[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
WANTED: FOREIGN FIGHTERS_THE.
ESCALATING THREAT OF ISIL.
IN CENTRAL ASIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 10, 2015
__________
Printed for the use of the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
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COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
HOUSE SENATE
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi,
Chairman Co-Chairman
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
ALAN GRAYSON, Florida TOM UDALL, New Mexico
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER,
New York
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Vacant, Department of State
Vacant, Department of Commerce
Vacant, Department of Defense
[ii]
WANTED: FOREIGN FIGHTERS--THE
ESCALATING THREAT OF ISIL
IN CENTRAL ASIA
----------
June 10, 2015
COMMISSIONERS
Page
Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 1
Hon. Joe Pitts, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 2
Hon. Steve Cohen, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 3
Hon. Randy Hultgren, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 13
WITNESSES
Daniel N. Rosenblum, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Central Asia,
U.S. Department of State....................................... 4
Frank J. Cilluffo, Associate Vice President and Director, Center
for Cyber and Homeland Security, The George Washington
University..................................................... 18
Jennifer Leonard, Deputy Director, International Crisis Group.... 20
APPENDICES
Prepared statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith.................. 32
Prepared statement of Hon. Roger F. Wicker....................... 33
Prepared statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin.................... 34
Prepared statement of Daniel N. Rosenblum........................ 35
Prepared statement of Frank J. Cilluffo.......................... 40
Prepared statement of Jennifer Leonard........................... 47
[iii]
WANTED: FOREIGN FIGHTERS--THE.
ESCALATING THREAT OF ISIL.
IN CENTRAL ASIA
----------
June 10, 2015
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Washington, DC
The hearing was held at 2:33 p.m. in room 2175, Rayburn
House Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Christopher H.
Smith, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, presiding.
Commissioners present: Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Joe
Pitts, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe; Hon. Steve Cohen, Commissioner, Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe; and Hon. Randy Hultgren,
Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Witnesses present: Daniel N. Rosenblum, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Central Asia, U.S. Department of State; Frank J.
Cilluffo, Associate Vice President and Director, Center for
Cyber and Homeland Security, The George Washington University;
and Jennifer Leonard, Deputy Director, International Crisis
Group.
HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Smith. The Commission will come to order. And first of
all, let me apologize for convening the Commission hearing
late. We did have a series of votes, so again I apologize to
our witnesses and to all of you for that lateness.
I want to express a very hearty welcome to our witnesses
and to everyone joining us this afternoon for this hearing on
foreign fighters and the escalating threat of ISIS in Central
Asia. A year ago today the city of Mosul fell to the Islamic
State of Iraq in Syria, or ISIS, during a wave of violence that
swept brutally through northern Iraq. Many of those who took
part in the offensive were foreign fighters.
In fact, the United Nations Security Council recently
estimated that there are now at least 25,000 foreign terrorist
fighters from more than 100 countries who have traveled
internationally to join or fight for terrorist entities
associated with ISIS and al-Qaida. According to the
international crisis group, as many as 4,000 foreign fighters
came from the five countries in Central Asia. Just last week,
we learned that the chief of Tajikistan's counterterrorism
program--someone highly trained by the United States
government--abandoned his post to join ISIS.
What does this say about the current efforts to stop
terror-
minded men and women from volunteering and traveling to the
Middle East? Clearly our government, working with others and
with organizations like the OSCE, must take stronger action to
combat radicalization beyond our borders, as well as to ensure
that returning foreign fighters do not bring jihad and murder
back home. Central Asian governments face major challenges
here. Many of these derive from their history as part of the
Soviet Union, from wars in nearby Afghanistan, and from limited
economic development which has led millions of their citizens
to seek employment abroad, especially in Russia.
The discrimination and exploitation to which these workers
are subjected, as well as the decline in the Russian economy
and changes in the Russian visa regime, have reduced the
remittances these workers can send home to support their
families, and may have contributed to creating conditions that
ISIS uses to recruit foreign fighters from among different
Central Asian nationalities.
Some of the challenges the Central Asia governments face
are of their own making, including widespread corruption, lack
of the rule of law and their own human rights records.
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have particularly terrible human
rights records, among the worst in the world with respect to
political prisoners and the use of torture. All of these
factors are exploited by ISIS recruiters and other
organizations promoting radicalization and violent extremism.
It should be the particular role of the U.S. to promote to
the Central Asian governments our conviction that fighting
terrorism is no excuse for violating human rights or the rule
of law. I look forward to hearing about many of the issues
here, including counteracting radicalization of potential
foreign fighters, inhibiting the travel of recruits and
volunteers to the Middle East, disrupting financial support to
fighters and their families and preventing their return to
their home countries.
This is in the first place the responsibility of the
governments. And there is the question of what they are trying
to do and how well they are doing it. There is a question of
what our government and the OSCE is doing, and perhaps can do
better, working with Central Asian governments. Here we need to
talk about issues of document security, border security and law
enforcement coordination. And I hope we can touch, during this
hearing with our very distinguished witnesses, on all of these
very pertinent issues and others.
I'd like to yield to Mr. Pitts--Commissioner Pitts for any
opening comments he has.
HON. JOSEPH R. PITTS, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Pitts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding
this important hearing.
And I'd also like to thank Mr. Rosenblum and the rest of
our panelists for testifying here today.
The Islamic State, or ISIS, poses a direct and substantial
threat to U.S. interest and security, as well as the security
of the Middle East. Just a few months back, Islamic States
spokespeople threatened to spread its brutality outward across
the Mediterranean to Rome, one of the focal points of Western
civilization. As the United States Government seeks to contain
and even degrade and destroy the Islamic State, the
contribution that foreign fighters offer inwardly to the
terrorist organization is of vast significance.
It has been estimated that more than 20,000 foreign
fighters from possibly up to 90 countries have traveled to
Syria to take up arms since the Arab Spring. And this includes
approximately 180 of our own citizens. The concern voiced by
the State Department and other observers and analysts on this
issue is very disturbing. One State Department official
characterized it as formidable--an enormous threat.
To put it simply, the United States Government and its
allies, and indeed all of those combating the Islamic State,
cannot hope to destroy the terrorist organization without
substantially cutting off or mitigating the number of foreign
fighters that fill its ranks. As noted by many observers, the
amount of foreign fighters stemming from Central Asia amounts
to only a small fraction of the thousands of foreign Islamic
State fighters. However, the region's significance in
addressing the problem may prove to be pivotal.
While we haven't necessarily seen the amount of fighters
originating from Central Asia as those from Europe, the
potential for extremists to change this dynamic is great. I am
encouraged by some of the actions from governments in the
region, including attempts to punish participation with the
terrorist group with penal codes. I believe the United States
Government must do more, both in the short term and long term,
to address this threat.
I've been in discussion with officials from the Republic of
Kazakhstan, for instance, on the need to increase economic
opportunities in the region through greater leverage of the use
of trade and power of American competitiveness and markets. As
WE observe this issue, it is my hope that we can find policy
tools that can obstruct the flow of foreign fighters, but also
give the people of this region greater exposure to freedoms,
prosperity and, ultimately, spiritual identities that don't
lead them to join the cult of death that the Islamic States
represents.
Again, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Commissioner Pitts.
Commissioner Cohen.
HON. STEVE COHEN, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And I'm just looking forward to your testimony, although I
think I've read it. I understand--you say recruiters employ a
variety of narratives to attract adherents with the idea of a
just war and defense of innocents, an Islamic caliphate as a
utopia, and the opportunity to fight back against Western
oppression. I think all those things are accurate and I can't
question what you're saying here.
But I was at a conference recently on Middle East. And a
fellow from Middle East suggested that a lot of the attraction
was young people not having opportunities at home and not
having opportunities to have--he got pretty basic in terms of
relationships and no opportunity to have a job and to be able
to afford to get married and not having too much of an
opportunity to have partners of the opposite sex, and that they
made him kind of like a football player in America, or a rock
star, and gave him some kind of special panache.
And I wondered what you thought about that theory. This was
a Saudi who has been on boards X, Y and Z and pretty wired in.
And this was his theory what attracted them, and that there's
not much other opportunity for young males in those countries
to do much, because no jobs, no money, no wife, nothing else
going on. They don't have rock stars. They don't have--I guess
they got a few soccer players, but they don't have LeBron and
they don't have Tom Brady and whatever. I'm just curious what
you thought about that theory.
And the other thing is social media, how we can use social
media better to try to give them a different perspective of
maybe what they should be doing with their lives, and to try to
counterbalance the whole idea of jihadist suicide. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much.
I'd like to now welcome our very distinguished witness from
the administration, Mr. Daniel Rosenblum, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for the Department of State's Bureau of South and
Central Asia. Before his appointment as Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Mr. Rosenblum served 17 years in the State
Department's Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to
Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia, including 6 as coordinator.
He was instrumental in designing and implementing large
packages of assistance for Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan
following internal upheavals and for Kosovo, following its
declaration of independence. Before coming to the State
Department, Mr. Rosenblum spent six years as senior program
coordinator at the Free Trade Union Institute, FTUI, of the
AFL-CIO. And without objection, your full resume will be made a
part of the record.
But finally, Mr. Rosenblum has a B.A. in history from Yale
and an M.A. in Soviet studies and international economics from
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
Welcome, the floor is yours.
DANIEL N. ROSENBLUM, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CENTRAL
ASIA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Sec. Rosenblum. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
members of the Commission who are here. Thank you for inviting
me to testify today. I'd like to give some brief remarks and I
ask that my full written statement be entered into the record.
Mr. Smith. Without objection, so ordered.
Sec. Rosenblum. Mr. Chairman, disrupting the flow of
foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq is a top priority for the
U.S. Government. The United States is working with governments
in Central Asia and with multilateral organizations who are
operating in the region--including the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, which I know is of special
interest to this Commission--in ways that parallel the work we
do with partners around the world.
Together with our international partners, we're committing
significant resources to track and disrupt foreign terrorist
fighter travel and recruitment. We're working together on
information sharing and border security, legal reform and
criminal justice responses, and countering violent extremism to
prevent recruitment and radicalization to violence. And we're
encouraging our key partners, including in Central Asia, to
prioritize this threat.
While there are no reliable statistics, research suggests
that the vast majority of Central Asia fighters in Syria and
Iraq are recruited while outside their own countries, mostly
while in Russia, where millions of them live as migrant
workers. They are without the family, community and religious
leaders that back home would all work to mitigate recruitment
and radicalization. Furthermore, many Central Asians working in
Russia are marginalized and experience discrimination and
harassment.
This combination of factors creates fertile ground for
extremist recruiters. The recruiters then employ a variety of
narratives and methods, especially using social media, to
attempt to attract adherents and radicalize recruits to
violence. Similar tactics are used to attract the individuals
who travel directly from Central Asia. The new recruits join
not only ISIL, but other terrorist organizations as well, such
as the al-Nusra Front.
Given the complex interplay of factors, there is no one-
size-fits-all approach to counter this phenomenon, but one key
long-term effort we are engaged in is to improve economic
prospects to allow Central Asians to find employment at home,
where radicalization to violence is less likely to take place
than among migrant worker communities in Russia. We've also
begun to engage the governments and people of Central Asia on
how they can disrupt recruiting, prevent radicalization, hinder
financing, prevent travel of recruits and also engage civil
society and counter false narratives.
Let me turn for a moment from the conflict in Syria and
Iraq to briefly address recent media reports on the presence of
ISIL in Afghanistan, which borders three of the Central Asian
countries. We have seen signs that ISIL is attempting to spread
into Afghanistan, and that some Taliban groups have rebranded
themselves as ISIL to attract funding and recruits. But ISIL's
presence in Afghanistan is still a relatively new phenomenon
and it will take time to evaluate its long-term prospects.
Let me now talk more specifically about some of the efforts
we're undertaking at the global, the regional, and the national
levels. Through the global coalition to counter ISIL, which
we've been encouraging our partners in Central Asia to join,
our key efforts include disrupting the flow of foreign fighters
and countering the messaging of violent extremists. Counter-
messaging is a critical element because so much of the
radicalization of recruiting happens through social media.
Also, on the global level, President Obama chaired the U.N.
Security Council session last fall that adopted Resolution
2178, which requires countries to take a range of steps to
address the threat of foreign terrorist fighters and calls for
improved international cooperation. This resolution resonated
in Central Asia, and in August the OSCE will hold a regional
workshop in Kazakhstan on its implementation. Then in February
of this year, the White House convened a summit on countering
violent extremism that brought together governments,
international organizations, civil society groups and the
private sector to develop a comprehensive CVE action agenda--
that's countering violent extremism, CVE.
Regionally, we're supporting a CVE summit that the
government of Kazakhstan will host in Astana at the end of this
month to follow on the White House meeting. The Astana summit
will focus on eight priority areas, ranging from assessing the
drivers and threats of violent extremism to counter messaging,
to how governments and communities can work together. And we're
also supporting this month a regional civil society CVE summit
that will be held in Istanbul. And it will focus on nine
priority areas ranging from the role of women and youth in the
CVE efforts to rehabilitation and reintegration of violent
extremists who return home.
Such gatherings not only enhance information sharing, but
they also generate action. For example, as a follow up to the
White House CVE summit, the OSCE has now developed a multiyear
program to build the capacity of civil society, including youth
and women, to counter violent extremism. We're also supporting
the OSCE and other regional efforts. This past February, it
organized a three-day workshop in Dushanbe on regional
cooperation and response to foreign terrorist fighters, the
first such meeting of its kind in Central Asia.
At the national level, our diplomats regularly engage on
these issues and we encourage a comprehensive approach that
includes security improvements that are in line with
international human rights obligations, as well as community-
level programs to address the root causes that may be making
some Central Asians vulnerable to recruitment by extremist
groups.
We have bilateral programs in each country that not only
build law enforcement capacity, but also train in community
policing techniques and how to increase the role of religious
leaders in conflict resolution. We're working closely with the
OSCE on several such programs and I'd refer you to my written
testimony for more details on country-by-country.
The nations of Central Asia are taking up this challenge,
Mr. Chairman. And the U.S. will continue to work with global
institutions, with regional groups and national governments to
reduce the threat. Thank you, and I look forward to your
questions.
Mr. Smith. Secretary Rosenblum, thank you very much for
your very comprehensive testimony and, again, in your written
submission you do go into great depth with each of the
countries, and this Commission certainly appreciates it.
I have a couple of opening questions. You point out and you
have listed in your bullets the topics that will be discussed
at the CVEs, including at the Istanbul summit. Turkey has
become a primary transit state for Central Asians traveling to
Syria--low airfares, there's a whole number of reasons, plus a
500-mile border with Syria. I'm wondering if that will be a
major focus of that Istanbul summit when you convene it.
Let me also ask you, Gulmurod Khalimov, the Tajik military
officer who recently defected to ISIS, received extensive
military training in the U.S. Can you tell us what kind of
safeguards are in place to prevent defection by Central Asian
military members participating in U.S. training?
Just a parallel, in a way, for years during the troubles in
Northern Ireland, it was very disconcerting to me and a whole
lot of other people that at the FBI academy some of the people
involved with terrorism who were part of the Northern Irish
police force there were actually terrorists. I actually wrote a
law that said they all had to be vetted. I'm wondering if we're
properly vetting people who get that training to ensure that
inadvertently we don't train someone who's doing such horrific
things.
Let me also ask you, as a Russia expert--as we all know,
many of the recruiters very often can go into the migrant
communities in Russia and play on the dissatisfaction and
demoralization of those there. I know we're at pretty much
loggerheads with Russia over Ukraine and, you know, things are
not the way they could be--hopefully someday will be in terms
of our relationship with Russia. But let me ask you, how are
they doing and are we assisting them in any way? Are they aware
of this problem--of this massive recruitment that appears to be
happening?
And finally, in what ways do you think human rights
violations by Central Asian states feed jihadist radicalization
and ISIS recruitment? And how does that vary from state to
state? Are the various Stans, different countries in the
Central Asian region, are they receptive of that? This
Commission has held multiple hearings, site visits, meetings
with the presidents, prime ministers and parliamentarians for
years. And human rights is always our first point of engagement
with each of those countries. If you could, perhaps, address
that.
Sec. Rosenblum. OK. Thank you for those questions, Mr.
Chairman. Hopefully I'll cover all of them, but please remind
me if I've left out something.
So, first of all, you asked about the upcoming conference
in Istanbul and Turkey's role as a transit country. I don't
believe, actually, that the agenda of that conference will
focus on that question because the conference is a civil
society meeting. I believe the focus will be on what civil
society groups can do in their communities and in their
countries to contribute to preventing the root causes,
essentially. It's sort of local-level engagement to prevent the
drivers of radicalization, as it's often referred to.
The issue of the transit through Turkey is something that
comes up, for us, frequently in our dialogue with our Central
Asian partners as well. And it is something that's of concern
and we're working closely with Turkey on these issues, but I
don't believe that it's going to be focused on in the
conference.
Mr. Smith. I understand going after systemic causes, but it
would seem to me that if since it is a large transit area,
country--has Ankara been responsive? Or are they really toeing
the line to try to mitigate this transit?
Sec. Rosenblum. Yeah. Turkey co-chairs with the Netherlands
the Foreign Terrorist Fighter Working Group of this counter-
ISIL coalition that the U.S. has helped put together. We
consult very frequently and with high intensity with Turkey on
these issues, on the foreign terrorist fighter flow.
Turkey signed a letter of intent on March 12th to improve
information sharing on foreign terrorist fighters and known and
suspected terrorists. We also co-chaired the Global
Counterterrorism Forum with Turkey. So there's a lot of
engagement with Turkey on this issue now. And Turkey itself
acknowledges the scope of the problem and that they need to do
more. So we're encouraging that line.
Let me talk for a minute about Mr. Khalimov, the head of
the interior ministry special forces who defected recently and
has claimed in a video that he had joined ISIL. He was an
important leader in the security forces in Tajikistan who came
up through the ranks over about a 10-year period, during which
he participated in five Department of State-sponsored
antiterrorism assistance program trainings between 2003 and
2010.
The process for selecting for training, which goes to your
question, involves first selection by the government--so in
each case it was the government of Tajikistan that selected and
recommended him to participate in training. And to be honest,
it was appropriate given the positions that he held. And then
we do vetting ourselves. We vet all participants in this
training course through processes we have under the so-called
Leahy amendment, to determine that there's no record of gross
human rights violations.
Mr. Khalimov was vetted in each case and passed our
standard vetting procedures. So I should emphasize here that we
offer the training and the other government that we're working
with identifies the students for training. The vetting is an
additional measure after the students are identified for the
program.
Now, your specific question, I think, at the end was
whether there's some technique that could be used to sort of
screen or identify people who are potentially recruits, so to
speak. And I don't know the answer to that, to be honest with
you, Mr. Chairman, today. It is something that we have to think
long and hard about. Something tells me that it would be very
difficult, because the motivations are so complex.
And that's something that I think Mr. Cohen actually
referred to in the question he asked in the opening. We can
talk more about that later. But the interplay of factors that
go into someone ending up doing what Khalimov did are so
complex that it might be difficult. But that doesn't mean we
shouldn't look at whether there are things that could be done
to screen out people.
Mr. Smith. Now, was he a lone wolf? Or he's not part of a
trend, as far as we know. Have there been others?
Sec. Rosenblum. We're following it closely. We're talking
to the government of Tajikistan about it. We----
Mr. Smith. Or any of the other countries, too.
Sec. Rosenblum. Yeah, we don't have any evidence that he's
part of some larger network yet.
So that----
Mr. Smith. But again, in terms of people we've trained, we
have no evidence that there are other people who have followed
the course of going into ISIS or al-Qaida?
Sec. Rosenblum. Right, no evidence that other people who
are involved in the same training are going the same way.
You asked about Russia. And on Russia, I think it's fair to
say that the Russian Government has acknowledged the problem.
And there have been statements--public statements by senior
officials both about the growth of foreign terrorist fighters
in Syria and Iraq, and also about the fact that some of them
are being recruited from within the territory of the Russian
Federation. That concern has been expressed and also acted on
through support, for example, for the U.N. Security Council
resolution that I referred to earlier.
Russia did participate--they were invited and they
participated in the summit in February on countering violent
extremism that was held here. They sent a high-level
delegation. Russia is also a founding member of the Global
Counterterrorism Forum, this group, and has been invited to
participate in this Astana meeting--regional meeting that will
be held in Kazakhstan later this month.
So we work together where possible to find ways of
disrupting the travel of foreign fighters, and we'll continue
to do so. I think it is fair to say, as you characterized it
too, that the level of our engagement on a lot of issues with
Russia these days is not as robust as it has been in the past.
But nonetheless, this is an issue where we clearly have shared
concerns.
And then I think your last question was about human rights
and in what ways do human rights violations and so on fuel
recruitment. I'd start out by saying that we are concerned that
lack of respect for human rights, limitations on freedom of
religion specifically could potentially be used by extremist
groups in their efforts to recruit individuals and to
radicalize them to commit acts of violence. And these things
could also contribute to what people refer to as self-
radicalization, where people through social media and other
means become inspired.
But at the same time, the recruitment process and this
radicalization process are complex phenomena. And we don't have
evidence of a direct causal link between restrictions on rights
and radicalization. The lack of evidence of a direct link
doesn't mean that we don't take the issues of human rights and
religious freedom and other related issues less seriously, and
we engage regularly with the governments in Central Asia on
these issues and raise them in many fora and many
opportunities. But I guess I would just come back to the main
point that there's a potential there, but we have not seen the
evidence--no one has brought to us the evidence of a direct
causal link.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Cohen.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
You mentioned some of the questions I asked earlier, and I
guess--I presume you were referring to the incentives or the
reasons why. I mean, I know you're not--because he's passed--
Dr. Freud, but can you help us with the 2015 Freud analysis of
the ISIS fighter and their desires? Easy question right?
Sec. Rosenblum. So, Congressman, it is a complex issue, as
I said before, and the motivations are complicated. Often the
people who study this--and I had to talk to the experts because
I confess I'm not an expert on radicalization and the
recruitment issue. But they talk about there being three types
of motivation, and sort of divide them into three categories:
the ideological motivations, which could be political or could
be religious. So for example, we have to get rid of Assad, so I
want to go to Syria to fight to overthrow the Assad regime.
Then you have the psychological motivations, which will
vary from individual to individual, even to the level of
somebody being a sociopath being inclined to violence and being
drawn to it, not necessarily for ideological reasons.
And then there's the situational category of motivations--
which is a big basket, a broad range of things. But it could be
anything from my community that says it's OK to go fight and to
commit acts of terrorism, or lack of opportunities, economic
opportunities, a feeling of hopelessness, a feeling of
drifting.
So all of those things could be possible explanations in
any given case. And they're probably not all going to play the
same role in any country. So as we're focused here on Central
Asia, it's hard to say what's the primary driver to those
Central Asians who are joining, except that the one interesting
piece of evidence we have, that I presented in my testimony, is
that it does seem that the majority--even some say the vast
majority--of those Central Asians going to fight in these
conflicts are coming from outside of Central Asia. So that's
suggestive of something, and I presented some possible
explanations related to the situation faced by migrant workers
in Russia. But a lot of it is conjecture at this point.
Mr. Cohen. You probably can't answer my question, and you
haven't, and maybe it can't be answered and it was just a
suggestion this man made and is fairly simplistic and I don't
have any answer, but part of it's the disparity in wealth in
all those nations. And then we have a terrible disparity here,
but compared to what it is in the Middle East, we're Nirvana.
And they have very little hope. And it seems like these
nations--a lot of people at the top making--or taking, I don't
know if they make it, they take it--lots of money. And they're
living beyond the Kardashians.
And then the rest of the people have got nothing. And so
the idea of going off and fighting and putting a Kalashnikov
over your shoulder and having some women that think you're
great that come over there to be your bride is a pretty
attractive life for somebody who has no life whatsoever where
they are. Now, maybe the migrant workers in Russia, but I don't
know how we're going to stop that until there's more of a
democratization in those nations and throughout the Middle
East.
And it's part of the whole problem, I think, that we're
seeing in terms of revolution and failed states and chaos,
which we have in the Middle East, is the disparity in wealth
that's gone on. And the Saudis, you see it there. It's all
throughout. I guess USAID can help, other opportunities like
that. Social media can help. And from what I understand, this
conference I went to recently with quite a few folks from the
United States and from around the world, everybody was in
agreement that our social media campaign is inadequate.
And we don't do a very good job of reaching the young or
influencing the young, and that we could do it better with some
cultural-type icons and trying to find ways that we can reach
them. I don't know who's doing our social media programs, but
we got the best social media people in the world in the United
States. And why our State Department or government isn't trying
to incorporate some of the ideas they can get and help us is
beyond me, because we don't seem to be doing it. Do you know if
we've reached out to any of these companies in Silicon Valley
or wherever? Have we?
Sec. Rosenblum. Yes, we have collaborated with some
companies. I will defer to colleagues who know more about this,
and we can get back to you with a more detailed answer to your
question on social media specifically. But I know that there's
been exchange with private companies in the past and
collaboration on this issue.
There is also an interagency body housed at the State
Department, the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
Communications, which was established specifically to counter
recruitment online through counter-messaging. And it is engaged
now in a sustained campaign against the ISIL and other groups
online messaging to combat their ability to recruit new
fighters. So there is an effort being made. It can always be
better.
Mr. Cohen. Is Russia doing anything in the same capacity? I
mean, I know they've got problems in Chechnya and Dagestan and
all the Stans. But they're very concerned about radical Islam.
Are they--if you say that most of these foreign fighters are--I
think that's what you said--they're coming from being migrant
workers in Russia. Are they not concerned that they're going to
return to Russia? I mean, we seem to be concerned that some of
these folks are going to return to the United States. Isn't
Russia concerned? And are they doing anything about it?
Sec. Rosenblum. They are concerned. And the details of what
they're doing about it, to be honest, I don't know. We can get
back to you about what we do know. I know that they have
supported the international efforts that I referred to
earlier--the U.N. Security Council, participating in our CVE
summit. But what they're doing domestically to address the root
causes and so on, I'll have to come back to you with a more
detailed answer on that.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the
balance.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Cohen.
Commissioner Pitts.
Mr. Pitts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your testimony and for coming
today.
Let me explore a little bit more--you're talking about root
causes and the economic aspect of this attraction. Could you
explore or explain a little bit about the religious dimension
of this attraction? Is it true that this brand of Islamic--
radical Islam that believes in this caliphate being
established--if they're of that brand, they are compelled to go
and defend the caliphate, just like others in Islam believe
they have to take a trip to Mecca once in a lifetime? Can you
explore a little bit of the religious dimension or motivation
that you understand here?
Sec. Rosenblum. Sir, as I understand it, that religious
message--the message of establishing the caliphate does have
appeal for some, but it's a minority. It's not something that
is part of the religious traditions of Central Asia, of the
mainstream Islam that's established in Central Asia.
And one often hears that those who are attracted to the
messaging and the ideal picture of this caliphate that they
will join are those who are probably not well-educated in their
religion, that they may be ignorant of it. And so actually one
of the efforts that we've been making in some countries in
Central Asia is working with local governments, working with
community groups to get religious leaders more involved in
community education, both about the dangers of the messages
that are coming out and also trying to fill in some of the gaps
that exist.
So in fact I just learned yesterday of a program that we're
doing in Kyrgyzstan which involves the religious
establishment--that is the deputy mufti who's the head of the
religious council there--local law enforcement in communities
in Kyrgyzstan and community groups talking about how religious
leaders can play a more active role in seeing the danger signs
that some of this messaging is resonating and providing
information that might help to counter it, they hope. And so we
actually supported this through a grant from our U.S. embassy
in Kyrgyzstan, this program.
And OSCE in addition is doing programming like this,
working at the community level. So it's about not having
information, not having multiple sources of information. It's
also--I think also about not really understanding their own
religious traditions completely, and therefore being more prone
to believe what they're reading online.
Mr. Pitts. If I can shift to another issue, due to the
relatively cheap flights, ease of visa restrictions and a
growing market aimed at aiding foreign fighters along their
journey, Turkey has become a primary transit state from--for
Central Asians traveling to Syria. Are the Turkish authorities
currently doing enough to prevent foreign extremist entry into
Turkey and departure to Syria? And what can the United States
do to help our NATO ally more effectively clamp down on their
500-mile border with Syria?
Sec. Rosenblum. Congressman, as I said in my earlier answer
to the Chairman, there is a major problem of the transit
through Turkey. It's something that comes up frequently in our
dialogue with our Central Asian partners as well, because
everyone's aware that that's the route that people take. And it
is something that the government of Turkey recognizes and is
taking seriously. The President just a couple days ago at the
G7 summit referred to this as one of a number of elements of
combating ISIL and said that Turkey can do more. And we're
working with them to help to take stronger action.
Mr. Pitts. The five Central Asian states that we're talking
about here have fragile governance structures and lack the
ability to adequately provide jobs and education and health
care to the citizens. And some reports argue that this lack of
social stability and structure tempts individuals to turn to
ISIL/ISIS, in the belief that it can provide better
opportunity, perhaps a better future for their families. How
have we, or can we or might we, encourage the Central Asian
governments to address these issues in order to create more
inclusive and appealing societies? What aid can the U.S.
provide in order to help build government institutions and
strengthen the rule of law?
Sec. Rosenblum. So that's a very good question,
Congressman. And the answer is a complicated one, as it often
is on this issue. First of all, we always stress in our
dialogue with our Central Asian partners that in the long term
stability and security is best ensured in countries where the
citizens can provide for themselves economically and where
government is responsive and accountable. And so that is
definitely part of our message about the long term. And that's
something that we say all over the world when we're engaging
with other countries on these issues of internal governance.
At the same time, on the specific issue of recruitment by
ISIL and foreign fighters going to Syria and Iraq, as I said
earlier, the motivations for those individuals to go are very
complex and it's hard to untangle the multiple possibilities of
why they're going. There may be cases where the economic
circumstances or frustration that somebody's feeling in their
local community toward local authorities or whatever it is
could be a factor, but it may be one among many. And we just
don't have evidence of that causal link. The question is,
though, what can we do to help address some of these issues,
which are important even if they're not a cause of foreign
fighter recruitment?
And the answer is that we've been working for the past 20
to 25 years in all these countries to try to improve economic
systems, to try to improve the performance by, for example,
helping small business buildup, improving government policies,
investment climate and all those sorts of issues, and also by
working with governments and with civil society to improve how
government delivers for its citizens. Part of that is fighting
corruption. That's a major issue in the region, and in many
countries, of course, around the world. And part of it is also
just how to deliver services to citizens in a way that they
deserve.
And we have a number of programs--USAID, which I think the
congressman referred to earlier, our State Department itself
works in many of these areas. So I guess I would characterize
that almost as a generational effort to make a difference.
Mr. Pitts. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. Commissioner Hultgren.
HON. RANDY HULTGREN, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Hultgren. Thank you so much. Thank you for being here
today and your work.
Couple questions, I know recently the U.S. has been pulling
troops out of Afghanistan and Iraq. I wonder what does this
mean for foreign fighters coming to or from this region. With
the lessening U.S. military presence, can the number of foreign
fighters be expected to increase in these areas?
Sec. Rosenblum. So I had a fairly brief reference in my
testimony to Afghanistan and the appearance of ISIL there. And
I would say, first of all, that to the extent that we
understand what's happening there now is that former Taliban
forces are essentially rebranding themselves as ISIL, whether
in order to get more funding or in order to get support from
outside. And the estimates of the numbers vary quite a bit.
It's not clear how big of a phenomenon it is.
But we also--what we don't see, in the case of ISIL
appearing in Afghanistan, is it being a foreign fighter issue.
That is, it's not coming about because of an influx of people
coming from outside. Very frankly, the magnet for the foreign
fighters today is Syria and Iraq. It's not Afghanistan. So it's
sort of a homegrown issue within Afghanistan. There's a broader
issue of security in Afghanistan, which I'm not the expert on
and can't really speak to in detail today, but I don't think
that we've been able to draw a connection between the
appearance of ISIL in Afghanistan and our drawdown. So----
Mr. Hultgren. Let me go back to this idea of the magnet of
Syria drawing these people and get more focused on Central
Asia. With the Central Asian countries, are they effective in
preventing Syria-bound violent extremists from exiting their
borders? If not, how can the United States be helpful to assist
or exert pressure on them in a way that will diminish the flow
of foreign fighters into these regions?
Sec. Rosenblum. So it's a good question. I think that the
countries themselves are making efforts and trying to deal with
a relatively new challenge. And I think they would acknowledge
themselves--although they should really speak for themselves--
that they can be more effective, that they need to improve. And
that's why, for example, they're participating in these global
meetings that we're helping to convene to learn from others, to
learn how it's done and also to improve information sharing.
So there's a number of things that we are doing and can do
more of that relate to helping them to be more effective. One
thing that we encourage all the governments of Central Asia to
do is to approach the issue in a comprehensive way that doesn't
just involve law enforcement, as important as that is, but also
involves civil society, religious groups, private
organizations. The response needs to deal with issues that
belong to law enforcement and security, like sharing
information about passengers who are traveling, traveler
screening, border security, things like that, but that it also
needs to address the root causes, the stuff we were talking
about a minute ago, the local, community-level issues.
And so we've offered our support. Ultimately they recognize
that they need--they're going to need to step up themselves.
But there are a number of ways in which our assistance
programs, through these conferences where people can exchange
information and ideas, and through belonging to a more global
network, that they can become more effective.
Mr. Hultgren. One last question, and I apologize if you've
already covered this, I've got a couple different meetings
going on at the same time so I missed a good part of your
testimony and I apologize for that--but I know according to a
report the lure of the Islamic State for Central Asians--there
was a report by Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty--that said
marginalized people, especially entire families in the Central
Asia area, are joining ISIL because they believe it to be a
better option for their families than the dismal economic
prospects, restrictive governments and oppressive social
circumstances of their home countries.
I wonder, do you agree with that assessment of the reason
why--for ISIL's allure, especially for entire families? And if
so, what kind of approach, comprehensive or otherwise, that the
U.S. and its allies and partners and organizations such as OSCE
offer to help diminish the sort of allure towards ISIL from
Central Asian countries?
Sec. Rosenblum. Congressman, this goes back to the
discussion about the motivations and what makes people join.
And as I said earlier, there's a complex mix of motivations or
potential motivations that people look at. Because of the
nature of the conflict in Syria, and because the recruitment
obviously happens in a sort of clandestine way, it's very hard
for us--it's rare to get the chance, for example, to interview
someone and ask them the question.
There are some returnees, and so there's a handful of
people--I mean, returnees--who have gotten disillusioned with
their membership in these extremist groups. But there aren't
many opportunities to ask people why they join these groups. So
clearly the economic circumstances or other frustrations people
feel could be a factor in some cases. And in terms of what we
can do to address it, or the governments of the region can do
to address it, it's really about providing economic
opportunity. But again, even if we did that, it's not clear
that that's going address the problem.
And just one last data point to throw on the table as we
think about these matters: If you look at the numbers--and as
you know, my focus is only Central Asia, not the whole world--
but if you look around the world at where the foreign fighters
are coming from to join ISIL, I've been told that probably
about 20 percent are coming from Western countries--from
Europe, the United States and other places. So it becomes
harder to say that economic circumstances must be the main
cause, when you look at the origin of other people.
Mr. Hultgren. Right. I've talked with some other European
countries, like Sweden, and very concerned of what's happening
there. And again, these are very affluent communities with
strong social structures. And yet, people are still choosing to
leave to go fight. So this is complex and deep.
Mr. Chairman, can I ask one last question, is that all
right? I'm sorry. You just sparked another question I had where
you mentioned some are returning because they're disillusioned
and going back to their home country because it wasn't what
they expected it to be. My guess is some are returning and
haven't been disillusioned yet. They're returning maybe because
they were injured or they're just coming back home for a while.
What kind of potential instability in those countries might we
see or are we already seeing? Or is there a threat to some of
these existing countries and governments as fighters come back
who still are committed to the cause?
Sec. Rosenblum. Well, the issue of returning fighters from
Syria is definitely of great concern to the countries of the
region. And they are watching very closely when these people
come back. We don't know of any cases or evidence yet of
attacks originating from those returned people. But it's
something that obviously the countries of the region first and
foremost will look at very closely. And we, to the extent that
we can be helpful to them in that, we stand ready to do so.
Mr. Hultgren. Well, thank you very much for your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Smith. Just if I could ask one final question, Mr.
Secretary. Again, paralleling with what Mr. Pitts was talking
about with regard to the radical Islamic allure, the magnet, if
you will. When Boko Haram was emerging as a clear and
compelling threat, I held four hearings in my Subcommittee on
Human Rights, Africa and Global Health. Assistant Secretary
Johnnie Carson testified and said that they're just unhappy
with the infrastructure in the northern counties that were
under assault, not enough roads and bridges. And to which I
said, well, so they can blow them up?
There seemed to have been a Boko Haram misperception about
what the core radical Islamic belief really was causing these
individuals to do. And again, we're now at the 14th month of
the Chibok girls having been kidnapped, and so many others
since. I've actually met some of the ones who escaped when I
was in Jos and Abuja on two trips to Nigeria. My question
really goes to do we really understand the importance that the
imams play?
In Bosnia, we've had a great grand mufti, and I'm good
personal friends with him--Reis Ceric, and we're coming up to
the 20th anniversary of the slaughter--the genocide in
Srebrenica. And he has been eloquent in his defense of human
rights, but also strictly adhering to his deeply held
convictions about his faith, but rejects radical Islam. General
al-Sisi--President al-Sisi in Egypt gave a powerful statement
on January 1st to a group of clerics about the need for a
reformation.
And I'm wondering in the Central Asian countries, you did
mention that religious believers--leaders are included--how
much emphasis are we putting on bringing the imams in to speak
out, to talk to those who attend their mosque? Sometimes it
makes them a target. I'll never forget in Jos I met with the
Archbishop Kaigama and the grand imam there. He said that when
certain clerics speak out, the next day they're murdered by
Boko Haram.
So there's a huge risk. But it would seem to me that in the
Central Asian countries that risk would be far less and could
have a preventive effect if they were to be very robust in
their stressing of the importance of the tenets of their faith,
but it doesn't include radical Islamic and murder and mass
atrocities. Are they really being brought into the fold in
Central Asia?
Sec. Rosenblum. Mr. Chairman, it's a very good point. And
it is something that we emphasize strongly in our engagement.
We also talk about civil society organizations and private
organizations. But I think there's an especial emphasis in our
recommendations and also events that we organize, on religious
leaders being involved, for exactly the reason that you cited.
I mentioned earlier in passing, and I'll just repeat it again
because I thought it was such an interesting example of how
this can work, that our embassy grants program in Bishkek,
Kyrgyzstan is supporting workshops for imams on conflict
resolution.
And there was an event that was just held two days ago
where the deputy mufti of Kyrgyzstan, together with the head of
the counterterrorism department under the Ministry of Internal
Affairs, led a training that was organized by an NGO, actually,
called The Foundation for Tolerance International. The focus of
this was on giving imams training in mediation and negotiation
in factors conducive to the spread of violent extremism. So,
sensitizing them, but also getting them involved in the
preventive aspect.
Mr. Smith. That's great. Thank you.
Sec. Rosenblum. That's the sort of thing, I think, that's a
good initiative--
Mr. Smith. Thank you. We look forward to working with you.
Thank you so very, very much for your testimony, for your
expertise and for your leadership. We deeply appreciate it.
Sec. Rosenblum. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. I'd like to now welcome our second panel to the
witness table, beginning first with Frank Cilluffo, who is the
vice president of the George Washington University. Mr.
Cilluffo directs the Center for Cyber and Homeland Security, is
co-director of the George Washington University Cyber Center
for National and Economic Security. Before his university
appointment he served as special assistant to George W. Bush's
Department of Homeland Security. As a matter of fact, he was
principle adviser to Governor Tom Ridge and directed the
president's advisory council for homeland security.
He is routinely called upon to advise senior officials in
the executive branch, U.S. armed services, state and local
governments on an array of national homeland security and
strategy policy matters. He frequently briefs congressional
committees and their staffs. And he has testified before
Congress over 25 times at high-profile hearings on
counterterrorism, cyber threats, security--I guess this is 26--
and deterrence, weapons proliferation, organized crime,
intelligence and threat assessment, border and transportation
security and emergency management.
Similarly, he works with U.S. allies and organizations such
as NATO and Europol. He has presented at a number of bilateral
and multilateral summits on cyber security and countering
Islamic terrorism, including the U.N. Security Council. Without
objection, your full resume will be made part of the record.
And then secondly we'll hear from Jennifer Leonard, who
joined the Crisis Group's Washington office in June of 2002. As
Washington advocacy director, she works across the spectrum of
Washington's foreign policy actors, including the
administration, Congress, media, think tanks and NGOs to design
and implement strategies that impact the process of policy.
She's also the primary responsibility in advocacy for the
Crisis Group's Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and
the Caucasus projects.
Jen came to the Crisis Group after three years with the
U.S. Department of Energy, where she worked for the assistant
secretary for nuclear nonproliferation, then a special
assistant to the administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration. At the Department of Energy, she oversaw
aspects of a new nonproliferation initiative, helped establish
the Russia task force, international organizations and foreign
governments on national security matters. She received her M.A.
from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and B.A. from
Connecticut College.
Two very highly credentialed experts and we welcome you to
the Commission. Please begin if you would, Frank.
FRANK J. CILLUFFO, ASSOCIATE VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR,
CENTER FOR CYBER AND HOMELAND SECURITY, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY
Mr. Cilluffo. Chairman Smith, Commissioner Pitts, thank you
for the opportunity to testify before you today. As you can
probably already surmise, I've never had an unspoken thought,
but I will try to be brief and summarize my comments and
hopefully submit the complete testimony.
Mr. Smith. Without objection your full statement and
anything you want to attach to it will be made a part of the
record.
Mr. Cilluffo. Terrific, thank you. And I also thank you for
your leadership in examining this challenge. It is an important
issue because the threat not only affects U.S. interests at
home and abroad, but also to our allies and it is pressing. At
the same time, we can't go it alone, and I think that's
emblematic of the Helsinki Commission's overall mission. This
threat spans borders, to include cyberspace in some of the
discussions that were brought up earlier, and will demand
international cooperation and transnational solutions.
The foreign fighter challenge is a matter of serious
concern for the U.S. and our allies. While the foreign fighter
phenomena is nothing new, its present scale and scope is
unprecedented. By comparison--and Mr. Pitts, I think you
brought this up in one of your questions--questions earlier,
whether or not it's a religious duty. That was first
popularized during the first Afghan-Soviet war in the 1970s,
when Abdullah Azzam made that argument in that case. At that
time, which was a very significant yet, you had about 5,000
Muslims from around the world join up the banner to fight the
Soviets. You've had similar scenarios in terms of Chechnya, in
terms of their war in the Balkans and in Bosnia, and then again
of course in the FATA region more recently. But those numbers
are dwarfed compared to what we're seeing today.
So during the Soviet-Afghan war, you had 5,000 foreign
fighters. That was over a decade of fighting. Here you've seen
over 20,000, up to 25,000, and we're still early,
unfortunately, in the situation in terms of what we're
addressing here. So scale and scope you really can't compare.
When you look at the foreign fighter phenomena today in Syria
and Iraq, you're talking 90 different countries. You're talking
thousands of Westerners, including up to 150 Americans who have
either attempted to travel or successfully did travel to fight
alongside ISIL.
It's also worth noting that just this past April there was
a big arrest in the United States: four Brooklyn men, including
an Uzbek American who radicalized three other Americans from
Central Asia to go fight alongside ISIS or ISIL. The good news
is obviously we were able to prevent that before they were
successful. But I think it's a harbinger and an indicator of
what we're dealing with here.
And I think it's also worth noting that terrorism is a
small numbers business. You don't need big numbers from a
national security standpoint. This is why I think these numbers
are so significant. It's not just that you can put X number of
thousands behind it, but unfortunately it only takes small
numbers to cause mass harm.
And I've been meeting with the security services of all our
allied countries recently, and quite honestly they're
overwhelmed. They can't keep up with the flow, both in terms of
people attempting to travel and also returnees. There have been
quite a few returnees. And actually, I would disagree with the
previous witness in one little incident. There have been some
incidents, including in France, an attack on a synagogue, in
terms of someone who had fought overseas in Syria and Iraq. So
I think that there's enough there to be aware of in terms of
what we need to be worrying about.
The phenomena itself I think is becoming difficult to
detect. Obviously you want to get there left of boom, before an
incident occurs, and that requires enhanced law enforcement
capabilities as well as intelligence cooperation. That's where
transnational solutions come in and are so important. And I
think from a U.S. perspective, and the same for the Stans or
for the region in Central Asia, all real solutions here are
going to be local at the end of the day. They're the ones
closest to the action, they're the ones who know their
communities, and they're the ones who are ultimately going to
either detect and/or prevent or respond to an incident. So I
think that has to be part of our solution set.
There's been some discussion in terms of Afghanistan, and I
think this is a dilemma and I think it's a significant
challenge to U.S. interest. This conflict zone, as well as
others such as the Maghreb and the Sahel--you've had a number
of Americans fight alongside Al-Shabaab in Somalia and
alongside al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen. You've
had French fighters fighting alongside Ansar al-Dine in Mali.
So the Maghreb and the Sahel have been front and center for a
while.
Afghanistan was not only as we discussed earlier the first
major situation in terms of foreign fighters, but you are
starting to see that undergoverned space be filled and that
vacuum be filled, whether it's for fundraising purposes or
whether it's for training in terms of conflating different
organizations. So in addition to the ISIL direct threat,
another concern is they're interacting with other foreign
terrorist organizations. Some of those organizations have
stronger international reach and capability, which obviously
from a homeland perspective poses a high threat perspective. So
that is a concern when they come back to Afghanistan, and I
think the reason you saw the numbers drop in recent years in
terms of foreign fighters going into Afghanistan was because of
the pressure we were asserting then. I'd rather them look over
their shoulder than have the time and space to maneuver, to
plan, train, and ultimately execute attacks. And when our
presence is diminished, that vacuum will be filled. And nature
abhors a vacuum, and unfortunately I think a lot of bad actors
will do that.
In terms of Central Asia itself, you heard the numbers:
2,000 to 4,000. I think that's, again, early stages. I am quite
concerned about Colonel Khalimov's defection. I think that one
of the key indicators, if you look at any foreign fighter flow
historically, is what I refer to as bridge figures. These are
people who have feet in both communities. Think Anwar al-Awlaki
in terms of the role that he played to get Americans to fight
alongside AQAP; or Eric Breininger, who was a German who
brought over thousands of people to fight alongside the IJU in
the FATA region. These bridge figures are important, and I do
think that his role in terms of serving as a communicator to
spread propaganda should not be underestimated. Not only does
he have operational capability, he's got street creds with the
folks he's trying to influence.
It also recognizes the fact that, unfortunately, to
paraphrase Bill Clinton, in this case it's not ``the economy,
stupid,'' but it is the ideology. And we need to do more to
expose, unpack, undermine and hit back at the Islamist
ideology. I think that's been our greatest missing tool in our
counterterrorism toolkit and statecraft since
9/11, and something we ought to be doing an awful lot more to
be able to combat their lifeblood, to be blunt.
Operationally, obviously we're doing a lot with our Five
Eyes partners, and that should still be the number one
relationship the U.S. has in terms of counterterrorism. But
we're seeing that expand to our transatlantic partners in
Europe, and obviously we need to expand that even beyond into
the region.
In terms of working directly with the countries of Central
Asia, I really do feel there's more that can be done in terms
of border security. It had come up in the previous panel,
questioning whether or not Turkey's doing all that they can do.
The reality is, is bluntly speaking, they're not. And there's
an awful lot more we should be able to do, which will in turn
help the countries in the region of Central Asia get their arms
around this issue. And there's no travel restrictions between
Central Asian countries and Turkey, so maybe we ought to be
looking to that as well.
So a long-winded way of saying that the threat that we're
facing today obviously has implications to the region, but
that's one part of a much broader set of issues that I think
does directly impact U.S. national security. So thank you, sir.
Mr. Pitts. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
Ms. Leonard, you're recognized for your statement.
JENNIFER LEONARD, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP
Ms. Leonard. Well, thank you very much, Congressman Pitts,
for inviting us to present our findings and research before the
Helsinki Commission. We appreciate the Commission's sustained
attention to the region over these long years. It's been going
on for a while. We have appeared before the Commission before,
and we appreciate today's opportunity.
International Crisis Group is an international conflict
prevention organization, and our approach is grounded in field
research that we conduct. We've got teams of political analysts
who are based in or near countries vulnerable to violent
conflict, and based on that research and analysis we try to
come up with prescriptions to prevent and resolve it. And we've
covered Central Asia for over 15 years. Right now, our current
base is in Bishkek, and we conduct frequent visits throughout
the region exploring the challenges and opportunities facing
Central Asia, with a particular focus on the interplay of
democratic repression, the threat of radicalization, and the
decay and decline of the economy as well as infrastructure over
the years.
And in January of this year, we published ``Syria Calling:
Radicalisation in Central Asia,'' a copy of which I'd like to
submit for the record. \1\ But it addresses the very topic that
we're here to discuss. And over the course of the research that
we conducted over last fall and preserved in the report, indeed
we see--and I don't think anyone here debates--that Islamic
State is attracting a coalition of Central Asian jihadis and
sympathizers, and it's fostering a network of links within the
region. Now, it's prompted in part by the political
marginalization and the bleak economic prospects that my fellow
panelists have addressed, and it's beckoned roughly 2,000 to
4,000 Central Asian citizens so far.
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\1\ http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/b072-
syria-calling-radicalisation-in-central-asia.aspx
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And while the phenomenon has a disproportionate impact on
security perceptions at home, the region supplies only a small
fraction of the IS fighters in Syria. But if enough of them
return, it does present a serious risk to regional security and
stability, which--yes--presents a complex problem to each of
the five Central Asian governments, which each suffer from
their own brand of political repression, poverty, corruption,
and all of them have really struggled over the years to
accommodate space for expression of conscience, religious
freedom, and the religious organizations that would be involved
in that expression. Meantime, the belief that Syrian-trained
jihadis plan to establish a caliphate in the region has shaped
the security debate and the response in each. That's created an
increased use of surveillance, harassment and detentions, and
provided additional justification for ever-stricter laws on
religious practice and expression that, in fact, may be
counterproductive.
So against that backdrop, you've got the call of IS, which
says not only does it want fighters but it wants facilitators.
They want nurses, engineers, teachers to support the effort.
And that can appear to offer an attractive alternative for
those who are feeling alienated, discriminated, marginalized,
et cetera, and who find some inspiration in the belief that the
Islamic State is a meaningful alternative to the challenges of
their post-Soviet life.
I'd like to talk about the profile because I think our take
on this differs a little bit from what we've heard. I think
Commissioner Cohen alluded to the sort of young,
disenfranchised male. In fact, there is no single one-size-
fits-all profile for IS supporters in Central Asia. We're
seeing rich, poor, young, old, men, women, educated, non-
educated. We've talked to 17-year-old hairdressers, established
businessmen, women who've been basically abandoned by husbands
who, yes, have pursued migrant opportunities in Russia, and
they've started another family and left their first one behind.
There are families who believe their children have better
prospects in a caliphate.
The largest single group are Uzbeks, both citizens of
Uzbekistan and ethnic Uzbeks from the region--notably, the
Fergana Valley and the city of Osh, which is in Kyrgyzstan. And
the risk has amplified since violence claimed the lives of
about 400 ethnic Uzbeks back in 2010. That has gone unaccounted
for. Meanwhile, Tashkent puts their number at about 500. We
think that's conservative. The number may go up to about 2,500
of their citizens.
In northern Kyrgyzstan, there may be up to 300 cases
unreported of recruitment.
In Kazakhstan, IS supporters tend to come from the west and
south, but that's not exclusive. And about 150 made headlines
in fall of 2013 when they appeared in a YouTube video that
surfaced.
And then, of course, there's Tajikistan and the alarming
revelations of this recent defection, which has rattled the
regime and the region. Clearly, you can hear from our own
discussion that the U.S. government is seized with it and
wondering how did somebody who darkened West Point's doorstep
end up where he is today.
In terms of how the recruitment of these individuals
occurs, it's happening at local levels. It's happening by word
of mouth. Some are recruited at home in mosques and prayer
groups, others abroad. We discussed the vulnerability of
migrant workers. And the Internet and social media do play a
critical role, but it's not a decisive or definitive one.
Groups that the Commission is familiar with, and in
particular Hizb ut-Tahrir, play a peripheral role insofar as
they--the folks who gravitate towards them could be radicalized
to a degree, but these groups don't yet appear to be directly
involved in recruiting to Syria. But they may be an unwitting
waystation on the way to that fight.
More worrying for the regional security climate is where
IMU--the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan--and its offshoots fit
into this picture. Up until earlier this year they'd sort of
kept a respective distance, but in March IMU released a sort of
IS-style beheading video shot in Afghanistan in which they
declared their allegiance and support to IS.
So in terms of the motivations, we talked about the
economic disenfranchisement and the lack of opportunities.
Indeed, economic reward is not a motivation here. Rather, it's
the idea of a holy struggle to advance Islam. And people who
are frustrated, excluded, who would not have considered
fighting with the longer-established IMU, some of these outfits
that have been around in the area longer, they're perceiving IS
as the creator of a novel political order, something--the call
of the IS caliphate is more compelling. And an imam from
southern Kyrgyzstan told us in an interview, in comparing Syria
to Afghanistan, that Syria is about principles, Afghanistan was
about colonialism. So there's something that's resonating now
along those lines.
One group that we haven't talked about here is women, and
indeed we are concerned about the radicalization of women. The
traditional and state-approved Muslim community's sort of
disinterest in the role of women in society allows underground
groups to fill a need. Radical Islam gives them some framework
to distance--for women to distance themselves from marital or
family frameworks that they feel frustrated by. For other
women, it's the call of a devout life for them, perhaps for
their children. And still others are following fighters or
family members that have already sort of tread the path and
have a network of contacts in Turkey and IS territory.
Now, while the numbers of Central Asians who've received
active combat training and might yet be rising through the
ranks is increasing, so far the danger is something to be
prepared for rather than presenting some immediate threat. But
for the time being, then, Central Asia is fortunate that Syria
is a long way away, the problem's in its infancy, no major
attacks have yet occurred back in their neighborhood--well,
actually I should also say that a point that hasn't yet been
made is that many, in fact, may not return because they may
very well perish in Syria.
But in the meantime, and keenly aware of the dangers that
the return of these fighters could pose, beyond criminalizing
their participation abroad, the Central Asian governments have
done very little to address the reasons why the draw exists in
the first place for their citizens, nor have they contemplated
how that dynamic might relate to broader unmet societal
demands. The prevention of extremism and the rehabilitation of
jihadis are just not high on the agenda, and female
radicalization in particular is not at all discussed.
These dynamics risk gathering pace and purpose. They risk
blindsiding the governments that are ill-prepared to respond to
such a complex security threat. ``Complex'' is a term that we
keep throwing around, but indeed it is. And these are
governments that may well, in the current day, be tempted to
exploit the situation to crack down further on dissent--not
just dissent expressed through a more radical religious means,
but generally speaking. These governments need to assess
accurately the long-term danger that jihadism poses to the
region and take effective preventive action now. That doesn't
mean labeling everyone who is interested in an unfamiliar
interpretation of Islam as an extremist, adopting increasingly
severe laws to limit freedom of conscience and association, or
promoting intrusive security practices. Rather, effective
prevention means responding to an unmet demand for increased
democratic space, revising discriminatory laws and practices,
implementing outreach programs--we talked about creating jobs,
ensuring better coordination between security services and
tackling police reform. And on the most basic level tackling
police reform needs to start with the basic matter of how
they're perceived by the communities that they serve.
For its part, the U.S. and regional partners should
recognize that Central Asia is a growing source of foreign
fighters, and we need to be prioritizing police reform and a
more tolerant attitude towards religion in our bilateral
engagements and programming in the region. We heard some
promising references from Secretary Rosenblum, but clearly more
can be done. There are lessons to be gleaned from other
countries--from Denmark, from Indonesia--about how they've
addressed some of these issues. But the capacity of the Central
Asian governments to absorb and implement these lessons are
undermined by not only weak state institutions, but a profound
lack of political will.
And with that, I'll stop. Thank you.
Mr. Pitts. The Chair thanks the gentlelady. Thank you both
for excellent testimony.
I'll begin the questioning, and like to start where I ask
the secretary about the idea of motivation, not economic but
religious. And you mentioned Islamic ideology. You mentioned
religious duty and the caliphate. Could you drill down a little
bit? Are there Islamic scholars who teach that, since there is
a caliphate, they have a duty to go there and defend the
caliphate? Explain how serious that religious motivation, you
think, is. We'll start with you, Mr. Cilluffo.
Mr. Cilluffo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Obviously, that's a
complex question, but--and I'm not going to zero right in on
Central Asia specifically, but looking more broadly.
I touched on what I referred to as bridge figures. These
are individuals who have played a significant role in
radicalizing and ultimately recruiting individuals to fight
alongside foreign terrorist organizations. You cannot
underestimate the significant role that Anwar al-Awlaki played,
for example, in recruiting Americans to join up with AQAP in
Yemen or to stay at home, given the fact that they had
recognized that the authorities may be on to them, and they
become a homegrown violent Islamist extremist threat. So the
bridge figure role.
And that's why I think the colonel's defection is so
significant here. This is someone kids would look up to. This
is someone who, if you think back to even gangs, think back to
the role that Tookie Williams played, for example, a big gang-
banger. Ultimately, he had more effect in renouncing the gang
lifestyle to others than anyone else could. So this is a big
coup in terms of defector if you think from intelligence
perspectives.
And I think his message is important, and if it's OK I'll
quote quickly what he said because it was dressed in religious
garb, but at the end of the day his message was also trying to
resonate from an economic perspective. And his note was this:
``Going out to work every morning, look at yourself in the
mirror and ask yourself: Are you ready to die for the state or
not?'' He was clearly speaking directly to his colleagues in
the Tajik services and others who could be potentially
susceptible to this message. He went on to say ``I am ready to
die for the caliphate. Are you?'' So there's clearly a
religious underpinning, but it's also tapping into obviously a
much broader message as well.
There are imams who have spoken out against, obviously,
jihad and violent jihad and terrorist activity. But there are
also many that have not. And at the end of the day, there are
people turning to the Internet--I don't mean to be pejorative
here, but Sheikh Google, call it that. Anyone who's got the
loudest voice is going to get a lot of the followers, and these
videos are resonating with a number of folks.
Now, I think the role social media plays with Western
foreign fighters is absolutely critical. I think it probably
has less of a significant impact in terms of Central Asia. But
don't underestimate that particular set of issues.
Everyone's going to disagree with me on this point in this
room. It's not only about what we're doing good in the world.
We need to think of it as negative political campaigning. We've
got to tear down the enemy. We have to expose the hypocrisy,
expose the lies, and facilitate it falling under its own
weight. Why? Because it's ideologically bankrupt. And ideally,
that wouldn't be with our fingerprints on it. Obviously, it
should come from the communities themselves. But we've had a
hard time recognizing this as a principal tenet of our
response, and until we do we're always going to be playing
defense. We're always going to be reacting because it's the
ideology, it's the underpinning of the overall message. So I'm
sure that there are very different views on that in this room,
including possibly on this panel, but those are my thoughts.
Mr. Pitts. Thank you. Ms. Leonard, if you could respond to
that. And you mentioned principles versus colonization, if you
can drill down a little bit more.
Ms. Leonard. Well, maybe before I do I wanted to make a
point that we're talking about push versus pull, to a certain
degree. So are these individuals who feel so marginalized,
disenfranchised, discriminated against that they have no
options or feel their options are so little where they
currently reside that they're pushed from their home country
towards something grand? Or is the pull of the caliphate what's
bringing them? I think in most cases it's not an either/or,
it's a combination. And so we need to work to address both of
those dynamics.
Now, in terms of sort of bringing it more local and
understanding what the religious dynamics or the religious base
that currently exists in each country--and each country is
different--and we have to be truthful, and for a variety of
reasons known very well by the panel varying degrees of access
to each of these countries too. But historically the state-
sanctioned imams are not as versed and as educated, and
therefore as capable of countering that narrative, that lure.
And to the degree that programs can enhance their understanding
and their capacity and their ability to counter that narrative,
it's a good thing. But they're operating in a space, too, where
they are state-sanctioned. So the state itself needs to arrive
at a level of comfort where that space can be provided and take
some of the pressure off of the situation, and that in nearly
every case runs counter to how these regimes approach
governance.
Mr. Pitts. You mentioned the profiling. We've had a large
discussion about fighters from Central Asia, but can you
possibly highlight distinctions between fighters from this
region and those coming from Europe or elsewhere? Are there
differences in motivations? Are there differences in lethalness
or, in combat experience?
Ms. Leonard. My comparative frame of reference--this isn't
my expertise; we're sort of based in or near conflict zones,
and we've done a lot of work historically in the Balkans but
haven't taken a really close look at this. So I'm really not in
a position to speak with any expertise on this.
Mr. Pitts. OK. Mr. Cilluffo, you want to speak to that?
Mr. Cilluffo. Unfortunately, there's not a single, easy
answer, a profile that comes in different shapes, sizes and
forms, and different people are being--whether actively or
susceptible to that message. So when you look at the U.S., for
example, one of the things we saw that was very interesting
when we were following some of the foreign fighter flows to
Yemen and Somalia, the Brits were, in particular, they always
had a significant foreign fighter issue vis-a-vis Pakistan,
given the strong community in the U.K. Overnight, they were
seeing, though, that a lot of these first/second generation of
Southeast Asian origin fighters moving to Somalia and Yemen.
And the answer that the security service would give you is they
were coming back with the same street creds; in other words,
they knew that the likelihood of them getting picked up was a
lot higher traveling to Pakistan, but less so when traveling to
North Africa. So I think we are seeing a different pattern and
demographic.
And the one thing I would note here is, we first did our
first major study on foreign fighters about five years ago, and
I get back to the fact that terrorism is a small numbers
business. In this case, it was an individual by the name of
Najibullah Zazi. This was a naturalized citizen who was
traveling to Afghanistan. His his intent was to join up with
the Taliban. He was intercepted by al-Qaida, turned back
around, and said you are of much greater value to attack the
homeland. He had the ability to travel. He understood the
region. And this was one of those cases since
9/11 where our system was really blinking red. Luckily, we got
there before the bombs went off, and his attempt was multiple
suicide/homicide bombings in the New York subway. We were able
to prevent that, but that was pretty far along in the planning
phase. And then if you look at another case in the United
States, Faisal Shahzad, the so-called Times Square bomber, he
too initially had intentions to go overseas and was turned back
around.
So I just caution that you don't need huge numbers. And
that's what makes this so difficult, because we can't--and when
you're talking 25,000, when you're hearing some of the security
services in Europe saying they are absolutely overwhelmed, they
don't have the bodies, they don't have the capability, that's
why transnational solutions I think right now are so important.
And I think anything the Commission can do to keep Turkey's
feet to the fire in terms of policing the border would be well-
received because that's where most of these guys are still
slipping through.
If you look back to the FATA region and foreign fighters in
the past, it was pretty hard to get to the FATA. To get to
Syria, it's a bus ticket, a train ticket, or a plane ticket
away, and you can easily slip across the border. And there were
probably about 18 months there where all security services were
not aware of the significant growth of this phenomenon, so
those numbers, who knows where they are and whether or not
they've come back.
Mr. Pitts. Thank you. Recognize the Chairman, Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Pitts.
Let me thank you for your testimony. I did read it. I was
on the floor, regrettably, and missed most of the oral
presentations. But let me just ask you a couple of questions.
In the Middle East, we know that anti-Semitism is used very
effectively to radicalize communities in country after country.
More moderate Muslims are ostracized/marginalized if they don't
toe the line on being virulently anti-Semitic. And I'm
wondering what impact anti-Semitism in an overarching way is
having on the Central Asian countries. If you could--and maybe
you don't want to, but if you could, how would you rate each
country? What might be the best: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan? How would you say--
who's doing the most? Which country is the laggard, or
countries?
Your comments, Ms. Leonard, on motivations--I couldn't
agree more. And I sometimes think that is missed, which is why
I asked Secretary Rosenblum about that, whether or not there is
an appreciation for how that motivation is what drives this,
because they missed it on Boko Haram. I'll give you an example.
For almost three years I tried to get the administration to
designate Boko Haram an FTO, a foreign terrorist organization--
number of hearings, dialogue after dialogue, finally put in a
bill to do so. The day we were going to mark up the bill, they
announced it was an FTO. We had missed two and a half, almost
three years in not so designating it because it was just a
bunch of ruffians who were blowing up bridges and killing
people rather than driven by an ideology. So I think your point
about the idea of holy struggle to advance Islam, the novel
political order, universal purpose, creation of a caliphate, I
think those words need to be said over and over again. So you
got to understand the nature of, in this case, a metastasizing
of cancer in order to combat it. And so I thank you for
bringing focus to that.
Because we do have to--and I did ask Secretary Rosenblum;
if you could maybe, perhaps both of you, answer this--are we
engaging the Islamic leadership well enough? I waited with
bated breath to hear comments when al-Sisi made those famous
comments on January 1st, and then a week later--I mean, that
was bold. He was Sadat-like. And yet, it was like a dead
silence here in the Capitol. We should have been embracing that
in calling for that reformation and for Islam to heal itself
from within. If you could speak to that.
Human rights--Secretary Rosenblum thought there was not a
nexus between what's happening in human rights--what your view
is on that.
With regards to Chechnya, the dictator there, Kadyrov, and
Chechen authorities in general, as you know, have become
increasingly aggressive and tinged with Salafist notions. I
remember we held hearings, did resolutions, traveled to Moscow.
We even had Elena Bonner twice testify at hearings that I
chaired--Sakharov's wife--when the Chechen wars broke out. And
now we're seeing this renewed--maybe it never went away--
radicalization occurring there. How does that figure into all
of this? Because, as you all know, those fighters were
absolutely bizarre in their extremism.
And finally, if you could--let's see--again, whether or not
the administration understands the core reasons why, I would
note parenthetically that--and I held hearings on this as
well--for half of President Obama's presidency, he did not have
an ambassador-at-large for international religious freedom, did
not name countries of particular concern. To me--and I held
hearings on it and asked them why, never got a good answer--it
was revelation of priorities. It was no priority. We passed
legislation last year to establish a special envoy for Middle
Eastern minority religions. That would include the Islamic
groups--faiths that are marginalized themselves, including
Coptic Christians and others. There's still nobody named as
special envoy. We do have, thankfully, right now an excellent
ambassador-at-large, David Saperstein, Rabbi Saperstein, but he
came on late. He's trying to do his level best. But you know,
if you miss the reason why these things are happening, your
remedy's going to be far less effective and efficacious.
So if you could speak to those things.
Ms. Leonard. That's a long list.
You had asked for a ranking. I'm going to sidestep the
ranking, but I'm going to address it a different way and talk
about the acute problem for Uzbeks. Now, we talk about Uzbek
citizens and ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan, and that's what we've
seen as the ripest group.
In Uzbekistan, it's a very repressive regime. There are all
kinds of challenges, and those citizens have long demanded
increased democratic space. We're no longer operating in
Uzbekistan because of those same reasons. We were forced to
leave the country, along with a lot of other NGOs, and that is
a symptom of a very large and significant problem.
In the meantime, right across the border, you've got the
ethnic Uzbek minorities, a minority that has really suffered in
Kyrgyzstan as a disenfranchised minority. I referred to the
death of 400 of them in 2010. That's totally unresolved. These
are completely marginalized. They don't feel safe. Even if
there are whiffs of radical activity and you're a moderate
ethnic Uzbek in Kyrgyzstan, the level of trust with the
security services, you're not going to go because it invites
increased surveillance, harassment, potential detention. And so
we're flirting with it becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. And
so, for that reason, I sort of single out the plight of Uzbeks
in particular.
But that's not to say--I mean, as the alarming example of
late in Tajikistan--that the problems aren't going to crop up.
And if I use my colleague's term, this is a small numbers game.
There are some really real threats. So I'll shift gears a bit
on your request for a ranking and say as much.
Now, in terms of the threat of return of foreign fighters,
a point that I didn't make in my shorter comments is the
criminalization that's happening--this is laws that have been
introduced in each of the countries, et cetera, in various
stages--Uzbekistan is actually one that has said--contained in
the legislation is basically an amnesty in terms of, as long as
you haven't actually done anything, we'll forgive you, just
come to us. And there's an effort to rehabilitate. If you are
that individual making that choice, the track record of that
government doesn't sort of infuse any degree of trust in taking
that leap toward ``I'm sorry, I've changed my mind, I want to
walk back from it.'' And so the Uzbek government and the rest
of them need to really think hard about how do we prevent that.
Now, if you're a foreign fighter that wants to return home
for whatever reason, our assessment is that you'd be more
likely to probably find your way to Kyrgyzstan because
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are going to treat you probably, on
the relative scale of how you'll be treated in the
neighborhood, more harshly. A zero-tolerance policy is what's
likely to be anticipated. Kyrgyzstan, although there may be
severe consequences and not a lot of faith in what the
rehabilitation opportunities would look like, it might be a
safer bet if you really feel compelled to return home.
You asked about human rights and the causal relationship.
It's a symptom of a larger problem. While there may not be
absolute sort of research illustrating the direct relationship
between human rights violations and radicalization, I think we
can all agree that we're here today suggesting that it's a
worrying trend. These are repressive regimes, with varying
degrees of repression in each. But human rights is symptomatic
of a larger problem and a lack of space. So, causal or not,
definitively, I don't think it's a false road. I mean, it's a
problem.
Chechens, I think I'll take a pass on that.
And whether or not the administration understands the core
reason why. We've talked about Afghanistan. For about a decade,
we've all talked about and--we've worked in Central Asia for
over 15 years. The Commission has paid a lot of attention to
the area. While the war was going on in Afghanistan and active,
frankly, those national security priorities trumped the
conversation that we're having today about the dynamics that
have created this particular problem. So while we might have
wanted to promote rule of law, governance, open democratic
space, take some of the pressure off, attend to the very issues
that we have identified as creating the environment where
radicalization is happening, those were trumped by strategic
and tactical priorities that flowed out of the operations in
Afghanistan, and it was really hard to find some bandwidth. So
here we are today having that conversation.
Mr. Cilluffo. Mr. Chairman, I'll try to pick up and briefly
touch on some of the excellent questions. By the way, that
should be your Commission staff, if they could put together the
answers to those questions I think they'll be very well focused
for a year because those are excellent questions.
Firstly, let me just make reference on your comment on
anti-Semitism and all minority religious rights--Christian
groups and others. They are oppressed. And you had mentioned
Boko Haram examples in Nigeria, but you've seen the same play
out in Iraq, obviously, as well as minority Muslim--Sufis in
particular have a pretty hard time operating in the area.
I'm also concerned about anti-Semitism, by the way, in
Europe. If you notice the communications that are trying to
resonate to the Islamists in the region, they do use that as
part of that narrative.
But I might try to tie a point that my colleague said
eloquently, and that ties to some of the human rights issues.
Whether it's causal or not I think misses some of the point.
The reality is it is part of the message, the story. That story
is resonating, and it really is about storytelling with a
certain group of individuals. So real or perceived grievances
is almost irrelevant. It's how it's packaged in that broader
story, and the storyboard has different components along the
way. And human rights will always be one of those issues, real
or perceived, raised in that storyboard.
One thing I'd note, especially as pertains to Western
foreign fighters, it's not the message as much as it's the
packaging around the message. It's an emotional call as much as
it is a religious call. So it's in the trappings of religion,
but it really is an emotional call. And we've been very
uncomfortable unpacking that particular set of issues. So I
think that is an area we can and should do more.
So a long-winded way of saying anti-Semitism is a concern.
So are the rights of Christians in the area and other Muslims.
Mr. Smith. I want to thank both of you for your
extraordinary insights, your leadership. And we benefit greatly
from that, as does the, by extension, Congress, and I hope the
executive branch as well.
I do have to run to the floor. I have a speech I have to
give, a colloquy. I might have missed it. I hope I haven't.
But I want to thank you so very, very much. The hearing's
adjourned.
Whereupon, at 4:22 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Prepared Statements
----------
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Welcome to our witnesses and to everyone joining us this afternoon
for this hearing on foreign fighters and the escalating threat of ISIS
in Central Asia.
A year ago today, the city of Mosul fell to Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria, or ISIS, during a wave of violence that swept brutally
through Northern Iraq. Many of those who took part in the offensive
were foreign fighters--in fact, the UN Security Council recently
estimated that there are now at least 25,000 foreign terrorist fighters
from more than 100 countries who have travelled internationally to join
or fight for terrorist entities associated with ISIS and Al-Qaida.
According to the International Crisis Group, as many as 4,000
foreign fighters come from the five countries of central Asia. Just
last week, we learned that the chief of Tajikistan's counter-terrorism
program--someone highly trained by our own government--abandoned his
post to join ISIS.
What does this say about the current efforts to stop terror-minded
men and women from volunteering and traveling to the Middle East?
Clearly, our government--working with others and with organizations
like the OSCE--must take stronger action to combat radicalization
beyond our borders, as well as to ensure that returning foreign
fighters do not bring jihad and murder back home.
Central Asian governments face major challenges here. Many of these
derive from their history as part of the Soviet Union, from wars in
nearby Afghanistan and from limited economic development, which has led
millions of their citizens to seek employment abroad, especially in
Russia. The discrimination and exploitation to which those workers are
subjected, as well as the decline of the Russian economy and changes in
the Russian visa regime, have reduced the remittances these workers can
send home to support their families and may have contributed to
creating the conditions that ISIS uses to recruit foreign fighters from
among different Central Asian nationalities.
Some of the challenges the central Asia governments face are of
their own making--including widespread corruption, lack of rule of law,
and their own human rights records. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have
particularly terrible human rights records, among the worst in the
world in respect of political prisoners and torture. All of these
factors are exploited by ISIS recruiters and other organizations
promoting radicalization and violent extremism.
It should be the particular role of the United States to promote,
to the central Asian governments, our conviction that ``fighting
terrorism'' is no excuse for violating human rights or the rule of law.
I look forward to hearing about the many issues here, including
counteracting radicalization of potential foreign fighters, inhibiting
the travel of recruits and volunteers to the Middle East, disrupting
financial support to fighters and their families, and preventing their
return to their home countries. This is in the first place the
responsibility of the governments, and there is the question of what
they are trying to do and how well they are doing it. There is the
question of what our government and the OSCE is doing and can do
better, working with the central Asian governments--here we need to
talk about issues of document security, border security and law
enforcement coordination. I hope we can touch on all of these aspects.
Prepared Statement of Hon. Roger F. Wicker, Co-Chairman, Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership and for calling a
hearing on an incredibly important aspect of security for our country
and for our partners in Central Asia and all across the entire OSCE
region. I also want to welcome our witnesses, and I look forward to
hearing their insights on how we can better address this threat.
I am pleased to note that the United States has a strong record of
promoting multilateral, multidimensional approaches to combatting the
diverse challenges associated with the recruitment of terrorists, as
outlined by Chairman Smith, stretching back over 10 years. Since 2003,
following a proposal by the United States, OSCE countries have been
focused on improving security standards for international travel
documents as a means of thwarting easy cross-border movement of
terrorists. Constraining terrorists' mobility continues to be a major
security concern in the region, particularly regarding flows of foreign
fighters from Central Asia. Over the past several years, the
establishment and increased efficiency of migration networks has played
a major role in ISIL's ability to recruit terrorists from abroad.
Additionally, since 2004, OSCE participating States, again at the
urging of the United States, have concentrated on the implementation of
Financial Action Task Force recommendations regarding terrorist
financing. Access to capital not only empowers military capacity of
organizations such as ISIL, but also affords them the opportunity to
finance travel expenses for foreign fighters. For many Central Asians,
ISIL's appeal further rests on its supposed ability to offer greater
access to educational opportunities, religious cohesion, and more
stable social structures. If the United States and its partners wish to
successfully extinguish the growing threat of these extremist
organizations, then deliberate steps must be taken to dismantle its
organizational structures.
In addition to monitoring the dangers posed in Central Asia by the
continued recruitment of foreign fighters to Afghanistan, Syria and
other areas of the Middle East, the United States must remain vigilant
in safeguarding its own security. Each individual recruited from
Central Asia and other regions contributes to the growing influence of
ISIL and the prevalence of violent extremism around the world.
Over the past several years, thousands of men and women have
abandoned their countries to join the ranks of ISIL. As Chairman Smith
noted, on May 30 it was announced that a top military official from
Tajikistan defected in favor of fighting for the terrorist group. The
official had received formal military training in the United States.
This troubling incident is indicative of the increased influence ISIL
is continuing to build in Central Asia, even among powerful
individuals. We must focus our efforts on nullifying the pretexts ISIL
uses for recruitment and on destroying the framework of ISIL at the
source, while simultaneously encouraging respect for human rights and
bolstering institutions and rule of law in Central Asia and elsewhere.
During the past decade, this Commission and the Congress have been
staunch advocates of the counter-terrorism work of the Office of
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), OSCE field missions,
especially those in Central Asia, and the extraordinary efforts of the
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. This work must continue into the future
and must remain a priority for the United States and OSCE member
States.
Prepared Statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Commissioner, Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe
I want to commend the Chairman for convening today's hearing.
Developments related to the recruitment of foreign fighters throughout
the OSCE space have been of deep and ongoing concern to me, and I want
to see continued progress in addressing this matter. The cooperative
bonds between the peoples of the United States and Central Asian
countries, I believe, are a solid foundation for us to cooperate on the
crucial issues of combatting violent extremism and of preventing
radicalization of individuals to the point that the become foreign
terrorist fighters.
As Chairman Smith noted, the Helsinki Commission has strongly
supported the efforts of the U.S. government over many years to build
cross-border, comprehensive security based on the shared commitments
made by all OSCE states--including Central Asians--to respect
fundamental freedoms. Human beings, whether they live in Washington or
Paris or Tashkent, should expect of their governments reasonable steps
to protect them from those who would do them harm, but also that their
governments not impose repressive security measures that inhibit the
exercise of freedoms of speech, assembly, media or religion.
Unfortunately, we have seen such steps taken by governments in
Russia and Central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and
Tajikistan. These restrictions fuel resentment on the part of law-
abiding citizens and give the propaganda arms of organizations like
ISIL ammunition with which to attempt to lure individuals into their
international terrorist networks. While I look forward to hearing from
witnesses about the scale of the threat we are confronting and the
measures we are, or should be taking to counter it, I want to note the
important multi-dimensional approach to security that is the hallmark
of the OSCE. As the OSCE's first-dimension, or security dimension,
response to threats to security and stability in the 21st Century has
grown to focus on border security, policing and counter-terrorism, we
have never lost site of the interdependence of such measures with
economic cooperation and respect for human rights.
If one looks at the Helsinki Commission's record over time, we have
advocated for keeping the focus on human rights, democracy and the
rule-of-law in U.S. policy as even handed as possible, toward allies
and partners alike. We seek nothing but friendship and cooperation with
the countries of Central Asia. But friends can--and need to--be honest
with one another when they see mistakes being made. I take very
seriously the grave concerns about ISIL and the threat that the
recruitment of Central Asian fighters--from Russia and their home
countries--represents to those countries and to the U.S. itself. As we
listen to the views and suggestions of friends on our own shortcomings,
I hope that others will be willing to consider our suggestions on how
they can deal with security challenges like ISIL while respecting their
OSCE human rights commitments.
Thank you Mr. Chairman and thanks in advance to our witnesses.
Prepared Statement of Daniel N. Rosenblum, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Central Asia, U.S. Department of State
Introduction
Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission: I welcome your invitation
to review U.S. efforts to address the issue of foreign fighters from
Central Asia joining the ranks of ISIL (Daesh) and other terrorist
organizations. The United States is working with governments in Central
Asia and with multilateral organizations in the region--including the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)--in ways
that parallel our work with partners around the world. Together with
our international partners, we are committing significant resources to
track and disrupt foreign terrorist fighter travel and recruitment. We
are working together on information sharing and border security, legal
reform and criminal justice responses, and countering violent extremism
to prevent recruitment and radicalization to violence. And we marshal
our resources to encourage key partners in Europe, North Africa, the
Middle East, and Asia--including in Central Asia--to prioritize the
threat, address vulnerabilities, and adopt preventive measures.
Central Asians and the Conflict in Syria and Iraq
For the overwhelming majority of Central Asians, the conflict in
Syria and Iraq is a distant phenomenon; it is not something they think
about day-to-day. But a small minority of Central Asians have been
successfully recruited by violent extremists to join the conflict.
Violent extremists have attempted to recruit Central Asians, millions
of whom live and work in Russia as migrant workers, into the conflict
in Syria and Iraq. In fact, while the nature of the conflict in Syria
and Iraq and the clandestine nature of foreign terrorist fighter
recruitment make reliable statistics nearly impossible to obtain, a
variety of research suggests the vast majority of Central Asian
recruits are being recruited from outside the borders of Central Asia,
and many come from the Russian Federation.
Why are these Central Asians leaving Russia to fight in Iraq and
Syria? Motivations vary widely throughout the world, and even on a
country-by-country basis within Central Asia. One key factor for
migrant workers in Russia can be the lack of a positive presence of
family, community, and religious leaders that, back home, would all
work to prevent recruitment and radicalization to violence.
Furthermore, once in Russia, Central Asian migrant workers are often
subject to ghettoization. Many regularly experience discrimination,
harassment, and humiliation from both the public and the authorities.
The absence of mitigating factors such as social, familial and
spiritual bonds together with the presence of aggravating factors such
as marginalization and disenfranchisement create fertile ground for
extremist recruiters. Recruiters are able to traverse migrant-labor
heavy neighborhoods in Russia's cities and use social media to find and
target their quarry--isolated and lonely individuals who want to feel
connected to something empowering and larger than themselves, often
including individuals who were not previously religiously observant or
educated. Recruiters employ a variety of narratives to attract
adherents, including the idea of a ``just war'' in defense of
innocents, an Islamic caliphate as a utopian paradise, and the
opportunity to fight back against alleged ``Western oppression.'' When
one or more of these narratives resonate with vulnerable individuals,
they are encouraged to travel to the conflict zone to take up arms,
either by recruiters face-to-face or through mechanisms such as social
media. The new recruits are not only joining ISIL but also a range of
other terrorist organizations, such as al Nusrah Front, some of which
in fact are in conflict with ISIL. Recruiters also use similar tactics
to attract the smaller numbers of individuals who travel directly from
Central Asia to the conflict zone.
What can be done to disrupt the flow of Central Asian fighters to
Syria and Iraq? No one-size-fits-all approach could succeed, since
radicalization involves a complex interplay of personal, group,
community, sociopolitical, and ideological factors. Key to countering
violent extremism is to mitigate causes of radicalization, such as
economic distress and hopelessness; as such, one key effort is to
improve economic prospects and job opportunities in the Central Asian
countries themselves, where radicalization is less likely to take place
than among migrant worker communities in Russia. Of course, improving
economic opportunities in Central Asia is a long-term effort, and one
that the United States and other donor countries have tried for years
to address through various development aid efforts. There are also
lessons to be learned about promoting safer labor migration as in the
countries of South Asia. But there are also plenty of actions that can
be taken in the short-to-medium term to address the threat of
recruitment. And so, we have begun to engage the governments of Central
Asia--and their peoples--about steps they can take to identify and
disrupt recruiting networks, prevent radicalization to violence, hinder
financing, monitor and prevent travel and transit of recruits, engage
civil society to develop resilient communities, build migrant support
networks, and counter the false narratives spread by violent
extremists. Additionally, we encourage Central Asian governments to
identify and act upon credible domestic and transnational security
threats, and to avoid conflating violent extremism with political
opposition, the activities of civil society organizations, and peaceful
religious practice. To prevent radicalization to violence, governments
need to distinguish peaceful expressions of conscience from genuine
threats of violence.
Let me also turn for a moment from the conflict in Syria and Iraq
to briefly address recent media reports on the presence of ISIL in
Afghanistan. We have seen signs that ISIL is attempting to spread into
Afghanistan, and that some Taliban groups have rebranded themselves as
ISIL to attract funding and recruits. ISIL's presence in Afghanistan is
a relatively new phenomenon and it will take time to evaluate its long-
term prospects.
It is clearly a complicated situation, and one that requires a
complex response. Let me turn to some of the efforts we are undertaking
globally, regionally, and at the national level through both bilateral
and multilateral engagement.
Global Efforts
Under the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, which we have been
encouraging our partners in Central Asia to join, our key efforts
include disrupting the flow of foreign fighters and countering the
messaging of violent extremists. On the former, efforts range from
legal reform and criminal justice responses, to border control, to
information sharing, to interdicting the travel of known and suspected
terrorists, and more. On counter-messaging, the United States, along
with the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom, lead the
Coalition Working Group on that subject, which directs coalition
efforts on counter-ISIL messaging across platforms and languages. The
UAE has established a messaging center in the UAE and may examine
prospects for other regional messaging centers. This is a critical
element because, as I mentioned earlier, so much of the violent
radicalization and recruitment begins on social media, on people's
smartphones, where our enemies are employing sophisticated and
effective techniques, and we have to counter them.
Another global effort regarding foreign fighters is through the
United Nations. In September 2014, President Obama chaired a session of
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that adopted Resolution
2178, which requires countries to take several steps to address the
threat of foreign terrorist fighters, including preventing them from
entering or transiting their territories and to adopt and implement
appropriate legislation to prosecute them. Resolution 2178 also called
for improved international cooperation through sharing information on
criminal investigations, interdictions, and prosecutions. The
resolution marked the first time that the UNSC named countering violent
extremism as a priority for Member States. The UNSC directed UN
counter-terrorism organizations to assist countries in enforcing the
resolution. The resolution resonated in Central Asia, as shown by
Kazakhstan's statement accompanying the resolution, in which Deputy
Foreign Minister Yerzhan Ashikbaev said cooperation between neighboring
States and regional organizations plays a key role in preventing
terrorism and highlighted specific concerns about young people
travelling to join ``terrorist-driven conflicts.''
Third, in February the White House convened the Summit on
Countering Violent Extremism that brought together ministers from more
than 60 countries, the United Nations Secretary-General and other
international organizations--including the OSCE Secretary General--and
representatives from civil society and the private sector to develop a
comprehensive action agenda against violent extremism. It charted a
path for progress that includes a leaders-level summit on the margins
of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2015.
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan took part in the event in Washington and have
continued to engage as the participants have built on the Summit's
action agenda.
So that covers some of our global efforts, but what are we
specifically doing in the region?
Regional Efforts
At the end of this month, the Government of Kazakhstan will host a
ministerial-level Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Summit in Astana.
The Astana event follows up on the White House CVE Summit and aims to
bring together government authorities, multilateral representatives,
and civil society leaders to exchange perspectives and share
information, and propose programs that will address violent extremism
at its roots. The Summit's sessions plan to focus on eight priority
areas:
Assessing the Drivers and Threats of Violent Extremism in
South & Central Asia
Innovative Approaches in Preventing and Countering
Violent Extremism
Violent Extremist Propaganda: Countering the Message and
Offering Alternatives
Developing National Strategies/Action Plans to Counter
Violent Extremism
Promoting Local Research on the Drivers and Spread of
Violent Extremism
Building Relationships and Success Stories--Government
and Community Collaboration
Empowering youth, women, and religious leaders and civil
society to prevent violent extremism
The Role of the Private Sector in Helping to Prevent
Violent Extremism
Later this month, and complementing the Astana event, we are supporting
a Civil Society CVE Summit in Istanbul. That summit plans to focus on
nine priority areas:
Promoting Local Research and Information-Sharing on the
Drivers of Violent Extremism
The Role of Civil Society, including Women and Youth in
Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
Strengthening Community-Police and Community-Security
Force Relations as Ingredients for Countering and Preventing Violent
Extremism
Promoting Positive Narratives and Weakening the
Legitimacy of Violent Extremist Messaging
Interactive Technology Training for Addressing CVE
Promoting Educational Approaches to Build Resilience to
Violent Extremism
Enhancing Access to Mainstream Religious Knowledge
Preventing Radicalization in Prisons and Rehabilitating
and Reintegrating Violent Extremists
Identifying Political and Economic Opportunities for
Communities Vulnerable to Radicalization and Recruitment to Violent
Extremism
So our regional approach is to bring together governments and civil
society across Central Asia to identify the drivers of radicalization
and find the solutions.We are also helping to support the OSCE as it
leads several regional efforts on the issue in Central Asia. This past
February, the OSCE's Transnational Threats Department and its
Tajikistan office organized a regional three-day workshop on promoting
regional cooperation and response to foreign terrorist fighters. This
workshop was the first of its kind in Central Asia and brought together
participants from government and civil society to discuss the
requirements of the UNSC and OSCE resolutions on countering foreign
fighters. From Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan all
sent representatives. The OSCE also plans an August regional workshop
on preventive obligations regarding foreign terrorist fighters under
UNSCR 2178 in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in addition to a June OSCE-wide
Conference in Vienna on countering the incitement of foreign terrorist
fighters and preventing their recruitment and departure. And as a
follow-up to the White House CVE Summit, the OSCE has developed a
multi-year program that aims to build the capacity of civil society
leaders, including youth, women, and religious figures, to contribute
to CVE efforts.
National Efforts
Central Asian governments are deeply concerned about the spread of
violent extremism, and they want to engage with the United States and
like-minded partners. Our diplomats regularly discuss these issues with
their counterparts, and we encourage the countries of Central Asia to
take a comprehensive approach to CVE and countering foreign fighter
recruitment and radicalization to violence that includes improving
security and law enforcement capacities consistent with international
human rights obligations, as well as broadening engagement with civic
groups, religious organizations, private businesses, and other groups
to counter the spread of violent extremism through grassroots programs.
Our bilateral programs also encourage this kind of comprehensive
approach. These efforts include security-focused programs such as
building law enforcement capacity and enhanced investigative skills,
but also broader programs such as those aimed at training law
enforcement in community policing techniques, or increasing the role of
religious leaders in conflict resolution at the local level.
Kazakhstan
As shown by their hosting of the upcoming CVE Summit and co-
sponsorship of UNSC 2178, Kazakhstan is a leader on these issues in the
region. At the highest levels, Kazakhstan's leadership has stressed the
importance of joint efforts to discredit ISIL and counter its
propaganda. We could not agree more, and we look forward to working
with Kazakhstan and other countries in the region on counter-ISIL
messaging. We are already working with the Kazakhstanis, through our
assistance efforts, to help increase access to civically-relevant
information; and to support increased communication among communities,
civil society organizations, the private sector and government
officials. The Department of Defense is also using counter-narcotics
funding to build the capacity of Kazakhstan's border guards with border
outposts and training.
Kyrgyz Republic
The Kyrgyz Republic has followed up on the White House CVE Summit
with programming and policies based on the Summit's recommendations,
and our Embassy reports very positive engagement on this issue. U.S.
development assistance provides economic growth programs designed to
improve people's lives, promote jobs, and enhance business and trade,
as well as to support the development of a more collaborative
relationship between government and civil society. NGOs like Foundation
for Tolerance International have partnered with the Ministry of
Internal Affairs (MVD) to conduct preventative training exercises in
areas that are especially susceptible to recruitment. Our Embassy funds
programs on increasing the role of religious leaders in peacekeeping in
volatile areas, as well as English language and vocational skills
training for madrassah students. And the OSCE, through its Community
Security Initiative, is embedding police advisors in at-risk
neighborhoods in the south of Kyrgyzstan to promote community policing
approaches, encourage ethnic reconciliation, and mitigate tensions.
Tajikistan
In Tajikistan, we are working to address some of the drivers of
radicalization by increasing economic opportunities within the country
in an effort to reduce migration and potential exposure to extremist
ideologies. USAID's Feed the Future initiative, for example, seeks to
improve food security, and reduce poverty and hunger. Its programs work
with local communities to improve irrigation water management and help
local families to improve the quality and quantity of their crops,
thereby increasing family incomes. USAID is also helping to strengthen
citizen participation in local government decision making and to
improve local governments' abilities to support its communities. The
Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement (INL) operates a Border Guard Infrastructure program that,
in addition to training and equipping border guards, focuses on
district-level community policing efforts that work to counter violent
extremism in remote areas. This program runs in parallel to an OSCE
project that focuses on regional-level community-policing coordination.
INL and OSCE are working to dovetail their efforts to create direct
communication, coordination, and community input on policing efforts at
district, regional, and national levels. The OSCE has also partnered
with international and local NGOs on initiatives focused on encouraging
family members, particularly mothers, to identify and address early
signs of violent extremism in their local communities. For example, we
supported a pilot OSCE CVE program in Tajikistan aimed at supporting
women's roles in security, working with mothers groups in rural
villages to train them to recognize and respond to early warning signs
of potential radicalization in their children. We are also in the
planning stages of a community-based cultural program designed to
counter extremist messaging in Tajikistan. Additionally, the U.S.
Department of Defense provides counter-narcotics funding in Tajikistan
to build the capacity of border guards with border outposts, training,
and communications gear.
Turkmenistan
We support an ongoing OSCE project to train officers from
Turkmenistan's State Border Service on border management that enhances
that country's ability to patrol and conduct searches, surveillance,
and counter threats at the border--a key component in the effort to
identify credible security threats in the region and addressing them
accordingly. Additionally, in March, we sent representatives to a
regional workshop on border security management for countering
terrorism hosted by Turkmenistan and organized jointly by the United
Nations Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia
(UNRCCA), the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, and the
OSCE's Center in Ashgabat and its Transnational Threats Department/
Action against Terrorism Unit. The workshop focused on countering the
flow of foreign fighters through enhanced transnational cooperation by
law enforcement agencies.
Uzbekistan
For the first time in ten years, two Uzbekistani officials
participated in training this past April by the Department of Defense
on the law of armed conflict. The training dealt in part with the nexus
between terrorism and human rights. In 2014 Uzbek security forces also
participated in border security training through a resumption of the
Department of State's Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program. In
addition to anti-terrorism training, our Embassy's social media and
programming in Uzbekistan, as elsewhere in Central Asia, focuses on
education, family, and peace--topics that, at their heart, are the
surest ways to counter the appeal of violent extremism over time.
Furthermore, anti-trafficking activities in Uzbekistan promote safe
migration and minimize the risk of labor exploitation that can
exacerbate radicalization.
Conclusion: A Generational Challenge
To conclude, I could not do better than to quote from the recent
speech in Doha by General John Allen, Special Presidential Envoy for
the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL: ``From the point of
radicalization and recruitment to the process of rehabilitation, we as
a Coalition and a community of nations must work together to confront
this generational challenge.''The nations of Central Asia, and the
nations of the world, are waking up to the challenge of foreign
terrorist fighters in Syria and Iraq. The United States plans to
continue to work with global institutions, regional groups, and
national governments to confront the challenge of foreign fighters and
reduce the threat to our partners, allies, and to our own country. And
the Department of State is eager to work closely with this Commission
and others in Congress to address this generational challenge. Thank
you and I look forward to your questions.
Daniel Rosenblum is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Central Asia at the
U.S. Department of State. Working within the State Department's Bureau
for South and Central Asian Affairs, Mr. Rosenblum oversees U.S. policy
towards and diplomatic relations with the five Central Asian states.
During 2008-2014, Mr. Rosenblum was Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to
Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia. His office provided strategic
guidance and oversight for all U.S. foreign assistance to more than 30
countries in the former Soviet Union, the Western Balkans, and Central
Europe. He and his team coordinated the efforts of more than a dozen
U.S. government agencies supporting economic reform, the development of
democratic institutions and rule of law, building the capacity of law-
enforcement and other security-sector institutions, and relieving human
suffering through humanitarian aid. He also served as the primary U.S.
government liaison with other international donors, including the
European Union and multilateral development banks.
During 1997-2008, Mr. Rosenblum held a variety of other positions in
the Assistance Coordinator's office, including Deputy Coordinator,
Director of the Eurasia Division, and Special Advisor for Economic
Programs. He played the lead role in developing economic initiatives
for several regions of Russia; served as the State Department liaison
to 10 U.S.-backed investment funds operating in the region; and was
instrumental in designing and implementing large packages of assistance
for Ukraine, Georgia and the Kyrgyz Republic following internal
upheavals, and for Kosovo following its declaration of independence.
Before coming to the State Department, Mr. Rosenblum spent six years as
Senior Program Coordinator at the Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI) of
the AFL-CIO. FTUI conducted educational programs and provided technical
assistance to labor unions in the former Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe. Mr. Rosenblum managed the operation of field offices in Moscow,
Kyiv, and Warsaw. While working for FTUI, Mr. Rosenblum also served as
a public spokesman for the AFL-CIO on the labor movement in the former
Soviet Union, and social problems associated with the transition to a
market economy.Mr. Rosenblum has a BA in History from Yale University
and an MA in Soviet Studies and International Economics from the Johns
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
Prepared Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo, Associate Vice President and
Director, Center for Cyber and Homeland Security, The George Washington
University
Chairman Smith, Co-Chairman Wicker and distinguished Members of the
Commission, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today
on the issue of foreign terrorist fighters. Your leadership in
examining this challenge is important because the threat to U.S.
interests at home and abroad, and to U.S. allies, is both real and
pressing. At the same time, we cannot go it alone: the threat spans
national borders, which means that international cooperation and
transnational solutions are required.
Allow me to begin with a word about how these remarks are
organized. This testimony is structured with the bottom line up-front:
a thumbnail sketch of the problem accompanied by key recommendations
for action. This executive summary is then followed by additional
details which serve as context and background for the crucial topline
material. The latter is intended to serve as a resource for those with
the time and inclination for a deep dive into the subject at hand.
The foreign fighter challenge is a matter of serious concern for
the United States and its allies. While the foreign fighter phenomenon
is not new, its present scale and scope is unprecedented. As
individuals from the West travel to conflict zones around the world,
they are forming new networks with discrete skills and they are
amassing battle experience that may be turned around and redirected at
their countries of origin. So-called returnees are a particular
challenge for domestic law enforcement officials and intelligence
agencies of the United States and its allies because such individuals
possess cultural fluency and are able to walk amongst us. While
tripwires such as exit and entry measures and controls are increasingly
being adopted by the U.S. and Europe, it remains a challenge to
identify and intervene before they cause actual harm, given the volume
of individuals of concern. Communities and local authorities are at the
tip of the spear in this regard because they are closest to the problem
and are best placed to identify and prevent it before it fully
materializes.
This problem is all the more complex as the U.S. draws down its
engagement in Afghanistan. This conflict zone and others (such as the
Maghreb and Sahel) are under-governed spaces where nefarious forces can
thrive; and with respect to Syria and Iraq, ISIL actually controls
territory. As the official U.S. presence tapers off in Afghanistan,
particularly in the context of indigenous forces being either unable or
unwilling to ramp up commensurately, our adversaries are afforded space
and time in which to train, plan, plot and recruit.
Of course the problem is not confined to Afghanistan. To the
contrary, a variation of the problem extends throughout Central Asia:
as the Commission has pointed out, the so-called Islamic State in the
Levant (ISIL) has attracted hundreds if not thousands of fighters from
``the `stans''. These numbers demonstrate that the ideology and
narrative of violent Islamist extremist movements and groups continues
to resonate with and successfully recruit individuals who are
susceptible to such propaganda.
In short, foreign fighters pose a threat to innocents within the
conflict zones, to countries in the surrounding region, and to the
broader international community. The crucial question, therefore, is:
what can and should we do to combat this problem? Allow me to offer
several suggestions.
First, we need to combat the root of the problem which is the
ideology upon which ISIL feeds and recruits. Pushing back on this
narrative in order to expose its inherent inconsistencies and
falsehoods must therefore be a crucial plank in both national and
transnational strategy. Unless and until we combat the lifeblood of the
jihadists in this way, their pool of recruits will continue to grow.
Second, there are many more operational activities, both within and
across borders that can be deepened and broadened to achieve more
robust (counterterrorist) outcomes. Specifically, the United States
must continue to work in tandem with its allies within the ``Five
Eyes'' intelligence alliance, and expand its cooperation in this area
to other countries in Europe and beyond. Information is the crucial
component that underlies virtually all counterterrorism efforts, both
domestic and cross-border; hence we must maximize the intelligence that
US officials and their counterparts in allied nations possess in order
to best formulate and execute the measures that will keep foreign
fighters' plans left of boom.
Third, the United States should work with the countries of Central
Asia to assist them in building the capacities that are necessary for
them to be their own best guardians. For instance, more could be done
in the area of border security (including sharing best practices in
this field) in order to clamp down on the freedom of travel currently
experienced by foreign fighter aspirants and returnees.
The measures recommended above are intended to complement, deepen
and extend ongoing OSCE work which leverages the Organization's unique
strengths and abilities.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify before you today. I look
forward to trying to answer any questions that you may have. And I hope
that you find the detailed explanatory material below useful.
Context
The current terrorist threat climate is reminiscent of that prior to 9/
11, marked by budget cuts and the rollback of hard-earned gains. The
emergence of ISIL, along with active terrorist groups in Nigeria, Mali,
Yemen, Libya, and Somalia, pose a set of unprecedented challenges. The
most notable: foreign fighters. These individuals constitute a critical
threat to the security of the United States and our allies. Foreign
fighters and bridge figures--the latter equipped with the cross-
cultural fluency to punch up and spread the radicalizing message across
a broader pool of recruits--come from a myriad of backgrounds, but
share a common ability to move across borders, extend conflict zones,
bolster insurgent factions both operationally and motivationally, and
threaten the territorial integrity of their home countries upon return.
\1\ ISIL has attracted well over 20,000 foreign fighters (at least
4,000 of whom Western, including 150 Americans) from nearly 90
nationalities. \2\ Bridge figures play a key role in radicalizing and
recruiting Westerners, as was the case when an Uzbek-American from
Brooklyn was charged with radicalizing three other Central Asian-
Americans and funding their transit to join ISIL in Syria. \3\
Countering the extremist threat--abroad and at home--will require
robust international and domestic partnerships emboldened by a clear-
cut foreign policy and strategy.
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\1\ ``Bridge figures'' are defined as primary actors in the
radicalization process and serve as a major catalyst for recruitment.
Frank J. Cilluffo, Jeffrey B. Cozzens, and Magnus Ranstorp, Foreign
Fighters Trends, Trajectories & Conflict Zones (Washington D.C.: The
George Washington Homeland Security Policy Institute, 2010).
\2\ Peter Neumann, ``Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now
exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s,''
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, January 26, 2015,
http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-
20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/
\3\ ``Fourth Brooklyn, New York, Resident Charged With Attempt and
Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to ISIL'', Department of Justice
Office of Public Affairs, April 6, 2015, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
fourth-brooklyn-new-york-resident-charged-attempt-and-conspiracy-
provide-material-support
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Foreign fighters and bridge figures internationalize local
conflicts, drawing the attention of Western media, promoting the
jihadist cause, and recreating recruits among populations. Moreover,
these conflicts became extended through time and space; forming
networks and cells through which ideology, manpower, and expertise are
exchanged across borders. The first conflict that involved mobilized
Islamic foreign fighters for the sake of jihad was the Afghan-Soviet
War from 1979 to 1992. The modern notion of individual obligation as a
religious duty was popularized by founding member of al-Qaeda Abdullah
Azzam. Throughout the 1990s, similar reasoning was used by foreign
fighters during the Bosnian War, First Chechen War, and Somali
conflict.
Many foreign fighters end up returning to their home countries,
radicalized, jobless, and well-trained. Such was the case after the
Soviet-Afghan war, as thousands of Arab foreign fighters leveraged
personal contacts with former comrades and bridge figures to form
decentralized cells and networks across the Middle East and North
Africa. This nascent, but growing jihadist scene produced a spate of
violent attacks against the U.S. and its allies, Arab governments, and
Israel. Led by Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda emerged as the ideological and
operational vanguard of jihadism, inspiring the 1993 attempting bombing
of the World Trade Center, orchestrating the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings
in East Africa, funding local militias in Bosnia and Somalia, and
staging the 9/11 attacks in 2001.
At the same time, Afghanistan--thrown onto the back burner by both
foreign jihadists and American policy-makers--continued to collapse
under the weight of civil war. Central Asian fighters; the peoples from
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, long
oppressed by their own authoritarian, secular governments, flocked to
the new dominant force in the region-- the Taliban. The Taliban
provided Central Asian combatants with a clear banner to mobilize and
fight under and shielded bin Laden after 9/11. Despite being toppled by
the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2002,
the Taliban resurged in 2006 with the help of the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU), other Central Asians, Chechens, and Caucasians. The
U.S. military operations in Iraq in 2003 forced a shift in
administrative energy, resources, and troops away from the Afghan
theater, allowing both the Taliban to re-emerge under the regime of
Hamid Karzai and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) led by Abu Musab az-Zarqawi, to
expand in the Levant. It is significant to note AQI is ISIL's
predecessor. Up until this time period, the international jihadist
network consisted of al-Qaeda ``core''--bin Laden and his small cadre
of commanders--and its various affiliates. Islamic insurgencies and
localized, homegrown cells sprouted up through these overlapping
logistical, financial, and personal networks.
The fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and eruption of region wide
uprisings in 2011 provided a set of completely unique circumstances
under which jihadists could threaten Western interests. As opposed al-
Qaeda core's priority of hitting the ``far enemy'', or the U.S. and the
West, the Islamic State or ISIL emphasized and was successful at
consolidating and governing territory. It has done so in Syria, Iraq,
and Libya; supported by cells across the region and world. ISIL's
declaration of the ``Caliphate'' in June 2014 bolstered by a
sophisticated, savvy media campaign--two things al-Qaeda never fully
achieved--has given it unprecedented legitimacy and appeal in the eyes
of foreign fighters. ISIL has attracted well over 20,000 foreign
fighters (at least 4,000 of whom Western) from nearly 90 nationalities.
\4\ To provide a sense of scale, these numbers are unprecedented
compared to the Soviet-Afghan War, which attracted 5,000 Muslims from
around the world, the Chechnya conflict 1,000 fighters, Operation
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan 1,000, and Operation Iraqi Freedom
4,000. \5\
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\4\ http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-
islamic-state-a-video-
introduction
\5\ http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-
islamic-state-a-video-
introduction
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With most of the international community's attention on Syria and
Iraq, a loss of focus on Afghanistan can lead to the rollback of hard-
earned gains that had been achieved through the investment of $686
billion and, most importantly, the lives of over 2,000 of our men and
women in uniform. If the U.S. ends military operations in Afghanistan
by the scheduled January 20 2016 deadline, we run the risk of allowing
the Taliban, both al-Qaeda and ISIL-backed elements, to carve out safe
havens. Given the freedom to operate in such havens, there is a greater
likelihood foreign terrorist organizations will be better positioned to
plan and conduct attacks against the U.S. and Europe. The key to the
Taliban's survival and success: Central Asian fighters. If the U.S. can
cooperate with regional and international allies to not only stem the
growth of Western jihadism, but also the free flow of Central Asian
militants to and from Afghanistan--some pro-ISIL and some not--then the
security of the American homeland and our allies will be better
addressed.
ISIL and Central Asia
While most of the international community is focused on Syria and Iraq,
a regional crisis is brewing in Central Asia and Afghanistan. The
activation and growth of Central Asian foreign fighter networks pose
three acute threats to U.S. security. First, these individuals provide
direct support to ISIL's foothold in the Levant and stand to protract
the conflict found there. Second, when these fighters return to their
home countries, many will use the financial, logistical, and military
skills acquired in the Levant and Afghanistan to form cells and groups
in Central Asia. Third, the entrance of ISIL-branded elements in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) internationalizes the fight
against a Taliban rejuvenated by Central Asian foreign fighters.
Direct Support
ISIL has made clear that it intends to engage heavily with Central
Asian Islamists. In January, its leadership began a charm offensive and
leveraged their position as an anti-establishment, Islamic alternative
to the region's secular regimes. ISIL's leadership has been able to
claim some level of religious authority, as it has effectively exposed
the (fairly naked) ties that moderating voices have to the government.
This political positioning has been bolstered by promises of economic
opportunity, with advertised salaries ranging as high as $5,000 per
month. In contrast to the glossy tactics used to attract Western
fighters, social media plays a more limited role. The `old pulls' of
economic opportunity and an outlet of political expression foster a
deeper support and will require a corresponding countering violent
extremism strategy.
The approach has been quite successful to date--some estimates hold
that
4,000 \6\ Central Asian foreign fighters have begun to fight in the
Levant. According to the International Center for the Study of
Radicalization (ICSR), there are an estimated 500 Uzbeks, 360 Turkmen,
250 Kazaks, 190 Tajiks, and 100 Kyrgyzs, bolstered by 1,500 Caucasians
and 800-1,500 Russians fighting in Syria. \7\According to the U.S.
Counter-Terrorism Center, there are more than 1,000 Kazakhs fighting
for ISIL. \8\ Like Western foreign fighters, Central Asians provide
propaganda and language services for recruitment abroad. In Syria and
Iraq, Central Asians are divided along ethnic and linguistic lines into
jamaats, or factions. Some of the most prominent ones like the Uzbek
factions Katibat al-Imam Bukhari and Sabri's Jamaat--both of which
operate in northern Syria alongside 1,500 veteran Caucasian fighters--
have pledged allegiance to ISIS. \9\ These factions mostly operate out
of northern Syria, contributing to ISIL's dominance in Raqqa and never-
ending attempts to take Aleppo, Idlib, and Latakia. In the absence of
U.S. Special Forces and human assets on the ground to guide air
strikes, these fighters enjoy more time to train, plot, and execute
attacks against moderate Syrian rebels.
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\6\ http://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/religion-geopolitics/
reports-analysis/report/isis-central-asia-growing-threat
\7\ http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-
exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/
\8\ http://www.csce.gov/
index.cfm?fuseaction=contentrecords.viewdetail&contentrecord-
id=1199&contentrecordtype=p&contenttype=p
\9\ http://jihadology.net/2014/07/22/al-%E1%B8%A5ayat-media-
center-presents-a-new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-join-the-
ranks/http://www.rferl.org/content/under-black-flag-central-asia-
militants-allegiance/26666098.html
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Cell Formation
Central Asians and Caucasians not only fill the rank-and-file, but also
important leadership positions. ISIL's Central Asian commanders with
previous military experience--for example, ISIL's northern Syria Emir
Umar al-Shishani, a former Special Reconnaissance soldier in the
Georgian Army and Tajikistan's former Special Forces chief Gulmurod
Khalimov--are particularly dangerous for several reasons. \10\ These
fighters, through mosques, prayer rooms, and personal connections, have
been able to recruit and radicalize hundreds of Central Asian youth
alongside ISIL. The combination of a committed leadership pool and a
broadened domestic base imbues the region with the necessary raw
materials for violent Islamist organizations to form domestically. As
leaders begin to convert their operational and administrative knowledge
into active terror cells, Central Asian governments may be forced to
contend with new threats.
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\10\ http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-32917311
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These fronts will be further enhanced by returning foreign
fighters. Central Asian Islamist groups--driven by the desire to
establish a transnational Caliphate across the region since the 1990s--
have a long history of armed opposition to both pre- and post-Soviet
regimes. The success of these groups spawned a plethora of
decentralized Islamist extremist groups. Some engaged American and
Pakistani troops in Afghanistan and Pakistan and others remained at
home to conduct bomb attacks and assassination of regime targets. In
essence, Islamist militancy in Central Asia--long cultivated by a
history of social and economic oppression by secular police states--
spawned a cadre of battle-hardened jihadis bent on transiting from one
conflict zone to another to establish an Islamic state. It is no
accident that the IMU experienced a pronounced period of resurgence,
immediately following the return of Taliban-
affiliated foreign fighters from Afghanistan. The result in Central
Asia could prove to be an existential threat for some of the region's
governments.
Conflict Convergence
Foreign fighter recruitment has served as a platform from which ISIL
has grown its physical presence. In September, the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan--one of the region's most active terror organizations--
effectively severed its ties to the Taliban and pledged allegiance to
ISIL's leadership. The move represented a large swing of momentum in
ISIL's favor and was accompanied by the emergence of ISIL-affiliated
fighters in Northern Afghanistan's Kunduz Province. From here,
operations have expanded into parts even less easily governed. The
Fergana Valley--a remote region that is incorporated into parts of
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan--has the beginnings of a
promising haven for returning ISIS fighters. And--as we saw in the
April attacks in Eastern Afghanista--ISIL will challenge Taliban
territories in and around the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA).
The most pressing concern lies in the FATA, however. Here, ISIL and
the Taliban are poised to battle one another for regional supremacy.
Syria's own civil war has shown that national militaries are ill-suited
to maintain territorial integrity, while combatting two rival
adversaries. In particular, an unproven Afghan National Army (ANA)
stands particularly vulnerable to these challenges. Geographically
challenging borders stand to exacerbate the problem and will likely be
exploited by transnational groups who can more easily move materiel
across national borders. Ultimately, decisive action will be required
if countries around the world are to deny ISIL a stronghold that has
lent its occupier the ability to stage more destructive attacks.
Remedies
In order to stem ISIL's further expansion into Central Asia and
Afghanistan, the United States needs to work with domestic and
international partners to ensure both short and long-term security. The
instability in Afghanistan is largely attributed to the conflating
violence in Syria and Iraq, as it is reported that 2,000-4,000 Central
Asians are fighting on behalf of ISIL. \11\ These individuals are
leveraging the political and economic marginalization of Muslim
communities to recruit and radicalize others. The police states of
Central Asia view ISIL not only as a security threat, but also an
excuse to crack down on political dissent--further crushing prospects
of political and social change. Circumstances warrant a security-
oriented strategy that reunites and enhances our relationship with the
``Five Eyes'' (U.S., United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New
Zealand), the world's strongest and most valuable counter-terrorism
partnership. We can take various lessons from this dynamic and expand
it to our European Union, transatlantic, and then, Central Asian
partners to fully curtail the foreign fighter and homegrown threat. On
the other hand, to prevent the opening up of terrorist safe havens in
Afghanistan and possible collapse of the nascent Kabul government and
Afghan National Army (ANA), the United States should not make the same
mistake as it did when disengaging from Afghanistan in 2003 and Iraq in
2011. Foreign fighter pipelines have intensified, requiring even more
determination, focus, and willpower to sustain our counter-
terrorism and military efforts in the FATA.
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\11\ http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/b072-
syria-calling-radicalisation-in-central-asia.aspx
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First, the U.S. needs to take on a clear yet broad-based stand
against foreign fighters. This may include a more concerted effort to
enforce U.N. Security Resolution 2178 (2014), which lays out
appropriate measures on preventing inter-state travel of foreign
fighters, enforcing proper information-sharing practices within
national security systems, and criminalizing terrorist activity. \12\
In terms of counteracting Western foreign fighters, the Five Eyes may
consider expanding intelligence cooperation to include other European
nations that suffer from radicalization and extremism, such as Germany,
the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, France, Norway, Spain, Italy, and to
a controlled degree Turkey, the Balkan states, and Central Asia.
Integrating European and Central Asian intelligence can provide the
necessary framework for broader, more global law enforcement
information-sharing equipped with secure communications networks,
databases, and a system of notices, plus measures to track illicit
money transfers, stolen, forged identity papers and travel documents.
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\12\ http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-
4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2178.pdf
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An example of the present lack of critical information sharing is
the relative ease in transferring personnel and resources from the
Levant, either through Turkey and the Caucasus and across the Caspian
Sea or overland through northern Iran, into Afghanistan. Travel to
Turkey is visa-free for citizens of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
and Turkmenistan, while Uzbeks can get a 30-day visa upon arrival. \13\
Intelligence sharing between Turkish authorities and Central Asian
security services is lackluster. As one of its NATO allies, the U.S.
should encourage Turkey to re-evaluate its liberal travel controls and
cooperate more with Central Asian nations. In order for this to occur,
there needs to be greater efforts to identify and investigate potential
foreign fighters. There are several mechanisms designed to maintain and
improve border management in Central Asia, including the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Border
Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA). BOMCA is a European
Union-U.N. Development Programme joint venture meant to promote
stability and security of Central Asian nation-states through
integrated, modernized border management. \14\ Originally conceived to
combat the illicit transit of goods and personnel across Central Asia,
BOMCA should be develop the capacity--through U.S. and European
assistance--to combat foreign fighter migrations. This means more
intelligence sharing to help border security officials identify,
apprehend, and ultimately prosecute violent extremists. The OSCE has
two lines of programming that can assist the BOMCA in beefing up border
practices: border management and combating terrorism. \15\ However OSCE
and BOMCA activities are not streamlined and they lack information
sharing amongst themselves, let alone between the nation-states they
are attempting to help. \16\
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\13\ http://www.crisisgroup.org//media/Files/asia/central-asia/
b072-syria-calling-radicalisation-in-central-asia.pdf
\14\ http://www.undp.org/content/brussels/en/home/
partnerships_initiatives/results/bomca.html
\15\ http://www.osce.org/secretariat/110768
\16\ Law, David. ``Intergovernmental Organisations and Security
Sector Reform''
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To make border management more geared towards counter-terrorism, it
is worth considering creating a liaison office that integrates the OSCE
and BOMCA offices with the Joint Plan for Action for Central Asian
States under the U.N. Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Istanbul
Process. The former enables all states to agree on a broad strategy to
combat terrorism. A major issue is the sluggish process of
implementation across national contexts and regional relationships.
\17\ The Istanbul Process, focused on security and development, also
faces issues of integration and implementation. Kazakhstan, the largest
Central Asian nation, is not formally a member in the Process's
counter-terrorism section. \18\
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\17\ http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/12/
26/counter-terrorism-in-
central-asia-requires-international-cooperation/
\18\ http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/12/
26/counter-terrorism-in-
central-asia-requires-international-cooperation/
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Better border management with an orientation towards counter-
terrorism and transnational security will reduce the spillover of
violence into northern Afghanistan, where the Taliban and ISIL-
affiliated groups are not only fighting each other, but also the ANA.
ISIL's goal is to one day merge its Wilayat al-Khorasan, or ``Khorasan
Province'' with its territory in Syria and Iraq. This prospect is
unlikely, but constitutes a direct threat to Afghanistan. President
Obama's rapid withdrawal of American troops from Iraq in 2011 should
serve as a valuable lesson in maintaining our political, economic, and
humanitarian commitment to Afghanistan. In Iraq, our lack of presence
in the post-withdrawal period afforded then-Prime Minister Nouri al-
Maliki a complete mandate to fill political and military ranks with
Shiite loyalists, dilapidating an Iraqi military that the United States
had spent $25 billion to train and equip. \19\ The Sunni population was
marginalized and pushed into the arms of a rejuvenated ISIL. To avoid a
similar situation in Afghanistan--where the United States has spent
$686 billion since 2001--American military officials, in tandem with
Kabul, should continue to pressure Taliban and ISIL-affiliated elements
with counter-terrorism and military operations led by Special Forces
and covert elements to earmark airstrikes. \20\ The continued presence
of U.S. troops will help the ANA prevent the Taliban or ISIL from
taking over and consolidating territory and forming potential safe
havens.
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\19\ http://www.stripes.com/us-advisers-hope-realistic-training-
scenarios-help-iraqi-troops-face-islamic-state-fighters-1.343931
\20\ https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf
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A consistent ANA campaign backed by U.S. airstrikes will
subsequently strengthen the Afghan government's position in
negotiations with the Taliban. The best option is to leave the U.S.
troop withdrawal deadline unknown to the international community and
U.S. public. Once the Taliban and ISIL know the definite date, they
will hunker down, wait out the drone strikes, and re-emerge to feast on
the ANA. Air strikes and presence of American operatives dramatically
increases the costs for the Taliban to operate in the open, maintain
pipelines to other parts of the region, facilitate transit, and build
training camps. This gives our enemies less time to train, plot, and
execute terrorist attacks while giving our allies more time to train,
obtain experience, and become a more competent fighting force. Plus, If
Ghani reaches a tentative deal with the Taliban, ISIL's position will
be significantly weakened. ISIL, which already clashes with the Taliban
over territory and ideological legitimacy, risks opening up a second
front with its Pashto rivals.
Frank J. Cilluffo is an Associate Vice President at The George
Washington University where he leads a number of national security and
cyber security policy and research initiatives. Cilluffo directs the
Center for Cyber and Homeland Security, is co-director of GW's Cyber
Center for National and Economic Security and along with the School of
Business, launched the university's World Executive MBA in
Cybersecurity program.
Cilluffo is routinely called upon to advise senior officials in the
Executive Branch, US Armed Services, and State and Local governments on
an array of national and homeland security strategy and policy matters.
He also frequently briefs Congressional committees and their staffs and
has testified before Congress over 25 times at high profile hearings on
counterterrorism, cyber threats, security and deterrence, weapons
proliferation, organized crime, intelligence and threat assessment, as
well as emergency management, border and transportation security.
Similarly, he works with US allies and organizations such as NATO and
Europol. He has presented at a number of bi-lateral and multi-lateral
summits on cybersecurity and countering Islamist terrorism, including
the UN Security Council.
Cilluffo serves or has served on various national security-related
committees sponsored by the US government and non-profit organizations,
including the Homeland Security Advisory Council, where he served as
the Vice Chairman of the Future of Terrorism Task Force. Cilluffo also
served as a member of the Secure Borders and Open Doors Advisory
Committee, Defense Science Board committees and summer studies, and
along with Norm Augustine, chaired the first Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review Advisory Council.
Cilluffo joined GW in 2003, establishing CCHS as a prominent
nonpartisan ``think and do tank'' dedicated to the building bridges
between theory and practice to advance US security. CCHS has hosted
numerous Cabinet Members and agency directors, military and law
enforcement officers, Members of Congress, diplomats, business
executives and academics and has issued dozens of reports that are
widely cited by media, research institutions, think tanks and
governments.
Prior to joining GW, Cilluffo served as Special Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security. Immediately following the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Cilluffo was appointed by President George
W. Bush to the newly created Office of Homeland Security. During his
tenure at The White House, he was involved in a wide range of
counterterrorism and homeland security strategy and policy initiatives,
served as a principal advisor to Governor Tom Ridge, and directed the
President's Homeland Security Advisory Council.
Prepared Statement of Jennifer Leonard, Deputy Director, International
Crisis Group
Thank you for the opportunity to speak before the Helsinki
Commission today. My organization, the International Crisis Group,
values the Commission's sustained focus on Central Asia.
As an international conflict prevention organization, our approach
is grounded in field-based research. We have teams of political
analysts located within or near countries vulnerable to violent
conflict and based on our research and analysis, we develop policy
recommendations to prevent and resolve it.
We have covered Central Asia for over 15 years. From our current
base in Bishkek, we conduct frequent visits throughout the region
exploring the challenges and opportunities facing it, with particular
focus on the interplay of democratic repression, threat of
radicalization, and the decay of the economy and infrastructure.
In January 2015 we published, Syria Calling: Radicalisation in
Central Asia, which addresses the very topic of today's discussion.
INTRODUCTION: The Islamic State (IS) is attracting a coalition of
Central Asian jihadis and sympathisers and fostering a network of links
within the region. Prompted in part by political marginalisation and
bleak economic prospects, in the past three years IS has beckoned
roughly 2K-4K Central Asian citizens. \1\ While the phenomenon has a
disproportionate impact on security perceptions at home, the region
supplies only a small fraction of IS fighters in Syria, however, if
enough return, they could present a risk to regional security and
stability.
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\1\ Official Central Asian governments' estimates of several
hundred are conservative. Western officials suggest the number is
2,000, and it may be as many as 4,000. Western officials estimate that
about 400 fighters from each of the five Central Asian countries have
travelled to join the Islamic State. A Russian official put the total
regional figure at 4,000. Crisis Group interviews, Bishkek, October
2014; Astana, November 2014.
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This presents a complex problem to the five CA governments, each of
whom suffers from its own brand of poor governance, poverty, and
corruption and has struggled to accommodate the growth of religion and
religious organisations. The belief that Syrian-trained jihadis plan to
establish a caliphate in the region has shaped the security debate and
response in each--including increased surveillance, harassment and
detentions--and provides additional justification for ever-stricter
laws on religious practice and expression that may be
counterproductive.
Meanwhile, the call of IS--which says it wants not just fighters
but also facilitators, e.g. teachers, nurses, engineers--can appear to
offer an attractive alternative for those alienated, marginalized, or
discriminated against, who are inspired by the belief that an Islamic
state is a meaningful alternative to post-Soviet life.
PROFILE. There is no single profile of an IS supporter from Central
Asia: rich/poor, young/old, men/women, educated or not. There are
seventeen-year-old hairdressers, established businessmen, women
abandoned by husbands who have taken second wives in Russia, families
who believe their children will have better prospects in a caliphate,
young men, school dropouts and university students.
The largest single group is reportedly Uzbek, both citizens of
Uzbekistan and ethnic Uzbeks from the Ferghana Valley, including Osh,
Kyrgyzstan's southern city, where risks have amplified since the
violence in 2010 that killed over 400 ethnic Uzbeks. \2\ While Tashkent
estimates 500 of its citizens are in Syria, they could exceed 2,500.
\3\ With the exodus that began in the Valley in 2011, perhaps 1,000 men
and women [including 500 ethnic Kyrgyz and others from Osh] have left
to fight for or provide humanitarian assistance to IS. \4\ In northern
Kyrgyzstan there could be another 300 unreported cases. \5\
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\2\ Many ethnic Uzbeks have retreated from engaging with the
Kyrgyz authorities for fear of harassment and extortion. Many men have
migrated to Russia to find work and escape discrimination. Unlike
ethnic Kyrgyz elsewhere in the country, Uzbek families are unlikely to
report or seek help regarding the radicalisation of relatives since it
invites at best state surveillance, at worst detentions, beatings or
demands for cash. Inter-ethnic tensions in southern Kyrgyzstan have
gone unresolved, and the political and economic marginalisation of the
Uzbek community contributes to the appeal of radical groups,
particularly Hizb ut-Tahrir, and the jihadi cause in general.
\3\ Crisis Group interview, Russian official, September 2014, who
also said there were 2,500 Russian citizens fighting in Syria.
\4\ Crisis Group interviews, senior Kyrgyz official, Bishkek, July
2014; senior police officer, southern Kyrgystan, August 2014; Uzbek
opposition activist, Turkey, September 2014.
\5\ 20 former residents from just one medium-sized town are
reported to have travelled to Turkey in 2013 with the intention of
going on to Syria; Crisis Group interview, Kyrgyz security official,
Chui province, Kyrgyzstan, May 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Kazakhstan, IS supporters tend to come from the west and south
of the country, but not exclusively. \6\ Some 150 people made headlines
when a video showing them in Syria appeared on YouTube in October 2013.
\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Crisis Group telephone interview, Kazakh security expert,
Astana, October 2014.
\7\ ``Astana probes video allegedly showing Kazakh `jihad' family
in Syria'', Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 21 October 2013.
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In Tajikistan, recruitment is nationwide but appears strongest in
two particular provinces. At least twenty people left from just one
village in September 2014 \8\ and recent revelations that a senior
Tajik security official, who disappeared only to resurface in an IS
propaganda video calling for violent jihad, has rattled
the region. \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Masum Mukhammadradjab, ``Chorqishloq: Birthplace of 20
participants in the Syrian war'', Radio Ozodi, 25 September 2014.
\9\ Col. Khalimov was an intimate of the elite--the head of
Tajikistan's Special Assignment Police Unit (OMON), a key element in
the security apparatus, he has trained in Russia and the US. His
defection is a blow to Rahman's regime on many levels, as he speaks to
the parts of the elite not yet bought off and to the alienation of a
substantial segment of society.
[It is worth noting that estimates vary among local, national,
Russian and Western security sources, underlining significant
information gaps which in turn complicate efforts to create prevention
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
and rehabilitation policies.]
RECRUITMENT: Recruitment of these individuals is happening at local
levels, by word-of-mouth. Some are recruited at home-- in mosques and
prayer rooms. Others are radicalised abroad, often as migrant workers
[where dislocation can lead them into the arms of jihadi recruiters].
\10\ The internet and social media play a critical but not definitive
role.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Its Federal Migration Service estimates there are some 3.95
million Kyrgyz, Tajik and Uzbek citizens working in Russia. See
[``There are more than 550 thousand Kyrgyz citizens in Russia''], Radio
Azattyk, 20 November 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat play a
peripheral role in so far as both men and women may be radicalised as
they gravitate toward their teachings, these groups do not appear to be
directly involved with recruiting to Syria, though they are sometimes
unwittingly staging posts in the journey [to extremist violence]. \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Tablighi Jamaat, a non-violent organisation founded in 1926
in India, is banned in every Central Asian state but Kyrgyzstan. Hizb
ut-Tahrir, a non-violent organisation that seeks to establish a
caliphate, is banned in all five Central Asian states.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More worrying for the regional security climate is the way Syria
appears to have provided the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and
its offshoots with a renewed sense of purpose. While the IMU and Afghan
Taliban have long-established links, for a while the IMU and IS kept a
polite but admiring distance from one another. However, in March 2015
the IMU released an IS style-beheading video [shot in northern
Afghanistan] to declare their allegiance to the organisation.
MOTIVATIONS: Socio-economic factors play a role but economic reward is
not a motivation. Rather it is the idea of holy struggle to advance
Islam. Frustrated and excluded, people who would not have considered
fighting with the longer-established IMU or Taliban perceive IS as the
creator of a novel political order, a more universal purpose: the
creation of a caliphate. An imam from southern Kyrgyzstan compared it
to Afghanistan, told us that ``Syria is about principles, not
colonialism''. And not all who go to Syria want to engage in violence,
but accept that others will do it for them in pursuit of the ordained
cause.
For women, the traditional and state-approved Muslim community's
relative disinterest in their role allows underground groups to fill a
need. Radical Islam also gives some a framework to distance themselves
from marital and family circumstances. For other women, it is the call
of a devout life, or an Islamic environment for their children. Still
others follow fighters or family members who have established contacts
in Turkey or IS-controlled territory.
RISK OF RETURN: While the numbers of Central Asians receiving combat
training and progressing through IS command structures is increasing,
so far, returning jihadis are a danger to be prepared for rather than
an immediate threat. For the time being, Central Asia is fortunate that
Syria is relatively distant, no major attacks have yet occurred, \12\
and the risks posed by returning jihadis are still in relative infancy.
In fact, many will not return because they will die in Syria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Alleged plots included bomb attacks in Bishkek and Dushanbe
and on strategic road tunnels through the Tajik mountains.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the meantime and though keenly aware of the dangers returning
fighters could pose, beyond instituting measures criminalizing fighting
abroad, \13\ Central Asian governments have done little to address the
reasons why such a diverse cross-
section of their citizens seek to participate in IS, nor have they
contemplated how the dynamic might relate to broader unmet societal
demands. Prevention of extremism and rehabilitation of jihadis are not
high on the agenda and female radicalisation, in particular, is largely
ignored [by religious leaders].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Tajikistan and Kazakhstan have introduced laws criminalizing
fighting abroad, the former coming into effect in July 2014, the latter
on 1 January 2015. Uzbekistan banned terrorism training without
reference to location in January 2014, but the law was widely
interpreted as directed against foreign-trained fighters. The law
states that persons with no previous convictions who turn themselves in
will not be held criminally liable (no such provision in the
legislation of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,) but doubt
surrounds Uzbekistan's actual willingness to rehabilitate returning
fighters. Kyrgyz parliament approved criminal code amendments
suggesting sentences of eight to fifteen years for taking part in
conflicts, military operations or terrorist- or extremist-training in a
foreign state in September 2014, but these have yet to be signed into
law.
CONCLUSION: These dynamics risk gathering pace and purpose, blindsiding
governments ill-prepared to respond to such a complex security threat
and tempted to exploit it to crack down on dissent. These governments
must assess accurately the long-term danger jihadism poses to the
region and take effective preventive action now. This does not mean:
labeling unfamiliar interpretations of Islam as extremist, adopting
increasingly severe laws to limit freedom of conscience and
association, or promoting intrusive security practices, etc.
Rather, effective prevention means responding to an unmet demand
for increased democratic space, revising discriminatory laws and
policies, implementing outreach programs, creating jobs at home for
disadvantaged youth, ensuring better coordination between security
services, and tackling police reform, starting with the most basic
matter of how they are perceived by the communities they serve.
For its part, the U.S. and other regional partners should recognise
that Central Asia is a growing source of foreign fighters and consider
prioritising police reform and a more tolerant attitude to religion, in
its bilateral engagements and programming. Indeed, there are lessons to
be gleaned [from places like Denmark and Indonesia], \14\ but the
capacity of Central Asian governments to absorb and implement these
lessons are undermined by weak state structures and lack of political
will.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ In Denmark, effective rehabilitation programs are based on
trust built up between the authorities and the families of fighters. In
Indonesia, police forces develop responses to radicalisation in terms
of improved intelligence-gathering techniques and building community
relations, as well as rehabilitation.
Jennifer Leonard joined Crisis Group's Washington office in June 2002.
As Washington Advocacy Director, she works across the spectrum of
Washington's foreign policy actor--including the Administration,
Congress, media, think-tanks, and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs)--to design and implement strategies that impact the policy
process. She also has primary responsibility for advocacy and research
in Crisis Group's Central Asia, South East Asia, North East Asia and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Caucasus projects.
Jen came to Crisis Group after three years with the U.S. Department of
Energy where she worked for the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear
Nonproliferation, then as special assistant to the Administrator of the
National Nuclear Security Administration. At the Department of Energy
she oversaw aspects of a new non-proliferation initiative, helped
establish the Russia Task Force, worked at the U.S. Embassy Moscow, and
liaised with other U.S. government entities, international
organizations, and foreign governments on national security matters.
Before joining the government, she worked with variety of NGOs,
including Conflict Management Group, a non-profit consulting company
dedicated to promoting peacebuilding through engagement, training and
research.
She has been an Associate at Harvard Law School's Program on
Negotiation, a Graduate Fellow at the U.S. Embassy in Yerevan, Armenia,
and a regular contributor to the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe's election-related activities in the Balkans and
Caucasus. She earned her MA from the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy and a B.A. from Connecticut College.
[all]
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