[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
114th Congress Printed for the use of the
2nd Session Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
_________________________________________________________________________
BALTIC SECURITY AFTER THE
WARSAW NATO SUMMIT
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
DECEMBER 7, 2016
Briefing of the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
________________________________________________________________________
Washington: 2017
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
234 Ford House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
202-225-1901
[email protected]
http://www.csce.gov
@HelsinkiComm
Legislative Branch Commissioners
HOUSE SENATE
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ROGER WICKER, Mississippi,
Chairman Co-Chairman
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida BENJAMIN L. CARDIN. Maryland
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
ALAN GRAYSON, Florida TOM UDALL, New Mexico
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER,
New York
Executive Branch Commissioners
Department of State
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Department of Defense
ARUN M. KUMAR, Department of Commerce
ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
The Helsinki process, formally titled the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe, traces its origin to the signing of the
Helsinki Final Act in Finland on August 1, 1975, by the leaders of 33
European countries, the United States and Canada. As of January 1,
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website of the OSCE is: .
ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as
the Helsinki Commission, is a U.S. Government agency created in 1976 to
monitor and encourage compliance by the participating States with their
OSCE commitments, with a particular emphasis on human rights.
The Commission consists of nine members from the United States
Senate, nine members from the House of Representatives, and one member
each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce. The positions
of Chair and Co-Chair rotate between the Senate and House every two
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In fulfilling its mandate, the Commission gathers and disseminates
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The Commission also contributes to the formulation and execution of
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Commission have regular contact with parliamentarians, government
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private individuals from participating States. The website of the
Commission is: .
BALTIC SECURITY AFTER THE
WARSAW NATO SUMMIT
December 7, 2016
Page
PARTICIPANTS
Alex Tiersky, Policy Advisor, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.................................. 1
Scott Rauland, State Department Senior Advisor, Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe.................. 14
Karl Altau, Managing Director, Joint Baltic American
National Committee, Inc................................ 2
Michael Johnson, Senior Defense Research Analyst, RAND
Corporation............................................ 5
Magnus Nordenman, Director, Transatlantic Security
Initiative, Deputy Director, Brent Scowcroft Center on
International Security, Atlantic Council of the United
States................................................. 11
APPENDIX
Prepared Statement of Karl Altau......................... 25
BALTIC SECURITY AFTER THE
WARSAW NATO SUMMIT
----------
DECEMBER 7, 2016
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Washington, DC
The briefing was held at 2 p.m. in room 340, Cannon House Office
Building, Washington, DC, Alex Tiersky and Scott Rauland, Policy
Advisors, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, moderating.
Panelists present: Karl Altau, Managing Director, Joint Baltic
American National Committee, Inc.; Michael Johnson, Senior Defense
Research Analyst, RAND Corporation; Magnus Nordenman, Director,
Transatlantic Security Initiative, Deputy Director, Brent Scowcroft
Center on International Security, Atlantic Council of the United
States; and
Mr. Tiersky. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. On behalf of
Helsinki Commission Chairman Chris Smith and Co-Chairman Senator Roger
Wicker, I'd like to welcome you to our briefing on Baltic security
after the Warsaw NATO summit. My name is Alex Tiersky. I'm the
political-military affairs advisor for the Helsinki Commission. To your
far right is Scott Rauland, who is our senior State Department
representative with the Commission. We will be sharing moderating
duties for today's event.
I would like to thank you all for coming. I see a number of embassy
staff here, who I'm pleased to see, as well as some esteemed colleagues
from think tanks, in addition to our usual audience from the Hill. It's
lovely to see everybody.
We're very fortunate to have a great panel for you today on an
issue that is of great importance to the Helsinki Commission. The
Commission is well known, of course, to those of you who have been
following its work for decades since it was signed into law in June of
1976. It is, of course, very well known for its work on human rights. I
think because of the changing dynamics in European security, you're
going to see the Commission increase its activity on the pol-mil
security, or ``first'' dimension set of issues as well. This briefing
is part of that increased attention to security issues. And it follows
on a briefing that we provided in the run-up to the Warsaw Summit on
what the expectations might be for the decisions that the allies took
in Warsaw.
Let me just point out that Baltic security fits under the
Commission's mandate of providing oversight for the 1975 Helsinki Final
Act's provisions. There is something called The Decalogue--or 10
principles--guiding relations between participating states that were
enshrined at that time by consensus. These include some very topical
commitments ranging from refraining from the threat or use of force,
inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity of states, peaceful
settlement of disputes--I could go on. A number of these principles
clearly have been infringed and are under attack in European security
in recent times.
Let me quickly turn to introducing our speakers who are going to
give us a good overview and a basis on which to have a discussion.
We're very much looking forward to the participation of our audience in
a question-and-answer session.
We will start with Karl Altau, who is well known to anyone in
Washington who follows the Baltic States. He's the managing director of
the Joint Baltic American National Committee, or JBANC, since 1997. In
this capacity he's helped conduct extensive advocacy on behalf of the
Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian communities in the United States. And
he played a key role in the NATO accession of the three Baltic
countries.
We will then hear from Michael Johnson, who is a senior defense
research analyst at the RAND Corporation. Mike is a very well respected
former U.S. Army strategic plans and policy officer, also a West Point
grad. But most importantly for our purposes, he is the coauthor of an
extremely impactful study of Baltic State vulnerabilities based on the
extensive use of wargaming that RAND conducted. The study, which I've
been aware of for quite some time, certainly shaped thinking in the
runup to the decisions made at the NATO summit. We're thrilled to be
able to get our version of a briefing on that wargame effort, that
study and what RAND is thinking about these issues since the Warsaw
decisions.
Finally, to my immediate left, to your right, we'll hear from
Magnus Nordenman, an old friend of mine from the Atlantic Council's
Scowcroft Center on International Security. Magnus is also the director
of the Transatlantic Security Initiative and a key person, the key
person, in Washington on, among a host of other issues, Nordic Baltic
defense.
So we have, as I say, three excellent experts to provide us an
overview. We'll hear from the presenters and then my colleague, Scott,
will moderate a question-and-answer session. So let us start with Karl,
please.
Mr. Altau. Hello, good afternoon. As you've heard, I'm Karl Altau
with the Joint Baltic American National Committee. We go by the
acronym, usually, JBANC, which I will do. We represent the primary
Baltic American national organizations, the American Latvian
Association, the Estonian American National Council and the Lithuanian
American Council. We were founded in 1961 and we're celebrating our
55th anniversary this year.
Also, we represent 1 million Baltic Americans. They're mostly
Lithuanians living in Chicago, believe it or not. But we've worked
closely with Congress, the administration and its agencies in that half
a century to enhance United States policy towards Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania.
And I'd like to thank the Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, the Helsinki Commission, and Alex and Scott for putting
together this event, this very important and timely briefing focusing
on security and the Baltic countries. We've worked very closely with
the Commission on supporting the passage of the Belarus Democracy
Reauthorization Act and the Magnitsky legislation. We are also
supporting our Ukrainian friends in their time of need.
Today, however, we need to get back to our Baltic roots and talk
about the new reality, or the new realities of deterring Russian
aggression and dealing with the increasing provocations by Moscow.
There haven't really been any Baltic-focused public briefings or
hearings for a long time, mainly because the region has been so
successful and has been a positive model. Today's briefing also
coincides with a coordinated visit of Baltic parliamentarians to
Washington and Congress.
I'd like to acknowledge my Baltic-American colleagues who are here
today, along with folks from the embassies, along also with board
members of the Baltic American Freedom Foundation, an organization
doing great work in providing practical work experience in the United
States for young professionals from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
The Baltics have been doing their job, particularly as NATO Allies,
since their admission to NATO in 2004. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
have been eager and active partners in NATO and as partners of the
United States. We see these positive relationships mirrored here in the
United States daily.
In the past, we've fought for decades to help raise awareness about
the Baltic countries and their plight behind the Iron Curtain and to
help see the countries of our heritage restore their independence. It
can't be repeated enough, one of the key elements for the duration of
that time was the Welles Declaration, the U.S. policy to not recognize
the Soviet annexation of the Baltic countries. It was a principled and
morally correct policy that stood for 50 years.
The Baltic-American communities worked very hard to support the
aspirations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to become NATO members.
One of the high points was collecting over 25,000 signatures. This was
back in the old days when we didn't have computers or cell phones. But
we collected those by hand, over 25,000 signatures from all 50 states,
plus D.C., plus Puerto Rico, in a year-long campaign to ask the
President to help ensure that the Baltics were invited to join NATO at
the 2002 Prague NATO summit. Baltic-American representatives across the
country came to the White House on September the 10th, 2001, the day
before 9/11, to deliver these petitions.
Seeing Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania join the Alliance was
something we all took great pride in. We are grateful that they have
punched above their weight and that they remain strong adherents of the
Alliance principles. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are active and
capable contributors to our joint defense and defenders of Western
standards and democracy.
We've all heard the phrase that freedom is not free. It is
something to constantly improve upon with many tweaks along the way. We
don't want to see these freedoms, Western values and the framework of
the relationship with NATO jeopardized. However, with Russia's
revanchist aggression, we are now experiencing the most difficult
challenges we have faced in the 25 years of restored independence.
There have been difficult times before with Russia's offensive
actions, from energy cutoffs in Lithuania, the 2007 cyberattacks
against Estonia, continuing disinformation campaigns targeting Latvia.
Russia's war against Georgia in 2008 was more than an omen. The
Kremlin's calculations, it appeared, led down a rocky road, which
eventually manifested itself again with the events in Ukraine. Soon
there will be three years of war there with daily bloodshed and no end
in sight.
Crimea is occupied and info wars have ramped up to new heights.
Have we done everything to counter this aggression? Has NATO met the
challenges? Well, we saw some issues incrementally addressed at
previous summits in Chicago in 2012 and Wales in 2014. The response
from this summer's Warsaw summit was certainly a more serious
adjustment of priorities. There, NATO stated it was fully prepared to
defend the Alliance and pledged an increase in military spending in
response to Russia's unpredictable and aggressive behavior in the
region. I'm sure my co-panelists will give a closer look at the details
of all this and how all these moves fit.
So this is a challenge for us; what can we do? Three things. First,
we must ensure that U.S. defense funding needs are met. Second is to
ensure the transition to a Trump Administration that fully understands
and supports these goals. Third is to continue to recognize Russia's
threats as a whole and to support U.S. efforts to address these
threats.
So the first point. Our organization has been urging swift passage
of the $3.4 billion European Reassurance Initiative in the defense bill
and we're happy to see additional funding being provided for overseas
contingencies. ERI has been a response to increasing Russian aggression
and supports increased U.S. investment in five areas: presence,
training and exercises, infrastructure, pre-positioned equipment, and
building partner capacity.
We aren't excited about the prospect of a continuing resolution
lasting well into spring. We prefer longer-term planning and
commitment, but we do see ample evidence that there is overwhelming
support in Congress for addressing Russia's rising militarism. It is
imperative to send a message that the United States means business and
that we will continue to stand against tyranny.
While our NATO Allies, Britain, Canada and Germany, are
establishing high-
readiness combat battalions in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania,
respectively, it is vital to continue showing the U.S. flag in the
Baltic countries as well, with ongoing increased forward presence,
regular rotational deployments, operations, exercises and more. We
can't forget the key National Guard relationships. We can't forget our
relationships with the Nordic countries, and other relationships.
As we reach out to the new Trump Administration--this is point
two--we are reminded about statements made, which questioned the
purpose and existence of NATO and the commitment of its members. JBANC
stands firm in its belief that NATO and America's commitments to its
NATO Allies are fundamental to ensuring the U.S. and European security,
and urges the next administration to continue to support all NATO
Allies, including the Baltic countries, and reaffirm commitment to the
treaty's Article V.
The Baltics are undeniably strong in their commitments to NATO and
fully understand what is at stake. Although challenged in fully
rebuilding their militaries over the past 25 years, they have worked to
fulfill their NATO obligations. Estonia spends over 2 percent of GDP on
pledged defensive expenditures. And while currently just under 2
percent, Latvia and Lithuania have been increasing their military
budgets more rapidly than any other NATO members over the past few
years and will be reaching that threshold soon. There has been rock-
solid commitment and engagement by the Baltic countries in supporting
NATO and U.S.-led actions.
The Alliance faces increasing unconventional threats. It is
imperative for allies to share their collective knowledge in key
security areas, whether cyber, strategic communications or the energy
security sphere. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania make substantial
contributions in all of these areas. The United States cannot allow any
weakening of resolve or commitment to our allies. The ironclad, long-
lasting friendship of the United States in NATO is critically
important. Baltic Americans particularly understand the importance of
effective U.S. leadership in supporting these alliances.
And I'll add that, together with our partners in the Central and
East European Coalition, we represent not just three, but 13
communities in the U.S. and more than 20 million Central and Eastern
European Americans. Together, we all strongly back the United States'
continued, unconditional commitment to upholding the NATO treaty, as
well as U.S. support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of
all Central and Eastern European nations. The organization stands firm
in its belief that America's close cooperation with all NATO Allies and
partners is fundamental to ensuring U.S. and European security.
We are reminded of the words of then NATO Supreme Allied Commander,
General Philip Breedlove, who stated at a hearing of the U.S. House
Armed Services Committee in February this year that Russia has chosen
to be an adversary and imposes a long-term existential threat to the
United States and to our European allies and partners. You can't get
much clearer than that.
Earlier this year, the CEEC sponsored a policy forum on NATO's
stance on Russia on Capitol Hill. The major theme of the discussion
characterized Russia's increasing aggression since 2008, not only in
terms of fanning regional conflicts, but a fundamental assault on the
post-World War II international order.
And then the third point, the bigger picture. Russia's ongoing wars
are of the greatest concern. I personally feel that the Putin and Assad
regimes should be investigated for war crimes in their bombing
campaigns in Syria. However, Moscow's crimes against Ukraine are also
horrible and must not be ignored. Having Russian missiles deployed to
Kaliningrad within striking distance of capitals in Poland, Germany,
the Baltics and Belarus is very worrisome. Russia's actions have the
potential to escalate into a wider European conflict. Our efforts to
deter such threats now are critical. In addition, Russia's unrelenting
disinformation campaign and other hybrid threats of destabilization put
all of our allies at great peril.
While the legislation to support military funding is finalized or
being finalized, we must also remember to support efforts to stymie
Russian disinformation, to support sanctions against the Putin regime,
and also against individuals through the Global Magnitsky Act, and to
support Ukraine, particularly now via H.R. 5094, the Stability and
Democracy, or STAND, for Ukraine Act. This helps push for sanctions
against Russia and supports Ukraine's territorial integrity,
particularly the nonrecognition of Crimea's annexation.
We look forward to working with all of you in the coming year to
ensure the continued security, stability and well-being of the Baltic
countries as NATO Allies and partners. And thank you for the
opportunity to speak here today.
Mr. Tiersky. Thanks very much, Karl.
We'll now move to Mike Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. All right. Good afternoon. Thank you very much for
inviting me here today.
The United States and the NATO alliance have adopted a dual-track
strategy consisting of dialogue and deterrence with respect to Russia.
But what exactly does that mean?
For NATO to decide the next steps to take after the Warsaw summit,
I think it's important that we understand the strategic implications of
the operational vulnerability that still exists. NATO should try to
cooperate with Russia to advance mutual interests where possible and
avoid a zero-sum mindset of a new Cold War. Yet because the
consequences of miscalculation, war and escalation would be enormous,
NATO cannot afford a failure of deterrence. Therefore, NATO should not
rest its collective security entirely on an assumption about Putin's
intentions, hopes for more constructive cooperation or uncertain
operational concepts.
To inform U.S. and NATO decisions about defense strategy,
deterrence and posture, RAND has conducted 24 wargames with
representatives from all military services, U.S. commands in Europe and
our European allies. Our aim was to provide a realistic assessment of
NATO's military capabilities as well as the risks that policymakers
have accepted with NATO's current posture and plans.
To set the strategic context quickly, Russia has a long history of
providing for its own security by occupying or dictating terms to its
neighbors. Russia has invaded Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania multiple
times and occupied these Baltic States for half of the last century. In
2008, Putin sent Russian forces to Georgia to support the separatists,
but he was also signaling all of Russia's neighbors that opposition to
Moscow's interests could be punished by force. Putin's stated objective
is to roll back NATO's influence from Russia's borders.
Then Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014 and annexed Crimea. This was
the first time military force was used to redraw the borders of a
European state since World War II. This act of aggression sent a
shockwave through Eastern Europe and Scandinavia. Will the Baltics be
next? It seems unlikely, but in Crimea's wake the probability should no
longer be considered zero. We should, therefore, evaluate Russia's
military capabilities and the consequences of any potential conflict.
Unlike Ukraine, the Baltic States are NATO Allies who sent their
forces to fight with us in Afghanistan after 9/11. Consequently,
President Obama assured them, with NATO you will never lose your
independence again. Yet Mr. Putin responded to the President with a
harsh assessment, quote, ``If I wanted, Russian troops could not only
be in Kyiv in two days, but also in Riga, Vilnius and Tallinn, too.''
So who is right?
We had competing predictions within RAND, so we designed a wargame
to answer this question. Given NATO's current posture, can Russia seize
the Baltic States in a rapid fait accompli, in a short-warning attack?
Unlike debates about intentions, that's a testable hypothesis. Sixty
hours or less, that's the longest it took any Russian player in the
wargames to defeat NATO forces and surround the Baltic capitals. This
was our consistent finding across 24 games in which the players were
free to develop their own innovative concepts of air, land, sea,
special and cyber operations. And should Russia seize the Baltic
States, there are no good military options to reverse aggression by a
great power with nuclear weapons.
But it is possible to prevent a quick win at relatively modest cost
if NATO has the political will. Here's how we arrived at this bottom
line. Geography clearly favors Russia. Taking a look at Latvia, for
example, it's only 135 miles from Pskov to Riga. There is simply not
enough time and space for airpower to significantly delay or degrade
Russian forces before they reach their objectives.
The American supply chain is much longer and slower. The United
States has only nine armored brigades left in the regular Army, fewer
than the number of aircraft carriers, and all of them are permanently
based in the United States. Russia's long-range surface-to-air
missiles, submarines, and anti-ship missiles would make it too
dangerous to deploy forces directly to the Baltics. This means U.S.
forces would have to alert, mobilize, train, move by rail from fort to
port, embark, move 5,000 miles by sea and disembark in channel ports,
like Bremerhaven. This takes time.
The second problem would be getting from Germany to the
battlefield. The transport trucks, rail cars, ramps, bridges and other
infrastructure necessary to move main battle tanks are insufficient,
especially in Eastern Europe.
The third problem is the thousand miles from the logistics hubs for
fuel, ammunition, spare parts and medical services. These are still
located in Germany, designed to sustain combat only 100 miles away
during a Cold War. This means NATO forces would quickly run out of
supplies.
So given these relative distances and challenges, what forces can
Russia and NATO quickly bring into battle? Even with the conflict in
Ukraine and a 33 percent poor readiness rate, Russia has proven it can
still generate 26-battalion tactical groups in their Western Military
District on three to seven days' warning. Twenty-six battalions is not
a very large force, as one commander said, it's not that the Russians
are 10 feet tall again, they're only five-foot-five, but very fast. The
problem is NATO is much smaller and slower by comparison.
We assumed a best-case deployment of NATO's 2015 posture in the
original wargame. On top of the three brigades that the Baltic States
themselves would contribute, we assumed two U.S. airborne infantry
brigades, one Stryker brigade and two NATO or European airborne
brigades could deploy in time. Still, these light forces are
outclassed. Russia would have 480 tanks on short warning, while NATO
would have none that could deploy in time. The 1st Armored Brigade from
the United States would need 30 to 45 days to arrive in Europe and be
ready to fight.
The situation with artillery would be even worse. NATO artillery
would be significantly outnumbered, outranged and outgunned by Russia.
These arrows give you a sense of the volume of fire that would fall on
our light infantry because NATO lacks an effective response. The effect
would be devastating. Again, it's not that U.S. and other European
armored forces are not capable. It's just that they're not ready and
they're not in the right place to respond rapidly. There is no U.S.
Army in Europe anymore that can quickly ride to the rescue. There is no
headquarters above brigade capable of planning and conducting
operations, no aviation, fire or engineer brigades to support combat,
no logistics capability to sustain that.
Assuming Russia was our partner, we have either cut or brought back
all of our armored forces to the United States. In fact, there are more
police officers in New York City than there are American soldiers
stationed in Europe today.
What about airpower? We assumed maximum use of NATO airpower in the
wargame. This included a Naval carrier battle group and access to
airbases in Sweden, which avoid the air defenses in Kaliningrad. While
Russia cannot equal our new fifth-generation aircraft, Russia can still
generate 24 squadrons of fighters and eight squadrons of attack
helicopters on short warning, or about one-third of their total air
force. This is a qualitatively and quantitatively much different
problem than the U.S. has faced in recent conflicts with regional
powers, like Iraq, that have no capable air force and could launch only
a few Scud missiles.
But the even bigger threat to all of NATO's fourth-generation
aircraft is the increasing range and accuracy of Russia's air defense
network that exceeds NATO countermeasures. As one planner at U.S. Air
Force Europe said, we have fifth-generation fighters, but we are still
using missiles designed in the 1970s to suppress enemy air defenses;
meanwhile, Russia has steadily modernized their systems to exceed our
range. Thus, there would be a limited supply of strike sorties for
interdiction and close-air support versus Russian ground forces in the
opening weeks of any conflict. Due to the lack of sufficient aircover,
U.S. Army forces would also suffer significant losses from enemy air
attacks for the first time since the early days of World War II.
Thus, Russia can achieve an overwhelming advantage in a short-
warning attack, overrun the Baltic defense forces and rapidly exploit
[the situation] to surround the capitals. NATO light infantry in the
Baltics would quickly become hostages, prisoners or casualties. Then
Russia would have six months to prepare a deliberate defense,
manipulate the risk of escalation to deter a counteroffensive, freeze
the conflict and shift NATO's response to economic sanctions. Would
Putin ever take this risk in the Baltics? Again, it appears unlikely.
But historically, states have begun wars they believed would be quick.
NATO's current strategy of assured response relies on a tripwire
that would launch an automatic counteroffensive by the entire alliance
to liberate the Baltics. This is essentially applying the Desert Storm
model of reversing aggression by regional powers, like Iraq, to a great
power with a large nuclear arsenal, like Russia. Yet many people do not
fully appreciate the risks of reversing Russian aggression if
deterrence fails. In fact, the American president and NATO leaders
would be left with a terrible choice of really bad options.
First, the consequences of war would be felt most immediately by
the free people of the Baltic States if they choose to defend their
freedom. Because their capitals would quickly come within range of
Russian artillery, the Russians could do to Riga what they did to
Grozny during the Chechen War. Current airstrikes against humanitarian
convoys and civilians in Aleppo suggest the Russians would not be
reluctant to destroy the Baltic capitals if they resist.
Second, NATO could take at least six months to deploy armored
forces and supplies from the United States and other NATO countries and
threaten to launch a counteroffensive if Russia does not withdraw. But
will policymakers really be willing to follow through with this threat?
It's not that simple.
First, attacking a prepared defense in-depth against the
overwhelming Russian advantage in air defense and long-range fires
would be bloody. The U.S. should expect to suffer more casualties in
the first week of a war with Russia than during the last 15 years of
war in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. And that's if the conflict remains
conventional.
Moscow will most likely threaten to use nuclear weapons if NATO
launches a ground offensive, initiating the uncertain process of
vertical escalation. Russia has already rattled the nuclear saber in
Crimea and again in Syria, which has effectively curtailed American
military options to support the opposition in Aleppo. Would NATO
policymakers really be willing to risk Washington, London, Berlin and
Paris? We haven't had to face hard questions like that for 25 years.
Instead of launching World War III to recover sunk costs,
policymakers might weigh the future benefits of liberating the Baltics
against the enormous costs if the conflict spirals out of control.
Thus, Putin may have doubts about NATO's political will to follow
through, especially when NATO apparently lacks the will to prepare a
credible defense in the first place.
The third option is even less credible. NATO could return to the
early Cold War strategy of massive retaliation and threaten a nuclear
strike to prevent defeat. No one finds this option credible because of
the obvious global catastrophic consequences that would ensue. Nuclear
weapons have more utility as a deterrent nested within a strategy of
flexible response by local conventional forces than as a threat to
coerce Russia to withdraw its forces.
If these risks proved too much for policymakers to accept, the last
option would be to tacitly concede Russian control of the Baltic States
and accept a new Iron Curtain in Europe. NATO would impose severe
economic sanctions to be sure and try to rejuvenate the defeated
alliance to defend Poland. But this strategic defeat can hardly be
described as a good outcome, especially when it could be deterred at a
relatively modest cost.
To avoid these outcomes, NATO needs to put more time on the clock
by preventing a Russian quick win followed by brinksmanship. Putin
should see the realistic prospect of a much longer war with NATO that
makes any potential gains not worth the costs of aggression. So how do
we arrive at our recommended forces?
We conducted a second iteration of the wargame with the players to
determine the changes in NATO's defense posture necessary to prevent a
quick win by Russia. We experimented with all different force sizes,
types of units and new capabilities, like extended-range munitions, to
suppress air defense networks. We also increased the size of the
Russian invasion force to 55 battalions to constitute a more realistic
stress test.
Here's what we found. The best way to improve NATO's chances is to
give it some armor. Specifically, we found that adding three armor
brigades in addition to the four infantry brigades that can fight on
short warning can change combat outcomes. If based in Europe, these
mobile armored forces can delay the Russian advance and then fall back
to defend the capitals. With pre-stocks of fuel and ammunition, they
could hold out for two to four weeks. That buys more time for more NATO
reinforcements to quickly come to their aid.
To get counterattack forces there in time, the U.S. should add more
pre-positioned equipment sets in Europe so we can quickly fly in
personnel from the United States. Our European allies would also need
to provide six to nine armor brigades to support a rapid counterattack
as there is no unilateral American solution to this time-distance
problem. This requires improving European readiness and infrastructure
to move units quickly. And we've got to improve air-ground synergy,
beginning with all services and countries working together to develop
the capability to suppress air defense networks.
If NATO takes these steps to add armor, expedite reinforcements and
get more airpower in the fight faster, our wargames show that Russia
could seize some territory, but they could not quickly seize the
capitals in a knockout blow and would eventually lose a longer war with
NATO. We're not suggesting a war-winning strategy to defeat Russia with
minimum risk, which would be impossible. Rather, this is the minimum
defensive force to remove any theory of quick victory that might tempt
Putin to attack.
So how much would it cost to restore credible deterrence in Europe?
Policymakers should first realize that the costs of reinforcing
deterrence pale in comparison to the enormous costs of war with Russia.
The question is, where would the three armor brigades come from? We've
outlined three options here with a rough order of magnitude cost
estimate.
First, DOD could grow three new armor brigades, a division
headquarters and the support forces in Europe with all new equipment
for 13 billion [dollars]. It would also cost 2.7 billion [dollars] to
own and operate these forces in Europe every year thereafter. This
would preserve a vital deterrent in Europe, even if the U.S. must
respond to a crisis in Korea, for Mr. Putin is nothing if not
opportunistic.
The second option would be to grow three new armor brigades, but
use existing equipment in the National Guard and in exchange for
Strykers. This would save 9 billion (dollars) in costs of new
procurement, but it could be difficult to implement.
The third option would be to move three existing armor brigades in
the active component to Europe. This would cost 716 million (dollars)
to move and 216 million (dollars) in additional operating expenses in
Europe.
The administration and Congress decided on a fourth option to
continuously rotate one armor brigade and establish a pre-positioned
equipment set for a second armor brigade in Europe. This is a good
first step which sends an important signal of American commitment to
deter Russia. But our recent wargames have shown it's not enough to
change combat outcomes or cross a new threshold of deterrence where
NATO could prevent a rapid fait accompli. The cumulative rotational
costs are more expensive than a one-time move, so the rotational
brigade in the second equipment set are currently only being resourced
at 50 percent strength. It's also not feasible for units to draw pre-
positioned equipment in time to defend on only seven to 10 days'
warning. So there would only be 44 U.S. tanks opposite 680 Russian
tanks on seven days' warning. Finally, the continuous turbulence would
degrade military readiness given there are only nine armor brigades to
meet three rotational requirements in Europe, Korea and Kuwait.
At the June 2016 Warsaw summit, the NATO Allies agreed to rotate
three battalions led by Britain, Canada and Germany, essentially
matching the U.S. commitment to rotate a brigade in the region. This
signals Russia that NATO will not be easily divided in the event of
attack, which is an important signal. But policymakers should
understand the realistic capabilities of a battalion which is not
designed to fight alone. The military standard is a one-to-three ratio
of defenders to attackers. The current three battalions of enhanced
forward presence opposite 54 battalions in Russia's Western Military
District is a one-to-18 ratio. That's not enough to defend, let alone
present an offensive provocative threat to Russia.
To put this in perspective, if NATO had applied the same standard
during the Cold War, it would only have needed nine NATO battalions of
enhanced forward presence on the inner German border to deter the 171
Soviet battalions that were in East Germany. Obviously, NATO leaders
rejected that ratio when Germany was at risk. After exhausting all
other politically expedient, but military insufficient concepts of
deterrence, NATO eventually fixed its forward posture to support
forward defense and flexible response. The 2017 NATO summit in
Brussels, therefore, should consider additional posture options to
deter a war that must never be fought.
Still, despite the lingering operational vulnerability and the
uncertain deterrent, NATO has made important progress with first
principles at Warsaw that should be acknowledged. NATO now recognizes
Russia can present a serious challenge which will require serious
leadership on both sides of the Atlantic. NATO has accepted it's not
prudent to rest our collective security on assumptions of Putin's
intentions. And NATO has committed, in principle, to move from
assurance to credible deterrence. The incoming U.S. administration and
Congress should do likewise and lead the Alliance in a dual-track
strategy of seeking greater cooperation with Russia where possible, but
strengthening credible deterrence as necessary.
Thank you.
Mr. Tiersky. I thank you very much for a fascinating presentation
with, I think, very grave implications. I can see why your initial set
of wargames had such impact leading up to the Warsaw summit.
Magnus, we heard that Ukraine was a shockwave in Scandinavia as
well. We heard about the use of Swedish airfields in the wargame. What
of it? Talk to us a little bit about Nordic perspectives on this
problem. Thank you.
Mr. Nordenman. Sure. And, you know, thank you so much for having
me. And thanks to the Commission for putting this together. And thank
you all for coming today.
I'm with the Atlantic Council. And obviously this region and this
set of issues is incredibly important to the Atlantic Council. We've
been watching and engaging with and working on regional issues almost
for the last 10 years really, so sort of before the new ``bad old
days'' happened. So it's an incredibly important region and certainly,
I think, for all the reasons that Karl outlined previously today.
But I would also say one of the reasons why we think this is
important is because it's not only about Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania,
it's actually about us, the United States. I don't think that Putin
wants to rule Estonia again. What Putin wants to do is break NATO and
sow doubt about American leadership in the world. So while the arena
for this demonstration may be in Estonia or Lithuania or Latvia, it
really is intended for us and it really is intended for other allies to
see that the United States may not come to the aid of its allies. So
that's why we feel very strongly about this and we're passionate about
this region, because at the end of the day it's about the United States
and U.S. leadership in the world.
And before I go on, let me just sort of add my shout out to Mike
and the team over at RAND and the work that they've done. I think it's
absolutely fantastic. There's a formal public report out there. I would
definitely pick it up if I were you.
Earlier this year, I spent about two hours in Mike's office with
coffee when we went over this. And professionally, it was the best two
hours of the year. I learned a ton, so it's great work. And it truly
has been very, very influential for the broader policy community
thinking through these issues.
What I wanted to do with my remarks is perhaps sort of broaden the
lens a little bit and talk about the broader region and how the Baltic
States fit in and how it, specifically, relates to security and defense
of the Baltic States. And as some have already remarked, obviously a
lot of the focus both here in Washington and at NATO over the last few
years has been on the Baltic States and what is being done up front.
With the battalions coming out of Warsaw, hybrid warfare,
reinforcement, which is completely understandable, that's where the
most immediate things needed to be done.
But the Baltic States obviously exist in a broader context and
exist in a broader region. And that broader region can also be brought
to bear and brings opportunities and possibilities for the defense and
security of the Baltic States. So that's what I want to spend my time
on during my brief remarks.
To the Baltic States' north you have Finland and across the Baltic
Sea you have Sweden. They are not NATO members. It's an important
distinction to point out they are not covered by NATO's Article V and
collective defense. But they are incredibly close NATO partners and
have been so for quite some time, with deployments in Afghanistan, in
Libya and elsewhere. And obviously now in the new security context,
they're important partners because they live in a region that's of
importance to NATO because of the Baltic States and defense commitments
that NATO has to those allies. So in this region we need to consider,
how do Sweden and Finland fit in and what can they contribute in a
crisis?
Mike has already obviously discussed reinforcement options into the
region, the use of airpower and so on and so forth. And due to sort of
just sheer geography, there are things that Sweden and Finland can
offer in terms of access routes and forward basing for NATO. Certainly
Sweden, which sort of lies across the region, it is certainly nifty, if
you will, if you can use that airspace and use that basing to get close
in order for airpower and naval power to work in the region. And
certainly both countries have signaled an interest to participate in
the response to a crisis in the Baltic Sea region. And both countries
are very much active participants in NATO exercises in the Baltic Sea
region. And indeed, Sweden has actually passed what they call a
``solidarity clause'' in their parliament, which means that they have
actually officially declared they stand ready to lend assistance in
case of a crisis in the region.
But, of course, all these things are easier said than done. Just
because we agree that this would be nifty and that we would like to do
this in a crisis, that is far from enough. And you cannot make this up
the day of the crisis or the evening before or the morning of. This
will obviously require planning and arrangements with Sweden and
Finland and how they figure in in a scenario where NATO is defending
the Baltic States. You may want to pre-position equipment, you may want
to pre-position ammunition and fuel and so on and so forth. And until
that's done, there's very little that American and NATO planners can do
with that potential opportunity for cooperation with Sweden and Finland
as NATO partners. And we are not there yet.
The U.S. very, very recently signed bilateral defense cooperation
agreements--not defense agreements, but defense cooperation agreements
with both Sweden and Finland, which speaks to joint exercises,
capabilities, development and so on and so forth. But so far, that
cooperation does not include hands-on planning--it's sort of, if you
will, quiet conversations about who does what to whom in a crisis
involving the Baltic States. So that is really the next step in order
to make this partnership effective in a defense of the Baltic States
scenario.
But you also need to look at the other side of this coin, because
just as that geography is useful for NATO and useful for a United
States seeking to provide increased defense for the Baltic States or
ratcheting up deterrence at the beginning of a crisis, it is obviously
also geography that is important to Russia, which may leverage that in
ways to stop NATO or make it tougher for a NATO or the United States to
enter the region.
We've all heard about Kaliningrad and the A2/AD, anti-access/area
denial bubble or network that is developing in Kaliningrad. You can
certainly take, say, the Gotland Islands which lie off of Sweden's east
coast. And if you emplace air defense batteries there and combine that
with Kaliningrad, you basically have air defense coverage across all of
the Baltic Sea region. So just as that geography is important to NATO
and the United States, it is, of course, important to Russia as well.
So what does that mean for U.S., NATO, Swedish and Finnish cooperation?
And what kind of scenarios do we need to consider?
Another aspect to all this--and we've done some work in actually
trying to look at the region as a whole, both other NATO countries, but
also the NATO partners, Sweden and Finland, and what's actually there
today. And obviously, Mike did a fantastic job sort of laying out what
the defense of the Baltic States would require in terms of not only
ground power, but aviation and naval assets and so on and so forth. And
certainly a lot of these things will have to come from the United
States and from other major NATO countries, such as a France and the
U.K. and Germany. But when you start counting out the resources and the
assets that are already in the region, it's actually not too shabby.
The region actually has a pretty impressive array of airpower. The
region is actually getting F-35s. Both Norway and Denmark are getting
F-35s, the Finns operate F-18s, the Swedes operate Gripens, and Poland
has a relatively new family of F-16s. And actually, there may be more
F-35s coming into the region as well in the coming decades. And
certainly Germany has a pretty impressive air force as well. So when
you put all this together, actually just in the region itself there's
something like 350 to 400 modern combat aircraft.
Same thing with submarines. The Russians have Kilo submarines, a
handful. But between the countries in the region, there's something
like 12 submarines on the, if you will, the good-guy side. And there's
even some long-range strike capabilities that are coming into the
region. Both Poland and Finland have acquired JASSMs from the U.S. for
long-range strike.
So the trick here, I think, is, how do you make all this work
together? And how do you coordinate this? And how do you ensure at a
regional level, that you don't have sort of too much coverage in some
assets and that you don't leave other gaps open that no one is thinking
about because you're obviously doing national defense investment plans?
I think there's an opportunity there to take regional stock in terms of
capabilities and assets and try to orchestrate them for increased
defense and deterrence in the region. And I think the U.S. certainly
has a role to play here as a bit of a, if you will, orchestrator of
regional capabilities and tying them together with U.S. capabilities.
My point here is not that the region can take care of itself or
should take care of itself. That's not my point. Defending the Baltic
States is very much an all-of-NATO task. And providing that defensive
deterrence is certainly also something that requires U.S. leadership as
the major military power within the Alliance.
However, if you look at not only the wargame that RAND has played,
but also a number of other games that have been played here in town,
one of the recurring issues is that the countries in the region will
basically be the first responders. Right? And that's not so strange.
They live there. The crisis is next door. If you think of the countries
of the region in terms of sort of being the first response to a crisis
with Russia, I think it would make sense to see more regional
coordination and orchestration of capabilities.
But let me say to emphasize so we don't have a misunderstanding,
I'm not saying that the region should defend itself, but I say as a
first response and as a base for the NATO response to rest on. So I
think this really is the time to get to a lot of these issues and talk
about them, not only here in Washington, but also in Brussels and in
the allied capitals.
And I think it's already been mentioned a couple of times, I agree
that the decisions about battalions in the Baltic States and also in
Poland coming out of Warsaw were great decisions and certainly a place
to start working. But obviously, so much more is needed. And this will
require a long-term effort and a long-term strategy.
Mike certainly described some of the things that could be done. But
also I think we need to talk about regional air defense for the Baltic
States and obviously reinforcement arrangements and what's needed, even
down to railroads and hangar space and ramp space, and the little sort
of things that sort of prove to be the devil in the details, but which
become important in all this.
My final point to all of this--I want to pull back perhaps a bit
more and sort of consider the new political environment that we all
find ourselves in with the election--I think this will require a new
focus on NATO as a two-lane road. This truly cannot be sustained, I
think, if this is only about what the U.S. is doing for the Europeans.
I think we also need to have a dialogue about what the Europeans offer
the United States, not only in Europe, but also globally, and all the
different security priorities that the United States is working on.
That is a tough issue for small countries, like the Baltic States,
which, again, are, in terms of spending, they are some of the best in
class and they certainly take their defense and their security very
seriously. But as we all know, they are small states.
But I do think that there are opportunities for countries like
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, to show their support and find niches
where they are relevant and can make meaningful contributions to U.S.
security priorities in other parts of the world.
So with that I'll end.
Mr. Rauland. Thank you, Magnus, for your presentation, and Michael
and Karl, for yours. These are really an excellent basis for us to
begin further discussions on this very important topic.
We'd now like to turn to the question-and-answer portion of our
briefing. And I am going to first selfishly use my position here to
weigh in with the first question. This month marks 25 years since the
fall of the U.S.S.R., and our panelists have done a good job of
pointing out how difficult it still is today dealing with the
consequences of that monumental event. There are a number of things
driving Russian aggressive behavior in the region. One of them
certainly is the sense that NATO expansion to the territory of the
former U.S.S.R.--that is, the Baltics--was a bridge too far.
My question for you is, in addition to the moves the Baltics and
NATO need to make to provide credible deterrence--and you've touched on
a number of them this afternoon--I'd like to ask you to comment on what
needs to be done to address the Russian view that NATO expansion has
gone too far, and to counter the sometimes virulent Russian
disinformation that is often linked to that.
Mr. Johnson. I'll take a first start at that. I think it's
important to understand the Russian perspective on strategy and
security. But you can approach that on the basis that you could get to
mutual defense and mutual deterrence as well.
The rhetoric surrounding the three battalions, which are commanded
by a lieutenant colonel, have a captain for an intelligence officer,
have a mortar platoon with an eight-kilometer range, and are outclassed
by Russian rockets with a 90-kilometer range, a support platoon that
can resupply about 10 kilometers, not the thousand miles back to
Germany, that does not represent an offensive threat to Russia. And the
Russian general staff knows it, despite what they say. So I don't think
we have to let Russia define anything it wants as provocative and
exercise a veto over NATO defense strategy to establish a minimum
defensive deterrent that doesn't present an operational threat to
Russia. And I think we should proceed with that.
Mr. Altau. Just going down the line I'll add onto that--that Russia
knows it, and Russia needs us. Russia needs the West. Russia needs the
European Union for their markets. And all the countries in between. So
by beginning to destroy that relationship, relationships with its
neighbors and any trust or cooperation, Russia only undermines itself,
simple as that.
Mr. Nordenman. I'm in broad agreement with both men. The one thing
I would add, and again, I would agree that it's important to understand
the Russian perspective and where they're coming from. And I think in
the Baltic Sea region it's not rocket science to realize that obviously
the Baltic Sea region is incredibly important to Russia. That's their
outlet for exports to Europe. It's a major outlet for gas supplies. St.
Petersburg is a big harbor. And actually, for the Russian navy, the
Baltic Sea itself is actually an important sort of test and trial space
for their navy. And obviously, all of those are perfectly legitimate
national interests, right? Trade, free passage and so on and so forth.
I think we can all agree that those are for any state, anywhere,
perfectly understandable and legitimate interests.
But on the other hand, I think what they are doing in the region
completely overshoots trying to guard those normal national interests
that you would have in the region. On the one hand, let's tip our hat
to the legitimate national interests that Russia has, along with any
other state, but let's call them out for when they go way beyond
guarding those legitimate national interests.
Mr. Rauland. Thank you. I'd like to turn next to representatives we
have here from the three Baltic embassies. I think it is important
during this session today to hear your views on this and give you a
chance to address the panel.
Then we'll get to the general audience with any questions you have.
Do we have volunteers from any of the three Baltic embassies?
Please, I'll give you the first crack at this. And if all of you as you
come up could tell us who you are and who you represent or who you work
for when you come up and speak. Thank you.
Questioner. Thank you. I'm Marki Tihhonova-Kreek, the Deputy Chief
of Mission from the Embassy of Estonia.
Thank you to all the panelists and the whole Helsinki Commission
for your work done in this area and for that very timely analysis, the
in-depth remarks, and also examples which very well describe the
situation in our region.
A couple of points that I would like to make on the security
environment in Europe, especially on the eastern flank of NATO. First,
I'm very glad that Michael has pointed out the necessity to continue to
make meaningful contributions from Europe. What I would like to point
out is that we do take defense seriously in Estonia and in all the
three Baltic countries. To prove that, next year Estonia will spend 2.2
percent of its GDP on defense. On top of it comes our host nation
support. So I'm confident that we can deliver on what is expected from
us. Likewise, also Latvia and Lithuania have committed themselves to
raise their defense spending.
In addition to defense spending, we have been active contributors
in terms of international military operations. We have been very active
in cybersecurity in global terms. So, again, like Michael has pointed
out, we have to find our niches as contributors. And cybersecurity,
when it comes to Estonia, is definitely one of those niches. So again,
we do take our defense seriously.
At the same time, I think it is very important that when it comes
to defense, burden-sharing is important. We have to match the means to
the ends and align talking to resources. So it's very timely for all of
Europe to face its obligations regarding this defense spending. The
timing is very good to have serious discussions within Europe in this
area.
My second point, Europe has its own discussions going on right now
to shape and strengthen its security environment. At the same time, I
would like to reiterate that a U.S. element in guaranteeing Europe's
security is absolutely vital and is indispensable. Without U.S.
support, the concept of Europe, whole, free and at peace, is shaking.
No matter how much we spend on defense or how often we do exercises, we
do need strong and credible deterrence measures by NATO and also strong
U.S. bilateral support. So we are very, very grateful for U.S. support
through ERI in that respect. NATO Warsaw Summit decisions were very
good, now they need to be implemented. And like it was pointed out by
some of you, we need to continue these discussions also during our next
NATO summit which will hopefully take place soon.
And my third point is that I very much welcome the intensified
cooperation of the EU and NATO on defense matters. This is another
example to prove that there is never too much when it comes to defense
and where we can cooperate. And in that respect, I welcome very much
the NATO foreign ministers' decisions which were made recently on
concrete measures to be taken when it comes to EU and NATO cooperation.
Thank you.
Mr. Rauland. Thank you very much.
Do we have representatives from the other two embassies, please?
Questioner. Well, thank you very much. My name is Ilmars Breidaks,
I am Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy of Latvia. Again, thank you
to the Commission for this meeting. And my Estonian colleague already
spoke on the very important issues where we fully concur, as on defense
and security matters. Our narrative is very similar.
But nevertheless, I will also add some points. We believe that
Latvia and the Baltic States are defensible. We believe in deterrence,
in deterrence which expresses collective and unified action as a
response to the challenges in Europe and in the Baltic region. We are
happy with NATO decisions taken in the Warsaw Summit regarding forward
enhanced presence. And we are thankful to the U.S. for the great
leadership in strengthening defense of our region and in responding to
the challenges which were raised after Russian interference in Ukraine.
We are definitely looking forward to U.S. continuous leadership, as
my Estonian colleague just mentioned, and further implementation of ERI
in the future. I would also like to add here that we are thankful to
those NATO countries, like Canada, which has taken leadership in
building a multinational battalion, a NATO battalion, and leading in
Latvia, which will be operational next year.
Having said that, we are not complacent. We certainly recognize the
challenges. And we ourselves, we keep our vigilance, if I may say so,
on a high level. We do our homework. We will have increased our defense
spending by 30 percent next year. We will reach 2 percent in 2018.
These decisions are supported by all main political parties in Latvia.
And the budget was approved, like, three weeks ago and there were no
discussions about the necessity to strengthen defense and to contribute
more to, first of all, our defense, but also to contribute to the
stability of Europe and transatlantic relations, which we will do
through our continuous support of NATO and also U.S.-led operations in
countries like Afghanistan. And we will contribute further also in Iraq
and other operations.
Having said that, once again, thank you very much to the
Commission, I am looking forward to a discussion.
And if I may, just one comment about a very good point which you
raised about the role of disinformation which we have witnessed for the
at least last two, three years in earnest. I think it's fair to say
that it is important to recognize that we are challenged with concerted
steps by one country to undermine some of the things, but the most
important, I think, are values which we believe in. And to undermine
that, these concerted steps, we feel that we should first recognize it
for what it is. These are actions to hurt us. And in this regard, we
should make collective, unified efforts to counter that.
Thank you.
Mr. Rauland. Thank you very much. And finally, a representative
from the Embassy of Lithuania.
Questioner. Hello. I'm Evelina Petrone, I'm the Political Officer
from the Embassy of Lithuania. We have a delegation of parliamentarians
who came here with the same goal to speak about our security and
defense, so my ambassador and DCM are with the delegation.
Thank you very much for this session. I think it's very, very
important. And having it at the Helsinki Commission, it's a very timely
discussion. I agree with my colleagues from the Estonian and Latvian
embassies and what they said.
Just brief points. Lithuania is taking its commitments very
seriously. We are trying to increase our defense spending commitment to
2 percent. We had it at 0.79 [percent] two years ago, which is very
low. We know that. We're increasing it fast. We came back to the
obligatory conscription. We have obligatory conscription which we do
not need because we have enough volunteers. People take this problem
very seriously, as you can see.
And we are grateful to the United States and NATO for commitments,
but as it was rightly pointed out it's about NATO's will. And I think
we all understand here that it's not some theoretical or hypothetical
threat. It's a real one. So, having said that, I think we can agree now
we have to do something about that, not just to talk about it. So
hopefully we'll come up with some ideas and some actions.
We had our parliamentary elections. We have a new government in
place. All parties, minority and majority, understand that it's a real
threat. And we have an agreement of all parties to continue doing
something very well with that.
Having said that, another thing is the unity which was already
mentioned, that Putin most probably doesn't want to rule Estonia,
Latvia or Lithuania, but he wants to have this hot spot or he wants to
break the unity and to challenge democracy, which he is already doing
unfortunately. So this is the challenge we have to face and to do
something with that.
Thank you.
Mr. Rauland. Thank you. We appreciate the time that all three of
you took to be here with us today and to share your views on this
important topic.
And now the floor is completely wide open to anybody who would like
to ask a question of our panel here. Again, if you can raise your hand
I'll recognize you.
Please.
Questioner. Hi, my name is Kathleen Weinberger. I'm with the
Institute for the Study of War. Thank you all so much for speaking with
us today.
My question is about the naval aspect of Baltic security. Most
recommendations that I've seen have focused on ground forces and
combating Russian air defenses. But Russia has very overtly started
boosting its own naval capability in the Baltic Sea region. They have
two new Corvettes armed with Kalibr cruise missiles. They completely
overhauled the officer leadership of the fleet. And in addition, they
recently deployed anti-ship Bastion systems into Kaliningrad.
And so my question is a two-part question. A, how important is it
for NATO and NATO partners to counter this with our own naval
capabilities? And then, B, what would that response look like? Thank
you.
Mr. Nordenman. So I'll jump on this one first. I think your
observations are correct, but I also think it's important to sort of
put it in a broader, if you will, sort of Russian naval context. Russia
has four major fleets, the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea and the Pacific.
Of those, the one that is sort of, if you will, the power projection
fleet and the nuclear deterrence fleet, that is the Northern fleet up
in the high north with access to the Atlantic.
In comparison, the Baltic Sea fleet is not going anywhere. It's
intended for the Baltic Sea and, in that sense, forms part of Russia's
anti-access/area denial system or network, if you will. It's there to
make it harder for other people to operate in the Baltic Sea region.
And obviously in this context, it's about frustrating reinforcements.
It's about holding reinforcements and NATO naval capabilities at risk.
In comparison, it is still one of the fleets in Russia that gets
the least amount of resources. Again, most of it goes into the Northern
fleet, but certainly they have gotten some new capabilities, and,
again, frigates with Kalibr missiles and so forth. But just to put it
in comparison to other things that the Russians are doing with their
naval capabilities.
In my mind, the counter is submarines actually. The Baltic Sea is
actually very small. And with long-range systems today, I actually
think, in a war situation, the Baltic Sea would be a dead sea, nothing
would be sailing on the surface because you can hit it from the sea and
submarines can get you, too. So the counter, in my mind, is submarines
on the NATO side. Where, again, as I said, there actually are some
capabilities there. The Germans have a pretty good submarine force. The
Swedes have a good submarine force. And the Poles are looking at
recapitalizing their force as well, so the subsurface environment.
And this is one area where the U.S. actually has less to offer.
Obviously, the U.S. operates big nuclear attack submarines. And the
Baltic Sea is actually too small and shallow for them to effectively
operate in there. So this is one area where actually the European
contributions may be more important than the American ones.
A final point on all this, mines and countermines, again, in terms
of anti-access and area denial is the use of Russian mines to frustrate
reinforcements, so, therefore, the ability to quickly clear mines to
keep the sea lanes open. And on that note, this is one niche, by the
way, where the Baltic States have cut a pretty impressive figure as
something that they contribute. They all have done a lot of hard work
on building up capabilities for mine clearing and UXO clearing in the
Baltic.
Mr. Johnson. All right, good question. We did have players from the
Navy staff and from U.S. Navy Europe in some of our games as well as
allies in Europe. We've conducted several games over there with the
naval dimension. I would agree with Magnus that you have a condition
of, you know, both sides can deny access to the large surface vessels
in the Baltic Sea. Some of the additional things beyond what Magnus
mentioned that I think would be helpful is the Navy, too, has SEAD--
suppression of enemy air defense--capabilities;they need to work on a
long-range anti-radiation missile to be able to neutralize the SA-21s
that have between a 250, 400-kilometer range.
There's also long-range anti-ship missiles to get the maritime.
They have Corvettes where they could try to put SAMs on top of that.
It's not exactly clear if it will work well or not. But if it does,
that could interdict the maritime air avenue approach coming out of
Sweden, which would be a significant problem for the close-air support
and interdiction for ground forces.
Along with that, this is something else where allies could help us,
to be able to deny Russia the ability to seize islands and emplace SA-
21 capabilities on those islands. That would be important, although
that's one of a number of things that need to happen. We'd have to be
able to target Russian long-range anti-ship missiles as well, and then
the countermine capability that Magnus mentioned.
Mr. Rauland. Thank you. Alex, over to you for a question.
Mr. Tiersky. Thanks. I'm going to throw a quick raft for maybe a
few quick hits from our panelists, if that would be OK.
To Mike, I'd like to get you in this forum publicly to respond to
the question of Russian intent. The question floats out there: Why
would Russia invade the Baltics when all they would have to do is
undermine them through measures short of war? And to what extent would
the additional military deployments that you recommend be responsive to
threats short of an all-out invasion?
To Karl, or any on the panel really who might like to respond, I'd
like to hear a little bit more about domestic efforts by the Baltics in
terms of their national resilience. I understand we've heard the point
repeatedly about increased defense spending. That point is well
registered. But what about improvements to infrastructure? We've heard
infrastructure is extraordinarily important in these scenarios.
And to Magnus--again, please, just quick hits--to Magnus, you
talked specifically about Sweden, and I'd like your thoughts on the
extent to which Russian rhetoric can impact the political will of those
states, in particular to play the significant roles that the Baltic
States would like to see them play in a contingency. Put differently,
do they fear becoming targets?
Thank you.
Mr. Johnson. That's a great question. And there's certainly a
healthy debate in the community about that. There are two basic
approaches to defense planning. One is to try to make predictions of
adversary intentions and to build a force specifically tailored to
counter that. And the other, which we recommend, is where you have a
vital region with U.S. vital interests, where there's an adversary
pursuing a strategy that runs contrary to our objectives and we have
the capability to inflict a high consequence event, that's enough for a
plausible standard for prudent defense planning that exists in other
theaters, you know, with respect to China, with respect to North Korea
and Iran. There's no reason not to apply that same prudent standard for
defense planning to the Baltics, especially when our predictions went
wrong.
There's still a wide range of op-eds, I think, trying to explain
Putin's behavior, running from he has Asperger's to he's a strategic
genius, so I think our ability to stay ahead of him and his next move
is we ought to approach that with a degree of humility, especially
when, again, it's a high-consequence event. I can't think of a scenario
that's more likely or with more potential to involve the United States
in a nuclear war, in the second nuclear age, than a miscalculation out
of NATO security in the Baltic States. So it is serious for us, not
just the Baltic States.
But in terms of Russian motives in the Baltics, I'll answer the
question directly, even though I'm skeptical of being able to ascribe
intentions. There's just the ability to militarily and strategically
restore a buffer zone, and to roll back NATO influence from their
borders. Their recent defense strategy has articulated NATO
infrastructure on their borders as a threat to Russian national
security, so that's articulated. There could also be domestic reasons
as a diversion from potential unrest.
Mr. Altau. On the second point about the domestic efforts in the
Baltics, certainly the representatives from the Baltic embassies could
address those very thoroughly here today. But let's say very briefly,
the Lithuanian representative did mention conscription on Lithuania,
that that has been a recent change in that country to address this
situation. Estonia has had conscription for a long time. So the work of
the National Guard, let's say, also has seen an increase in
volunteerism, we heard. There were more people volunteering to go out
and train and to take that responsibility. So that's been definitely a
big thing.
I really can't talk too much about the domestic military efforts in
too much detail. But Magnus did talk about the niche capabilities. And
again, I reiterate that in the Baltics each country has done something
to address a particular situation, but an overall issue that is very
important to NATO as well and to the United States. So Estonia, when it
was cyberattacked by Russia, at that time was developing a NATO Cyber
Center of Excellence which has now been operational for quite a while,
for almost 10 years, I think. The Lithuanians, as you may remember, a
few years ago opened an offshore LNG, a floating terminal, so they've
been very keen on energy security aspects. So they have a NATO Center
of Excellence for energy security. And just like the Latvians, who
suffer also, as do all three of the Baltic countries, from repeated
disinformation attacks, sustained propaganda campaigns, subtle and not
so subtle, so the Latvians have set up a NATO Strategic Center for
Strategic Communications to address all these threats.
Mr. Nordenman. I'll be very quick. On the first question, I think
both the Swedes and the Finns are convinced that a crisis over the
Baltic States would directly impact them and that there's no way of
getting around that and would very, very likely involve them one way or
another. But obviously, the particular route or trajectory of a crisis
is, of course, hard to predict.
On your second question, and again, now we're completely
speculating here, but I don't have a hard time imagining that in a
crisis over the Baltic States where Russia certainly would go to a
Helsinki and a Stockholm with a very sharp message of, ``do yourself
and everyone else a favor and stay out of this, the big boys are
playing,'' so obviously both Stockholm and Helsinki would, in a crisis,
face very, very difficult questions and very, very difficult choices.
And I don't think they're difficult because they're Stockholm and
Helsinki. I think they're difficult because we're talking about two
relatively small countries who will have to deal with an aggressive and
assertive major power.
Mr. Rauland. Thank you. We have time for a few more questions, if
any of you still have things on your mind you'd like to address to the
panel, please.
Questioner. Good afternoon. My name is Pirak Cusick [ph]. I'm a
graduate student focusing on European security. And as a proud
Estonian, I will thank the U.S. continuous commitment in the region.
We haven't talked much about diplomatic relations. General
Breedlove just months ago said that we need a constructive discussion
with Russia. And thus I would ask, do you see that happening anytime
soon? If yes, what would be the potential talking points and what role
will the Baltics and also Sweden and Finland play in these discussions?
Thank you.
Mr. Nordenman. Sure. I guess I can start. This will likely be an
unsatisfying answer, if you will. When you're talking about sort of
diplomatic dialogue, I certainly think there is certainly room to do
some things to lower tensions and make sure that mistakes are avoided.
So in terms of behavior in the airspace, behavior in the maritime space
and so on and so forth and your hot lines and so on, and we certainly
did that during the Cold War and we certainly have developed that with
the Chinese today. And that is obviously a way to avoid incidents
escalating into war.
More broadly speaking, I don't think this is a good time to reset
the relationship or make arrangements. I'm pretty sure I know what
Putin wants out of us, but actually I'm not very sure that he has much
to offer us on the other end. So I have a hard time seeing a major
dialogue, but certainly opportunities in order to avoid
misunderstandings, to avoid confrontation and to avoid accidents. And
that's certainly a very, very needed and urgent conversation to have
with the Russians.
Mr. Johnson. It's a good question. Like Magnus, I think we should
keep the lines of communication open. The dialogue is important, not
only for regional security in Europe, but on the range of political
challenges that we both face. There may be potential for cooperation in
other regions.
I think, though, that the Russians approach it from more of a
transactional perspective rather than a firm belief and support for a
liberal democratic international order. And so the question would be,
what's the quid pro quo to get that cooperation versus ISIS or other
challenges that are out there? I personally don't think that the West,
that NATO should trade credible deterrence of NATO Allies in hopes of
gaining cooperation elsewhere. That strikes me as a rather bad deal to
ratify aggression and leave allies vulnerable so that we can help
Russia fight its enemies in Syria and occupy its position there. I
don't see how that's a good trade for the U.S. or for NATO or the
international order.
Mr. Rauland. Any other questions?
Questioner. Hello. And thanks to the Helsinki Commission for
convening this timely meeting. My name is Petyo Varbanov from the
Embassy of Bulgaria. I'm a political officer at the embassy.
I would like to expand a little bit more on the previous question
vis-a-vis the U.S. policy toward Russia and the new incoming Trump
Administration. The current Congress was quite critical, especially
from the Republican Party, of President Obama, and there were
accusations that the Obama administration was too soft, et cetera, et
cetera.
So I was wondering, now the Republican Party controls both houses,
the House and the Senate, and there is a Republican President soon in
the White House, I was wondering what role Congress might have in
shaping the foreign and security policy of the Trump Administration?
And how do you square this with the indications for eventual
rapprochement with Russia?
Mr. Johnson. I'll take it first. I'm reluctant to engage in
military and strategic speculation, and that's actually my field; I'm
even less inclined to engage in political speculation about what the
new administration will do. I would just say that Congress as a coequal
branch of government has responsibility for foreign policy and defense
planning as well.
Mr. Altau. Well, I don't know whether to give the long answer or
the short answer. But this is the short one, because we could talk all
day about this, the role of Congress. And I think that Congress does
have an extremely important role as the new administration is coming
in. I think that as whether a counterbalance to a Republican
administration or with working across the aisle to balance legislation
and policies, I can imagine that being of serious consideration next
year, for the next couple of years.
And as some people look ahead to the next elections already and the
mid-term elections and what the effects will be of what will come up in
the meantime, and then also you have to keep in mind elections
elsewhere across Europe and France, for instance, in the spring, and
how the U.S. Congress will respond to those. The relations that
Congress has with the countries of Europe, the transatlantic
relationship is very, very important.
I know that for the Baltic-American communities, we work with a
broader group of members in the House Baltic Caucus. And there's a
Senate caucus as well. And there are people in Congress, and not just
in the caucuses, but in the committees who are, I think, very pragmatic
and very realistic about their approaches in dealing with Russia. So
we've already seen that by the indications that, for instance, Senator
McCain will be holding hearings on Russia early next year, Senator
Graham, of course, and a number of members in the House as well, so
there's opportunity, certainly.
Mr. Rauland. I think we have time for at least one more question.
Are there any other questions out there? Please.
Questioner. Hi. I'm Beni Kovacs. I'm an intern here at the U.S.
Helsinki Commission.
I have a question about what was said earlier about how U.S.-
Baltic relations should be mutually reinforcing. My question is, number
one, how can the Baltic States facilitate U.S. support, rotational
forces in the region in terms of infrastructure, rules of engagement or
strategy?
And additionally, Mr. Nordenman mentioned these niche areas where
the Baltic States can be contributing to U.S. and global security. What
are these areas and how do you think the Baltic States can move forward
in this respect?
Thanks.
Mr. Johnson. That's a great question. I'd like to just begin by
acknowledging the Baltic commitment to our collective security, the
increasing commitment as well. I served with Baltic forces in
Afghanistan and Iraq. They fought without caveats. And one told me,
``We will fight and die with you here in Afghanistan so that you will
help defend us should the need arise.''
But I think it's still important to keep this in perspective. They
have the combined population of, I think, Maryland, the combined GDP of
New Mexico. It's not realistic to expect that the Baltic States
themselves will provide NATO's land army in a major conflict with
Russia. That would just exceed any realistic capabilities. Even if they
match Russia at 4 percent defense spending per GDP, collectively that's
still only $8 billion which is not enough to buy three armor brigades,
OK? So we have to be realistic.
That being said, there's a lot of things that they could do and are
doing in terms of making their countries more resilient, more difficult
to occupy, things to slow down the Russian advance, be able to extend
Russian security requirements. And you could implement and integrate
that within a more comprehensive NATO general defense plan in which
that would provide some valuable operational contributions.
Mr. Nordenman. I'll just make one quick point about niche
capabilities. I think actually all of the countries in the Baltic
region have sort of clear niche areas where they've cut a figure and
are recognized experts. Certainly cyber in Estonia has already been
mentioned. Also clearing of sea mines. Another one actually, fun
factoid for today, Lithuania has the largest special operations
community as a proportion of the overall force of any NATO country. So
that has become a niche for Lithuania. And obviously that is a tough
skillset to build and maintain. And obviously, cyber is globally
applicable, special forces, you know, globally applicable; mine-
clearing is certainly something that we would like to do potentially in
the Gulf and other places. So those are niches that can play beyond the
region.
I'll just end with sort of an anecdote when it comes to our
commitment to defense. We had a visiting fellow from the Marine Corps
last year who really got into Baltic issues. And he went to the region
and he wrote on defensibility of the Baltic States and deterrence and
reinforcement. And he sort of ate and lived Baltic defense.
And at one point, at the water cooler, I said, ``John, you're a
Marine Corps officer, you've served around the world, you've been to
the Middle East a bunch of different tours and you've trained Afghan
security forces and Iraqi security forces. So of all the different
things that you could be doing, why did you get so excited and why are
you so passionate about the Baltic States and Baltic defense?'' And he
came back and he said, ``Because these people give a damn!'' and that's
why he thought this was exciting and that's why he wanted to work on
it, because he thought that these were allies and partners that gave a
damn about their own security and their own defense.
Mr. Rauland. That's a very good note to end on.
Well, let me thank all of you--the audience for your interest, for
attending, for some very good questions today, and our panel for some
excellent presentations and good answers to all the questions that were
offered up.
Most of you may know this, but for anybody who doesn't, the
Helsinki Commission always posts unofficial transcripts of these
sessions. Those will be at our website hopefully by tomorrow. And in
case you don't know what the website is, it's www.csce.gov; CSCE stands
for the formal name of the Helsinki Commission, the Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe.
So thank you once again and have a great evening.
[Whereupon, at 3:37 p.m., the briefing ended.]
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statement of Karl Altau
My name is Karl Altau, and I'm the Managing Director of the Joint
Baltic American National Committee, Inc., known also by our acronym
JBANC. JBANC represents the primary Baltic-American National
organizations--the American Latvian Association, the Estonian American
National Council, and the Lithuanian American Council. We were founded
in 1961 and are celebrating our 55th anniversary this year.
We represent one million Baltic-Americans and have worked closely
with Congress, the Administration and its agencies in that half century
to enhance United States policy towards Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
I'd like to thank the Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe [Helsinki Commission] for hosting this very important and timely
briefing focusing on Security and the Baltic countries. We've worked
very closely with the Commission on supporting the passage of the
Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act and the Magnitsky legislation. We
are also supporting our Ukrainian friends in their time of need.
Today, however, we need to get back to our Baltic roots, and talk
about the new reality of deterring Russian aggression and dealing with
the increasing provocations of Moscow. There haven't really been any
Baltic-focused public briefings or hearings for a long time, mainly
because the region has been a positive model and success story. Today's
briefing coincides with a coordinated visit of Baltic parliamentarians
to Washington, and to Congress. I'd like to acknowledge some of my
Baltic-American colleagues and Baltic embassy representatives who are
here today, along with board members of the Baltic American Freedom
Foundation, an organization doing great work in providing practical
work experience in the United States for young professionals from
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
The Baltics have been doing their job--particularly as NATO Allies
since their admission to NATO in 2004. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
have been eager and active partners in NATO and with the United States.
We see these positive relationships mirrored here in the United States
daily.
In the past, we fought for decades to help raise awareness about
the Baltic countries and their plight behind the Iron Curtain and to
help see the countries of our heritage restore independence. It can't
be repeated enough--one of the key elements for the duration of that
time was the Welles Declaration, the U.S. policy to not recognize the
Soviet annexation of the Baltic countries. It was a principled and
morally correct policy that stood for 50 years.
The Baltic-American communities worked very hard to support the
aspirations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to become NATO members.
One of the high points was collecting over 25,000 signatures from all
50 states, plus Washington, DC and Puerto Rico, in a yearlong campaign
to ask the President to help ensure that the Baltics are invited to
join NATO at the 2002 Prague Summit. Baltic-American representatives
across the country came to the White House on September 10, 2001, to
deliver those petitions. The results of seeing Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania join the Alliance was something we all took great pride and
joy in. We are grateful that they have punched above their weight, and
that they remain strong adherents of Alliance principles. Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania are active and capable contributors to our joint
defense and defenders of Western standards and democracy.
We've all heard the phrase that ``freedom is not free.'' It is
something to constantly improve upon, with many tweaks along the way.
We don't want to see those freedoms, Western values, and the framework
of the relationship with NATO jeopardized. However, with Russia's
revanchist aggression, we are now experiencing the most difficult
challenges we have faced in the 25 years of restored independence.
There have been difficult times before with Russia's offensive
actions--from energy cutoffs in Lithuania, the 2007 cyberattacks
against Estonia, continuing disinformation campaigns targeting Latvia.
Russia's war against Georgia in 2008 was more than an omen. The
Kremlin's calculations, it appeared, led down a rocky road which
eventually manifested again with the events in Ukraine. Soon, there
will be three years of war there--with daily bloodshed and no end in
sight. Crimea is occupied, and the info wars have ramped up to new
heights. Have we done everything to counter this aggression?
Has NATO met the challenges? While we saw some issues incrementally
addressed at previous Summits in Chicago in 2012 and Wales in 2014, the
response from this summer's Warsaw Summit was certainly a more serious
adjustment of priorities. There, NATO stated it was fully prepared to
defend the alliance and pledged an increase in military spending in
response to Russia's unpredictable and aggressive behavior in the
region.
I'm sure the other two panelists will give a closer look at the
details and how these moves fit.
So, what can WE do? First, we must ensure that U.S. defense funding
needs are met. Second is to ensure the transition to a Trump
Administration that fully understands and supports these goals. Third
is to continue to recognize Russia's threats as a whole and to support
U.S. efforts to address these threats.
(1) JBANC has been urging swift passage of the $3.4 billion European
Reassurance Initiative in the Defense bill, and we're happy to see
additional funding being provided for Overseas contingencies. ERI has
been a response to increasing Russian aggression and supports increased
U.S. investment in five areas: 1) presence, 2) training and exercises,
3) infrastructure, 4) prepositioned equipment, and 5) building partner
capacity.
We aren't excited about the prospect of a Continuing Resolution
lasting well into spring--we'd prefer longer term planning and
commitment--but we do see ample evidence that there is overwhelming
support in Congress for addressing Russia's rising militarism. It is
imperative to send the message that the United States means business
and that we will continue to stand against tyranny. While our NATO
Allies Britain, Canada, and Germany are establishing high readiness
combat battalions in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, respectively, it
is vital to continue showing the U.S. flag in the Baltic countries as
well, with ongoing increased forward presence regular rotational
deployments, operations, exercises, and more. We can't forget the key
National Guard relationships. Nor the important Nordic relationships.
(2) As we reach out to the new Trump Administration, we are reminded
about statements made which question the purpose and existence of NATO,
and the commitment of its members. JBANC stands firm in its belief that
NATO and America's commitment to its NATO Allies is fundamental to
ensuring U.S. and European security, and urges the next Administration
to continue to support all NATO Allies, including the Baltic countries,
and reaffirm commitment to the Treaty's Article V.
The Baltic countries are undeniably strong in their commitments to
NATO and fully understand what is at stake. Although challenged in
fully rebuilding their militaries over the past 25 years, they have
worked to fulfill their NATO obligations. Estonia spends over 2% of GDP
of pledged defensive expenditures, and while currently just under 2%,
Latvia and Lithuania have been increasing their military budgets more
rapidly than any of the other NATO members over the past few years, and
will be reaching that threshold soon. There has been rock-solid
commitment and engagement by the Baltic countries in supporting NATO
and U.S.-led actions.
The Alliance faces increasing unconventional threats. It is
imperative for allies to share their collective knowledge in key
security areas--whether cyber, strategic communication, or in the
energy security sphere. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania make substantial
contributions in all of these areas.
The United States cannot allow any weakening of resolve or
commitment to our allies. The ironclad long-lasting leadership of the
United States in NATO is critically important. Baltic-Americans
particularly understand the importance of effective U.S. leadership in
supporting these alliances.
Together with our partners, the Central and East European
Coalition, we represent not just three, but 13 communities in the U.S.
and more than 20 million Central and Eastern European Americans.
Together, we strongly back the United States' continued unconditional
commitment to upholding the NATO Treaty as well as U.S. support for the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of all Central and Eastern
European nations. The organization stands firm in its belief that
America's close cooperation with all NATO Allies and partners is
fundamental to ensuring U.S. and European security.
We are reminded of the words of then-NATO Supreme Allied Commander
Gen. Philip Breedlove, who stated at a hearing of the U.S. House Armed
Services Committee in February this year that ``Russia has chosen to be
an adversary and poses a long-term existential threat to the United
States and to our European allies and partners.'' Earlier this year the
CEEC sponsored a policy forum on NATO's stance on Russia on Capitol
Hill. A major theme of the discussion characterized Russia's increasing
aggression since 2008 not only in terms of fanning regional conflicts
but as a fundamental assault on the post-World War II international
order.
(3) Russia's ongoing wars are of the greatest concern. I personally
feel that the Putin and Assad regimes should be investigated for war
crimes in their bombing campaigns in Syria. However, Moscow's crimes
against Ukraine are also horrible and must not be ignored. Having
Russian missiles deployed to Kaliningrad within striking distance of
capitals in Poland, Germany, the Baltics, and Belarus is very worrying.
Russia's actions have the potential to escalate to a wider European
conflict. Our efforts to deter such threats now are critical. In
addition, Russia's unrelenting disinformation campaign and other hybrid
threats of destabilization put all of our allies at great peril.
While the legislation to support military funding is finalized, we
must also remember to support efforts to stymie Russian disinformation,
to support sanctions against the Putin regime to uphold human rights
through the Global Magnitsky Act, and to support Ukraine, particularly
now via H.R. 5094, the Stability and Democracy (STAND) for Ukraine Act.
This helps push for sanctions against Russia and supports Ukraine's
territorial integrity, particularly the nonrecognition of Crimea's
annexation.
We look forward to working with all of you in the coming year to
ensure the continued security, stability, and well-being of the Baltic
countries as NATO Allies and partners. Thank you for the opportunity to
speak here today.
[all]
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