[Senate Report 114-32]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Calendar No. 28
114th Congress } { Report
SENATE
1st Session } { 114-32
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CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION SHARING ACT OF 2015
_______
April 15, 2015.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Burr, from the Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
[To accompany S. 754]
The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an
original bill (S. 754) to improve cybersecurity in the United
States through enhanced sharing of information about
cybersecurity threats, and for other purposes, reports
favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.
Background and Need for Legislation
Over the last several years, the Committee has listened
with increasing alarm to the testimony of senior intelligence
officials and private sector experts about the growing
cybersecurity threats to our nation.
The Committee has already seen the impact these threats are
having on the nation's security and its economy as losses to
consumers, businesses, and the government from cyber attacks,
penetrations, and disruptions already total billions of
dollars. Beyond direct monetary losses, the continuing efforts
of foreign actors to steal intellectual property will have far
reaching impacts on the innovation upon which a robust economy
and strong military relies. The Committee has seen widespread
theft through cyberspace increasingly evolve into disruptive
and destructive attacks. American financial institutions have
been subjected to denial of service attacks by foreign actors
that blocked consumers' access to banking services. Critical
infrastructure companies abroad and businesses in the United
States have seen their vital business systems rendered useless
by hostile actors operating in other countries. The reported
destructive cyberattacks on the Las Vegas Sands Corporation and
Sony Pictures Entertainment represent further escalation of
this disturbing trend, including unprecedented efforts to
destroy data of U.S. companies. Our nation is growing more
vulnerable to cyber threats. Every aspect of society is growing
more dependent on computers which are all linked to networks,
opening this country up to many known vulnerabilities and many
yet to be discovered.
The Committee and its staff have also engaged in hundreds
of conversations with senior government and private sector
officials that have demonstrated the need for a legislative
effort to allow for the increased sharing of information about
these cyber threats. There are many stakeholders who are
engaged on these issues and the Committee is convinced that
legislation is needed to assist them in finding better ways to
work together to address our nation's shared cybersecurity
challenges. This legislation is designed to create a voluntary
cybersecurity information sharing process that will encourage
public and private sector entities to share cyber threat
information, removing legal barriers and the threat of
unnecessary litigation. This in turn allows for greater
cooperation and collaboration in the face of growing
cybersecurity threats to national and economic security.
Additionally, the Committee believes that such increased
sharing will drive public and private sector cybersecurity
efforts to develop key new technologies and processes, such as
an improved ability to share technical threat information
through an automated process in ``real time'' to counter cyber
threats at machine speed.
Through the Committee's oversight of the Intelligence
Community, it has long recognized the need to better use the
government's knowledge and expertise about cyber threats for
defensive purposes. This legislation includes requirements for
the government to share more information, including classified
information under appropriate safeguards, with relevant private
sector entities to further cybersecurity. Often as a result of
overclassification and parochialism, some cybersecurity
information that could enable the businesses facing these
threats to better protect themselves remains exclusively in the
government. Although sensitive sources and methods must be
protected, the government does not presently share adequate
information about cyber threats. This bill encourages the
government to expand this sharing and to create the appropriate
processes to do so.
This legislation also includes positive legal authorities
for private companies to: (1) monitor their networks, or those
of their customers upon authorization and written consent, for
cybersecurity purposes; (2) take defensive measures to stop
cyber attacks and (3) share cyber threat information with each
other and with the government to further collective
cybersecurity. Through extensive hearings, briefings, and
discussions, the Committee has identified the need to provide
carefully tailored cybersecurity authorities to address these
current gaps. The Committee also recognizes the careful balance
that must be struck in providing increased authorities to
ensure they are used appropriately. This legislation creates a
completely voluntary information-sharing framework that
includes several layers of privacy protections to prevent abuse
and ensure that the government cannot inappropriately acquire
or use sensitive information other than for limited
cybersecurity and public safety purposes.
In addition to concerns about legal authorities, the
specter of litigation for monitoring a company's own networks
or sharing cyber threat indicators or defensive measures for
cybersecurity purposes has disincentivized private sector
cybersecurity efforts. Entities appropriately monitoring their
systems for cybersecurity threats and sharing information
necessary to protect against those threats should not be
exposed to costly legal uncertainty for doing so. Moreover, it
is these same companies who are the victims of malicious cyber
activity, and their appropriate efforts to protect themselves
and other future victims from cyber threats should not only be
authorized but protected from unnecessary litigation. This
legislation creates narrowly tailored liability protection to
incentivize companies' efforts to identify cybersecurity
threats and share information about them. However, this
liability protection does not extend to defensive measures, nor
does it protect unauthorized monitoring or sharing, including
gross negligence or willful misconduct, that risks sensitive
data rather than safeguarding it.
The Committee believes that the increased information
sharing enabled by this bill is critical step forward for
improving cybersecurity in America.
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation
The following is a section-by-section analysis and
explanation of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of
2015 that is being reported by the Committee.
Section 1. Short title
Section 1 states that this Act may be cited as the
``Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015.''
Section 2. Definitions
Section 2 provides 18 definitions for this Act, to include
the following key terms: ``cybersecurity purpose,''
``cybersecurity threat,'' ``cyber threat indicator,''
``defensive measure,'' and ``monitor.''
The term ``cybersecurity purpose'' means the purpose of
protecting an information system or information that is stored
on, processed by, or transiting an information system from a
cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability. This definition
ensures that the authorities of private entities to monitor and
operate defensive measures must be exercised for the purpose of
protecting their own networks and those of their customers when
authorized by the written consent of such customers. The
definition of ``cybersecurity purpose'' is also one of the main
limitations on the ability of private and governmental entities
to use cyber threat indicators and defensive measures.
The term ``cybersecurity threat'' is defined as an action,
not protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, on or through an information system that may
result in an unauthorized effort to adversely impact the
security, availability, confidentiality, or integrity of an
information system that is stored on, processed by, or
transiting an information system. The term does not include any
action that solely involves a violation of a consumer term of
service or a consumer licensing agreement. Many terms of
service agreements prohibit activities that would also meet the
``cybersecurity threat'' definition; such activities would
still be considered a ``cybersecurity threat'' because they
were not ``solely'' violations of consumer agreements. The
Committee intends this definition to include activities that
may have unauthorized and negative results, but to exclude
authorized activities, such as extensive use of bandwidth that
may incidentally cause adverse effects. However, this
definition clearly does not permit hackers to cloak their
criminal actions like theft of information or destruction of
property under the ambit of First Amendment protected
activities.
The term ``cyber threat indicator'' is one of the most
important definitions in this Act. It is defined as information
that is necessary to describe or identify: (1) malicious
reconnaissance, including anomalous patterns of communications
that appear to be transmitted for the purpose of gathering
technical information related to a cybersecurity threat or
security vulnerability; (2) a method of defeating a security
control or exploitation of a security vulnerability; (3) a
security vulnerability, including anomalous activity that
appears to indicate the existence of a security vulnerability;
(4) a method of causing a user with legitimate access to an
information system or information that is stored on, processed
by, or transiting an information system to unwittingly enable
the defeat of a security control or exploitation of a security
vulnerability; (5) malicious cyber command and control; (6) the
actual or potential harm caused by an incident, including a
description of the information exfiltrated as a result of a
particular cybersecurity threat; (7) any other attribute of a
cybersecurity threat, if disclosure of such attribute is not
otherwise prohibited by law; or (8) any combination thereof.
This narrow definition is a key privacy protection in the Act
because it creates an exhaustive list of the types of cyber
threat information that can be shared among private and
governmental entities, and only when they are necessary to
describe or identify threats to information and information
systems. Essentially, this definition limits the information
that can be shared under this Act to the techniques and
``malware'' used by malicious actors to compromise the computer
networks of their victims, not sensitive personal and business
information contained in such networks.
The term ``defensive measure'' is defined as an action,
device, procedure, signature, technique, or other measure
applied to an information system or information that is stored
on, processed by, or transiting an information system that
detects, prevents, or mitigates a known or suspected
cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability. However, a
defensive measure does not include a measure that destroys,
renders unusable, or substantially harms an information system
or data on an information system not belonging to the private
entity operating such measure or another entity or Federal
entity that is authorized to provide consent and has provided
consent to that private entity for operation of such measure.
Recognizing the inherent right of self-defense that entities
have to protect their networks and data, the Committee intends
for this definition to provide a positive legal authority
allowing private entities to take measures to take appropriate
steps to defend their own information networks and systems, or
those of their customers when authorized by the written consent
of such customers, against malicious cybersecurity threats. For
example, a defensive measure could be something as simple as a
security device that protects or limits access to a private
entity's computer infrastructure or as complex as using
sophisticated software tools to detect and protect against
anomalous and unauthorized activities on a private entity's
information system. Regardless, this definition does not
authorize the use of measures that are generally to be
considered ``offensive'' in nature, such as unauthorized access
of or executing computer code on another entity's information
systems or taking an action that would substantially harm
another private entity's information systems. The Committee is
aware that defensive measures on one entity's network could
have effects on other networks. It is the Committee's intent
that the authorization in this Act extends to defensive
measures on an entity's information systems that do not cause
substantial harm to another entity's information systems or
data on such systems, regardless of whether such non-
substantial harm was intended or foreseen by the implementing
entity.
The term ``monitor'' means to acquire, identify, or scan,
or to possess, information that is stored on, processed by, or
transiting an information system. This definition, as used in
this Act, is not intended to equate to the meaning of the term
``monitor'' used in the context of the interception of
communications under the Federal criminal wiretap statutes or
electronic surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act. Specifically, private entities are only
authorized to monitor their own information systems or those of
another private entity upon the authorization and written
consent of such other entity. Moreover, such monitoring is
limited to cybersecurity purposes. Essentially, these important
limitations ensure that private entities are only authorized to
monitor their information systems to protect against
cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities. Any other monitoring
would require lawful authority other than that provided in this
Act.
Section 3. Sharing of Information by the Federal Government
Section 3 requires the Director of National Intelligence,
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense,
and the Attorney General to develop and promulgate procedures
that facilitate and promote the timely sharing of: (1)
classified cyber threat indicators with cleared representatives
of relevant entities; (2) declassified cyber threat indicators
with relevant entities; (3) unclassified cyber threat
indicators with relevant entities or the public; and (4)
information in the possession of the Federal Government about
cybersecurity threats to such entities to prevent or mitigate
adverse effects from such cybersecurity threats. These
procedures must ensure that the Federal government has and
maintains the capability to share cyber threat indicators in
real time consistent with the protection of classified
information and incorporate to the greatest extent practicable
existing processes and existing roles and responsibilities.
The procedures required by this section must also include a
process for notifying entities that have received a cyber
threat indicator from a Federal entity that is known or
determined to be in error or in contravention of Federal law or
policy. Federal entities receiving cyber threat indicators will
also be required to implement and use security controls to
protect against unauthorized access to or acquisition of such
indicators. Moreover, the procedures require that a Federal
entity, prior to sharing a cyber threat indicator, review and
remove any information that the Federal entity knows at the
time of the sharing to be personal information of or
identifying a specific person not directly related to a
cybersecurity threat or implement and use a technical
capability configured to remove personal information of or
identifying a specific person not directly related to a
cybersecurity threat. In developing these procedures, the
responsible officials must coordinate with other appropriate
Federal entities, including the National Laboratories due to
their technical expertise, so that effective protocols are
implemented to facilitate and promote sharing in a timely
manner. Within 60 days of the enactment of this Act, the
Director of National Intelligence in consultation with the
heads of the appropriate Federal entities shall submit these
procedures to the Congress.
Section 4. Authorizations for Preventing, Detecting, Analyzing, and
Mitigating Cybersecurity Threats
Subsection (a) of Section 4 provides a private entity with
the authority to monitor, for cybersecurity purposes: (1) its
own information systems; (2) an information system of another
entity, upon the authorization and written consent of such
other entity; (3) an information system of a Federal entity,
upon the authorization and written consent of an authorized
representative of the Federal entity; and (4) information that
is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system
monitored by the private entity. Nothing in subsection (a)
shall be construed to authorize the monitoring of information
systems, or the use of any information obtained through such
monitoring of such information systems, other than as provided
in this Act.
Subsection (b) provides private entities with the authority
to operate defensive measures, for cybersecurity purposes, that
are applied to its information systems to protect the rights
and property of such private entities, those of another entity
upon written consent of such entity for operation of such
defensive measures to protect the rights and property of that
entity, or those of a Federal entity upon written consent of an
authorized representative of such Federal entity for operation
of such defensive measures to protect the rights or property of
the Federal Government. This subsection does not authorize the
use of defensive measures other than for cybersecurity
purposes.
Under subsection (c), an entity is authorized to share with
or receive from any other entity or the Federal Government
cyber threat indicators and defensive measures for the purposes
permitted under this Act, consistent with the protection of
classified information when applicable. An entity receiving
cyber threat indicators and defensive measures from another
entity or Federal entity must comply with otherwise lawful
restrictions placed on the sharing or use of such cyber threat
indicators or defensive measures by the sharing entity or
Federal entity, such as a limitation of future sharing of the
indicators or measures.
An entity monitoring information systems, operating
defensive measures or providing or receiving defensive measures
under Section 4 must implement and utilize security controls to
protect against unauthorized access to or acquisition of such
cyber threat indicators or defensive measures.
Prior to sharing a cyber threat indicator pursuant to this
Act, an entity shall review such cyber threat indicator to
assess whether such indicator contains any information that the
entity knows at the time of sharing to be personal information
of or identifying a specific person not directly related to a
cybersecurity threat and remove such information or implement
and utilize a technical capability configured to remove any
information contained with such indicator that the entity knows
at the time of the sharing to be personal information of or
identifying a specific person not directly related to a
cybersecurity threat. During the Committee's drafting of the
legislation, industry groups and trade associations noted that
the requirement to remove personal information may preclude
some companies, especially smaller ones, from participating in
the information sharing process endorsed by the bill. As a
private entity must ensure that any information shared meets
the definition for ``cyber threat indicator'' or ``defensive
measure'' to comply with the Act, the requirement to remove any
known unnecessary privacy information strikes the appropriate
balance between narrowly tailoring what information can be
shared and providing a practicable standard. Further, the
Committee hopes that the Attorney General guidance required in
section 5 and common practices and guidelines will assist
smaller and middle-sized companies implement this requirement.
Section 4 authorizes an entity to use cyber threat
indicators and defensive measures, for cybersecurity purposes,
to monitor or operate defensive measures on its information
systems or those of another entity or Federal entity upon
written consent.
A cyber threat indicator shared by an entity with a State,
tribal, or local department or agency may, with the prior
written consent of such entity, be used for the purpose of
preventing, investigating, or prosecuting any of the offenses
described in Section 5(d)(5)(A)(vi). These offenses involve
imminent threats of death, serious bodily harm, or serious
economic harm, including a terrorist act or a use of a weapon
of mass destruction. They also include serious violent felonies
and offenses related to fraud and identity theft, and
protection of trade secrets. If the need for immediate use
prevents a State, tribal, or local department or agency from
obtaining written consent before such use, consent may be
provided orally with subsequent documentation of consent. The
entity providing consent for this use must have the
authorization to possess and share such a cyber threat
indicator under this Act and must conduct such sharing
consistent with the conditions set out.
Cyber threat indicators shared with a State, tribal, or
local department or agency under Section 4 are deemed
voluntarily shared information and exempt from disclosure under
any State, tribal, or local law requiring disclosure of
information or records.
In general, cyber threat indicators shared with a State,
tribal, or local government under this Act shall not be
directly used by any State, tribal, or local government to
regulate, which includes bringing an enforcement action, the
lawful activity of any entity, including an activity relating
to monitoring, operating a defensive measure, or sharing of a
cyber threat indicator. However, a cyber threat indicator or
defensive measure may, consistent with a State, tribal, or
local government regulatory authority specifically relating to
the prevention or mitigation of cybersecurity threats to
information systems, inform the development or implementation
of a regulation relating to such information systems. The
Committee views this as a narrow exception to ensure that
government agencies with regulatory authority understand the
current landscape of cyber threats and those facing the
particular regulatory sector over which they have cognizance.
Under subsection (e), two or more private entities are not
to be considered in violation of any provision of antitrust law
when exchanging or providing a cyber threat indicator, or
assistance relating to the prevention, investigation, or
mitigation of a cybersecurity threat, for cybersecurity
purposes under this Act. This provision should be read in
conjunction with the rule of construction in Section 8(e) that
nothing in the Act shall be construed to permit price-fixing,
allocating a market between competitors, monopolizing or
attempting to monopolize a market, boycotting, or exchanges of
price or cost information, customer lists, or information
regarding future competitive planning. The bill allows for the
sharing of cybersecurity-related information for cybersecurity
purposes, acknowledging that doing so might otherwise be a
potential violation of anti-trust laws that seek to limit
sharing of information for other purposes. The bill does not
intend to protect companies from engaging in anti-competitive
behavior under the guise of cybersecurity.
Further, this subsection only applies to information that
is exchanged or assistance provided to the communication or
disclosure of cyber threat indicators for the facilitation of
the prevention, investigation, or mitigation of cybersecurity
threats to an information system or information that is stored
on, processed by, or transiting an information system.
Section 4 also clarifies that the sharing of cyber threat
indicators under this Act shall not create a right or benefit
to similar information by such entity or another entity.
Section 5. Sharing of Cyber Threat Indicators and Defensive Measures
with the Federal Government
Section 5 directs the Attorney General, in coordination
with the heads of appropriate Federal entities, to develop and
submit to Congress not later than 60 days after the enactment
of this Act interim policies and procedures relating to the
receipt of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures by
the Federal Government. Not later than 180 days after the
enactment of this Act, the Attorney General, in coordination
with the heads of appropriate Federal entities, is required to
promulgate a final version of such policies and procedures.
The policies and procedures developed under Section 5 must
meet several requirements in addition to being consistent with
the Attorney General's privacy and civil liberties guidelines
required by subsection (b). They must ensure that cyber threat
indicators shared with the Federal Government through the real
time process described in subsection (c)--the capability and
process within the DHS--are shared in an automated manner with
all appropriate Federal entities, are not subject to any delay
or interference, and may be provided to other Federal entities.
The Committee intends that these policies and procedures both
enable the delivery of real time information about
cybersecurity threats to appropriate Federal entities and
provide sufficient technical controls to protect privacy
information.
For cyber threat indicators shared in a manner other than
the real-time process described in subsection (c), the policies
and procedures shall ensure that cyber threat indicators are
shared as quickly as operationally practicable with all
appropriate Federal entities, are not subject to unnecessary
delay, interference, or any other action that could impede
receipt by all of the appropriate Federal entities, and may be
provided to other Federal entities. As cyber threat indicators
received outside of the real-time process in subsection (c) may
be received by the Federal Government in a format less
conducive to ``as quickly as operationally practicable''
sharing, the Committee intends that this sharing requirement
will vest when such information is in a format that can
feasibly be shared. Once a cyber threat indicator can feasibly
be shared with appropriate Federal entities, the Federal entity
possessing such indicator must proceed to share it consistent
with the policies and procedures and without unnecessary delay.
The Attorney General's policies and procedures should include
how such cyber threat indicators will be put into a shareable
format and the proper sharing procedures within the Federal
Government. Further, the policies and procedures shall govern
the retention, use, and dissemination of cyber threat
indicators shared with the Federal Government, consistent with
this Act, otherwise applicable law, and consistent with the
applicable sections of the commonly accepted fair information
practice principles. To ensure compliance, an audit capability
and appropriate sanctions for officers, employees, or agents of
a Federal entity who knowingly and willfully conduct
unauthorized activities are required to be included in the
policies and procedures.
In an effort to assist the public and promote sharing of
cyber threat indicators, Section 5 requires the Attorney
General to develop and make publicly available guidance that:
(1) identifies the types of information that would qualify as a
cyber threat indicator under this Act that would be unlikely to
include personal information of or identifying a specific
person not directly related to a cyber security threat; (2)
identifies the types of information that are protected under
otherwise applicable privacy laws that are unlikely to be
directly related to a cybersecurity threat; and (3) contains
such other matters as the Attorney General considers
appropriate for entities sharing cyber threat indicators with
Federal entities under this Act.
Section 5 also directs the Attorney General, not later than
60 days after the date of enactment, in coordination with heads
of the appropriate Federal entities and in consultation with
privacy and civil liberties officers of such entities, to
develop, submit to Congress, and make available to the public
interim guidelines relating to privacy and civil liberties that
will govern the receipt, retention, use, and dissemination of
cyber threat indicators by a Federal entity obtained in
connection with activities authorized under this Act. Not later
than 180 days after the date of enactment, the Attorney General
shall, in coordination with the heads of the appropriate
Federal entities and in consultation with privacy and civil
liberties officers of such entities and such private entities
with industry expertise as the Attorney General considers
relevant, promulgate final privacy guidelines that shall govern
the receipt, retention, use, and dissemination of cyber threat
indicators by a Federal entity obtained in connection with
activities authorized in this Act. The Attorney General is also
required to periodically review these privacy guidelines, again
in coordination with the heads of the appropriate Federal
entities and in consultation with privacy and civil liberties
officers and industry experts. Consistent with the need to
protect information from cybersecurity threats and mitigate
those threats, the guidelines are required to limit the impact
on privacy and civil liberties from activities by the Federal
Government under this Act. These guidelines shall also limit
the receipt, retention, use, and dissemination of cyber threat
indicators containing personal information of or identifying
specific persons. As part of these limitations, the guidelines
will establish a process for the timely destruction of
information that is known not to be directly related to uses
authorized under this Act and specific limitations on the
length of time a cyber threat indicator may be retained by the
Federal Government.
The guidelines will include requirements to safeguard cyber
threat indicators containing personal information of or
identifying specific persons from unauthorized access or
acquisition, including appropriate sanctions for activities by
officers, employees, or agents of the Federal Government in
contravention of such guidelines. If a Federal entity
determines or knows that it has received information that does
not constitute a cyber threat indicator, the guidelines shall
include a procedure to notify entities and Federal entities.
The privacy and civil liberties guidelines will protect the
confidentiality of cyber threat indicators containing personal
information of or identifying specific persons to the greatest
extent practicable, and they will require recipients to be
informed that such indicators may only be used for purposes
authorized under this Act. They must also include steps that
may be needed so that dissemination of cyber threat indicators
is consistent with the protection of classified and other
sensitive national security information.
Subsection (c) requires the Secretary of Homeland Security,
not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act and in coordination with the heads of the appropriate
Federal entities, to develop and implement a capability and
process (commonly referred to as a ``portal'') within the DHS
that accepts cyber threat indicators and defensive measures
from any entity in real time. The Committee intends that this
DHS capability should build upon current Federal Government
efforts to both more efficiently receive cyber threat
indicators from outside the Federal Government and to more
efficiently share such indicators within the Federal
Government.
Upon certification by the Secretary of Homeland Security,
this capability shall be the process by which the Federal
Government receives cyber threat indicators and defensive
measures shared by a private entity through electronic mail or
media, an interactive form on an Internet website, or a real
time, automated process between information systems. There are
only two exceptions to this requirement: (1) communications
between a Federal entity and a private entity regarding a
previously shared cyber threat indicator; and (2)
communications by a regulated entity with such entity's Federal
regulatory authority regarding a cybersecurity threat. The
sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures in
other formats where there is less privacy risk, such as a
telephone call, letter, or in-person meeting, receives
liability protection regardless of whether it is first sent
through the DHS portal.
When cyber threat indicators and defensive measures are
shared through the DHS capability, the Secretary of Homeland
Security will ensure that all of the appropriate Federal
entities, as defined, receive them consistent with applicable
policies, procedures, and guidelines in Section 5.
The DHS capability and process does not limit or prohibit
otherwise lawful disclosures of communications, records, or
other information, including: (1) reporting of known or
suspected criminal activity, by an entity to any other entity
or a Federal entity; (2) voluntary or legally compelled
participation in a Federal investigation; or (3) providing
cyber threat indicators or defensive measures as part of a
statutory or authorized contractual requirement.
Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment, the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to Congress a
report on the development and implementation of the capability
and process required by this section.
Subsection (d) includes a number of protections for
information shared with or provided to the Federal Government.
The provision of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures
to the Federal Government under this Act does not constitute
the waiver of any applicable privilege or protection provided
by law, including trade secret protection. A cyber threat
indicator or defensive measure provided by an entity to the
Federal Government under this Act shall be considered the
commercial, financial, and proprietary information of such
entity when so designated by the originating entity. Consistent
with this Act and all privileges, protections, and any claims
of propriety on such cyber threat indicators or defensive
measures, the Committee expects that the Federal Government
will further share and use such information for cybersecurity
purposes. This sharing and use will be governed by the
policies, procedures, and guidelines required by Section 5.
Cyber threat indicators and defensive measures provided to the
Federal Government under this Act will also be deemed voluntary
shared information and exempt from disclosure under section 5
U.S.C. 552 and any State, tribal, or local law requiring
disclosure of information or records. Additionally, such cyber
threat indicators and defensive measures shall be withheld
without discretion from the public under 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3)(B)
and any State, tribal, or local law requiring disclosure of
information or records. The provision of cyber threat
indicators and defensive measures under this Act shall not be
subject to the rules of any Federal agency or department or any
judicial doctrine regarding ex parte communications with a
decision-making official.
Cyber threat indicators and defensive measures provided to
the Federal Government under this Act may be disclosed to,
retained by, and used by, consistent with otherwise applicable
Federal law, any Federal agency or department, component,
officer, employee, or agent of the Federal Government solely
for the purposes identified by Section 5, and consistent with
the procedures developed by the Attorney General. These
purposes are: (1) a cybersecurity purpose; (2) the purpose of
identifying a cybersecurity threat, including the source of
such cybersecurity threat, or a security vulnerability; (3) the
purpose of identifying a cybersecurity threat involving the use
of an information system by a foreign adversary or terrorist;
(4) the purpose of responding to, or otherwise preventing or
mitigating, an imminent threat of death, serious bodily harm,
or serious economic harm, including a terrorist act or a use of
a weapon of mass destruction; (5) the purpose of responding to,
or otherwise preventing or mitigating, a serious threat to a
minor, including sexual exploitation and threats to physical
safety; or (6) the purpose of preventing, investigating,
disrupting, or prosecuting an offense arising out of a
previously described imminent threat or any of the offenses
listed in Section 5(d)(5)(vi), including offenses related to
serious violent felonies, fraud and identity theft, espionage
and censorship, and protection of trade secrets. The word
``imminent'' in paragraph 5(d)(5)(A)(iv) is intended to modify
all the threats listed in that paragraph, to include the threat
of a terrorist act or use of a weapon of mass destruction.
Use of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures by
the Federal Government will be conducted in accordance with the
policies, procedures, and guidelines required in Section 5, and
will be done in a manner that protects from unauthorized use or
disclosure any cyber threat indicators that may contain
personal information of or identifying specific persons and
protects the confidentiality of such information.
Additionally, such cyber threat indicators and defensive
measures shared with the Federal Government under this Act
shall not be directly used by any Federal, State, tribal, or
local government to regulate, including an enforcement action,
the lawful activities of any entity, including an activity
relating to monitoring, operating a defensive measure, or
sharing of a cyber threat indicator. However, a cyber threat
indicator or defensive measure may, consistent with Federal or
State regulatory authority specifically relating to the
prevention or mitigation of cybersecurity threats to
information systems, inform the development or implementation
of a regulation relating to such information systems. As
previously described, the Committee intends for this exception
to be narrowly constrained to improving the government's
understanding of cybersecurity threats. The procedures
developed and implemented under this Act are not to be
considered regulations within the meaning of this section.
Section 6. Protection from Liability
Subsection (a) of Section 6 provides that no cause of
action shall lie or be maintained in any court against any
private entity, and such action shall be promptly dismissed,
for the monitoring of information systems and information under
Section 4 that is conducted in accordance with this Act. The
Committee intends that monitoring for cybersecurity purposes as
authorized by this Act should be protected from liability to
encourage private entities' efforts to identify cybersecurity
threats.
Subsection (b) provides that no cause of action shall lie
or be maintained in any court against any entity, and such
action shall be promptly dismissed, for the sharing or receipt
of cyber threat indicators or defensive measures under Section
4 when conducted in accordance with this Act, including cases
in which such information is shared with the Federal Government
in a manner consistent with subsection (c)(1)(B) of Section 5.
Liability protection for the sharing or receipt of cyber threat
indicators or defensive measures under Section 4 conducted in
accordance with this Act, and in a manner consistent with
subsection (c)(1)(B) of Section 5, does not go into effect
until the earlier of the date on which the interim policies
required under Section 5(a)(1) are submitted to Congress or the
date that is 60 days after this Act's date of enactment. In all
other cases where the sharing or receipt of cyber threat
indicators or defensive measures is conducted in accordance
with the Act, liability protection is effective immediately
upon enactment of this Act. The Committee intends that the
sharing between entities of cyber threat indicators and
defensive measures for cybersecurity purposes in accordance
with this Act, including the removal of sensitive personal
information not directly related to a cybersecurity threat,
should be protected from claims. Activities conducted in
contravention of this Act's provisions are not entitled to such
liability protection, but this Act does not create any cause of
action for such non-compliance. When private entities share
cyber threat indicators or defensive measures with the Federal
Government in a manner consistent with subsection (c)(1)(B) of
Section 5, such entities should also not be subject to
burdensome litigation. The Committee intends that entities
sharing such information with the Federal Government should do
so consistently with required procedures to qualify for such
protection.
Subsection (c) clarifies that nothing in this section shall
be construed to require dismissal of a cause of action against
an entity that has engaged in gross negligence or willful
misconduct in the course of conducting activities authorized by
this Act. Also, nothing in this section shall be construed to
undermine or limit the availability of otherwise applicable
common law or statutory defenses. The Committee intends to
protect the responsible behavior of entities furthering
cybersecurity under the authorizations and procedures of this
Act, but it does not seek to protect willful or reckless
activities that violate the letter and spirit of its
provisions. Entities should not use Section 6 as an excuse to
engage in wanton or dangerous activities, nor should they
consider it to indemnify them for purposes other than the
purposes authorized by this Act.
This section does not provide protections from liability
arising out of a private entity's use of defensive measures,
because it is the Committee's intent to maintain the status quo
with respect to the use of cybersecurity defensive measures.
While section 4 authorizes the use of defensive measures by an
entity on its information networks or the networks of a
consenting entity, the Committee notes that the use of
defensive measures may have significant impact on those
networks or in physical space. The lack of liability protection
for the use of defensive measures should not be interpreted as
the Committee taking any view on whether and how defensive
measures should or should not be implemented.
Section 7. Oversight of Government Activities
Section 7 mandates reports on implementation and privacy
impacts by agency heads, Inspectors General, and the Privacy
Civil Liberties Oversight Board to ensure that cyber threat
information is properly received, handled, and shared by the
federal government.
Section 8. Construction and Preemption
Section 8 contains 19 construction provisions for this Act.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to: (1) limit or
prohibit otherwise lawful disclosures of communications,
records, or other information; (2) preempt any employee from
exercising whistleblower rights currently provided under any
law, rule, or regulation; (3) create any immunity against, or
otherwise affecting, any action brought by the Federal
Government to enforce any law, executive order, or procedure
governing the appropriate handling, disclosure, or use of
classified information; (4) affect the conduct of authorized
law enforcement or intelligence activities; (5) modify the
authority of the Federal Government to protect classified
information and sources and methods and the national security
of the United States; (6) affect any requirement under any
other provision of law for an entity to provide information to
the Federal Government; (7) permit price-fixing, allocating a
market between competitors, monopolizing or attempting to
monopolize a market, boycotting, or exchanges of price or cost
information, customer lists, or information regarding future
competitive planning; (8) limit or modify an existing
information sharing relationship; (9) prohibit a new
information sharing relationship; (10) require a new
information relationship between any entity and the Federal
Government; (11) require the use of the DHS capability in
Section 5(c); (12) amend, repeal, or supersede any current or
future contractual relationship between any entities, or
between any entity and the Federal Government; (13) abrogate
trade secret or intellectual property rights of any entity or
Federal entity; (14) permit the Federal government to require
an entity to provide information to the Federal Government;
(15) permit the Federal Government to condition the sharing of
cyber threat indicators with an entity on such entity's
provision of cyber threat indicators to the Federal Government;
(16) permit the Federal Government to condition the award of
any Federal grant, contract, or purchase on the provision of a
cyber threat indicator to a Federal entity; (17) subject any
entity to liability for choosing not to engage in the voluntary
activities authorized in this Act; (18) authorize, or to modify
any existing authority of, a department or agency of the
Federal Government to retain or use any information shared
under this Act for any use other than permitted in this Act; or
(19) limit the authority of the Secretary of Defense to
develop, prepare, coordinate, or, when authorized by the
President to do so, conduct a military cyber operation in
response to a malicious cyber activity carried out against the
United States or a United States person by a foreign government
or an organization sponsored by a foreign government or a
terrorist organization.
This bill supersedes any statute or other law of a State or
political subdivision of a State that restricts or otherwise
expressly regulates an activity authorized under this bill.
However, this bill shall not be construed to supersede any
statute or other law of a State or political subdivision of a
State concerning the use of authorized law enforcement
practices and procedures.
Nothing in this bill shall be construed to authorized the
promulgation of any regulations not specifically authorized by
this bill, establish any regulatory authority not specifically
established under this bill, or to authorize regulatory actions
that would duplicate or conflict with regulatory requirements,
mandatory standards, or related processes under Federal law.
Section 9. Report on Cybersecurity Threats
Section 9 requires the Director of National Intelligence to
submit a one-time report to the congressional intelligence
committees on cybersecurity threats, including cyber attacks,
theft, and data breaches.
Section 10. Conforming Amendments
Section 10 makes a technical amendment to 5 U.S.C. 552(b).
Section 10 also makes a conforming amendment to Section 941
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013
(Public Law 112-239) to allow the Secretary of Defense to share
information received under that section consistent with this
bill.
Committee Action
On March 12, 2015, a quorum being present, the Committee
met to consider the bill and amendments. The Committee took the
following actions:
Votes on amendments to committee bill
By a voice vote, the Committee made the Chairman and Vice
Chairman's bill the base text for purposes of amendment. The
Committee also authorized the staff to make technical and
conforming changes in the bill following the completion of the
mark-up.
The Committee moved to consideration of the managers'
amendment by the Chairman, which was developed jointly by the
Chairman and the Vice Chairman, and adopted the managers'
amendment by a voice vote.
By a vote of 7 ayes to 8 noes, the Committee rejected an
amendment by Senator Collins to require entities that own or
control information systems that are deemed essential to the
operation of designated critical infrastructure to report
successful intrusions of those under certain circumstances.
According to the amendment, such reporting would only be
required with respect to systems where a cybersecurity incident
could reasonably result in catastrophic regional or national
effects on public health or safety, economic security, or
national security. The votes in person or by proxy were as
follows: Chairman Burr--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator Coats--
aye; Senator Rubio--no; Senator Collins--aye; Senator Blunt--
no; Senator Lankford--no; Senator Cotton--no; Vice Chairman
Feinstein--no; Senator Wyden--no; Senator Mikulski-- aye;
Senator Warner-- aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--
aye; Senator Hirono--aye.
By a vote of 3 ayes to 12 noes, the Committee rejected an
amendment by Senator Wyden to prohibit the federal government
from mandating that private companies deliberately introduce
security weaknesses into their products. The votes in person or
by proxy were as follows: Chairman Burr--no; Senator Coats--no;
Senator Rubio--no; Senator Collins--no; Senator Blunt--no;
Senator Lankford--no; Senator Cotton--no; Vice Chairman
Feinstein--no; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Mikulski-- no;
Senator Warner-- no; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King-- no;
Senator Hirono--aye.
By a voice vote, the Committee adopted an amendment by
Senator Heinrich to require the Attorney General develop and
make publicly available guidance to assist entities on the
types of information that would qualify as cyber threat
indicators under the bill and identify types of information
that are protected under otherwise applicable privacy laws.
By a voice vote, the Committee adopted an amendment by
Senator Hirono and Senator Rubio to place the Attorney General
privacy guidelines on the same timeline as the bill requires
for the Attorney General policies and procedures for the
receipt of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures by
the government. The amendment also requires the Attorney
General to consult with private entities with industry
expertise that are considered relevant before the promulgation
of the final privacy guidelines.
Vote to report the committee bill
The Committee voted to report the bill as amended, by a
vote of 14 ayes to 1 no. Chairman Burr--aye; Senator Risch--
aye; Senator Coats--aye; Senator Rubio--aye; Senator Collins--
aye; Senator Blunt--aye; Senator Lankford--aye; Senator
Cotton--aye; Vice Chairman Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--no;
Senator Mikulski--aye; Senator Warner--aye; Senator Heinrich--
aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Hirono--aye.
Compliance With Rule XLIV
Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires
publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed
spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff
benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report
accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the
Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending
items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill or this
report. The bill and report also contain no limited tax
benefits or limited tariff benefits.
Estimate of Costs
Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(1) of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, the Committee estimates that implementing
the bill would have a discretionary cost of about $20 million
over the 2015-2019 period, assuming appropriation of the
necessary amounts. Enacting S. 754 would not affect direct
spending or revenues; therefore pay-as-you-go procedures do not
apply. On March 17, 2015, the Committee transmitted this bill
to the Congressional Budget Office and requested it to conduct
an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out S. 754.
Evaluation of Regulatory Impact
In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing
the provisions of this legislation.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SEN. HEINRICH AND SEN. HIRONO
The rising incidences of cyber attacks on our private and
public networks increasingly threaten our economic and national
security. Although the enactment of the Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Act, or CISA, would not necessarily prevent
such attacks, there is a general consensus that facilitating
cybersecurity information sharing between the private sector
and federal government would promote a common understanding of
the threats we face and allow the private sector to more
effectively defend its networks.
We supported the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act
during its consideration in the Senate Intelligence Committee
because we support the broad aims of this bill. In particular,
we agree that individuals, companies, and government
institutions can best protect themselves from cyber-attacks
when they are aware of the presence and nature of cyber
threats. But the only way to ensure the broadest dissemination
of threat information is to develop a framework in which that
information can be shared and disseminated with appropriate
restraints, guidance, and oversight.
The bill as passed out of the Committee provides more
restraints, guidance, and oversight than did the earlier draft
version of the legislation, including a narrowing of the
definition and authorized use of defensive measures, fewer
exceptions for liability protections for information shared
outside of the DHS portal, and more limits on how cyber threat
information is used.
In addition, we are pleased that the Committee adopted
amendments we offered during the bill's markup. Senator
Heinrich's amendment requires the Attorney General to develop
guidance to help private sector companies understand the types
of information typically considered to be cyber threat
indicators, and the types of personal information generally
considered unrelated to such a threat. Senator Hirono's
amendment--offered with Senator Rubio--requires the privacy
guidelines called for in the bill to be developed and
promulgated in a timely and thorough manner, alongside the
policies and procedures to be developed for the cyber threat
information sharing program.
But we continue to harbor concerns about some of the bill's
provisions. Vice Chairman Feinstein noted that the goal of the
bill is for companies and the government to voluntarily share
information about cybersecurity threats--not about personal
information. Our concern is that, however well intended, the
bill's provisions do not adequately direct companies to remove
personally identifiable information when sharing cyber threat
indicators with the government. The bill also lacks a directive
that the Department of Homeland Security scrub cyber threat
indicators for unnecessary personally identifiable information
before sharing that information with other areas of the federal
government. Further, the bill confers broad liability
protections on companies before requiring them to abide by
privacy guidelines. We believe that the privacy guidelines
required in the bill should be treated as a serious component
of the new cyber threat sharing regime--not as an
afterthought--and thus should be promulgated before the
liability protections in this legislation take effect.
Finally, we are unconvinced that it is necessary to create
an entirely new exemption to the Freedom of Information Act, or
FOIA. Government transparency is critical in order for citizens
to hold their elected officials and bureaucrats accountable;
however, the bill's inclusion of a new FOIA exemption is
overbroad and unnecessary as the types of information shared
with the government through this bill would already be exempt
from unnecessary public release under current FOIA exemptions.
And to the extent FOIA exemptions need to be updated, those
changes should only be made following open hearings in which
all stakeholders have an opportunity to have their voices
heard.
We are committed to addressing some of these issues through
amendments on the Senate floor, and believe there should be an
open amendment process as this bill moves forward. A number of
our colleagues on the Committee offered important amendments
during the markup that we hope will be offered again for full
Senate consideration--in particular, a number of those offered
by Senator Wyden, and one by Sen. Collins to require mandatory
reporting of cybersecurity intrusions for the most critical
infrastructure owners and operators.
As with other countries around the world, the United States
is still just beginning to find ways to confront and mitigate
the very real dangers our country faces from cyber threats.
Thus far, we have seen no perfect answers. But this bill is not
intended to confront every threat. We support it as a way for
the government and private sector to begin to address the
shared threat that cyber attacks represent, and we will look
forward to a robust debate on the floor.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR COLLINS
The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015
eliminates some of the legal and economic disincentives
impeding voluntary two-way information sharing between private
industry and government and is a first step in improving our
nation's dangerously inadequate defenses against cyber attacks.
This bill is insufficient, however, to protect the critical
infrastructure of the American people who rely upon this
infrastructure for their safety, health, and economic well-
being. Simply put, the current threat posed by cyber actors is
too great and the vulnerability of existing information systems
operating critical infrastructure too widespread to depend
solely upon voluntary measures to protect the most essential of
these systems upon which our country and citizens depend.
Without information about intrusions into our most critical
infrastructure, our government's ability to defend the country
against advanced persistent threats will suffer in a domain
where speed is critical. This threat is not theoretical.
Admiral Mike Rogers, the director of the National Security
Agency, has publicly discussed the cyber threat posed against
critical infrastructure. In addition to stating his belief that
U.S. Cyber Command will be tasked to help defend critical
infrastructure, he has said that ``We have . . . observed
intrusions into industrial control systems . . . what concerns
us is that . . . capability can be used by nation-states,
groups or individuals to take down the capability of the
control systems.''
A tiered system of information sharing is part of the
solution to address this significant vulnerability. The first
tier of reporting should be voluntarily, rely upon the
procedures established in this legislation, and be utilized by
99 percent of businesses. The second tier of reporting should
be mandatory, and it should apply only to a subset of critical
infrastructure where a cybersecurity incident could reasonably
be expected to result in catastrophic regional or national
effects on public health or safety, economic security, or
national security.
For this reason, I offered an amendment during the
Committee's consideration of the bill to implement this tiered
system by requiring the small number of the owners and
operators of the country's most critical infrastructure at
greatest risk to report to the federal government intrusions of
information systems essential to the operation of critical
infrastructure.
Had my amendment been adopted, 99.99 percent of businesses
and 96 percent of critical infrastructure would still decide
for themselves whether or not to share information with the
government. The four percent of critical infrastructure at
greatest risk of a devastating cyber attack would be mandated
to report successful cyber intrusions so the government can
develop and deploy countermeasures to protect its networks and
the information systems of other critical infrastructure.
The Department of Homeland Security has already identified
63 critical infrastructure entities where damage caused by a
single cyber incident could reasonably result in $50 billion in
economic damage or $25 billion in damage that occurs in
conjunction with 2,500 immediate deaths or the severe
degradation of our national security or defense. Public
reporting by Mandiant in 2013 and repeated testimony of the
Intelligence Community leave no doubt that U.S. critical
infrastructure already faces advanced persistent cyber threats
posed by nation-states and other actors.
The critical infrastructure of the United States remains
woefully unprepared to confront this clear and present threat.
One former agency head told the 9/11 Commission during its 10th
anniversary review that, ``We are at September 10th levels in
terms of cyber preparedness.'' We cannot afford to wait for a
``cyber 9/11'' before taking legislative action to protect our
critical infrastructure. By rejecting my amendment, the
Committee is electing to take just such a risk.
Susan M. Collins.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR RON WYDEN
Cyber-attacks and hacking against U.S. companies and
networks are a serious and growing problem, with very real
consequences for American companies and American consumers, and
pose a significant challenge for national security. I share my
colleagues' view that Congress should do what it can to help
address this problem. The most effective way to protect
cybersecurity is to ensure that network owners take
responsibility for security and effectively implement good
security practices. And it is important to ensure that
government agencies do not deliberately weaken security
standards.
It also makes sense to encourage private companies to share
information about cybersecurity threats. However, this
information-sharing must include strong protections for the
privacy rights of law-abiding American citizens. Any
information-sharing legislation that lacks adequate privacy
protections is not simply a cybersecurity bill, but a
surveillance bill by another name.
I opposed this bill because I believe its insufficient
privacy protections will lead to large amounts of personal
information being shared with the government even when that
information is not needed for cybersecurity. This could include
email content, financial records, and a wide variety of other
personal information. While corporations will have a choice
about whether or not to participate in this sharing, they could
do so without the knowledge or consent of their customers, and
will be granted immunity from liability if they do so.
Additionally, this bill trumps federal privacy laws and permits
government agencies to use the collected information for a wide
variety of purposes, rather than only to protect cybersecurity.
The bill also creates a problematic double standard, in that
personal information about individual consumers can be used for
a variety of non-cybersecurity purposes, including law
enforcement actions against those consumers, but information
about the companies supplying the information generally may not
be used to regulate those companies. A corporation's privacy is
not more important than an individual's privacy.
This excessively broad collection may not be the intent of
this bill, but the language is clearly drafted broadly enough
to permit it. Most notably, the bill defines a cybersecurity
threat as anything that ``may result'' in harm to a network.
This broad definition will incentivize the sharing of
information even when it is unlikely to pertain to an actual
cybersecurity threat. A more tailored definition, limited to
actions that are reasonably likely to harm or interfere with a
network, would ensure that information-sharing is more narrowly
focused on actual threats.
A more tailored approach would also specify that companies
should only provide the government with individuals' personal
information if it is necessary to describe a cybersecurity
threat. This would discourage companies from unnecessarily
sharing large amounts of their customers' private information.
This bill unfortunately takes the opposite approach, and only
requires private companies to withhold information that is
known at the time of sharing to be personal information
unrelated to cybersecurity. This approach will disincentivize
companies from carefully reviewing the information that they
share and lead to a much greater amount of personal information
being transferred unnecessarily to law enforcement and
intelligence agencies.
I am also concerned that this legislation does not provide
individuals with an adequate mechanism for redress in cases
where the government violates the rules established by this
act. Similar bills have included provisions permitting
individuals harmed by such violations to recover damages from
the government, and such a provision is needed in this bill as
well.
I am disappointed that the committee did not adopt stronger
privacy protections in this legislation, and I am also
disappointed that my amendment to prohibit government agencies
from requiring U.S. hardware and software companies to build
weaknesses into their products was not adopted. I have
introduced this amendment as stand-alone legislation and will
continue to pursue this goal.
This bill is likely to significantly increase government
collection of individuals' personal information, while
unfortunately doing relatively little to secure American
networks. I hope to work with colleagues to address this bill's
shortcomings, and if these flaws are not fixed I will continue
to oppose it.
Finally, I remain very concerned that a secret Justice
Department opinion that is of clear relevance to this debate
continues to be withheld from the public. This opinion, which
interprets common commercial service agreements, is
inconsistent with the public's understanding of the law, and I
believe it will be difficult for Congress to have a fully
informed debate on cybersecurity legislation if it does not
understand how these agreements have been interpreted by the
Executive Branch.
I have repeatedly asked the Department of Justice to
withdraw this opinion, and to release it to the public so that
anyone who is a party to one of these agreements can consider
whether their agreement should be revised. The deputy head of
the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel testified to
the Intelligence Committee that she would not rely on this
opinion today, but I remain concerned that other government
officials may be tempted to rely on it in the future. I will
continue to press the Justice Department to release this
opinion, so that Congress and the public can debate this bill
with a full understanding of the facts. And I look forward to
working with my colleagues to revise this legislation to ensure
that Americans' privacy rights and American cybersecurity are
both adequately protected.
Changes in Existing Laws
In the opinion of the Committee, it is necessary to
dispense with the requirements of paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of
the Standing Rules of the Senate in order to expedite the
business of the Senate.
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