these KGB-
trained operatives, and their willingness to use force to
maintain their privileged status, should not be underestimated.
(2) Second, while the stifling of dissent is widespread, it
is arguably most pronounced in the North Caucuses region, home
to violent insurrections against Russian rule for centuries.
Human rights defenders who bravely speak out about the
situation in the North Caucuses region are particularly at
risk.
Russia's most famous Prisoners of Conscience are the members of the
band Pussy Riot. Pussy Riot's 1-minute long performance in Christ the
Savior Cathedral in Moscow, and the band members' subsequent arrest and
sentencing, sparked a global outcry and brought Russia's mounting
repression to an international audience. The YouTube video of their
punk performance, in which they criticized President Putin, generated
over 3,000,000 YouTube views.
Amnesty International championed the case of Pussy Riot, not
because we have an opinion on their musicality--I am more of a Sondheim
fan myself--but because we recognize that artists are often at the
cutting edge of political commentary. When artists are arrested for
exercising their fundamental right to freedom of expression--whether in
China with painter and sculptor Ai Wei Wei, in Egypt with TV Bassem
Youssef, or in Burma with comic Zarganar--broader restrictions on the
general public are likely to follow.
Two of three Pussy Riot members remain imprisoned, and Amnesty
International has designated them as Prisoners of Conscience. We are
calling on Russian authorities to immediately and unconditionally
release Maria Alekhina and Nadezhda Tolokonnikova and clear all charges
against them.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Nadezhda ``Nadya'' Tolokonnikova is serving a 2- year sentence at
the notoriously brutal IK-14 women's penal colony in the Republic of
Mordovia. Prior to her arrest, Nadya was a student of philosophy at
Moscow State University and split her time juggling the demands of
being a student, mother, and a political activist. Her daughter Ghera
is 5 years old. I had the honor to meet Ghera last fall when I hosted
her along with a more famous human rights activist--Daw Aung San Suu
Kyi--at the Newseum. Ghera misses her mommy very much.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The second jailed Pussy Riot band member, also a Prisoner of
Conscience, is Maria ``Masha'' Alekhina. Masha has a 4-year-old son,
Philip. She was a senior at the Institute of Journalism and Creative
Writing in Moscow prior to her arrest. Masha is serving the rest of her
term in Perm Krai, a Siberian region notorious for hosting some of the
Soviet Union's harshest gulags. Like Ghera, Masha's son misses his
mother very much.
An HBO documentary--``Pussy Riot: A Punk Prayer''--debuted this
week, and Amnesty International, in collaboration with the producers,
has produced a viewing guide, available at our Web site
www.amnestyusa.org. Concerned citizens--including Members of Congress--
can also express solidarity for the band members by visiting
pussyriot.amnestyusa.org.
Unfortunately, the case of Pussy Riot is just the tip of the
iceberg when it comes to political repression in Putin's Russia. Other
critics of the government--less colorful, perhaps, but no less brave--
suffer in obscurity. They are likely to be treated even more harshly
than their more famous kindred spirits.
The situation is especially grave in the North Caucasus region,
which has been characterized by insecurity and armed attacks on
security forces, civilians, and local officials. Many Americans may
have first become aware of this region during the Boston Marathon
bombing, but the region has long been troubled. Heavy-handed security
operations have led to human rights violations such as extrajudicial
executions, enforced disappearances, secret detention, torture, and
other forms of ill-treatment.
The absence of rule of law fuels unrest. The criminal justice
system of Russia is set up to deliver quick convictions, not justice.
Defense lawyers are often seen as obstacles to law enforcement
officers, who would prefer to see them removed from the equation
altogether. Lawyers who dare to defend individuals suspected of
membership in armed groups are themselves often threatened, attacked,
or murdered by law enforcement officials. Complaints against law
enforcement officials often receive no response, are dismissed, or are
countered by criminal investigations against those who have filed the
complaint.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The case of Sapiyat Magomedova is emblematic. As a defense lawyer,
Magomedova is known for her work on cases involving human rights
violations committed by law enforcement agencies in Dagestan. In June
2010, when she went to the Khasavyurt town police station to visit a
client, police officers prevented her from gaining access to her
client. They forcibly removed her from the police station and
physically assaulted her. When she attempted to file a complaint about
the attack, the police launched their own investigation saying that she
in fact attacked them. Investigators repeatedly tried to pressure her
into withdrawing her complaint, and warned her that she would face
criminal charges herself if she pressed ahead. She refused to be
intimidated. In the end, the courts dismissed both complaints--hers and
that of the police--without explanation. While some might have
interpreted this as a victory, she doesn't see it that way, and neither
does Amnesty International. When police assault lawyers simply for
attempting to do their jobs, the authorities should hold those police
accountable. Magomedova is still seeking justice, and still being
persecuted for her persistence. Just last month, Magomedova reported
receiving death threats via text messages. Amnesty International stands
beside this brave human rights defender and supports her call for
justice and accountability.
what can be done?
There are no quick fixes to reverse the ever shrinking space for
freedom of expression in Russia. A blend of public and private
initiatives may work best. Let me suggest four things the members of
this committee can do to perhaps deter some of the worst of the abuses
and support those inside Russia who are courageously doing their part
to advance human rights and rule of law.
First, continue to shine a spotlight on what is happening
and help the American people understand why they should care.
Ideally, you should synchronize your efforts with
parliamentarians in Europe and through the Helsinki process,
because when you speak in unison with your fellow legislators,
your voices are amplified. Russia is a great power with
enormous potential to help solve the world's problems. But what
happens in Moscow does NOT stay in Moscow. It speaks volumes
about Russia's reliability as a global partner of the United
States in every field, from trade to international security.
Second, insist that when President Obama travels to Russia
in September, that he put human rights prominently on his
summit agenda. The Russian Government cares about its
reputation, and the United States should not give President
Putin a free pass on repression.
Third, join Amnesty International's Defenders of Freedom
program, a cooperative venture we launched last fall with the
Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission and the International
Religious Freedom Commission. You can adopt a certified Amnesty
Prisoner of Conscience and tell their story on your web pages,
give floor statements about them, and pass resolutions calling
for their release. YOUR voices can help unlock cell doors, and
we've already done the research work for you.
Finally, notwithstanding budget pressures and Russian
restrictions, you can generously support funding for
nongovernmental organizations striving to strengthen Russian
civil society. Training in international human rights law for
journalists, lawyers, judges, and even public security
officials can improve their performance and better equip them
to be human rights champions. And let me say for the record
that this is NOT an appeal for funding for Amnesty
International. We don't take government money for our research
or advocacy.
These would all be constructive, welcome steps. You may not win any
thanks from President Putin, but I can assure you, as a representative
of the world's largest grassroots human rights organization, that your
efforts can make a difference in the lives of Nadia, Masha, Sapiyat,
Ghera, and countless other brave citizens of Russia who would will
benefit if the U.S. Senate makes a firm commitment to advancing human
rights at home and abroad.
[Editor's note.--The attachments to Mr. Jannuzi's prepared statement
can be found in the ``Additional Materials Submitted for the Record''
section at the end of this hearing.]
Senator Boxer. Thank you. I thought you gave us some very
good ideas.
Next, we welcome Dr. Leon Aron, of the American Enterprise
Institute.
Welcome, sir.
STATEMENT OF LEON ARON, RESIDENT SCHOLAR AND DIRECTOR OF
RUSSIAN STUDIES, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Aron. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking
Senator Johnson, Senators Paul and Murphy.
In the summer of 2011, Dan Vajdic and I were fortunate to
travel from Vladivostok to Kaliningrad across Russia to
interview leaders and activists of nongovernmental
organizations and movements. The conclusions from more than 40
hours of interviews and over 300 pages of transcripts are in
this report, titled ``A Quest for Democratic Citizenship,''
which I ask to be entered to the record, subject to format
rules and regulations.
I recall this report because I want to put causes and faces
on the tragedy--and it is a tragedy--that is unfolding in
Russia today.
These were among the finest men and women I have met
anywhere. They were fearless, hardworking, smart, and
absolutely unyielding in their quest for fairness and justice.
None of these organizations and movements were political,
overtly or covertly. What united them was the moral imperative
of dignity in democratic citizenship, including, first and
foremost, equality before the law and the end of effective
disenfranchisement. In that, they were not different from the
civil rights movement in the United States or the Arab Spring
or the cause of the Chinese dissidents today.
All of the organizations I visited--and I keep in touch
with all of them--are now under pressure and harassment. One of
them, the Baikal Ecological Wave, which, for many years, has
been trying to save the world's largest body of freshwater from
pollution, is facing the same humiliating choice as the
hundreds of other nongovernmental organizations of Russia. To
register as alleged foreign agents because the only support
they could get is from foreign environmental organizations will
close down and abandon its cause for good.
Looking ahead, let me mention three major implications of
the crackdown on civil society in Russia today. I will list
them in the order of growing importance, from short-term and to
long-term impacts.
First, the prospects for better United States-Russian
relations seem bleak. Any substantive reset with the United
States would contradict the regime's dominant domestic
narrative of propaganda and repression in which the United
States is featured as the key alleged threat to Russian
security and domestic stability. It is possible, of course,
that the regime would try and combine repression with detente.
It happened before. But, this Kremlin does not seem to be in
the mood for sophisticated bifurcation of its domestic and
foreign policies.
Second, a year into authoritarian consolidation following
Vladimir Putin's reelection, what we are witnessing is a
significant change of the regime, from a relatively soft
authoritarianism to a much harder, more repressive, more
malignant version. The harassment and self-exile of the leading
Russian economist and establishment reformer, Professor Sergei
Guriev, 2 or 3 weeks ago, was another signal of the regime's
moving in that direction.
The Kremlin's message to the establishment, liberal, pro-
reform, pro-democracy men and women in the elite seems to be
something like this, ``Stop criticizing the government or risk
harassment, or even jail. If you don't like the deal, leave
while the going is good. Those of you who choose to stay,'' in
the words of the leading opposition blogger, Yulia Latynina,
``must, in all honesty, believe that the greatness of Russia
lies in Vladimir Putin and that the source of protests against
the great Putin can only be a world conspiracy and the `fifth
column' inside the government.''
Finally, I called it ``the tragedy.'' I called it a
tragedy. And it is. The assault on civil society unfolding in
Russia today is a tragedy for Russia, because nongovernmental
organizations, grassroots organizations, are, first and
foremost, a school of democracy. They teach personal
responsibility, self-organization, peaceful dissent,
compromise, solidarity, and respect for law. And what is left--
and that is what is being destroyed--and what is left in the
rubble are only stagnation, hatred, and radicalism. What is
left is scorched earth, incapable of upholding democratic
institutions when the regime falls, just as happened in the
Soviet Union.
Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Aron follows:]
Prepared Statement of Leon Aron
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the summer of 2011 I crossed Russia's
11 time zones, from Vladivostok to Kaliningrad, to interview about two
dozen leaders and activists of six nongovernmental organizations and
movements. The analytical conclusions from more than 40 hours of
interviews and over 300 pages of transcripts, are in this report,
titled ``The Quest for Democratic Citizenship'' which I ask to be
entered in the record, subject to format rules and regulations.
But this was far more than a field study for me. These were among
the finest men and women I've met anywhere. They were fearless,
extremely hard working, smart and absolutely unyielding in their quest
for dignity in democratic citizenship. None of the organizations and
movements whose leaders and activists I interviewed was overtly
political much less oppositional. Two of them were environmental; one
was battling the destruction of historic buildings in St. Petersburg;
one was concerned with road safety and the corruption of the traffic
police; and two advocated honest elections and freedom of speech and
demonstrations.
What united them all was the moral imperative of dignity in
democratic citizenship, including, first and foremost, equality before
the law and the end of effective disenfranchisement through
restrictions on party registration and falsification of the election
results. In these key regards, their core demands were no different
from the civil rights movement in the United States or the demands of
the Arab Spring or the cause of Chinese dissidents today.
I describe them here for you because I want to put causes and faces
on the tragedy that is unfolding in Russia today. All of the
organizations I visited are now under pressure and harassment. One of
them, Baikal Ecological Wave which for many years has been trying to
save the world's largest body of fresh water from pollution is facing
the same choice as hundreds of other organizations: to register as a
foreign agent, because the only support it gets is from foreign
environmental organizations--or close down and abandon its cause.
Looking ahead, I see three main implications of this crackdown on
civil society in Russia. Let me list them in the order of importance
and from short term to longer time periods.
First, the prospects for U.S.-Russian relations seem bleak. Any
substantive reset with the U.S. would contradict the regime's dominant
domestic narrative of propaganda and repression, with the U.S. as the
key alleged threat to Russian security and domestic stability. It is
possible, of course, that the regime would try and combine repression
with detente but it is unlikely: the Kremlin today seems in no mood for
sophisticated bifurcation of its domestic and foreign policies.
Dictated by the considerations of regime survival, the worsening of
relations with the United States may be seen as a boost to the domestic
legitimacy of the regime which presents itself as the defender of
Russian sovereignty against the plotters from abroad, aided by paid
traitors at home. Thus, expect no accommodation on Syria or Iran--or
anything else that might be seen domestically as ``concession to the
U.S.'' Indeed, even strategic nuclear arms reduction may fall victim to
the same domestic political calculus despite the administration's
concerted efforts to assuage Russia's concerns over the missile defense
in Europe.
Second, what we are witnessing after a year of authoritarian
consolidation, following Putin's reelection in March of last year,
looks more and more like a significant change of the regime from a
relatively softer authoritarianism to a much harder and malignant
version. The harassment and self-exile of a leading Russian economist
and establishment reformer Professor Sergei Guriev has signaled a
unilateral renegotiation of the longstanding social compact with the
liberal public opinion leaders. If previously proreform members of the
establishment could write what they wanted and be safe from repression
so long as they were not actively supporting political opposition, the
Kremlin's message today is: You must stop public criticism of the
government--or risk harassment and even jail. If you don't like the
deal, leave while the going is still good. Those who chose to stay, in
the words of a leading opposition blogger Yulia Latynina, ``must in all
honesty believe that the greatness of Russia in lies in Vladimir
Putin,'' and that ``the source of protests against the great Putin can
only be a world conspiracy [by the West] and the `fifth column' inside
the government.'' \1\
Finally, and most damagingly in the long run, the assault on civil
society is a tragedy for Russia because nongovernment organizations
are, first and foremost, a school of democracy that teach personal
responsibility, self-organization, peaceful dissent and compromise.
Although on the personal level they detested the regime and never hid
this attitude, the leaders and activists I interviewed were utterly
pragmatic, ready to compromise and cooperate in the service of their
cause. ``Our attitude toward the government is that when we can
cooperate with it, we do,'' a young woman in Vladivostok told me.
``When we think that the regime's policies are wrong, we don't hesitate
to say it openly.''
This is what is being destroyed! Left in the ruble of civil society
are only stagnation, hatred, and radicalism. Left behind is scorched
earth, incapable of upholding democratic institutions, when this regime
falls or implodes--just as happened after the fall of the Soviet Union.
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I ask that in addition to my study of civil
society organizations, two recent articles of mine, published in the
Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal, be entered into the
record, subject to format rules and regulations.
----------------
End Notes
\1\ Yulia Latynina, ``Pikseli odnoy kartinki,'' gazeta.ru, May 31,
2013 and ``Doktor, a otkuda u vas takie kartinki?'' novyagazeta.ru,
June 1, 2013.
[Editor's note.--The report ``A Quest for Democratic Citizenship''
submitted for the record was too voluminous to include in the printed
hearing. It will be retained in the permanent record of the committee.
The Washington Post and Wall Street Journal articles can be found
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section at the
end of this hearing.]
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
And now we turn to Ambassador Sestanovich, who was the
State Department's principal officer responsible for policy
toward Russia, 1997 to 2001, and he is now at the Council on
Foreign Relations.
STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN SESTANOVICH, SENIOR FELLOW FOR
RUSSIAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Sestanovich. Thank you very much. Senator Boxer,
Senator Murphy, members of the committee, thank you for
inviting me to join this timely and important discussion.
From the other witnesses on today's panel, you are
receiving a full and informed picture of Russian political
developments. It is a discouraging picture. But, the key
question that this committee faces is, How should the United
States respond? Let me suggest five things that we, and
especially you, as Members of Congress, can do.
First, we need to stay out of the political struggle that
is underway in Russia. Those who are trying to exercise their
political rights to bring Russia into the European democratic
mainstream are not asking us for direct assistance. They
recognize that Putin wants to draw us into the middle of
Russian politics because he thinks it will help him to stay on
top. The United States should leave no confusion on this score.
Russia's political course is for Russians to set. We may have
our favorites, but we do not fund them. Sharpening the line
between what we do and what we do not do can only help us.
Second, we should, at the same time, be emphatic that it is
an international norm for nongovernmental organizations to be
able to reach out to foreign donors. Doing so does not make
them foreign agents. Claiming that they are is a crude attack
on civil society that pits Russia against principles around
which European countries have rallied since the end of the cold
war. And not just European countries. Consider the recent
resolution of the United Nations Human Rights Council, which
declared that no state should, ``delegitimize activities in
defense of human rights on account of the origins of funding
thereto.'' When Putin has a majority against him at the United
Nations, you know he is on shaky ground.
Third, even as we stay out of Russian politics, we should
increase our support for civil society in Russia. Congress can
take an important step in this direction by reviving
consideration of a United States-Russia civil society fund. A
year and a half ago, the Obama administration notified Congress
of its intention to use some of the proceeds from the now
liquidated U.S.-Russia Investment Fund to create such a fund.
In light of recent developments, two adjustments of the
administration's plan are called for. First, the amount should
be bigger. Use all the proceeds, a full $162 million. And with
no budgetary impact for the United States, let me add. And it
should not be focused just on Russia. A fund to support civil
society in all the countries of the former Soviet Union would
advance American interests in this entire region.
Fourth, Congress should remind the administration that the
Freedom Support Act is still on the books and that our national
commitment to its goals is intact. For many years, the U.S.
Agency for International Development oversaw most of the
funding that Congress made possible in this area. But AID has
ceased to operate in Russia. Congress should insist on hearing
a credible plan from the administration for how the funds it
has made available are to be spent effectively.
Fifth, we should remember that American strategy since the
end of the cold war has reflected the unusual weakness of civil
society in countries that were ruled, for decades, by Soviet-
style dictatorships. Eventually, nongovernmental organizations
of the kind that we take for granted in modern societies need
to be self-sustaining. They need support from domestic donors.
Congress should ask the administration what strategy it has for
encouraging support for Russian NGOs from within Russia,
itself.
For the past 2 years, Congress has wrestled with the
question of how to modernize our support for human rights and
democracy in Russia. The measures I have described, and others
like them, would be a sign that we still have the ideas, the
resources, and the commitment to advance our interests in this
way.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Sestanovich follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Stephen Sestanovich
Senator Boxer, Senator Murphy, members of the committee, thank you
for inviting me to join this timely and important discussion. America's
concern for the state of Russian democracy is sometimes portrayed as an
intrusion into another country's affairs. The truth is different. Our
concern reflects a strong commitment to partnership between the two
countries. We have many reasons to hope for democratic consolidation in
Russia, but one reason is perhaps more important than any other.
Without it, Russian-American cooperation--which is very much in our
national interest--will never take secure root.
From the other witnesses on today's panel, you will receive a full
and informed assessment of Russian political developments. It is a
discouraging picture. Over the past year and a half President Putin and
his supporters have put in place a new strategy to restabilize their
rule after the protest of 2011-2012. One key element of their strategy
is to portray challengers to the status quo as instruments of foreign
manipulation. This was Mr. Putin's first rhetorical jab at those who
demonstrated against fraud in the parliamentary elections of December
2011. (It was Hillary Clinton, he claimed, who had ordered them into
the streets.) The same impulse lives on in the new law requiring
Russian NGOs to register as ``foreign agents'' if they receive any part
of their funding from abroad.
There are some puzzling elements of Putin's strategy, but his
political calculation is pretty obvious. He hopes to benefit by
blurring the distinction between political movements and civil society.
Many Russian NGOs do get support from abroad. Putin's political
opponents do not. They do not need, do not want, and should not get
foreign funds. Even so, if Putin can convince people that the two are
one and the same--that the protesters are paid by foreigners to rally
against him--then he has a better chance of keeping Russia's ``silent
majority'' on his side. This is an obnoxious strategy, but it has
clearly won some converts for him.
How should the United States respond? Let me suggest five things
that we--and especially you as Members of Congress--can do.
First, we need to stay out of the political struggle that is
underway in Russia. We are of course, inspired by the efforts of those
who want to bring Russia into the European democratic mainstream. But
they are not asking us for direct assistance. They recognize that Putin
wants to draw us into the middle of Russian politics because he thinks
it will help him to stay on top. The U.S. should leave no confusion on
this score. Russia's political course is for Russians to set. We may
have our favorites, but we don't fund them. Sharpening the line between
what we do and what we won't do can only help us.
Second, we should be emphatic that it is an international norm for
nongovernmental organizations to be able to reach out to foreign
donors. Doing so does not make them ``foreign agents.'' Claiming that
they are is a crude attack on civil society that pits Russia against
principles around which European countries have rallied since the end
of the cold war. And not just European countries. Consider the recent
resolution of the U.N. Human Rights Council, which declared that no
state should ``delegitimize activities in defense of human rights on
account of the origins of funding thereto.'' When Putin has a majority
against him at the U.N., you know he's on shaky ground.
Third, even as we stay out of Russian politics, we should increase
our support for civil society in Russia. Congress can take an important
step in this direction by reviving consideration of a U.S.-Russia Civil
Society Fund. A year and a half ago the Obama administration notified
Congress of its intention to use some of the proceeds from the now-
liquidated U.S.-Russia Investment Fund to create such a fund. In light
of recent development, two adjustments in the administration's plan are
called for. The amount should be bigger (use all the proceeds--a full
$162 million), and it should not be focused just on Russia. A fund to
support civil society in all the countries of the former Soviet Union
would advance American interests in this entire region.
Fourth, Congress should remind the administration that the Freedom
Support Act is still on the books--and that our national commitment to
its goals is intact. For many years, the U.S. Agency for International
Development oversaw most of the spending that Congress made possible in
this area. But AID has ceased to operate in Russia. Congress should
insist on hearing a credible plan for how the funds it has made
available are to be spent effectively.
Fifth, we should remember that American strategy since the end of
the cold war has reflected the unusual weakness of civil society in
countries that were ruled for decades by Soviet-style dictatorships.
Eventually nongovernmental organizations of the kind that we take for
granted in modern societies need to be self-sustaining. They need
support from domestic donors. Congress should ask the administration
what strategy it has for encouraging support for Russian NGOs from
within Russia itself.
For the past 2 years, as it contemplated Russia's ``graduation''
from the Jackson-Vanik amendment, Congress has wrestled with the
question of how to modernize our support for human rights and democracy
in Russia. The measures I have described, and others like them, would
be a sign that we still have the ideas, the resources, and the
commitment to advance our interests in this way.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much.
We turn to Dr. Ariel Cohen of the Heritage Foundation.
Welcome, sir.
STATEMENT OF ARIEL COHEN, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW FOR RUSSIAN
AND EURASIAN STUDIES AND INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POLICY, HERITAGE
FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Senator Murphy,
Senator Johnson, Senator Paul, ladies and gentlemen. My name is
Ariel Cohen. I am senior research fellow at the Heritage
Foundation and testify in private capacity.
Russia has missed its historic opportunity to build the
modern, law-based society and democratic system of governance
since the collapse of communism in 1991. This is for several
reasons.
First, there was no lustration. In other words, members of
the Communist Party, those who were in senior positions, and
members of secret services were allowed to continue to rule the
country.
Second, the corruption and the failure of the rule of law
destroyed popular support of democracy.
Third, Russia had to fill the vacuum of ideology left
behind by collapsed communism, and moved into the three pillars
that we recognize from the czarist regime: autocracy, Christian
Orthodox in Moscow patriarchate, and populism with nationalist
overtones.
Why should we care? Why should America care? And why should
Senate and U.S. Government do anything about it? The answer is
that the more authoritarian and anti-United States Russia
becomes, the more difficult it is to do business with the
Kremlin, be it concerning the civil war in Syria, Iran
sanctions, large-scale investment, or our support of American
allies and friends in the former Soviet Union.
Today, as my colleagues mentioned, the best and the
brightest of Russia are pushed into exile. Lenin, the founder
of the Soviet state, first exiled the intellectuals and the
philosophers by boatload and then the big terror came. Today,
Sergei Guriev, the founder of the new school of economics and
very much an establishment figure, was under pressure to leave
his own country, the country where he advised, at the highest
level, the Presidency, and was on the board of the largest
Russian Bank, Sberbank. He had to stay in Paris because of the
interrogations in the Mikhail Khodorkovsky third investigation.
Khodorkovsky has been in jail for over 10 years now, and
everybody expected him to be let go next year. However, the
signs are, the Russian state is preparing the third kangaroo
trial of Mikhail Khodorkovsky.
Another prominent figure is opposition leader, and the
world chess champion, Garry Kasparov. Garry Kasparov announced
that he is not going back to Russia, as well.
So, no, there are no philosophers' boats being shipped to
the West with hundreds of Russian top talent, but people are
choosing to stay abroad because of the fear. And I witnessed
this fear this year, in April, when I was in Yekaterinburg, the
location of the execution of the czar's family and a place
where tens of thousands were killed in great terror. People
came up to me and said, ``We are afraid. Nothing is going to
change for many, many years.'' This is the first time I hear
such despair in Russia.
So, what can we do? Clearly, there are valid and compelling
bilateral interests in Washington that we need to pursue,
including our orderly withdrawal from Afghanistan,
antiterrorism cooperation, the challenge of rising China,
broadening business relationship, et cetera. This Senate, in
passing the Jackson-Vanik amendment, created its own track
record for defense of human rights in Russia. Such pillars of
the Senate as ``Scoop'' Jackson and Daniel Patrick Moynihan
were at the forefront of fighting for human rights in Russia.
Today, the Senate, the Presidency, and the U.S. Government
at large needs to strike appropriate balance between pursuing
American security interests and being true to our own values.
So, what can we do? We can make a stronger case for civil
freedoms for the Russian people through international
broadcasting, which is in bad shape. It needs funding, needs
serious reorganization, needs new talent and new content
providers. We also need to revisit the Magnitsky List, which
only has, now, 18 names on it. The Magnitsky List is the living
memorial for the man who was murdered in a Russian jail, trying
to be loyal to his American client.
We also have, as Americans, a wealth of experience to
offer, be it in legislative policy, in health care, in
developing investment and high tech. But, this will not happen
if Russia is not going to be free. This is not going to happen
if Russia continues to keep laws on books that call NGOs
``foreign agents'' if they take foreign funding. This is not
going to happen if the definition of ``treason'' in the
criminal law has been expanded to be something like what they
had in Stalin's times.
Senator Boxer. I am going to ask you to wrap up now.
Mr. Cohen. So, it is true that it is up to the Russian
people to make their country free, but it is up to us to give
support and make our voice heard in support of freedom in
Russia.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ariel Cohen
Chairman Murphy, Senator Johnson, ladies and gentlemen. My name is
Ariel Cohen. I am a Senior Research Fellow, Russian and Eurasian
Studies and International Energy Policy at The Heritage Foundation.
First, I want to thank the subcommitee for inviting me to testify and
hereby ask to enter my remarks in the record. Second, I would like to
note that I testify in a private capacity and my testimony reflects my
personal view only and should not be construed as views of The Heritage
Foundation.
Russia has missed its historic opportunity to build a modern, law-
based society and a democratic system of government since the collapse
of communism in 1991. This is for several reasons. First of all,
remnants of the Communist Party and the security services remained in
positions of power. No lustration, or political cleansing of the old
totalitarian system, was undertaken by the Russian people or their
leaders, most of who belonged to the old regime.
The second reason for the reemergence of authoritarianism in Russia
is the lack of rule of law as well as the rampant corruption that
tainted the economic reform and the implementation of privatization
during the 1990s, discrediting multiparty democracy and civil freedoms
in the process. The Russian Communists as well as the nationalists
exploited the situation, deliberately equating freedom and democracy
with chaos and moral corruption.
Russia problems with stinted civil society and abysmal rule of law
did not start with the collapse of communism. This is a known and
systemic problem which has become a major roadblock on the road to the
country's modernization. While czarist Russia had a rather weak and
somewhat corrupt legal system, the Soviet Union used the law as an
instrument of oppression, deliberately destroying even the smallest
manifestation shoot of civil society. Stalin even sent speakers of
Esperanto and philatelists to the GULAG camps.
The third reason for the weakness of open society in Russia is
resurging nationalism, neoimperialism, and the state's alliance with
the Orthodox Church, which harbors many xenophobic and anti-Western
elements.
Taken together, these three elements have combined in Russia to
produce what we see today: an illiberal regime which is inimical to
civil society and hostile to the West both ideologically--rejecting the
values of freedom and individual rights--and geopolitically. The
predominant, state-supported political ideology in Russia today is
close to what it was over 100 years ago: Russian Orthodoxy, autocracy,
and populism with nationalist overtones.
Why should Americans care? And why should the Senate and the U.S.
Government do anything about it? The answer is that the more
authoritarian and anti-U.S. Russia becomes, the more difficult it is to
do business with the Kremlin, be it concerning the civil war in Syria,
Iran sanctions, large scale investment, or our support of American
friends and allies in the former Soviet Union.
It is harder to get along with large authoritarian states that view
the U.S. as an adversary, than it is with fellow democracies. However,
not everyone in Russia is anti-American. Late-Soviet and post-Soviet
Russian civil society has roots in the dissident movement which began
under Stalin and was strongly influenced by three Nobel Prize winners--
Andrey Sakharov, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and Joseph Brodsky, who later
became a U.S. poet-laureate. Some of the dissidents were pro-Western,
while others, like Solzhenitsyn, were Russian nationalists and
themselves deeply suspicious of the democratic West. Many of the
dissidents provided piercing critiques of Stalinist totalitarianism and
the late Soviet high authoritarian system. Some survivors of that early
movement are still with us today, including the octogenarian Lyudmila
Alexeeva, who recently testified on Capitol Hill.
Sakharov, Alexeeva, Mstislav Rostropovich, a prominent musician who
later became conductor of the U.S. National Symphony, Natan Sharansky,
who became Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister, and
internationally renowned author, and many others played a key role in
launching the dissident movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
With selfless dedication, and with the help of some international
funding, including money provided by the U.S. taxpayer through USAID,
the National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican
Institute, and National Democratic Institute, as well as private
foundations, such as Krieble, Mott, McArthur, and Soros, Russian civil
society went from taking its first baby steps to providing a wide array
of services to hundreds of thousands of people. These include defending
the civil rights of civilians and minorities in war zones, the fight
against state corruption and graft, demanding protection against
Russia's notorious police brutality and lawlessness, upholding the
human rights of military recruits subject to systemic violence and
abuse, promoting voters' rights, working to prevent HIV/AIDS and other
diseases, advocating for the rights of the disabled, and many other
activities. Recently, actions also focused on protecting those who were
detained and arrested in the course of political protests after the
2011 Duma elections, which suffered from widespread voting fraud; as
well as efforts to promote freedom of the media, including the
Internet; secure prisoners' rights and highlight abuses in the courts;
and to further environmental protection activities.
Civil society, human rights, and independent media activities,
however, are dangerous pursuits in Russia. The crusading journalist,
Anna Politkovskaya, was murdered in the entrance to her apartment
building. Chechen human rights activist Natalia Estemirova was gunned
down. Anticorruption journalist and Novaya Gazeta editor Yurii
Schchekochikhin was poisoned. Many journalists were beaten or killed;
and anticorruption crusader, blogger and politician Alexei Navalny is
awaiting trial on trumped up criminal charges of embezzlement.
The latest scandal at the heart of Russia's civil society involves
a highly respected economist, the founder of the Russian Economic
School, Sergey Guriev. He was interrogated by the country's top-flight
Investigative Committee, the high profile investigations branch of the
Interior Ministry (federal police) which effectively reports to the
Kremlin. The authorities deliberately blurred Guriev's legal status in
this case. He was reportedly suspected of taking money from jailed
YUKOS oil company founder and regime opponent, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, in
return for providing an expert opinion favorable to the businessman,
who is now serving his second jail term. After jailing Khodorkovsky for
a decade, the state alleges that he somehow initiated a review of his
case by Presidential Human Rights Commission experts in order to
shorten his 13 year sentence. The charges against Khodorkovsky are
widely recognized as false. In Guriev's case, however, it is highly
significant that he was a member of the inner sanctum of the Russian
establishment, hardly a marginal figure. He undertook his activities on
behalf of Khodorkovsky within the framework of the Presidential Human
Rights and Civil Society Council. He was an advisor to former President
Dmitry Medvedev; in close contact with leading economic ministers and
pro-Kremlin businessmen; the dean of New Economic School and a star
economics professor; and a member of the board of Sberbank, the largest
Russian state-owned savings bank. Guriev's colleagues at the Human
Rights Council included Tamara Morshchakova, the former Constitutional
Court Justice; Mikhail Subbotin, an economist from the Higher School of
Economics, and other prominent establishment figures.
After Guriev realized that he and his wife were being followed both
in person and electronically, he fled Russia and now resides in France.
In a media interview, he said that ``Paris is better than
Krasnokamensk'' (the East Siberian town where Khodorkovsky's former
labor camp is located). The charges against Guriev may have been part
of an effort to launch a third Khodorkovsky trial in which, this time,
the businessman would stand accused of using his funds to influence the
Russian expert community in his favor. Khodorkovsky's decades-long
string of prosecutions is a litmus test of Russian civic development,
as he funded the liberal opposition Yabloko party, the Open Russia NGO,
and other nonprofit organizations and activities, including an
orphanage and an Internet training program, which connected millions of
Russian schoolchildren with the outside world.
Khodorkovsky's 2003 arrest and two jail terms marked a retreat from
civil liberties and a turning away from the period of relatively free
political activities, and sent a resounding message to the business
community to stay away not just from politics, but from civic activism.
Even those who limited themselves to charities and buying Faberge eggs
for the state museums are now under attack, as has been the case of
Victor Vekselberg for the thankless job he did of spearheading the
multibillion dollar Skolkovo high-tech park, which was supposed to
recreate the Silicon Valley experience Russian style: top to bottom.
With independent TV channels coming under state control in 2000-
2001, and the oligarchs Vladimir Gusinsky and the late Boris Berezovsky
were pushed into exile around the same time, Russian TV channels came
under state control. With democratic opposition parties effectively
prevented from entering the Duma since 2004, Russian civic society and
its NGOs, many of them U.S.- and Western-supported, were a breath of
fresh air in the increasingly oppressive country. However, their
funding within Russia was severely limited as Moscow never bothered to
make the support of NGOs fully tax-exempt, and instead offered to
provide government funding to friendly organizations, effectively
undermining their independence.
It took almost 10 years to gradually tighten the screws--despite
the Bush administration's earnest attempts to collaborate with the
Kremlin over Afghanistan and Iran. Then came the much-touted ``reset''
policy of the Obama administration, which despite offering Russia
unprecedented concessions, including a strategic nuclear weapons START
treaty; freezing ballistic missile defense modernization in Europe; and
a much lower profile for U.S. ties and activities in the former Soviet
Union, nevertheless failed to protect Russia's civil society. Instead,
the Obama administration attempted to redefine U.S. support of civil
society in Russia as financing mostly nonpolitical efforts, like infant
health and other health care projects. In vain.
Coming back to current developments, the Guriev affair typifies all
that is wrong with the crackdown on civil society and the lack of rule
of law in Russia. The authorities are generating pressure on the best
and the brightest to leave. Instead of creating conditions for
electoral pluralism, political party-building, the thriving
nongovernmental sector, and free media, the state is doing exactly the
opposite. Some may blame it on the oil and gas windfall, as many petro-
states, for example Venezuela, as well as the Middle Eastern states,
are stuck between authoritarianism and populism.
The Russian leadership today rejects the freedom- and law-based
Western liberal democratic model, and is increasingly pushing Russia in
the direction of authoritarianism. It is no accident that some of the
world's most prominent authoritarian regimes are Russia's best friends,
including Cuba, Iran, Nicaragua, Syria, Venezuela, not to mention the
authoritarian former Soviet republics such as Belarus and Tajikistan.
Others, such as Sunni Arab monarchies, while clashing with Russia over
Syria, share the regime's oil and gas revenue dependence as a
distinguishing characteristic. And while former President and current
Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev, and his advisors at least paid lip
service to individual rights, professing that ``Freedom is better than
no freedom'' and voicing tentative suggestions for political and
``economic'' prisoner amnesty, election of Governors and Senators in
Russia's parliamentary upper house, and lowering of the minimal
electoral barrier for the Duma to 5 percent, today the state's actions
speak louder than any words.
While President Putin was elected last spring with a viable
majority, some election fraud occurred, especially in the North
Caucasus. Some Presidential candidates were not allowed to run, and
those who did had no equal access to television, their funding was
severely constrained, and the Central Electoral Commission chaired by
Vladimir Churov, a Putin loyalist, successfully prevented a runoff.
Today, the legitimacy of the current administration is questioned by
many in Russia, and increasingly relies on the rural/small town, older,
less educated, more nationalist and more traditional population, many
of whom do not care about civil liberties and are deeply suspicious of
the West.
It is against this background that we need to view the the 78-page
report by Human Rights Watch (HRW), ``Laws of Attrition: Crackdown on
Russia's Civil Society After Putin's Return to the Presidency,'' which
highlights some of the anti-NGO legislation and tactics that marked the
return of Putin to the Presidency in May 2012.\1\ This included the
introduction of a series of law severely restricting civil society, and
particularly, the activities of NGOs. It also featured the imprisonment
of a number of political activists, and the characterization of the
government critics as foreign-supported enemies. The HRW report
analyzes these new laws, including the so-called ``foreign agents''
law, the treason law, and the public demonstration/assembly law, and
documents how these have been used. The package of new laws and
government harassment are ``pushing civil society activists to the
margins of the law,'' notes Hugh Williamson, Europe and Central Asia
Director at HRW, ``the government crackdown is hurting Russian society
and harming Russia's international standing.'' \2\ Many of these new
measurements and activities violate Russia's international human rights
commitments.
In today's Russia, draconian limits have been placed on association
with foreigners and foreign funding. The term ``foreign agents''
deliberately hearkens back to the Stalin era, and the law requires
organizations that receive foreign funding and supposedly engaged in
any vaguely defined ``political activities'' to register as ``foreign
agents.'' Another law, adopted in December 2012, essentially bans
funding from the United States for ``political'' activity by
nongovernmental organizations, along with groups whose work is
``directed against Russia's interests.'' Russia also shut down the
activities of USAID, terminated the successful Nunn-Lugar program to
dismantle weapons of mass destruction and boost nonproliferation, and
caused organizations such as the International Republican Institute to
relocate its staff to Lithuania.
Yet another recently passed Russian law expands the legal
definition of treason in such a way that it can be used to criminalize
involvement in human rights advocacy, including work for international
organizations. It can also criminalize scientific and business
activities involving foreigners and Russian citizens, having a chilling
effect on investment and international cooperation. A recent piece of
legislation effectively criminalizes unauthorized demonstrations,
including their preparation, organization, and promotion, by
establishing jail terms and huge fines for organizers and participants.
Since the spring of this year, the Russian authorities began a
nationwide campaign of intrusive government inspections of the offices
of hundreds of civil organizations. Officials from the prosecutor's
office, the Justice Ministry, the tax inspectorate, and in some cases
the antiextremism division of the federal police, the health
inspectorate, and the fire inspectorate, have descended on the offices
of election-observation NGO Golfs, Memorial, which is organizing a
memorial to Stalin's victims, and even some bird sanctuaries and health
advocacy organizations. The inspection campaign, which began in March
2013, was prompted by the ``foreign agents'' law.
Although many organizations have not received their inspection
results yet, a few received citations for failing to register as
``foreign agents,'' and others have been fined for fire safety and air
quality violations and the like. According to Human Rights Watch,
government inspectors examined each group's tax, financial,
registration, and other documents. In several cases, they seized
computers or e-mail. In one case, officials demanded that an
organization prove that its staff had had been vaccinated for smallpox,
and in another the officials asked for chest x-rays of staff to ensure
they did not have tuberculosis. In yet another case, officials demanded
copies of all speeches made at the group's recent seminars and
conferences. This is clearly an unwarranted and systematic persecution
of civic organizations, and particularly, of human rights organizations
and activists. Such state activity goes beyond acceptable international
practice and suggests that Russia, while not yet in the ranks of most
oppressive human rights violators, such as Iran, North Korea, Saudi
Arabia, and Cuba, is on a very worrisome trajectory.
While the Russian Government has asserted that these inspections
are routine, they are clearly not. As Human Rights Watch points out,
``The campaign is unprecedented in its scope and scale, and seems
clearly aimed at intimidating and marginalizing civil society groups.
This inspection campaign can potentially be used to force some groups
to end advocacy work, or to close them down.''
Currently, there are several cases of prosecution which suggest
strong political motivation. These include the Guriev case discussed
previously; the charges against politicians Alexei Navalny and Boris
Nemtsov; and the case of the May 6 Bolotnaya Square demonstrators, with
over 20 accused. Garry Kasparov, a world chess champion and one of the
leaders of the Russian opposition has announced his forced emigration.
He is not going back to the country, which he represented in
international chess battles because he, too, like Guriev, is being
called to prosecutor's office, which violates dues process and goes out
of its way to destroy the peaceful opposition in Russia. Vladimir
Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state, exiled philosophers and other
scholars by shipload. Today, the state forces its best and brightest,
like Guriev and Kasparov, to emigrate, while others, like Navalny, are
threatened with jail and the GULAG camps.
There are others, such as the matter of Pussy Riot--three female
punk band members who are incarcerated in labor camps for 2 years for
allegedly offending the feelings of Christian Orthodox believers when
their anti-Putin song was performed, admittedly in very bad taste, in
Moscow's Cathedral of Christ the Savior.
Thorough investigation and research of these cases by Russian and
Western experts and journalists demonstrate a lack of regular due
process, biased judges and prosecutors who disregard the law,
questionable and underqualified government experts, and the lack of a
proper appeals process independent of the executive branch and
politics. As in the Soviet past, judges bow before secret police and
law enforcement and are enforcers of the political leadership's will.
Most importantly, it appears that the old Soviet practice of
``telephone law'' is back, under which the executive authority
informally and without a paper trail or track record, dictates how
judges should rule in cases of particular interest.
While the Putin regime has been ratcheting up the pressure on
Russian NGOs and civil activities, the Obama administration has toned
down its protests against lawlessness and the crackdown on civil
society in Russia. Clearly, there are valid and compelling bilateral
interests that Washington and Moscow need to pursue, including an
orderly withdrawal from Afghanistan; antiterrorism cooperation (the
urgency for which the horrific Boston marathon bombing amply
demonstrated); the search for a diplomatic settlement to the Syrian
civil war; further and more effective sanctions on Iran; the challenge
of rising China; and broadening business relations, especially in the
energy field. Nevertheless, the U.S. should remain true to its values
and protect those who seek human dignity and freedom. Speaking up for
victims of oppression in the Soviet Union and Russia has a glorious
history which goes back to at least the 1960s, when American Senators
like ``Scoop'' Jackson passed the Jackson-Vanick amendment. All of us
fondly remember Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a great critic of Communist
excesses when he was President Ford's U.N. Ambassador and later the
Senator from New York. Americans supported Andrey Sakharov, gave refuge
to Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and marched in the hundreds of thousands on
behalf of Soviet Jews who yearned to be free to emigrate.
Some of those who have fallen victim to the more recent crackdown
are alive: Khodorkovsky, Navalny, the prisoners of the last year's
Bolotnaya Square protests. Their voices need to be heard. Some are
dead, like Sergey Magnitsky, Anna Politkovskaya, and Natalia
Estemirova. The lives, and the reasons for their deaths, need to be
remembers. Their murderers need to be apprehended and brought to
justice.
Russia's civic organizations are in the process of shutting down,
and one can only hope and pray that darkness won't descend. Without
groups such as Golos and Memorial, without the Committee of Soldiers'
Mothers, without a free media, Russia can only become more nationalist,
more authoritarian, more anti-Western, and more anti-American.
The Senate, the Presidency the U.S. Government, the U.S. nonprofit
sector, all need to strike a proper balance between pursuing American
security, diplomatic, and business interests--and being true to our
values. We need to make the support of freedom and individual rights in
Russia, as well as in other places around the world where civil rights
are violated or people are oppressed, a priority--as well as in this
country. In our contacts with Russian officials, we need to keep
bringing up the cases of those whose murderers are unsolved, or who are
rotting in camps and jails. We may need to revisit the Magnitsky list,
which the administration went out of its way to minimize. We need to
use the power of public diplomacy, and especially international
broadcasting, currently moribund for lack of new technologies and high
quality content providers, to make the U.S. voice heard in Russia and
other languages, from Brest to Vladivostok. America needs to make a
strong case for civic freedoms to the Russian people and to the Russian
leaders, and it is up to the Kremlin and to the Russian people to allow
their country to move toward unencumbered political expression, a
thriving civil society, and away from stagnation and authoritarianism.
America is capable of global leadership when it believes in itself
and in its values. We can offer the Russian people so much--in areas
they need most: to improve their uncompetitive education, abysmal
health care, and chilling investment climate.
We can expand space cooperation, energy exploration, and work together
on much-
needed infrastructure development in that vast country that covers nine
time zones.
Most importantly, U.S. have a wealth of experience to offer in
legislative policy, court administration and--despite the recent
scandals--the rule of law. The good will is there, but Russia would
need an unencumbered nonprofit sector and the rule of law to benefit
from it.
It is up to the Russian leadership to rise to the challenge, to
allow the nonprofit sector to thrive, and to restore cooperation with
the U.S. The ball is in Moscow's court.
----------------
End Notes
\1\ ``Laws of Attrition: Crackdown on Russia's Civil Society after
Putin's Return to the Presidency,'' Human Rights Watch, April 24, 2013,
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/04/24/laws-attrition.
\2\ Ibid.
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much.
And finally, we hear from Boris Nemtsov. In addition to
being a former Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, he is
cochairman of what I believe is the opposition party, the
Republican Party of Russia-People's Freedom Party, and, in
January 2011, he was sentenced to 15 days in jail after taking
part in an opposition rally.
We are very happy to have you here, sir. Please go ahead.
STATEMENT OF HON. BORIS NEMTSOV, COCHAIRMAN OF REPUBLICAN PARTY
OF RUSSIA-PEOPLE'S FREEDOM PARTY, MOSCOW, RUSSIA
Mr. Nemtsov. Well, thank you very much for opportunity to
be with you today.
I want to thank you for holding this timely and topical
hearing and for giving me the opportunity to share my views on
the situation in Russia.
I want to tell you that I have a ticket to Moscow today,
and--100 percent, I will be back, and--but, I think that
opposition leaders must fight inside the country, not outside.
With Vladimir Putin's return to the Presidency in May 2012,
Russia's authoritarian regime has transitioned to a new stage
of development, from so-called ``sovereign democracy,''
characterized by election fraud, media censorship, and the
harassment of the opposition, to open political repression.
Critics of Mr. Putin's government, from opposition leaders to
rank-and-file activists, are being put up for political show
trials.
The case of the participants of the May 2012 anti-Putin
rally, the so-called ``Bolotnaya case,'' the case of
anticorruption campaigner Alexei Navalny, and the possible
third criminal case, which Ariel mentioned, against Mikhail
Khodorkovsky, Russia's most prominent political prisoner, are
only some of the examples of a rapidly worsening situation.
Meanwhile, new laws targeting the freedom of assembly,
expanding the definition of ``treason,'' and labeling NGOs that
receive funding from abroad as ``foreign agent,'' which, in
Russian language, is synonymous with ``foreign spies,'' show
that the regime is no longer satisfied with mere political
control and seeks to subject society to fear and submission.
In this context, attempts by some in the West, including in
the United States, to adopt a realpolitick approach and to
conduct business as usual with the Putin regime, contradict the
most basic values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of
law. Such policy is also counterproductive, since the Kremlin
considers it as a sign of weakness and, therefore, as an
invitation to behave even more aggressively, both at home and
abroad.
This coming Monday, G8 leaders, including Barack Obama and
Vladimir Putin, will gather for a summit in Northern Ireland.
The agenda does not even include any mention of human rights
abuses in Russia. The G8 is still known as the group of leading
industrial democracies, which sounds incredibly grotesque,
given the situation in Russia. It would be more appropriate,
and more honest, to refer to the group as ``G7 plus Putin.''
Last year, the U.S. Congress adopted the most pro-Russian
law in the history of any foreign Parliament, including the
U.S. Congress. The Magnitsky Act, directed against crooks and
abusers, finally ends the impunity for those who violate the
rights and steal the money of Russian citizens. According to a
recent poll--Russian recent poll--by the Levada Center, 44
percent of Russian people support the Magnitsky Act, with just
21 percent against and 35 percent holding no opinion. And this,
despite the massive Kremlin propaganda against this law.
Unfortunately, the initial public list of violators that
was published by the U.S. administration in April includes only
18 names, none of them high-ranking. Too many of those
responsible for repression and human rights abuses have been
let off the hook. This is a great strategic error. I hope that
it will be corrected in the near future.
It is our task, the task of Russian citizens, to bring
about democratic changes in our country. This cannot be done
from outside. But, if the United States wants to show support
for the Russian people, the best way to do it is also to
implement the Magnitsky Act, in full accordance with the
original intent.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nemtsov follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Boris Nemtsov
Chairwoman Boxer, Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member Paul, Ranking
Member Johnson, esteemed members of the committee, I want to thank you
for holding this timely and topical hearing and for giving me the
opportunity to share my views on the situation in Russia.
With Vladimir Putin's return to the Presidency in May 2012,
Russia's authoritarian regime has transitioned to a new stage of
development--from the ``sovereign democracy'' characterized by election
fraud, media censorship, and the harassment of the opposition, to overt
political repression. Critics of Mr. Putin's government--from
opposition leaders to rank-and-file activists--are being put up for
political show trials. The case of the participants of the May 2012
anti-Putin rally (the so-called ``Bolotnaya case''); the case of
anticorruption campaigner Alexei Navalny, and the possible third
criminal case against Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Russia's most prominent
political prisoner, are only some of the examples of a rapidly
worsening situation. Meanwhile, new laws targeting the freedom of
assembly, expanding the definition of ``treason,'' and labeling NGOs
that receive funding from abroad as ``foreign agents,'' (which in
Russian is synonymous with ``foreign spies'') show that the regime is
no longer satisfied with mere political control and seeks to subject
society to fear and submission.
In this context, attempts by some in the West, including in the
United States, to adopt a realpolitik approach and to conduct
``business as usual'' with the Putin regime contradict the most basic
values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Such policy is
also counterproductive, since the Kremlin considers it as a sign of
weakness--and, therefore, as an invitation to behave even more
aggressively, both at home and abroad.
This coming Monday, G8 leaders--including Barack Obama and Vladimir
Putin--will gather for a summit in Northern Ireland. The agenda does
not include any mention of human rights abuses in Russia. The G8 is
still known as the group of leading industrialized democracies, which
sounds increasingly grotesque given the situation in Russia. It would
be more appropriate to refer to the group as ``G7 plus Putin.''
Last year, the U.S. Congress adopted the most pro-Russian law in
the history of any foreign Parliament. The Magnitsky Act, directed
against crooks and abusers, finally ends the impunity for those who
violate the rights and steal the money of Russian citizens. According
to a recent poll by the Levada Center, 44 percent of Russians support
the Magnitsky Act (with just 21 percent against, and 35 percent holding
no firm opinion)--and this despite the massive Kremlin propaganda.
Unfortunately, the initial public list of violators that was
published by the U.S. administration in April includes only 18 names--
none of them high-ranking. Too many of those responsible for repression
and human rights abuses have been let off the hook. This is a grave
strategic error. I hope that it will be corrected in the nearest
future.
It is our task--the task of Russian citizens--to bring about
democratic changes in our country. This cannot be done from outside.
But if the U.S. wants to show solidarity with the Russian people, the
best way to do it is to implement the Magnitsky Act in full accordance
with its original intent.
Senator Boxer. And thank you for your courage. And I would
just say, you know, on behalf of all of us, your being here
helps shine the light on what is happening, and I hope that--
because we now know you and we now know what you face, that,
when you get back there, you will have respect and not be
mistreated. And we certainly will follow that very closely.
I want to start the questions with Mr. Jannuzi. I thought
you gave us two really important ideas. One is to keep shining
the light on these abuses, which is always very effective, I
think. And, second, you said, before the President goes to his
summit meeting--is it called a summit?--in September----
Mr. Jannuzi. In September, there will be a summit meeting
in Moscow.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. A summit meeting that we need
to, if we can, put human rights on the agenda, which we have
learned is not on the agenda. So, what I am going to work with,
with Senator Johnson, Senator Murphy, Senator Paul, is a
bipartisan letter that we can send to the administration,
saying that we are very concerned, and perhaps sending them a
summary of this hearing, so they can--and we will send that to
John Kerry, as well. And I think that would be a good way to
show bipartisan support for putting this on the agenda and not
letting it be swept under the rug. Do you think that would make
some sense?
Mr. Jannuzi. I do, Senator. I've always felt that human
rights should not be an afterthought in summitry, that human
rights issues are really integral to everything else the United
States is trying to accomplish, whether it is with Russia or
with China or other great powers. And, by signaling that
intention, I think we put the Russians on notice that we care.
Senator Boxer. And perhaps it is up to the--I think we will
talk about it--maybe we will want to see Secretary of State
Kerry, or at least do a conference call with him, where we can
underscore this, because one of the things I was struck by,
both by comments up here and out there, is, you know, we really
do not know exactly where this is all leading. And it could be
leading to a horrible place--it is already in a very bad
place--and may not be. But,
it is one of those moments when, if there is any thought
process going on over there, that they need to understand that
people are watching.
Ambassador, I wanted to ask you to expand on your
suggestions to us. You said, ``Congress should remind the
administration that the Freedom Support Act is still on the
books, our national commitment to its goals is intact, and, for
many years, AID oversaw most of the spending that Congress made
in this area, but AID has ceased to operate in Russia. Congress
should insist on hearing a credible plan for how the funds it
has made available are to be spent effectively.''
Can you give us a sense of--you know, you are saying
Congress should insist on hearing a credible plan. What would a
credible plan be, to you, if you had the opportunity to give
input into that?
Ambassador Sestanovich. Well, thank you for the opportunity
to elaborate that point, Senator, because I think resources are
just as important as letters, and create facts on the ground
and capabilities in Russian civil society that may not
otherwise exist.
AID has had the lead in spending money through a variety of
organizations that it has supported over the years. I think it
probably may be in the ballpark, this year, of $40-$50 million
in democracy-in-governance support. But, that is now an empty
vessel. AID is closing up shop. And the question is, What will
happen to that amount of money? where will it go? who will have
control over it in the U.S. Government? Or are we just going to
take the fact that AID has been closed down by the Russian
Government as a reason that the United States Government cannot
do anything in this area?
There is a debate going on, in the administration, about
how to dispose of those funds and who should have control over
them. And I cannot settle the question for you here, but I
think the crucial question is whether the United States stays
interested in this issue and puts resources behind its
interest.
There are some people who are saying, really we cannot do
anything in this area, so we should shift to other activities.
I think that would be a mistake, for all the reasons----
Senator Boxer. Well, give me an example. If you were
sitting in the room, and had--just give us one example. You say
we should insist on a credible plan. So, I am asking you,
Assuming we could find someone to execute the plan, what would
be some of the top ideas you would have?
Ambassador Sestanovich. Well, as I say, it always matters
who is able to dispose of the money and what kinds of groups
can be----
Senator Boxer. But, I am asking you.
Ambassador Sestanovich [continuing]. Supported. Yes.
Senator Boxer. You are an expert. What are your ideas?
Ambassador Sestanovich. I think there are many different
organizations in Russia that are worthy of support. My
copanelists have mentioned environmental groups, have mentioned
groups interested in public health. But, I would focus on a
couple that I think are particularly at the interface between
civil society and politics. And I will give you two. Two kinds
of activities. I am not going to give you specific donors.
Senator Boxer. That is fine.
Ambassador Sestanovich. One involves polling and public
opinion, the other involves election monitoring.
The Russian Government has tried to create the idea that
these are political activities, and that any groups involved in
these activities are political actors, as though people who
count the ballots in an election are engaged in political
activity instead of creating a fair playing field. So, polling
groups and election monitors have come under particular
pressure. These are critical functions. And whatever the
mechanism that we pursue for supporting activities of that
kind, we should----
Senator Boxer. Well, that is very----
Ambassador Sestanovich [continuing]. Definitely take----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. That is very helpful. And I saw
Mr. Jannuzi shaking his head yes, and I saw Mr. Cohen----
Mr. Jannuzi. Just strong affirmation.
Senator Boxer. So, that would be the strong affirmation.
And, Mr. Cohen, do you agree with that idea, about polling
and that--but, you shook your head when he said ``environmental
groups.'' I saw that.
Mr. Jannuzi. Yes.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Cohen.
Mr. Cohen. Yes. I think the battlefield today is not in
health care. I witnessed, during the Obama administration--
Secretary Clinton came and opened civil society, Congress here,
and it was inundated with health care and other
noncontroversial----
Senator Boxer. Yes.
Mr. Cohen [continuing]. U.S.-supported, taxpayer-supported
activities. It did not work. The crackdown on American civil
society activities came after that, not before that.
So, this--I do not want to use a word like ``appeasement,''
but it did not work, and the battlefield is in what my
colleague Steve Sestanovich said: transparency. Clear--clean
elections----
Senator Boxer. Good.
Mr. Cohen [continuing]. Clean politics, whistleblowing.
Alexei Navalny is facing five criminal cases. Alexei Navalny is
the leading whistleblower in Russia. So, yes, we should
support, we should focus, but, no, we should not shy from the
battle.
Thank you.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
My time is up, so I am going to turn to Senator Johnson.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And, by the way, I would fully support an effort to, you
know, put a letter together prior to the summit. And from my
standpoint, I would personally call on members of this
distinguished panel to provide me the input, provide this panel
the input, this committee the input, on what the prioritized
listing of issues we should put in the letter, as well as the
individuals that we should call out, the people of courage,
like Mr. Nemtsov, you know, to make sure that the Russians know
that we are watching and, you know, we want to make sure that
these people are treated with human dignity and respect.
Two people mentioned the Magnitsky List, that we only have
18 individuals listed on that. Without naming the people, I
would like to know who--you know, I would also like to know
your version of who should be on the list, but can you tell us
how many people should be on that list? Should it be thousands,
should it be hundreds? I mean, what--to have main effect.
Mr. Cohen, you mentioned it.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Senator.
On a case-by-case basis, and with examination of proper
evidence, I would say there should be a process that selects
these individuals. I will not venture a number right now. I
think you have to look at who was involved in what kind of
activities. And the language of the law does not limit it to
the case of the late Sergei Magnitsky. The language of the law
expands the scope of the law to address systematic, gross
violations of human rights and economic activities that stem
from those abuses. And with this criteria, these individuals
should be evaluated and then entered into the list.
Senator Johnson. Well, obviously, this administration did
not follow criteria to add enough people, according to you
folks, or at least a couple of you, in terms of people on that
list. So, what should be the process? I mean, is that something
you could also feed into this committee, in terms of who should
be on that list?
Mr. Aron, would you like to----
Mr. Aron. Well, I actually defer to Boris Nemtsov.
Senator Johnson. Okay.
Mr. Aron. I think he is the best expert on this.
Senator Johnson. Mr. Nemtsov.
Mr. Nemtsov. Well, first of all, I want to tell that the
administration has already got a lot of names, which was
prepared by a human rights organization from Russia and from
the United States. My understanding is that they do not want to
be serious, as far as this list is concerned. They want to be
very cautious, because they are afraid of Putin disappointment
and his aggression, et cetera, et cetera. I think that this is
great mistake----
Senator Johnson. So, how many people are on that list?
Mr. Nemtsov. Well, I want to tell you that there are
several lists which were prepared by NGO. One is very short,
about 13 names; another looks bigger, about 200 names. I do not
think that you must think about an amount of names; I think
that most important thing, like Ariel said, and that is that
people who are responsible for violation of law, people who are
responsible for political repression in Russia, must be
included, nevertheless what there is a relationship between
these guys and Putin.
Senator Johnson. Okay. So, you want the right names on the
list, as do I, so I would like to work with you, in terms of
getting those people on that list.
Let me talk a little bit about--or, I would like to get
your input on the effect of the reset, or, even more so, the
effect on U.S. policy, or lack of policy, in terms of
emboldening Putin. I am exactly sure who I should ask that
question to, so whoever--it looks like--you know, whoever wants
to answer that. What is that effect, in terms of, really, the
deteriorating civil society in Russia? America's lack of
leadership.
Mr. Aron.
Mr. Aron. Well, I think--you know, depending on who you
speak to, the reset had either very specific goals or very
broad goals. I think it was oversold as a kind of, you know,
broader coincidence of values in some areas. Others were more
realistic about it and felt that this is just about arms
control.
Now, this administration continues to pursue another arms
control--or, I should say, arms reduction agreement with
Russia. It pursues it, I think, with a great deal of zeal, thus
giving, I think, the Kremlin what they at least interpret as
the ability to manipulate the relationship because the
administration wants an arms control deal. This is something to
watch for. This is not the cold war, this is not the Soviet
Union. The pursuit of arms control cannot be a be-all and an
excuse-all kind of policy. And I think this is where, not just
a reset, but the broader structure of our relationship needs to
be somewhat corrected.
Senator Johnson. Mr. Sestanovich.
Ambassador Sestanovich. Senator, I think there are pluses
and minuses to their reset record. And one could go through,
issue by issue, and evaluate them. But, if the question is,
``Did something in the reset trigger Putin's repression?'' I
would give you a different answer. I would say the calculation
that Putin made was based primarily on the appearance,
unexpected for him, of an amazing degree of popular opposition
and the readiness of people in Moscow and other cities across
Russia to go into the streets and demonstrate against electoral
fraud, against him. That challenge is one that I think he would
have responded to, in the way that he has, no matter what kind
of Russian-American relationship you created.
Senator Johnson. Okay.
Ambassador Sestanovich. Because his instincts are what they
are.
Senator Johnson. Thank you.
Ambassador Sestanovich. He is----
Senator Johnson. I am running out of time, and I want to
get to one conflict that I heard.
Mr. Sestanovich, you said we need to stay out of Russia.
Mr. Jannuzi, you said we need to shine the spotlight. Are those
mutually exclusively? Or--you know, I just kind of wanted to
get that--I think spotlight's good, but in what----
Mr. Jannuzi. Senator, I think I can square that circle.
The strongest proponents of human rights--basic rights,
civil rights--in the world do not live along the banks of the
Potomac, they live along the banks of the Volga, the Amur, and
other rivers, you know, in Russia. And by shining a spotlight
on their efforts, by supporting, both rhetorically and, as
Ambassador Sestanovich has said, to the extent we are able,
through training initiatives and civil society promotion,
activities, supporting their efforts, we are not intruding into
the decisionmaking of the Russian people; we are helping them
have the tools they need to make those decisions for themselves
in a more democratic, open, and transparent way. And so, I
believe that we can do both.
Senator Johnson. Mr. Cohen, you raised your hand, there.
Mr. Cohen. We, at the Heritage Foundation, documented the
failure of the reset policy. I can point out one success, and
that is cooperation on the United States transportation network
into Afghanistan, and now out of Afghanistan. Other than that:
Syria, missile defense; Iran, terrorism. It did not work. In
case of antiterrorism cooperation, it did not work well enough.
To wit, Boston.
I think that the issues at hand--civil society, human
rights--should remain on the table. It is our national security
interest--it was so since Jimmy Carter, since Ronald Reagan--
that Russia will move into the direction of freedom, civil
society, and cooperation. The more Russia goes there, the
better it is for the Russian people. They are talking about
lack of sustainability of the current economic model that is
based on oil and gas. Well, you develop your non-natural
resources economy by having a freer society, by having your
elites staying in Russia, living in Russia, working in Russia,
and creating wealth there and not in New York, although I am
not against the fact that they are contributing to the welfare
and prosperity of this great country.
Thank you.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Cohen.
I guess I will turn it over to the new chair.
Senator Murphy. Thank you, Senator Johnson.
I wanted to further explore the comment that Ambassador
Sestanovich raised, which is that Putin's turn toward
repression comes from a fear of a changing level of opposition
from the Russian people. And I guess I will start with Mr.
Nemtsov with this question. I would love your thoughts, and
then others, as to the status of popular opinion in Russia
today with respect to this level of oppression. We saw a high
level of organized unrests in 2011, in 2012. We have not seen
as much organized protest and unrest this year as we have in
previous years. And I guess the simple question, to start with
you, Mr. Nemtsov, and then others want to chime in, is, Is this
because the tactics have succeeded and there is a similar
amount of opposition to Putin today than there has been in the
past, and people just feel like they cannot express that? Or is
there less interest than we might otherwise think amongst the
Russian people in this new series of oppressive and repressive
tactics?
Mr. Nemtsov. Well, first of all, Putin lost, after the
election--after the election of 2012--he lost more than 10
percent. Secondly, in authoritarian country, public opinion is
very strange thing, because public opinion formed by TV,
mainly, in Russia--more than 65 percent of Russians get
information from TV, not from Internet. And TV is under 100
percent of Putin control. That is why, for example, Russian
people do not like America--not because they think that this is
devil empire, but because Putin TV show that this is our enemy.
That is it. That is why this is manipulation, this is not
public opinion, in democratic understanding point of view.
Well, people are tired of him. People know that he is a
leader of corruption team. People know that he is very rich.
Very rich, not because of his incomes, but because of
corruption scheme, et cetera, et cetera. People know that there
is new oligarchy team around him, including KGB guys, et
cetera. That is why I think that his popularity is going down
and down.
As far as protest is concerned, your second question, I am
one of the organizer of rally and demonstrations from 2011.
What the main problem. Yes, it was, yesterday, a good
demonstration, with more than 20,000 of people on the streets,
which is good, with this main slogan, ``Freedom for political
prisoners and for free Russia and for democratic Russia,''
which is great, but people want to get results immediately.
They believe that if we came to the street with 100,000 of
people, Putin will disappear in 1 second. This is Russian
tradition: to get result immediately. You know, if you--if you
explain, them, ``Guys, this guy control 600 billion U.S.
dollars in reserves,'' he is one of the richest men in the
world, and he is very much afraid to be in jail, and he is
ready to use every opportunity to keep his power, and I do not
think that one peaceful rally is enough--it is very unpopular
idea, but this is realistic.
That is why we must continue, I am 100 percent sure,
because peaceful protest is an only way for Russia. Russia has
terrible history of bloody revolutions, with terrible results.
That is why our absolutely clear choice is to continue, but
peaceful protest.
Senator Murphy. Let me just see if there are any other
quick thoughts on the status of public opinion.
Mr. Jannuzi. Senator, we do not have good polling data, but
we know that, since Putin was inaugurated last year, more than
5,100 people have been arrested. This is having a chilling
effect on their willingness to come out in the streets. And the
fact that there were 10- to 15- or 20,000 people in the streets
of Moscow yesterday,
the day after the Duma had passed new restrictive laws,
suggests
that there is a significant amount of unrest and unhappiness.
More information on this is available at our infographic at
AmnestyUSA.org. And we do not see a diminution in the
willingness of the Russian people to step up and criticize
their government. But, the size of the protests is being
reduced, out of fear.
Senator Murphy. All right.
Mr. Cohen.
Mr. Cohen. From my sense--I am a lapsed lawyer, and one of
the few things that I am dragging from my legal past is
engagement in writing about the Russian Constitution. I spoke
in Russia, in Yekaterinburg, about that. And what Russian
Constitution provides--I think, mistakenly--is that the
Presidency is above the three branches of government. Well,
ladies and gentlemen, I am sorry to say, the Presidency in
Russia, de facto, is the executive branch and is very
politicized. The Russian Constitution says that the President
of Russia is a guarantor of the constitution. Since 2011, Mr.
Putin is no longer guarantor of the constitution. Maybe even
from before that. Mr. Putin is a part of a political struggle
in Russia. He is a political actor. And he, as such, today,
unfortunately for him, lost control of the Russian elites.
Today, in every poll that you see of people who are under 45,
urban, and educated, Mr. Putin's party, United Russia, is not
getting the majority. And his popularity is not growing. It
used to be very high. It used to be in the 75-percent range.
Not among the elites anymore.
So, what is he doing? He is doing what any politician is
doing: disregarding the Russian Constitution and being the
guarantor and above the branches--the three branches of
government, because, between us, this is basically, a
description of a czar. He is shifting his political base to
less educated, more urban and small town, and older. And that
is part of the explanation for the crackdown, for this policy
that is pulling Russia back into the past, into this populism
and disregard to the rule of law.
Senator Murphy. I will save my second few questions for the
second round. Maybe we will go back to Senator Johnson now, and
then, now that Senator McCain has joined, we will give him a
chance to take a breath and ask questions after Senator
Johnson.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to follow up, really, on the flow of
information into Russia. Mr. Nemtsov, you talked about 60 or 65
percent of the information Russians get is from Russian TV, and
yet we have a fair amount of real information coming in there,
to the extent where you have got the elite that are against
Putin. Where are they getting it from? How free is the
Internet? You know, how restricted is it?
Mr. Nemtsov. Well, Internet is relatively free. Comparing,
first of all, with China or Belarus or Iran and some other
countries, it looks free, except maybe the most powerful Web
sites, like Yandex--this is Russian Google--like Mail.ru, like
some others. But, we have an opportunity to use Twitter,
Facebook, to use LiveJournal, some other Web sites.
But, I want to tell you that Internet is not targeting
information resource, because you can get, in Internet, all of
the information, from freshest, you know, to pornographia. You
can get everything you want. If you look at TV--why TV is so
influential and why this is so powerful--because this is
absolutely targeting resource, ``Putin is good. McCain is
disaster.'' That is it. [Laughter.]
Senator Johnson. No offense, Senator. [Laughter.]
Mr. Nemtsov. Well, it is very clear message----
Senator Johnson. Welcome to the hearing.
Mr. Nemtsov. Yes. [Laughter.]
Mr. Nemtsov. Very clear message. But very targeted, right?
Every day, from the morning to the dark, ``I am a hero, I am a
patriot, America is our main enemy, while our Russian
opposition, all of them, are American spies,'' including me, of
course, while--that is it. And every day. If you look at
Internet, you get different information, free.
Senator Johnson. So, we certainly do understand the power
of mainstream media, here. But, what is--what is the power--I
will ask somebody else on the panel--What is the power of the
alternate information? As well as--I also want to tack on this
question, too, is--What is the prospect of relatively free and
fair elections? I mean, how unfair are they? How easy is it for
Putin to steal those, time and time again?
Mr. Nemtsov. Let me--well----
Senator Johnson. Okay.
Mr. Nemtsov. I know an answer. We do not have elections. We
have special operation, always.
One example. Election--mayor election in Moscow City, the
biggest city in Russia, the most opposition city, and the most
well-educated city, with concentration of money, with a budget
like in New York City. Well, they decided to organize these
elections, just few days ago, with Putin, because of summer
vacations and because of great pressure to Alexei Navalny, who
is one of the candidate--he wants to take part--and because
they are very afraid of Mikhail Prokhorov, Russian billionaire
who wanted to take part. But, they--specially for Prokhorov,
they adopted a law that all of the money and the assets must be
in the country, even if you are just candidate. To Prokhorov,
it means that Brooklyn Mets basketball team must be in Moscow
in one week----
Senator Johnson. Right.
Mr. Nemtsov [continuing]. Because he is an owner of this
basketball----
Senator Johnson. So, you are really describing----
Mr. Nemtsov. That is why--you know, they--they separate
everybody. This----
Senator Johnson. Right.
Mr. Nemtsov. Do you think that this is elections? And, as
far as Navalny is concerned, you know, he face five criminal
cases against him.
Senator Johnson. So, they are certainly not fair elections,
but, again, when he gets right down to balloting, if there was
more free flow of information, if they--if they were not able
to rig, you know, the timing of them so there is absolutely no
chance for the opposition to be known and to get traction
within the public, is there a prospect for the actual election
to be--represent what people are actually voting, or is it--
they are always stolen?
Mr. Cohen.
Mr. Cohen. It is a matter of demographics. The demographics
of, I would say, 45 or 50, and up, which is still a big
demographic, get their information from TV. TV channels are
controlled by the state, one way or another. But, I would like
to focus your attention on what we are doing or not doing--
rather, not doing--with American international broadcasting.
International broadcasting helped us to win the cold war. I
am proud to be part of the Radio Liberty research that was a
part of that. Today, we are not doing that anymore. We are not
doing that vis-a-vis Russia, we are doing--barely doing it vis-
a-vis Iran, we do not have successful and widely popular media
in the Arab world. And I am just not a specialist in China, so
I--it is hard for me to compare.
We are in a different media world, we are in a different
media environment, but I do not see the same fervor, the same
impact, the same technology, and the same content that we
managed, together with Russian emigres, together with prominent
Russian intellectuals at the time, to generate. And I do
believe that it was American public broadcasting that helped us
to bring communism down, and that there is no reason why we
cannot promote the cause of freedom today in the Muslim world
and in nonfree societies.
Senator Johnson. Mr. Jannuzi.
Mr. Jannuzi. Senator, as important as information is--and I
agree, very much, that access to accurate information is
essential for an informed electorate--the problem in Russia has
more to do with the ability to speak truth to power once you
know that truth. It is about freedom of speech, freedom of
assembly, freedom of association. So, information, great, I am
all for it. But, what we really need is to be focusing on the
defenders of the civic space in Russia.
Senator Johnson. Right. But, again, you do not have the
civil rights, so is it possible to broadcast that through the
Internet, through things like Radio Free Europe, I mean, those
types of levers that we used to, you know, wield far better,
here in the United States, than what we are apparently doing
today?
Mr. Jannuzi. I think the passion and the activism is in
Russia now. We do not need to ignite it through broadcasting.
We need to stand with those who are attempting to wield their
power.
Women like Sapiyat Magomedova, she is a human rights
defender in Dagestan. She goes after police who use violence
against those who they are supposed to be protecting. But, she,
herself, as a human rights defender and lawyer, is now coming
under death threats and scrutiny from the authorities.
Senator Johnson. So, we should put her in our letter.
Mr. Jannuzi. We should put her in our letter, and we will
help you do that, Senator.
Senator Johnson. Okay.
Ambassador Sestanovich. Okay. Can I add one thing that--to
follow up on what Frank has said? There is no doubt that the
impact of the new legislation about foreign funding is having
an impact on civil society groups. They are finding it harder
to operate. Their budgets are under pressure. And the question
for them is going to be how much foreign donors are actually
pulling back from supporting them, which is why I suggested
that Congress should take a look at reviving the United States-
Russia civil society fund, from a year and a half ago, that the
administration proposed. We have not yet seen the real
contraction of activities by NGOs in Russia. But, that is
coming, because they are under a lot of pressure, and they are
finding it difficult to keep the resources.
So far, nobody has been convicted under this law, but that
may come, too.
Senator Johnson. The threat is there.
Okay, I just want to say thank you all. This has been, I
think, enormously helpful, certainly to me. I could sit here
and ask questions for hours, and maybe we should be convening
that type of panel.
But, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Murphy. Thank you.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I share your
comment, there, that these are five of the most respected
people I know, in America, that have spent, literally, their
careers, four of them, in behalf of human rights. And Mr.
Nemtsov has obviously been on the front line in his efforts to
bring democracy back to Russia.
I would like to ask the panel about the Magnitsky Act. I
would like to know its effect in Russia, whether it has been
implemented in the manner which we had hoped it would be, as
far as the number of people who would have been affected by it.
And, third of all, do you believe that we should make the
Magnitsky Act a global act from--there's many--you know, we
went through a debate, when we passed this, to whether it
should be global or just Russia-specific.
So, Mr. Jannuzi, maybe I could begin with you, and we will
go down the line.
Mr. Jannuzi. Senator, I am hamstrung by the fact that the
Amnesty International organization, because of a skepticism of
the use of sanctions, took no position on the Magnitsky Act,
but we strongly believe that, if you are going to have it, you
ought to use it wisely. And that means that you need to be
looking at the list--not only should it be accurate, but it
should be calibrated to your political objectives. That list
could be populated with hundreds of names, if you wanted to,
based on the criteria of the law. I do not think anyone has
that intention.
But, if your goal is to send that message to the
decisionmakers in Russia about our commitment to human rights
and our hope that they will embrace those rights, as well, then
you need to calibrate the list politically. It is a political
decision, how many names and which names you put on there.
Senator McCain. And its effect in Russia?
Mr. Jannuzi. It has pissed off President Putin greatly.
[Laughter.]
We got his attention. Once you have his attention, there
has to be engagement if there is going to be progress. That is
why we are calling for President Obama to put human rights
prominently on the agenda of his summit meeting with President
Putin in September. He should raise human rights, both
privately and publicly, at other opportunities, including a 1-
hour meet-and-greet that he has with President Putin in
Iceland. If he raises these issues consistently at a time when
we have their attention, he is more likely to get a good
listening.
Senator McCain. Mr. Aron.
Mr. Aron. Yes. Senator, I think sometimes we have to look,
not just at the nitty-gritty of stuff, but at symbols. We now
know, from the memoirs of the prisoners of conscience in the
Soviet Union, including Anatoly, now Nathan, Shcharansky, about
the enormous effect of the ``Evil Empire'' speech by Ronald
Reagan, of the ``Bring down that wall, Mr. President--Mr.
General Secretary.''
The effects may not be immediate, but, I think, apart from
the punishment of what is known in Russia's crooks and
swindlers, and the repression, I think the enormous impact of
the Magnitsky Act is precisely in showing the solidarity with
that quest for democratic citizenship, of which I spoke before.
I think the effect is on the urban, younger generation,
whom, by the way, Putin lost, I mean, by every public-opinion
poll--the future of Russia is not with his constituency. And
therefore, you know, this has been a fairly gloomy session,
but, short term, things are very bleak. I think--even in the
medium term--I think we ought to be hopeful.
But, this expression of solidarity is extremely important,
and I think the--again, apart from the specific names on that
list, I would--any continuation--any continuation of attention
to the Magnitsky Act and the Magnitsky process, I hope--I think
is going to be, long term and even medium term, of enormous
symbolic importance for those who strive for democracy and
human rights in Russia.
Senator McCain. Do you share Mr. Jannuzi's view of Mr.
Putin's reaction? [Laughter.]
Mr. Aron. I think all kinds of acts were involved, yes. Not
just the one that he mentioned.
Ambassador Sestanovich. Senator, I think the effect of the
Magnitsky bill has been primarily symbolic. Symbolism is good.
It symbolizes American commitment and interest in the rule of
law in Russia. But, beyond the symbolism, I think the effect,
for many members of the Russian elite, has been relief. That
is, they are coming to understand that the reach of this act is
relatively limited.
Senator McCain. Only because of its interpretation.
Ambassador Sestanovich. Well, not exclusively because of
its interpretation. The law says that the people on the list
are those who are guilty of gross violations of human rights,
and it gives two examples: killing and torture. So, that is
going to limit the reach of the act.
I think you need--whatever--however you apply the Magnitsky
Act, you need other elements of a modern policy to demonstrate
American commitment to human rights and to put resources behind
it.
So, symbolism, by itself, is good. It is not the only
element of American strategy.
Senator McCain. But, a step in the right direction.
Mr. Cohen.
Mr. Cohen. Senator, I think that the Magnitsky Act was used
and abused by the Russian leadership, up to and including
punishing orphans that were supposed to be adopted by American
families, who would give them, not only warm homes, but medical
care that they desperately needed. One of these orphans already
died, according to the Russian media. So, the punishment of the
orphans, the punishment of civil society, the slew of
legislation, the crackdown, this was the message to us that we
created, supposedly, more damage by promulgating the Magnitsky
Act than what happened.
I do believe that we need to revisit the act. We need to
see who falls into the scope of the act, and possibly expand
it. This is not my decision; this is above my pay grade. This
is your decision, Senators.
Senator McCain. But, we value your advice.
Mr. Cohen. And I will be happy to provide the advice, of
course, as will my colleagues. However, you asked a trillion-
ruble question, Senator, Should it be expanded? And I would
say, ``Yes,'' with caution, because we have our foreign policy
priorities that influence these kind of decisions. And I think,
if you look at the Reagan era, how Ronald Reagan used human
rights agenda and the bully pulpit at the same time, promoting
rapprochement with Gorbachev because he could have
rapprochement with Gorbachev. So, in very sensitive cases--you
look at a Saudi Arabia or a Bahrain--what do you do? At the
same time, you would--I can see a Magnitsky Act for Iran,
easily, because that regime is involved in gross violations of
human rights, day in and day out.
So, this is a foreign policy and national security matter,
as well as a human rights matter. But, yes, the Magnitsky Act
should be a blueprint and a model for America to stand for what
we are.
Thank you.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Mr. Nemtsov, it is always a pleasure to see you.
Mr. Nemtsov. Yes, thank you very much, Senator.
Senator McCain. You not only inform, but you entertain.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Nemtsov. Well, first of all, I want to tell you that
Magnitsky Act for Europe is absolutely crucial, even more
important to come back to human rights and rule of law in
Russia than American Magnitsky Act, because corrupted
bureaucrats around Putin, they mainly spend vacations and send
their kids to European universities, they have accounts, not in
American, but Swiss, banks, they relax in the south of France,
et cetera. That is why the response from Kremlin is terrible,
as far as European opportunity for Magnitsky is concerned.
The last example of Irish Parliament discussion about
Magnitsky Act was said--you know, that Russian Ambassador in
Ireland sent a letter, to every deputies in Irish Parliament,
that, ``Guys, be careful. If you vote for Magnitsky in Ireland,
we stop adoption.'' Stop adoption for kids, right? And a few
hundred families--Irish families--press, deputies, and ask
them, do not vote for that. It does not happen. Another
opportunity is to use gas--I mean, Gazprom, et cetera--like a
tool, to stop this Magnitsky. Well--but this is very important.
Second, I believe that Magnitsky Act is very, very pro-
Russian law, because this is replacement of sanctions from the
state--sanctions against the state to sanctions against
corrupted and criminals, which is good. And Russian people,
nevertheless what has happened on Putin TV, they understand
that it is not against ordinary Russian people, this is against
corrupted, murders, terrible guys.
And, last point, I believe that we will forget about
Magnitsky Act when we come back to independent justice in
Russia, because if we have independent court, why do you need
some acts outside? If you are criminal, you will be in jail.
That is it. But, this is not for Putin Russia.
Well, as far as list is concerned, I do not agree that this
is like a symbolic. I do not think so. For example, there are
some names, including friends of Putin, who are responsible for
political repression, and our guys from an investigative
committee, for example, or people who made the decision
concerning Mikhail Khodorkovsky, right? Well, I think that, if
such guys, we would be, in the least, not low profile guys, but
serious guys--I think that this is not symbolic. This is a
system. System based on corrupted person who are absolutely out
of control. But, if they appear in this list, and the
Europeans, for example, bomb the--them just--a visa, it will be
the end of the story, believe me.
Senator McCain. I thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Murphy. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Mr. Sestanovich, I wanted to come back to this idea of the
United States-Russian civil society fund. So, we are dealing
with the ongoing persecution of NGOs. The Russians are acutely
looking to see which of those we are funding. USAID has had to
leave. How do you thread this needle? I mean, if we create a
new fund that is funding NGOs, does not that essentially become
a red, blinking light for Putin to watch for as he tries to
figure out which NGOs to shut down? And, in this context, how
do you do transparent, open support from the U.S. Government or
from a civil society fund to NGOs, when that will just become a
big advertisement for Putin as to who he should go after?
Ambassador Sestanovich. Senator, it is a good question. I
am a member of the board of the National Endowment for
Democracy, I should say, at the beginning. So, the favorable
things I am going to say about NED's record should be heard
with that in mind.
I think, even if you had not had this wave of repression in
the past year in Russia, there are reasons to doubt the
effectiveness of AID as a dispenser of assistance to civil
society. It made it a government-to-government irritant. It
involved an awful lot of bureaucratic overhead in Washington, a
lot of inflexibility, slow moving. The National Endowment has a
different track record and different mode, which is to operate
with smaller grants, with a lot more flexibility, more rapid
lead times, and has had an ability to support a lot of groups
that would not have been able to benefit from AID's approaches.
The civil society fund that I mentioned could be
administered by an organization like the NED. And I think you'd
have some significant benefits in doing that.
Would the Russian Government dislike that reality? Yes. No
question about it. But, the Russian Government is on weak
ground, internationally, in trying to repress support for civil
society. They are really isolated, in terms of international
norms, and this is going to have to be an issue that we, and
other like-minded countries, challenge them on. It is going to
be a disagreement. We do not have to shy away from that.
Senator Murphy. Mr. Nemtsov, we are going to all be
watching the Navalny trial with great interest to see what it
suggests about the lines that are going to be drawn, in terms
of political prosecutions. I want to ask you a very simple
question that you have answered privately, and ask you to
answer it here.
Why are you not on trial today? And what does that say
about the lines that are being drawn today, in terms of who is
prosecuted and who is not? And is there any hope, in the fact
that you are able to sit here today and testify in front of
this committee and go back, later today, to Russia to continue
your activities?
Mr. Nemtsov. Well, this is the most popular question to me
everywhere in the world, including America.
Well, I think that the best way is to ask this question to
Putin, not to me, because he is responsible for jail, not me.
Well, it is a first-second. I think that, when I was in jail, I
want to tell you that it was huge response from the world,
including the U.S. Senate, including Mr. McCain, including Mr.
Cardin, including a lot of officials here and in Strasbourg, in
Brussels. For Putin, it will be very difficult to explain that
I am a criminal. It is very difficult. Of course, his
investigative groups investigate--has already investigated all
of my business before, and tried to find something. I am sure
that if they will be successful, I'm not be here. Well, but
they worked, hard, every day.
Well, next point, he is not Stalin. He is a combination of
Stalin and Abramovich, oligarch, billionaire, to relax, to be
recognized, et cetera. To organize absolutely clear political
case--the case against me is 100 percent political. Everybody
understand that. This is not even Khodorkovsky, because
Khodorkovsky was the average guy, he took part in
privatization, he took part in the shares-for-loans scheme, et
cetera, et cetera. That is why, to explain, the world, that he
is not because of politics, but he is because of no taxation,
et cetera, it is easy. With me, to explain that I am the cause
of taxation, is in jail, it is impossible, right?
Well, and he believes that criminal cases against Navalny
is a sign to every opposition leaders to be quiet. To emigrate
or to sit still. And he believe that if he will push Navalny,
the rest will be relaxed and be great, to repeat the experience
of Guriev and Kasparov----
Senator Murphy. Right.
Mr. Nemtsov [continuing]. And that's it.
Senator Murphy. Right.
Mr. Nemtsov. But, he is not right. I want to tell you that
we will continue our fight.
Senator Murphy. Good.
Senator Johnson and I have both done second rounds. Senator
McCain, anything further?
Senator McCain. No, I just want to thank all of the
witnesses for their continued advocacy for democracy, not only
in Russia, but especially in Russia. Your voices are well
respected.
And, Mr. Jannuzi, I understand that you cannot take a
position on some of these issues, but I also think that some of
your public activities have been very helpful on behalf of the
oppressed.
And, Boris, I am not quite as optimistic about--Boris, pay
attention----
[Laughter.]
Mr. Nemtsov. Excuse me. I explain what is happening. I have
my flight at 3 o'clock. That is why I----
Senator McCain. All right. I just want to say I am not
quite as optimistic about----
Mr. Nemtsov [continuing]. If I will be here, it will be
great signal for Putin, you know. [Laughter.]
That is why the best way for me to leave now.
Senator McCain. I just want you to be careful, because I am
not quite as optimistic as you are about Mr. Putin's desire to
stifle opposition. So, you will be in our thoughts and our
prayers as you continue your activities.
And I thank the other three witnesses. I read them all the
time. It is nice to see you in person.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Murphy. Thank you, Senator McCain. We will get Mr.
Nemtsov to his flights.
Thank you, to all five of you. As you have heard, we are
very interested in following up with some communication to the
President that we will work with you on.
Senator Murphy. And, with that, our hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:56 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Pussy Riot Collective Statement Submitted by Senator Barbara Boxer
Last week, members of our collective, Pussy Riot, visited
Washington, DC, to meet with the U.S. State Department and Members of
Congress who might help release two of our friends, Maria Alyokhina and
Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, who are imprisoned in penal colonies in Russia,
for the crime of hooliganism motivated by religious hatred.
They have been sentenced to 2 years in prison as extremists,
receiving harsh punishments like vicious neo-Nazis and
ultranationalists responsible for hate crimes against ethnic
minorities, and are serving time alongside violent criminals, including
murderers.
Our friends are mothers with small children. They are artists who
are expressing our social and political views. Nothing more.
We are a collective of women active in feminist, LGBT,
environmental, and other causes in Russia. We formed in advance of
Vladimir Putin's return to the Presidency, which has been marred by
deteriorating human rights conditions in Russia.
Our band stands for many freedoms, including our feminist values.
These are values that directly contradict the culture of the ``macho
man,'' led by Vladimir Putin that marginalizes women and degrades our
role in society.
Many Russians did not pay attention to politics, but by 2011 they
saw an arrogance in Putin, and it has activated people, many of whom
have taken to the streets in protest. It activated us too. And for our
protests, two of us were carted off to a penal colony, as violent
criminals. The Russian Government is attempting to use all the
institutions at its power--courts, the Duma, church--to suppress
dissent.
We are but one example of dissenters who have been charged with
crimes since Vladimir Putin's inauguration.
We urge the United States to take notice of what is happening in
Russia, of how we are slipping backwards, not toward progress, but
toward repression. We ask you, members of the Senate, to work for the
release of our friends who aren't hooligans or criminals, but women who
have strong views and the courage to voice them. Thank you.
______
Material Submitted by Frank Jannuzi as an Attachment
to his Prepared Statement
appendix: chronicle of rights violations in russia
[Drawn from Amnesty International's 2013 Annual Report, available on-
line here: http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/russia/report-2013-page]
Vladimir Putin's return as President, following widely criticized
elections, led to a surge in popular protest and demands for greater
civil and political freedoms, particularly around his inauguration in
May. The result was increased restrictions. Protests were frequently
banned and disrupted. New laws were adopted, often without public
consultation and in the face of widespread criticism, which introduced
harsh administrative and criminal penalties that could be used to
target legitimate protest and political and civil society activities,
and to restrict foreign funding for civic activism.
The Russian Federation responded belligerently to international
criticism of its human rights record. A law on travel and other
sanctions on officials allegedly responsible for the death of lawyer
Sergei Magnitsky in custody in 2009 was passed by Congress and proposed
in several other countries. The Russian authorities retaliated with
reciprocal sanctions and by banning the adoption of Russian children by
U.S. citizens and prohibiting Russian NGOs from receiving funding from
the USA.
Freedom of assembly
Peaceful protests across Russia, including gatherings of small
groups of people who presented no public threat or inconvenience, were
routinely dispersed by police, often with excessive force. The
authorities regarded every such event, however peaceful and
insignificant in number, as unlawful unless expressly sanctioned,
although gatherings of pro-government or pro-Orthodox Church activists
were often allowed to proceed uninterrupted even without authorization.
There were frequent reports of police brutality toward peaceful
protesters and journalists, but these were not effectively
investigated.
On 6 May 2012, the day before the inauguration of President
Putin, a column of protesters moving along a permitted route to
Bolotnaya Square in Moscow was halted by police, resulting in a
standoff and localized skirmishes. Subsequently, 19 protesters
faced criminal charges in connection with events characterized
by authorities as ``mass riots''; one pleaded guilty and was
sentenced to 4\1/2\ years' imprisonment; the remainders were
still awaiting trial at the end of the year. Several leading
political activists were named as witnesses in the case and had
their homes searched in operations that were widely broadcast
by state-controlled television channels. Over 6 and 7 May,
hundreds of peaceful individuals were arrested across Moscow,
some merely for wearing white ribbons as a symbol of protest
against electoral fraud.
The law governing public events was further amended in June. It
expanded the list of violations, introduced new restrictions and
increased sanctions.
Freedom of expression
The right to freedom of expression was increasingly restricted.
Most media remained under effective state control, except for some
outlets with limited circulation. Prime-time national television was
regularly employed to smear government critics.
Libel was recriminalized, 8 months after its decriminalization.
Changes to the Criminal Code expanded the definitions of treason and
espionage and made them vaguer by including sharing information with,
or providing miscellaneous assistance to, foreign states and
organizations whose activity is ``directed against security of the
Russian Federation.''
New legislation gave the government powers to blacklist and block
Web sites publishing materials considered ``extremist'' or otherwise
harmful to public health, morals, or safety. By the end of the year,
this legislation was already being used to shut down sites publishing
content protected by the right to freedom of expression.
Maria Alekhina, Ekaterina Samutsevich and Nadezhda
Tolokonnikova, members of the punk group Pussy Riot, were
arrested in March after a brief and peaceful, albeit
provocative, political performance in the Cathedral of Christ
the Saviour in Moscow. They were convicted of ``hooliganism
motivated by religious hatred'' in August and were each
sentenced to 2 years in prison, although Ekaterina Samutsevich
received a conditional sentence on appeal and was released on
10 October. On 29 November a Moscow court declared video
footage of the group's church performance ``extremist,''
rendering its publication on the Internet unlawful.
Discrimination
Discrimination on grounds such as race, ethnicity, gender,
religion, or political affiliation remained widespread. Discriminatory
legislation targeting LGBTI individuals was introduced in several
regions and proposed at the federal level. A law banning ``propaganda
of sodomy, lesbianism, bisexualism, and transgenderness among minors''
came into force in St Petersburg in April. Similar laws were also
introduced in Bashkiria, Chukotka, Krasnodar, Magadan, Novosibirsk, and
Samara regions, and tabled before the State Duma. A number of public
LGBTI events were forbidden and participants dispersed by police.
Across Russia, LGBTI individuals and members of various minority
groups continued to face attacks. Such attacks were not effectively
investigated by the authorities, and the perpetrators often remain
unidentified.
On 4 August, four men forcibly entered an LGBTI club in
Tyumen and physically and verbally assaulted several customers.
Police detained the attackers. When the victims came to the
police station to file complaints, they were left in the same
room with the perpetrators, who continued to threaten them and
were later released without charge.
Human rights defenders
Reports of harassment of human rights defenders continued. In the
North Caucasus and elsewhere, activists, journalists and lawyers
representing victims of human rights violations continued to face
physical threats, including from law enforcement officials.
Investigations into many past attacks, including the killing of
Natalia Estemirova, made no ostensible progress.
New legislation introduced further administrative hurdles and a
legal obligation for NGOs to register as ``organizations performing the
functions of foreign agents'' (language evocative of espionage) if they
received foreign funding and engaged in broadly defined ``political
activities.'' Failure to comply with these provisions might lead to
heavy fines, and imprisonment for NGO leaders.
Public officials routinely sought to blacken the reputation of
individual human rights defenders and specific NGOs, as well as the
work of human rights NGOs in general.
In October, a senior Federal Security Service (FSB) official
reportedly stated that the FSB had secured the closure of 20
NGOs in Ingushetia for their links with foreign intelligence
services. He provided no information either on any specific
case involving charges of espionage against an NGO in
Ingushetia, or on which NGOs had supposedly been closed for
this reason. However, he singled out the well-known Ingushetian
human rights NGO, Mashr, as a ``foreign agent'' still in
operation.
On 20 January, lawyer Omar Saidmagomedov and his cousin were
shot dead in Makhachkala, Dagestan, by security officials. The
authorities reported the incident as a killing of two armed
group members during a shoot-out. Omar Saidmagomedov's
colleagues dismissed this report and demanded an investigation
into allegations that he had been extra judicially executed
because of his professional activities. The investigator
summoned the lawyer representing Omar Saidmagomedov's family
for questioning as a witness, apparently with the aim of
disqualifying him from acting as legal counsel in the case.
Elena Milashina, a journalist from the independent newspaper
Novaya Gazeta, together with a friend, was assaulted by two men
in the street in Moscow on 4 April, and received serious
injuries. The investigator identified and charged two
individuals who initially signed confessions but retracted them
after their families hired independent lawyers. The
investigator ignored protests by Elena Milashina that the two
did not fit her friend's description of the men who assaulted
her and that the real perpetrators had not been identified.
Igor Kalyapin, head of the NGO Committee Against Torture, was
threatened with criminal proceedings in connection with his
work on the case of Islam Umarpashaev, torture victim from
Chechnya. On 7 July, Igor Kalyapin was summoned by a criminal
investigator for questioning for allegedly disseminating
confidential information. In September, journalists who had
interviewed Igor Kalyapin and individuals who wrote letters to
show their support were summoned for questioning.
Torture and other ill-treatment
Allegations of torture and other ill-treatment remained widely
reported and effective investigations were rare. Law enforcement
officials allegedly frequently circumvented the existing legal
safeguards against torture through, among other things: the use of
secret detention (particularly in the North Caucasus); the use of force
supposedly to restrain violent detainees; investigators denying access
to a lawyer of one's choice and favoring specific state-appointed
lawyers who were known to ignore signs of torture.
In March, one torture case in Kazan was widely reported in the
media after a man died of internal injuries in hospital. He claimed
that he had been raped with a bottle at the police station. Several
police officers were arrested and charged with abuse of power, and two
were later sentenced to 2\1/2\ years' imprisonment respectively. Many
more allegations of torture by police in Kazan and elsewhere followed
media reports of this case. In response to an NGO initiative, the Head
of the Investigative Committee decreed to create special departments to
investigate crimes committed by law enforcement officials. However, the
initiative was undermined by the failure to provide these departments
with adequate staff resources.
On the night of 19 January, Issa Khashagulgov, held in a
pretrial detention center in Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia, was
allegedly taken to an undisclosed location and beaten and
threatened with further violence for refusing to cooperate with
the investigation against him. Reportedly, between 6 and 8
February he was transferred from the detention center to a
different location in North Ossetia for several hours each day
when his lawyers tried to see him, and subjected to ill-
treatment. Issa Khashagulgov, suspected of armed group
membership, had earlier been repeatedly transferred between
different detention facilities while his family and lawyers
were denied information about his whereabouts, sometimes for
several days. His complaints were not investigated.
Russian opposition activist Leonid Razvozzhayev went missing
on 19 October in Kiev, Ukraine, outside the office of a partner
organization to UNHCR, the U.N. refugee agency. On 22 October,
the Investigative Committee in Moscow stated that he had
voluntarily returned to the Russian Federation and handed
himself in to the authorities. Leonid Razvozzhayev disavowed
this statement via his lawyer, and alleged that he had been
abducted and smuggled into the country, held at a secret
location, ill-treated and forced to sign a statement
implicating him and other political activists in plotting mass
disturbances in Russia on foreign orders. The Russian
authorities dismissed his allegations and refused to
investigate them.
Justice system
The need for judicial reform was widely acknowledged, including by
senior officials. However, no effective steps were taken toward
ensuring the independence of the judiciary. Reports of unfair trials
were numerous and widespread. A range of court decisions, including
those concerning extremism and economic and drug-related crimes, were
affected by political considerations, and a growing number of
convictions appeared politically motivated, including those of the
Pussy Riot members. Allegations were frequently made of collusion
between judges, prosecutors, investigators and other law enforcement
officials resulting in unfair criminal convictions or disproportionate
administrative penalties.
Lawyers across the country complained of procedural violations
undermining their clients' right to a fair trial. These included denial
of access to clients, detention of individuals as criminal suspects
without promptly informing their lawyers and families, appointment of
state-paid lawyers as defense counsel who are known to raise no
objections about procedural violations and the use of ill-treatment.
Lawyer Rustam Matsev complained that on 31 May a senior
police official at a pre-trial detention center in Nalchik,
Kabardino-Balkaria, demanded that he should ``stop teaching his
defendant to lie'' and convince him to withdraw a complaint
about abduction and ill-treatment by police. The officer
allegedly told Rustam Matsev that lawyers ``get blocked'' in
the same way as members of armed groups during their
``elimination'' in security operations. The authorities refused
to investigate the lawyer's allegations.
On 27 October, dozens of protesters lined up 50m apart (a
form of picketing which requires no prior authorization) in
front of the central FSB headquarters in Moscow. Later, when
several known political activists tried to leave, surrounded by
reporters, they were detained by police. On 30 October and 4
December respectively, activists Alexey Navalny and Sergei
Udaltsov were fined nearly US$1,000 each for organizing and
participating in an unauthorized rally that violated public
order. The judge hearing Alexey Navalny's case reportedly
declined his defense lawyer's request to cross-examine the
police officers who had detained him, and refused to admit
video footage of the event as evidence.
North Caucasus
The region remained highly volatile. Human rights violations in the
context of security operations remained widespread.
Armed groups continued to launch attacks against security forces,
local officials and civilians. A double bomb attack on 3 May in
Makhachkala, Dagestan, left 13 people dead (including 8 police
officers), and over 80 emergency and rescue workers were injured. On 28
August, an influential Dagestani Muslim cleric, Sheikh Said Afandi, and
his five visitors were killed by a woman suicide bomber. Other attacks
by armed groups took place across the North Caucasus.
Some republics sought to develop nonrepressive responses to the
threats posed by armed groups. Commissions for Adaptation were
established in Dagestan and Ingushetia with the aim of encouraging the
surrender and reintegration into society of former members of armed
groups. The Dagestani authorities adopted a more tolerant attitude
toward Salafi Muslims.
However, security operations continued to be conducted on a regular
basis throughout the region. In the course of these, numerous human
rights violations by law enforcement officials were reported, including
enforced disappearances, unlawful detentions, torture and other ill-
treatment, and extrajudicial executions.
The authorities systematically failed to conduct effective,
impartial, and prompt investigations into human rights violations by
law enforcement officials, or to identify those responsible and bring
them to justice. In some cases, criminal proceedings were initiated,
but for the most part, the ensuing investigation either failed to
establish the perpetrators or confirm involvement of officials in the
relevant incidents, or concluded that there had been no violation by
law enforcement officials. Only exceptional cases led to the
prosecution of police officials for abuse of authority in connection
with torture and other ill-treatment. Not a single case of enforced
disappearance or alleged extrajudicial execution was resolved, and no
perpetrators from any other law enforcement agency were brought to
justice.
Rustam Aushev, a 23-year-old resident of Ingushetia, was last
seen on 17 February at Mineralnye Vody railway station in the
neighboring Stavropol region. The next day, his relative spoke
to staff at the station. They reported seeing a young man being
detained by plain-clothes men and driven away in a Gazelle
minivan, which was also captured on CCTV. A security guard had
reportedly spoken to the minivan's driver asking it to be
parked in the designated area, and was shown an FSB official's
ID. Rustam Aushev's family reported these details to the
authorities and demanded an investigation, but his fate and
whereabouts were unknown at the end of the year.
In Ingushetia, the first ever trial of two former police officials
concluded in Karabulak. Some charges related to the secret detention
and torture of Zelimkhan Chitigov although the officials faced other
charges as well. The announcement of the verdict was postponed
repeatedly for almost 3 months, and on 7 November the judge sentenced
one defendant to 8 years' imprisonment, and fully acquitted the other,
his former superior. Allegations of intimidation of victims and
witnesses had persisted throughout the trial, during which both
defendants remained at large. No other perpetrators were identified
despite Zelimkhan Chitigov naming at least one other official by name
and alleging that many others had been involved in the incessant bouts
of torture during the 3 days he was kept in secret detention.
______
additional resources: reports available from amnesty international's
international secretariat on russian human rights conditions
The Circle of Injustice: Secutiry Operations and Human Rights
Violations in Ingushetia (2012)
[http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/
3680_ingushetia_cover_contents
_web.pdf]
In recent years, the Russian authorities have tried to extend and
diversify their approach to threats posed by armed groups. This
approach in Russia usually comes coupled with scant regard for the rule
of law, and results in Human Rights Abuses that hinder the entire
region's stability. Citizens in Ingushetia are the victims of
extrajudicial executions, secret and incommunicado detentions and
torture. Authorities fail to investigate allegations of torture, or the
investigations are inadequate especially of complaints and accusations
against security forces. Amnesty also documents the purposeful
meandering of the legislative process to delay the development of
justice.
Security forces in the North Caucasus partake in covert operations
with masked and camouflaged men that bare no distinguishable markings.
This tactic helps them to set the groundwork for the elaborate process
of misleading investigators, refusing accountability, denying secret
detentions, and deferring justice. No one has ever been held
accountable by the Russian Government for enforced disappearances or
extrajudicial executions in the North Caucasus.
Confronting the Circle of Injustice: Threats and Pressure Faced by
Lawyers in the N. Caucuses (2013)
[http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR46/003/2013/en/6af890a1-
d79f-487d-bd39-2af4020a5835/eur460032013en.pdf]
Human rights violations such as enforced disappearances, unlawful
killings, torture and other ill-treatment committed by members of law
enforcement agencies are regularly reported from the North Caucasus and
almost never effectively investigated. These violations, and the
Russian authorities' systematic failure to investigate them
effectively, produces a circle of injustice and leads to further
violations of fundamental human rights. This in many cases includes the
inability for defendants to access or choose their own lawyer.
Furthermore the lawyers that are chosen to represent the defendants are
coming under increasing pressure and threats from the criminal justice
system.
This intimidation fundamentally undermines the right to a fair
trial, and in turn makes the lawyers themselves victims of human rights
abuse. The atmosphere of intimidation and harassment creates a
festering environment for the continued ``success'' of a repressive
justice system. The Lawyers who choose to defend the rights of
individuals accused of military or political crimes, routinely come
across procedural and institutional obstructions which limit their
ability to see and communicate with their clients. They are threatened
by law enforcement officials and often receive no assistance from their
respective bar associations.
Illustrative Cases
Rustam Matsev: As a defense lawyer, Matsev has worked on a
number of cases of individuals accused of membership in armed
groups, many of whom claimed to have been tortured and
mistreated by law enforcement officials. Prior to a cross-
examination of one of his clients, the officer who would
question his client asked Matsev why he had ``taught his client
to lie.'' He was then warned that ``During security operations,
while eliminating members of armed groups, we block lawyers as
well. We will definitely meet again. When you walk, always look
back because we are watching you and know everything that you
do.'' Matsev believes this was a direct threat against him, but
when he filed a complaint with the authorities, he was informed
that the officer was joking, and Matsev must have misunderstood
him.
Omar Saidmagomedov: Saidmagomedov acted as defense counsel
for several individuals accused of being members of armed
groups, and alleged the use of torture and fabrication of
evidence for use in criminal proceedings against his clients.
On January 20, 2012, Saidmagomedov and his cousin were murdered
by security officials in front of his cousin's house. A news
broadcast the same night reported that the incident was a
security operation in which two armed criminals were fleeing
law enforcement officials who were shot as they tried to
escape. Saidmagomedov's family and colleagues have been
prevented from pursuing the case.
Sapiyat Magomedova: A criminal lawyer known for her work on
cases involving human rights violations allegedly committed by
law enforcement agencies in Dagestan, Magomedova was beaten by
police officers while trying to gain access to her clients.
When she filed a complaint about the beating, the police opened
a criminal investigation to prove that she, in fact, had beaten
the police officers. Magomedova was repeatedly pressured to
drop the charges. In 2011, both Magomedova's case against the
police officers and the officers' case against her were closed.
Magomedova plans to appeal the decision to close the criminal
investigation of the assault by police officers.
Freedom Under Threat: Clampdown on Freedoms of Expression, Assembly and
Association in Russia (2013)
[http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/eur460112013en.pdf]
Vladimir Putin was inaugurated as President of the Russian
Federation in May 2012. His election in March fueled protests all over
Russia. From December 2011 to December 2012 at least 5,100 protestors
have been arrested in more than 220 protest gatherings.
His administration's response to the protest movement has been
almost entirely repressive. Through administrative and legal changes he
has severely curtailed the rights to freedom of expression,
association, and assembly. The rights of political opponents, human
rights organizations and activists, and all Russian citizens wishing to
raise their voice in protest have been curtailed. These rights are
explicitly guaranteed to the people by the Russian Constitution.
[AIUSA's interactive timeline on the above report is here: http://
www.amnestyusa.
org/russia/]
additional resources: amnesty international's prisoners of conscience
(pocs) and other individuals at risk in russia
Mikhail Khodrokovskii and Platon Lebedev (Prisoners of Conscience)
AI believes that there is a significant political context to the
arrest and prosecution of Mikhail Khodrokovskii and Platon Lebedev.
They were arrested in July 2003 and charged with seven counts of fraud,
tax evasion, and embezzlement and were accused of defrauding the state
of over $1 billion. Both men denied the charges against them and
maintained that the case was politically motivated, as did many
domestic human rights groups. After a trial lasting almost 1 year in
May 2005 a court found them guilty and sentenced them to 9 years in
prison. On appeal, Khodorkovskii's sentence was reduced to 8 years.
AI is concerned about a number of fair trial violations, both
publicly and in letters to the Russian Government.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mikhail Khodorkovskii: Khodorkovskii was arrested in 2003 and has
faced two trials: Tax evasion and fraud and embezzlement and money
laundering. He was an outspoken activist against government corruption
and was once considered a potential leader for the anti-Putin
opposition party. The international community has spoken out in support
of Khodorkovskii and many believe that his arrest was politically
motivated. AI expresses concern about the timing of the charges against
him, the reported harassment of his lawyers, and cited procedural
violations that could have exonerated him. He is married and has four
children.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Platon Lebedev: AI declared Russian businessman Platon Lebedev a
prisoner of conscience after his convictions on money laundering were
upheld by a Moscow court in 2011. Lebedev was a close associate of
Khodorkovskii and the fourth-largest shareholder in Yukos oil. AI
believes that his arrest was politically motivated. He has spent 9
years in jail on dubious charges. He is married and has four children.
lawyers in the n. caucuses (individuals at risk)
Omar Saidmagomedov--Saidmagomedov was a defense lawyer for several
individuals accused of being members of armed groups. Many of his
clients stated they had been mistreated by authorities and were the
victims of torture. On January 20, 2012, Saidmagomedov and his cousin
were murdered by security officials in front of his cousin's house.
That same night, the authorities claimed that he was killed in a
security operation in which ``two armed criminals shot at police
officers during their escape.'' Saidmagomedov's family and colleagues
have been blocked by the judicial process when attempting to pursue his
case.
Rustam Matsev--As a defense lawyer from Nalchik, Kabardino-
Balkaria, Matsev has worked on a number of cases for individuals
accused of membership in armed groups, many of whom claimed to have
been tortured. For this representation he has received personal and
direct threats against himself and his clients. He was threatened prior
to a cross-examination of one of his clients, when an officer who would
question his client accused Matsev of teaching his client to lie. He
was then told, ``During security operations, while eliminating members
of armed groups we block lawyers as well. We will definitely meet
again. When you walk, always look back because we are watching you and
know everything that you do.'' The officer also kept insisting that his
client should confess to the crime he had been charged with. Matsev
perceived the officer's words as a direct veiled threat against him and
a warning that a criminal case against him may be fabricated. He later
filed a complaint with the authorities but it was dismissed.
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______
Two Articles Submitted for the Record by Leon Aron
[From the Washington Post, May 30, 2012]
Putin's War on Russian Civil Society Continues
(By Leon Aron, Published: Washington Post Opinions)
Almost a year into the Kremlin's war on civil society, the legal
veneer looked familiar: A May 15 letter from prosecutors informed the
Levada Center, Russia's most authoritative independent polling firm,
that in publicizing the results of its polls it ``aimed at shaping
public opinion on government policy'' and was, therefore, a ``political
organization.'' And, as a political organization receiving foreign
grants (from the likes of the Ford and MacArthur foundations), it had
to register as a ``foreign agent.''
Every assault on civil society is a tragedy for Russia.
Nongovernmental organizations are, first and foremost, schools of
democracy, teaching personal responsibility, self-organization,
peaceful dissent and compromise. Left in their rubble are stagnation,
hatred and radicalism. Yet even among the myriad instances of this
state-directed civil catastrophe in the making, the (likely fatal)
assault on the Levada Center stands out.
The last line of Pushkin's ``Boris Godunov''--still a primer in
Russian political tradition--is ``Narod bezmolstvuet'': ``The people
are silent.'' In a history strewn with tragedies and bad luck, it is
hard to pinpoint the most damaging malady, but this silence is among
the worst of Russia's ills. Of course, the people were never silent:
They thought and they talked to one another, even if only in whispers.
But all venues for influencing their country's course were severed--
short of the periodic ``bunt,'' or ``Russian revolt, senseless and
merciless'' (Pushkin again). ``We did not know the country in which we
lived,'' Mikhail Gorbachev wrote in 1988.
So it was only natural that glasnost and public opinion polling in
the Soviet Union were born in the same year: 1987. It was among the
first and most exhilarating miracles of glasnost--a miracle of self-
discovery: People learned what their fellow citizens thought! It was
also among the surest signs that democratization was real. At long
last, the country's leaders wanted to know people's views.
Leading the way was the All-Union Center for the Study of Public
Opinion. Known by its Russian acronym, VTsIOM, the center was soon
headed by the dean of Soviet sociologists, Yuri Alexandrovich Levada,
who made it into the country's most respected polling firm.
But in September 2003 the Kremlin decided to ``reclaim'' VTsIOM,
which was still nominally state-owned, and installed a new board of
directors. The tipping point reportedly was tepid support for the four-
year-old war in Chechnya. (The center publicized that 58 percent of
Russians were against and only 27 percent for continuing it.) Levada
quit--and the center's entire staff, more than 100 people, left with
him. There was, however, still enough space unoccupied by the state for
a new and independent polling firm, bearing Levada's name, to garner
enough customers and supporters at home and abroad to sustain itself.
Today, however, the government appears to have resolved to finish off
the center.
For a regime that seems determined to deny the country desperately
needed institutional reforms because they involve democratization--
ensuring its short-term survival at the cost of the country's long-term
stagnation--the letter was a logical move. All manner of findings
routinely reported by the Levada Center in the past few months have
flat-out contradicted the official propaganda narrative.
One in five Russians, the center found, were considering
emigration, with the rate skyrocketing to 44 percent among 18- to 24-
year-olds and 36 percent among those 25 to 39. A majority of Russians
(57 percent) said that the Magnitsky Act--U.S. legislation that bars
Russian officials involved in corruption and human rights abuses from
entering the United States and from keeping money in U.S. banks--was
aimed at those who ``misuse power and violate human rights,'' or at the
``meretricious and corrupt Russian bureaucracy,'' or at the country's
leadership that covers up the misdeeds of ``swindlers and embezzlers.''
By contrast, the government's assertion that the act was aimed
``against Russia'' was supported by only 23 percent. The final straw
for the Kremlin may have been polling data on Putin's approval rating:
It was at the lowest level in 12 years, Levada reported in January.
Less than two weeks ago, the center found that if the presidential
election were held this month, only 29 percent were ready to vote for
Putin.
``We will continue our activity, although we are in a very
difficult situation,'' Levada Center director Lev Gud kov, a man of a
quick smile and impeccably objective analysis, recently told an
interviewer. But it was ``out of the question'' for the center to
register as a ``foreign agent.'' ``A totally new period has begun in
Russia,'' he added, ``the suppression of all independent organizations
by the Kremlin.''
Six and a half years ago in this newspaper, I said farewell to Yuri
Levada, a great political sociologist and a dear friend. This news from
Moscow is like burying him again.
______
[From the Wall Street Journal, June 10, 2013]
The Widening Putin Clampdown
In today's Russia, even a moderate critic like Sergei Guriev is in
danger of arrest.
(By Leon Aron)
In late May, Sergei Guriev, a prominent Russian economist and dean
of Moscow's prestigious New Economic School, fled Russia fearing
imminent arrest. His crime? Being critical of the Putin regime.
His concerns were well founded. Since February, Mr. Guriev had been
interrogated more than once by Russia's Investigative Committee, the
most feared of the Kremlin's tools of repression, and pressured to
surrender personal and professional documents. He and his wife were
under surveillance, his office searched, and five years of emails
seized. He was told that his home would soon be searched.
Mr. Guriev was no opposition activist, much less an opposition
leader--the typical targets of Kremlin harassment. To the contrary,
while his incisive analytical articles (a must-read for all Russia
watchers) were often critical of government policies--and while he
never shied away from advocating the rule of law or condemning
corruption--he was in many ways a consummate insider. A longtime
adviser to the Kremlin, Mr. Guriev sat on the Presidential Commission
on Open Government as well as the board of several state-run companies.
Even after fleeing the country, he was re-elected to the board of
Sberbank, SBRCY -2.90% Russia's state-controlled banking giant.
It is precisely Mr. Guriev's within-the-system position that makes
the regime's attack on him so portentous and troubling. In forcing him
into exile, the Kremlin has signaled a unilateral renegotiation of the
long-standing social compact with liberal public-opinion leaders.
Not long ago, pro-reform members of the establishment could say and
write what they pleased so long as they did not actively support the
opposition. Now the message is: You must stop public criticism of the
government--or risk harassment and even jail. If you don't like the
deal, leave while the going is still good. Those who choose to stay,
according to the popular opposition blogger Yulia Latynina, must
``believe that the greatness of Russia lies in Vladimir Putin,'' and
that criticism of him is part of a ``world conspiracy'' or ``fifth
column'' machinations inside the Russian government.
Thus, a year into the authoritarian consolidation that followed Mr.
Putin's re-election as president in March 2012, his government has
entered a new phase of repression. The Guriev exile marks the beginning
of the regime's transition from the softer authoritarianism of who is
not against us is with us to a much harder and malignant version of who
is not with us is against us.
This is on display in the continuing trial of popular opposition
leader Alexei Navalny, a lawyer and anticorruption crusader who had the
temerity to declare that he would challenge Mr. Putin in the 2018
election. Facing the unlikely charge that he stole 10,000 cubic meters
of timber from a state-owned company while he was an unpaid adviser to
a regional governor, Mr. Navalny faces a maximum sentence of 10 years.
Another opposition leader, Sergei Udaltsov of the Left Front
movement, is awaiting trial under house arrest for his role in protests
against Mr. Putin after last year's election. Mr. Udalstov is charged
with the ``preparation of riots and mass disorder,'' arranged with the
help of the ``government of Georgia.'' There is little doubt now that,
like Mr. Navalny, he is likely to be sentenced ``to the full spool of
thread,'' as Russians say of a maximum sentence.
The Guriev ordeal also leaves little doubt about the fate of
Russia's most famous prisoner, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who more than a
decade ago refused to heed Mr. Putin's warning to ``stay out of
politics.'' After two trials, two convictions and 10 years in jail, the
former ``oligarch'' and principal owner of the now bankrupt oil giant
Yukos is up for release next year. It would not be a surprise if the
government found a reason to keep him in jail.
Mr. Guriev's key sin appears to have been his participation, with
eight other law and economics experts, in a commission convoked in
2011, at then-President Dmitry Medvedev's request, to address a
widespread revulsion over the second trial and conviction of Mr.
Khodorkovsky and his business partner Platon Lebedev the previous year.
Predictably, the independent commission found the state's case bogus.
In the regime's new mode of repression, the survival of Russia's
few remaining independent media outlets looks precarious. These include
Ekho Moskvy radio station, the Dozhd television and online station, and
the Vedomosti daily and Novaya Gazeta twice-weekly newspapers. The main
financier of the latter newspaper, former billionaire Alexander
Lebedev, is on trial for ``malicious hooliganism'' for getting into a
fist fight on live television. ``The full spool of thread'' for him
would be five years. LiveJournal.com, where most opposition leaders
blog, has in recent years been the target of several mysterious cyber
attacks, causing it to shut down for short periods.
``It seems that Russia is entering a new period--the establishment
of a dictatorship,'' a leading Russian political sociologist wrote to
me in recent days. Earlier this spring, I would have asked if I could
cite him by name and almost certainly would have received his
permission. Now that even Sergei Guriev has fled the country, such a
request was no longer safe to make without putting my correspondent in
danger.
[all]