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HEARING

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

ON

HOW IS DOD RESPONDING TO EMERGING SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE?

HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 25, 2015



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HOW IS DOD RESPONDING TO EMERGING SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE?

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 25, 2015.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. "Mac" Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. "MAC" THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Committee will come to order. Let me welcome our members, witnesses, and guests for this hearing on how the Department of Defense [DOD] is responding to emerging security challenges in Europe.

In a world and a time full of complex threats facing the United States, it seems to me the situation in Europe poses peril on several levels; one is naked aggression of conquest. We have seen this before in Europe many times in the past and it seems to me if history has taught us anything, it is that aggression unchallenged in its early stages leads to greater costs and greater misery when it must be confronted.

A second element is—what I believe is an attempt to undermine the rules-based international system that has existed since the end of World War II. I am among those who are convinced that President Putin is working to undermine that system in order to replace it with one that is more of his liking, and, unfortunately, he has some unsavory allies in that effort.

A third challenge is the tactics that the Russians are using in Ukraine. We have heard a lot about "little green men," but the various efforts Russia is using to undermine Ukrainian security forces, as well as to pull a facade over its own involvement, presents a number of challenges to NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and to the United States. We tend not to deal with naked lies and subversion and other forms of subterfuge very easily.

I am pleased to be supporting Mr. Smith's legislation that would provide defensive lethal assistance to Ukraine. It seems to me that any people ought to be able to defend themselves and their country. But beyond the immediate crisis, part of what this committee needs to think about as we consider funding, organizing, and equipping our troops, is how well we are prepared to deal with this sort of threat in Europe and elsewhere.

As Europe and NATO grapple with this crisis, as well as the growing threat of jihadi terrorists, the world is watching and will draw conclusions about what course they will take in response.

Mr. Smith.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in the Appendix on page 47.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, obviously, that is the game-changing issue of the European Command, Russia and President Putin's aggressiveness in the Ukraine, and I think the chairman summed it up fairly well.

What Mr. Putin is trying to do is fundamentally alter the post-World War II construct in terms of how the world is organized. And it is very unfortunate. You know, when the Soviet Union broke up and the Cold War ended, there was a real opportunity to integrate Russia into that world order which has worked reasonably well. And Russia would have been a great partner and, you know, history can be written about why that didn't work out.

The bottom line is Russia is now attempting to set up again a bi-polar world. They see it as a zero-sum game. What is good for the West is not good for them and they are attempting to reestablish their power and break away as many people as possible from Western influence. And that is bad enough. Worse is that they are aggressive militarily in how they go about trying to do that.

We have seen it in Crimea, we have seen it in Eastern Ukraine, and the real concern is you read about how Russia's top leadership looks at this issue. There is really not much reason to believe that they are going to stop. They believe this sort of aggression has been rewarded. That they have been able to take territory. That they have been able to reestablish themselves as a legitimate power on the world stage.

So confronting that threat is the number one biggest issue, and it is not easy to confront. We do not want to start another war. We want to figure out some way to stop this aggression in a peaceful means. And we have to work with our NATO and European partners in order to achieve that. And, yet, that is not always an easy process either.

But it does also raise questions about something I think this committee had long assumed, was that we could afford to substantially draw down our presence in Europe in order to focus whether it was on the pivot to Asia or to focus on the rising tide of Islamic extremists in various countries in confronting the terrorist threat that that presents.

Now we realize that our presence in Europe is more important than it used to be. So be interested to hear how are we properly positioned in Europe to confront this threat. How are we aligned with our European allies to, hopefully, you know, maximize our assets and theirs, put them together in the best way possible? And what is the most logical way to confront Putin's aggression. I think that is the fundamental and central question that we face in Europe. I look forward to the testimony.

I apologize, I may have to leave a little early. I am still, as I said, I am in between hip surgeries. Good news is my left hip is getting a lot better. Bad news is my right hip is getting a lot worse. But the surgery is coming so sitting for extended periods of time is not something I can do so I may not be here for the whole hearing, but I do look forward to testimony and questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 48.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We are pleased to welcome Ms. Christine Wormuth, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and General Philip Breedlove, Commander, Supreme Allied Command Europe and U.S. European Combatant Command. Thank you all for being here.

Without objection, your full written statement will be made part of the record. And we would invite you to make what oral statements you would like at this point.

Ms. Wormuth.

STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE E. WORMUTH, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Secretary WORMUTH. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry, and Ranking Member Smith and distinguished members of the committee. I very much appreciate the opportunity to be with you all today to talk about the security situation in Europe and our relationship with allies and partners in the region.

As both of you have noted, in the last 18 months the security situation in Europe has changed quite significantly. But despite these challenges, Europe is a cornerstone of our engagement with the rest of the world and a catalyst for our global cooperation.

Time and again, Europe and NATO have proven to be our indispensable strategic partners. We believe that will continue to be true and, for these reasons, U.S. engagement in Europe is and will remain a vital element of our national security strategy.

It has been almost a year since Russia's occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea. Since that time, we have seen Russia funding and arming separatists in Eastern Ukraine. We have seen direct Russian participation in the fighting. These actions, coupled with Russia's continued support of frozen conflicts elsewhere, and violations of its obligations under numerous treaties, are undermining European stability.

Russia's actions to undermine the sovereignty of a neighboring country and to attempt to change borders and to change the international order even, but certainly to change borders by force, are unacceptable.

Russia's aggression against Ukraine challenges our vision of a Europe whole and free, which is what we have been working so hard on since the end of the Cold War. It changes Europe's security landscape, it is causing instability, obviously, on NATO's borders, and we are steadfast as a nation in opposing Russia's destabilizing actions.

To do that, we have been working closely with Europe and other partners and allies; first and foremost, to impose real costs on Russia for its aggressive actions. This has included diplomatic isolation

and economic sanctions which, combined with falling oil prices, are having a substantial and mounting impact on Russia's economy.

We are also taking visible, concrete measures to reassure our allies and partners in Europe and to deter further Russian aggression. For example, since May 2014, NATO has been reassuring allies and deterring Russia by maintaining a continuous land, air, and maritime presence and increasing military activity particularly in the eastern part of the NATO Alliance. These measures are defensive, they are proportionate, and they are fully in line with our obligations as NATO members regarding allied defense.

We are also, as part of our strategy, providing substantial support to Ukraine as it is dealing with simultaneous economic and military crises. Since the start of the crisis, we have increased our security-related assistance to Ukraine significantly, to both its military, its national guard, and its border guard services. And, together, next year, in fiscal year 2015, DOD and the State Department will be providing $120 million to Ukraine as part of the European Reassurance Initiative.

But it is, I think, important to also remember that NATO and our European allies are also on the frontlines of the fight against ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant]. There the United States has been leading a coalition of over 60 nations across multiple lines of efforts ranging from military contributions to humanitarian assistance.

As part of the coalition military campaign, Europe has been stepping up to fill critical roles, particularly in denying ISIL safe haven in Iraq and Syria, and helping us build the capacity of partners to take the fight to ISIL, including by actively striking ISIL targets.

The threat we see of foreign fighters going into Iraq and Syria remains a significant concern for us and for our European allies. We are drawing on all forms of our intelligence to understand and address the flow of foreign fighters and we are working closely with our NATO allies and other partners to have an international effort to try to combat this complex problem.

In addition to the threat of ISIL, it is also, I think, important to note that there is significant instability in the Middle East and North Africa that also affects NATO's security, especially for those allies that are on the southern flank of the Alliance. The movement of thousands of migrants to the shores of southern Europe can bring instability and sometimes violence, particularly because of the transnational criminal networks that are involved in human trafficking.

Finally, as we look beyond Europe, it is also useful to reflect on the true strategic partners we have in our European NATO allies for a host of challenges that are well outside of NATO's boundaries. In particular, I just wanted to note how effectively we work together with NATO allies in Africa to be part of the international community's response to the Ebola crisis.

Under Operation United Assistance, the Department has supported the USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development]-led effort to break the back of the Ebola outbreak, with the United States focusing primarily in Liberia. This mission isn't complete and many lives have been lost but I think we can be proud as part of the international community with the strong roles that we have

played and that European allies have played to successfully mobilize all of our capabilities to address the emergency.

Also, in Afghanistan, NATO allies remain our steadfast partners in the effort to try to help bring civility and security to that country. The Resolute Support Mission, which we launched at the beginning of this year, focuses the efforts of our NATO allies and other partners on training, advising, and assisting the Afghan security institutions at both the ministerial and institutional level. Twenty-six of our allies and 16 partners are providing forces to the Resolute Support Mission, and our allies there have also committed to providing sustainment funding to the Afghan National Security Forces through 2024, which is going to be critical to locking in the gains that we are making there.

Finally, to do all of this together with our NATO allies and to be able to work effectively, it is essential to have a robust force posture in Europe. Our U.S. footprint in Europe gives us the capability to defend our security interests, to enhance trans-Atlantic security, to reassure allies and deter aggression which, again, we certainly see in a very marked way in recent times.

In a time of limited resources, however, the United States has to be more innovative and explore new posture arrangements by increasing our flexibility, our adaptability, and our readiness.

If sequestration returns, and this is something I am very personally concerned about—our ability to sustain our posture in Europe is going to be at significant risk. If sequestration returns, our ability to continue to invest in the capabilities we need and to maintain the readiness levels we need to be able to effectively respond to crises is going to be at significant risk.

This is a very serious concern. I know it is one that many of you share and we look forward to working with this committee and with Congress more broadly to try to find solutions to these budgetary pressures so that we can maintain the U.S. military as the world's finest military force.

Thank you very much for your time today, and I look forward to questions.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Wormuth can be found in the Appendix on page 50.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General.

STATEMENT OF GEN PHILIP M. BREEDLOVE, USAF, COMMANDER, SUPREME ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE AND U.S. EUROPEAN COMBATANT COMMAND

General BREEDLOVE. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

It is an honor to appear before you representing the dedicated soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines and our civilians of U.S. European Command [EUCOM]. Thank you for all you do to support them as they serve our Nation.

I am particularly happy to be here today with Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Christine Wormuth.

Compared to just one year ago, Europe faces a very different and much more challenging security environment. Our top concern is a

resurgent Russia. A Russia attempting to exercise power and influence through the use of force and intimidation. Russia is blatantly challenging the rules and principles that have been the bedrock of European security for decades. The challenge is global, not regional, and enduring, not temporary.

Russian aggression is clearly visible in its illegal occupation of Crimea and in the continued armed conflict in the Donbass, or Eastern Ukraine.

The best way to bring the conflict in Ukraine to an acceptable lasting solution is through a political settlement, one that respects state sovereignty and territorial integrity. But what we have seen recently and, frankly, over the course of the whole conflict, gives us cause for concern.

Russian forces have supplied separatists with heavy weapons, training and mentoring, command and control, artillery fire support, tactical and operational-level air defenses; more than 1,000 pieces of Russian military equipment have been transferred into Ukraine, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, heavy artillery pieces, and other military vehicles and equipment.

And in a number of cases, when the separate offensive or operations were stalled or were threatened, Russian regular forces themselves intervened to right the course. Just this month, Russian forces fought hard to change the facts on the ground just before the cease fire was scheduled to take effect.

These are not the actions of a good faith negotiating partner. Actions matter much more than words, and what we see in the fight on the ground and in the diplomatic efforts designed to resolve it, is a revanchist Russia that does not play by international rules or norms.

The crisis in Ukraine affects more than just Ukraine. Russian activities are destabilizing to neighboring states and to the region as a whole. Russian illegal actions push instability closer to the boundaries of NATO. As President Obama has clearly stated, the United States will uphold its Article 5 commitments under the Washington Treaty.

In turn, Russia is learning lessons from our responses to their actions. If they feel rewarded by the outcomes, this might embolden them to try them again elsewhere. And the rest of the world, states and non-state actors alike, are also keeping eyes on how these events unfold.

For the longer term, it makes sense to aim for a new Russia-U.S. relationship and a new NATO-Russia relationship that are based on mutual respect and shared interest. A Europe whole, free, at peace, and prosperous, is a vision that would benefit everyone. And it would offer the best possible long-term protection of U.S. national security interests.

At the time same, Europe also faces a surge of violent extremism. The executions and other brutal actions that ISIL has carried out show their total disregard for human life. European nations are rightly worried about foreign fighters returning home to Europe from the fight in Syria and Iraq with new skills and with malign intent. Attacks like those in France, Belgium, and Denmark are only likely to become more frequent.

Foreign fighters are part of a much broader pattern of insecurity in Europe's south, with its roots in the Middle East and North Africa, with flows of migrants and criminal transit routes. The spread of instability into Europe and the reach of transnational terrorism could have a direct bearing on the national security and the U.S. homeland. These challenges are transnational. To solve them, nations need to work together and our civilian and military institutions are and need to continue to cooperate.

EUCOM is working with European nations bilaterally and supporting NATO Alliance initiatives to meet and counter this new and more complex security environment.

Based on the decisions made at NATO's Wales Summit last year, the Alliance is adapting in order to improve its readiness and responsiveness. The Readiness Action Plan, or RAP, is well underway. Our allies are stepping up, making contributions and investments that give them a real stake in the outcome.

The United States will have a key and sustained role to play supporting and enabling these changes, especially in critical areas that are the hardest for our allies to provide like lift, sustainment, and enablers such as ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]. At the same time, our own U.S. efforts in Europe remain utterly essential, more important now than at any time in recent history. With Russian troops illegally occupying Crimea, soldiers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Europe deployed to the Baltic States in Poland with only 96 hours' notice to reassure our allies and our Air Force began flying missions out of Poland within 18 hours of notice.

The reason that we could respond so quickly is that we were there forward and ready. There is simply no substitute for our forward force presence in Europe. It is the bedrock of our ability to assure our allies, to deter real and potential adversaries, and to act in a timely way should deterrence fail.

That forward force presence ensures that EUCOM can play a full array of essential supporting roles for other combatant commands from neighboring AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command] and CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] to STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command] and TRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation Command]. And it supports all the other critical facets of EUCOM's mission, including, very importantly, fulfilling our commitment to the defense of Israel.

Rotating presence is no substitute for permanent forward presence in the building of relationships or signaling of our commitment. But genuine and fully funded rotational presence can play a very important role in helping to meet requirements in our theatre if it is heel-to-toe and fully resourced.

The budgetary challenges and resourcing tradeoffs that we face now, based on the Budget Control Act, have already forced EUCOM to assume risk. Our timelines are longer, our preparations are less robust, and our fundability to deter and defeat in a timely and effective manner is less sure than it could be. The security challenges in and around Europe are only growing sharper and more complicated at the same time.

Your support of EUCOM's mission and your efforts to chart a longer-term path toward properly resourcing defense are critical

steps to ensuring the ability of EUCOM to protect and defend its nation and do its mission.

Thank you for your time and your attention, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Breedlove can be found in the Appendix on page 57.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you both for your testimony.

General Breedlove, you heard me mention at the beginning that I support Mr. Smith's legislation that would require defensive lethal assistance be provided to the Ukrainians. Have you provided options to the administration for various kinds of weapons and equipment that could be provided to the Ukrainians that would make a significant difference in their ability to defend themselves and, part b, is if a decision were made, how long would it take to get it to them?

General BREEDLOVE. Chairman, thank you for the question. And these are important things, especially the second part as it relates to how this would play out.

So what we have seen across the last year in discussing these issues with Ukraine is a very consistent picture of the things that they tell us they need to move forward in their struggle.

Additionally, the U.S. European Command has had a series of broad and deep conversations across all of the aspects of military business with the Ukrainian military and their defense ministry. And what we have observed about Ukraine is very consistent with what Ukraine was telling us about Ukraine.

And so, Chairman, I have advised to my chain of command those things that we have learned in these discussions and talked about, categories of things that the Ukrainians would need.

All of these options have timelines. Some timelines are short and some are longer. It is pretty straightforward. Small arms and some of the other things that you might consider are a very short timeline. Longer, more sophisticated capabilities take training, they take delivery, et cetera, so there is a mixed bag, I think is the best way to answer your question, of not only delivery, but training required to bring things to fruition.

The CHAIRMAN. And I appreciate the point about training. Obviously, that takes some time. I am also—remember that in this room just a couple weeks ago we had the King of Jordan who said that he is incredibly frustrated when equipment and weapons he has requested have been approved but our own bureaucracy still takes so long to actually get the things delivered. And so my offer to you is that I hope a decision is made one way or another soon. If there is something that we can do to speed delivery once that decision is made, whether we force it or the President decides on his own, then we want to do that.

Ms. Wormuth, let me just ask you briefly. This administration probably before your time made a big deal about a reset of Russia—of relations with Russia. Even the policy folks in the administration admit that didn't really work out very well, right?

Secretary WORMUTH. Chairman, what I would say is the reset policy did bear some fruit. For example, we were able to successfully negotiate with the Russians at that time the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] treaty which was very much in

our interest as well as being very much in Russia's interests, and they are continuing to comply with that treaty.

We also were able to cooperate with them to maintain the Northern Distribution Network which we very much needed to achieve our objectives in Afghanistan. But I would certainly say that at this time, we are much more in a posture of needing to reassert the importance of deterrence and our Article 5 obligations with NATO vis-a-vis Russia.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I appreciate it. I think, as you know, we will have continuing conversations about whether Russia is meeting its arms control obligations across the board, and I think there is considerable doubt about that. But that is for another time.

Ms. Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, both of the witnesses, for being before us.

I was just in for a NATO parliamentary meeting and I was in Turkey with Mr. Turner and Colonel Cook, so I won't ask a lot of questions. But I do have a couple of them.

The first one is this whole issue of trying to counter ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] recruiting through the social media, especially to the young people who we see going. What is the military and what—you know, how are we working with our European allies, in particular, to ensure that this recruitment isn't going on, not just in the United States but, of course, in Europe.

And then my second questions would be with respect to Turkey who we know at this point is a key NATO ally, has been for a while. We have had our ups and downs in that relationship. It is alarming to see recent reports of the Turkish government turning a blind eye to arming some of the extremist groups like al-Nusra and—some of these reports even suggest that they help groups to capture Syrian towns from the Syrian army with the use of artillery to move in and out across the Turkish border, et cetera.

So while we are all concerned about ISIS and its great cancer in the region, groups like al-Nusra and its allies are not far behind from that. So can either of you comment about what we are seeing there on the ground and what we intend to do about it? Thank you.

Secretary WORMUTH. Congresswoman, on the issue of ISIL recruiting and their very effective use of social media, it is certainly—ISIL has been remarkable in its effective use of social media and we are working very hard, as a whole-of-government effort, to try to be more agile in countering that.

And it really is—first and foremost, the center of gravity on that really needs to come from within the region and come from figures that have credibility with the Muslim community. And so, in many cases, the Department of Defense is playing more of a supporting role in trying to counter those recruiting efforts.

But what we are trying to do—I mean, a lot of what makes ISIL effective with its recruiting, unfortunately, is its very barbaric ideology and the fact that they have been, up until recently, able to demonstrate progress on the battlefield and they have sort of used that momentum to make themselves attractive to potential recruits.

To try to counter that in the Department, we are working already, but want to do a better job of being able to show the suc-

cesses that the coalition and the Iraqi forces are having on the ground, again, to try to counter ISIL's message that they have the momentum. And the fact that the Kurdish forces in Kobane, for example, were able to defeat ISIL.

You know, we were able to make very good use of that, for example, and again, in some of the recent operations in northern Iraq, where we have seen the Peshmerga, in particular, make progress, we want to try to leverage that, from the military perspective, to try to blunt the effectiveness of ISIL's use of social media for recruiting.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Right. And that might require maybe an off the side conversation at some point about what we are really doing.

The last question, of course, General, Turkey, these other groups, slippery border armies—I have some of my constituents of Turkish decent coming in with pictures of ISIL-type people with armaments stamped Turkish Army. What is going on there?

General BREEDLOVE. Congresswoman, thank you.

I am not personally aware of what you have talked about, but what I will do is go back and take a hard look at this and offer to come to you in a classified engagement.

I would tell you that—you and I have actually talked about this before; Turkey is a great mil-to-mil ally and that is where I am focused. Our mil-to-mil relationship is as good as it has ever been and I think you are aware we have had a few successes this week in things that we have asked of them to move forward, both in Syria and Turkey.

But allow me to take the real meat of your second question and come back to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Madam Secretary, General Breedlove, thank you for being here and your service to our Nation.

Madam Secretary, you were mentioning in some of your comments about sequestration and we have heard this before, from outside think tanks who have testified, as well as military and administration officials like yourself.

I think we all know that we are looking at some major, major decisions forthcoming. My concern is that it is almost like we know that we have a problem, but we are not willing to deal with the problem.

General Breedlove, I have great respect for all of our military services. I know the stress you all have been under, as it relates to budgets, and this brings me to the point I am trying to make.

First of all, Madam Secretary, has this administration brought in inspector generals, like John Sopko, to talk about the waste, fraud, and abuse in Afghanistan?

You made mention in your comments that things in Afghanistan; we are going to be there to 2024. That is the agreement that the President signed with the Afghan government. And yet, the waste, fraud, and abuse continues to go on and on. Well, that takes away from the military and their needs.

I have said many times that I just do not see how this country can continue to do what is necessary to maintain a strong military,

unless there is some debate in the Congress about a war tax, because I don't know where the money is going to come from.

If we don't level with the American people in this very unsafe world that we live in, if we want to win the war or protect Americans then we cannot continue to go into deficit situations. And this committee is probably tired of hearing me saying it, but we are $18.1 trillion in debt.

And every time I have been told that we—bomb in Iraq for about an hour is $300 million an hour. So, I mean, at some point in time, I think the administration has got to say to Congress, we have got to pay for this war. And it is unfair for the American people not to have a Congress that is willing to do what is necessary to rebuild and strengthen our military.

I would like to know your—excuse me; your feelings, as well as General Breedlove's, because you can't do the job if you don't have the armaments. If you can't afford to buy the bombs, you can't bomb. And that is where I am concerned, not just for these few months in front of us, but for the years, to 2024, using the time in Afghanistan. Any comments?

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, let me to try to address some of the points you raised in sequence.

First, just to clarify, because I certainly don't want to have misled the committee; our NATO allies and other partners in Afghanistan have committed to financially continue to help sustain the Afghan National Security Forces through 2024.

As I think you all are very aware, President Obama has made clear that our military forces will be drawn down to a Kabul-centric footprint by the end of 2016. So I don't want to imply that we are contemplating keeping our military there through 2024. That is just an issue of providing funding to try to help the Afghans pay for the security forces they need.

We are very much in contact with, for example, John Sopko, the Special Investigator for Afghanistan. General Campbell and he work very closely together. We take the concerns that he raises and look into them very deeply and where there is clearly, for example, waste or fraud or abuse, we do everything we can to try to address that.

I think your point about how we pay for the military we need is well-taken and I think you will hear, when Secretary Carter comes up here I think in the near future, to talk about the overall budget request for fiscal year 2016, he is going to be emphasizing that, just as we come to come to Congress and ask you all to support our Defense budget request, we have a responsibility to do everything we can to reform how the Department of Defense operates so that we are making the best use of those Defense dollars.

And we have been trying to do that, for example, with some of the proposals we have made to try to adjust our compensation, for example, or requesting authority for base closure. But Secretary Carter and his team; we are very aware that reforming how we do business is a key part of making sure that we are able to spend the resources that we have in an effective way.

The CHAIRMAN. Time of the gentleman is expired.

Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you to the witnesses.

General, in your opening remarks, you used the term resurgent Russia, which—I would just like to explore that with you for a minute.

I mean, obviously, a big part of the resurgence is more investment in military spending by the Russian government. I just wonder if you could sort of walk us through what capabilities and forces have been the focus of that change.

General BREEDLOVE. Thank you, Congressman.

And what we don't want to do is overstate. You know, that has happened in the past, that we used to talk about a 10-foot-tall Russia. But what Russia has done, over the past 5 years, has steeply ramped up their investment in their military, period.

We see a strong commitment to their nuclear forces in upgrading their nuclear forces, making them more survivable and then making the bench deeper. So a strong emphasis on their nuclear forces.

And then, what they have learned through the years. As you know, when they went into Georgia, it didn't go real well for them and they learned some tough lessons. And so they have addressed those lessons in their conventional forces and they have invested in their mobility, their readiness; they are training them to a higher level and they are outfitting them with new equipment to make them more capable when they take the field.

So it is sort of a bifurcated path, strong emphasis on nuclear weapons, and then the kind of money that you would smartly invest in order to bring up the readiness and capability of their conventional forces.

Mr. COURTNEY. So, you didn't mention naval arena and I—you know, obviously, there have been news reports about, you know, them sort of showing up near U.K. [United Kingdom] and you know, our Scandinavian allies and some talk about, you know, boosting their shipyard capacity.

I was wondering if you [could] talk about that a little bit.

General BREEDLOVE. Yes, sir.

I am sorry; I lumped air, land, and sea into conventional. And to make the point, they have invested in all three. They have made strong investment in their land forces, which is what you see playing out on the border of Ukraine now.

They have made strong investment in their aviation capability and they are doing the same thing with aircraft that they are doing with their naval forces. The investment in the naval forces is, again, sort of split; a good emphasis on their submarine forces and their nuclear submarine forces, as well as their conventional forces.

But what we see with the more surface navy is just bigger, better, exercises, training, more out-of-area operations, as you saw the *Kuznetsov* carrier go all the way into the Eastern Med [Mediterranean] and have about a 30-day rotation in the Eastern Med. Haven't seen that in a long time; so they are investing there.

Mr. COURTNEY. And you know, part of the events with the Crimean takeover was that they actually, at least for some short period of time, seized a number of Ukrainian naval vessels. What is the status of that? Did they return any of those or did they just enlarge their force by keeping them?

General BREEDLOVE. Several were kept. Several of the very—lesser-capable vessels were given back. At least one, maybe two were scuttled, in order to block the entrance and exit from the harbor in Sebastopol.

The main combatant that was retained by Ukraine is their flagship, which actually was out of area on a NATO operation during the time.

Mr. COURTNEY. And so, in terms of our response and our NATO allies' response, in terms of, you know their naval forces; can you talk about that a little bit, in terms of what is happening right now?

General BREEDLOVE. So, as a part of the assurance measures that we have done that the Under Secretary talked about, we have upped our presence in the north and in the south in our naval presence, so our standing naval group and our standing naval mine group showing a stronger presence in the Baltic Seas.

And then, in the south, we have had, not a constant presence, but almost constant presence in the Black Sea. Originally, in the beginning, by U.S. forces, and now NATO forces are folding in with us, so that we keep a NATO or U.S. presence in the Black Sea.

We have done several exercises in the Black Sea, with the navies, our NATO navies there, and Ukraine has participated in those exercises.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

And, Ms. Wormuth, a few weeks ago, the chairman put together a round table with some of the best defense planners and strategists in the country and they all concurred that it would be fair to categorize Mr. Putin as opportunistic.

That means he would see an opportunity like Ukraine, move in there, then evaluate it, based on the responses, for his next movement; that the Chinese were long-term strategists, but that the United States has become more reactionary, and they felt that one of the biggest weaknesses we had now was a lack of strategy.

When I listen to the chairman correctly talking about the need to perhaps give defensive [lethal] assistance, weapons and equipment, to the Ukraine now—Ukraine government, I am concerned because, for the longest time, this administration would not even allow our military to give information, which is kind of the baby step before you do anything else, to the people in Ukraine.

We couldn't tell them about Russian troop movements, capabilities, locations, all of those kinds of things. In hindsight, was that an incorrect strategy?

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, I think at the time, we made decisions about what kind of support to provide and what kind of intelligence to share, based on the situation on the ground at the time.

We are—for several months, certainly, have been providing considerable intelligence to Ukraine.

Mr. FORBES. But what was your strategy, for so long, not giving them that information; in fact, prohibiting that information from being given?

Secretary WORMUTH. We were giving them information we thought would be useful to them and would help them respond——

Mr. FORBES. You didn't think that the location of where the Russian troops and the size of the troops and those kind of things would be important to the Ukraine government?

Secretary WORMUTH. To my knowledge, Congressman, we were providing intelligence.

Mr. FORBES. Can you check that and verify that for us?

Secretary WORMUTH. Yes.

Mr. FORBES. Please give it back to us on the record.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 87.]

Mr. FORBES. Second thing is talk about this resurgent Russia. Many of us were concerned when the Russians asked us to pull our missile defense systems out of Europe and this administration said sure, we will do that.

Two questions; in hindsight, was that a bad strategy? And secondly, where did you put the additional resources to fill that gap?

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, the European Phased Adaptive Approach that we have for missile defense in Europe is a very strong approach to deal with the missile defense threats that we face, which are primarily from North Korea, with their nuclear program, and to posture us to be able to prevent or defend against a potential future Iranian threat.

We have made the investments needed to support that program——

Mr. FORBES. Can you tell me where you made those investments? And if you don't have them now——

Secretary WORMUTH. Certainly.

Mr. FORBES [continuing]. Would you supply that, because I haven't seen where you put those dollars. We put it on the back of the Navy, but we continue to wait for when you are going to give those additional resources to do it.

Maybe you could just—if you would, just supply it for the record. And again, if you would tell us what your strategy was; whether or not a gap has been left because you have done that.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 87.]

Mr. FORBES. And then, General, the question I would ask for you, in follow-up to Mr. Courtney's question about the Navy, you know, Europe used to be a hub for our Navy and over the last decade, maybe two decades, we have allowed our naval presence to decline considerably.

Based on what we see with Russia now, where do you see us going forward? Is there going to be a new level of demand, perhaps, that our Navy has? And if so, can you give us a little bit of definition of what you think that might look like?

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, as you know, this is one of the places where our force structure in Europe is growing.

We have received two of the Aegis destroyers that will go into Rota and we have two more that are on schedule to come to us.

They will be a multi-mission ship, but they will also be dedicated to missile defense, because that is their core capability. So the U.S. presence in Europe is growing.

But you rightly question that—are we taking all the right steps and here is what I would say. We are making a strong push with our NATO allies to better cooperate and bring them into these assurance measures and the changes that we are making to NATO, because you are——

Mr. FORBES. General, I would just point out; if we are going to do this so-called pivot to the Asia-Pacific area and if we see this increase in Europe then we are going to have to increase our naval presence if we are going to be able to do that.

And on the ships we are talking about, we really didn't add resources to that. We just shifted ships around, which is a big difference than adding resources.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield.

The CHAIRMAN. Ranking Member.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The big concern with Russia is what would they do next. I mean, obviously, we are focused on the Eastern Ukraine right now, but most of the speculation is that, unchecked, this leads to further problems.

What would they do next? What are you guys most fearful of? Where might they try their little-green-men strategy next, if Eastern Ukraine were to be resolved in their—yes; in their favor?

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, I think we have probably two primary areas of concern, in terms of where might Russia go next.

First is they might go to countries who are not part of NATO; for example, Montenegro, some of the smaller countries, and try to, again, create some instability to try to use some of the information operations; techniques that we have seen them use very effectively in Ukraine.

And we are working through the European Reassurance Initiative, for example, to provide support to countries like that, to be able to help them to resist those kinds of activities.

Similarly, we also have concerns about the potential for Russia to try to destabilize actual NATO member countries, particularly, I think, the Baltics or—because, again, those countries have sizable ethnic Russian populations.

So, again, we have been very, very clear and I think Putin understands that we are completely committed to upholding our Article 5 obligations and that to cross that line would be an extremely substantial step.

But we are working in a variety of ways to try to help countries, whether inside of NATO or whether partner countries, be able to resist that kind of destabilizing activity.

Mr. SMITH. And at this moment, of those possibilities, are there hints that he is moving in one direction to implement one of them or is it just pretty much, at this point, speculation or have there been active steps that Russia has taken that give you concern about one of those specific examples that you mentioned?

Secretary WORMUTH. From what I have seen, we don't have—there are not significant active steps. I have not seen anything, for

example, in intelligence that would indicate that, but I would ask General Breedlove to comment.

General BREEDLOVE. Sir, I would just step back.

I know that your question was really next after Ukraine, but think we also need to think about next inside Ukraine, because I don't think any of us are sure that he has accomplished his objectives inside Ukraine next and so that would be my first next.

And then there might be some revisits. For instance, we start to see a more Western-leaning Moldovan government and Russian troops in Transnistria are there to keep Moldova from leaning to the West and so there may be some revisit in Moldova.

And I think what we should do is watch first where we see strong information campaigns picking up. And that is happening in Moldova and other places now.

Mr. SMITH. Understood. And how do we change this mindset of Russia? Part of the—you know, reason for the chairman and I, you know, doing the bill that we did to give Ukraine greater position to defend themselves is to sort of up the military cost.

I mean, obviously, if, you know, the Russian military decides to go, you know, full-force, no matter what we do, you know, they are—Ukraine is no match for them. But the higher the cost, the less likely, in my way of thinking, that he would try this in the future. And yet, the administration has been a little reluctant to cross that line and do that.

And I understand, you know, we don't want to, you know, escalate, but on the other hand, if it was more costly, if it did mean that Russia would have to, you know, commit more troops, more weaponry, lose more of their soldiers; wouldn't that be a discouragement for them to do something in Moldova or in Montenegro or any of these other places that you have talked about?

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, I think that is exactly right, in the sense that we are—a key part of our strategy vis-a-vis Russia right now is to impose costs on them, diplomatic costs, economic costs, and then also to provide support to Ukraine. We are—as you know, I mean the President said, I think just before the Munich Security Conference or just after, considering all options.

We don't want to take options off the table and there is discussion of providing defensive lethal assistance, in an effort to, again, raise costs on Russia; not, I think—not from the perspective at all of being able to fundamentally alter the military balance between Ukraine's military and Russia's military, but to try to give Ukraine more ability to defend itself against the separatist aggression.

The Minsk agreements have now been signed and we very much want to see those upheld. Obviously, experience to date gives us, I think, pause, and actions are going to speak much more loudly than words.

So, as we watch whether those agreements are going to be upheld in the coming days, if we see continued violation and continued aggressions—pardon?

Mr. SMITH. I see no reason to for a second believe that they will be upheld.

Isn't it rather clear at this point that Putin's strategy is to use that negotiation to neutralize Europe from, you know, fully engag-

ing and helping, meanwhile continuing to do exactly what he wants to do?

I mean, is there any counterargument to that interpretation?

Secretary WORMUTH. We are very concerned and I think skeptical of whether this agreement will be upheld. And if it is not, we will again look at measures to impose additional costs. So I think we—that conversation is still ongoing and is very active.

Mr. SMITH. I think we can pretty much count on it not being upheld, so we should start planning.

Because—it is part of the strategy. It is sort of slow-rolling it, you know, keeping them at bay as he moves through the Eastern Ukraine as he sees fit, so that is something we are going to have to do.

Thank you. I am going to yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Breedlove, good to see you. Thank you for your comments before the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the Munich Security Conference.

You have been a great voice of trying to give us clarity in this time period of what you have described as hybrid warfare, where we see ambiguity that Russia is trying to create on their actions, which makes it more difficult for people to formulate policy and then address that policy with having clarity, so thank you for the clarity.

Ms. Wormuth, I have a few questions for you, because also, when your position is policy, what we don't want to have is issues of ambiguity of things that are true or not true: facts.

We can disagree as to policy, but facts are those things that we shouldn't allow ourselves to degrade to ambiguity, as Vladimir Putin tries to get us to do in hybrid warfare.

Phased Adaptive Approach; you will not deny that Phase 4 of the Phased Adaptive Approach was canceled, would you not?

Secretary WORMUTH. Well, we made a different decision; that is correct.

Mr. TURNER. So that would be a yes. You canceled Phase 4 of the Phased Adaptive Approach.

The Phased Adaptive Approach was the portion of Phase 4 that was to actually protect the continental United States. You said we have a strong commitment to the Phased Adaptive Approach; not so strong, since it is canceled.

And I do want to give a footnote here; that we are all aware that the fourth phase of Phased Adaptive Approach, which you cited as being a strong commitment, was canceled after the election, prior to the—with the President having had a prior conversation with Medvedev in an open mike situation, where he said to him, after the election I will have more flexibility with respect to the Phased Adaptive Approach, in what many people, including myself, refer to as the secret deal, then has the appearance of the President making a deal with Russia and subsequently canceling the Phased Adaptive Approach, which, again, underscore, would have protected the mainland of the United States.

And let's refer to START. You cited START. You would not deny, right, that the United States, under START, cut our deployed nuclear weapons, correct?

Secretary WORMUTH. The New START negotiations lowered the number of nuclear weapons in our arsenal; yes.

Mr. TURNER. Great. You will also not deny that it did not require Russia to cut any of their deployed nuclear weapons. In fact, they have had the ability to increase the number of their deployed nuclear weapons; correct?

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman——

Mr. TURNER. Correct; right? Yes, no; it is a numbers game. These are not ambiguity issues. These are not policy for us to have a disagreement. Doesn't the numbers in START not require Russia to cut any of their nuclear deployed weapons and actually would permit them to increase them?

Secretary WORMUTH. The New START treaty protects our interests.

Mr. TURNER. Yes? No? It is yes/no. Please don't give me ambiguity. Please don't have, right where we are here in the middle of this hearing, a question answered where you leave people with an impression other than the truth. The truth is under START we cut our deployed nuclear weapons, they don't. Correct?

Secretary WORMUTH. We cut our nuclear weapons but not to a level to which we couldn't provide a very strong nuclear deterrent.

Mr. TURNER. I didn't ask that. Under the numbers under New START, they have the ability to increase, we had to cut. Correct? I mean, you have to know this. Don't leave us with the impression that perhaps you don't know the circumstances.

Secretary WORMUTH. Correct.

Mr. TURNER. Correct. Thank you for giving me that correct.

Now Russia, at the time of the discussions with us on the New START agreement, was violating the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] treaty. Correct?

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, we raised Russia's violation of the INF treaty in 2013.

Mr. TURNER. I am not asking you what you raised. I am asking you a correct or not correct. During the New START negotiations with the United States, Russia was, at that time, in violation of the INF treaty. Correct?

Secretary WORMUTH. We had concerns that they were in violation. We know now that they were.

Mr. TURNER. I am not asking you what your concerns at the time were. We now have information, we know it clearly. So——

Secretary WORMUTH. Yes, we know now that they were in violation.

Mr. TURNER. Russia was violating the INF treaty at the same time that we were negotiating START. Correct?

Secretary WORMUTH. Correct. We know that now.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you.

Now you started to say you had concerns, so you knew that it was—that there was a possibility that they were violating the INF treaty at the time of New START [Treaty].

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, we had not determined that they were in violation.

Mr. TURNER. No, no. I am asking you. I am not asking we; I am asking you.

Secretary WORMUTH. I was not in a portfolio at that time to personally be aware but——

Mr. TURNER. Did you have concerns of the information—did you receive information that gave you concerns about their possible violation of the INF treaty?

Secretary WORMUTH. At that time, we had not determined that they were not compliant.

Mr. TURNER. You had—you personally had no concerns? You personally had no concerns?

Secretary WORMUTH. At that time, I was not involved in that particular issue, Congressman.

Mr. TURNER. Okay. Could you please tell me why the President of the United States refuses to acknowledge that Ukraine has been invaded by Russia, when they have invasion forces on the ground? What is the term invasion that causes difficulty with the administration? I mean, Ukraine's territorial integrity has been violated. Russian troops are there. Why can't we call it an invasion?

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, I think we have been more focused on what is happening as opposed to what you call it. Russia has absolutely violated Ukraine's territorial integrity and has attempted to unlawfully annex Crimea.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. O'Rourke.

Mr. O'ROURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Breedlove, if we arm Ukraine, what will Russia do?

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, it is a great question. It is one that we are all working very hard on now. Clearly, we don't know what Mr. Putin will do. What we need to do is look at what is on the ground, the capabilities and capacities that he is building, and make inference from those capability and capacities. Right now, we are not arming the Ukrainians with lethal weapons.

And what we see is Russia continues to build their force, continues to provide capability to the Eastern Ukrainians. And so no—the fact that we are not doing now is not changing their path forward. So I think that we have to be cognizant that if we arm the Ukrainians, it could cause positive results, it could cause negative results, but what we are doing now is not changing the results on the ground.

Mr. O'ROURKE. But bottom line, I take your answer to be we do not know what Russia will do should we arm Ukraine.

And Ms. Wormuth, would that be your answer, as well?

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, certainly, we don't know with certainty how Russia would respond. And I also would add that in addition to thinking about whether to provide defensive lethal assistance, we also—there are other measures we can take to try——

Mr. O'ROURKE. I understand, but the proposal on the table in terms of arming Ukraine should beg the question what will Russia do, then what are our options when Russia does any number of different things and what are the second, third, fourth, fifth order of consequences of arming Ukraine. That is what I am trying to get

to. I understand some of those considerations probably should not be discussed here, but I think, bottom line, we don't know what Russia will do.

The information I have shows that we spend a little under 4 percent of our GDP [gross domestic product] on our Armed Forces; Estonia, 1.9 percent, Latvia, 1 percent, Lithuania, .8 percent, France, a little over 2 percent. Are we not, Ms. Wormuth, creating a moral hazard for Europe and especially for these Baltic States? What are you doing, what is the administration doing to get our NATO allies to spend a more significant percent of their budgets on military so that we are not asking our taxpayers to do their job?

Secretary WORMUTH. That is a great question, Congressman, and we—a couple things I would say there. First, at the Wales Summit, all of the allies agreed to a defense investment pledge to work towards providing 2 percent GDP as the standard. So that is an important step.

Mr. O'ROURKE. Two percent by when and what are the consequences if they don't reach it?

Secretary WORMUTH. I don't know if we put a by when on it. But what I would say is——

Mr. O'ROURKE. It is pretty urgent right now. Considering everything that we just discussed,

Secretary WORMUTH. I absolutely agree.

Mr. O'ROURKE. I would think there would be a date certain that you are going to commit if you want to make sure that we are going to be there for you. You have got to carry your weight. So there is not a date certain or we just don't know what that is right now?

Secretary WORMUTH. We think it may be 2020, Congressman, but let me check and get back to you on the specific details.

Couldn't agree with you more that it is essential that our European allies invest more in defense, and this has been a longstanding challenge that we have had, frankly, with our NATO allies. Many Secretaries have raised this.

I do think that with everything that is happening vis-a-vis Russia right now, but also the threats posed by ISIL, our European friends have a greater appreciation for what they are truly facing and some of them are revisiting in their own parliaments and governments how much they are investing.

Mr. O'ROURKE. So I will just ask that you—I appreciate that but I will ask that you give us a definite answer to that. You know, I certainly would like that and I think my colleagues would like to know that as well.

Secretary WORMUTH. Certainly.

Mr. O'ROURKE. My last question, for General Breedlove, what lessons do you take from the 2008 Russian/Georgia war that we could apply to what we are seeing today?

General BREEDLOVE. So the lessons are not good ones. As I mentioned just a little earlier in one of my comments, the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 was accomplished but it was not a very clean operation for them. They lost aircraft. They lost lives. It was a tough slog for them, and I don't think they expected it to be a tough slog.

And what we have seen is they have been a very learning and adaptive force. They have completely cleaned up the issues that we saw in Georgia as they went into Crimea. I would love to offer you a classified briefing to show you the depth and breadth of the way they have corrected their problems, their military issues, the way they ran the military piece into Crimea. And then just from Crimea to Donbass, or the eastern part of Ukraine, they have corrected problems there as well. So——

Mr. O'ROURKE. Thank you. I will take you up on your offer.

I yield back. Thanks.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And Mr. Chairman, Mr. Turner pursued my line of questioning with Ms. Wormuth and he did a much better job than I would have done. So if it is alright, I am just going to suggest that some of us were very concerned about the New START because we saw it allow Russia to build up a stockpile of strategic weapons and for us to be required to build down.

And it did not take into consideration the tactical capability of Russia, especially in Europe. And in retrospect, it appears to me that this Russia reset has been a startling failure. And that is a sincere conclusion, and I know it doesn't really probably track with your own perspective.

So I am going to, if I could, switch over to General Breedlove here.

And General, you know, every time you come here I try to say something nice about you because I think you—people like you that stand out there and give your whole lives for the cause of freedom are the noblest among us. And I am just wondering how he keeps carrying those stars he keeps—they keep putting on him here. It is starting to be pretty good thing for such an old guy, you know? But I say that having been in an F–16 with him during a 360-degree loop, so I had a lot of confidence in him at that time.

But the EPAA [European Phased Adaptive Approach] Phase 2 was set fully to be implemented this year. Can you just discuss the need for increased missile defense capability in your AOR [area of responsibility]?

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, thank you for that. EPAA Phase 2 is on track for delivery capability in 2016 to be ready. We see all of the actions on the ground doing well. The budget is going well. We may be a month or so behind in the construction but we think we are ready to deliver on time for that. We see the authorities and everything that we need shaping up there. And we also see that the progress on starting the next phase in Poland is tracking as well.

Mr. FRANKS. Let me ask you now, the Department has requested a multi-year procurement authority for the SM–3 IB [missile] and that hopefully would achieve critical cost savings and production stability. Can you speak to that request and its significance or importance?

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, my facts agree with yours that the proposed way to go forward on purchasing these missiles now will save us, I think the number is 14 percent across the first

buy, and that is significant. And it also addresses some of the long-lead-term items, issues that a company would be working in to deliver those missiles.

More importantly to me is that the capability inherent in that SM–3 IB is important to the mission that we need to do in both of these sites, the site in Romania and the site in Poland. And so we hope to stay on track with delivery of the capabilities that that missile brings.

Mr. FRANKS. I will just ask two last questions and they are a little bit eclectic and just give you the time to elaborate as you will. Given your area of expertise with the whole situation happening in Crimea and Ukraine, number one—first question is what would you suggest would be the most important policy or strategic initiative we should pursue to contain that problem the best that we can, given the circumstances.

And then number two, completely different subject, related to the danger of ISIS and Islamist terrorism in the world. What do you consider, as a general, to be the most significant, at least strategic approach, that we might have? I know tactically we have engaged them very effectively, but strategically, what do you think is the most important thing that we are missing here, and how significant do you think the failure to approach—to address that is?

General BREEDLOVE. If you will allow me, I will lightly remark to the policy and strategy piece, and I might ask the Secretary to remark to that. Let me start with ISIS because I don't want to run your time out. As we understand the problem of ISIS, one of the main things that I think we need to focus on is their legitimacy. This caliphate draws to it those who would want to come and fight for the caliphate.

And the incredible information campaign that they have out there and other things that just transmits the legitimacy of this caliphate, we need to attack it. We understand, and I won't go into it here, it would take all your time, those elements that make the caliphate real to those who would follow it, and I think we attack them in detail.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you both for being here, for your service.

You know, we have had a discussion about just the question what would Russia do, and I wanted to just be certain and clarify there are, obviously, proposals about providing more than nonlethal support to Ukraine and that does trigger our thinking about their using conventional, perhaps even tactical weapons at some point. Can you tell us some more about, you know, how that calculation is and sort of the response of the Congress and what you would like to see?

Secretary WORMUTH. Congresswoman, in terms—again, we don't know with certainty what Russia would do if we were to provide defensive lethal assistance. I think what needs to be weighed is, again, providing that those kinds of systems, for example, might well strengthen Ukraine's ability to defend itself, be more effective against Russian tanks, for example. But the potential concern that has to be weighed is does Russia then double-down and provide

even more heavy equipment and just escalate the violence, cause more human suffering and continue to sort of prosecute its campaign.

So part of, I think, what we have to look at is whether there are other tools that might also impose costs on Russia and cause Russia to pause and reevaluate where it is going, and do the pros and cons of those other tools, for example, such as economic sanctions or other steps that could be taken in the financial domain, would they potentially be more effective and have fewer downsides. So I think those are some of the issues that we need to be weighing as we think it through.

Mrs. DAVIS. I think I am asking, too, about how the discussions here in the Congress are read in terms of what we would anticipate or what we would like to see. I don't know, General, if you want to weigh in on that.

General BREEDLOVE. Ma'am, first, I would echo what the Secretary has said and that I think that the important—the discussion of defensive lethal aid is very important. It is one of the tools. We talk about DIME, diplomatic, informational, military and economic, and I think that these need to be worked—all worked at the same time. Mr. Putin is putting intense diplomatic pressure in Kiev. The information campaign is quite impressive. And the—I call it the disinformation campaign is quite impressive. Clearly, Mr. Putin is all in when it comes to the military element.

And then he is attempting to put economic pressure through energy and recalling loans early, et cetera, on Ukraine. And so I think that the discussion about the military element is incredibly important, but we also have to continue to bring the pressure on all fronts in—across these four areas.

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. Thank you.

We have talked about our allies providing more defensive support. And just going back to your numbers, General, about the military personnel at EUCOM, you mentioned 65,000 as a—how much are—does that include allied personnel?

General BREEDLOVE. No, Congresswoman. That is our U.S. personnel in European Command.

Mrs. DAVIS. And so allied personnel is where in that?

General BREEDLOVE. That is more—we talk about them more in terms of the NATO Alliance and how—what they bring to that Alliance. And clearly, the depth and breadth of all of the nations of NATO and their militaries is quite significant, but the readiness and capability are the things that we are working on together to raise that capability in our NATO allies.

Mrs. DAVIS. So the fact that you are working on that in terms of readiness doesn't necessarily mean that they are ready to deploy alongside U.S. troops at this time or in——

General BREEDLOVE. Ma'am, I would say that they have some of the same problems that we have in our military. They have forces that are capable and ready right now and others that are at a more increased responsiveness.

Mrs. DAVIS. Is there a number that you would be more comfortable with when you think about adequately staffing EUCOM for our current global missions?

General BREEDLOVE. Ma'am, I would like to come back to you on that. I didn't come prepared to talk about growing my command. Right now, we are just working on the mission that we have, but I would love to come back and talk to you about that.

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. I was going to turn really quickly to Afghanistan as well because Secretary Carter is now talking about slowing the withdrawal. Do we have the support, again, with our partners, in being able to do that? And we can take that later for the record.

Thank you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 87.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

It occurs to me that we—nobody can know for certain how Putin would respond to us providing weapons. What we can know for certain is how he has responded without us providing weapons and that hasn't gone very well.

Mr. Wittman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Wormuth, General Breedlove, thank you for joining us.

I want to ask, so far, the administration's strategy to counter Russian aggression is focused on sanctions. We heard senior Russian officials, though, say that Russians will eat less food and use less electricity. Just this past Saturday, Secretary Kerry said the administration is exploring additional sanctions on Russia. Give me your perspective.

How effective to this point have sanctions been? Will they be more effective in the future in changing the Russian calculus? And what military options have you suggested to the administration to counter Russian aggression in Ukraine?

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, on the sanctions and their effectiveness, you know, the sanctions that we and the Europeans have put in place on Russia are having a very significant effect on their economy and that—and those effects are growing over time. But I think we would all agree that it hasn't changed what Russia has been doing on the ground.

Mr. WITTMAN. Give us some specifics about what those effects are. I mean, that is a general terminology, they are affecting their economy. Tell me, how is it affecting the economy? The lives—the daily lives of Russians, it is really hurting them? Give us some perspective on what that is.

Secretary WORMUTH. I will try to do that. The value of the ruble, for example, has fallen substantially. They are—they have very large strategic financial reserves but they are having to draw those down to be able to provide fluidity in their economy. So the size of those financial reserves are shrinking substantially and will continue to do that.

And I think, you know, we will see that effect happen over time, and sort of have a cumulative effect. But again, I think, you know, we would agree that despite the significant economic costs that are starting to have effects on the Russian population and on the oligarchs. You know, we are hearing, for example, more dissatisfaction of the oligarchs who to date have been very supportive of Putin. They are concerned about the impact it is having on their businesses, on their own financial holdings.

But it has not changed so far what Russia has been doing on the ground. And that is the great concern we have, and that is where there is a need to again look at the overall package of cost-imposing strategies towards Russia, and also support to Ukraine, to see if we can change the calculus going forward.

Mr. WITTMAN. General Breedlove.

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, on the military options to date, I will talk just briefly to U.S. and to our allies. Both U.S. and allies have brought primarily non-lethal aid to the table to help the Ukrainian military, and these are well known, everything from medical capabilities, food, to probably on the high end, our counter-mortar radars that we have delivered to them, which are defensive in nature, to allow the Ukrainians to understand when they are under attack, et cetera.

And the change now is that while we are considering, and you are deliberating, possibilities of lethal aid, now nations are beginning to also do what for nations outside of the U.S., I would categorize as training. You recently heard both Canada and U.K. announce that they are going in to do training in various things.

In the United States, we have a deep relationship with the Ukrainians that was already underway before this all started. And we are doing coaching and mentoring. You probably have heard and seen reported in the paper today that we have a team going in to do medical coaching and mentoring now.

So, we have non-lethal aid; nations doing training; U.S. forces doing coaching and mentoring. And then, of course, our Nation is deliberating the next step.

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. General Breedlove, let me ask you this, from your perspective. Do you believe that Vladimir Putin's strategy is to undermine the credibility of NATO as it relates to its Article 5 obligations to protect NATO nations? And if so, do you believe that his next move might be to Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, and trying to destabilize that region?

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, I think that the main goal of Mr. Putin is to divide the West in general; in EU [European Union] terms, economically, as you see him try to build his own economic union; and also militarily to divide NATO; to try to find those cracks, live in them, expand them, and try to bring dissent to the conversation.

So I absolutely believe that is his number one goal. If he divides NATO, he gets Ukraine. It would happen.

As to Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, I am not sure that would be the next targets. He understands what Article 5 means.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Moulton.

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Breedlove, I am interested in whether you think that we have essentially exhausted our means of supporting Ukraine with non-lethal aid at this point? And whether that, therefore, lethal aid is the next logical step?

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, no, I don't think we have exhausted the options in non-lethal aid, but I don't think that is directly tied to should lethal be the next step.

Mr. MOULTON. I agree.

General BREEDLOVE. I mean, there is much more that we can continue to do. But that doesn't preclude, then, should we also consider lethal.

Mr. MOULTON. No, I agree with that point. I am just curious whether we have exhausted those options.

I am also interested in what both from the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] perspective and from your perspective, would be other avenues of escalation. And I understand that some of this may be classified, but if you can speak to that for a minute, I would appreciate it.

General BREEDLOVE. So, Congressman, thank you for that. There are other—as we just talked about a few minutes ago. We are focused on the military piece of the four pieces of—four types of power that a nation has. But diplomatic efforts can continue and we can step those up. Informational work—we are frankly well behind the Russians in this area. Their disinformation campaign is very impressive.

And then as you know, the debate about will there be further economic tools used. That continues to be talked about. So, I completely agree that we need to go back at Russia across all four elements of national power.

Mr. MOULTON. Great. Ms. Wormuth, do you have anything to add to that?

Secretary WORMUTH. No. I think that is a very good elucidation of what we are trying to do.

Mr. MOULTON. Okay, great.

Could you just take a minute to comment for a second on your view as to whether the New START was in our national security interests or not?

Secretary WORMUTH. Certainly, Congressman. Thank you.

The New START treaty was in our interest. We were able to negotiate with the Russians and come to an agreement as to the size of both arsenals. We would not—I mean, fundamentally, the only reason to pursue negotiated arms control treaties is to do it if it is in the interests of the United States from our perspective, for example.

So, our view was very much that through New START, in addition to looking at the overall size of the strategic arsenal, it gave us a verification regime. It allowed us to go in and have transparency to the Russian arsenal; to have predictability in terms of understanding what they are doing with that part of their nuclear arsenal. And all of that adds to strategic stability.

So I think the administration's view is very much that the New START treaty was in our interest.

Mr. MOULTON. Right. But could you just explain that a bit more? Because Mr. Turner raised the question that if the overall number of Russian weapons goes up and ours stays the same or goes down, it doesn't seem to the sort of casual observer that that would be a favorable agreement.

Secretary WORMUTH. Well, again, in terms of the overall levels of our arsenal versus the Russian arsenal, there are, you know, we do not have exact strategic parity in terms of down to the very last number. But what we negotiated through New START was a level

for both sides that provided for the, basically the fundamental soundness of our strategic deterrent.

So, you know, and it is fair to say that the tactical nuclear weapons that Russia had were outside of that agreement. But from a strategic nuclear force perspective, the levels that we have are ones that very much allow us to provide the kind of nuclear deterrent that we need to have.

Mr. MOULTON. Given that—given Mr. Putin's new ambitions in Europe, would you say that leaving tactical nuclear weapons out of that agreement is a greater concern now?

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, I don't think it is a greater concern necessarily. I mean, the—you know, it would be desirable certainly to convince Russia to be able to reduce its overall amount of tactical nuclear weapons. They have a very large number. But a country has to be willing to do that.

That disparity existed before the situation we have now. I don't think there is a need to be more concerned about it before. I mean, again, I think fundamentally we have to make sure that we have the full range of military capabilities to deter Russia effectively. And we do that through a combination of our conventional force posture and our nuclear force posture.

Mr. MOULTON. I think 10 years ago, we didn't expect this kind of movement on behalf of Russia.

Secretary WORMUTH. That is certainly true.

Mr. MOULTON. Do you think that we should consider expanding our tactical nuclear arms?

Secretary WORMUTH. I think the nuclear deterrent we have today very much protects our national security interests. I don't——

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Important questions we will dig deeper into in the future.

Mr. Gibson.

Mr. GIBSON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Appreciate the panelists being here today.

First, a question about Lieutenant Nadiya Savchenko. I am interested in what we know about her current health and about release.

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, we don't know as much as we would like to know. What we do hear is that she is well cared for. It is not an arduous affair. But that is clearly what we are being told. We have no indications one way or the other.

And this is a strong point of constant contact as Ukraine negotiates forward.

Mr. GIBSON. I am following that situation very closely and appreciate your attention to that as well.

Question now is really more one of a whole-of-government. So Ms. Wormuth, I am interested in your insights with regard to your actions in the interagency. And specifically here I am asking about the status of political-military cohesion and unity within Ukraine and across Ukraine, and the status of civil-military relations inside Ukraine. Because really the focus, the thrust of the question is: How are we doing as far as helping Ukraine strengthen itself?

Secretary WORMUTH. Thank you, Congressman, for that question.

I think we are working very hard across a range of fronts to try to help Ukraine strengthen itself. And I think the DIME construct is a good way to try and talk about that. So, you know, for example, the State Department is engaging at all levels, from Secretary Kerry and President Poroshenko, down to the level of our ambassador. And we are very much, you know, working with them and talking with them about their political situation.

In terms of, you know, as I have said earlier, we have significantly increased our security assistance to the Ukrainian military. And as General Breedlove mentioned, we are providing training. We have something called the Joint Commission with Ukraine's military that we have used to talk with them about what their requirements are both in the near term, but also over the long term as they try to professionalize their military.

On the economic front, we are working to—through the IMF [International Monetary Fund] to try to secure additional economic assistance. Because obviously, Ukraine has a very difficult economic situation as well.

So I think across all fronts, we are doing a lot to try to help Ukraine strengthen itself and be better able to determine its own path as a sovereign country.

Mr. GIBSON. So then, more specifically, what I am concerned about is certainly the reports that I read and from my constituents. I have strong Ukrainian-American communities in upstate New York, Kerhonkson and other places, and so I often hear of, at times, different approaches in different parts of Ukraine.

So now, I have a geographic question, and how are we interacting that maybe helps strengthen and unifying some of the geographic differences of opinion as it relates to political-military. And then, of course, that question is still on the table: Do you have any concerns on the civil-military relations inside Ukraine?

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, I don't have significant concerns about the civil-military situation in Ukraine. I would certainly ask General Breedlove if he wants to elaborate on that. But I saw our ambassador to Ukraine when I was in Munich just a few weeks ago, and the report I had from him was that those relationships are pretty strong.

I was also struck in talking with him about his sense that when you drive throughout all different parts of Ukraine, if anything, the Russian aggression in most areas has strengthened Ukrainian nationalism and—which, you know, again, I think gives the lie to the whole idea that somehow this is an indigenous movement that is coming out of Ukraine and that there are individuals who feel that their, you know, rights are at risk.

I think—you know, he talked about how roads, farmland, fences were painted blue and yellow, again, as an expression of their strong nationalism.

General BREEDLOVE. I will just jump on that a little bit, and that was a vignette I was going to use. Post-Crimea, prior to Donbass, this nationalism was very, very high. I think that you would find east of the Dnieper River that it is probably a little strained now because of what they have seen. I don't think we have targeted any geographic unity, but what we do know is that Mr. Putin is trying

to drive a wedge in the government, and we are trying to help them to fight that.

Mr. GIBSON. That is an encouraging report. And I will continue to watch very closely. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My quick assessment is that, for Russia on the economic front, they care about what is going on and they can care more. Diplomatically, they don't care what people think, and militarily, the West has to find a way to get them to care more. And right now, we are not, because backing diplomacy with nothing is going to continue to get us—you know, we will have Minsk III and Minsk IV and Minsk V and still no action out of Russia, in my view.

General, I want to ask you a question. I was asking you, or somebody, at the NATO PA [Parliamentary Assembly], and it is simple. I mean, do you think Russia understands the difference between a NATO country and a non-NATO country?

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, the short answer is yes. I believe they do understand what Article 5 means and I think they do respect that. But that does not mean that they will not reach out to those dense Russian-speaking populations that might be in a couple of our border NATO nations to see if there is a way to raise and foment unrest there.

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks. And do you think a—would a lack of quick NATO consensus on a specific action to counter an Article 5 violation would preclude any one NATO ally from acting to defend Article 5?

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, I would just say that I was at Wales and I have been at every meeting since Wales. And one of the things that was most striking to me is that while we have lots of tough conversations—as you know, NATO is not only facing Russia to the north and east, but there is a growing concern about the south, what is coming across the Med from Africa, what is coming out of the Levant and Syria and Iraq. So there are lots of things that sort of cause us to have conversations about where we should focus.

But what I was struck by in every meeting since Wales is the iron-clad commitment to Article 5 responsibilities and defense.

Mr. LARSEN. Ms. Wormuth, what do you think has been the primary objective of Russia's military modernization?

Secretary WORMUTH. I think, Congressman, the primary objective of military—of Russia's military modernization is to demonstrate its vision of itself, which is to be a global power on the world stage. And, you know, in the wake of the Cold War, Russia's military declined to a significant degree, and Putin has very methodically, as General Breedlove outlined, gone about rebuilding in many ways the conventional and nuclear sides of the Russian force. And I think Putin sees that strong military as an important tool in his ability to function in his own mind as a global power and to be able to protect what he sees as Russia's rightful sphere of influence.

Mr. LARSEN. Well General, talk a little bit about that rightful sphere of influence because in your testimony, although you didn't cover it in your oral, in your written, you discussed the Russian in-

vestment in infrastructure in the Arctic, and the United States actually chairs the Arctic Council starting in April of this year. And Commandant Papp, former Commandant of the Coast Guard, is the State Department's designee to that.

Russia is a member of the Arctic Council. I don't imagine that is going to get in the way of the Arctic Council doing whatever it needs to do. But there is this issue of the Arctic opening up, more water days per year, and then you have this heavy investment, it seems, from Russia in the Arctic. Can you talk a little bit about that?

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, just to agree with much of what you said, that there is this opening and changing way that we might be able to use the Arctic. And frankly, one would hope that we could see that as an opportunity and a place that we might cooperate. But there are concerns by the NATO nations who are along the Arctic—or all of the eight nations of the Arctic really are watching what is going on up there, and some have more concern than others.

Clearly, as you state, the Russians are changing the nature and capabilities of their infrastructure in the Arctic. This could either be for good or not.

Mr. LARSEN. You know what? I have got a question, but I don't want to get tapped down by the chairman, so I will yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate the gentleman's consideration. With the largest committee in the Congress, we have got to stay on time.

Gotcha. Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ma'am, General Breedlove. General, thank you for joining me at Robins Air Force Base a couple of weeks ago. We have picked up all the Georgia Tech stickers and tags that we handed out prior to your arrival, but should you choose to come back, we will be more than willing to hand them out again. And I hope you will. I hope you will join us at Robins or at Moody, but I know you are busy.

And I want to talk about one of the platforms that flies out of Robins Air Force Base right now, if I can, and that is the JSTARs [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System]. We have worked to recapitalize that program over the last several years. The Air Force has asked for that. Certainly, want to continue that.

The new budget submission provides funding to keep the five additional E–8Cs [JSTARS] that were scheduled for divestment to recapitalize the fleet. And just like to hear the battle management command and control capabilities of that system, how they have benefited in the current fights that we are in, that you are directly in control of and that capability.

And then again, making sure that—understanding the needs of that platform. We are going to continue with the recapitalization of it to get that ISR platform that—not only us, but our allies' needs in these fights.

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, thanks for that. And I will refrain from the Georgia-Georgia Tech discussion.

Clearly, the capabilities of this aircraft are key and essential to everything that we do. The ability not only to have some command and control capability aloft but the other part of the mission and looking at the ground, et cetera, et cetera. So we are—as I would

say that every COCOM [combatant commander] that sits here in front of you would tell you that these are capabilities we need into the future to be able to do not only our ISR business, but our command and control.

Mr. SCOTT. Do you consider it urgent? Would that be an appropriate word to use with regard to——

General BREEDLOVE. I think that the demonstration of how fiercely we compete to have that capability in our theater points to how needed it is. It is a requirement we need.

Mr. SCOTT. Well, I look forward to working with you to expand that capability. And thank you for your support of Robins.

Ma'am, I want to talk about our NATO allies for a second. One of my primary concerns as a husband and a father is that when I look at our overall budget picture, within 5 years the net interest on our national debt will exceed what we spend on national security. And I look at what our NATO partners are committed to contribute towards what I would consider global security, and I look at what they are contributing and they are not living up to their end of the bargain, if you will.

What do we need to do differently to explain to them that while we as the United States want to be a good partner, we are perfectly willing to take the lead, we are perfectly willing to, on a dollar share, put more in because our economy is stronger, but we can't carry all of the weight. How do we get our NATO partners to put in what they committed to put in?

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, that is a great question. And I share your concern, I share concern as a taxpayer and as a parent. I have two daughters and was trying to explain to them last night what sequestration is. So it is a very good question to ask what do we need to do differently, or what more can we do, because this conversation about defense investment with our NATO allies has been a long-standing conversation.

And I—you know, I think what we can do is take steps like we did at the Wales summit where we got NATO allies to sign up to a defense investment pledge. The hard work, though, is going to be, going forward, making sure that they do live up to that. But what we can do and what we are doing is both raising it at the highest levels—this is something that when Secretary Hagel met with the German MOD [Minister of Defense] a few months ago, he raised it with her. Secretary Carter will be raising this with his counterparts.

But we also can be having very serious conversations, I think, with the Europeans about the very real and serious security threats that they are facing and how to be able to have the capabilities they need to be able to be interoperable with us, they simply have to make those investments. And part of the defense investment pledge was to say that 20 percent of their defense budget should go to investment in major equipment systems——

Mr. SCOTT. M'aam.

Secretary WORMUTH [continuing]. And more R&D [research and development].

Mr. SCOTT. I am out of time. If I could finish with one statement, Mr. Chairman, if you would indulge me. We can push whoever we need to out of a territory. We, as the United States with our allies.

But at some point somebody has got to hold that territory. It is a big world. We can't hold it all. And if our NATO allies aren't putting in their share so that they can hold their own territory—and I recognize the Ukraine is not NATO, with us, but they have to be able to hold their own territory. We can't hold every country for them.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Gabbard.

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Breedlove, I am wondering if you can talk to the unconventional tactics being used by Russia, specifically what is being done to counter those? You know, when we look at Ukraine, everyone is—obviously recognizes that there is no head-to-head or tank-to-tank battle that is possible between Ukraine and Russia. So I am wondering what is being done, whether it is done by the U.S. or done by other countries, to assist Ukraine.

We have talked about lethal assistance but also, with regards to training assistance for them to counter these unconventional tactics with unconventional tactics and to begin to exact a toll on the Russian military that becomes more evident to the Russian people beyond the toll that is there from the sanctions.

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, thanks. And if I could just open the question a little bit, too. We talk a lot about the unconventional tactics in the military side but I think we have to remember that they are being unconventional in diplomatic, incredibly unconventional in the information sphere, and then they are using those sort of tough tools in the economics, as well. So, the "D" [diplomatic], the "I" [intelligence], and the "E" [economic] of DIME are all in unconventional operations for the Russians. And so we need to help our partners to be able to work that.

Broadly, then, in the military piece, there are three things we are helping all of our nations and this is work we are doing in the Baltics right now even more so than in Ukraine, to preclude this problem in the future, and that is to give our nations the ability to understand it is more than military, it is normally almost more a ministry of interior problem to develop the capabilities to do three things: Recognize that we have unconventional warfare going on; characterize it as unconventional as opposed to just normal issues, political issues in the populace; and then attribute it to an aggressor nation if it is being imposed.

So recognize, characterize, and attribute. And, then, when we can do that, we can have other nations to be more involved in how we fight that battle. So we are developing right now capabilities inside these nations to take those steps and get their laws and authorities right inside their own nations to be able to attack this when it occurs to them.

Ms. GABBARD. I have another question with regard to the EU but I think that is an issue that I and others on the committee would like to hear more about specifically because Ukraine is where things are happening and then also how the other Baltic States and NATO allies are also preparing.

With regards to the traffic of foreign fighters and the flow between Syria and through Turkey, what is the EU doing and what role are you playing in working with them to address that issue and the fact that their ability to or their willingness to cross-ref-

erence names on terror watch lists, for example, and to track people who are coming through those porous borders in between these EU nations, how is that being addressed and improved given these weaknesses have been identified?

General BREEDLOVE. Do you want me to take this one?

Secretary WORMUTH. Oh, I can. Congresswoman, that is a great question. One of the major lines of effort in our counter-ISIL strategy is trying to address the foreign fighter network problem. There are I think at the last that I read as many as 20,000 foreign fighters flowing from more than 90 countries into Iraq and Syria. So it is an extremely significant challenge.

We are working with the countries in the European Union to try to help them—I mean, much as combating some of these unconventional tactics to try to help them strengthen their laws that govern their border security, that govern their travel regulations. We are working with them to try to help them strengthen their intelligence organization's ability to identify these networks and to identify where the facilitators are.

There is more work to be done but this is a major prong in our strategy. It has to be a truly international effort because if you only address it in a particular region or within the context of Europe, you know, the water——

Ms. GABBARD. But wouldn't you say a majority of those numbers that you threw out are, though, within that region at this juncture?

Secretary WORMUTH. Many of them are coming from European countries.

Ms. GABBARD. Right.

Secretary WORMUTH. That is certainly true. We also see them coming from places like Indonesia——

Ms. GABBARD. Right.

Secretary WORMUTH [continuing]. And elsewhere in Asia.

Ms. GABBARD. But I am—since we are talking about this region right now, is Turkey on board?

Secretary WORMUTH. Turkey has been steadily improving. There is more work to be done though. Turkey is one of the transit points that we are most concerned about. They are getting better. They have put more people on their watch list. But there is more work to be done with Turkey.

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bridenstine.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Breedlove, I would like—I think there are a lot of people that don't understand the important relationship between U.S. European Command and the nation of Israel. Could you brief us on some of our commitments to Israel? Maybe some of our mil-to-mil exercises, that kind of thing. How important is what you do to the nation of Israel?

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, thank you. Some I can discuss here, others I would be glad to come talk to you in a classified environment.

U.S. European Command has been given the mission of assisting in the defense of Israel. The most—probably the most visible piece of that is our joint work in ballistic missile defense and how we would help Israel to do that because of their, as you know, strategic

depth is not something that Israel has and so being able to help them defend that.

And that is—we have a series of exercises that are some of the best that we do in this ballistic missile business. We have great exercises in the air defense, Air Force across the board. And I think, at that point, I would defer to a more classified conversation.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Well, I appreciate that. And another question I had is—and maybe this is for you, Ms. Wormuth. If we were to go continue through the sequestration process, maybe you could help us understand a little bit about how that would impact the nation of Israel and European Command and maybe, General Breedlove, you could highlight as well, too, because we are about to go through a budget process here in the U.S. Congress and I, for one, believe we need to get beyond sequestration, especially as it relates to our defense forces. And we hear all the time about the increased risk. Can you guys quantify that for us?

Secretary WORMUTH. Thank you, Congressman. Let me try to answer your question there. I think if we return to sequestration levels of funding, it will have a profound impact—a profound negative impact, I would argue, on what we are trying to do in European Command and that in the Europe AOR, but also globally.

You know, at the current level of funding that the President has requested, we are able to execute our strategy at a manageable risk level, I would argue, but we are already now at the point where we don't really have a margin.

You know, I think you have heard General Breedlove say, for example, he is showing American presence through a rotational approach as opposed to permanent presence in some cases. And under sequestration, we would be forced to look at choices between the size of our Army, our Air Force. We would be, just as we did in 2013, we would be having to eliminate exercises with countries in Europe, for example, potentially Israel. We would be facing some very difficult choices.

And in terms of speaking to the risk in a little bit more concrete way, you know, the way I think about it is part of what we do is to try to prevent crises from arising and we do that through our forward presence. We do that through our engagement. Under sequestration, we will have a smaller military that will make it difficult for us to maintain that presence. We will have a military that will be less ready and less able to respond to crises. If we were to get in a major conflict, that conflict would extend far longer than we want it to be, it would be higher casualties, so there are very substantial, real-world implications to that kind of risk.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. And, General, I can tell you would like to answer this as well, but I would like to move on to one last question with my one remaining minute. We know that, you know, Iran is continuing with an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] program. We know that Hamas and Hezbollah are reconstituting their missile capabilities. ISIS, of course, is in the region. My question is this. What did the administration go through as far as a process to determine in its budget request that it was appropriate to cut $150 million from missile defense for Israel?

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, I don't have the figures at my fingertips in terms of what level of cuts we made. As General

Breedlove indicated, we are supporting Israel very robustly through programs like Iron Dome, David Sling, the Arrow program and——

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Just real quick, with my 23 seconds, Arrow was cut, I think $45 million, David's Sling was cut $100 million from appropriated levels last year. Any comments on that?

Secretary WORMUTH. Well, we are making very difficult choices, you know, over—since 2012, we have absorbed almost a trillion dollars in reductions to planned defense spending over a 10-year period and, in that context, we are having to make difficult choices already.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being here. General Breedlove, in your opinion has Russia achieved an operational capability of its INF Treaty-violating ground-launch cruise missile?

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, I would really like to talk to you about that in a classified environment. And I would—I will get on your calendar to do that.

Mr. ROGERS. I would appreciate that. Let me ask this, do you agree with Chairman Dempsey that Russia's INF systems pose a threat to our deployed forces in Europe?

General BREEDLOVE. Yes, sir, I do.

Mr. ROGERS. And what is your best military advice about the response most likely to assure our allies and to prevent Russia from attaining military advantage from these actions?

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, there are a series of things that we can do and some of those were discussed by some of our senior leaders in the past days. We need to first and foremost signal that we cannot accept this change and that, if this change is continued, that we will have to change the cost calculus for Russia in order to help them to find their way to a less bellicose position.

Mr. ROGERS. A little while ago one of our—my predecessors on the dais up here asked you about what would Russia do next, in your opinion, if it continues unopposed across Ukraine, and they specifically asked if you thought that the Baltics, Estonia, Lithuania, would be the next target and you stated that you felt that Vladimir Putin fully understood Article 5. So what is your professional opinion as to what might be the next concern that we would have in that region?

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, it is a tough question and there are several options available. As I mentioned before, I think, first and foremost, Mr. Putin has not accomplished his objectives yet in Ukraine, so next is probably more action in Ukraine.

We do see the seeds of issues in Transnistria and Eastern Moldova. We do see, as you know, continued pressure being put on Georgia and Gagauzia. So there are several places where pressure is being brought on these nations to keep them from leaning West and so there are options there.

I do, as I have said already today, believe that Mr. Putin understands Article 5 but I do not believe that that would preclude Mr. Putin from taking some actions in reaching out to the disparate Russian-speaking populations that are in some of our easternmost nations in NATO.

Mr. ROGERS. Is it your opinion that if we don't—and I am asking your opinion, I don't want to be leading in this question. But if lethal aid is not provided by the United States, does your best military opinion that the Ukrainian military can, in fact, stop the progress of the Russian troops across their country? Or can they not?

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, in the current configuration, I do not think that the Ukrainian forces can stop a Russian advance in Eastern Ukraine. And to the degree that we can supply help, I am not sure that they could stop a Russian advance in Eastern Ukraine even if we supply aid. I think that our——

Mr. ROGERS. Lethal aid?

General BREEDLOVE. Lethal aid, that is correct. Congressman, I think that what we are talking about is changing the calculus of the decisions that Mr. Putin has to make and the cost to him in his internal environment more than the external environment.

Mr. ROGERS. You are talking body bags?

General BREEDLOVE. That is right. I think we should talk about raising the cost for Russia in many dimensions, yes, sir.

Mr. ROGERS. Ms. Wormuth—thank you, General. In reading your opening statement I was concerned that you made no reference at all to INF Treaty violations by Russia, given that Secretary Carter right out of the gate has made it clear. This is a big problem that we are facing and he takes it seriously. Why did you not think it was worthy of mentioning in your opening statement?

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, that was an—excuse me. I don't want to be yelling at you. The fact that it wasn't mentioned in my written statement was not an indication that we are not deeply concerned about it. They are in violation. It is a problem. We have been raising this with them since 2013, making clear that their violation is unacceptable, and we are quite concerned about it as General Breedlove said. We want to continue to try to bring them back into compliance, but if they do not do that, we do not want them to have a military advantage over us and will look at what responses are appropriate to take.

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. McSally.

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for your testimony today. General Breedlove, I wanted to talk to you a little bit about truth in disclosure. I was part of a team to stand up Africa Command back in 2007 and 2010. And you mentioned the 65,000 assigned to you that includes forces that are dual-hatted, components to Africa Command and also forces assigned to you as a staff officer.

Great frustration that, you know, we did not have the forces required to include crisis response forces. So I haven't been there in a while so just wanted to get your perspective on especially with the increasing activity in your theater and responsibilities, how is that working and do you see if there is a crisis where you need a crisis response team in your theater but we also have a Benghazi-like situation in Africa Command, how does that work? Have you seen any shortfalls where you haven't been able to fill missions?

And, also, as we are looking for places to gain savings, I have heard some of my colleagues talk about how Africa Command can

just roll back into EUCOM again and, having been a part of that, with all you have on your plate, adding another 53 countries in Africa and the ungoverned spaces and the terrorism threat and everything we are doing there, I strongly disagree with that. So I wanted to hear your perspectives on that proposal as we move forward. Thanks.

General BREEDLOVE. So there has been some very good news since you left in that, as you may or may not heard, we have been given the authority at the combatant commander and deputy combatant commander level between EUCOM and AFRICOM to move forces back and forth without going through the DEPORD [deployment order] book process in the Pentagon. So when——

Ms. MCSALLY. There is a conflict there. How do you have two crises at once, something has got to get a priority, right?

General BREEDLOVE. There is no doubt about that and that priority would probably be adjudicated. But what happens is that Rod Rodriguez and I can make these decisions now very quickly and move the forces back and forth and you had it right, almost all the force is in EUCOM, there are some small crisis response—forces in AFRICOM but we are free to share at a very quick and easy way.

I completely agree with you about Africa Command and EUCOM but for a different reason. In Africa, the growing mission—the growing problem with radicals and with terrorists and ungoverned spaces in these nations, the focus that AFRICOM is able to bring on that is unique to the fact that there is a combatant commander assigned to focus on that. And I don't think that where the next problem really is going to be would be the place that we would want to lose focus.

Ms. MCSALLY. No, I do agree for the same reasons. Next question is we closed down the squadron of A–10s [Thunderbolt II aircraft] at Spangdahlem [Air Base] a couple years ago, and the squadron that I commanded at Davis-Monthan just deployed over to Spangdahlem. You can't make this stuff up. So we are in a situation where we are closing down A–10s in Europe and then we are deploying A–10s from CONUS [continental United States] to Europe. Can we walk through kind of a logic behind that and the cost?

Maybe you don't have that but maybe for the record later, the cost of deploying units forward versus having kept them there in the first place, and are you seeing value with that deployment? And you certainly can't have the squadron from Davis-Monthan full time but in a future discussion hindsight, should we have just kept a squadron of A–10s at Spang [Spangdahlem]?

General BREEDLOVE. I would defer to the Under Secretary for some of the policy piece of that. I would like to say that it is clear that the capabilities that these aircraft bring is needed. You already know, I think, in the military as a combatant commander we try not to prescribe the tool. We ask for a capability, and in an anti-armor capability certainly the A–10s bring a great capability forward to Spang.

I have often said that I favor forward-stationed forces. When the budget changes and precludes and forces are cut or brought down, then it is important that we have the ability to bring rotational forces. Rotational forces are only good if they have solid fiscal backing in order to be able to deploy.

Secretary WORMUTH. Congresswoman, I would just again go back to the figure I cited before, where we, you know, we have absorbed just a very, very large set of reductions from what we planned just a few years ago. And as General Welsh has testified, the A–10 is a great platform and all other things being equal, we would like to keep that.

But in order to modernize the Air Force, which is in desperate need of recapitalization, we have had to make some tough choices. I think that is what you are seeing.

Ms. MCSALLY. And my time is expired, but I just say I would like a cost analysis of keeping a squadron at Spang versus the cost of sending them TDY [temporary duty], which potentially could be more costly in the long run. So if we are gaining savings, let's make sure we are actually gaining savings. Thank you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 88.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Nugent.

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you General Breedlove and Ms. Wormuth for being here. Just a follow-up on the A–10 issue, and we all know that it is more than just armor that it can devastate. Having sons that actually saw the use of A–10s on unconventional forces and the fear factor that placed upon them was huge. So I would just, once again, I happen to like the A–10s because my kids, who called upon them to protect them when danger was close, was phenomenal.

But getting past that and we've talked about Russia, I think, and a lot of this needs to be in a classified setting, I agree. But when you talk about ISIS, and particularly forget about ISIS but talk about the Islamic extremism that is rampant across this world, I start to worry that, you know, we try to isolate—you know, we have got European Command, what goes on within Europe. Then we have, you know, Africa Command, which is under-resourced, obviously. One of my sons actually did a tour down in Africa training up Ghanaian soldiers.

But when you look at the threat, and we had King Abdullah here, that really gave us, I think, a very enlightened aspect in regards to, you know, the fight is within Islam itself. And until I think we identify the fact that is where the fight is, that is problematic on strategy.

But he was saying, and I tend to agree, is that it needs to be a coordinated attack across the broad spectrum, and I don't know that we have the ability to have a coordinated fight brought to the Islamic extremists when you have them parceled out by Africa Command, European Command, and what goes on in PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command].

Is there a way to coordinate all of that? Because I worry that we are not—and he was talking about that coordinated approach in particular.

General BREEDLOVE. I will allow the Secretary to talk to the larger part of the question, but let me assure you that we are not doing disparate attacks. I just literally came from Kuwait, where all of the leaders, to include our new Secretary of Defense, came together to talk about just your issue, of how we stay coordinated.

That area of the world, where CENTCOM, AFRICOM, and EUCOM comes together, Rod Rodriguez and Lloyd Austin and I work this personally all the time to not allow seams. Again, witnessed by what we just did in Kuwait. I will turn the rest of the question over to the Secretary.

Secretary WORMUTH. I was basically going to say the same thing, Congressman. You see we are also trying to do things like have conferences with the chiefs of defense from all of the different countries. We have John Allen, who is working to bring together all of the coalition countries. So while it is certainly true that the membership of the coalition crosses EUCOM's AOR, CENTCOM's AOR, AFRICOM's AOR, we have a number of mechanisms in place to make sure that we are working together and that we are seeing it holistically and comprehensively and not through a soda straw.

General BREEDLOVE. A two-second pile-on. An example. To stay unclassified, I won't name the base. So we take off an ISR asset and that ISR asset may change two or three times in the same mission, who it is really supporting as we gather on targets. So this is an extremely well-orchestrated dance.

Mr. NUGENT. And I think that was the biggest concern that we have as a committee in regards to what is the strategy. And I think that we have been somewhat reluctant in regards to the strategy. We are going to hear, you know, on AUMF [authorization for use of military force] and what is the real strategy going forward. And it is not just ISIS. This is a much broader issue of Islamic extremism.

And until I think the administration actually drills down and says the words, it kind of diminishes. And what you don't want to do is give credence to the caliphate or ISIL or whatever. I think that just creates a bigger problem for us when we add legitimacy to that.

And lastly, just on Ukraine, I would just say—and I agree with the chairman—it hasn't worked so far. And I understand what happens when we ratchet up and we give lethal aid to the Ukrainians. But I had a meeting last night with some Ukrainians in an off setting and they are absolutely concerned about their loved ones that are still there and what is going to happen to them. And these folks are U.S. citizens concerned about what is going to happen.

And so I would think that we have not been very successful in predicting Mr. Putin's actions, but I think our inaction is more of an appeasement than it is of showing leadership.

And I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I don't want to try y'all's patience too long. I do have just a handful of things I would like to ask about briefly. Several people asked about NATO defense budgets, Wales summit sets a goal 2 percent. General, I know you have these conversations with your counterparts all the time in NATO.

So far do you see anybody heading up, and who is?

General BREEDLOVE. Mr. Chairman, it is a great question and I would like to answer it in two ways. Yes, we have seen nations, including some of the Baltics that were mentioned earlier, who have made a pledge and showed a plan on how they will attain their 2 percent spending. Now they are very motivated. Other nations also are in the same boat.

We also, in truth, have seen a couple of nations whose administrations have changed. Remember this was national leaders that made this commitment and those national leaders have changed and we see a little regression in a couple.

Let me not try to pump sunshine but point out a few good things, and that is, separate from the 2 percent, also important is that their militaries step up to the mission we need to do. Defense starts at home. And as we have made these three basic changes in NATO as a function of the Readiness Action Plan, RAP, we are standing up the Very High Readiness Task Force. We needed three or four nations to be center brigades for that task force. We got six volunteer nations to step up to that in our recent defense ministerials.

As we stand up these six new units in our easternmost nations, they are NATO Force Integration Units—we jokingly call them nephews—they will be receiving an onward moving capability of NATO nations in these countries. And we have strong pledges, again, for the manning and standing up those units.

And then last but not least, the fundamental change in what we are going to expect from the Multinational Corps Northeast in Stechin, Poland, which will take on that Article 5 responsibility in the east and the north, strong manning conference and a strong pledge by the three framework nations, including us, the United States, stepping up our participation in that headquarters to bring it to capability.

So I painted a long picture, but the bottom line is we also ask them to step up with their forces, and to this point they are answering, Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That is helpful. Thank you. One issue that I don't believe has come up today is the threat of Islamic infiltration through the Mediterranean. So we all saw or knew of this horrible beheading of Coptic Christians on the coast of Libya. There is clearly an ISIS presence there. I read that the Italians are quite concerned about what is going to come up from the south.

Is NATO considering naval patrols of some sort to deal with this threat? Or is it a real threat, I guess?

General BREEDLOVE. Chairman, it is a real threat and it is one of the primary concerns of our southern NATO nations. I think you heard me mention a little bit earlier that coming out of Wales and every meeting since we have had a strong recognition that we have to adapt NATO to be able to react to the north and east and the problem with a revanchist Russia, but we also have to look to the south because we have a multifaceted problem in the south. From migration flows, organized crime, terror, all the problems that are occurring in the ungoverned spaces in northern Africa are bleeding across the Mediterranean in the south.

And as a part of the tasking I was given in my other hat as the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, we have to deliver a plan for addressing that. We will deliver that on the 31st of March. We delivered first the plan to address the north and the east, and next we will deliver our papers to look at the south threat as well. And you are right, Chairman, this is a multifaceted approach to include naval applications.

The CHAIRMAN. If I were in some of those nations, I would be concerned about how long that is taking to get a plan because these folks seem to move really quickly. I think you may have answered this, but other than budgetary considerations, your preference would be to have a permanent stationing of forces in Eastern Europe rather than a rotational one, is that correct?

General BREEDLOVE. Chairman, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And it would be those Eastern European countries' preference as well.

General BREEDLOVE. Chairman, if I could back up and clarify what I just said. I am in favor of permanent stationed forces in Europe. I think that the discussion of in our easternmost nations this is a different discussion for all of the reasons that you understand. Does that answer?

The CHAIRMAN. We need to go country by country as to their preferences. That makes sense.

Ms. Wormuth, lots of discussion about arms control and tactical nukes and so forth. But isn't it true that the Russian public doctrine is evolving to include the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons against even conventional forces? So that this potential danger by these tactical nukes that were not included in New START is taking on a little bit of a different enhanced meaning?

Secretary WORMUTH. Chairman, I think it is fair to say that Russia is in the process of evolving its doctrine in some very important ways. I would prefer to talk to you about that in a classified session and would be happy to do that, but I think it is fair to say in an open hearing that they are making some doctrinal changes that are concerning to us and that we need to take into account as we look to how we are going to deter Russia going forward.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am just referring to some of the things they are publishing openly. Now obviously there are other conversations to have as well. Last question I have got: General, you mentioned in answer to one of the questions that—talking about what the Russians learned from the Georgian invasion, and you said the Russians are a learning and adaptive force.

My question is, are we? And especially as we see these hybrid tactics and all that in this theater Russia is using to advance their national interest, seems to me it presents us some really difficult challenges. And from where you sit, are we learning and adaptive to deal with these new challenges that try to strike at some of our weaknesses?

General BREEDLOVE. Chairman, I would like to assure you that, yes, we are learning and adaptive. And I am encouraged by some of the things that even our young people have helped us to understand and how do we approach some of these hybrid challenges we see.

There is a lot of mystique around this word "hybrid warfare." All it really is is a different way to use tools that we have known about forever. The things that they bring to the table and use in a more—in a way that creates ambiguity.

And so how we address those ambiguities are very important. And so that I don't give away some of the more, I would say very ingenious ways that our young folks have worked, we will make

those available to you. But the bottom line is, yes, sir, we are a learning and adaptive force.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I hope we are in a timely way. Because it is whether we are talking about the threat from terrorism, whether we are talking about what the Russians are doing, or a number of other threats around the world, adversaries seem to be moving very quickly, looking for those asymmetric advantages that they can gain against us and looking for our weak spots.

And one of our weak spots is we don't do very well with somebody who lies and cheats and does all the things that we have seen coming out of the Russians. But that is the world we live in and we have to adapt.

Thank you both. We have touched on a lot of subjects today. I very much appreciate your being here and appreciate the seriousness of the issues which confront each of you as well as this committee.

And with that the hearing will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:23 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

FEBRUARY 25, 2015

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

FEBRUARY 25, 2015

Opening Statement of Chairman William M. "Mac" Thornberry

HEARING ON

How is DOD Responding to Emerging Security Challenges in Europe?

February 25, 2015

In a world and a time full of complex threats facing the United States, the situation in Europe poses peril on several levels.

First is the naked aggression of conquest. We have seen this in Europe many times in the past. History has taught us that aggression, unchallenged in its early days, leads to greater costs and greater misery when it finally must be confronted.

Second is the undermining of the rules-based international system that has existed since the end of World War II. I am among those who are convinced that President Putin is working to undermine the current international structure, in order to replace it with one more to his liking. And he has some unsavory allies in that effort.

The third challenge is the tactics that are being used by Russia in Ukraine. We've heard a lot about "little green men," but the various efforts Russia is using to undermine the Ukrainian security forces -- as well as to pull a facade over its own involvement -- presents challenges to NATO and the United States. We do not deal with naked lies, subversion, and other forms of subterfuge very well.

I am pleased to be working with Mr. Smith in support of legislation to provide defensive lethal assistance to Ukraine. It seems to me any people ought to be able to defend themselves and their country.

As Europe and NATO grapple with this crisis, as well as with the growing threat of jihadi terrorists, the world is watching and will draw conclusions about what course they will take.

But beyond the immediate crisis, part of what this Committee needs to think about as we consider funding, organizing, and equipping our troops is how well we are prepared to deal with this sort of threat in Europe or elsewhere.

Statement of Ranking Member Adam Smith

HEARING ON

How is DOD Responding to Emerging Security Challenges in Europe?

February 25, 2015

Just a few years ago, there was a debate about removing all remaining ground troops from Europe and bringing them back to the United States. The subtext of that debate was that Europe was at peace, European Command (EUCOM) was a backwater, and a high level of military engagement on a day-to-day basis with other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was probably unnecessary. To say, "things change" is an understatement.

Vladimir Putin's actions, beginning with the invasion of Georgia in 2008 and continuing through the seizure of Crimea and direct military support for the separatists in Eastern Ukraine, are reestablishing the tensions between Russia and the West. Putin's Russia has, despite the best efforts of the United States, proven to be a significantly destabilizing actor in Europe.

Ukraine and the Russian-backed separatists recently signed a ceasefire that supposedly took effect over the weekend. However, there continue to be reports of conflict around Mariupol. Unfortunately, it appears that this ceasefire will suffer the same fate of the last one and break down in the near future.

At the moment, we are left with how to address the conflict in the Ukraine. It is my personal belief that in the short term, we should support the Ukrainian government, and to this end Chairman Thornberry and I have introduced a bill that would authorize the Department of Defense to provide training and lethal defensive equipment to the Ukrainian security services. I hope that this legislation will move soon.

In the longer term, the United States, and our European colleagues, must figure out how we are going to deal with Russia. It is my understanding that the Administration will soon finalize an updated Russia strategy, which is a good step. But we cannot, and more importantly, should not, be thinking about this problem in a unilateral context. Our NATO and European partners are integral parts of this conversation.

Europe and NATO will continue to be vital in other areas as well. For example, NATO members have forces in Afghanistan that conduct or support operations in

the Middle East and they continue to play an important role in the anti-ISIL coalition. And NATO members, probably more than anyone, understand the threats posed by instability and extremists in North Africa. We and they simply must coordinate closely, probably more closely than ever before, to deal with these problems.

Both we and our European partners understand the need for this enhanced cooperation, and we are ready to move forward. For this, General Breedlove, I think we owe you some thanks—your work to build consensus and prepare us all to move forward together has been invaluable.

This is not to say that there will not be, and are not now, challenges to this cooperation. Many of our NATO partners are not meeting their commitments for defense spending. While some of them may meet this commitment soon, there is the real possibility that others, including at least one major NATO partner, may backslide to below the minimum required levels. For example, recent stories about the German army mounting broomsticks on armored vehicles to simulate machine guns underscores this problem. A military alliance that cannot field militaries that are properly trained and equipped cannot be taken seriously.

We also have some way to go in coordinating our response. Last year, the Administration requested and Congress approved the European Reassurance Initiative—a $1 billion fund designed to reassure our European allies concerned about Russian aggression. The Administration is requesting additional funding for this purpose for Fiscal Year 2016. NATO, meanwhile, is preparing the Readiness Action Plan to help build a rapid response to aggression in Europe. It is unclear how these two efforts are linked and coordinated, but they should be. There are other similar questions about how we will better work together as we go forward.

Testimony of
Under Secretary of Defense Christine Wormuth
U.S. Department of Defense

House Armed Services Committee Hearing
"How is DOD Responding to Emerging Security Challenges in Europe?"
February 25, 2015

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss with you today the security situation in Europe and our relationship with Allies and partners in the region. Over the last 18 months, we have seen the security situation in Europe change significantly. Russia has occupied the Crimean peninsula and unlawfully claimed to have annexed it, and has supported separatist violence in eastern Ukraine. Russian aggression has prompted a renewed focus within NATO on deterrence and reassurance of Allies. In Southern Europe, Allies face instability flowing from the turmoil in the Middle East. Across the continent, European nations are facing a growing terrorist threat fueled by the unprecedented flow of foreign fighters into Iraq and Syria.

Despite these challenges, Europe is the cornerstone of our engagement with the rest of the world and the catalyst for our global cooperation. As the United States and Europe work together to address a range of global challenges, from extremism to climate change to illicit finance, this is true today more than ever. Time and again, Europe and NATO have proven to be our indispensable strategic partners; for these reasons, U.S. engagement in Europe is and will remain a vital element of our national security.

Russian Actions in Ukraine

It has been almost a year since Russia's occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea. Since that time, we have seen Russia funding and arming separatists in eastern Ukraine. We have seen direct Russian participation in the fighting. These actions, coupled with Russia's continued support of frozen conflicts and violations of its obligations under numerous treaties, are undermining European stability.

Russia's actions to undermine the sovereignty of a neighboring country and to attempt to change borders by force are unacceptable. Russia's aggression against Ukraine challenges our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. It changes Europe's security landscape, causes instability on NATO's borders, and is a challenge to the international order. The United States remains steadfast in opposing Russia's destabilizing actions. As the President said in his State of the Union address: "We are upholding the principle that bigger nations can't bully the small—by opposing Russian aggression, supporting Ukraine's democracy and reassuring our NATO Allies." Since the outset of the crisis, the United States has sought to impose costs on Russia, reassure our NATO Allies, and support Ukraine in its effort to define its own course as a sovereign nation.

U.S. efforts to reassure Allies and support Ukraine

First, working closely with Europe and other partners and allies, we have imposed real costs on Russia for its aggressive actions. This includes diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions, which, combined with falling oil prices, are having a substantial and mounting impact on Russia's economy. The ruble has fallen dramatically against the dollar since our first round of targeted sectoral sanctions in mid-July, and Russian companies face a looming credit crunch as sanctions have severely curtailed access to external funding markets. We have also imposed visa and financial sanctions on individuals in Putin's inner circle, Russian officials, and separatist Ukrainian actors who are undermining Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Second, we are taking visible, concrete measures to reassure our Allies and partners in Europe and to deter further Russian aggression. Since May of 2014, NATO has reassured Allies and deterred Russia by maintaining a continuous air, land, and maritime presence and increasing military activity in the eastern part of the Alliance. These measures are defensive, proportionate, and fully in line with NATO's Treaty obligations regarding Allied defense. For example, we have maintained a persistent presence of U.S. military forces in each of the Baltic States and in Poland, Romania and Bulgaria since April 2014. We tripled the number of U.S. aircraft taking part in our Baltic Air Policing rotation, provided refueling aircraft for NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) missions, deployed U.S. Navy ships to the Black and Baltic Seas 14 times, and increased training flights in Poland.

Allies have also agreed to adaptation measures as part of NATO's Readiness Action Plan (RAP) that will improve the Alliance's long-term military posture and capabilities, and ensure it is ready to respond swiftly and firmly to new security challenges. These measures include enhancing the NATO Response Force (NRF) to make it more responsive and capable; establishing a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force that will consist of a multinational brigade, supported by air, maritime and special forces; creating new, small NATO headquarters units -- known as NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) – in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania; raising the readiness and capabilities of the Headquarters Multinational Corps Northeast in Poland; and enhancing NATO's Standing Naval Forces with greater numbers and more types of ships.

Third, we are providing substantial support to Ukraine as it deals with simultaneous economic and military crises. Ukraine has been a strong partner to the United States and NATO since its independence, and our security cooperation with Ukraine dates back to1992. Since the start of the crisis the United States has increased its security-related assistance to Ukraine significantly. We have committed $118 million in material and training assistance to Ukraine's military, National Guard, and Border Guard service, and together, DoD and the State Department will dedicate at least another $120 million in FY15 as part of the European Reassurance Initiative. . Our assistance has been consistent with identified Ukrainian needs and priorities in the areas of sustainment, medical support, personal protection, secure communications, perimeter security, and capabilities to counter separatist and Russian artillery. We maintain senior-level defense and military discussions with Ukraine and we are continuously assessing how to maximize the impact of our security assistance.

Other Challenges Facing Europe

Looking beyond the crisis in Ukraine, Europe is also on the frontlines of the fight against ISIL. The United States has led an effort to build a coalition of over 60 nations that are contributing across multiple lines of effort, ranging from military contributions to humanitarian assistance. In the coalition military campaign, Europe is stepping up to fill critical roles both to deny ISIL safe-haven and to build the capacity of our partners to take the fight to ISIL, to include actively striking ISIL targets. This activity is also supplemented by Allied contributions of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), lift, and other air assets.

Europe is also playing a big role on the ground in our efforts to build the capacity of Iraqi forces and the moderate Syrian opposition. In the early days of the conflict in Iraq last year, European partners played a leading role in our effort to provide urgent resupply for Peshmerga forces, providing both substantial donations of arms as well as lifting those supplies into theater. European partners are also playing a lead role in 3 of our 4 building partner capacity (BPC) sites; these forces are in addition to forces from many European countries that are supporting the mission to "advise and assist" Iraqi units on operations against ISIL.

Across the border, Turkey has agreed to be one of the hosts for a joint U.S.-Turkish Train and Equip program for the moderate Syrian opposition, which we expect will begin in the coming months. This framework gives us the foundation to continue strengthening U.S.-Turkish partnership on regional security, and marks a key Turkish contribution to the counter-ISIL efforts.

The threat posed to the United States and the West by foreign fighters moving in and out of Syria – many of whom transit through Turkey -- remains a concern. Turkey acknowledges the threat and has taken steps to bolster its law enforcement and border security efforts over the past year, including increased monitoring, border security, and counter illicit finance measures. The Department contributes to interagency efforts to support Turkish efforts against this threat – including through strengthening the Department's close cooperation with the Turkish military. The Department also supports efforts to help source countries identify and disrupt foreign fighters before they transit through Turkey. More broadly, the United States is using all forms of intelligence available to understand and address the flow of foreign fighters. The United States and our Allies have made progress, and we will continue to explore opportunities to address this complex problem.

In addition to the threat of ISIL, instability in the Middle East and North Africa is affecting NATO's security, especially for Allies on NATO's southern flank. The movement of thousands of migrants to the shores of southern Europe brings instability and violence, due in part to the transnational criminal networks involved in human trafficking. The United States is working closely with France to battle extremism in Mali and elsewhere in the Sahel by supporting France's operations against groups such as al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Murabitun. Today, the French are leading counterterrorism operations in Mali, Niger, and Chad, with over 3000 personnel deployed. U.S. support to French operations, including intelligence sharing, airlift, and aerial refueling, has been vital to French

success. The United States is also cooperating with Spain and Portugal to strengthen security across West Africa. The Special Marine Air Ground Task Force – Crisis Response (SPMAGTF-CR) postured in Spain deployed to evacuate Embassy Juba early last year, and is postured to handle similar unrest in other locales. DoD also works with European partners in the Gulf of Guinea through a robust engagement program, including maritime exercises, Africa Partnership Station (APS), and coordinating maritime domain awareness efforts in the region.

Europe as a Strategic Partner

Looking beyond Europe, our European allies are our strategic partners in addressing a host of security challenges far from NATO's boundaries, whether it is responding to the Ebola outbreak in Africa, or working together to help bring greater stability and security to Afghanistan. Our strong relationship with our NATO allies, our shared values, and shared view of many security threats we face is the strong foundation to this strategic partnership.

In Africa, we saw the importance of our relationships with NATO Allies and partners as part of the international community's response to the Ebola crisis. Under Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE, the Department has supported the USAID-led effort to break the back of the Ebola outbreak, focusing primarily on Liberia. The United Kingdom and France are leading similar efforts in Sierra Leone and Guinea respectively. Key partners, such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark, deployed personnel in support of these efforts and provided air and sealift to transport humanitarian supplies. From a posture perspective, the Department relied on our partners in Spain, Portugal, Germany, Italy, and Senegal to support deployments. While the mission is not complete, and many lives have been lost, we can be proud that the international community, with strong roles played by European nations, successfully mobilized to address this emergency.

In Afghanistan, NATO Allies and partners remain our steadfast partners. The Resolute Support Mission (RSM), launched on 1 January 2015, focuses the efforts of NATO Allies and operational partners on training, advising, and assisting the Afghan Security Institutions at the ministerial and institutional levels. Twenty-six Allies and sixteen partners are providing forces to this mission. Under Resolute Support, advisors provide assistance to their Afghan counterparts to develop skills and processes focused on support and oversight of the Afghan National Security Forces, including: planning, programming, budgeting, and execution; transparency, oversight, and accountability of the budget; force generation, recruitment, and personnel management and development; and the principles of rule of law and good governance. Finally, in accordance with decisions taken at NATO's Summit in Chicago in 2012 and reconfirmed during the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO Allies and partners have committed to providing sustainment funding to the Afghan National Security Forces through 2024.

U.S. Force Posture in Europe

To work with our Allies and Partners in all these areas, it is essential to have a robust force posture in Europe. Our footprint in Europe gives us the capability to defend the United States' security interests forward, enhance transatlantic security, reassure Allies, and deter aggression. For example, U.S. facilities in Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom

enable U.S. and European militaries to plan, train, exercise, and operate together effectively -- activities vital to forming effective coalitions as we look for ways to cooperate during austere times. Additionally, we maintain two brigade combat teams in Europe for rapid response and have begun to forward deploy naval forces at Naval Station Rota in Spain. We are also continuing to implement the European Phased Adaptive Approach for ballistic missile defense.

The threats the United States and Europe face are familiar challenges in some instances, but we need to refresh our approach to posture in the region in a time of limited resources. Achieving U.S. presence through more innovative approaches not only makes strategic sense, but it is also an increasing necessity in the current fiscal environment. Our Joint Force has been engaged in uninterrupted warfare for over thirteen years, while the changing security environment has generated new challenges not only in the European theater, but across the globe. Our defense strategy assesses that the future security environment will continue to be volatile and dynamic.

The United States must innovate and explore new posture arrangements by increasing the flexibility, adaptability, and readiness of our forces throughout the region. For example, the United States announced in January 2015 that RAF Lakenheath in the United Kingdom will be the first location in Europe to host the F-35, demonstrating that we are putting our most advanced capability in a critical region postured to support and defend our Alliance interests in the region. In response to our need to provide DoD support to the protection of U.S. personnel and facilities in high-risk areas, the Department deployed a Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force to Moron, Spain as well as an East Africa Response Force to Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti. Italy and Greece have also been key partners and hosts to U.S. forces to facilitate the monitoring of the security situation in the Mediterranean region and to conduct crisis response against threats to U.S. interests in north and central Africa.

Moving forward, we need to continue to assess whether the U.S. European Command has sufficient forces and capabilities assigned given the threats in the region. The Office of the Secretary of Defense will continue to work closely with General Breedlove and his team of planners and strategists to ensure that they have the resources they need to tackle current and future challenges.

Conclusion

In the current economic environment, burden sharing and leveraging partner capabilities are critical. The NATO Alliance includes many of the United States' most capable and reliable Allies, and it is essential that the Alliance remain capable and interoperable. While the United States remains ready to counter new threats, we prefer to address them alongside our European Allies and partners. But they in turn must maintain the forces and capabilities to work alongside us. The defense spending pledge signed by NATO leaders at the Summit in Wales is an important step in keeping Allies capable to meet the challenges ahead.

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Smith, if we do not solve sequestration and related budget pressures, our ability to continue to invest in capabilities and posture in such a vital part of the world will remain at risk, as it is today. We look forward to working with this Committee, and

with Congress more broadly to find solutions to these budgetary pressures so that our military force remains healthy, agile, and able. Thank you for your time today.

Ms. Christine Wormuth
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Ms. Christine Wormuth was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on June 19, 2014. Ms. Wormuth serves as the Principal Staff Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives.

Ms. Wormuth was appointed as the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Force Development in August, 2012. In this role, Ms. Wormuth was responsible for advising the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense on the development of U.S. national security and defense strategy. She oversaw the strategic guidance development, review, and assessment for military contingency plans and the plans for the day-to-day military activities of Combatant Commanders. In addition, Ms. Wormuth led Policy's efforts to provide strategic guidance and implementation oversight to the Department's planning, programming, and budgeting process as well as various force development, force management, and corporate support processes. As DUSD(SPF), Ms. Wormuth led the Department's 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review.

Prior to serving as DUSD(SPF), Ms. Wormuth was a Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Defense Policy and Strategy on the National Security Staff (NSS). As the Senior Director for Defense Policy and Strategy, Ms. Wormuth oversaw the Defense directorate and was responsible for providing NSS expertise on global, functional, and regional defense, military and political-military issues.

Before her assignment to the NSS, Ms. Wormuth was the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. As Principal Deputy, she advised the Assistant Secretary of Defense on the homeland defense activities of the Department and regional security matters for the countries of the Western Hemisphere. In addition, she was responsible for management of the Department's participation in interagency activities concerning homeland security and relations with the Department of Homeland Security.

Before returning to the Department of Defense as a political appointee in early 2009, Ms. Wormuth was a Senior Fellow in the International Security Program with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Ms. Wormuth worked on defense and homeland security issues, including emergency response and preparedness matters, homeland security policy development, defense strategy and resources, and the capabilities and readiness of the U.S. military. In 2007, she served as the Staff Director for the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, also known as "The Jones Commission." As Staff Director, she traveled with the Commission to Iraq, focusing on the readiness of Iraqi police forces.

Prior to joining CSIS, Ms. Wormuth was a Principal at DFI Government Services, a defense consulting firm, where she developed and managed a wide range of projects for government clients within the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security.

Ms. Wormuth began her public service career in the Policy Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1996 through 2002. She served as the French desk officer during and after the September 11 attacks and, from 2000-2001, was the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Policy, focusing on defense program and legislative issues. Ms. Wormuth spent more than two years in the Strategy office, where she focused on defense strategy, the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review process and a range of European issues. She entered government as a Presidential Management Intern and received a Masters of Public Policy from the University of Maryland. She holds a Bachelor of Arts in political science and fine art from Williams College.

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF GENERAL PHILIP BREEDLOVE

COMMANDER

U.S. FORCES EUROPE

FEBRUARY 25, 2015

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

I. Introduction

It is an honor for me to lead the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Civilians of the U.S. European Command (EUCOM). Those assigned and deployed from the European theater sent into harm's way, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, are particularly within the thoughts of the Command. I want to thank this Committee for all of the support it has offered them.

EUCOM has experienced dramatic changes in the security situation on the European continent over the last 12 months, forming a new European security environment. These changes have significant ramifications for U.S. national security interests and those of our European Allies and partners. As a result, we are assessing the threat to U.S. and NATO Allies in the theater and beyond. Even as we continue to lean forward with our NATO Allies and partners in response to the conditions in this new environment, fully addressing these growing challenges and their long-term implications requires a reformulation of the U.S. strategic calculus and corresponding resourcing levied towards Europe.

In the statement I submitted to this Committee last year, I described in detail how important our NATO Allies and non-NATO partners in Europe are to American safety and security – their importance is even greater today. EUCOM must be able to assure, deter, and defend against Russian aggression; support ongoing and future contingency operations; counter transnational threats; and help build our partners' capability to help us accomplish these missions, thereby enhancing regional and global security.

Our many shared values, interests, and economic interdependence with Europe provides unique opportunities and assets for collective security as well as global security cooperation. The United States depends on our willing and capable Allies and partners throughout Europe to work with us to fully defend our national security interests and to respond to crises around the world. Time and again, our Allies and partners in Europe have proven essential to U.S. military operations by allowing us access, including bases, transit, and overflight rights for U.S. forces as well as providing enhanced legitimacy and operational capability through the participation of Ally and partner nation military forces in undertakings in Europe, around Europe and often far from Europe.

Maintaining our strategic Alliance with Europe is vital to maintaining U.S. national security and is not to be taken for granted. We must reassure our European Allies and partners through the United States' commitment to NATO and the credibility of that commitment

fundamentally rests upon the capabilities, readiness, and responsiveness of U.S. military personnel stationed in Europe. The forces assigned to EUCOM are the U.S.'s preeminent forward deployed force and fulfill the United States' primary treaty obligation to NATO. Our permanent presence also allows us to maximize the military capabilities of our Allies. Permanently stationed forces are a force multiplier that rotational deployments can never match.

EUCOM must be a stabilizing force on multiple fronts. Nations on Europe's Southern flank are concerned the focus on Eastern Europe may draw attention and resources away from their region, allowing for an unmonitored flow of foreign fighters, economic and political refugees, and unchecked illicit trafficking of goods and humans from an arc of instability stretching across large parts of northern Africa through the Middle East. In the Levant, persistent threats from other countries and non-state actors drives continued security concerns in Israel.

Multiple ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and Africa also require EUCOM to use its limited resources to support missions occurring in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) areas of responsibility. EUCOM works closely with our bordering Combatant Commands to ensure there are no seams as we address issues crossing geographic boundaries, supporting CENTCOM and AFRICOM operations to protect U.S. national interests. Each of these security situations reinforces the importance of EUCOM and NATO to our long-term vital national security interests.

After years of force structure and other personnel reductions, fewer than 65,000 U.S. military personnel remain permanently stationed in Europe to secure and advance U.S. national interests from Greenland to Azerbaijan and from the Arctic to Israel. The size of our military presence forces difficult decisions daily on how to best use the limited resources we have to assure, stabilize, and support. I ask you for your support and favorable consideration of the U.S. role in addressing the new European security environment and helping me set the theater. As the Commander of EUCOM, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and Allied Command Operations for NATO, I support the goal of a Europe that is whole, free, at peace, and prosperous. It is with this in mind that I consider Europe's current security situation.

II. Assessing the Threat

As mentioned, EUCOM is working within the framework of a new European security environment, focused on countering three primary security threats: Russian aggression in the East, foreign fighter flow between Europe and the Levant, and transnational threats stemming from North Africa.

A. Eastern Flank: Russia and Periphery

For almost two decades, the United States and Europe have engaged with Russia as a partner, seeking to build relationships militarily, economically, and culturally. In 1994, Russia became a Partnership for Peace member with NATO. That same year, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom signed the Budapest Memorandum, reaffirming commitments made by all parties under the Helsinki Final Act and the UN Charter to "respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine." Under the 1997 Founding Act, NATO made a political commitment that, "in the current and foreseeable security environment," the Alliance would carry out its collective defense and other missions without "additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces." In 2009, the United States sought to "reset" its relationship with Russia, which had been damaged by the 2008 Russian invasion of the Republic of Georgia. During this period, the Department of Defense made security and force posture determinations significantly reducing European force structure based on the assumption that Russia was a partner.

Despite these and many other U.S. and European overtures of partnership, Russia has continued to view its own security from a zero-sum point of view. Since the beginning of 2014, President Putin's Russia has abandoned all pretense of participating in a collaborative security process with its neighbors and the international community. Instead, Russia has employed "hybrid warfare" (which includes regular, irregular, and cyber forms of war as well as political and economic intimidations) to illegally seize Crimea, foment separatist fever in several sovereign nations, and maintain frozen conflicts within its so-called "sphere of influence" or "near abroad." Undergirding all of these direct approaches is the pervasive presence of the Russia propaganda machine, which inserts itself into media outlets globally and attempts to exploit potential sympathetic or aggrieved populations.

Russia uses energy as a tool of coercion. Many former-Soviet bloc and Eastern and Central European states have long been concerned about Russia's intentions in Europe and they

consider the Ukraine crisis the latest validation of their concerns. Recent Ukrainian and Russian energy negotiations show how Russian coercion threatens broader European cooperation as individual countries must weigh their own security and economic concerns. Russia's coercion using energy has grown along with Russia's threats and outright use of force.

As a result, there are growing security concerns among Central and Eastern European countries that are members of NATO and the European Union or are seeking closer ties with the trans-Atlantic community. Having already experienced the use of Russian military force in the 1990s and in 2008, Georgia is especially threatened by Russian occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Baltic States have demonstrated their concern by increasing military interaction with U.S. and NATO forces, which has resulted in more U.S. and Allied forces in NATO's Baltic Air Policing mission and the deployment of U.S. rotational ground forces to the Baltics and Poland to foster interoperability through training and exercises. U.S. Special Operations Forces training events were also initiated throughout the Baltics and Eastern Europe at the request of the host nations. We must continue to work with NATO to provide enduring support to the security of our Allies and partners in this area.

Russia views Ukraine as part of its sphere of influence, regardless of the views of the Ukrainian people. While Russia's aggressive actions in Ukraine are the most current manifestation in a pattern of continuing behavior to coerce its neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe. Beyond its actions in Georgia and Ukraine, other examples of this pattern are abandoning the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaties; the ZAPAD 2013 snap exercise along the borders of the Baltics and Poland; intercepts of U.S. aircraft and shadowing of U.S. ships in international airspace and waters; basing Russian fighter aircraft in Belarus; threats to deploy nuclear-capable Iskander-M missiles in Kaliningrad; and pressure on former Soviet states through the manipulation of prolonged, "frozen" conflicts.

B. Eastern Flank: Vulnerability of NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) Countries

As U.S. partners, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine face a different security challenge from Russia than that facing NATO Allies. All three countries have implemented political and economic reforms to advance democracy and integrate with Europe; however, their ability to make further progress is significantly constrained by Russian interference and pressure. Russia occupies portions of their territory with its military forces, wields economic leverage and energy dependence as coercive instruments, exploits minority Russian populations to serve its interests,

interferes in democratic processes, engages in bribery and coercion of government officials, and generates a constant propaganda deluge.

Even as these three countries face severe threats to their sovereignty and territorial integrity, they continue to make meaningful contributions to international security. Since 2010, Georgia has rotated 14 battalions to Afghanistan in support of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and three additional battalions in support of the RESOLUTE SUPPORT mission, and is currently the second largest contributor after the U.S. Ukraine has been the largest provider of vertical lift capability to U.N. peacekeeping operations around the world and has also contributed troops and resources to ISAF, NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR), and NATO's maritime operations, and Moldova contributes a platoon to KFOR.

In addition to conducting expeditionary operations and while having differing objectives regarding the scope of their integration with NATO, all three countries strive to develop military forces meeting NATO standards and interoperability requirements; however, their efforts face a number of challenges, as all three countries require deep institutional reforms to efficiently generate, organize, equip, and sustain their armed forces. They must also continue and accelerate their transition from Soviet-era systems to modern, NATO-interoperable systems and equipment. These countries have severely limited resources available to address these requirements. Thus, U.S. security assistance to train, advise, and equip the national security forces of Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova is absolutely essential.

Recent Russian activities are forcing our partners to reevaluate their strategic requirements, including reassessing the relative importance of their ability to contribute toward NATO or U.N. operations. These countries must balance the national responsibility of their armed forces to defend their own sovereignty and territorial integrity with that of contributing to regional and global security beyond their borders. For many years, a partner's contribution to regional security was measured, at least in part, by its force contribution to international peacekeeping missions. Now that these nations face an even more aggressive Russia, their ability to protect their own borders and enforce their own sovereignty is understandably more urgent than acting as a force provider for peacekeeping missions abroad.

C. Eastern Flank: Russian Use of Frozen Conflicts as a Foreign Policy Tool

Describing the prolonged conflicts in states around the Russian periphery as "frozen" belies the fact that these are on-going and deadly affairs. In Georgia, there are conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. A clear purpose behind Russia's invasion of Georgia and its continued occupation of Georgian territory is to prevent Tbilisi from pursuing its rightful and legitimate intentions to become a full member of the European and transatlantic communities. Toward that end, Russia has signed a "treaty" with Abkhazia and is pushing for another with South Ossetia to increase its influence while hampering Georgia's Euro-Atlantic integration In Moldova, Russian forces have conducted supposed "stability operations" since 1992 to contain the conflict in Transnistria. In fact, Russia deliberately and actively perpetuates these conflicts by manipulating its support to the participants, while engaging in international diplomatic resolution efforts only to the extent necessary to prevent the resumption of all-out violence.

Russia uses these conflicts to maintain its influence and deny these states' ability to make their own foreign and security policy choices and chart their own futures. Those pretending to lead these Russian-created quasi-states rely on Russia to maintain the *status quo* and therefore, cannot stray far from Russia's preferences. These unresolved disputes may not represent active war, but impede the democratic development of the concerned states. Just as the oppressed nations of the Warsaw Pact served as strategic buffers to the Soviet Union, so the current arc of frozen conflicts is part of a security buffer for a modern, paranoid Russia. This fits into a greater "buffer policy" sought by Russia, complemented by other dubious—yet aggressive—claims, such as its militarization of the Arctic and its military exercises on the Kuril Islands over its dispute with Japan.

D. Western Balkans: Challenges and Unresolved Issues

Significant challenges to peace and prosperity with the Western Balkans persist. EUCOM engages in a number of cooperative endeavors that provide an area of common interest, building confidence and good relations between former warring factions to reduce the likelihood of renewed fighting in the region. The Balkans Medical Task Force is one specific example of how EUCOM helps foster such cooperation by assisting the Balkan states in building a regional, deployable humanitarian assistance and disaster response capability.

E. Southern Flank: Turkey as a Lynchpin to Security in the Black Sea

Persistent instability in the Levant and beyond remains a top U.S. and European national security concern and threatens U.S. interests throughout Europe and the homeland. ISIL controls territory just across NATO's southern border and it actively recruits and trains foreign fighters destined to return to their countries of origin. Extremist actors, exemplified by ISIL, have an inordinate impact on Europe's periphery. The Syrian crisis is destabilizing the entire region, and the regional repercussions are likely to persist for years to come. Israel faces a more complex environment, complicating their political and military calculus and their need for U.S. support.

Turkey is in the unenviable position of having to hold NATO's Southern Flank. Turkey, and important NATO ally, is understandably very concerned by the ongoing crises in Syria and Iraq, which are generating significant security, political, economic, and humanitarian challenges across the region. These challenges include the influx of refugees and foreign terrorist fighters, and increased terrorist activity. EUCOM continues to work with Turkey and CENTCOM to address these multiple threats.

Finally the flow of returning foreign terrorist fighters to Europe and the United States in both the near- and mid-term poses a significant risk, including to our forward based forces in Europe. Foreign terrorist fighters are active in multiple conflict zones, gaining experience and contacts that could lead them to conduct terrorist attacks after returning home. Actively encouraged by ISIL, returned foreign fighters are mounting so-called "lone wolf" attacks. This problem will grow in scope as the flow of returning individuals increases over time.

F. Southern Flank: Instability in the Middle East and North Africa Region

The security environment on Europe's Southern Flank, broadly defined as the Middle East and North Africa, is likely to remain unstable and likely grow more complex for the next decade or longer. This environment is characterized by political chaos; ethnic, tribal, and religious tensions; pervasive corruption; and weak security institutions. These factors have created conditions that allow illicit trafficking, to include the smuggling of narcotics, humans, and weapons into Southern Europe and beyond. Transnational criminal organizations continue to take hold and further destabilize the region, posing a growing economic and security risk to countries on Europe's Southern Flank. The threat of highly contagious diseases spreading through unmonitored personnel movements and illicit trafficking channels, such as the Ebola virus, represent another potential threat.

The countries of southern Europe are currently facing massive migration flows from Northern Africa. In August 2012, Greece began an operation to curb and tackle illegal migration into its country. In October 2013, Italy began a similar operation to patrol the Strait of Sicily and the southern Mediterranean following the death of more than 350 African refugees off the Italian island of Lampedusa. Since its start, Italy has intercepted or rescued more than 100,000 illegal migrants while 3,000 have drowned in the Mediterranean Sea. Dealing with illegal migration adds to the burdens of Allied Navies, particularly Italy's, and pulls them from other missions. Due to concerns raised by European countries along the Mediterranean Sea, FRONTEX launched Operation ORION TRITON in October 2014 to help nations cope with the illegal migration crossings from North Africa and the Middle East. Although most European countries do not perceive the ongoing situation in North Africa as a direct threat to their national security, the majority views the increased illegal migration flow as a serious economic and humanitarian problem. EUCOM continues to work with our Allies on this issue.

Continued tensions between Israel and the Hamas-led government in Gaza resulted in open warfare beginning in June 2014 leading Israel to launch Operation PROTECTIVE EDGE. Scores of infiltration tunnels were found and between June and September 2014 over 2,500 rockets were launched from Gaza into Israel. Fortunately, the Iron Dome system effectively neutralized many of these rockets. EUCOM monitors the situation between Israel and Hamas closely, consulting with Israel and providing logistical support.

G. Arctic Region

The Arctic region is a growing strategic area of concern from both an environmental, resource, and security perspective. Environmentally, changing climate conditions will allow the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage to open for longer periods each year, meaning greater access to the Arctic. Less ice coverage will lead to increased shipping traffic and attract more industry and tourism. From a resource perspective, we seek to work cooperatively to ensure exploration and extraction does not lead to conflict. From a security perspective, Russia's behavior in the Arctic is increasingly troubling. Their increase in stationing military forces, building and reopening bases, and creating an Arctic military district to counter an imagined threat to their internationally undisputed territories does not fit the direction or interests of the seven other Arctic nations. Despite Russia's increasing militarization of the Arctic, EUCOM continues to work with our Arctic public and private partners to create a secure and stable region.

This is critical to safeguarding U.S. national interests, insuring the U.S. homeland is protected, and for nations working cooperatively to address challenges through our sponsorship of the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable and combined Arctic specific exercises like ARCTIC ZEPHYR.

III. Reassuring our Allies and Deterring Russian Aggression

A. Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE

Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE uses U.S. access and strategic reach to develop a unified response to revanchist Russia. EUCOM continues to take positive steps to reassure our Allies along NATO's eastern flank and to deter potential Russian aggression against our NATO Allies and partners. Since the beginning of Russia's intervention in Ukraine, EUCOM's strategy has continued to evolve and demonstrates the commitment of the United States to NATO's overarching principle of collective defense. The cornerstone of EUCOM's strategy is physical presence. Coupled with our visible commitment to maintain capabilities, readiness, responsiveness and our strategic level messaging, our presence demonstrates, to friend and foe alike, our absolute commitment to the sovereignty and security of every Ally.

The credibility and effectiveness of our response to Russian aggression in the East and growing threats in Southern Europe depend not only on the operational scale and geographic scope of our operations, but also their persistence and longevity. A temporary surge in rotational presence, for example, will not have lasting effect unless it is followed by the development and fielding of credible and persistent deterrent capabilities. Forward deployed air, land, and sea capabilities permits the U.S. to respond within hours versus days as crises emerge. We must follow our near-term measures with medium-term efforts to adapt the capabilities and posture of United States, NATO, Allies, and partners to meeting these new challenges. We must accelerate this adaptation because we now face urgent threats instead of the peacetime environment previously anticipated. NATO and our European Allies have recognized the absolute requirement to effectively counter Russian coercive pressure in the East as well as urgent threats in the South.

NATO has adopted the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) designed to meet quickly emerging threats emanating from both NATO's eastern and southern flanks. The RAP features forces that can deploy in days – not weeks, an improved command and control capability (including forward

headquarters), and the regular presence of NATO rotational forces in Eastern Europe for exercises and training. U.S. support to the RAP will be essential to its long-term success. Our European Allies have already offered to serve as primary contributors of land forces to the envisioned Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), but U.S. participation with key enablers is critical to Alliance cohesion and capability. EUCOM is also responsible for implementing other key aspects of our support to the RAP, such as maintaining continuous presence in the East, enhancing the capabilities of Multinational Corps North East, and the establishment of a NATO command and control presence on the territories of Eastern Allies.

1. The Baltics and Poland

As a response to events in Ukraine, EUCOM augmented scheduled multinational and joint exercises and deployments to provide a near-continuous air, land, and sea presence in the Baltic States and Poland, assuring them of the U.S. commitment to NATO. The intent of our actions is to demonstrate the ability and resolve to act together as an Alliance in the face of the challenges from Russia, while avoiding escalation. Our continuous presence and engagement activities in the Baltics and Poland fall under the umbrella of Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE.

U.S. rotational force to the Baltics began on March 6, 2014, when the United States deployed an additional six F-15Cs to augment the four already in Lithuania, fulfilling a NATO Baltic Air Policing peacetime requirement to have quick reaction interceptor aircraft "ramp-ready." Poland took over the Baltic Air Policing mission on May 1, 2014 with augmentation from the United Kingdom, Denmark, and France. Polish and British aircraft operated from Siauliai Air Base in Lithuania, Danish aircraft from Amari Air Base in Estonia, and French aircraft from Malbork Air Base in Poland. This pattern of enhanced Baltic Air Policing continues with four-month rotations. Simultaneously, the United States established a persistent flight training deployment in Poland, consisting of either fighter or transport aircraft. These deployments continue to be a method to increase allied force interoperability as well as provide assurance to Poland and other regional Allies. Also, beginning in March 2014, United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE) began providing air-to-air refueling support to NATO AWACS aircraft conducting operations along NATO's eastern flank.

At the end of April 2014, the U.S. Army's 173rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne) quickly deployed company-sized contingents of U.S. paratroopers to Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to begin expanding land forces training. These deployments established a

persistent U.S. military presence in these countries and demonstrated U.S. assurance and a commitment to Article 5. These exercises, which came at the request of the host nations, work to improve interoperability through small unit and leader training. In October, the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (1/1 CD) out of Fort Hood, Texas, conducted a Relief in Place (RIP) with units of the 173d in the Baltic States and Poland. Since assuming the mission from the 173d, 1/1 CD has participated in exercises, such as PLAYGROUND and IRON SWORD. Most recently, Soldiers from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment stationed in Germany have deployed to the Baltics and Poland, continuing our persistent reassurance to our NATO Allies. Additionally, USAFE elements deployed to Poland to conduct bi-lateral training with the Polish Air Force and rotations will continue through 2015.

In 2014, beyond previously scheduled exercises, United States Special Operations Forces expanded the number and frequency of Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) events in the Baltic States and Poland. Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) has maintained a near continuous presence in the Baltic States and Poland from June 2014 to the present. These training deployments have proven invaluable for our special forces, with indirect benefits for their Allied counterparts. Additionally, EUCOM forces conducted 67 other significant military-to-military engagements with the Baltic States and Poland from April to October 2014.

2. Romania and Bulgaria

Romania and Bulgaria continue to be steadfast U.S. Allies. Access to training areas and transit locations in these nations provide a basis to send a strong signal to Russia, while forging stronger bilateral working partnerships. Romania remains a key Ally, offering tremendous support to ISAF's retrograde from Afghanistan and the RESOLUTE SUPPORT Mission by allowing U.S. and NATO forces use of its base in Mihail Kogalniceanu (MK). MK is a key node for multi-modal operations and an ideal example of the bilateral cooperation and strategic access forward deployed forces in the European theater provides.

Romania has offered to host a new Multinational Division Headquarters. Bulgaria has committed to play a greater role in NATO and European defense by 2020, and made contributions to our efforts in Afghanistan. These offers demonstrate Romanian and Bulgarian resolve to be key Allies in deterring Russian aggression and building a stronger eastern flank. In Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia, the Marine Corps' Black Sea Rotational Force provides EUCOM with a limited land-based and contingency response force in the Region, while

additional rotational forces from the U.S. Army will come into Romania and Bulgaria this summer.

Romania's cooperation on such areas as missile defense, the RESOLUTE SUPPORT Mission, and Afghanistan retrograde, and Bulgaria's work to expand Alliance and bilateral use of the Novo Selo Training area, are positive contributions to regional and Alliance Security.

3. Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine

Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine continue to offer significant opportunities for cooperation, furthering both regional security, and in some cases, acting as willing and capable partners in coalition operations. In Georgia, NATO and the U.S. have long invested in improving defensive capabilities, continuing multinational exercises that contribute towards both enhanced capability and deterrence efforts in the region. In Ukraine, we have increased our security assistance in response to the crisis, committing over $118 million in 2014 to help Ukrainian forces better monitor and secure their borders and operate more safely and effectively, and preserve Ukraine's territorial integrity. We also continue to conduct planned exercises such as Rapid Trident to increase interoperability among Ukraine, U.S., NATO and Partnership for Peace member nations. The most recent Rapid Trident iteration in September 2014 consisted of multinational battalion-level field training exercise and saw the participation of 15 countries with approximately 1,300 personnel. An upcoming train and equip program for its security forces demonstrates U.S. resolve towards increasing Ukrainian capacity to provide for its internal and territorial defense.

Despite increasing Russian presence in the region, EUCOM has increased U.S. maritime presence in the Black Sea through Passing Exercises (PASSEXes) and other bilateral and multinational exercises. Since April 2014, U.S. Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR) has maintained a monthly periodic presence in the Black Sea, and led the Baltics Operations exercise in the Black Sea with numerous Allied and partner nations. Despite Russia's increased and aggressive posture in the region, NAVEUR also conducted exercise SEA BREEZE in September 2014 with multinational support from Turkey, Romania, and Georgia. Active discussions are underway for next year's iteration of SEA BREEZE, which will continue our engagement with the Ukrainian Navy and other Black Sea maritime partners.

B. European Reassurance Initiative

I would like to thank this committee for supporting the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI). Your support directly enables EUCOM's ability to strengthen its posture along NATO's eastern flank in order to demonstrate commitment to our NATO Allies, and deter further Russian aggression. The ERI will provide temporary support to bolster the security of NATO Allies and partner states in Europe, enable adjustments to U.S. defense posture along NATO's eastern flank, and maintain momentum in conducting operations to demonstrate our commitment to our European Allies and partners. ERI funds will enable the development of infrastructure at key locations in the east to support exercise and training activities for both the U.S. and NATO, as well as support contingency operations. Additionally, ERI will fund improvements to airfields in Eastern and Central Europe along with improvements at training ranges and operations centers. Finally, our plan also includes enhancing available prepositioning, focused on the addition of a rotational Armored Brigade Combat Team set and related assets into several NATO Member nations.

C. Building Partnership Capacities (BPC)

Congressional support over the past several years enabled EUCOM to accelerate and expand efforts to build capacity of Eastern European Allies and partners to contribute to operations in Afghanistan. With U.S. training and equipment, these countries made substantial strides in developing NATO-interoperable capabilities to conduct special operations, intelligence analysis and exploitation, counter improvised explosive devices, coordinate close air support, and maneuver in combat. They brought these capabilities to bear in support of ISAF, further developing their interoperability and gaining experience on the battlefield in Afghanistan now in support of NATO's RESOLUTE SUPPORT mission in Afghanistan.

Even prior to the recent events in Ukraine, EUCOM was examining ways to preserve interoperability gains and expeditionary capability following ISAF. EUCOM launched our first "post-ISAF" program in 2014, implementing the Secretary of Defense's 2012 decision to reinvigorate U.S. land forces participation in the NATO Response Force (NRF). The 1st Armor Brigade Combat Team, 1st Calvary Division (1/1 CD ABCT), based in Fort Hood, Texas, began its 12-month mission as the U.S. contribution to NRF in January 2014. In May 2014, the Brigade deployed 2nd Battalion, 5th Calvary Regiment (2-5 CAV) to Germany to exercise with our Allies and partners. While here, 2-5 CAV conducted Exercise COMBINED RESOLVE II at

the U.S. Army Europe's (USAEUR) Joint Multinational Training Command, which trained 1,451 personnel from 13 countries and helped to enhance NRF interoperability and readiness.

The end of ISAF and the events in Ukraine require the U.S. to shift the focus of our foreign military training and equipping programs preparing Allies and partners for deployment to Afghanistan, to restoring and/or building Ally and partner nation capability to address the challenges of hybrid warfare and to territorial defense. However, the BPC authorities and funding available to EUCOM to equip and train foreign military forces are largely limited to preparing forces for counter-terrorism and deployment to Afghanistan. EUCOM needs continued assistance from Congress to provide adequate funding under existing authorities, to build partner capacity and address the complex challenges of the new European security environment.

For example, Section 2282 and other authorities have been invaluable in providing Allies and partners with the equipment needed to deploy to Afghanistan. Much of this equipment – such as night vision goggles; communications; counter-improvised explosive devices; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems – is equally relevant to joint combined arms warfare. With the end of ISAF, our Allies and partners are bringing much of this equipment home. To ensure the capabilities we have helped build are enduring and available to meet the urgent challenges we now face, the U.S. needs to be prepared to assist these countries, as appropriate, with sustainment of U.S.-provided systems. The only U.S. government program with this ability is Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which has been reduced for the EUCOM AOR (not including Israel) by more than 50% since FY10. Congressional support for an increase in FMF for the Europe and Eurasian region would greatly assist in helping to address this sustainment challenge. Additionally, to facilitate and enable our Allies and partners to preserve capabilities, there is a need for authorities that allow for multilateral Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to support NATO Smart Defense and pooling and sharing initiatives. The U.S. benefits from a Europe that is whole, free, at peace, and prosperous. Building Allied and partner capability to provide for their own national defense, as well as to deploy in support of global stability and security, will sustain these substantial benefits for the United States.

IV. Stabilizing the Middle East and North Africa

A. U.S. Support to Israel

Israel has witnessed a deterioration of security along its borders over the last several years. Spillover from the Syrian civil war, continued threats from Hezbollah rockets, and ISIL pose a threat to the stability of Israel and the entire region. ISIL has especially used violence in an attempt to impose their self-proclaimed religious authority and political control over the Middle East. Given this situation, it is feasible that, with limited warning, war could erupt from multiple directions within the Levant with grave implications to Israeli security, regional stability, and U.S. security interests.

EUCOM primarily engages with Israel through our Strategic Cooperative Initiative Program and numerous annual military-to-military engagement activities. These engagements strengthen both nations' enduring ties and military activities. EUCOM chairs four bilateral and semiannual conferences with Israel. These conferences address planning, logistics, exercises and interoperability. EUCOM also supports the Joint Staff's bilateral engagements, including meetings at the highest levels within the Department of Defense. The U.S.-Israel exercise portfolio includes five major recurring exercises and as a result of continued engagement, U.S.-Israeli military and intelligence cooperation relationships have never been closer or our joint exercises more robust. Through these engagements, our leaders and staff maintain uniquely strong, frequent, personal, and direct relationships with their Israeli Defense Force counterparts.

EUCOM diligently works to strengthen our relationship with Israel, which includes $3.1 billion in annual FMF, support for Israel's layered-missile defense program—including the Iron Dome and David's Sling systems, and the approval to release advanced military capabilities, including the F-35 and the V-22 aircraft. Finally, EUCOM works closely with CENTCOM to keep abreast of all emerging threats that may cross into EUCOM's AOR.

B. Countering Threats along the Southeastern Flank

In August 2014, the U.S. Departments of Defense and State, in close consultation with the Government of Iraq, formed a task force to bolster the resupply of lethal aid to Kurdish Peshmerga security forces in northern Iraq. EUCOM has supported CENTCOM by facilitating the integration of European forces and efforts into the larger CENTCOM coalition. EUCOM led the European resupply effort by soliciting, coordinating, and transferring donated arms, ammunition, and material from a multitude of European Allies and partners. By early October

2014, over two million pounds of donated lethal aid had been delivered to the Kurdish Regional Government via 45 airlift missions to Iraq. The vast majority of these donations and a significant portion of the aircraft were provided by European nations under the direction of EUCOM. These efforts are expected to last through 2015.

EUCOM has also led numerous interactions between U.S. interagency partners, the Custom and Border Protection Agency, and the Drug Enforcement Administration. These actions have focused on countering transnational threats, including trafficking of persons and illicit substances, as well as prosecution actions to build partner capacity. EUCOM works in conjunction with the Department of State to monitor and thwart the flow of foreign fighters going to and from Syria and the Levant, dismantle extremist facilitation networks, and build partner nation capacity to counter the flow of foreign fighters on their own.

V. Supporting Other Combatant Commands and Contingencies

A. RESOLUTE SUPPORT: Enabling the NATO mission to Afghanistan

U.S. and NATO forces completed Afghan combat operations in December 2014. On 1 January 2015, ISAF transitioned to the RESOLUTE SUPPORT Mission. Our European Allies and partners have borne and will continue to bear the burden of providing the bulk of forces, second only to the United States.

As we conduct the RESOLUTE SUPPORT Mission, EUCOM will continue to help prepare our Allies and partners for deployments to support the train, advise, and assist mission, all the while maintaining maximum readiness to protect the force and to conduct full-spectrum operations, as required. Authorities to include allowing EUCOM to provide operational logistics, lift and sustain support for Allies and partners in Afghanistan, and Section 1202 have been invaluable in providing our Allies and partners with logistical support in the form of inter-theater lift, sustainment, and equipment loans. On the training side, the Coalition Readiness Support Program enables us to provide crucial pre-deployment training to prepare 12 of our Ally and partner nations for the missions they will support during the RESOLUTE SUPPORT Mission. Section 1206 was absolutely vital in FY14, and previous years, to procure the equipment needed to fill critical shortfalls for nine of our Allied nations. This much needed equipment includes interoperable communications gear, counter-IED and explosive ordinance disposal equipment, medical equipment, and night vision devices.

B. Operation INHERENT RESOLVE: Supporting military intervention against ISIL

The United States is considering options for enabling moderate Syrian opposition and EUCOM is in support of CENTCOM on this planning effort and continues to assist in developing options. Operation INHERENT RESOLVE is intended to reflect the unwavering resolve and deep commitment of the U.S. and partner nations in the region and around the globe to eliminate the terrorist group ISIL and the threat they pose to Iraq, the region, and the wider international community. It also symbolized the willingness and dedication of coalition members to work closely with our Allies and partners to apply all available dimensions of national power necessary – diplomatic, informational, military, economic – to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL.

C. Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE: Fighting Ebola in Africa

EUCOM has worked in support of AFRICOM's efforts to stop the spread of Ebola from epidemic plagued countries in Africa, providing intra-theater lift, equipment, and personnel through and from the EUCOM AOR through established basing and access. EUCOM has proactively and aggressively engaged a number of European nations to secure permissions for U.S. Forces to use facilities and infrastructure for DoD-directed 21-day controlled monitoring in Europe and to relay the protocols necessary to prevent the inadvertent transmission of the Ebola disease onto the European continent. Furthermore, EUCOM has worked closely with various U.S. Embassies and other Combatant Command personnel to help shape the development of host nation permission requirements, while identifying and allying European fears via robust information and intelligence sharing efforts.

D. Protection of U.S. Embassies and Facilities in North Africa and the Middle East

EUCOM continues to posture both land and air forces for quick reactions to volatile environments in North Africa and the Middle East. Forces, such as the Special-Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Crisis Response-Africa (SPMAGTF) currently located in Spain, Italy, and Romania provides a crisis response force of 1,550 Marines. Aircraft stationed in Germany, Italy and elsewhere in Europe are on high alert to react to crises as needed. EUCOM supports this mission through its strategically located facilities and access agreements within Europe. The protection mission is vital, albeit costly, as a large number of embassies and consulates are at risk on the Africa continent and AFRICOM has no bases in Africa that can support forces assigned to the mission.

VI. Setting the Theater

EUCOM needs sufficient resources to maintain readiness, execute assigned missions, and build capability and capacity of our Allies and partners to defend themselves and bolster regional security.

A. U.S. Defense Posture

1. Forces

Overall reductions in the Department of Defense's budget have meant the reduction of force posture in Europe. Nevertheless, in light of recent, significant changes to the European strategic environment, it is my judgment we must immediately halt any additional reductions to the number of assigned forces in Europe. At the height of the Cold War, there were more than 450,000 uniformed personnel stationed across the European Theater. Today there are fewer than 65,000 permanent military personnel stationed throughout the EUCOM AOR, of which 55,000 are in direct support of EUCOM missions, and 9,000 support the missions of other organizations, such as AFRICOM, TRANSCOM, NATO, and others. The EUCOM assigned forces are tasked with the same deterrent and reassurance missions we have performed for the past several decades. It is important to understand the critical roles these forces play in this theater before the Services recommend further reducing the current force posture in Europe.

On any given day, forces throughout Europe are engaged in a variety of activities and missions to include (1) Training of our forces in order to be ready, if called upon, to conduct full spectrum military operations; (2) Assuring our Allies of our commitment to collective defense; (3) Training and collaborating with our NATO Allies and partners to maintain interoperability; and (4) Working with our Allies and partners to effectively prepare for and support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

In addition to my responsibilities as a warfighting commander, I also often serve in the role of a supporting commander. EUCOM forces are ready to support the needs and missions of four other Geographic Combatant Commanders, three Functional Combatant Commanders, and numerous Defense Agencies, including the ability to appropriately base and provide logistics support functions to forces assigned to operations in the AFRICOM and CENTCOM areas of responsibility.

Some have suggested we can mitigate the impact felt from a reduction in assigned forces through the augmentation of rotational forces from the United States. Rotational forces from the

continental United States to Europe cannot completely fulfill strategic roles. The temporary presence of rotational forces may complement, but does not substitute for an enduring forward deployed presence that is tangible and real. Rotational forces also have an impact on our relationships with various host nations we will count on to enable operations; we might over reach to assume host nations will readily accept our new readiness construct. As I have said previously, virtual presence means actual absence. The constant presence of U.S. forces in Europe since World War II has enabled the United States to enjoy the relatively free access we have come to count on—and require—in times of crisis. Further reductions of both infrastructure and forces will reduce our access to key strategic locations during times of crisis.

2. Footprint

a. European Infrastructure Consolidation (EIC)

Since the end of the Cold War, EUCOM has reduced its footprint in Europe to less than 25% of the total controlled, European real estate inventory once held by the United States. Our current network of U.S.-controlled bases throughout Europe provides for superb training and enables power projection in support of steady-state and contingency operations. As EUCOM begins to implement the Secretary of Defense's direction on EIC, the Department must focus to ensure remaining infrastructure properly supports operational requirements and strategic commitments.

EIC reductions will yield cost savings with the remaining infrastructure sufficient to support steady-state and crisis activities. Upon full implementation of EIC, EUCOM will have 17 main operating bases in Europe. As we continue to implement EIC recommendations, EUCOM will work towards minimizing any negative effects the reduction of bases may have on our strategy, operations, and the political-military relationships the U.S. has built in Europe.

b. Key Military Construction (MILCON) Priorities

EUCOM's FY 2016 military construction program continues to support key posture initiatives, recapitalize key infrastructure, and consolidate enduring locations. I am thankful Congress continues to fund EUCOM's priorities, in particular the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center/Rhine Ordnance Barracks theater medical consolidation and recapitalization project (ROBMC), European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) missile defense projects, and the relocation of the Joint Intelligence Operations Center Europe (JIOCEUR) and Joint Analysis Center (JAC) to Croughton, United Kingdom.

ROBMC remains one of the command's highest priority military construction projects, providing a vitally important replacement to theater-based combat and contingency operation medical support from the aged and failing infrastructure at the current facility. The official ground-breaking ceremony, conducted jointly by the United States and Germany, took place this past October and signified continued support and commitment from both nations. This project is vital to ensuring the availability of the highest level trauma care to future U.S. warfighters.

Congressional support for the EPAA Phase 1 projects, including approval to replace expeditionary facilities in Turkey with semi-permanent facilities, has been critical to achieving a high degree of readiness at the AN/TPY-2 radar site. In FY 2013 and FY 2014, the command began EPAA Phase 2 projects, including an Aegis Ashore site in Romania.

Another key EUCOM MILCON priority project is the consolidation of the JIOCEUR Analytic Center and other intelligence elements at RAF Croughton, UK. The Department requested planning and design funding for the consolidation during FY 2015, with three phases of MILCON construction in FY 2015-2017 respectively. We anticipate the construction completion will occur in FY 2019, with movement of units occurring in FY 2019/2020.

Phase 1 includes EUCOM's Joint Analysis Center (JAC) as well as Defense Intelligence Agency's Regional Support Center. The planned replacement facility will consolidate intelligence operations into an efficient, purpose-built building which will save the U.S. Government $74 million per year and reduce significant operational risk associated with current substandard, deteriorating facilities. The RAF Croughton site also ensures continuation of the strong EUCOM-UK intelligence relationships our sponsorship of the co-located NATO Intelligence Fusion Center.

The maintenance of our intelligence relationships with the UK and NATO remains vital to EUCOM's capability to conduct military operations from and within Europe. Phase 2, programmed for FY 2016, adds AFRICOM intelligence activities (currently at RAF Molesworth), the NATO Intelligence Fusion Center, and the Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (BICES), which provides classified communications to our NATO partners.

3. Missile Defense

The changing security environment in the EUCOM AOR makes it critical for the U.S. to take proactive measures and ensure our Allies and partners have the capability and capacity to defend themselves, their region, and support global coalition requirements.

a. Progress on implementation of EPAA

EUCOM continues to implement EPAA and further develop partnerships and assurances in NATO and later this year, EUCOM expects to complete Phase 2 of the EPAA for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). The EPAA Phase 2 program provides enhanced medium-range missile defense capability to support EUCOM plans and operations, including potential U.S. national contributions to the NATO BMD mission. The cornerstone of Phase 2 capability includes the first Aegis Ashore site, under construction in Deveselu, Romania. This site along with the integration of Aegis Combat Systems upgrades; Standard Missile-3 Block 1A and 1B interceptors; and Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) system updates are all required for EPAA to realize its full potential. In addition, while the broader basing agreement is complete, implementing arrangement negotiations for the second Aegis Ashore site in Redzikowo, Poland are on-track to support completion of Phase 3 capabilities in 2018. Phase 3 further enhances intermediate-range missile defense capability to support EUCOM plans and operations, and is intended as a U.S. national contribution to the NATO BMD mission.

b. Increasing Allied engagement and commitment

EUCOM is encouraging Allies and partners to invest in their own air and missile defense capabilities that are interoperable with ours. Building an integrated network of interoperable IAMD systems will leverage cost-sharing and help spread the commitment among willing participants. The Allies are listening, and they are beginning to respond. The allies are also making investments in BMD capabilities, such as the Netherlands-Denmark-Germany effort to study the upgrade of the Smart-L radar systems onboard their Air defense ships, and the comprehensive programs underway in Poland and Turkey to upgrade their lower-tier air and missile defense capabilities. EUCOM is working with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and the Department of Defense on developing authorities that will enable the U.S. to sell missiles and other weapons systems with retransfer rights to groups of NATO and other authorized nations.

c. Support to Israeli Missile Defense

U.S. efforts to enhance the BMD for Israel are well-developed. The threat posed by longer range ballistic missiles, larger raid sizes, and increased accuracy of ballistic missiles and rockets poses a significant challenge to Israel. EUCOM maintains plans to deploy forces in support of the defense of Israel against ballistic missile attack if requested. EUCOM also conducts maritime BMD patrols in cooperation with Israel. In addition, EUCOM conducts regular BMD training exercises with Israel on a weekly and quarterly basis.

In late 2013, U.S. and Israeli representatives signed the "Combined U.S.-Israel BMD Architecture Enhancement Program" (AEP). In addition to providing guidance on combined U.S.-Israel operations, the AEP provides direction on how the United States and Israel will jointly address the full range of potential BMD enhancements developed by both sides.

4. Cyber

Among the most dangerous threats facing Europe's new security environment are those that can manifest asymmetrically through Cyberspace. Adversaries can easily hide their identities and locations in Cyberspace, and attempt to exploit our people, our systems, our information, and our infrastructure. EUCOM must defend against these adversaries who can threaten our forces from anywhere in the world, by identifying and securing key parts of our critical infrastructure in what has become our cyber flank. Through a defensible architecture, ready cyber forces, and improved situational awareness, EUCOM will protect this flank just like eastern and southern flanks that see increasing threats today. While doctrine and concepts for operating in cyberspace are still being formulated and debated, our adversaries are aggressively searching for new vulnerabilities to exploit in the cyber flank.

EUCOM's first Cyber Combat Mission Team (CMT) and Cyber Protection Team (CPT) reached Initial Operational Capability (IOC) this past year providing us with new capabilities to protect our people, systems, information, and infrastructure while holding adversaries at risk. As these teams continue to improve, EUCOM will have an enhanced ability to plan and conduct Cyberspace Operations to enhance our situational awareness and protect our cyber flank.

The Joint Information Environment (JIE) is moving ahead in the European theater as the as a way to reduce risk to missions by providing better situational awareness into networks, improving security, and better integrating information technology across all the Services within the Department of Defense. As a result of this effort, EUCOM has seen improved mission

effectiveness through the implementation of unified capabilities, virtual desktops, and an enterprise operations center that is capable of tracking all of our component information technology systems. As EUCOM enters into the next phase of JIE, we are improving our ability to better operate with allies, friends, and partners in a Mission Partner Environment that has enhanced capabilities for information sharing and situational awareness. As demonstrated during Operations ATLANTIC RESOLVE, UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, and INHERENT RESOLVE, USEUCOM's information technology infrastructure must remain relevant, interoperable, and resilient to support a range of missions that transit our theater in support of what our national leaders may ask us to do with like-minded friends, partners, and Allies. As part of JIE, EUCOM continues to enhance our interoperability so that we can rapidly share information, enhance understanding, and dominate any potential adversary.

5. Maintaining U.S. Nuclear Deterrent with NATO Allies

The NATO 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture Review and the September 2014 Wales Summit Declaration affirm "as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance." EUCOM maintains a safe, secure, and effective theater nuclear deterrent in support of NATO and enduring U.S. security commitments, with the EUCOM AOR a critical component of the U.S. Global Strike mission. Through rigorous and effective training, exercises, evaluations, inspections, operations, and sustainment, EUCOM ensures that United States nuclear weapons and the means to support and deploy those weapons are fully ready to support national and Alliance strategic nuclear directives.

The U.S. stands side-by-side with our NATO Allies to provide safe, secure, reliable, and effective nuclear forces to deter aggression against Alliance members. EUCOM and STRATCOM work closely together to provide U.S. leadership options to assure our Allies of our commitment, and as part of Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE, EUCOM has forged a link between STRATCOM Bomber Assurance and Deterrence missions to NATO regional exercises.

6. Information Operations

Information Operations are essential to EUCOM's ability to shape the security environment and achieve our military objectives. Activities conducted under Operation ASSURED VOICE provide a powerful means to counter Russian aggression, challenge extremist ideology, and prepare for contingency operations. The EUCOM AOR has the highest internet usage rate of any OCONUS Geographic Combatant Command; that characteristic

simultaneously presents the Command with an unprecedented opportunity and efficient conduit for influence in the region. We know from experience that our adversaries will seek to gain an edge by using the internet to present false narratives and spread propaganda. We will leverage the advanced technological environment in the EUCOM AOR and use the internet as a principal, cost-effective means to reach target audiences critical to our objectives. These leading-edge capabilities and methods will augment and complement the more traditional military influence measures we currently employ. To effectively move forward, we must clarify the roles, expectations, and authorities required for steady state military influence operations on the internet and continue to advance these activities in close coordination with other departments and agencies.

7. Global Mobility Operations

The footprint within the EUCOM Theater is essential to USTRANSCOM's global strategy and directly supports AFRICOM, CENTCOM, EUCOM, SOCOM, STRATCOM, and NATO operations. TRANSCOM will continue to depend on relationships with European host nations for overflight and access to European infrastructure.

8. Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction, Counter Trafficking, and Counter Narcotics

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), in the hands of a rogue state or non-state actor, continue to represent a grave threat to the United States and the international community. Our Allies, Partners, and NATO share these concerns; we continue to work with them on building capacity and capabilities for countering WMD and pursuing efforts bilaterally, regionally, and in a NATO construct to collaborate on reducing the potential for successful WMD trafficking and use. We are also working in a whole of government manner to counter the trafficking of other illegal items, especially drugs crossing through Europe into the United States.

VII. Conclusion

Those of us assigned to Europe on behalf of the U.S. work every day to maintain peace with our European Allies and partners, striving to meet the security challenges we face as a nation and as a member of NATO. This includes continuing to demonstrate U.S. leadership and commitment to NATO and supporting the implementation of the NATO Readiness Action Plan.

The resurgence of a revanchist Russia, and the emergence of new risks emanating from across the Mediterranian, places us in a new security environment that drives new ways of thinking. Accurately assessing these changes is critical to ensure we react properly to state and non-state actors who are not complying with international norms. As one of only two forward positioned Combatant Commands, EUCOM is in a front row seat for the action, and our staff, both at the headquarters and component levels, has the expertise and relationships to adapt.

We must continue to leverage and build upon the expeditionary capability and interoperability gained over a decade of operations in Afghanistan and increase opportunities to work together in the future. Many of these capabilities are essential to confronting current security challenges. Our Allies and partners have benefited from our sustained efforts to build partnership capacity with EUCOM and we see this process as a keystone to countering threats like Russian aggression and influence. We need to protect our investment to leverage it in response to near and medium-term threats and challenges. We must also continue exercising with and training our Allies and partners and enabling the NATO Alliance to make the transition from expeditionary and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, to conducting a full spectrum of joint, combined operations, including high-end combined arms warfare. Our nation's security interests require we preserve their capabilities and their willingness to act so that they remain able to respond to threats to U.S. and European security as well as global contingencies.

While preserving expeditionary capabilities developed over the last decade, we must address and help our Allies and partners address renewed challenges, including along Europe's eastern periphery. Reassuring, stabilizing, and supporting Allies and partners in Europe are vital to protecting American interests both on the continent and at home. As the Commander of EUCOM, we need the resources to remain decisively engaged in the EUCOM Theater, to have the stabilized force structure to effectively meet our challenges brought by the new European security environment, and to defend our nation forward. If we do not stand up and take the initiative to set the theater, someone else will. We need credible, enduring capabilities that will assure, deter, and defend while shaping the theater with a coordinated whole of government approach. As long as I have the watch over EUCOM, I will relentlessly pursue a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace.

General Philip Breedlove, USAF
Commander, Supreme Allied Command Europe and U.S. European Combatant Command

Gen. Philip M. Breedlove is Commander, Supreme Allied Command, Europe, SHAPE, Belgium and Headquarters, U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany.

General Breedlove was raised in Forest Park, Ga., and was commissioned in 1977 as a distinguished graduate of Georgia Tech's ROTC program. He has been assigned to numerous operational, command and staff positions, and has completed nine overseas tours, including two remote tours. He has commanded a fighter squadron, an operations group, three fighter wings, and a numbered air force. Additionally, he has served as Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. Operations Officer in the Pacific Command Division on the Joint Staff; Executive Officer to the Commander of Headquarters Air Combat Command; the Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force; and Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff.

Prior to assuming his current position, General Breedlove served as the Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe; Commander, U.S. Air Forces Africa; Commander, Air Component Command, Ramstein; and Director, Joint Air Power Competence Centre, Kalkar, Germany. He was responsible for Air Forces activities, conducted through 3rd Air Force, in an area of operations covering more than 19 million square miles. This area included 105 countries in Europe, Africa, Asia and the Middle East, and the Arctic and Atlantic oceans. As Vice Chief, he presided over the Air Staff and served as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Requirements Oversight Council and Deputy Advisory Working Group. He assisted the Chief of Staff with organizing, training, and equipping of 680,000 active-duty, Guard, Reserve and civilian forces serving in the United States and overseas. General Breedlove has flown combat missions in Operation Joint Forge/Joint Guardian. He is a command pilot with 3,500 flying hours, primarily in the F-16.

EDUCATION

1977 Bachelor's degree in civil engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology

1982 Distinguished graduate, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

1991 Distinguished graduate, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

1991 Master of Science degree in aeronautical technology, Arizona State University

1995 Master's degree in national security studies, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.

2002 Fellow, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Seminar XXI, Washington, D.C.

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING

FEBRUARY 25, 2015

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES

Secretary WORMUTH. Yes, we are providing Ukraine intelligence. I am happy to provide greater fidelity in a classified setting. [See page 14.]

Secretary WORMUTH. The U.S. missile defense systems previously planned by the President Bush Administration for deployment in Europe, and the systems now planned and being deployed to Europe, were never designed or intended to defend against threat missiles launched by the Russian Federation.

The ten Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) that were planned for deployment to the Republic of Poland and the long-range discrimination radar that was planned for deployment to the Czech Republic, the combination of which was known as the "Third Site," were never intended or designed to counter Russian strategic systems.

In 2009, we replaced the Third Site with the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), which is intended to be phased to match advances in our missile defense technology and to be adaptive to changes in the threat. There are three phases planned for EPAA. Phase 1 has been operational since 2011. It consists of an AN/TPY–2 radar in Forward-Based Mode that is deployed to Turkey; a multi-mission, Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)-capable Aegis ship in the eastern Mediterranean, which is forward-deployed to Rota, Spain; and the Command-and-Control Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC), which is the command-and-control network for the BMD system. Phase 2 is on track for completion by the end of 2015. It will add an Aegis Ashore site in Deveselu Base, Romania, equipped with the SM–3 Block IB missile to the current Phase 1 systems. Phase 3 will be completed in 2018 and will provide coverage for all of NATO Europe. It will add an Aegis Ashore site in Rzedikowo, Poland, and also consists of software and hardware upgrades to the existing Aegis Ashore site in Romania and the deployment of a new variant of the SM–3 missile, the Block IIA. [See page 14.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS

General BREEDLOVE. Since last appearing before the committee, the United States has chosen to slow its withdrawal of troops from the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies and partner nations are currently staffing the options internally and are waiting on the associated detailed plan for the U.S. drawdown in 2016 in order to make an informed decision on their way forward. While we won't have any assurances, national force contributions are confirmed in June 2015. We believe the majority of nations will continue to follow our lead as they have done for the past several years. However, several of our Allies and partners are reliant on the unique enablers that we provide in Afghanistan, and their commitments to stay longer could be contingent upon these enablers remaining. Some of these countries are also reliant upon distinctive authorities provided by Congress such as the Coalition Readiness Support Program, Global Lift and Sustain, and section 1207 to deploy into theater and sustain interoperability with United States and NATO forces. The early U.S. decision on continued troop levels in Afghanistan will assist the U.S. and NATO to work with the Framework Nations and the force generation process to resource and stabilize troop levels in calendar year 2016.

It's important to mention that in no other region of the world does the United States find more willing, capable, and reliable partners for global military operations than in Europe. Some specific points highlighting this commitment include:

Historically, European Allies and partners have contributed 88 percent—92 percent of non-U.S. forces deployed to Afghanistan.

Since 2003, European Allies and partners have contributed more than 275,000 personnel to operations in Afghanistan. These very significant troop contributions reduce operational demands on U.S. forces and enhance the legitimacy and credibility of U.S.-led military operations.

In particular, some of our newer Allies and partners have consistently shown the political willingness and military capability to fight alongside U.S. forces. Unfortunately, our increased shared security requirements are occurring while our security cooperation efforts such as Foreign Military Financing have been dramatically re-

duced. These countries reliance on former Soviet-era equipment further exasperates our ability to effectively sustain these very strategic partnerships.

European Allies and partners account for 36 of the 41 troop contributing nations to the RESOLUTE SUPPORT Mission (RSM) and over 5,000 personnel (as of April 2015), which comprises 92 percent of non-U.S. forces in RSM.

European Allies and partners provide critical capabilities to RSM, including leadership of Train, Advise, Assist Commands, Afghan National Army/Police training teams, and special operations forces that conduct counter-insurgency operations. [See page 24.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. McSALLY

General BREEDLOVE. This is a complicated question that is very difficult to quantifiably answer. European Command (EUCOM) has reached out to the U.S. Air Force to get their help in answering this question as they the services maintain the costing data to answer this question. The RAND Corporation addressed a similar question in their Congressionally mandated, Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces report in which they concluded, "If the sending base is closed (greatly increasing the savings), substituting full rotational presence (12 months out of the year) for permanent presence sometimes saves money, sometimes costs money, and sometimes roughly breaks even, depending on the service, unit type, region, frequency and length of rotations, and equipment policy options (transporting versus prepositioning unit equipment). In particular, achieving extensive presence through high-frequency, short rotations would greatly increase costs, leaving longer rotations as the only option that enables some savings or avoidance of increased costs while maintaining high presence. If only partial, rotational presence is substituted for permanent presence, then, depending upon the rotational design, savings can be more substantial. In other words, we found no single, definitive comparison for permanent versus rotational presence. Each case must be examined individually." We agree with the RAND report—there are numerous factors in determining the cost of permanently stationed forward-based force against a rotational force. [See page 38.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

FEBRUARY 25, 2015

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS

Ms. TSONGAS. General Breedlove, Poland, Germany, and Turkey are all considering PATRIOT for their Air and Missile Defense requirements, Congress recognizes that in the United States, selection of PATRIOT would send a strong signal of trans-Atlantic commitment from our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies.

General, how would Poland, German, Turkey selection of PATRIOT be perceived in your area of responsibility?

General BREEDLOVE. The United States maintains a Global Response Force, including PATRIOT missile units, which is capable of rapidly deploying to respond to a range of worldwide contingencies. These United States forces, along with the capabilities of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies, provide flexible options to defend our NATO Allies in the event of an imminent threat.

Heavy global Combatant Command demand for ballistic missile defense forces has the U.S. Patriot force stretched to capacity. Thus, the future acquisition of these forces by our Allies will address critical shortfalls in NATO capability, alleviate the burden on overstretched U.S. PATRIOT forces, send a clear signal of cooperation, recognize the need to generate modern defense capabilities, and demonstrate a commitment to protect our strategic interests.

Current proposals for PATRIOT systems are being reviewed by the Governments of Poland and Turkey, and European Command (EUCOM) is working with the Department of State and the Department of Defense to advocate for the selection of PATRIOT. In the context of Turkey and Poland, the level of technology transfer to improve domestic industrial capabilities, the participation by those nations in the continued development of PATRIOT technology and the long term commitment of the United States to continue development of the PATRIOT system are critical considerations. Turkey and Poland are important regional partners for EUCOM, and hold significant influence in regional security. Acquisition of Patriot by these nations would be an important signal to their regional partners and other NATO Allies that could lead to additional, potentially multilateral, acquisition of a similar or complementary capability. With regard to Germany, they are currently equipped with PATRIOT and are ably employing this weapon system alongside the United States and Spain in NATO's Operation ACTIVE FENCE.

All acquisitions of capable and interoperable air and missile defense systems work to strengthen the collective defensive capability available to the Alliance to defend NATO populations, territory, and forces. This growing capacity should give pause to those who would potentially use air and missile systems against members of the Alliance.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER

Mr. SHUSTER. The United States manufactures a number of weapons systems that our allies in Europe can utilize to offset the military advantages of Russia. Countries like Poland are increasingly looking to proven weapons systems, such as the PATRIOT Air and Missile Defense System, which are maintained and modified right here in America at Letterkenny Army Depot in my district. In light of this, how do you believe we can best utilize our organic industrial base to assist allies our allies in the region?

Secretary WORMUTH. The United States has a strong domestic industrial base that is a global leader in the development of advanced technology and is well-placed to assist Allies and partners in Europe with emerging requirements. Once specific needs are established, the Department of Defense works with industry and the potential customer to develop a responsive and competitive offer that leverages our unique capabilities. As with all cases, any weapon systems cooperation efforts with our Allies and partners will consider the best use of U.S. domestic shipyards, depots, and arsenals to maintain and modify those systems, and also must comply with national laws and regulations. We are committed to doing all we can to continue supporting our defense industrial base.

Mr. SHUSTER. Ms. Wormuth, how would you characterize U.S.-Russian relations? Would you call President Obama's "reset" policy a success?

Secretary WORMUTH. The Russian Federation's military capabilities and modernization, coupled with its ongoing violations of its neighbors' sovereignty, are un-

dermining stability and security in Europe and threatening the international order. Russia's actions of concern include the ongoing occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea, its occupation of the territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, and violations of its international obligations under nuclear and conventional arms control agreements.

The Administration's reset policy netted positive results before Russia chose its current course. Under the reset policy, we cooperated on the Northern Distribution Network, a series of logistics arrangements connecting Baltic and Caspian ports with Afghanistan via Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus; agreed to reduce nuclear weapons and their proliferation with the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and a 123 Agreement on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy; obtained Russian cooperation in the United Nations for our actions in Libya; and jointly agreed to eliminate Syria's chemical weapons stockpiles.

Mr. SHUSTER. In response to continued Russian violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter recently stated "U.S. responses must make clear to Russia that if it does not return to compliance, our responses will make them less secure than they are today." How do you think the United States should best respond to these violations, and do you believe that the United States should continue to abide by the treaty if the Russians will not?

Secretary WORMUTH. The Department of Defense continues to support efforts to convince the Russian Federation to return to compliance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty while protecting the security interests of the United States and our allies and partners. The security of the United States and its allies is not negotiable.

The INF Treaty benefits the security of all of the Treaty parties, including the United States and the Russian Federation. The INF Treaty also benefits our allies and partners in Europe and Asia. For that reason, we are continuing to comply with the INF Treaty while we determine whether we can convince Russia to return to compliance with it. However, our patience is not without limits, and we are considering an array of responses that would seek to ensure that Russia gains no significant military advantage from its violation.

If Russia does not come into compliance, it will ultimately require the United States to take action to protect our interests and security along with those of our allies and partners. Those actions will make Russia less secure. Some of those options are INF Treaty-compliant, and some are not.

Mr. SHUSTER. Ms. Wormuth, the United States continues to reinforce our commitment to our NATO allies through the use of Operation Atlantic Resolve, which increased United States military rotational deployments, and the European Reassurance Initiative, which provided $1 billion to reassure and build partner capacities. Should our support to the region expand beyond our NATO partners to countries at risk of illegal occupation and if so, what should be the extent of our assistance?

Secretary WORMUTH. OPERATION ATLANTIC RESOLVE (OAR) is a demonstration of our continued commitment to the collective security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies and dedication to the enduring peace and stability in the region, in light of the Russian intervention in Ukraine specifically. In meeting our global security commitments, the United States must have strong, committed, and capable Allies, which is why we have fought, exercised, and trained with our European Allies for the past 70 years. Aided by the European Reassurance Initiative, OAR will remain in place as long as the need exists to reassure our Allies and deter Russia from further aggressive actions.

In keeping with our goal of a Europe whole, free, and at peace, our support should and does extend beyond our NATO Allies. For example, we plan to sustain a significant level of security assistance to Ukraine throughout this year. Congress appropriated $118 Million for fiscal year 2014 for Department of Defense activities in Ukraine, and in fiscal year 2015, Congress appropriated at least an additional $75 Million for Ukraine. We are also providing additional funds for security assistance to Georgia and the Republic of Moldova to support their independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity in light of recent aggressive Russian actions.

The Department of Defense continues to monitor the evolving security situation in Europe, particularly along the southern and eastern regions, and is prepared to adjust the level of assistance necessary to reassure NATO Allies and partners in the region of our commitment to collective security.

Mr. SHUSTER. Last week, German broadcaster "ARD" broke the story that German soldiers made an effort to disguise their lack of arms by painting wooden broomsticks black and attaching them to their armored vehicles during a NATO exercise last year, in an effort to make them look like heavy machine guns. Media reports have also indicated that 41 percent of German soldiers lack pistols they would carry in a genuine rapid deployment situation; and 31 percent of their MG3 general-

purpose machine-guns are absent. Given this information, do you still believe our NATO allies in the region are prepared to honor their Article 5 obligation in the face of major threats such as Russia?

General BREEDLOVE. I fully believe that every North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Ally is prepared to honor Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. However, the general decline in defense spending by many NATO Allies is threatening their ability to generate the right forces, capabilities, and readiness levels to respond to a changed European security environment highlighted by Russian aggression. As spelled out in Article 3 of the Washington Treaty, every nation has a requirement to be capable of its own defense. Increased defense spending on the right capabilities, forces, and readiness is an unmistakable signal that NATO is fully prepared for any situation and provides a road map to meet our current strategic dilemma in responding to aggression in Europe. At the September 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, Allied leaders committed to raise and maintain defense spending minimum of 2 percent of gross domestic product. Several major European nations have announced significant increases in defense spending, and Germany itself announced it will increase defense spending by 6.2 percent per year for each of the next four years. However, we must remain engaged across the board with all our Allies to encourage them to abide by their pledge made in Wales.

Mr. SHUSTER. You state in your written testimony "After years of force structure and other personnel reductions, fewer than 65,000 U.S. military personnel remain permanently stationed in Europe . . . the size of our military presence forces difficult decisions daily on how to best use the limited resources we have to assure, stabilize, and support." In your estimation, how many personnel do you believe would be optimal to have permanently stationed in Europe given the array of threats the region currently faces?

General BREEDLOVE. The answer is not necessarily how many personnel are required but rather what capabilities are needed to meet the threats we currently face. United States European Command (EUCOM) requires, at minimum, the deferral of previously planned force reductions and an increased presence of U.S. forces in Europe through stepped-up rotations. These actions close the capacity gap in steady-state operations, enable building partner capacity and interoperability, provide a tangible measure of reassurance to the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and partners, and demonstrate through unambiguous actions that the security commitment to Europe remains unshakable. Subject to the Global Force Management allocation process, the Army would augment presence through the rotation of continental United States (CONUS)-based units from an Armored Brigade Combat Team which is allocated to the NATO Response Force. The U.S. Navy could expand its presence in the Black and Baltic Seas as would the Marine Corps via its Black Sea Rotational Force. The U.S. Air Force would sustain its current air superiority force by rotating CONUS-based Air Forces squadrons to participate in Theater Security Package training and exercise events along NATO's Eastern Flank, and rotating C–130s in support of Mobility Air Force missions. Special Operations Forces would expand its presence to increase partnership activities in Central and Eastern Europe. Dedicated analytic support at EUCOM's Joint Intelligence Operations Center and NATO Intelligence Fusion Center would provide timely indications and warnings and enhanced exercise planning. With the exception of the aforementioned naval forces, these initiatives are currently nested and implementing the President 's European Reassurance Initiative.

Mr. SHUSTER. General Breedlove, you state "Russia uses energy as a tool of coercion." Last month the House passed the LNG [liquid natural gas] Permitting Certainty and Transparency Act, which expands export opportunities for the natural gas industry to send energy to nations like the Ukraine. America is blessed with an abundance of energy resources, including massive natural gas reserves such as the Marcellus shale, which is estimated to hold about 141 trillion cubic feet of technically recoverable natural gas reserves. In what other ways do you believe the United States can offset Russia's energy coercion with our own resources?

General BREEDLOVE. As the primary energy supplier to Ukraine and the Baltic states, the Russian Federation has the ability to unilaterally control the energy market in those countries, and has demonstrated on several occasions its willingness to do so. As voiced by Secretary of State Kerry, energy must not be used as a political weapon, and by opening those markets to U.S. natural gas suppliers at a competitive prices, Russia's stranglehold will be meaningfully weakened.

More broadly, we should consider a whole of government approach—in collaboration with the Department of State and the Department of Energy, for instance—to expand Ukrainian access to energy supplies less vulnerable to Russian influence as well as provide technical expertise for improving power generation and distribution efficiency.

(1) Optimize domestic energy production. The United States and the European Union have extensive expertise in both coal and nuclear plant optimization and could help Ukraine maximize efficiency from existing plants. Recent developments in clean coal technologies would be particularly useful in an already sizeable Ukrainian coal market.

(2) Build-up renewable energy. Ukrainian officials are already calling for investment in green technologies to take advantage of the abundant natural resources in the country, particularly hydro, solar, and biomass.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. O'ROURKE

Mr. O'ROURKE. During the hearing, you stated that our NATO allies have pledged to bring their defense spending up to 2 percent of gross domestic product, in line with NATO requirements, following the Wales Summit in September 2014. When must other NATO members reach this benchmark to be compliant with the Wales Summit deal, and what are the consequences if they do not meet this goal?

Secretary WORMUTH. The pledge states that Allies will seek to increase defense spending in real terms as gross domestic product grows; and to move towards the 2 percent guideline within a decade. More significantly for the near term, Allies spending less than 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense undertook to halt any further decline in defense spending. Allies agreed that progress would be reviewed at least annually and discussed at future Ministerials and Summits. This is the first time such a commitment has been made at the level of Heads of State and Government. It will empower Defense Ministers within European coalition governments to fight more effectively for adequate funding, with the support of the United States and other Allies. While there are no defined consequences for failing to meet the goals of the pledge, I will ensure allies who are in danger of falling into this category and fully understand the importance the United States puts on the pledge's fulfillment, and the high standard to which we hold members of the NATO Alliance.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ZINKE

Mr. ZINKE. Would you argue that a major leverage point against Russia is its economic frailty, and to what regard do you think the U.S. exporting liquefied natural gas (LNG) to European markets will have on Russia's economy and influence in the region. Please give describe both short term implications (from the time the LNG is being exported) and long term implications.

Secretary WORMUTH. Although the Department of Defense does not have responsibility for liquefied natural gas (LNG) market issues, I agree that LNG market diversification in Europe would help to limit the leverage the Russian Federation has over European customers who are heavily reliant on Russian gas supplies, as well as provide alternative sources for European nations to ensure they are not reliant on a single supplier for their gas needs.

The United States, in coordination with the European Union and other partners, has used targeted sanctions, including in the energy sector, to raise the costs to Russia for its actions in Ukraine over the past year, and this has had a sharp impact on the Russian economy. Over the long-term, Russia's failure to diversify and over-reliance on hydrocarbon sales would also have negative consequences, providing an important point of leverage on Russia.

Mr. ZINKE. Would you argue that a major leverage point against Russia is its economic frailty, and to what regard do you think the U.S. exporting liquefied natural gas (LNG) to European markets will have on Russia's economy and influence in the region. Please give describe both short term implications (from the time the LNG is being exported) and long term implications.

General BREEDLOVE. The diversification of European energy sources and supply routes is a longstanding priority of U.S. energy diplomacy. Even before the current crisis in Ukraine, the Russian Federation has deftly used natural-gas supplies as leverage in pursuing long-term goals in the former Soviet space and in Europe as a whole. Growing availability of liquid natural gas has given Europe greater leverage in negotiations with Russia, and we should continue working with our partners on diversifying Europe's supply sources.

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