[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM THREATS: EXPLOR-
ING SECURITY IMPLICATIONS AND MITIGATION
TECHNOLOGIES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT AND
MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 18, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-9
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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94-580 PDF WASHINGTON : 2015
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Curt Clawson, Florida Kathleen M. Rice, New York
John Katko, New York Norma J. Torres, California
Will Hurd, Texas
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia
Mark Walker, North Carolina
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia
Martha McSally, Arizona
John Ratcliffe, Texas
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan V. O'Hara, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania, Chairman
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Curt Clawson, Florida Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia Norma J. Torres, California
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Ryan Consaul, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dennis Terry, Subcommittee Clerk
Brian B. Turbyfill, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight
and Management Efficiency:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Bonnie Watson Coleman, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Oversight and Management Efficiency:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Witnesses
Mr. Todd E. Humphreys, Assistant Professor, Cockrell School of
Engineering, The University of Texas at Austin:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Major General Frederick F. Roggero, (USAF-Ret.), President and
Chief Executive Officer, Resilient Solutions, Ltd.:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Mr. Richard Beary, President, International Association of Chiefs
of Police:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
Mr. Gregory S. McNeal, Associate Professor, School of Law,
Pepperdine University:
Oral Statement................................................. 23
Prepared Statement............................................. 25
UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM THREATS:
EXPLORING SECURITY IMPLICATIONS AND MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES
----------
Wednesday, March 18, 2015
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Oversight
and Management Efficiency,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Scott Perry
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Perry, Carter, Loudermilk, Watson
Coleman, Thompson, Richmond, and Torres.
Mr. Perry. Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on
Oversight and Management Efficiency will come to order. The
purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony regarding
security implications of small, unmanned aerial systems in the
domestic airspace and technologies to mitigate associated
threats.
Chairman now recognizes itself for an opening statement.
When most people think of unmanned aerial systems, or UAS,
commonly known as drones, they may think of large aircraft used
in overseas combat operations. However, in the coming years,
the majority of UAS will be small--55 pounds or less--many of
which fly less than 400 feet above the ground. Small UAS have a
variety of potential uses such as pipeline, utility, and farm
inspections, aerial photography, and crop-dusting, among other
uses.
Last month the Federal Aviation Administration, the FAA,
released proposed rules to allow for the operation of small UAS
for non-recreational purposes into domestic airspace. The
proposed rules would place numerous limitations on flying small
UAS: Flights could take place only in daylight, the area of
operations would be limited, and only visual-line-of-sight
operations would be permitted. These proposed rules are now
open for public comment.
Our hearing today will focus on the security implications
of opening our skies to small UAS and how agencies such as the
Department of Homeland Security, Federal, State, and local law
enforcement agencies should prepare.
Several recent security incidents are concerning. In
January, a small quadcopter crashed on the White House lawn.
Although the incident seemingly was accidental, it exposed the
larger issue of how law enforcement should respond to UAS
threats and, subsequently, the Secret Service quickly scheduled
exercises in the D.C. area in response.
Also, a September 2013 incident where a small UAS landed
only inches away from German Chancellor Angela Merkel also
exposed serious concerns and the challenge that protective
services around the world now face.
Last but not least, French police recently were confounded
when several unidentified small UAS flew over key Paris
landmarks, including the Eiffel Tower, as well as nuclear power
plants. French authorities are investigating, but again, this
incident showcases the challenges to law enforcement to respond
swiftly to this new technology.
Threats posed by the small UAS are nothing new. For
example, an individual was arrested in September 2011 after a
failed plot to attack the U.S. Capitol and Pentagon using
multiple remote-controlled aircraft laden with explosives.
But nightmare scenarios by terrorists aren't the only
concern. Drug smugglers could use this technology as a cheap
way to smuggle illegal drugs into the United States, and spies
may also use small drones to get into areas we would prefer
hidden.
So the question remains: How can homeland security and law
enforcement prepare for these potential threats?
In July 2012, this committee held a hearing highlighting
the need to address the security risks associated with UAS. In
the past 3 years, the Department of Homeland Security has taken
some steps to educate law enforcement and the public on small
UAS.
The National Protection and Programs Directorate, the NPPD,
released a model aircraft reference aid to inform the public
about potential illicit uses, impacts, and indicators of
malicious activity. The Science and Technology Director has
been assessing the capabilities of small UAS for State and
local law enforcement and first responders.
However, much more needs to be done to safeguard against
malicious actors successfully using this technology for illegal
means. The Department of Homeland Security needs a cohesive
strategy to address these issues.
Lone-wolf terrorists, drug smugglers, and foreign spies
don't care about FAA rules. The DHS must help protect against
these bad actors perverting this technology for their
objectives.
Testimony from our witnesses today will help provide a
roadmap for what homeland security and law enforcement can do
to mitigate this risk. Specifically, we need a better
understanding of the technological solutions that exist to deal
with these threats and what law enforcement needs to better
respond when a small UAS is used for illegal activity.
I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses on their
assessment of the threats and potential solutions.
[The statement of Chairman Perry follows:]
Statement of Chairman Scott Perry
March 18, 2015
When most people think of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), commonly
known as ``drones'', they think of large aircraft used in overseas
combat operations; however, in the coming years, the majority of UAS
will be small--55 pounds or less--some of which fly less than 400 feet
above the ground. Small UAS have a variety of potential uses, such as
pipeline, utility, and farm inspections, aerial photography, and crop
dusting, among others. Last month, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) released proposed rules to allow for operation of small UAS for
non-recreational purposes into domestic airspace. The proposed rules
would place numerous limitations on flying small UAS: Flights could
take place only in daylight, the area of operations would be limited,
and only visual-line-of-sight operations would be permitted. These
proposed rules now are open for public comment. Our hearing today will
focus on the security implications of opening our skies to small UAS
and how agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
Federal, State, and local law enforcement should prepare.
Several recent security incidents are concerning. In January, a
small quadcopter crashed on the White House lawn. Although the incident
seemingly was accidental, it exposed the larger issue of how law
enforcement should respond to UAS threats and, subsequently, the Secret
Service quickly scheduled exercises in the D.C. area in response. Next,
a September 2013 incident where a small UAS landed only inches away
from German Chancellor Angela Merkel also exposed serious concerns and
the challenge that protective services around the world now face. Last
but not least, French police recently were confounded when several
unidentified small UAS flew over key Paris landmarks, including the
Eiffel Tower as well as nuclear power plants. French authorities are
investigating, but again, this incident showcases the challenges for
law enforcement to respond swiftly to this new technology.
Threats posed by small UAS are nothing new. For example, an
individual was arrested in September 2011 after a failed plot to attack
the U.S. Capitol and Pentagon using multiple remote controlled aircraft
laden with explosives. But nightmare scenarios by terrorists aren't the
only concern. Drug smugglers could use this technology as a cheap way
to smuggle illegal drugs into the United States, and spies may also use
small drones to get into areas we would prefer hidden.
So the question is: How can homeland security and law enforcement
prepare for these potential threats? In July 2012, this committee held
a hearing highlighting the need to address the security risks
associated with UAS. In the past 3 years, the Department of Homeland
Security has taken some steps to educate law enforcement and the public
on small UAS. The National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD)
released a model aircraft reference aid to inform the public about
potential illicit uses, impacts, and indicators of malicious activity.
The Science and Technology Directorate has been assessing the
capabilities of small UAS for State and local law enforcement and first
responders. However, much more needs to be done to safeguard against
malicious actors successfully using this technology for illegal means.
The Department of Homeland Security needs a cohesive strategy to
address these issues.
Lone-wolf terrorists, drug smugglers, and foreign spies don't care
about FAA rules. DHS must help protect against these bad actors
perverting this technology for their objectives. Testimony from our
witnesses today will help provide a roadmap for what homeland security
and law enforcement can do to mitigate this risk. Specifically, we need
a better understanding of the technological solutions that exist to
deal with these threats and what law enforcement needs to better
respond when a small UAS is used for illegal activity. I look forward
to hearing from today's witnesses on their assessment of the threats
and potential solutions.
Mr. Perry. The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Minority
Member of the subcommittee, the gentlelady from New Jersey,
Mrs. Watson Coleman, for her statement.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Again, thank you for holding this hearing.
I would also like to thank the panel of witnesses for
appearing before the subcommittee today.
I am very interested in hearing from Professor McNeal, an
expert on the issue of drones, about the potential policy
options available to mitigate and respond to the threats posed
by the commercial availability of unmanned aerial systems.
Additionally, I am eager to hear from Professor Humphreys
regarding DHS's efforts since his last appearance before the
subcommittee to respond to the security vulnerabilities
associated with drones.
I am also looking forward to hearing from Mr. Roggero, who
will be able to better inform this subcommittee about emerging
technology that can be used to increase the safety of our
airspace and our security posture as drones become increasingly
integrated into our National airspace. Last, I am pleased that
Chief Beary, the president of the International Association of
Chiefs of Police, is appearing before this subcommittee.
Although you are here today to testify about the use of
drones in law enforcement, I cannot forego the opportunity to
talk with you about an issue that is very important to me and
my constituents--that is the recent report from the Department
of Justice on policing in Ferguson, Missouri, which found that
many predominantly African-American neighborhoods are targeted
in an effort to raise revenue for financial functions.
My question will be: Are drones possibly--can they possibly
be mechanisms used for accountability, such as body cameras
will be? I want to thank you for the fine job that you are
doing, but this issue really must be addressed.
Now, back to the specifics of drones. Commercially-
available drones are becoming an increasingly popular purchase,
with the drone market expected to grow $84 billion over the
next 5 years. As the commercial drone market grows, so, too,
does the threat that drones will be used by actors with ill
intent.
Drones can be purchased on-line with prices starting as low
as $40, and they are fairly easy to assemble and learn how to
operate. In many cases, it is easier to learn how to operate a
drone than it is a model aircraft.
With drones being so easily accessible, we must consider
the potential they have to be used as mechanisms to conduct an
attack.
Although we have not yet witnessed such an attack, we have
seen how individuals operating drones have gotten
extraordinarily close to at least one head of state. During the
campaign rallying in 2013, the drone, piloted by an opposition
party supporter, landed at the feet of the chancellor of
Germany, Angela Merkel, as mentioned by my Chairman.
There have also been recent stories of mysterious drones
flying over sensitive Government assets, including the U.S.
Embassy in Paris, and we are all familiar with the story
regarding the drone landing on the White House lawn in January.
It does not take wild imagination to envision what may happen
if someone with malicious intent got their hands on drones.
This emerging threat requires a unified effort by the
Department of Homeland Security in developing security plans
for mitigation and response. The Department of Homeland
Security must conduct risk assessment to accurately determine
the threat posed by drones.
In the absence of risk assessments and a measured approach,
the Department will spend millions of dollars without knowing
what the real threat is or how to defend against it.
Unfortunately, the Department of Homeland Security declined
this invitation to testify before this subcommittee to explain
how they are working toward a Department-wide strategy and
address the issues at hand. Even without the Department's
testimony, I am confident that the panel of witnesses that are
here today will help us better understand the threat posed by
drones and the technologies available to address that threat.
Although drones are not the only avenue for conducting
attacks, it is imperative that we leave the bad guys with fewer
rather than a whole universe of options. We will narrow the
threat picture by dealing with the security vulnerabilities
posed by commercially-available drones while still recognizing
the economic benefits of the industry.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you and I yield back the
balance of my time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Watson Coleman follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bonnie Watson Coleman
March 18, 2015
I am very interested in hearing from Professor McNeal, an expert on
the issue of drones, about the potential policy options available to
mitigate and respond to the threats posed by the commercial
availability of Unmanned Aerial Systems.
Additionally, I am eager to hear from Professor Humphreys regarding
DHS' efforts, since his last appearance before the subcommittee, to
respond to the security vulnerabilities associated with drones.
I am also looking forward to hearing from Mr. Roggero who will be
able to better inform the subcommittee about emerging technology that
can be used to increase the safety of our airspace and our security
posture as drones become increasingly integrated into our National
airspace.
Lastly, I am pleased that Chief Beary, the president of the
International Association of Chiefs of Police, is appearing before the
subcommittee.
Although you are here to testify about the use of drones in law
enforcement, I cannot forgo the opportunity to talk with you about an
issue that is very important to me and my constituents.
That is, the recent report from the Department of Justice on
policing in Ferguson, Missouri, which found that many predominantly
African American neighborhoods are targeted in an effort to raise
revenue for municipal functions. I want to thank you for the fine job
you are doing, but this issue must be addressed.
Now, back to the subject of drones. Commercially-available drones
are becoming an increasingly popular purchase, with the drone market
expected to grow $84 billion over the next 5 years.
As the commercial drone market grows, so too does the threat that
drones will be used by actors with ill intent. Drones can be purchased
on-line, with prices starting as low as $40, and they are fairly easy
to assemble and learn how to operate. In many cases, it is easier to
learn how to operate a drone than it is a model aircraft.
With drones being so easily accessible, we must consider the
potential they have to be used as a mechanism to conduct an attack.
Although we have not yet witnessed such an attack, we have seen how
individuals operating drones have gotten extraordinarily close to at
least one Head of State.
During a campaign rally in 2013, a drone, piloted by an opposition
party supporter landed at the feet of Germany's Chancellor, Angela
Merkel. There have also been recent stories of mysterious drones flying
over sensitive Government assets, including the U.S. Embassy, in Paris
and we are all familiar with the story regarding a drone landing on the
White House lawn in January.
It does not take a wild imagination to envision what may happen if
someone with malicious intent got their hands on a drone. This emerging
threat requires a unified effort by the Department of Homeland Security
in developing security plans for mitigation and response.
The Department of Homeland Security must conduct risk assessments
to accurately determine the threat posed by drones.
In the absence of risk assessments and a measured approach, the
Department will spend millions of dollars without knowing what the real
threat is or how to defend against it.
Unfortunately, the Department of Homeland Security declined our
invitation to testify before the subcommittee to explain how they are
working towards a Department-wide strategy to address the issue at
hand. Even without the Department's testimony, I am confident that the
panel of witnesses here today will help us better understand the threat
posed by drones and the technologies available to address that threat.
Although drones are not the only avenue for conducting attacks, it
is imperative that we leave the ``bad guys'' with fewer, rather than a
whole universe of options.
We will narrow the threat picture by dealing with the security
vulnerabilities posed by commercially-available drones.
Mr. Perry. Chairman thanks the gentlelady.
The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member of the full
committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this important and timely hearing.
On a daily basis articles are published about the
suspicious use of commercially-available drones. In recent
weeks drones have been observed flying over sensitive locations
in Paris. According to French authorities, drones have flown
over nuclear installations, the home of the French president,
and the United States Embassy.
Here in the United States, a drone recently crashed on the
White House grounds. While the incident at the White House has
been described by officials as nothing more than a drunken
misadventure, it raises questions about the threat
commercially-available drones may pose to individuals,
infrastructure, and our aviation systems.
Undoubtedly, drones have great potential. In Japan, drones
have been used by farmers for years as an efficient and
effective tool for crop fertilization. Projects for commercial
use in the United States display that drones will become a
common sight on farms in Pennsylvania and my home State of
Mississippi in the coming years.
In the wrong hands, however, these potentially valuable
commercial tools could become dangerous instruments for attack.
That is why it is critical that the Department of Homeland
Security conduct risk assessments to determine what steps
should be taken to mitigate the potential threat.
To date, we have learned of components of the Department,
such as Secret Service and the Science and Technology
Directorate, conducting testing that identifies methods to
address the potential threats drones pose. It is less clear
whether there is a Department-wide strategy to develop--to
address the issue.
Unfortunately, despite being invited, as previously
commented, the Department of Homeland Security is not here
today to explain why and to Members what is being done to
address the security vulnerabilities drones expose. Despite the
Department's absence, I am confident that the Members will
receive valuable testimony from this distinguished panel of
witnesses assembled.
Professor McNeal is an expert on the issues of drones and
will add a valuable voice to our conversation about the policy
solutions should be explored to address the security concerns
surrounding drones. Professor Humphreys is making his second
appearance before the subcommittee to discuss the issue. I look
forward to the other witnesses' testimony also.
Finally, I am pleased that Chief Beary is appearing in his
capacity as president of the International Association of
Chiefs of Police. We all have questions Chief Beary can address
regarding how law enforcement utilizes drones and how they
respond to drone operating in our cities.
However, before yielding back, Mr. Chairman, I am compelled
to point out that much of what we, and now the public, know of
the Secret Service's testing of drones is the result of leaks.
Unfortunately, it is all too common an occurrence that
information provided to Members and staff in our security space
to be published by the media in the next days and hours after
the briefing.
This committee has a responsibility to the American people
to make the Department of Homeland Security work and,
accordingly, our Nation more secure. Leaking Classified
information is in direct conflict with that responsibility. It
is also in conflict with the law and the oath we signed to
obtain access to Classified information.
I hope and trust all Members and staff of this committee
and those of other committees we invite to attend briefings
will take the oath and the responsibility that comes with it to
heart.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
March 18, 2015
On a daily basis, articles are published about the suspicious use
of commercially-available drones. In recent weeks, drones have been
observed flying over sensitive locations in Paris. According to French
authorities, drones have flown over nuclear installations, the home of
the French President, and near the United States embassy.
Here in the United States, a drone recently crashed on the White
House grounds. While the incident at the White House has been described
by officials as nothing more than a drunken misadventure, it raised
questions about the threat commercially available drones may pose to
individuals, infrastructure, and our aviation system.
Undoubtedly, drones have great potential. In Japan, drones have
been used by farmers for years as an efficient and effective tool for
crop fertilization. Projections for commercial use in the United States
display that drones will become a common sight on farms from
Pennsylvania to Mississippi in the coming years.
In the wrong hands, these potentially valuable commercial tools
could become dangerous instruments for attack. That is why it is
critical that the Department of Homeland Security conduct risk
assessments to determine what steps should be taken to mitigate the
potential threat.
To date, we have learned of components of the Department, such as
the Secret Service and Science and Technology Directorate, conducting
testing to identify methods to address the potential threat drones
pose. It is less clear whether there is a Department-wide strategy
being developed to address the issue.
Unfortunately, despite being invited to testify, the Department of
Homeland Security is not here today to explain to Members what is being
done to address the security vulnerability drones expose. Despite the
Department's absence, I am confident that the Members will receive
valuable testimony from the distinguished panel of witnesses assembled.
Professor McNeal is an expert on the issue of drones and will add a
valuable voice to our conversation about what policy solutions should
be explored to address the security concerns surrounding drones.
Professor Humphries is making his second appearance before the
subcommittee to discuss this issue. I look forward to hearing from him
regarding the progress DHS has made regarding drones since his
appearance in 2012.
I also look forward to hearing from Mr. Roggero regarding potential
technological solutions to the threat posed by drones.
Finally, I am please that Chief Beary is appearing in his capacity
as president of the International Association of Chiefs of Police. We
all have questions Chief Beary can address regarding how law
enforcement utilizes drones and how they respond to drones operating in
our cities.
Before yielding back Mr. Chairman, I am compelled to point out that
much of what we, and now the public, knows about the Secret Service's
testing of drones is the result of leaks. Unfortunately, it is an all
too common occurrence for information provided to Members and staff in
our secure space to be published by the media in the days and hours
after briefings.
This committee has a responsibility to the American people to make
the Department of Homeland Security work and accordingly our Nation
more secure.
Leaking Classified information is in direct conflict with that
responsibility. It is also in conflict with the law and oath we signed
to obtain access to Classified information. I hope, and trust, all
Members and staff of this committee, and those on other committees we
invite to attend briefings, will take the oath and the responsibility
that comes with it to heart.
Mr. Perry. Chairman thanks the gentleman.
Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses
before us today on this important topic.
Let me remind the witnesses that their entire written
statement will appear in the record, and I will introduce each
of you first and then recognize you for your testimony.
Dr. Todd Humphreys is a professor at the Cockrell School of
Engineering at the University of Texas at Austin. He directs
their radio navigation laboratory at U.T. Austin, where his
research focuses on defending against intentional GPS spoofing
and jamming.
Dr. Humphreys' research has uncovered that GPS signals that
navigate unmanned aerial systems can be hijacked and
controlled. Dr. Humphreys obtained his doctorate from Cornell
University.
Mr. Frederick Roggero is president--got that correct, don't
I, General--president and CEO of Resilient Solutions. Mr.
Roggero is an expert in commercial unmanned aerial systems.
Previously, Mr. Roggero served as the chief of safety of
the U.S. Air Force, where he oversaw all Air Force aviation,
ground, weapons, space, and systems mishap prevention, and
nuclear surety programs. Mr. Roggero is also a pilot with over
4,000 hours in 22 different type of military aircraft. Mr.
Roggero retired from the Air Force with the rank of major
general.
Thank you for your service, sir.
Chief Richard Beary is president of the International
Association of Chiefs of Police. Chief Beary served for over 30
years as a law enforcement officer in Florida, including as
chief of police for the University of Central Florida, the
largest university in the State. Chief Beary was awarded the
Medal of Valor twice in his career.
Thank you for your service, sir.
Dr. Gregory McNeal is a professor at Pepperdine University,
where his research and teaching focus is on National security
law and policy, criminal law and procedure, and international
law. Previously he served as assistant director of the
Institute for Global Security and codirected a transnational
counterterrorism grant program at the U.S. Justice Department.
Dr. McNeal obtained his doctorate from Pennsylvania State
University.
Go Lions.
All right. Thank you all for being here today.
Chairman now recognizes Dr. Humphreys for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF TODD E. HUMPHREYS, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, COCKRELL
SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING, THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
Mr. Humphreys. Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Watson
Coleman, and Ranking Member Thompson, last August the U.T.
football season opener was interrupted by a drone. There were
nearly 100,000 football fans in the stadium that day and the
police had to stand by watching helplessly as this drone
shifted around the stadium.
The incident only ended when the operator decided to recall
the drone and it landed at his feet.
The situation turned out to be harmless. This was just a
case of a ticketless but devoted U.T. football fan who just
wanted to watch the game. But the police couldn't have known
that before-hand, so they had to treat the incident as a
potential attack on the multitude of gathered spectators.
In the years to come, this intrusion at the U.T. football
stadium will be replayed in various forms at sites critical to
the security of the United States. The great majority of these
incidents will be accidently, like the flyaway drone that
crashed at the White House in January.
But in the early stages of a drone incursion, it is
impossible to distinguish the accidental from the intentional,
the malignant from the benign. The distressing truth is that
even consumer-grade drones can be rigged to carry out potent
attacks, and against these attacks our defenses will either be
only weakly effective or so militarized as to pose themselves a
threat to bystanders and the surrounding civil infrastructure.
In thinking about how to detect and defend against rogue
UAVs, it is useful to distinguish three categories. First are
the accidental intrusions; second are the intentional
intrusions by unsophisticated operators; and third are the
intentional intrusions by sophisticated operators--these are
people who know how to modify the hardware and software of a
drone to make it do what they want.
Detecting and safely repelling intrusions of the first two
categories is not simple, but it is quite possible. Commercial
UAV manufacturers can play a key role here by implementing GPS-
enforced geo-fences within their autopilot systems. That simple
fix would prevent accidental and unsophisticated drone
intrusions into restricted airspace.
So what about the third type--the sophisticated malicious
attacks? These will be much more difficult to counter. The fact
is that for any reasonable defense I can imagine, I can also
imagine a counter to that defense, a way to circumvent that
defense.
I am not alone. Any one of my graduate students at the
University of Texas, or many undergraduate students walking the
halls of universities across the globe, or those part of the
do-it-yourself community, hobbyists--these people have the kind
of skills that would be required to carry out one of the
sophisticated attacks I mentioned. The documentation is also
extensive.
So what should we do? Well, let's start with what we
shouldn't do.
It won't help to impose stricter regulations on small UAS
than the sensible regulations the FAA has already proposed.
Likewise, restricting open-source autopilot platforms would
hardly improve security, but it would stifle innovation.
Military-style radio link or GPS jamming or spoofing wouldn't
stop a sophisticated attacker, but would endanger commercial
airliners and disrupt communications.
In my view, the most sensible way forward is to focus on
accidental and unsophisticated UAV intrusions. Let's encourage
the UAV manufacturers to put geo-fences in their autopilot
systems.
For especially sensitive sites like the White House, we
could deploy a network of infrared cameras set up to detect and
track an incoming drone by looking for the thermal signatures
of its warm batteries and motors. This network of sensors could
be used to guide an always-ready squadron of interceptor drones
that could capture the intruder in a net can carry it off.
But we should refrain from any more drastic measures than
these until the threat of UAVs proves to be more of a menace
than the recent incidents, which, while alarming, were
ultimately harmless.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Humphreys follows:]
Prepared Statement of Todd Humphreys
March 16, 2015
1. summary
The nearly 100,000 football fans gathered in Texas Memorial Stadium
last August to watch the Longhorn football season opener had trouble
concentrating on the game. Hovering above the stadium was an unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV), a drone, with blue and red blinking lights. The
University of Texas Police watched helplessly as the UAV shifted from
one area of the stadium to another. When the UAV's operator finally
recalled the device and landed it at his feet in a nearby parking lot,
the police immediately took both UAV and operator into custody.
The situation turned out to be no more menacing than a devoted but
ticketless UT football fan trying to watch the game through the video
feed on his drone. But the police could not have known this before-
hand, and so had to treat the incident as a potential chemical,
biological, or explosive attack on the multitude of gathered
spectators.
As we enter an age of highly capable and increasingly autonomous
UAVs purchasable for a few hundred dollars over the internet, the
intrusion at the UT football stadium will be replayed in various forms
at sites critical to the security of the United States. The great
majority of these incidents will be accidental, such as the flyaway UAV
that crashed on the White House grounds in January. But in the early
stages of a UAV incursion, it will be impossible to distinguish the
accidental from the intentional, the benign from the malicious. And the
distressing truth is that even consumer-grade UAVs can be rigged to
carry out potent attacks against which our defenses will either be only
weakly effective or so militarized that the defenses themselves will
pose a threat to the surrounding civil infrastructure.
UAVs have been around for a long time. The Academy of Model
Aeronautics was founded in 1936 and since that time a vibrant and
knowledgeable community of radio-controlled model aircraft enthusiasts
has been active in the United States and across the globe. What
explains, then, the recent uptick in alarming UAV sightings near
sensitive sites? The answer is clear: Never before have highly-capable
UAVs been so inexpensive and widely available. One can buy over the
internet today a UAV that rivals the increasingly autonomous
surveillance and guidance capability of military UAVs. Many of these
commercial UAVs can easily carry a payload of a couple of pounds or
more.
In thinking about how to detect and defend against UAV incursions
into sensitive airspace, it is useful to distinguish three categories.
First are the accidental intrusions, whether the UAV operators are
sophisticated or not. Second are intentional intrusions by
unsophisticated operators. Third are intentional intrusions by
sophisticated operators--those capable of assembling a UAV from
components and modifying its hardware and software.
Detecting and safely repelling intrusions of the first two types is
not simple but is quite possible. Commercial UAV manufacturers can play
a key role here by implementing GPS-enforced geofences within their
autopilot systems that prevent their UAVs from being flown within
exclusion zones around airports, sports stadiums, Government buildings,
and other security-sensitive sites. The sites themselves could be
equipped with radar, acoustic, and electro-optical sensors for UAV
detection, and with powerful and agile interceptor UAVs, possibly
working as a team, that could capture and carry off a small number of
simultaneous intruders.
UAV intrusions of the third type will be much more difficult to
counter. A sophisticated attacker could mount a kamikaze-style attack
against a sensitive target using a fixed-wing powered glider with an
explosive few-pound payload. The UAV glider could be launched tens of
miles from the target.
It could cut its engine on final approach to evade acoustic
detectors, and could be built of poorly-radar-reflective material
(e.g., Styrofoam) to evade radar detection. With only minor changes to
the UAV's autopilot software, of which highly-capable open-source
variants exist, an attacker could readily disable geofencing and could
configure the UAV to operate under ``radio silence,'' ignoring external
radio control commands and emitting no radio signals of its own. The
UAV would thus be difficult to detect and would be impervious to
command link jamming or hijacking. Moreover, the attacker could
configure the autopilot to ignore GPS/GNSS signals during the final
approach to the target, relying instead on an inexpensive magnetometer-
disciplined inertial navigation system. Such a modification would
render GPS/GNSS jamming or deception (spoofing) useless during final
approach.
It is not obvious how to protect critical civil infrastructure
against such a UAV, or--worse yet--against a swarm of such UAVs. What
is more, the skills required of operators in this third category are
not uncommon: The do-it-yourself UAV and autopilot development
communities are large and the documentation of both hardware and
software is extensive. One should also bear in mind that the threshold
for a successful attack is low when success is measured by the ability
to cause widespread panic or economic disruption. For example,
explosion of a UAV anywhere on the White House grounds could be seen as
a highly successful attack even if it causes only minor physical
damage.
What can be done? First, it is important to take stock of what
should not be done. Imposing restrictions on small UAVs beyond the
sensible restrictions the Federal Aviation Administration recently
proposed would not significantly reduce the threat of rogue UAVs yet
would shackle the emerging commercial UAV industry. In fact, even the
FAA's current ban on non-line-of-sight UAV control would be of little
consequence to a malefactor capable of modifying an open-source
autopilot. Likewise, restricting open-source autopilot platforms would
hardly improve security but would stifle innovation. Powerful and
persistent wide-area GPS/GNSS jamming would prevent inexpensive UAV
attacks launched from miles away from reaching their targets, but this
military-style defense would be disruptive to civil use of GPS over a
wide area. Powerful GPS jamming around the White House, for example,
would deny GPS aiding to commercial aircraft at nearby Reagan National
Airport. Similarly, anti-UAV laser or electromagnetic pulse systems are
a danger to nearby civil infrastructure and transport.
From a strictly technological point of view, the best way forward
will be to adopt simple measures that sharply reduce the risk of
category 1 and 2 incidents, such as voluntary manufacturer-imposed
geofencing. For especially critical sites, detection and tracking
systems based on electro-optical sensors will be most effective,
particularly those applying infrared sensor pattern recognition to
distinguish a UAV's warm motors and batteries from a bird's warm body.
The output of such a detection and tracking system could be fed to an
always-ready squadron of interceptor UAVs whose job would be to catch
the intruder in a net and expel it, or, as a last resort, to collide
with it and force it down. We should refrain from any more drastic
measures than this until the threat of UAVs proves to be more of a
menace than the recent incidents, which were alarming but harmless.
The following sections offer more detailed analysis of potential
techniques for detecting, tracking, and repelling UAVs.
2. detection and tracking
This section gives an overview of techniques that may be used to
detect and track UAVs operating in restricted airspace. Merits and
drawbacks of each technique are noted.
2.1 Conventional Surveillance: Radar and Beacon Transmitters.--
Conventional aircraft surveillance techniques are based on radar and
beacon transmissions from aircraft. The latter either respond to ground
interrogation (as with secondary surveillance radar) or are broadcast
from the aircraft without interrogation (as with ADS-B)\1\, Ch. 5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ K. Wesson, Secure Navigation And Timing Without Local Storage
Of Secret Keys. PhD thesis, The University of Texas at Austin, May
2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.1.1 Advantages
1. Primary surveillance radar (PSR) and secondary surveillance
radar (SSR) systems are already installed at major airports
across the United States.
2. PSR does not assume any cooperation from the target and so is
well-suited for detecting malicious intruders.
3. If an incoming UAV is broadcasting ADS-B squitters, detecting
and tracking it would be trivial.
2.1.2 Drawbacks
1. UAVs do not typically carry SSR beacons, and it would be wishful
thinking to expect Category 3 UAV intruders to be equipped with
functioning ADS-B beacons.
2. UAVs whose structure is made of poorly-radar-reflective
materials (e.g., a fixed-wing glider made of Styrofoam) and
having a wingspan less than a few meters would not be visible
to PSR or would be hardly distinguishable from birds or bats.
Moreover, UAVs flying at an altitude of less than 100 feet
would be difficult to detect by PSR.
2.2 Acoustic Sensing.--The motors of electric-powered rotorcraft and
fixed-wing UAVs emit a characteristic whine that can be used to detect
such UAVs. Gas-powered UAVs also exhibit a characteristic acoustic
signature.
2.2.1 Advantages
1. Low cost, even when implemented as a network of sensing devices
placed around the protection perimeter.
2. Can be highly effective when combined with electro-optical
sensing to distinguish UAVs from electric weed whackers.
3. Forces a UAV wishing to evade detection to execute final
approach as a glider or a free-falling rotorcraft.
2.2.2 Drawbacks
1. Leads to false positives due to electric weed whackers or
spoofing via playback of an audio recording of a UAV if not
combined with other sensing modalities such as electro-optical
sensing.
2. Incapable of detecting fixed-wing UAVs operating as gliders or
rotorcraft UAVs in free fall.
3. Unlikely to offer reliable detection at more than a 500-meter
standoff range.
2.3 Radio Emission Sensing.--UAVs typically send data back to their
controller through a wireless data link. Using a directional antenna or
a network of synchronized ground stations, such emissions can be
detected and located.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ J.A. Bhatti, T.E. Humphreys, and B.M. Ledvina, ``Development
and demonstration of a TDOA-based GNSS interference signal localization
system,'' in Proceedings of the IEEE/ION PLANS Meeting, pp. 1209-1220,
April 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.3.1 Advantages
1. Can offer effective detection and accurate tracking of multiple
UAVs with arbitrary emitted waveforms if the UAV emissions are
sufficiently persistent and powerful.
2.3.2 Drawbacks
1. To be economical and offer rapid detection, the system must have
some knowledge of the emission center frequency and bandwidth.
2. Easily evaded by a UAV operating under radio silence, which
would be trivial for a Category 3 attacker to implement.
2.4 Electro-Optical Sensing.--Electro-optical (EO) sensors in the form
of cameras that are sensitive to visible light or infrared radiation
can be quite effective at detecting and tracking UAVs.
2.4.1 Advantages
1. An EO sensing network can be built from small, low-cost sensors
with only mild synchronization requirements. The network could
be geographically large (e.g., it could cover the area around
the White House and the U.S. Capitol in Washington, DC), which
would increase the chance of detecting and the accuracy of
tracking an overflying UAV.
2. Infrared EO sensors can detect the warm motors or batteries of
UAVs day or night and, with proper pattern recognition, would
likely be reliable in distinguishing UAVs from birds, bats, and
insects.
3. A network of EO sensors can offer full three-dimensional target
tracking.
2.4.2 Drawbacks
1. The author is not aware of a commercial networked EO system that
can provide 3-D UAV tracking and distinguish UAVs from
wildlife. But there do not appear to be any serious
technological roadblocks that would prevent such a system from
being developed and deployed.
2. It is unclear what the effective range of an infrared sensor
network could be. This will depend on the strength of thermal
emissions from a UAV and on the pattern recognition algorithm
tasked with distinguishing the UAV from wildlife.
3. electronic defenses
For typical operation, UAVs capable of autonomous flight rely on
two vital wireless links: The command link to the operator and the
(passive) navigation signal link to overhead GPS/GNSS spacecraft.\3\ In
the event of a UAV attack, a defender can attempt to disrupt these
links or feed false signals to the UAV's radios.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ K.D. Wesson and T.E. Humphreys, ``Hacking drones,'' Scientific
American, vol. 309, no. 5, pp. 54-59, 2013.
\4\ A.J. Kerns, D.P. Shepard, J.A. Bhatti, and T.E. Humphreys,
``Unmanned aircraft capture and control via GPS spoofing,'' Journal of
Field Robotics, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 617-636, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3.1 Command Link Jamming and Appropriation.--Modern commercial UAVs are
controlled by one or more wireless links to the operator's control
equipment. Traditional RC controllers are still used as a back-up means
of control even for UAVs capable of a high degree of autonomy. These
controllers send low-level commands to the autopilot system or directly
to the UAV motors or to the servos that actuate the aircraft's control
surfaces. These transmitters typically operate in unlicensed bands
(often 2.4GHz), but do not typically use WiFi/802.11 protocols,
preferring direct-sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) or frequency-hopped
spread spectrum (FHSS) protocols that offer a large number of
independent channels.
For control at a higher level of abstraction, a control station may
communicate with a UAV independent of the RC controller. Like the RC
controller, this link is often established within unlicensed bands. For
example, the popular DJI drone establishes this link in the 2.4 GHz
band using a standard WiFi/802.11 protocol. This link facilitates video
downlinking and general control functionality such as parameter setting
and high-level trajectory control.
In defending a sensitive site from UAV intrusion, a defender may
attempt to jam or appropriate the command link.
3.1.1 Advantages
1. Command link jamming or appropriation is an effective means of
denying a hostile operator the ability to execute an RC-
controlled visual line-of-sight UAV attack or a first-person-
viewer (FPV) UAV attack.
2. Command link jamming forces an attacking UAV to operate
independently from its human operators.
3. Command link appropriation can enable a defender to obtain full
control of an intruder UAV.
3.1.2 Drawbacks
1. Although the signals from today's commercially-available RC
controllers are not encrypted or authenticated, the UAV is
paired with the RC controller in such a way that the two agree
on a communications channel selected from a large number (e.g.,
100) of possible channels. Thus, to appropriate the RC link, a
defender would need to determine at least: (1) Which
communications protocol is being used (e.g., DSSS or FHSS), (2)
which channel within the protocol is being used.
2. Although the command and data link to the control station is not
typically encrypted or authenticated, it can be encrypted with
well-established cryptographic algorithms using openly
available software*, rendering appropriation of this link
difficult at best.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* See, for example, http://phantommods.info/effect-on-wifi-
encryption-for-fpv-range/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. To avoid the effects of command link jamming or appropriation,
an attacking UAV can simply transition to an autonomous
operational mode soon after takeoff, accepting no further
external commands.
3.2 GPS/GNSS Interference.--Virtually all modern commercial UAVs
capable of autonomous flight exploit navigation signals from overhead
GPS satellites. The UAV's satellite navigation receiver may also be
capable of exploiting signals from other Global Navigation Satellite
Systems (GNSS) such as the European Galileo system and the Russian
GLONASS system. It is well-known that civil GNSS signals are weak and,
to date, unencrypted and unauthenticated,\5\ although proposals exist
to insert digital signatures into the broadcast GPS and Galileo
navigation data streams.\6\ \7\ \8\ In the face of a deliberate UAV
attack guided by GNSS signals, a defender could take advantage of the
weak security of GNSS signals to confuse or commandeer the attacking
UAV.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ T.E. Humphreys, ``Statement on the vulnerability of civil
unmanned aerial vehicles and other systems to civil GPS spoofing.''
http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony-
Humphreys.pdf, July 2012.
\6\ K.D. Wesson, M.P. Rothlisberger, and T.E. Humphreys,
``Practical cryptographic civil GPS signal authentication,''
Navigation, Journal of the Institute of Navigation, vol. 59, no. 3, pp.
177-193, 2012.
\7\ A.J. Kerns, K.D. Wesson, and T.E. Humphreys, ``A blueprint for
civil GPS navigation message authentication,'' in Proceedings of the
IEEE/ION PLANS Meeting, May 2014.
\8\ I.F. Hernandez, V. Rijmen, G.S. Granados, J. Simon, I.
Rodriguez, and J.D. Calle, ``Design drivers, solutions and robustness
assessment of navigation message authentication for the Galileo open
service,'' in Proceedings of the ION GNSS+ Meeting, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3.2.1 Advantages
1. Three-dimensional hostile control of a UAV via GPS deception
(spoofing) is possible: It has been demonstrated in the
laboratory and in a Government-supervised experiment at White
Sands Missile Test Range.\4\
2. Even if the location of an incoming UAV is known only very
approximately (e.g., it is only known that a UAV is approaching
the White House grounds from the southwest), GPS deception can
be effective at repelling an attack. If one sectorizes the area
around the site to be protected into 4 quadrants, each quadrant
covered by a directional transmission antenna, then a UAV
approaching under GPS guidance, or a group of UAVs, can be made
to believe it has overshot its target, causing the UAV to slow
and eventually proceed away from the target site as if facing a
stiff headwind. The University of Texas Radionavigation
Laboratory recently demonstrated this defense in the laboratory
against the GPS receiver used in a large number of commercial
UAVs.
3. Persistent and powerful GNSS jamming would force attackers to
operate either by: (1) Line-of-sight (LOS) RC control, (2)
first-person viewer (FPV) control, or (3) non-GNSS autonomous
navigation. LOS control exposes the operator to visual
detection and recognition. LOS and FPV control can be denied by
control link jamming. And non-GNSS autonomous navigation in an
unmapped environment is either expensive (e.g., a navigation-
or tactical-grade INS initialized with GNSS), can only be
applied accurately over short time intervals (e.g., a MEMS-
grade magnetometer-disciplined INS),\9\ or still in the
research stage (e.g., autonomous visual navigation).\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ O. Woodman, ``An introduction to inertial navigation,''
University of Cambridge, Computer Laboratory, Tech. Rep. UCAMCL-TR-696,
2007.
\10\ G. Chowdhary, E.N. Johnson, D. Magree, A. Wu, and A. Shein,
``GPS-denied indoor and outdoor monocular vision aided navigation and
control of unmanned aircraft,'' Journal of Field Robotics, vol. 30, no.
3, pp. 415-437, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3.2.2 Drawbacks
1. Persistent and powerful GNSS jamming would cause substantial
collateral damage, denying the use of civil GNSS in a wide area
around the protected site, which possibly encompasses
airports.\5\ Powerful GPS jamming around the White House, for
example, would deny GPS aiding to commercial aircraft at nearby
Reagan National Airport. Such jamming would alter civil
operational procedures in the area: Automobile commuters would
be denied use of their in-car navigation systems, cell towers
could no longer be synchronized by GPS, and approaches to
airports could no longer benefit from GPS for safety and
efficiency. While it is not out of the question to engage in
powerful GNSS jamming to protect extremely sensitive sites such
as the White House, it is the opinion of the author that this
would need to be a last resort. It would need to be carefully
coordinated with the DOT and DHS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ T.E. Humphreys, ``Statement on the vulnerability of civil
unmanned aerial vehicles and other systems to civil GPS spoofing.''
http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony-
Humphreys.pdf, July 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Even intermittent GNSS jamming powerful enough to deny UAV use
of GNSS would be problematic for the surrounding civil
infrastructure. UAV GNSS receivers are typically high-
sensitivity receivers capable of operating at carrier-to-noise
ratios (CNRs) as low as 15 dB-Hz (e.g.,\11\). By contrast, the
GPS receivers used in commercial aviation typically fail to
track signals below a CNR of 29 dB-Hz. Therefore, to
effectively jam a UAV located 1 km from the White House would
require a jamming power that would also effectively deny GNSS
to a commercial aircraft along the same line of sight more than
5 km from the White House.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ u-Blox, Datasheet: NE0-6 GPS Module.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. GNSS spoofing would potentially be even more damaging to
surrounding civil systems than GNSS jamming, and thus would
need to be carefully coordinated with the DOT and DHS.
Moreover, to be absolutely reliable, a GNSS spoofer would have
to create simulated signals for all available civil GNSS,
including Galileo and GLONASS.
4. An attacking UAV can simply disregard GNSS signals during the
final approach to the target, relying, for example, on a low-
cost magnetometer-disciplined MEMS-grade inertial navigation
system, which, over a 60-second interval, may only exhibit a 5-
meter drift in perceived location.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ O. Woodman, ``An introduction to inertial navigation,''
University of Cambridge, Computer Laboratory, Tech. Rep. UCAMCL-TR-696,
2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. kinetic defenses
Kinetic defenses encompass all techniques that involve mechanical
contact with the UAV intruder such as interceptor UAVs, rubber bullets,
shotgun shot, or nets.
4.0.3 Advantages
1. Net capture of UAVs by interceptor UAVs has been demonstrated
(though it cannot yet be considered a mature technology). Net
capture has the additional benefit of enabling eviction of the
intruder UAV from the vicinity of the site to be protected.
2. Commercial UAVs are, in general, fragile in the face of kinetic
attacks.
4.0.4 Drawbacks
1. All kinetic defenses require reliable detection and accurate
tracking of the UAV intruder.
2. Hard-contact kinetic defenses such as collision with an
interceptor UAV may cause an intruder UAV carrying an explosive
payload to explode.
3. Interceptor UAV technology is currently immature.
5. acknowledgments
The author is grateful to Mark Psiaki, Christopher Hegarty, Andrew
Kerns, Nathan Green, Michael Szmuk, and Daniel Shepard for insightful
conversations on how to protect critical civil sites from UAV
intrusion.
Mr. Perry. Chairman thanks Dr. Humphreys.
Chairman now recognizes Mr. Roggero for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL FREDERICK F. ROGGERO, (USAF-RET.),
PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, RESILIENT SOLUTIONS,
LTD.
General Rogerro. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today,
Ranking Member Watson Coleman and Ranking Member Thompson,
ladies and gentlemen.
Aviation is undergoing a global revolution as we sit here
today. With advances in unmanned technologies that are moving
ahead at the speed of Moore's Law, as you have indicated
already, while associated prices are continue to fall, small,
unmanned aerial systems have become high-tech and universally
available tools.
Coupled with advances in autopilots, telemetry, sensor and
camera miniaturization, small UASs are delivering capabilities
that were once only the purview of nation states. Now almost
anyone can experience the advantages of thrills of aviation
without ever having to leave the ground, taking a flight
physical, or getting a check ride.
As these barriers to entry continue to fall, we are
witnessing the democratization of aviation.
These new technologies give individuals a limited version
of the unique characteristics of aviation--speed, range,
flexibility, and altitude--that are enjoyed by every air force
in the world. It is true that small UASs are capable of making
our lives better by helping us to imagine more, safer ways to
do our jobs that are dangerous, dull, and dirty. But they are
also a terrific means to enhance commerce, save lives, gain
different perspectives, and even to provide recreation.
But as with all revolutions, there are risks that must be
dealt with, and the safety and security risks of small drones
are no exception. However, as the risk of these types of
aircraft are reviewed, we must strive to preserve and to
protect the overwhelming benefits that this rapidly-expanding
technology will bring for generations to come.
The risks inherent in this revolution can be divided into
two parts: Safety and security. Safety because we have a
growing class of new operators who don't understand that they
have just become part of the aviation system and are flying a
piece of equipment that is capable of operating in the same
space as an airliner. But this type of safety risk can and
should be dealt with through a public campaign of education,
regulation, and enforcement.
Next are those small UAS operators that know the rules but
decide to violate them anyway. It is operators from this class
that will most likely cause the first collision between an
aircraft and a drone in the United States. But once again,
public awareness; standard, clear regulations; firm penalties;
and enforcement are the best remedies to slow these types of
transgressions.
At this point we move into the security risks. Tasks such
as intelligence gathering, surveillance, reconnaissance,
attack, and mobility can all be conducted with easily available
UASs at very reasonable prices. These actions could be directed
at National critical infrastructure points, factories, VIPs,
and other examples, as we have heard this morning.
Much work has already been done in this area of defense by
our NATO partners, and we should take advantage of those
developed solutions and lessons learned. For example, the
United Kingdom took this threat so seriously in 2012 that the
Royal Air Force and Selex ES designed and deployed an
integrated counter-small UAS system in London to defend the
Olympic Stadium during the opening ceremonies. This system was
further improved and used to defend world leaders during the
2013 G8 Summit in Ireland.
Certainly the lessons learned from these efforts could
inform our actions as we address these common threats.
I believe that our way should be a simultaneous two-prong
solution. First, use commercial, off-the-shelf technology that
has already been developed, tested, refined, and used
operationally in this role to establish a baseline capability
for us immediately. By using a layered defense, the threat can
be neutralized and the physical and electronic forensic
evidence be preserved for arrest and prosecution.
We should pick what works best for our needs, and I will
refer you to my submitted statement for a listing of the
elements that I believe are required for a multiple-layered,
integrated UAS defense.
The second simultaneous track starts with interagency
cooperation to draft an overarching strategy and linked
policies that have a legal and regulatory basis to deal with
unmanned systems in general, and unmanned aerial systems in
particular.
Ranking Member Thompson, I would say that this strategy
needs to be Government-wide and not just focused on DHS.
This is where the departments and agencies will need to
help to ensure that they have the legal framework necessary to
respond to this threat.
Furthermore, a single department should be nominated as the
executive agent, and provided with the right resources and
charged with leading this effort across the Government.
In summary, my written statement provides several
recommendations for consideration by the committee to tackle
this problem, and by capitalizing on best practices and
technology already applied by our international allies such as
the United Kingdom, we could be ready to deal with today's
threats immediately while we draft the correct policies and
spin up U.S. industries, universities, and laboratories to
rapidly explore ways to counter tomorrow's drones and the
unique threats that they will bring in the next 2 to 5 years.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of General Roggero follows:]
Prepared Statement of Frederick F. Roggero
March 18, 2015
the current environment
Aviation is undergoing a global revolution. With advances in
unmanned system technology that are moving at the speed of ``Moore's
Law,'' while their associated prices continue to fall, ``Class 1''
small, unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) have become high-tech,
universally available tools. Coupled with advances in autopilots,
telemetry, sensor and camera miniaturization, and corresponding
increases in battery and engine capacities, sUAS's are delivering
capabilities that were once only the purview of nation-states,
corporations, and wealthy individuals. Now, almost anyone can
experience the advantages and thrills of aviation without ever leaving
the ground, taking a flight physical, spending hours and considerable
funds to hone a skill, or complete a rigorous training and
certification processes. As these barriers-to-entry continue to fall,
we will witness the democratization of aviation.
This combination of new, expanding, technologies delivers a limited
version of the unique characteristics of aviation (speed, range,
flexibility, and altitude) enjoyed by every air force directly to
individuals and groups around the globe. And, as drone technologies
improve, airpower concepts such as ``stealth'' and ``air supremacy''
could even become available to more common operators. It's true that
sUAS's are capable of making our lives better by helping us to imagine
new, more safe, ways to do jobs that are dangerous, dull, and dirty.
They are also a terrific means to enhance commerce, save lives, gain
different perspectives, and even to provide recreation. But, as with
all revolutions, there are risks that must be dealt with. And, the
safety and security risks of small drones are no exemption. However, as
the risk of these types of aircraft are reviewed, we must also strive
to preserve and protect the overwhelming benefits that this rapidly
expanding technology will bring for generations to come.
The risk inherent in the drone revolution can be divided into two
sections--safety and security. Although the Academy of Model
Aeronautics does a terrific job of providing voluntary safety
standards, the exploding growth of this market means that many new
recreational users of small drones simply do not understand that there
is an aviation culture of safety. The days of the remote-control flying
field with noisy gas motors and plenty of mentors is disappearing. The
new group of ``park flyers'' haven't received education or training in
safety, airspace, weather, air traffic control, emergency procedures,
or even basic airmanship. Because of that, a few in this segment will
eventually pose a safety hazard by unknowingly flying in areas that
they are not allowed to operate, not out of malice, but because they
simply do not understand the rules. But this type of safety risk can,
and should, be dealt with through education, regulation, and
enforcement.
Next on the ladder of safety risk are those drone operators that
know the rules but decided to violate them. Perhaps they feel the need
to test out the new technology, to see how high, fast, or far it can
go, or to obtain video from perspectives not allowed, usually for good
reason. It is operators from this class that will most likely cause the
first collision between an aircraft and a drone in the United States.
But, once again, standard, clear regulation and enforcement are the
best remedies for these types of transgressions.
At this point, we move into the risks to our security. This
revolutionary technology can be an affordable asymmetric tool for those
who want to use its capabilities for illegitimate purposes. For less
than $1,000 one could purchase a system that would allow you to conduct
traditional ``air force'' missions, at limited, but still effective,
levels of success. Tasks such as intelligence gathering, surveillance,
reconnaissance, attack, and mobility can all be conducted with
commercially-available systems. These actions could be directed at
National critical infrastructure points, factories, VIPs, military
bases, prisons, large public gatherings, the borders, or simply, a
neighborhood.
the challenge
The U.S. Government must be able to protect its sensitive critical
infrastructure, personnel, and citizens from the malicious use of small
drones, while preserving the best aspects of using small sUAS's
commercially and recreationally. There will be a balancing act as we
deter, mitigate, and defeat these types of security threats while
preserving the benefits that sUAS's bring. Much work has already been
done in this area by our international partners and allies and we
should take advantage of those developed solutions and ``lessons
learned.''
the threat
Small UAS's are easy to make, cheap to buy, simple to fly, hard to
detect, carry small versatile payloads, have a disruptive capability,
and are evolving and proliferating quickly. ``Lone Wolves,'' activists,
thieves, terrorist groups, etc. could use this reliable and inexpensive
capability to conduct intelligence gathering or execute missions
against a variety of targets using explosives, chemicals, powder, etc.
to deliver a disruptive attack via a single aircraft, or through more
sophisticated coordinated, or multi-platform, attacks. Since 2013
smugglers have already tried to use the mobility capability of sUAS's
to deliver 6.6 lbs. of crystal meth across the Mexico-U.S. border and
to deliver tobacco and cell phones into a prison in Georgia and
marijuana into a South Carolina prison.
And, we are not the only country to feel this threat. A July, 2013,
NATO Industrial Advisory Group, Study Group 170, ``Engagement of Low,
Slow and Small Aerial Targets by Ground Based Air Defense,'' concludes
that, ``If appropriate measures are taken in the near future it will be
possible to significantly mitigate the threat that LSS [low, slow,
small] platforms pose to any future military conflict or from the
terrorist attack of national infrastructure.'' Other NATO study groups
have jumped into this issue, but participation by U.S. companies and
the Government in these on-going studies appears underrepresented.
The United Kingdom took this threat so seriously in 2012 that the
Royal Air Force, and Selex ES, designed and deployed an integrated
counter sUAS system in London to defend the Olympic Stadium,
particularly during the opening ceremonies. This system was further
improved and used to defend world leaders during the 2013 G8 Summit in
Enniskillen, Scotland, and, most recently, at the 2014 NATO Summit in
Wales. Certainly, the lessons learned from these efforts should inform
our actions as we address this common threat.
roadmap towards a u.s. solution
Technology typically outstrips policies, and this technology has
certainly stretched the capacity of the U.S. Government's bureaucracy
to swiftly provide a counter drone strategy. Thus, we find ourselves
behind in strategy, policy, and the technological capabilities needed
to counter-sUAS's. Hence, this two-pronged problem requires a
simultaneous, two-track solution.
First, a search should be conducted to find technology that has
already been developed, tested, refined, and used operationally. By
using a combination of radar, networked electronic support measures,
infrared, electro optical cameras, and engagement solutions of
electronic attack, or hard kill options, the threat can be neutralized
and the physical and electronic forensic evidence can be preserved for
arrest and prosecution.
This system should consist of an integrated network of multiple
layered means of defense to find, fix, track, identify and classify,
then engage and assess the result. It should also be designed for
persistent, low-profile surveillance and be operational 24/7/365. This
system should also incorporate a rapid decision-making process that can
be used to quickly prosecute a response since one of the unique
abilities of sUAS's is to quickly close on a target with little notice.
The system must also possess a range of ``soft'' and kinetic responses,
both with a high ``Probability of Kill.'' The counter system that is
selected must also be able to capture and preserve the appropriate
incident information that will inevitably be used for prosecuting the
sUAS operators.
Additionally, the system must be able to fully operate without
interfering with security, law enforcement, or first responder networks
and communications. Thus, the system must be able to comply with
Federal Communication Commission rules, if not operating under special
rules for highly sensitive areas. The system should also have a variant
that is mobile (man-portable and air-transportable) for temporary
setups. Of course, the system must be designed with open architecture
in order to allow for spiral, scalable, and modular developments as
drone technology continues to evolve (i.e., 5G LTE will almost
immediately offer new capabilities to command and control drones).
Finally, any system must be economically proportionate to the threat
and available almost immediately.
The second step of this two-pronged solution starts with
interagency cooperation to draft an overarching strategy and linked
policies that have a legal and regulatory basis to deal with drones. A
single department or agency should be charged with leading this effort
using the experiences and lessons learned from our international allies
as they have already wrestled with these issues. In any case, it will
take a joined effort across all Government departments since it will
require navigating through current rules and regulations in the face of
the unique capabilities of sUAS's and recommending changes to those
base documents. For example, even though drones are unmanned, they are
currently considered ``aircraft'' by the FAA and are protected by all
of the laws and rules associated with manned flight when they are
airborne. This is just one example of where current policy could
severely limit options in reacting to a drone attack.
Once formalized, the overarching goals of the strategy and
individual policies would then lead to identifying the correct
supporting tactics, techniques, and procedures needed to guide security
and law enforcement personnel during their response to any threat. The
goal, of course, is to mitigate the safety and security risks while
steering this technology towards its positive and productive uses.
recommendations
1. Draft a single strategy and supporting policies that clearly
guide Government agencies in regards to Rules of Engagement and
ensure that all responses are proportionate to the threat.
2. Simultaneously work with allies and international partners to
discover ``lessons learned'' and best practices for solutions
to the counter-drone issue.
3. Rapidly acquire proven technical solutions that can immediately
provide protection to National critical infrastructure and
personnel.
4. Train and educate Federal law enforcement, and State and local
law enforcement, personnel on the legal uses of drones, and
potential threats.
5. Conduct a campaign to educate the public (sUAS operators and
non-operators) on the use, and potential misuse, of drones.
6. Work closely with commercial drone manufacturers to install geo-
fencing and traceability codes into drones of specific
capabilities (i.e., size, weight, battery/motor size, flight
times, etc.)
7. Draft appropriate legislation and regulations that govern the
registration, licensing, etc. of any manufactured, or home-
built, drone that fall above a specified weight and/or
capabilities.
8. Establish, and fund, an on-going research and development
program to devise counters to new drone technologies before
they widely appear in the marketplace.
With last week's announcement by the Secret Service that the White
House grounds would be used to conduct a series of exercises involving
drones, it is clear the United States is not fully ready to deal with
the threats that could come from this emerging technology today.
However, there is a path to success. By capitalizing on ``best
practices'' already discovered by our international allies, such as the
United Kingdom, we could be ready to deal with today's threats
immediately, while we draft the correct policies and spin up U.S.
industries and laboratories to rapidly explore ways to counter
tomorrow's drones and their unique, new, threats.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Roggero.
The Chairman now recognizes Chief Beary for your testimony,
sir.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD BEARY, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE
Chief Beary. Good morning, Chairman Perry and Members of
the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to testify today on
the potential threat posed by unmanned aerial systems.
As president of the International Association of Chiefs of
Police, commonly referred to as the IACP, and on behalf of our
23,000 members in 98 different countries, I would like to thank
you, Members of this committee, for the support you have
demonstrated for law enforcement over the years. Our law
enforcement community and our communities in general need your
support. Thank you.
The IACP is the world's largest association of law
enforcement leaders, and for over 120 years the IACP has been
launching internationally-acclaimed programs, speaking out on
behalf of law enforcement, and conducting ground-breaking
research. We provide services not only in the United States but
across the globe.
I began my law enforcement career in 1977 and, as the
Chairman said, I have 30 years on the municipal side, and now I
have almost 8 years on the university side of law enforcement.
The University of Central Florida is the largest university in
the State of Florida, and we are the second-largest in the
United States.
During my career I have watched the threats to our
communities evolve. We still deal with the problem of violent
crime, drugs, prostitution, smuggling, trafficking, and gangs,
but we are now tasked in dealing with cyber threats, violent
extremism, terrorism, and highly organized criminals with
access to specialized equipment to aid them in their mission
and to harm others and devastate our communities.
Included in that specialized equipment are unmanned aerial
systems. While UAS can be a great tool, they also pose a
serious threat to the public and law enforcement when used by
the wrong people.
When used responsibly, and with good policies in place, UAS
have enhanced law enforcement's ability to protect communities
they serve. UAS has helped law enforcement agencies save time,
save money, and, most importantly, save lives.
They are ideal for dangerous or difficult situations, like
executing high-risk warrants; responding to barricaded
suspects; gaining situational awareness in difficult terrain;
and enhancing officer safety by exposing unseen dangers;
locating missing children; or responding to damage caused by
emergencies such as natural disasters, downed power lines, or
hazardous material incidents.
Despite the undeniable benefits these systems can have,
they also pose a grave threat to public safety. Almost anyone
can obtain an unmanned aerial system these days. They can buy
it off the shelf from Amazon, have it delivered in 2 days,
charge the battery, and immediately begin flying the device.
The fact that these devices are so readily available to the
public is concerning. The average citizen that is purchasing
these devices generally has no aviation experience and
therefore does not think twice about operating in controlled
airspace, over the public, or over a crowded beach or any other
gathering--mass gathering. Nor do they think twice about
launching a UAS to ascertain what the police or the fire
department is working on up the street.
This is a real danger to the public. Public safety and
others regarding these aircraft have to be addressed. The
average citizen simply does not know what they are doing wrong
and the potential damaging effects that these devices can have
when operated improperly.
Recently we have witnessed several high-profile incidents
with UAS. Of course, we talked about the crash landing at the
White House, flying over sensitive locations, and near-miss
with aircraft on a regular basis. At the University of Central
Florida we have personally experienced these aircraft flying
over mass gatherings, including football games, in violation of
airspace restrictions that are in place to protect the public.
The newest version of these devices are now flown in
virtual reality mode, meaning that the operator does not need
to be in the line of sight while flying the aircraft.
Thankfully, at this point most of the incidents involving
UAS have not lead to horrific events, but I don't think we are
far away from one of those happening. The concerns are real.
There is nothing to stop the criminal element from purchasing a
UAS and using it to cause localized or catastrophic damage.
I mentioned earlier that I am from Orlando, which is home
to many, many theme parks. I can assure you they have major
concerns about the safety of their guests, and they have
numerous incidents of these devices flying over their airspace.
They have a real fear that someone wants to harm a large amount
of people who are attending their parks.
Now, something as simple as a UAS were to fly into a park
or a football stadium with something as simple as a smoke bomb
could cause incredible panic, thus leading to major injuries
for the people that are there.
Again, these devices can be used to fly over restricted
areas and to plan an attack.
Because these devices are in their infancy, now is the time
for the Federal Government and the Federal agencies to work
with us and develop the guidelines so that law enforcement
knows what to do. The Department of Homeland Security did
provide my agency with a 2-page document on recommended UAS
response procedures at our stadium. We got that late in the
football season in November.
While those things are nice, there is no detail in what do
we do for the follow-up, how do we respond to these, who do we
call for further information? We are not criticizing the
Federal Government; this is our call for help. Law enforcement
needs to know how you want us to respond to these and where we
are going to go in the future.
The lack of clear guidance and best practices has led to
confusion among the law enforcement community when they are
dealing with these. Almost every critical situation now, they
are drones flying over top of law enforcement officers and
interfering with our helicopter when we are trying to deal with
these things.
Again, since these devices do not have a transponder or a
registration, it is difficult to track down and it is
impossible, in many cases, to figure out where they came from.
Without law enforcement knowing the proper procedures it
leaves us vulnerable and makes our primary job of keeping the
public safe more challenging.
Ladies and gentlemen, I thank you for allowing me the
opportunity to be here. I look forward to the questions.
Again, I bring quite a bit of law enforcement experience to
the table, and if you want to talk about the Justice report,
wherever you want to go I am good to go. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Chief Beary follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard Beary
March 18, 2015
Good morning Chairman Perry and Members of the subcommittee: Thank
you for inviting me to testify today on the potential threat posed by
unmanned aerial systems. As president of the International Association
of Chiefs of Police (IACP), and on behalf of our over 23,000 members in
98 different countries, I would like to thank this committee and
subcommittee for the support it has demonstrated over the years for the
law enforcement field and our communities.
The IACP is the world's largest association of law enforcement
leaders. For over 120 years, the IACP has been launching
internationally-acclaimed programs, speaking out on behalf of law
enforcement, conducting ground-breaking research, and providing
exemplary programs and services to the law enforcement profession
around the globe.
I began my law enforcement career in 1977, and I am now chief of
police for the University of Central Florida, the largest university in
the State and the second in the country. During my career, I have
watched the threats to our communities evolve. We still dealing with
the problem of violent crime, drugs, prostitution, smuggling/
trafficking, and gangs. We are now dealing with cyber threats, violent
extremism, terrorism, and highly-organized criminals with access to
specialized equipment to aid them in their mission to harm others and
devastate our communities.
Included in that specialized equipment are Unmanned Aerial Systems
(UAS). While UAS can be a great tool they also pose a serious threat to
the public and law enforcement when used by the wrong people. When used
responsibly, and with good policies in place, UAS have enhanced law
enforcement's ability to protect the communities they serve. UAS have
helped law enforcement agencies save time, save money, and most
importantly, save lives. They are ideal for dangerous or difficult
situations like executing high-risk warrants; responding to barricaded
subjects; gaining situational awareness in difficult terrain; enhancing
officer safety by exposing unseen dangers; locating a missing child; or
responding to the damage caused by emergencies such as natural
disasters, downed power lines, or hazardous material incidents.
Despite the undeniable benefits UAS can have, they can also pose a
grave threat to public safety. Almost anyone can get ahold of an
unmanned aerial system these days. You can buy an off-the-shelf product
from Amazon, have it delivered in 2 days, charge the battery, and
immediately begin flying the device. The fact that these devices are so
readily available to the public is concerning. The average citizen that
is purchasing these devices generally has no aviation experience, and
therefore does not think twice about operating them in controlled
airspaces, over the public or on a crowded beach. Nor do they think
twice about launching a UAS to ascertain what the police or fire
department is working on up the street. This is the real danger to the
public, public safety, and others regarding these aircraft. The average
citizen simply does not know what they are doing wrong and the
potential damaging effects these devices can have if not operated
properly.
Recently we have witnessed several high-profile incidents with
UAS--crash landing on the White House lawn, flying over sensitive
Federal buildings or locations, or having near-miss incidents with an
aircraft. At the University of Central Florida, we have experienced
these aircrafts flying over mass gatherings, including football games,
in violation of airspace restrictions. The newest version of these
devices are flown in virtual reality mode, meaning the operator does
not need to be in the line of sight while flying the craft.
Thankfully, at this point, most of the incidents involving UAS have
not lead to horrific events, but I don't think we are far away from
seeing more incidents involving unmanned aerial systems that lead to
tragedy. The concerns out there are real. There is nothing to stop the
criminal element from purchasing a UAS and using it to cause localized
or catastrophic damage. I mentioned earlier that a local theme park has
witnessed UAS flying over the park. They have the real fear that
someone who wants to harm a large amount of people could use a UAS to
do this. If a UAS were to drop something as simple as a smoke bomb down
on a theme park or during a football game, think of the panic that
could ensue. These devices can also be used to fly over sensitive areas
and gather information for a planned attack; to disperse a chemical/
radiological agent; and to conduct an explosive attack.
Because the use and availability of UAS in its infancy, the
guidance around how law enforcement agencies should respond to and
mitigate potential UAS threats is relatively nonexistent. The Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) has issued guidance to the law
enforcement community explaining the legal framework for the agency's
oversight of aviation safety in the United States, including UAS
operations, how UAS can be operated legally, and the options for legal
enforcement actions against unauthorized or unsafe UAS operators. The
Department of Homeland Security did provide my agency with a 2-page
document on recommended UAS response procedures at our stadium. The DHS
guide includes recommended response to a UAS in a stadium and outside a
stadium, potential illicit uses of a UAS, recommended pre-event
measures, and a brief overview of the FAA guidelines. Other than those
two documents, law enforcement has had little guidance on response
procedures. This is not a criticism to our Federal agency partners, it
is a call for help.
The lack of clear guidance and best practices has led to confusion
among the law enforcement community regarding about what law
enforcement is allowed to do when they encounter a UAS. Tactical
guidance needs to be provided on the proper measures to take.
Since these devices do not have a transponder device, registration
number, or other mechanism to track them, it makes them next to
impossible to identify when they are flown or who is flying them. What
steps can we take to identify UAS and the operators of these devices?
If we see a device being flown somewhere it should not be, can we bring
it down? These questions only scratch the surface, and many of my
fellow law enforcement officers are asking themselves these tough
questions.
Without law enforcement knowing the proper procedures that need to
occur, it leaves us vulnerable and makes our primary job of keeping the
public safe from harm more challenging.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Chief Beary.
The Chairman now recognizes Dr. McNeal for your testimony,
sir.
STATEMENT OF GREGORY S. MC NEAL, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, SCHOOL OF
LAW, PEPPERDINE UNIVERSITY
Mr. McNeal. Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Watson Coleman,
Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the committee, thank
you for hosting this hearing and inviting me to testify.
The emergence of unmanned aerial vehicles in domestic skies
raises understandable concerns that may require employment of
mitigation technologies by law enforcement or security
personnel. However, before any funds are expended on such
technologies, agencies should engage in comprehensive risk
assessment to identify the probability of that harm, the
magnitude of a potential harm, benefits of security measures,
and the cost of those measures. We have to bear in mind that
one of the significant costs is that the vast majority of
drones will be used for economically and socially beneficial
purposes, and we have to remain cognizant of that at all points
in time.
This testimony outlines four key issues that Congress
should remain cognizant of when drafting legislation or
overseeing the Department of Homeland Security.
First, Congress should ensure that agencies are
distinguishing between possible threats, which we can all sit
around and imagine, and probable threats. Congress should also
ensure that agencies are avoiding fear-based appeals that might
drive the policymaking process.
Drones are an exciting topic. They capture the attention of
the media. Oftentimes that drives agencies to feel like they
need to do something, to look like they are responding.
The recent attention for drones, though, oftentimes appears
to be driven by this type of media attention. I say this
because while remote control aircraft are seemingly new, they
have, in fact, been around for decades.
Furthermore, the small quadcopters that have been gathering
so much attention lately due to their ease of use would also be
the least useful to a dedicated attacker. Rather, larger,
faster, and heavier systems exist, and these systems have
existed for many years. Many of those systems can be home-
built, and in the hands of a dedicated attacker they will be
very difficult to stop.
Given the complexity of the threat picture, we must ensure
that agencies do not fall victim to the sensationalism that
drives worst-case scenario-based planning. Such an approach to
risk management can justify enormous expenditures no matter how
unlikely the prospects are that the event will take place.
We should avoid focusing only on the extreme but
improbable, and rather, we should do the best that we can to
focus on the probable and assess the magnitude of the potential
harm that might flow from those.
Second, Congress should ensure that agencies are assessing
risk by not only looking at that probability of a successful
attack, but also the magnitude of losses. Congress should
ensure that every agency action related to an alleged homeland
security risk from drones is preceded by a risk assessment.
That is the first step in any managerial decision about
potential threats. Across homeland security, any time we are
looking at threats it should be preceded by looking at the risk
before we immediately begin expending funds.
A risk assessment is that first step and ensures that
agencies make hard choices with limited resources. Every
possible threat cannot be guarded against; therefore, agencies
have to focus on the riskiest threats.
Third, Congress should ensure that before any funds are
spent agencies are also engaged in a formal cost-benefit
analysis. The employment of mitigation technology against risk
cannot take place in a vacuum. Rather, it requires agencies to
consider the degree to which a security measure is likely to
deter, disrupt, or protect against a terrorist attack.
The reality is that implementing security measures across
all--across the Federal Government will require aggregating the
costs across thousands of facilities. How to allocate those
scarce resources will require prioritization driven by risk
assessments, and this brings me to my final point.
Congress should ensure that specific individuals at the
Department of Homeland Security are responsible for conducting
these analyses and reporting their methodology. Congress may
also want to provide funds to the Centers of Excellence for an
independent check on how agencies are conducting these
assessments.
Given the complexity of the risk assessment picture
associated with drones and their potential to pose a homeland
security threat, I am certain that DHS and agencies are working
on this. I am sure many people are working on this. In fact,
that might be part of the problem is that in every--in each
stovepipe across agencies, various individuals might be working
on the threat but there is not a single point of coordination.
So Congress should direct that a specific individual or an
office within DHS take the interagency lead on this. There is
some precedent for this. Back in 2004 homeland security stood
up an office known as the Counter-MANPADS System Program
Office. This was the office that assessed whether or not there
was a threat to commercial aviation from man-portable surface-
to-air missiles.
It was a temporary office that assessed the threat; after
assessing the threat, providing some recommendations, it went
away.
We could stand up a similar office about emerging threats.
Or in the alternative, what we could do is we could designate
that the under secretary for National Protection and Programs
Directorate lead a threat assessment process for drones
specifically, or for emerging threats in general.
The emergence of unmanned aerial vehicles in domestic skies
raises understandable concerns, but before any funds are
expended on such technologies--mitigation technologies, the
Department should engage in a comprehensive risk assessment to
identify the probability of harm, magnitude of harm, benefits
of security measures, and the direct and indirect costs of
those security measures.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. McNeal follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gregory S. McNeal
March 18, 2015
introduction
The emergence of unmanned aerial vehicles in domestic skies raises
understandable concerns that may require employment of mitigation
technologies. However, before any funds are expended on such
technologies, the Department of Homeland Security should engage in a
comprehensive risk assessment to identify the probability, magnitude of
harm, benefits of security measures, and cost of those measures. This
testimony outlines four key issues that Congress should remain
cognizant of when drafting legislation and/or overseeing the activities
of the Department of Homeland Security.
recommendations
(1) Congress should ensure that agencies are distinguishing between
possible threats and probable threats; Congress should also ensure that
agencies are avoiding fear-based appeals focused on worst-case
scenarios: Drones are an exciting topic that captures the interest of
journalists and the public. The popular attention associated with
drones has the benefit of raising awareness about their potential uses,
however it also raises the possibility that emotions and sensationalism
will drive the crafting of public policy.
For example, after a recreational drone crashed on the White House
lawn, ``security experts'' appeared on CNN to discuss the possibility
that a drone might be equipped with explosives or weapons of mass
destruction. This is a highly unlikely scenario. While consumer drones
are readily available, lightweight explosives and weapons of mass
destruction are not. Even if terrorists were able to procure explosives
or WMD, using a consumer drone to conduct an attack would be one of the
least effective means of carrying out an attack. Nevertheless, the
Secret Service and other agencies seem to be planning for ``possible''
worst-case scenarios. Such an approach shifts the policy debate away
from probability and creates demands for substantial Governmental
responses even when the risk does not warrant the response.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Sunstein, Cass R. 2003. Terrorism and Probability Neglect.
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (26) (2-3) March-May: 121-136.
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Congress must ensure that agencies do not fall victim to the
sensationalism that drives worst-case scenario-based planning. Such an
approach to risk management can justify enormous expenditures, no
matter how unlikely the prospects are that the dire event will take
place. As security analyst Bruce Schneier has written, focusing on the
worst possible outcome ``substitutes imagination for thinking,
speculation for risk analysis, and fear for reason.''\2\ It substitutes
ill-informed possibilistic thinking over careful, well-reasoned,
probabilistic thinking, forcing us to focus on what we don't know, and
what we can imagine, rather than what we do know. ``By speculating
about what can possibly go wrong, and then acting as if that is likely
to happen, worst-case thinking focuses only on the extreme but
improbable risks and does a poor job at assessing outcomes.''\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Schneier, Bruce. 2003. Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly about
Security in an Uncertain World. New York: Copernicus.
\3\ Id.
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Congress should ensure that agencies are as concerned with the
probability of harm as they are of the possibility of a worst-case
scenario. This requires paying attention to the ``spectrum of threats,
not simply the worst one imaginable, in order to properly understand
and coherently deal with the risks to people, institutions, and the
economy.'' While public attention to the issue of drones may create a
sense of urgency amongst members of the public and some agency
officials, this ``does not relieve those in charge of the requirement,
even the duty, to make decisions about the expenditures of vast
quantities of public monies in a responsible manner'' that is
disconnected from emotions and focused on probabilities.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Mueller, John and Stewart, Mark G. 2011. Terror, Security, and
Money. New York: Oxford University Press.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Congress should ensure that agencies are assessing risk by
calculating both the probability of a successful attack and the
magnitude of losses that might be sustained in a successful attack:
Congress should ensure that every agency action related to an alleged
homeland security risk from drones is preceded by a risk assessment.
Assessing risks is the first managerial step in decision making about
potential threats, and it is one that is readily subject to
Congressional oversight. Forcing agencies to conduct a risk assessment
is the first step toward ensuring that agencies efficiently and
effectively use taxpayer funds and control costs. A risk assessment is
also the first step toward ensuring that agencies make hard choices
with limited resources--every possible threat cannot be guarded
against, therefore agencies must focus on the riskiest threats.
``Risk is the expected consequences of a terrorist attack, and the
accepted definition of risk as applied in the terrorism context, is
Risk = (probability of a successful attack) (losses sustained in the
successful attack).''\5\ Probability of successful attack in this
context is the likelihood of a successful terrorist attack using a
drone if the security measure were not in place. On the probability
side of the equation, the benefits of drones are that they allow an
adversary to control delivery of an attack from a distance, perhaps
solving some operational problems (like risk of capture) that
terrorists may face in planning and mounting an operation. However,
they introduce complexity into the attackers operation that may
decrease the likelihood of a successful attack. The clear advantages of
drones are that they allow for: (1) Attacks over perimeter defenses,
(2) multiple simultaneous attacks without directly risking attacker
personnel, (3) better surveillance capabilities. However, the
probability of a successful attack may also go down when an attacker
chooses to use a drone. In fact, one RAND/Defense Threat Reduction
Agency study found:
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\5\ Id.
``[UAVs] do not appear to have major advantages over other ways of
carrying out operations against similar targets, although they cannot
be dismissed outright as a potential threat. Where they did appear
preferable, the choice for these systems was driven by the actions of
the defense or in place security measures--i.e., were alternative
attack modes foreclosed by defenses or did concerns about a potentially
compromised plan push the attacking group farther away from its desired
targets? The price of these advantages was, however, greater
complexity, technological uncertainty, and higher cost and risks
associated with these platforms. Consequently, rather than being an
attack mode likely to be widely embraced by such actors, UAVs . . .
appear to represent a `niche threat'--potentially making some
contribution to the overall asymmetric and terrorist threat . . . UAVs
do provide some advantages to an attacker, but in most cases there are
simpler alternatives that provide similar, or even superior,
capabilities.''\6\
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\6\ Jackson, Brian A. et.al. 2008. Evaluating Novel Threats To The
Homeland, RAND.
Losses sustained in the successful attack in this context include
the fatalities and other damage (both direct and indirect) that will
accrue as a result of a successful terrorist attack employing a
drone.\7\ This part of the calculation takes account of the value and
vulnerability of people and infrastructure, as well as any
psychological and political effects. Thus, agencies engaging in an
analysis of risk must separate the probability that an attack will be
successful if committed using a drone (the subject of the preceding
paragraph) from the magnitude of harm that would flow from that
particular attack if it were successful.
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\7\ Mueller, John and Stewart, Mark G. 2011. Terror, Security, and
Money. New York: Oxford University Press.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus the prior factor, probability of successful attack, would
address the low likelihood that an attacker would be able to acquire
explosives or WMD, and the decreased likelihood of success with
explosives or WMD when using a drone versus alternative methods (like
delivering from a manned aircraft, a vehicle, or carried by a person).
Whereas the losses sustained factor assumes the scenario analyzed
probabilistically is successful, and looks to what harms would then
flow. In the context of drones, this will requiring gathering
information about the payload capabilities of various systems (if
assessing a threat from explosives), or the dispersal capability of
various systems (if assessing a threat from WMD). What analysts will
likely find is that the low payload capabilities of drones will reduce
the direct losses sustained from an attack, however the propaganda
value associated with a drone attack may increase the indirect costs
(such as psychological, economic, and political effects) associated
with their use.
Taken together, the probability of a successful attack employing a
drone multiplied by the losses sustained in the successful attack will
tell agencies what the risk from drones is. From there agencies, guided
by Congress, can determine whether the risk is acceptable. If the risk
is unacceptable, then agencies should adopt mitigation, risk reduction,
and security measures to reduce the risk to an acceptable level--
remaining cognizant of the fact that such measures have costs (the
subject of the next section).
(3) Congress should ensure that before any funds are spent on
security measures, agencies engage in risk assessment and a formal
cost-benefit analysis using best practices: The employment of
mitigation technology against risks cannot take place in a vacuum.
Rather, it requires agencies to consider the degree to which a security
measure is likely to deter, disrupt, or protect against a terrorist
attack. Mitigation technologies are thus a benefit that can reduce risk
(as calculated in the prior section).\8\ To determine the benefit of a
security measure, agencies should make the following calculation:
Benefit of a security measure = (probability of a successful attack)
(losses sustained in the successful attack) (reduction in risk
generated by the security measure).\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Id.
\9\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The first two factors in this equation are identical to those
calculated earlier, while the reduction in risk factor is a degree, or
percentage factor. In the context of drones, reductions in risk may
come from greater surveillance of areas near airports where drones
might pose a risk to commercial aircraft, or it may be specific
technologies designed to jam the communication links between drones and
their operators. But all of the likely risk reduction security measures
will have costs, and sometimes those costs may be significant. Thus,
the costs will need to be compared to the benefit of a security
measure. A hypothetical will help illustrate this analytical process.
Hypothetical
FACTS: Assume that in a 10-year span of time we believe there is a
chance of one successful attack by an explosives-laden drone against a
Federal facility (a 10% yearly chance). Suppose further that we believe
an attack will result in 1 death (valued at $10 million, an admittedly
high estimate), and significant psychological and economic damage
(valued at $50 million, an admittedly high estimate). For this
hypothetical the total losses from such an attack amount to $60
million.
RISK: The yearly risk from such an attack is thus the (probability
of a successful attack .10) (losses sustained in a successful attack
$60 million) = $6 million.
BENEFIT OF SECURITY: Now assume that a security system can be
installed that cuts the probability of a successful attack by 50%. Such
a system might be a combination of cameras, sensors, and jamming
equipment that allows for detection of a drone and the jamming of the
drone's control link.
The yearly benefit of the security measure is the reduction in risk
associated with its employment, which is thus the (probability of a
successful attack .10) (losses sustained in a successful attack $60
million) (reduction in risk generated by the security measure .50) =
$3 million.
IS THE COST OF SECURITY WORTH IT?: To determine whether the cost of
such a security system is worth the expenditure of taxpayer dollars, we
must compare the costs to the benefits. If the cost of cameras,
sensors, and an interdiction system for drones in this hypothetical
were less than $3 million, the benefits would outweigh the costs, and
it would be a cost-effective security measure.
Importantly, this hypothetical calculation only takes account of
the security measures being implemented at one Federal facility. The
reality is that implementing such measures across the Federal
Government will require aggregating the costs across thousands of
facilities. How to allocate those scarce resources will require
prioritization, driven by risk assessments (as explained above), and
will require the identification of a specific individual or office
within the Department of Homeland Security responsible for coordinating
interagency efforts to conduct risk assessments.
(4) Congress should ensure that specific individuals at the
Department of Homeland Security are responsible for conducting these
analyses and reporting their methodology. Congress may also want to
provide funds to the Centers of Excellence for an independent
evaluation of threats: Given the complexity of the risk assessment
picture associated with drones and their potential to pose a homeland
security threat, Congress should direct that a specific individual or
office within the Department of Homeland Security assume responsibility
for generating threat assessments.
There is some precedent for this type of managerial approach. In
2004, the Department of Homeland Security initiated a $100 million
program to evaluate whether civilian aircraft should be equipped with
countermeasures to defeat the threat of man-portable surface-to-air
missiles. The program was directed by Congress as a means to evaluate
whether Congress should require that some or all U.S. commercial
airliners install such devices. At the time, the office within DHS was
known as the Counter-MANPADS System Program Office. Congress could
create a similar temporary office within DHS for the purpose of
evaluating the threat posed by unmanned aircraft. In the alternative,
Congress could direct the under secretary, National Protection &
Programs Directorate to lead and staff a similar effort within DHS and
make the under secretary the lead Federal official for interagency
efforts.
Additionally, Congress may want to consider requesting the support
of the Department of Homeland Security Centers of Excellence. These
university-based research centers can engage in terrorism risk analyses
that will supplement the work of DHS. Such outside research may provide
an independent check on the interests of Government agencies that may
adopt or promote drone countermeasures as a means to ensure the
continued relevance of their office or to justify increased budgetary
outlays.\10\
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\10\ For an example of such mismanagement, see GAO Report, DOD
Needs Strategic Outcome-Related Goals and Visibility over Its Counter-
IED Efforts available at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588804.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
conclusion
The emergence of unmanned aerial vehicles in domestic skies raises
understandable concerns that may require employment of mitigation
technologies. However, before any funds are expended on such
technologies, the Department of Homeland Security should engage in a
comprehensive risk assessment to identify the probability, magnitude of
harm, benefits of security measures, and cost of those measures.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Dr. McNeal.
The Chairman now recognizes himself for a few questions. I
will start out with General Roggero.
According to a January 2015 Wall Street Journal article,
counterterrorism authorities in the United States, Germany,
Spain, and Egypt stated that six potential terrorist plots
involving drones had been foiled since 2011. Can you describe,
if you know, the types of capabilities of the UAS that these
groups were using or planning to use?
General Rogerro. Sir, I am sorry about that.
Mr. Perry. Sure.
General Rogerro. No, sir, I am not familiar with the
technology that they used in that particular case.
Mr. Perry. Okay.
Anybody else on the panel, just in case?
Yes, sir, Dr. Humphreys.
Mr. Humphreys. I do know that commercial off-the-shelf
technology, when modified, is perfectly capable of carrying out
those kind of attacks. In fact, even as we speak, in Ukraine
the conflict is involving off-the-shelf drone hardware modified
for that conflict, for surveillance and even weaponized drones.
So it is probably the case that they were using an open-
source autopilot and off-the-shelf hardware.
Mr. Perry. So surveillance is pretty simple. You mount a
camera, or you can buy one with a camera mounted.
Dr. Humphreys or General Roggero, can you talk to us about
the weaponization or other potential nefarious means--to be
combative or proactive in a militaristic style?
Mr. Humphreys. Right now surveillance is being used in
Ukraine to guide mortar shelling.
Mr. Perry. Okay.
Mr. Humphreys. So it can be, you know, part of the lethal
chain.
Mr. Perry. Sure.
Mr. Humphreys. But beyond that you can, of course, insert
in the battery compartment some explosives. Many of these
drones can carry a couple of pounds easily.
Of course, if your intention is to cause panic, as was
mentioned earlier, all you have to do is drop a smoke bomb and
you can cause that kind of panic.
General Rogerro. So there are other things that you can do
with that, as well. Mobility is one.
For example, in Congressman Loudermilk's State, delivering
marijuana and cell phones into prisons has been attempted. I
believe just a few weeks back there was 6\1/2\ pounds of
crystal meth being delivered across the border from the Tijuana
area into San Ysidro. So certainly smuggling is an activity
that is being seen out there with these particular devices.
But certainly intelligence-gathering, surveillance, and
reconnaissance is the top priority and the easily done thing
with these drones. We have also seen ISIS use it very
effectively to do propaganda and broadcast after an attack, as
well, to use these devices to gain their images that they need
to put out on the web.
Mr. Perry. Okay. Thank you.
To Professor McNeal: As we have discussed today, the UAS
can be used for a variety of malicious purposes and therefore
present a multitude of potential threats. The DHS will often
prepare risk assessments in the face of threats such as these
to ensure all relevant stakeholders are taking all possible
steps to mitigate the threat.
Which areas do you perceive the threats are most pressing
and why, if you know?
Mr. McNeal. It is difficult to answer that question without
a direct view of the intelligence picture, but let me answer it
in a general way and--which sort of focuses on the capabilities
of UAVs and how I think the threat assessment process should
approach it.
Really, UAVs provide three distinct advantages. They allow
for attacks over perimeter defenses, and so when you think of
the hardening that we did for Federal facilities after 9/11 and
after the Oklahoma City bombings, now the enemy is able to
attack beyond--over those perimeter defenses. If you have an
area that is intended to be secure, either from observation or
from personnel trafficking through, because you have fences,
UAV obviously can get over that.
Second, better surveillance capabilities, which we have
already discussed. It gives a different vantage point.
Then third, also allows the possibility of multiple
simultaneous attacks or multiple disruptive attacks. So if you
have a gathering--a crowded gathering, as Chief Beary
mentioned, you might--if I were an attacker I might send in
multiple drones with smoke bombs to create--to get people moved
from a secure perimeter to outside of a secure perimeter where
I might engage in an attack.
All these things, of course, are possibilities that you
could do as an individual on the ground. In fact, the
limitation of UAVs is the payload. So the typical UAV might be
able to carry 5 pounds of explosives. You could have one that
carries more than that, but you are really starting to get into
more sophisticated systems.
Whereas a person can carry 20 pounds of explosives if they
are--if they bring it in on a backpack. They don't have to be a
suicide bomber; they could leave it in a facility. Of course,
we can mitigate that with security checks.
So the security threat picture needs to balance not only
the capabilities that the enemy gets by using this in an attack
factor, but then also some of the limitations on it. That is
why I say that we need a comprehensive process to assess each
threat across each facility in each type of scenario.
Mr. Perry. Thank you. My time is expired.
The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member, Mrs. Watson
Coleman, for questions.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much for your testimony. One thing that you
all have raised in my mind is that there is this sort of drone
capacity from the tiniest to the biggest. So I need to know
what I should be worried about.
The drone that could possibly create a threat, whether or
not it is, you know, disseminating some gas or some
weaponization or whatever, what is the smallest drone, and what
is the average cost of that type of drone? Because I am trying
to figure out what don't we bother ourselves with.
I don't even know who can answer that, but if anyone of you
want to take a shot at it----
Mr. Humphreys. I will jump in first. I bought a drone for
my son for Christmas that was no bigger than my hand. I don't
think we have to worry about that one.
But we do have to keep in mind that the threshold for
success in these attacks can be very low. If anything exploded
due to a drone acting on the White House, even though it didn't
cause much physical damage, that would be viewed as a
successful attack. You know, it would cause psychological and
economic damage.
So in that case, they don't have to be much bigger than the
one that I bought for my son for Christmas, and----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So then I guess my question is: How do
we go about discerning what we should be concerned about, and
how we should be--policy should be evolving and interagency
interaction, you know, taking place so that we are prioritizing
our response and our proactivity in this area, at the same time
recognizing it has--these have very important economic
benefits. They help farmers with their crops, they--certainly
an industry that has the potential to be very, very successful,
and we can certainly use that economy here.
What is it that we should be doing? Are we now facing
impediments because FAA has got a piece of this, DHS has a
piece of this, Secret Service has a piece of this? You know, is
anybody cooperating?
Mr. McNeal. Congresswoman Coleman, I think this highlights
the challenge that we all face, which is the spectrum of risk
is from the smallest UAV up to extremely large 55-pound systems
that could fly at 200 miles an hour and they are systems filled
with fuel. But these have existed for decades.
So for us to recognize the possible is, I think, really
that first moment at which then we turn to homeland security
and we say, ``It is time for you to have a comprehensive
process where you study this.'' We do this all the time across
Government, right? We pass a new bill that directs an agency to
engage in scientific studies to figure out whether the benefits
of adding a certain device to an automobile are worth it.
That same type of scientific process has to be applied
here.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Should that be sort-of our starting
point?
Mr. McNeal. I think that should be our starting point. I
think we have recognized the potential and that a lot more
research is required for us to do something.
The best thing for us to do is to begin that process inside
Government of making those studies and making informed
decisions. Otherwise what I think and I fear will happen is
that the next drone that crashes on the White House lawn has a
firecracker on it and we say, ``What if it were something
worse?'' and we make hasty decisions that aren't informed by
science.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So, Mr. Roggero--I hope I didn't
bastardize your name--you shared information with regard to our
international partners around the world, and they are--they
seem to be a little bit farther along than we are. So what are
the lessons that we specifically need to learn from them as we
embark on this year?
General Rogerro. Thank you very much for that. One of the
things that they learned--they started back in 2012--their
trigger event, if you will, was the 2012 Olympics, and that is
what they were concerned about--was that there is no single
silver bullet that is going to apply. As you yourself said, it
is a spectrum of threat, and one of the first things you have
to do is catalogue that threat and identify it, and then go
through the mitigation strategies that can be put against it.
But one of the most important things that they discovered
was that the defense had to be layered. It had to be a
combination of things, as Dr. Humphreys was mentioning. It is
not just electro-optical cameras and radars and thermal, but a
whole slew--menu of things that you need to protect those
vitally important parts and gatherings that we do have.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have one
more question, if I might? Thank you very much.
This is, Chief Beary, you did--you illustrated the good and
the bad of drones in law enforcement, and I was just wondering,
with regard to what we learned in the Ferguson matter, is there
any use for them in ensuring accountability, fairness, and
protection of communities other than, you know, using them as
revenue sources?
Chief Beary. Well, on the revenue source side, I am not
sure that there is any of those that exist now. I can tell you
this, being a person who spent 30 years in municipal
government, quite frankly, the operations out there were--
trying to use taxpayers to fund your system is wrong.
I will tell you this as a police chief: Every police chief
in this country works for a mayor and a city commission, or
whatever the word is in your community, and they need to be
held accountable, plain and simple.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Yes, they do.
Chief Beary. I will answer the oversight--the comical,
ironic part of this is in the State of Florida, as an
individual I can buy a drone and I can fly it around and I can
do what I want. As a law enforcement officer I can't operate
one, because we have restricted them in Florida so anybody else
can violate your privacy except the police. It is crazy, but
that is what we have done because of the concern.
So right now there is no use of accountability that I am
aware of.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am really concerned about
Orlando and Disney World.
Mr. Perry. There are a lot of things to be concerned about.
Thank you.
The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member of the full
committee, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Excellent witnesses. You raise a lot of, I think,
interesting points.
For this committee, one of the real challenges is how do
you insert the role of Government in this process? There are
people who say, ``Well, we have too much Government already.''
But there are others who will say if something happens,
``Why didn't the Government see this coming?''
So our question is--and I heard two things. Some say the
role ought to be in DHS.
General, you kind of talked about a broader involvement,
but with no head. You know, you said we ought to get everybody
together.
So would your message to us be there is a role for
Government, but somebody ought to have the primary
responsibility for administering that role?
I will start with you, Dr. Humphreys.
Mr. Humphreys. Yes, I do believe there is a proper role for
Government here. This is a question of security and safety of
the citizens, and it seems obvious to me that DHS should lead
out on this.
There should be an interagency effort, but DHS should lead
out on threats to our homeland, and especially so because the
Secret Service, which has been highlighted in recent attacks at
the--or intrusions at the White House, you know, is charged
with protecting the White House and the President.
So having a head at DHS or standing up a committee, as
Professor McNeal had recommended, I think is a good idea. They
have got the expertise--or should have the expertise to lead
this off.
Mr. Thompson. General.
General Rogerro. Thank you very much, sir.
I would probably split it up a little bit and say,
``Department of Defense, you are responsible for those drones,
if you will, or those remote-piloted aircraft that are state-
sponsored.'' So those are the larger ones. Those are going to
be more your Predators and Reapers.
As we talk drones, you know, it is very easy to slip into
just thinking that they are just a quadcopter when they could
be much more.
DHS certainly has a role in that and in the security piece,
as well. So perhaps DHS is the right area.
Or do you pick an operational arm, such as in the
Department of Energy, who has some very vital sites that they
need to protect and could really identify the requirements and
drive an effort and pull in all of those various bits on the
defense as well as the mitigation technology and spread that
throughout Government. So that is, perhaps, one solution as
well, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Chief, you are on the ground. You talked
about a lack of direction.
Chief Beary. Right. A lack of authority. If we have one
that we deem a threat, what authority do I have to take it
down? It doesn't exist.
I think that Department of Homeland Security and DOD both
share a role, and I think that in those areas of responsibility
I think they could come back and make great recommendations for
State and local law enforcement on how to deal with these
threats.
Mr. Thompson. Doctor.
Mr. McNeal. So, as I mentioned in my written testimony, I
think DHS should be the lead on this across all agencies. Of
course, the threats exist in a lot of different places, but DHS
has the experience to work with both the Federal Government and
with local law enforcement.
I do have to dissent a little bit from Chief Beary's point
on--well, not a dissent, but a nuanced point here, which is
that if we think about the risks that law enforcement is
worried about we must also recognize Congresswoman Watson
Coleman's point, which is that drones can be a form of
accountability.
What we saw in Ferguson was that local law enforcement--the
AP got--FOIA'd these documents; local law enforcement asked for
the grounding of drones so that the media couldn't cover what
the police were doing. So it was used as--the security threat
or the risk of safety to the officers was used as a tool to
keep--to remove public accountability.
I think that type of thing is something that when we
elevate the threat picture too high and we spread it too far
across Government, we run the risk of allowing those types of
things to happen. That is why I think a single point of
responsibility and accountability is the best way we can ensure
that we are not going off the rails with any particular policy
preference from one agency or one law enforcement perspective.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Ranking Member.
Chairman now recognizes gentleman, Mr. Loudermilk.
Mr. Loudermilk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Appreciate the testimony here, and I think, Dr. Humphreys
and Dr. McNeal, you kind of hit on some significant areas with
risk analysis as we go forward. Especially, I think the two
categories that we can really look at this is the unintentional
and the intentional.
Unintentional, we can mitigate some of the incidents with
that via regulation, legislation, technology, et cetera. But
the intentional--it is more difficult because the bad guys are
going to be bad guys. They are going to work around that.
I put a lot of thought into this as an aviator, and working
in search and rescue and different areas such as that. This is
a question to anyone on the panel that has the information:
Have there been any efforts or have we classified UAS platforms
based on their technology, sophistication, payload capabilities
complexity of operation?
Do we have a classification, like we do with civilian
aircraft? You know, we have the different classifications--
single engine, twin, land, sea-capable, et cetera.
Mr. McNeal. Congressman Loudermilk, we do not currently.
However, I and a bunch of other experts in the field and
manufacturers are working with NASA to develop a system, and
testing is beginning in August. So from drone manufacturers to
drone consulting companies, we are all working with NASA to
create the system to certify and basically create those
categories of capabilities for platforms.
The long-term vision is that once you have those
categories--let's say class one through class five of small,
unmanned aircraft--that will then ultimately feed into the
unmanned traffic management system that we are hoping to have
in place 10 years down the road. So it might be the case that--
--
Mr. Loudermilk. The next-gen?
Mr. McNeal [continuing]. That 10 years from now we will
have something that is integrated with next-gen that will tell
us the classification of aircraft. But that still won't do
anything for home-builts that don't want to play ball with the
traffic management system.
General Rogerro. Congressman, actually NATO is already--
does have a classification and it is based on weight. That does
go class one up to class four, and then it also is classed by
capabilities, and then what their top vulnerabilities as well
as their top capabilities are in there.
So that is, once again, it is a good idea to look towards
international partners instead of reinventing the wheel every
time.
Mr. Loudermilk. General, the classifications, are you going
from, you know, what you can buy at the kiosk at the mall,
which are the basic indoor--a nuisance more than a threat type
system, all the way up to the--those that require a landing
strip--you know, take-off and landing?
General Rogerro. Correct. It would go by--it would take
things into account such as size, engine capacity, fuel or
battery requirements, and their ensuing capability to speeds,
et cetera.
Mr. Loudermilk. Payload?
General Rogerro. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Loudermilk. Okay. It sounds like there has been a--we
are kind of in the same direction.
Looking at the unintentional side, as a private pilot the
concern is those that can go, you know, above 500 feet AGL,
especially around an airport. We have got plenty of class G
airspace in the Nation, which is unrestricted, but yet a lot of
private pilots, sport pilots, ultralight pilots operate at low
altitudes but still at the slow speeds that we are flying, as
compared to our military friends.
Still you are not going to see one of these quads or
certain UAVs until after you have impacted it. Looking at this
classification--model rocketry ran into this back many years
ago and the industry kind of self-regulated itself.
If you are familiar with model rocketry, you can go to a
hobby store and buy the little SDs model rocket engines. They
are capable of low-altitude flight, but there is a
classification that if you get above I think 1,000 feet and
then 10,000--they have level one, level two, level three--you
actually have to be licensed to purchase the propeller.
Has anybody looked at any type of classification that if a
UAV is capable of a certain altitude, or outside-of-line-of-
sight operation, then you have to be licensed? I fully think
that if you are going to do that you need to at least have a
basic ground school. Maybe not a medical, but at least know the
area you are operating in.
Is there any movement in that direction?
Mr. Humphreys. I will say that the challenge here is that
the same drone that can operate up to 400 feet can easily
operate above that, and even if we put in these geo-fences that
exclude them from sensitive areas or from above 400 feet, an
operator who had some knowledge of the autopilot system could
override that sort of a geo-fence.
So the classifications smear into one another, and it is
not just a question of knowing how high they can fly because
most of them can fly fairly high if their batteries will hold
out.
Mr. Loudermilk. What about technologies such as those that
are beyond just the small quads you get at a mall--a
requirement of a transponder or a next-gen system to be on
those?
Mr. McNeal. The FAA has not required this type of
technology but the industry is evolving to create it. So I
recently saw ADS-B small enough to fit on a small, unmanned
aircraft and it would interface with the, obviously, with the
air traffic system, and you would be able--presuming that you
are in an aircraft where you are then able to know other
aircraft around you, you would know that that aircraft was
nearby.
Of course, that doesn't solve the small sport and
ultralight category of pilots who simply are not going to see
this type of aircraft in the National airspace.
Mr. Loudermilk. Chairman thanks the gentleman from Georgia.
The Chairman recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Richmond.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, to the Ranking Member of the full committee, and
the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, and the witnesses.
Let me just start with some very basic stuff.
Major General Roggero, let me start with you.
I represent the district with probably the largest
petrochemical footprint in the United States on the Mississippi
River in New Orleans, around New Orleans. Is there any
technology out there right now that would prevent these drones
from being used to do reconnaissance missions just to look at
the security on these chemical facilities or our port or any of
those very sensitive properties?
General Rogerro. From a technology aspect, depends on what
equipment they are using. But for a good amount of it I would
say yes, there is technology that could do things.
I am not looking at policy right now or questions on
technology, but yes, technology could get into the signal--
either the video or the command and control of the system--and
affect the navigation of the system so it may not be looking
exactly what they want it to look at. So that is there.
But there are complications with that in terms of policy,
with FCC rules and other things that--another issue that is out
there is that the FAA has declared that all of these are
aircraft, and as such, their second and third order of
effects--perhaps unintended effects--but that aircraft is given
protections as if it were a manned aircraft, as well. So there
are certain actions, according to policy, that you can't take
against them.
Mr. Richmond. Very quickly, I mean, part of this, I think,
will have to be some industry, some Government, and everybody
uses some common sense. But I think back to the very simple
analogy of, if you go to the fancy golf courses and you are in
the golf cart, there are some places the cart will not let you
drive, like close to the green and other places they don't want
you.
So at some point, you know, when we start talking about
high school football games or, well, facilities--football
stadiums, and baseball stadiums, and all of those things, do
you see a day where those will, either GPS or otherwise, just
be off-limits in terms of the capability of not being able to
go in that space?
Dr. McNeal.
Mr. McNeal. Congressman Richmond, I don't necessarily see
it as a technological solution. I think, as Dr. Humphreys
pointed out, that is part of the equation.
In fact, the industry is already self-regulating for
airports and other sensitive sites. There are start-up
companies now that are allowing individuals to file the GPS
location of their private property in the hopes that the
manufacturers will then use those maps as no-fly zones.
I think what we will eventually find is that State and
local government, through their zoning authority, will begin to
say that certain areas are no-fly zones. We already see this in
Los Angeles, for example. You are not allowed to fly a model
aircraft on the beach or in parks. The National Park Service
has said the same thing.
Then what happens is that local law enforcement can come in
and say, ``Listen, this is a place where you are not allowed to
fly,'' and they are able to intercept the individuals.
What that does for us from a security perspective is then
it--when an aircraft is in that area, law enforcement doesn't
have to make a judgment about whether it is nefarious or not;
they can begin with the presumption that this person at best is
someone who is unaware that they are violating the law in that
particular no-fly zone, thus giving them reasonable suspicion
or even probable cause to go talk to the operator. Then from
there, that also puts--heightens the security picture for them.
Of course, there is a cost associated with that in that we
lose some of the beneficial--the benefits of the technology.
That is why I almost think that on designating no-fly zones
that are non-Federal, we want to leave that up to State and
local to figure out the right way to balance the costs and
benefits.
Mr. Richmond. Chief, let me just ask you a question,
because earlier you mentioned, you know, at some point you
would have to make a decision whether to take a drone down or
not. Let me just ask you the--for me, the practical part of it.
How do you do that?
Let's assume it is over a high school football game and you
can't determine whether it is a amateur hobbyist or whether it
is something nefarious. If you decided you wanted to take it
down, what do you do?
Chief Beary. Well, therein lies the challenge. Most State
and local law enforcement have no capability to do that.
No. 1, we don't have the technological capability. More
importantly, we don't have the lawful authority.
As the general said, those are--they are aircraft. I don't
have the lawful authority to take down an aircraft. There is
not a State and local law enforcement agency in this country
that does.
So right from the start we have no authority, so how am I
going to respond?
These are the incidents, though, that the rank-and-file
watch commanders in our agencies across this country are
dealing with every single day now. When you have a hostage
situation or you have any kind of major scene, you have got
drones everywhere, and the helicopter is calling down saying,
``You have got to get these drones out of the airspace because
I am trying to work a perimeter here.''
So our people have just--we don't have the resources and we
don't have the backing of the law to help us deal with these
situations. That is why I said in my testimony this is really a
call for help.
Mr. Richmond. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much.
Thank you, to the witnesses.
Mr. Perry. Chairman thanks the gentleman from Louisiana and
recognizes the gentlelady from California, Mrs. Torres.
Mrs. Torres. Thank you so much, and thank you for the
opportunity to discuss this very important topic.
Just to follow up on your conversation, as a former 9-1-1
dispatcher I can tell you from personal experience that trying
to get clearance to--as we are pursuing a vehicle, or our
officers are pursuing a vehicle, trying to get clearance from
an airport to follow a vehicle into that restricted zone, our
helicopters are unable to continue that pursuit, but yet the
media or, you know, folk from the ground can continue that
pursuit through a drone.
That poses, you know--it is a very scary environment for
those of us who live near an executive airport, for example,
where our homes are very close by, and the--and these executive
aircraft are landing--their landing route is right over our
home. I thought, you know, birds were the scariest things that,
you know, could face an aircraft as they are beginning to land,
but now we have more and more of these drones that are getting
in that way.
My question is really going to be to Professor Humphreys,
and that is, in your prior testimony before the committee in
2012 you spoke of the use of civilian GPS and their ability to
be spoofed or counterfeit. Can you tell me how technology has
evolved? You know, what are the differences between then and
now with older and newer models?
Mr. Humphreys. Well, despite the passage of 3 years and
despite the fast-moving technology in this area, you still
cannot purchase over-the-shelf anything that can resist a
spoofing attack like the ones we generate in my lab. I know the
DHS has established some contracts to study the problem, and
the FAA put together a tiger team to look at the problem, but
still, only 3 years later, the problem exists.
In the current situation you can almost look at that
weakness of GPS as a possible way to bring down these drones.
But I would discourage that, because in transmitting false GPS
signals, that will have unintended consequences for these
executive airports, as you say. You don't want to endanger
commercial airliners or even passersby who are trying to use
their sat nav in their car to find their way to their office.
Mrs. Torres. Thank you. I yield back my time.
Mr. Perry. Okay. Chairman thanks the gentlelady.
We are going to go for a second round and we are going to
go a little bit out of order. Mr. Loudermilk has to leave
early.
So, as a matter of fact, I think I am just going to turn
the floor over to him for questioning, and then we will move
through the regular order at that point.
Mr. Loudermilk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your
indulgence. I do have a meeting to get to, but this is
fascinating. It is of great interest to me and something that
my office has been putting a lot of work and thought into.
What percentage of the platforms are manufactured
domestically versus internationally? Do we know that?
Anyone?
Mr. Humphreys. I know that the most popular quadcopter in
the world is manufactured in China, and that is the most
popular by far. But other U.S. domestic drone manufacturers--
notably, the--robotics community, the do-it-yourself community
are also large. As I said earlier, the knowledge is out there;
the documentation is extensive.
Mr. Loudermilk. Okay. One of the reasons I was asking, you
know, what level of regulatory constraint that we can put on
the technology or, back to the police chief's ideas of how do
we bring down these platforms when they are operating
nefariously or unintentionally?
Is the technology there? Do we have the influence over the
technology that we can--I imagine most of them use some type of
R.F. signal to control them--to intercept the R.F. signal, to
force a go-home activity, you know, fly back to the source? Is
that even a conceivable idea that would be made available to
law enforcement?
Mr. Humphreys. It is conceivable. It does work, but it only
really works against the unintentional, accidental, or
unsophisticated attackers. If I am a sophisticated attacker I
can adapt the autopilot to simply disregard any communication
from the ground and work on an autonomous approach.
So it depends on what you want to protect. If it is just
the accidental, incidental, yes, that can be effective.
But again, these technologies are operating in popular
communication bands--wi-fi bands, and in the future they will
be operating over LTE bands. You don't want to mess with those
bands in a wide area. You will disrupt other people's
activities, and maybe safety of life activities.
Mr. McNeal. Congressman, the only thing I would add there
is that while the interdiction problem seems--it seems
problematic to us for the moment that it is there, and I can
only imagine law enforcement having that feeling of
helplessness, my response would be, you know, wait 25 minutes
because the battery is likely to run out on that system, and
there really are not very many systems in the quadcopter space
that can fly for longer than 25 minutes. When you get into the
fixed-wing model aircraft, basically, you get a bit more--a bit
longer flight time.
The only other thing that I think I would raise there are
the obvious civil liberties concerns and First Amendment
concerns, because if you--instead of thinking of these as mere
flying aircraft, if you think of them as flying cameras that
might be operated by Fox News or NPR, you are immediately
running into the question of the Government being able to turn
off CNN's cameras, and that could be really problematic. So I
am not certain that even if were able to implement this
mitigation technology to take control of the aircraft, that it
would be something that we would want to do.
Mr. Loudermilk. That is a good point. I agree with you
there.
I also look at it from a personal privacy standpoint. What
if it is hovering over my backyard, you know? What rights to do
have to take it down? I have got a 12 gauge that could assist
in that pretty readily.
But you can't engage that in a public area.
Chief, you brought up a challenge that you have. You have
no right to take down any aircraft. No one in the Nation does,
as far as local law enforcement.
But the operator is on the ground somewhere. You do have
authority over the operator, correct?
Chief Beary. The answer to that is ``it depends.'' If they
are lawfully in a place where they are allowed to do that--here
is where we get into the question is, how do--who do I justify
to what my actions were? Usually it ends up being in a civil
court several years down the road.
That is why if we had some guidance on the front end it
would help us write those policies for our personnel. Those are
these situations we get into right now.
It is interesting you talked about your backyard, because
what law enforcement is receiving now, we are getting those
calls from the people that are on their back deck and then
there is a camera in a drone looking at them. They call law
enforcement, and what right do I have to deal with that?
As these systems get more sophisticated, as I talked about,
with the flying by virtual reality, they are not--the people
aren't as easy to find anymore, trying to find the operator.
Mr. Loudermilk. Right.
Chief Beary. So it is problematic. We are seeing more and
more of those privacy concerns coming it from residents that
walk outside and there are three of them in their backyard.
Mr. Loudermilk. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Perry. Chairman thanks the gentleman.
Chairman recognizes the Ranking Member, Mrs. Watson
Coleman.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman.
I want to thank each and every one of you for the
information you shared today. You have given us a lot to
consider, and hopefully we come up with recommendations and
considerations that are cost--you know, that make sense in
terms of cost, make sense in terms of application, make sense
in terms of collaboration, and make sense in terms of the
parameters that we--that get established in dealing with this
sort of wide spectrum of issues.
My last question is to Mr. Roggero, because in your
prepared testimony you recommended that on-going research and
development program to devise counters to new drone
technologies that should be established and funded.
So my two-part question is, regarding that funding, what
type of investment in counter-drone technology should Congress
expect to make to realize the intended results? Would you
suggest partnershipping with colleges and universities to
conduct research and development in the areas of drone
insecurity?
General Rogerro. Thank you very much for the question,
ma'am.
I certainly do agree with investing because, as we have
seen, this hearing is different from the one that was 2 years
ago, and different technologies and things are out there now.
The next hearing that we have in a couple years is also going
to change and evolve.
So the R&D needs to be spent now. We have to focus on the
capability that is out there now and available and install
that, put that in place where it makes sense for the Government
to protect those critical infrastructure points now. But going
into R&D certainly makes sense, and going into universities is
great for those scanning of the horizons in the 5-year-plus so
that we don't find ourselves behind again.
I would even go one more step. This might be a great
opportunity for a public-private partnership with those
corporations that are heavily dependent in their new business
plans on the use of drones, such as Amazon, Google, and Apple,
who have all professed to be very interested in this
technology, but certainly the security and safety issues can
hurt their business plan, quite. So they may be a willing
partner in this R&D as well.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Well I can certainly see that they are
a natural partner here. Do you have any estimates of what you
think the Government's cost associated with taking on such an
endeavor would be? Just sort-of an estimate?
General Rogerro. Well, I will turn to the university
professor who is more engaged with grants than----
Mr. Humphreys. Sure. So you can do a lot of good with very
little funding in this area.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. We are finding that out.
Mr. Humphreys. I would say that you do need to recognize
that even a risk assessment, however, is a--it can be something
or it does require funding. I mean, we were talking earlier
about doing a risk assessment before spending any funds, but a
risk assessment itself requires some research.
I was involved with a DHS risk assessment in 2011 where a
bunch of us subject-matter experts were brought into a room,
asked questions we poorly understood, and asked to vote. It was
just appalling, in my view, that this was the procedure for
determining whether there were real risks, instead of handing
us some marching orders and giving us some funding to go out
and find out really what were the answers.
By the way, I have friends at Google today who may be
watching this proceeding who are interested in knowing how they
could help, because they do have a business interest in
securing drones from malfeasance and making sure that the
drones themselves aren't the bad actors.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am through.
Mr. Perry. Chairman thanks the gentlelady.
I have got some questions continuing. I will start with the
general.
Given the wide range of threats the UAS can pose, the
creation of a DHS strategy on domestic UAS will be a crucial
aspect in mitigating the threat. Or maybe it is not DHS; you
postulated maybe it would be DOD.
I just wrote down FAA, DOD, DOE, Justice. There is no
limit, probably, to the number of agencies that might or should
be involved in a comprehensive strategy.
But let's just say you were going to write a strategy. You
know, I have got 5 minutes, right, and you have got some of
that, so give me the high points, maybe, if you could, General,
about what you think is important regarding such a strategy.
General Rogerro. Certainly, sir.
I would first of all, as we discussed earlier, identify the
threats, identify what needs to be protected, and in all cases
that may not be a thing--it may be a reputation, it may be a
brand. The White House is a great example. The drone was no
threat kinetically, but to the reputation of the United States
Government to protect a key spot, it very much is very
important.
So I would identify those priorities and then get the
resources down right and figure out where you need to apply
those resources today while you are doing that research and
development tomorrow to get those capabilities moving. So it is
a multi-prong.
In the mean time, you also have to look at all of those
authorities that law enforcement needs, make sure the rules are
clear, and have a whole roll-out campaign, a strategic
communications campaign, if you will, to get to the public, to
let them know where you can fly, where you can't fly, what the
penalties are, and if you see something you need to say
something.
Mr. Perry. Thank you. Continuing, just if you can,
General--and anybody else, I will start with the general--some
examples, maybe, of some larger UAS above 55 pounds. The
availability, the payload--I am trying to determine--and--for
myself and maybe anybody watching or listening what really the
potential worst-case scenario could or would be.
Then, you know, if you maybe classify that in terms--I
guess we had a potential cyanide issue at the White House. It
is in the news today. You put a container--a small container--
of anthrax or ricin or something like that on even one of these
small, less than 55 pounds--I think it certainly has the
ability to carry that payload.
Can you paint a picture for us--maybe not necessarily a
worst-case scenario, but an actual probable scenario or a
possible scenario with somebody with that kind of malicious
intent, what the capabilities that exist?
General Rogerro. Certainly. I am an R.C. hobbyist myself,
and there are some local hobby stores not very far away from
where we are sitting here today in the District of Columbia
that if you go into you can have an F-16 jet that is about as
long as this table that has a turbofan engine and has fuel
which is in and of itself an explosive. This will do probably
200 to 300 miles an hour and you need a small runway to take it
off from. It could fly from a location just outside of the
District of Columbia into the center of the District of
Columbia within minutes.
So that is here and that is current, so don't want to scare
you any more than that, sir.
Mr. Perry. I think I can understand the potential, the
possibilities.
Dr. McNeal, you want to weigh in?
Mr. McNeal. Congressman Perry, the example that the general
pointed out actually, in preparation for the testimony, I tried
to find the earliest example of someone on the internet talking
about this type of thing and there was actually a researcher
out of--it was either New Zealand or Australia who basically
said--who wanted to create remote control cruise missiles using
a similar system to what the general is talking about.
I mean, this is DIY technology and there is very little we
can do to mitigate against that, and you are looking at a high-
speed missile at a low altitude.
With regard to the dispersal threat, we have--I think you
have probably been in the threat briefings where people talk
about the unmanned aircraft as a threat dispersal--as a
dispersal method. It is almost too cute by half, though,
because if you really wanted to have a high impact with a WMD,
first we have the problem of getting the WMD. But if you have
anthrax, that is not the best way to do it.
Go to every Starbucks on every corner in the District of
Columbia, sprinkle it into the sugar. Or put it in a sugar
shaker on the roof of your car and drive around and you will
impact a lot more people through that dispersal method than you
would through the aircraft, which--right?
Now, this, of course, assumes that the enemy is smart
enough to think these things through, and some of the guys who
have got caught haven't been the brightest, you know, bulbs on
the Christmas tree. But----
Mr. Perry. Even if they are not, I mean, let's say they are
smart enough to go to a sporting event where--a large stadium
and fly it low over the crowd, almost within arm's reach, I
mean--and maybe it has an impact on you or not, but which one
of us wants to be the person that said, ``Well, look, I got
checked out and I was fine,'' you know, over the course of
thousands of people in that--and, you know, you already
talked--the chief has talked about panic setting in, people
running across each other and down the steps and falling, and
little children and older folks, and so on. I mean, you can
picture the scene, right?
Mr. McNeal. Yes. Mr. Chairman, you have also highlighted
the other challenge in our planning process, which is that the
threat of anthrax being spread at Starbucks in the sugar is
something that is not as tangible as the cameras picking up the
drone as it flies in over the football stadium, and that
psychological impact is also something that the terrorists
would go for, but also that unfortunately drives policy in a
way that is not probabilistic but is possibilistic.
Mr. Perry. Would any of you folks here, depending on size,
classification, are any of you advocating or recommending
registration of some type towards ownership so that the, you
know, as the chief said, you know, the aircraft that is
flying--and, you know, his officers are all standing there
looking at it, they can't do anything about it. Maybe they
can't at that moment, but once maybe rules are set into place
where it is illegal to do what has just been done, they can
actually track down the perpetrator and link those two up so
that we know what he is doing at X house and there is
justification.
Is anybody advocating or has anybody thought about that, or
what are the considerations----
General Rogerro. The only way right now is through support
groups such as the AMA, which pulls in modelists and has a set
of rules and regulations that people voluntarily roll into.
I would not be opposed to registration for somebody that
either buys or builds a certain size UAS with a certain
capability. I don't see where anybody would have a problem with
that, and putting that accountability into this system where
these capabilities are going so high so fast I think is
probably a good thing and well-deserved.
Mr. Perry. To the chief, you know, we talked a little bit
about law enforcement's role or the role of UAS with law
enforcement in the context of civil liberties, but also in the
context of using the asset to law enforcement's advantage for
search and rescue, or maybe surveillance in a hostile
situation, et cetera, and then juxtaposed that to State laws
and the 10th Amendment.
Can you describe, generally speaking, what do you think
the--at this point--the role of UAS is, the legitimate role of
UAS in law enforcement would be? Just so we have a clear
understanding of where--you know, how we can help you and how
we can assist in--but at the same time make sure that
everybody's privacies and civil liberties are maintained?
Chief Beary. Yes, sir. We certainly are always concerned
about the civil liberty aspect, and I echo that concern.
Where they would be very beneficial for law enforcement are
those quick tactical situations where I have got--the example I
could give you is a railroad car. We have got a derailment and
I have got a situation. Well, it might be 20 minutes or 15
minutes before I can get a helicopter, but I can put up an
unmanned aerial system in 3 minutes with a video camera with a
live feed back and I can see where I need to immediately create
my evacuation zone, I can--I am getting real-time data instead
of waiting for the State police helicopter or somebody else to
get there.
So those kind of very fast incidents would be a huge help
to us. Again, we talked--in my testimony I talked about high-
risk warrant service. The same thing--instead of a loud
helicopter being up drawing attention, I could deploy a couple
of small drones with video feeds so that we could know that the
area is secure and our--and the evacuation is going as planned.
So those are just a couple of quick examples of how we
could deploy this and keep the public safe and the officers
safe. Reduce costs, by the way. Helicopter time is very
expensive.
Mr. Perry. Well, it is unless you are the Department of
Homeland Security, and I think at our last hearing they paid
about $22,000 or $23,000 an hour for their Predator time. As a
helicopter pilot myself, you know, there are a lot of
helicopter pilots that would love to charge that amount of
money to do surveillance and they would make a pretty good buck
at it.
Finally, let me conclude with this: Based on what you have
heard today--you folks are, I think, recognized as having some
expertise in--the field, and we are trying to craft a policy, a
strategy, et cetera--do you have a recommendation, each one of
you, regarding which agency--I know, you know, I have something
in my mind, but which agency should take the lead on maybe
policy formulation or execution, should the legislative bodies
do that, and work out the strategy, you know, proposed
strategy?
We will start with Dr. Humphreys.
Mr. Humphreys. Sure. As I said earlier, Chairman Perry, I
believe the DHS has the obvious role to play here.
But I would also say that if DHS proves to be an unwilling
leader or an incapable leader then others could step in.
Someone else mentioned the Department of Energy. I also think
the FAA has shown itself to be quite competent in this area.
They are mostly looking at threats to aviation, but the threats
by aviation against our homeland could also be within their
expertise, I suppose.
But most importantly, I would like to reiterate that simply
saying we are going to throw together a risk assessment isn't
free. So we end up needing to have a deliberate risk
assessment.
I believe DHS should lead that off, but it might need to--I
would say it would need to involve deliberate research, perhaps
funded research, whether by universities, Federally-funded
research and development centers, or private groups, where they
can do a deep dive into the problem and not just be asked
questions off the cuff that they might be poorly prepared to
answer.
Mr. Perry. Okay.
General.
General Rogerro. Yes, sir. I would say in the policy realm
that DHS probably has the correct knowledge and background to
take the lead on the security piece. However, it would have to
be very closely aligned, I think, with the FAA, which, as you
know, is a safety of flight piece.
But by designing policy and security you could take that
airborne asset, as we have been talking about this morning, and
push that into an aviation safety incident. So I think that the
FAA has to be there with their expertise of aviation on this
process, as well.
Mr. Perry. Chief.
Chief Beary. Because we deal with DHS on a regular basis,
most State and local law enforcement agencies, to me it is a
natural, where we have those relationships built. The number of
agencies that report to them I think make it conducive.
I do absolutely agree with the general that the FAA needs
to be a part of it, because it is a huge part of it. But
integrating with State and local law enforcement, I think DHS
would be the right vehicle to do that.
Mr. Perry. Dr. McNeal.
Mr. McNeal. Congressman Perry, here is a four-part plan for
how I would put it together. I would direct that the under
secretary for National Protection and Programs Directorate be
the lead individual responsible for this across the Federal
Government.
Second, I would allocate to that office funding for a
program office that would have temporary personnel--probably
contractors that report to NPPD. You would probably need $5
million to $10 million to stand up the office with personnel
and be able to do testing.
Third, I would require that all other Government agencies
have to play if they want to get paid. So if DOE wants to
implement security measures at their facilities they better
participate in the threat assessment process, otherwise the
funding won't be allocated through the under secretary down to
those pieces of critical infrastructure.
Then fourth, as a check against sort of empire and
bureaucracy-building--not that that happens in the District of
Columbia--I would allocate some funding to the homeland
security centers of excellence, which are your research
institutions, that could do similar threat assessments to check
the work of the Government. I will tell you, if you put Dr.
Humphreys and I together with, you know, a half-million dollar
grant, we would do a lot with that money--probably more than
many of the people in Government would do because we are
cheaper.
So I think that four-part plan of outside independent look,
you have to play if you want to get paid, and then a program
office supervised by the under secretary, is the most effective
way to move this forward. It is relatively small cost. I
recognize funds are limited.
Mr. Perry. All right.
Thank you very much, gentlemen. I thank you for your
valuable testimony and the Members for their questions.
Of course, the Members of the subcommittee may have some
additional questions for the witnesses and we will ask that the
witnesses respond to those in writing. Pursuant to committee
rule 7(e), the hearing record will be open for 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank
you.
[Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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