

[H.A.S.C. No. 115-7]

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR  
GENERAL REPORT “INVESTIGATION ON  
ALLEGATIONS RELATING TO USCENCOM  
INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS”**

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT  
AND INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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HEARING HELD  
FEBRUARY 28, 2017



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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

24-679

WASHINGTON : 2017

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[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]	



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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS,  
*Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 28, 2017.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:32 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vicky Hartzler (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VICKY HARTZLER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS**

Mrs. HARTZLER. Welcome. Good afternoon. I am delighted to convene the first Oversight Investigation Subcommittee hearing for the 115th Congress.

Before I turn to the topic of today’s hearing and introduce our witnesses, I want to welcome our new ranking member and the others who are joining the subcommittee for the first time, who will be coming shortly, we are sure.

In recent years, this subcommittee has been engaged in a wide variety of important national security topics. I am eager to work with all of you to ensure we continue to exercise our constitutional responsibilities to help to oversee the Department of Defense [DOD].

I am happy to have Mr. Moulton as the subcommittee’s ranking member, and I look forward to his important contributions to our work.

I am also pleased that we are joined this year by Mr. Gaetz, Mr. Banks, Ms. Cheney, Mr. O’Halloran, and Mr. Suozzi. They are new to this committee. And our returning members are Mr. Conaway and Mr. Scott. So I look forward to their keen insights.

Now, for today’s hearing, we are also joined by or probably will be joined by one or more committee members who are not members of the subcommittee. And for any members of the full committee who are not permanent members of the subcommittee who are or will be attending, I ask unanimous consent that they be permitted to participate in this hearing with the understanding that all sitting subcommittee members will be recognized for questions prior to those not assigned to this subcommittee.

Without objection, so ordered.

Today’s hearing topic is especially timely. Three weeks ago, the Department of Defense Inspector General [IG] released a report about allegations that leadership within U.S. Central Command

[CENTCOM] improperly manipulated intelligence products that led to an inaccurate understanding of the U.S. campaign against ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria].

As a consequence, 30 professionals in the Inspector General's Office undertook an inquiry into this matter. They conducted 152 interviews at CENTCOM and reviewed thousands of pages of materials over the course of many months. Although the report did not find systemic or intentional distortion of intelligence or evidence of misconduct, the IG did conclude that CENTCOM intelligence products could have and should have been better.

The report also found a very challenging command climate at CENTCOM and identified several process and procedural issues which the IG believed impeded the intelligence analysis process. The inspector general proffered 29 specific recommendations for improvements and discussed the need to implement corrective action.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and learning about the changes that have been made in response to the report and the progress we can expect. I look forward to discussing these issues with the two panels today.

Before I introduce our first witness, I turn to the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee ranking member for any opening remarks that he would like to make.

[The prepared statement of Mrs. Hartzler can be found in the Appendix on page 21.]

**STATEMENT OF HON. SETH MOULTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS**

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Chairwoman Hartzler. It is an honor to be here, and I very much look forward to our work together. So thank you so much for welcoming me.

And I would like to just take a quick moment to also recognize a couple new Democratic members on the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee: Tom O'Halleran of Arizona and Tom Suozzi of New York. So we are bringing you two Toms in addition to myself.

I came to Washington promising to work across the aisle and to make sure that we in Congress never flinch when it comes to asking the difficult questions about what it takes to ensure our national security. I believe we will do an excellent job working together in that spirit and in the bipartisan tradition of this committee.

In the United States, our policymakers and service members rely on intelligence analysis to make critical strategic, operational, and tactical decisions every day, some life or death. So it is imperative that we have adequate safeguards in place to ensure they receive objective, empirically based reporting on which is ground truth.

For that reason, when allegations arose last year about manipulation of intelligence at United States Central Command, Congress encouraged the DOD Inspector General to conduct a thorough investigation and report back with recommendations. The inspector general conducted an exhaustive investigation involving 152 interviews of 120 witnesses, reviews of millions of emails, 425,000 documents, and 140 finished intelligence products.

In its final report, they did not find evidence that intelligence was falsified or intentionally distorted or that intelligence processes resulted in false narrative or systemic distortion; however, the IG did find evidence of issues that are concerning to the committee, including some that the chairwoman already mentioned.

These include a poor command climate, low morale, and ineffective communication and guidance that produced a perception among analysts that the integrity of the process was questionable. These findings demonstrate how it is paramount that we ensure the climate at CENTCOM is improved and that better safeguards are in place.

I believe these are exactly the types of issues that require serious scrutiny from the Oversight Committee, and I would like to thank the chairwoman again for her leadership and her interest in delving into this important topic today.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Moulton can be found in the Appendix on page 23.]

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Moulton. Appreciate your comments.

So I am pleased to recognize the witness on our first panel, the Honorable Glenn Fine, Acting Inspector General for the Department of Defense. So thank you for being here today and we welcome your opening statement.

**STATEMENT OF HON. GLENN A. FINE, ACTING INSPECTOR  
GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

Mr. FINE. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Moulton, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to discuss the investigation by the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General into allegations that senior officials at CENTCOM falsified, distorted, delayed, or suppressed intelligence products related to its efforts to degrade and destroy ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant].

These were very serious and troubling allegations, and we devoted significant resources to investigating them. We assembled a multidisciplinary team of more than 30 DOD OIG employees to handle the investigation. Our team did conduct over 150 interviews of 120 witnesses, both inside and outside of CENTCOM.

We examined in detail the specific intelligence products that were raised by the complainants and witnesses. In addition, we collected and reviewed a massive amount of draft and final intelligence products and emails produced by CENTCOM. We also interviewed intelligence officials in the DOD and the intelligence community for their assessments of CENTCOM's intelligence products.

We did not stop there. We conducted an analytical review of a random sample of 140 CENTCOM intelligence products to determine whether there were significant changes related to the edits of these products and whether such changes indicated any trend or pattern of distortion with regard to the portrayal of ISIS and the Iraqi Security Forces as stronger or weaker. We also interviewed witnesses about the command climate in CENTCOM's intelligence directorate, and we reviewed command climate surveys.

Finally, we examined in detail the management processes for producing intelligence products in CENTCOM to determine if there were deficiencies or weaknesses in need of improvement.

Our full findings and conclusions are contained in a 542-page classified report of investigation, which we have provided to this and other congressional committees. In addition, we prepared a 190-page unclassified report of investigation, which we publicly released.

In short, our investigation did not substantiate the most serious allegation that intelligence was falsified. Similarly, we did not find systematic or intentional distortion of intelligence by CENTCOM's senior leaders or that the leaders suppressed or delayed intelligence products.

However, we did find a troubling and widespread perception among many intelligence analysts that their leaders were attempting to distort the intelligence products. We also identified specific weaknesses and flaws in the CENTCOM management processes for creating intelligence products.

We believe these deficiencies, such as ineffective communication and guidance, lack of adequate feedback, uncertainty about various policies, and the ambiguous status of DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] analysts assigned to CENTCOM hindered the effectiveness and efficiency of CENTCOM intelligence processes and it affected the morale of the analytical workforce.

We concluded that these practices related to intelligence products in CENTCOM could have and should have been better and that further improvements can be made. We therefore made 29 recommendations that relate to the issues we investigated.

Some of the most important recommendations were that CENTCOM should improve feedback, communication, and guidance between its leaders and the intelligence workforce. CENTCOM should update and maintain its standard operating procedures related to intelligence production.

The relationship, reporting responsibilities, and intelligence requirements that apply to DIA analysts should be detailed and clarified in writing, and CENTCOM leaders should require that intelligence products consider analysis of alternatives.

We also recommended that senior leaders in the responsible organizations review the report with regard to the overall performance of the individuals described. We believe that all 29 recommendations are important and that they provide a useful roadmap for improving intelligence processes, not only in CENTCOM but throughout other combatant commands in the DOD.

We also note that many of our recommendations are consistent with what the House of Representatives task force recommended. We therefore urge the DOD, DIA, and CENTCOM to take these recommendations seriously and to fully implement corrective action in response to the recommendations or to explain in detail why such corrective action is not necessary or warranted.

We believe that such actions can further improve intelligence processes and reduce the risk that allegations such as the ones at issue in this report will arise in the future.



Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our investigation with the subcommittee. That concludes my statements, and I would be glad to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fine can be found in the Appendix on page 25.]

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Fine. I appreciate your very good work.

This is the unclassified version, and then with another 500-page classified, you really have put a lot of effort into this. And there is a lot of things in here that we can learn from, and I guess that is my first question, because I have seen in other instances of the excellent work that is done by the DOD IG or the SIGAR [Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction] offices, but the story seems to never continue after the report is issued.

So can you please tell me your responsibilities after you released your report, and is there anyone that ensures your recommendations are implemented?

Mr. FINE. Yes. We typically take follow-up action to inquire from the responsible organizations what they intend to do with regard to our recommendations. We want specific details about whether they agree or disagree and whether they concur with the recommendations or whether they intend to implement other things to address the intent of the recommendations.

We then follow up with them. We ask them for documents and verification that they have actually implemented those recommendations, and in many cases, we often go back and test to verify that they have actually done that. These are important recommendations. We intend to do that. We intend to follow up with them and we intend to ensure that they take corrective action or explain why they don't intend to.

Mrs. HARTZLER. So is the follow-up actions, is that made public too?

Mr. FINE. Sometimes it is. It depends if we do a follow-up report. We do make public our follow-up actions. Often we provide in our semiannual reports the status of unimplemented recommendations, so we do that as well. And sometimes—and we are happy to provide the committee with information on the status of those recommendations as time goes on as well.

Mrs. HARTZLER. That sounds good. So this report you issued was January 31, 2017. Is that right?

Mr. FINE. Yes.

Mrs. HARTZLER. So when will you go back and check and see that they are following up on the recommendations? About what is the timeframe?

Mr. FINE. We normally give them a little time. I would say they average about 60 days or so for them to determine what they intend to do, and then we periodically follow up after that as well, periodic time periods, depending on the recommendation itself.

Mrs. HARTZLER. So how has CENTCOM and other agencies responded to the report recommendations, and do you assess that they are willing or reluctant to pursue the changes that you suggest?

Mr. FINE. Well, when we issued the report, they indicated they thought it was a thorough report, and they thought that particu-

larly DIA, for example, said that this made useful recommendations, thoughtful recommendations. They have not responded specifically to each recommendations, and we want that, and we intend to follow up with them.

But in general, the reaction has been generally positive, but the proof is in the pudding. We want to see exactly what they intend to do with regard to each specific recommendation.

Mrs. HARTZLER. I think it is very important to pursue the follow-up, and I look forward to your continued look at this and what you find out.

So I turn to the ranking member for questions.

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

First of all, Mr. Fine, I share Chairwoman Hartzler's views of the quality of your report, the importance of it, and it gives us a lot of confidence to know that such good work is being done. I also share her concerns that the recommendations actually be implemented, and so that is very important.

Sort of looking even further into the future, if there were, here or elsewhere, an active attempt to manipulate intelligence analysis sometime in the future, do we have adequate protections in place to guard against that from ever occurring?

Mr. FINE. I think we do. I think that there is the opportunity to make those complaints known and that there are entities within the Department of Defense that will look into that, including us. As you saw, we took these allegations very seriously and conducted an exhaustive investigation.

We do think that there can be additional actions that can be taken, including clarifying the relationship of the analysts at CENTCOM to DIA, improving the training, and guidance, and oversight, increasing standardized operating procedures, and also a recommendation to explain and identify the function of the ombudsperson who can be an outlet for these kinds of concerns, if analysts have them.

So I do think there is that opportunity, but there can be improvements made to those processes.

Mr. MOULTON. This issue with the ambiguity of the DIA analysts' roles at CENTCOM seems to be one of the specific examples you cite as a real issue here. Can you just give us an example or a little bit more clarity into exactly how that played out.

Mr. FINE. It played out by some of the analysts not knowing what analytical standards applied to them, whether ICD [Intelligence Community Directive] 203, 206, 208 applied to them; not knowing who exactly they worked for; not knowing various, you know, operating procedures and what their reports were—and what the intent of their reports were. I think it needs to be clarified exactly what kind of training they receive, who they are working for, what kind of certifications they need to have, and what their exact relationship is to the combatant command, as well to DIA.

We found some ambiguity about that, not only among the analysts but the senior leaders we talked to as well, not even knowing for sure whether the intelligence community directives applied to them. So that is concerning to us, and there needs to be more clar-

ity in writing and documented, including the standard operating procedures that they have; that needs to be clarified.

Mr. MOULTON. So there clearly are some process improvements that need to be made, but part of this is also just command climate. And you addressed that in your report as well. Has the IG received any similar complaints of command climate issue or poor process issues at other COCOM [combatant command] J-2s [intelligence directorates]?

Mr. FINE. I can't say whether we have never received any other complaints, but we have never received anything like this in terms of the intensity and the number and the concern that we have had. So this was unusual. It was very unusual.

Mr. MOULTON. And Mr. Fine, my final question is, do you have any plans to share the recommendations of your findings with other COCOM J-2s so that this kind of thing does not happen elsewhere in the future?

Mr. FINE. Well, we have made the recommendations known, publicly released them, gave them to the Department, gave them to the DIA. I think the DIA, as well as the Department itself, ought to make sure that others are aware of this, and they can provide, as I say in my opening statement, a useful roadmap for others as well.

I think that is one of the important things that needs to be done, not solely for folks here on CENTCOM, but to have others look at this as well to see whether there are process improvements that they need to make in other combatant commands as well, as well as throughout the DOD and the DIA.

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you again for your work.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you very much.

We are voting right now, so we are getting ready to recess here, but just based on the former conversation, I just want to let everybody know there is a second panel. And we do have representatives of the DIA and CENTCOM and the Office of Under Secretary of the Defense, Intelligence, and the Joint Staff that will be testifying next.

So I hope everyone will be able to come back, and we will finish our questioning with Mr. Fine, but then we will get their response as well. So I call a recess until after votes. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Mrs. HARTZLER. We will reconvene. We appreciate your patience while we were voting, but thank you very much for waiting. I know there may be some other members here, but I did have another question for you before our second panel.

In your opening statement, you said that you did find that they distorted the products, that they didn't falsify but you used the word that they distorted, or did I misunderstand you?

Mr. FINE. Yeah, we found that they did not systematically distort or intentionally distort the products or suppress or delay. We did find a perception of that and we found processes that needed improvement, but we did not find systematic or intentional distortion.

Mrs. HARTZLER. And when you were conducting this investigation, where did the burden of proof lie? Did the CENTCOM leadership need to show they didn't manipulate the intelligence, or did the whistleblowers need to show the CENTCOM leadership did manipulate it?

Mr. FINE. We didn't have a burden of proof. We didn't apply that burden of proof. We just wanted to see what the facts showed and what the evidence showed, and then we reached our conclusions based upon that.

So if we would have found that there was distortion, we would have said that, but we didn't find that. So we tried to do a thorough and objective review and come to the conclusions that we thought were warranted.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. Very good.

Do you have any further questions, Mr. Moulton?

Mr. MOULTON. No, Madam Chairwoman.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. I think there was some members that had some questions, but they are not back yet, and we have had our second panel waiting very long, so I think we will conclude this first section.

But thank you very much, Mr. Fine, for your fine work—no pun intended—and we look forward to following up with you and seeing what you find in the future as far as how well the departments follow your recommendations. So thank you very much.

Mr. FINE. Thank you.

Mrs. HARTZLER. We will welcome our second panel, and thank you for your patience in waiting. We very much appreciate your involvement in our hearing, and I look forward to hearing what you have to share.

For our second panel, we have Major General James Marrs, he is Director of Intelligence for the Joint Staff; Major General Mark Quantock, Director of Intelligence for U.S. Central Command; Mr. Jacques Grimes, Director of Defense Analysis for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; and Mr. Neil Wiley, Director of Analysis for the Defense Intelligence Agency.

So I understand the Department of Defense has submitted a single written statement, but I will turn to each of you for any opening remarks that you wish to make, so General Marrs.

[The joint prepared statement of General Marrs, General Quantock, Mr. Grimes, and Mr. Wiley can be found in the Appendix on page 36.]

#### **STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN JAMES MARRS, USAF, DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE, JOINT STAFF**

General MARRS. Thank you Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Moulton, and members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to offer testimony on the Department of Defense Inspector General report "Investigation on Allegations Relating to USCENCOM Intelligence Products."

I am pleased to be here today with my other colleagues at the table to share my perspective, both as a producer of intelligence and as a representative of the combatant command J-2s. Other than CENTCOM, of course, who is most ably represented by Major General Mark Quantock to my left.

I echo my colleagues' sentiments, and you will hear more of that shortly, regarding the important work done by the DOD IG and the House Joint Task Force. Both reports remind us of the vital and complex responsibilities entrusted to intelligence professionals within our joint force. Continual improvements in analytic stand-

ards and processes are necessary to ensure intelligence products continue to be of the highest quality, objectivity, and integrity.

Let me comment first on the Joint Staff J-2, a unique team that is both part of the Joint Staff and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Our J-2 mission is to provide the chairman, the Secretary of Defense, and senior joint force leadership with decision-quality intelligence that is relevant, accurate, and unbiased.

Doing that work well depends on a high-quality team of intelligence professionals, and within the context of today's hearing, emphasis on two key ingredients: First is a workforce steeped in the elements of good analytic tradecraft. The programs and processes that will be outlined by Mr. Grimes and Mr. Wiley serve as the foundation of that tradecraft. We build upon that in the Joint Staff J-2 with our own local training and collaborative relationships to ensure the best application to our mission.

The second ingredient is the responsibility I, and my leadership team, have every day to create an environment where even in the most pressure-packed situations, dissent and candor are encouraged as we shape our intelligence assessments.

While I, as the J-2, am ultimately responsible for the quality of those assessments, this is a team sport of the highest stakes for our national security and one that only works at its best when communication and collaboration are strong.

As for my J-2 colleagues across the combatant commands, they and their teams face a very similar mission and set of challenges as they support their four-star commanders and combatant command joint force. They are very aware of today's hearing and the important work done by the DOD IG and the House Joint Task Force and are looking at this as a near-term opportunity to focus on the aspects of our tradecraft and operating environment that are vital to mission success.

I look forward to your questions.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you.

General Quantock.

#### **STATEMENT OF MG MARK R. QUANTOCK, USA, DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND**

General QUANTOCK. Yes, ma'am. Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Moulton, and members of the committee, thank you for the invitation —

Mrs. HARTZLER. Is your microphone on?

General QUANTOCK. Yes, it is. Okay. Now. I am sorry.

Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Moulton, and members of the committee, thank you very much for the invitation to offer testimony on the IG report.

First, I would like to acknowledge the breadth of the investigation and appreciate the efforts of both the IG and the Joint Task Force on CENTCOM Intelligence Analysis. The IG report provided thoughtful recommendations on ways to make improvements within the command, and we are taking those on as well as those from the Joint Task Force [JTF].

Of the 29 DOD IG recommendations, and the 4 from the JTF report, I view CENTCOM J-2—and that would be me—as the lead

for implementation, certainly for CENTCOM. We have developed an aggressive action plan, which we are currently executing.

To be clear, some of these actions are new initiatives, but many are actions that have already been implemented, indeed were implemented many months ago. But as with any action that involves leadership, communications, or training, the initial implementation is the easy part. Sustainment over time is the real challenge, a challenge that we readily accept at CENTCOM.

We look forward to working with USDI [Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence] and DIA in developing and implementing tradecraft and production standards to ensure our commanders and the Nation's policymakers receive the very best intelligence support.

Thank you.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, General.

Mr. Grimes.

**STATEMENT OF JACQUES T. GRIMES, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE ANALYSIS, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE**

Mr. GRIMES. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Moulton, and members of the committee. Thank you for the invitation to offer the testimony of the Department of Defense on the inspector general report, "Investigation on Allegations Relating to USCENTCOM Products."

I am Jacques Grimes, Director of Defense Analysis and Partner Engagement, and I represent the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. My role is to oversee defense analysis and to set a policy foundation that empowers defense analytic components to produce high-quality, relevant, effective analysis.

The Department is indeed impressed with the inspector general's investigation, and we appreciate the opportunity that it gives us to discuss the steps we are taking to improve intelligence analysis across the defense intelligence enterprise.

We in the Department hold ourselves to the highest standards, and we take great pride in the exceptional intelligence professionals who support the full spectrum of DOD intelligence customers from the President of the United States to the soldier in the field. Every day, thousands of our intelligence professionals across the globe tirelessly provide insight and analysis without politicization.

Our commitment is and always will be to provide unvarnished intelligence and key assessments into the myriad of challenges facing our country every day. But we recognize that we can be better, and we are getting better. We are studying the inspector general's recommendations closely, and we are identifying specific actions that we can take now to address them.

We will use the recommendations in concert with our already ongoing actions to build a strong foundation for high-quality objective defense intelligence analysis. For example, in November 2016, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence signed out a new policy titled "Management and Oversight of DOD All-Source Analysis," which assigns the role of the functional manager for DOD all-source analysis to the Defense Intelligence Agency and extends in-

telligence community analytic standards to all DOD intelligence analytic organizations, including the combatant commands.

I co-chair, along with my colleague from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense Analytic Tradecraft Council, which serves as a forum for advancing analytic integrity and tradecraft standards across the defense intelligence enterprise.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence also sponsored the first ever analytic objectivity symposium in September 2016 that brought together expert speakers from academia, finance, accounting, medical research, and law enforcement to discuss measures for reducing bias and politicization in analysis.

While these steps were initiated without specific reference to the inspector general's investigation at CENTCOM, they align with many of the IG's recommendations. The steps we are taking have already established a firm foundation for DOD intelligence analysis. We very much look forward to continuing along this path to ensure that DOD analysis meets the highest standards of quality, objectivity, and integrity.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very good. Thank you.

Mr. Wiley.

**STATEMENT OF NEIL R. WILEY, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE  
ANALYSIS, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

Mr. WILEY. Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Moulton, and members of the committee, I would like to join my colleagues in thanking you for the invitation to offer testimony on the DOD IG report.

As the DIA director for analysis and the DOD functional manager for all-source analysis, I am responsible for the alignment, quality, and integrity of the analytic output at DIA to service intelligence centers in the combatant commands. We appreciate the DOD IG's thorough investigation and note that the investigation found no lack of integrity or lack of probity in the intelligence process.

We in the analytic profession hold ourselves to a high standard, and when concerns are raised, it makes us all examine what we could do better going forward. At DIA, across the defense all-source analysis enterprise, and in partnership with USDI, we have been aggressively investing in initiatives to strengthen analytic tradecraft and analytic processes.

While many of these efforts were initiated independently from and prior to the IG report, they align well with many of the recommendations contained therein. We have established the Defense Analytic Tradecraft Council to coordinate and implement analytic tradecraft and process improvements across the enterprise.

Most noteworthy thus far have been the implementation of an enterprise-wide analytic ombudsman program and a common process for analytic product evaluations. We have expanded professional and analyst career education through the addition of a 10-day course for DIA analysts, offered both in the National Capital Region and at the combatant commands, stressing and exercising Intelligence Community Directive 203 tradecraft standards in analytic design.

We also believe that rigorous certification is an essential component of a professional workforce and continue to implement and enhance the certified defense all-source analysis program to demonstrate attainment in analytic competence.

We have already made considerable strides in implementing common analytic standards and practices across the enterprise, but the business of intelligence analysis is one of constant improvement. With our partners in USDI and across the enterprise, we will continue to develop, codify, and share best practices in intelligence tradecraft, process, and training.

Our ultimate mission is to provide our warfighters and policy-makers with defense all-source analysis of the highest insight, quality, and integrity. They deserve no less.

Thank you.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. I am encouraged by your testimony. It sounds like already that you have made a lot of changes, and it can be defense-wide, the lessons learned from this incident. You talk about, Mr. Wiley, analytic ombudsman, common analytic standards for intelligence all across the DOD, career education.

Mr. Grimes, you talked about the development of a council, standards, defense analytics, and a symposium that was held where experts looked at ways to measure. So I am very encouraged by this.

And, General Quantock, my question is that the inspector general identified several issues having to do with poor work environment and climate at CENTCOM during a crisis period. So can you describe the specific actions that have been taken to improve the common climate at CENTCOM.

General QUANTOCK. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question.

We have endeavored over the past really 18 months to continue to improve the climate in specifically in the CENTCOM J-2. And I think, just in terms of the numbers, that has beared out. So in the IG investigation, the way we have monitored this is through the use of several surveys.

So the one that was called out in the IG report was the analytic integrity and standard survey, which did have an anomalous in the 15 percentage. It was much higher than other COCOMs. Since that time, and we just received the calendar year 2016, where it went from a 41 percent, essentially dissatisfaction, down to 22 percent. That is an enormous increase.

And when you look at that, you contrast that, and so in 2015, it was 41 percent and then compared to a combatant command average of 23 percent. This past year, it has gone down to 22 percent as opposed to 25 percent for the COCOM average. We are actually under the COCOM average, which is a pretty marked increase.

And that is really through a lot of programs that we have instituted, and this was really actually well before I got there and General Votel got there. So when it was recognized by the previous J-2 command team that there—there were challenges. They did start to institute things like, you know, townhalls and interfacing with the analysts, and we have certainly continued that.

So to be very specific, some of the things that are not new that they instituted that got the ball moving in the right direction were monthly townhalls. We have what is called a daily IFC, or Intel



Fusion Center closeout, where the J-2 or the vice J-2 sits with all the analysts that are working the problems. It is usually anywhere between 25 and 50 of them. And we have a discussion of what has occurred that day in the fight, in the fights that we have at CENTCOM.

Our vice J-2 has normal office hours where he will take—a couple times a week he'll go down to an office and events, which is the location where the bulk of our analysts are, and he will spend an hour and a half there and just interfacing with analysts or anyone in the J-2 that has an issue they want to talk to or bend the J-2's ear on.

We have had an open-door policy for some time. And the command climate that we also work very hard on is—and General Votel has been an enormous advocate for this, is he spends a lot of time with our analysts. He receives intelligence first thing in the morning through his read book.

And what I will send in with that read book is a young analyst. And so it is a one-on-one between a four-star and a young analyst, and they get to answer the questions. And they do a magnificent job. I will tell you, I am very proud of the workforce that we have. They are magnificent professionals.

And when he has a question, they will take that back to the JIOC [joint intelligence operations center], to the JIC [joint intelligence center], and they will work that question, and it will be an email from that young analyst to the four-star. And, you know, those of us on the chain of command also get cc'd so we know what the boss knows, but that has been very, very positive.

What is new in terms of—since the new team has rolled in, is we do—it is normal leadership things where you have got outreach to the full team, not just the analysts but the full J-2 team, which is biweekly I will put out an update to the team in terms of what is kind of happening within the command.

We have—the CENTCOM commander, General Votel, has daily addresses over the PA [public address] system where he tells about his travels and what is going on within the command. Very, very well received by the command.

We have introduced walkabouts, where I will just frankly, again, just do normal leadership stuff of getting out there and mixing it up with our troops. I learn something every time I do that, and as I mentioned, it is a world-class workforce.

Thank you.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very good. Thank you. Ranking Member Moulton, do you have some questions?

Mr. MOULTON. Yes, Madam Chairwoman. Thank you very much. This is a question for General Quantock. One of the key findings in the DOD IG's report was that the leadership did not ensure operational reporting was necessarily from commanders on the ground was appropriately separated from analytical assessments. I am an operational guy myself. I think highly of commanders' views on the ground, but obviously they have a certain place in intelligence analysis. Can you talk about what you are doing to correct that particular issue?

General QUANTOCK. So I will tell you that in the intelligence field we need to take all the information in, always. We have to ac-

knowledge that operational information, like other information, has its own biases, and we have to acknowledge that and incorporate that into our assessments.

But properly if we have got, for example, when Mosul fell and before OIR [Operation Inherent Resolve] stood up, we had intelligence analysts, the intel guys normally do red. They do the threat. And so we were actually trying to report on friendly forces, and the team was working that. When we started to have friendly forces, U.S. forces come on the battlefield and start to make assessments about what was going on the battlefield, we have to take that in. That is right. It is appropriate, it is in accordance with ICD 203. It is just the right thing to do.

And so, we have encouraged the use of all forms of information and intelligence, signals intelligence, human intelligence, open source intelligence, anything we can get. We just again have to weigh and acknowledge that there are biases and be aware of those.

Mr. MOULTON. And my understanding is that the issue was not that you weren't incorporating these different sources of intelligence, but that the biases weren't recognized. Is that correct?

General QUANTOCK. Well, I wasn't there in terms of the specifics of what was, how it was characterized, but looking forward, certainly that is one of the things that we are most cognizant of.

Mr. MOULTON. Great. Thank you very much.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you so much. We have Representative Cheney.

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. And thank you very much all of you for your service and for being here today.

I wanted to just see if we could get a little more details about the mention sort of repeatedly about analytic standards and the lack of understanding on the part of some of the analysts about what standards were really applicable to them, and how has that changed, and specifically, how do the standards themselves, how are they implemented?

And then secondly, give a little bit of specifics about the DIA engagement. I know one of the things that we have urged is that DIA really accept its responsibility as sort of overseer of the whole defense intelligence enterprise. And I would be interested to know specifically how that is manifesting itself on a day-to-day basis.

General QUANTOCK. If I may take it first, and then I will hand it over to my teammates. In terms of standards, because it was brought up I know in the testimony from the IG in terms of who do folks work for. I have made it very clear, and I know that DIA is supporting me on this, and we have had actually a session with other J-2s to make sure we are all in alignment with this.

But analysts that are from DIA that work in combatant commands, work for the combatant commander. They work for the J-2. What J-2s need to be cognizant of is the requirements that those analysts have for their professional development in terms of training and in terms of their advancement. And they have to make sure that that training and those experiences and exposures that they need are taken into account.

And so in my townhalls with my folks, I have told them, I said, listen, let's make sure you understand it, that we work for the combatant command. It is no different, quite frankly, in terms of these loyalties is to say, hey, do I work for the Army or do I work for the combatant command? Well, the reality is I work for both, but I take my instructions from the tower, and the tower is at MacDill Air Force Base with General Votel.

But like every service, I have to be aware of the requirements that the Army has of me, whether it is for firing a weapon or doing PT [physical training] test or whatever the standards I have to do. So it is really that both worlds. And that is really, it talks to, you know, what folks have to have. The saying I have with this whole thing is we did not have an intelligence integrity issue. We had communications, leadership, and training issues. That is exactly what the IG found in their 29 recommendations, and that is exactly what we are getting after.

And part of our action plan, I have gone through it in depth, when you look at those 29 recommendations, you can put a training, a leadership, or a communications issue by every one of those recommendations. And so I acknowledge that, and we are getting after that, ma'am.

Mr. WILEY. So if I may take the questions on DIA and commonality and standards, so intelligence community directive analytic standards do apply to combatant commands. That was reinforced recently by Under Secretary of Defense instruction in November that establishes that ICD standards do apply across the defense all-source analytic enterprise, so it is very clear that they do apply at the combatant commands.

In terms of DIA's role in all-source analysis in the enterprise, I think I would characterize it in that we are interested in consistency, integrity, and probity of the analytic process, rather than interested in the actual analytic outcome. So in other words, the analytic line taken by the elements within the enterprise are the responsibility of the elements within the enterprise, the combatant command, JIOC, service intelligence centers, the applicants within DIA.

The process by which they arrive at that analysis needs to have integrity, and we get that through common standards, common practices, and common execution. So with USDI and the rest of the enterprise, what we are focusing on now is establishing that common understanding of what standards are, what tradecraft practices are, and what the institutions and mechanisms for doing that are.

So we mentioned earlier the Defense Analytic Tradecraft Council, that is the principal vehicle to bring all 16 members of the defense intelligence enterprise together to discussion tradecraft standards, establish consistent tradecraft standards, and then communicate those tradecraft standards. We also use that as the vehicle for establishing the ombudsman of the product review process.

Ms. CHENEY. Let me just ask, so is that a process that has just begun now as a result of what has happened and as a result of these reports, and was it the case that there wasn't sort of a consistent set of standards previously?

Mr. WILEY. Yes. The Defense Analytic Tradecraft Council was revitalized. It was established some years back, but it had essentially lain dormant, so it was revitalized as a result of this situation, and we reestablished it to invigorate commonality and standards. And, again, that is what we recognized was necessary, was a vehicle to achieve greater consistency across the enterprise.

Mr. GRIMES. I just want to add that perhaps the chapeau, if you will, of the USDI's role in all of this, we develop policy, we conduct oversight, and we are advocates for defense analysis programs to include playing an integrator function across the defense intelligence enterprise. We have laid out four basic actions that we have taken already.

First, the oversight and management of DOD all-source analysis in a DOD instruction. That applies to the entire defense intelligence enterprise and lays out the role of the functional manager for analysis, calls for a board of governors, a governance, if you will, structure for the defense intelligence enterprise.

And we have three memos that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence put out to the enterprise laying out six functional areas that are critical to defense analysis.

And then finally, an all-source analysis certification program for certified analysts and how they can become certified across the enterprise.

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Representative. And I am very encouraged by the testimony that we received today.

You clearly have taken this report very seriously and taken a lot of positive steps that will benefit not only CENTCOM, but it sounds like across all the combatant commands.

And so this committee is dedicated to making sure that our war-fighter has the best intelligence possible and the most positive environment possible for those who are committing their lives to this very important mission.

So we look forward to working with the inspector general as he continues to follow up with you in the months ahead, but keep up the great work. We appreciate what you are doing, and this hearing is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:02 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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# **A P P E N D I X**

FEBRUARY 28, 2017

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**PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

FEBRUARY 28, 2017

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**Opening Remarks of Chairwoman Vicky Hartzler  
Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations Hearing  
Hearing on  
Department of Defense Inspector General Report “Investigation on  
Allegations Relating to USCENTCOM Intelligence Products”  
February 28, 2017**

Good afternoon and welcome.

I am delighted to convene the first Oversight and Investigations subcommittee hearing for the one-hundred and fifteenth Congress.

Before I turn to the topic of today’s hearing and introduce our witnesses, I want to welcome our new Ranking Member and the others who are joining the subcommittee for the first time.

In recent years, this subcommittee has been engaged in a wide variety of important national security topics. I am eager to work with all of you to ensure we continue to exercise our Constitutional responsibilities to help to oversee the Department of Defense.

I am happy to have Mr. Moulton as the subcommittee’s Ranking Member. I look forward to his important contributions to our work.

I am also pleased that we are joined by Mr. Gaetz, Mr. Banks, Ms. Cheney, Mr. O’Halleran, and Mr. Suozzi.

Welcome to the subcommittee.

Our returning members are Mr. Conaway and Mr. Scott. It is great to have you with us again. I know we will continue to benefit from your keen insights.

For today’s hearing we are also joined by (or will be joined by) one or more committee members who are not members of this subcommittee.

Welcome.

For any members of the full committee who are not permanent members of the subcommittee who are, or will be attending, I ask unanimous consent that they be permitted to participate in this hearing with the understanding that all sitting subcommittee members will be recognized for questions prior to those not assigned to the subcommittee.

Without objection, so ordered.

Today’s hearing topic is especially timely.

Three weeks ago, the Department of Defense Inspector General released a report about allegations that leadership within U.S. Central Command improperly manipulated intelligence products that led to an inaccurate understanding of the U.S. campaign against ISIS.

As a consequence, 30 professionals in the Inspector General’s office undertook an inquiry into this matter. They conducted 152 interviews at

CENTCOM and reviewed thousands of pages of materials over the course of many months.

Although the report did not find systematic or intentional distortion of intelligence or evidence of misconduct, the IG did conclude that CENTCOM intelligence products “could have, and should have been better.”

The report also found a very challenging command climate at CENTCOM and identified several process and procedural issues which the IG believed impeded the intelligence analysis process.

The Inspector General proffered 29 specific recommendations for improvements, and discussed the need to implement corrective action.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and learning about the changes that have been made in response to the report, and the progress we can expect. I look forward to discussing these issues with the two panels today.

Before I introduce our first witness, I turn to the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee Ranking Member for any opening remarks he would like to make.

**Ranking Member Seth Moulton Remarks**  
**Hearing on Department of Defense Inspector General Report**  
**“Investigation on Allegations Relating to USCENTCOM Intelligence**  
**Products”**  
**February 28, 2017**

Thank you, Chairwoman Hartzler. This is my first hearing as Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, and I'd like to begin by saying I look forward to working with you and the other Members of this panel. I came to Washington promising to work across the aisle, and to make sure that we in Congress never flinch when it comes to asking the difficult questions about what it takes to ensure our national security. I believe we'll do an excellent job working together in that spirit and bipartisan tradition of this committee.

I'd also like to recognize two new Democratic Members of the Oversight & Investigations Subcommittee—also new members of Congress—Tom O'Halleran of Arizona and Tom Suozzi of New York. I look forward to working with both of you.

In the United States, our policymakers and service members rely on intelligence analysis to make critical strategic, operational, and tactical decisions every day—some life or death—so it is imperative that we have adequate safeguards in place to ensure they receive objective, empirically-based reporting on which to ground their choices.

For that reason, when allegations arose last year about manipulation of intelligence at the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), Congress encouraged the DOD Inspector General to conduct a thorough investigation and report back with recommendations.

The Inspector General conducted an exhaustive investigation involving 152 interviews of 120 witnesses, reviews of millions of emails, 425,000 documents, and 140 finished intelligence products.

Its final report did not find evidence that intelligence was falsified or intentionally distorted, or that intelligence processes resulted in a false narrative or systematic distortion.

However, the IG did find evidence of issues that are concerning to the committee. These include a poor command climate, low morale, and ineffective communication and guidance that produced a perception among analysts that the integrity of the process was questionable. These findings demonstrate how it is paramount that we ensure the climate at CENTCOM is improved and better safeguards are in place.

My questions to you are: First, how have we remedied, and what additional actions must be taken to remedy, the institutional and command climate issues that led to these allegations?

Second, going forward, if there were an active attempt to manipulate intelligence analysis, do we have adequate protections in place to guard against intelligence manipulation?

It doesn't take too much imagination to understand the danger of injecting bias—or worse—into the system. When we see officials at the highest levels of government visiting CIA headquarters and asking how intelligence professionals voted, thus threatening to politicize the process; or when we see requests that senior intelligence officials weigh in on intelligence matters in order to shape stories in the media for political purposes, it should cause serious concern. In other words, do we have adequate safeguards in place to protect the objective integrity of the intelligence process when an administration seeks to inject politics or comes calling for alternative facts?

I look forward to your answers, and as Sherman Kent, the father of intelligence analysis, liked to say, “the truth shall set you free.”



**INSPECTOR GENERAL**  
*U.S. Department of Defense*

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**Statement of Glenn A. Fine  
Acting Inspector General  
Department of Defense**

**on**

**Department of Defense Office of Inspector  
General Report of Investigation on  
Allegations Related to USCENTCOM  
Intelligence Products**

**Testifying before the  
House Armed Services Committee  
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations  
February 28, 2017**

For Release on Delivery, Expected at 3:30 p.m.

Good afternoon Madam Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Moulton, and Members of the Committee.

Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to discuss the investigation by the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) into allegations that senior officials at U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) falsified, distorted, delayed, or suppressed intelligence products related to its efforts to degrade and destroy the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)<sup>1</sup>. The allegations, in essence, were that the intelligence was altered or suppressed to present a more optimistic portrayal of the success of USCENTCOM's efforts against ISIL.

These were very serious and troubling allegations, and we devoted significant resources to investigating them. We assembled a multi-disciplinary team of more than 30 DoD OIG employees, including administrative investigators, intelligence analysts, Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) digital forensics specialists, auditors, attorneys, and statisticians to investigate these allegations. This was one of the most extensive investigations in the DoD OIG's history.

Our team conducted over 150 interviews of 120 witnesses, both inside and outside of USCENTCOM. In addition, we collected and reviewed a massive amount of draft and final intelligence products produced by USCENTCOM's Intelligence Directorate (the CCJ2). We also collected and reviewed USCENTCOM emails, and we examined in detail the specific examples of alleged falsification, distortion, suppression, or delay raised by the complainants and witnesses.

We also interviewed intelligence officials in the DoD and the Intelligence Community for their assessments of USCENTCOM's intelligence products.

We did not stop there. We conducted a systematic analysis regarding the direction of edits that were made within the CCJ2 on counter-ISIL intelligence products. In this analysis, we reviewed a statistically random sample of CCJ2 products, examining each individual edit between the initial and final versions of these products. We sought to determine systematically whether there were any trends in the direction of those edits that made ISIL look less successful and the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) more successful, as raised in the allegations.

We also interviewed witnesses about the command climate in CCJ2, and we reviewed command climate surveys.

Finally, we examined in detail the management processes for producing intelligence products in the CCJ2 to determine if there were deficiencies or weaknesses in need of improvement.

Our full findings and conclusions are contained in a 542-page report of investigation classified at the SECRET level. We have provided that classified report to the relevant organizations in the DoD, as well as this committee and other congressional committees with

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<sup>1</sup> The term "ISIL" is used in this statement as well as the DoD OIG report which was issued prior to the Feb. 13, 2017 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Mattis directing the use of the term ISIS instead of ISIL.

jurisdiction over the DoD or the Intelligence Community. In addition, we prepared a 190-page unclassified report of investigation, which we publicly released on February 1, 2017.

In short, our investigation did not substantiate the most serious allegation that intelligence was falsified. Similarly, we did not find systematic or intentional distortion of intelligence by USCENTCOM senior leaders, or that the leaders suppressed or delayed intelligence products.

However, we did find a troubling and widespread perception among many intelligence analysts who worked on USCENTCOM Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) intelligence products that CCJ2 leaders were attempting to distort those intelligence products.

We also identified specific weaknesses and flaws in the CCJ2 management processes for creating intelligence products. We believe these deficiencies in the processes, such as ineffective communication and guidance, lack of adequate feedback, ambiguity and uncertainty about certain CCJ2 policies, and the ambiguous status of Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analysts assigned to USCENTCOM, hindered the effectiveness and efficiency of the CCJ2 and affected the morale of the analytic workforce.

We concluded that the intelligence practices related to OIR intelligence products in the CCJ2 could have, and should have, been better, and that further improvements can be made. We therefore made 28 recommendations for improvements in the intelligence processes that relate to the issues we investigated, which we believe will help address the issues that led to the allegations. We made one additional recommendation that senior leaders in the DoD review this report with regard to the overall performance of the individuals described in this report.

In the following sections of this statement, I will summarize in more detail the methodology of our investigation and our findings.

## **I. Summary of the allegations and the methodology of the investigation**

The DoD OIG initiated this investigation to address complaints that senior intelligence officials -- Major General (MG) Steven Grove, U.S. Army, Director of Intelligence (the J2), USCENTCOM; Mr. Gregory Ryckman, Senior Executive Service, Vice Director of Intelligence, USCENTCOM; and Mr. William E. "Buddy" Rizzio, Defense Intelligence Senior Leader, Joint Intelligence Center, USCENTCOM (JICENT) -- allegedly falsified, distorted, suppressed, or delayed USCENTCOM intelligence products.

Two complainants, whom we call Complainant 1 and Complainant 2 in our report, originally raised the allegations. In addition to their original allegations, we also considered other allegations and issues they and others raised during the course of our investigation. In general, the allegations related to USCENTCOM intelligence products and processes associated with the counter-ISIL campaign, from May 2014, when Mr. Ryckman arrived at USCENTCOM (MG Grove arrived shortly thereafter in June 2014), to the initiation of our investigation in September 2015.

Specifically, the first complainant alleged in a letter dated May 28, 2015, to the DIA Inspector General, that CCJ2 senior intelligence leaders imposed a "false narrative" on analysts and analytic leaders that Iraqi forces, with U.S. help, were performing well on the battlefield, while ISIL was struggling. The complainant asserted that the senior leaders imposed this

narrative through many changes, small and large, on a daily basis, the cumulative effect of which was creation of a false narrative. The complainant also alleged that the JICCEN, which is part of the CCJ2, was eventually reorganized to create a layer of managers willing to enforce the false narrative, “relieving senior leaders of the entire workload of falsifying intelligence, and more broadly socializing the unethical behavior.”

The second complainant also alleged that the top two CCJ2 senior intelligence officials – MG Grove and Mr. Ryckman – routinely and intentionally re-wrote and suppressed intelligence products to conform with a “preconceived narrative,” intentionally withheld information from the DIA, and engaged in “foot-dragging and delay tactics during coordination of DIA HQ’s [Headquarters] intelligence products” in an effort to “undermine DIA’s intelligence production.”

We interviewed the two complainants several times to clarify their allegations, to request documents and examples in support of the allegations, and to ask them for the names of others who they believed had direct knowledge of the facts relating to their allegations. As a result of those interviews and our review of what was provided, in September 2015 we initiated a full-scale investigation of these allegations.

At the outset of our investigation, we invited the Intelligence Community Inspector General (ICIG) to participate in our investigation, but that office declined. However, our investigative team met with ICIG officials, who reviewed and concurred with our methodology and investigative plan.

To investigate the allegations raised by the complainants, as well as those raised by others, we took various steps, including:

- interviewing 120 witnesses (some several times) regarding the allegations;
- seeking documents and examples from the witnesses regarding the allegations;
- conducting detailed reviews of the specific examples that the witnesses raised;
- obtaining, on our own, USCENCOM intelligence products relating to the allegations that were produced during the period covered by our investigation;
- interviewing witnesses outside of USCENCOM regarding their assessment of the intelligence products;
- conducting an analytical review of a statistical, random sample of intelligence products to determine whether the edits made presented a rosier picture of USCENCOM’s operations;
- reviewing the command climate in CCJ2, to include reviewing surveys conducted of CCJ2 analysts; and
- assessing the CCJ2 management processes related to the production and editing of intelligence products and whether there were deficiencies in the processes or areas that could be improved.

In total, we collected over 15 terabytes of unclassified, secret, and top secret data from CCJ2, which represented over 17 million documents and files, approximately 2 million of which were emails. We used search terms and phrases to search the data and emails for evidence relevant to the allegations, and we identified more than 425,000 documents and files for initial review. We reviewed all of those 425,000 documents and files, and we identified thousands of emails and documents for closer scrutiny and evaluation related to the allegations.



We incorporated relevant documents, emails, and evidence specific to each allegation throughout our report.

We also examined in detail the specific examples of alleged falsification, distortion, suppression, or delay that were raised by the complainants and witnesses. Specific examples of the allegations raised by the complainants and witnesses, and which we discuss in the report, include the alleged banning of certain words in intelligence products, the changing of an intelligence product relating to the attack at the Al Asad Air Base in Iraq, a change to the Watch Condition (WATCHCON) level for Iraq during May and June of 2014, changes in the ISIL Assessment Tool and the J2 Weekly update, and changes in the policy on coordination and collaboration with analysts from throughout the Intelligence Community. In addition, other allegations arose during the course of our investigation, which we investigated, such as whether USCENTCOM emails were deleted; whether CCJ2 employees or managers were urged to leave; whether the Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, attempted to influence USCENTCOM intelligence products; and whether anyone in the CCJ2 attempted to intimidate witnesses in this investigation.

In total, we investigated more than 25 specific allegations. Each required an investigation in and of itself. We discuss each of those examples in separate sections of the report.

In addition, we interviewed other officials in the DoD and the Intelligence Community regarding their views on USCENTCOM's intelligence products related to the counter-ISIL campaign. We believe an important factor to consider was whether other intelligence officials outside USCENTCOM, who often had access to similar information that formed the basis for CCJ2 intelligence products, believed those CCJ2 intelligence products were distorted. While those officials did not conduct a systemic comparison of the intelligence products, their perspective provides insight on whether USCENTCOM's intelligence products were markedly different in tone or outlook from other intelligence products their organizations produced on similar subjects. We therefore sought the view of those officials, who worked in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the DIA, the Joint Staff, and elsewhere.

As noted above, we also conducted an analytical review of a random sample of USCENTCOM intelligence products. The overall purpose of this review was to determine whether there were any significant changes related to edits of these products, and whether such changes indicated any trend or pattern of distortion with regard to the portrayal of ISIL and the ISF as stronger or weaker, as alleged by the complainants and some witnesses. To conduct this review, we examined a stratified random sample of 140 USCENTCOM final intelligence products related to the counter-ISIL efforts that the CCJ2 produced from May 1, 2014, through September 30, 2015.

## **II. Findings of the investigation**

In sum, we did not substantiate the most serious allegation, which was that intelligence was falsified. Only a few witnesses described intelligence assessments as false, and they did not provide specific examples that supported the allegation. They did not point out, and we did not find, specific intelligence products that contained false – untrue – facts or analysis. We also did not find sufficient evidence to conclude that the CCJ2 or its leaders attempted to change

intelligence to make it factually untrue. Nor did we find that the senior leaders presented, or allowed to be presented, any intelligence assessments that they did not believe were accurate.

The more difficult matter to investigate was the allegation that CCJ2 intelligence was distorted – or skewed – to portray counter-ISIL operations in a rosier light, or to show that ISF was stronger and ISIL weaker than the intelligence warranted. We found much greater difference of testimony on this allegation. In our investigation we found a strong perception among many intelligence analysts who worked on USCENTCOM OIR intelligence products that CCJ2 leaders were attempting to distort the intelligence products, either through excessive editing, imposition of a narrative, requiring a higher burden of proof for “bad news,” or demanding additional sourcing requirements if the intelligence indicated that ISIL was doing well or ISF was struggling.

However, when we analyzed the full scope of the testimony, both by USCENTCOM analysts and leaders, and by other intelligence officials outside USCENTCOM; reviewed the specific examples provided by the complainants and the witnesses regarding alleged distortion; searched over 17 million documents and files, including approximately 2 million emails for evidence of distortion; and conducted our own analytic assessment of a sample of intelligence products, we did not substantiate that CCJ2 leaders intended to distort intelligence products or that their changes to intelligence products resulted in a false narrative or systematic distortion of intelligence. Similarly, we did not find sufficient evidence to substantiate the allegations that CCJ2 leadership suppressed intelligence, or that they attempted to delay intelligence products for improper purposes.

With regard to the specific examples of distortion to which the complainants and other witnesses pointed, we did not find that they demonstrated any systematic or intentional distortion of intelligence.

For example, some witnesses stated that the editing process included the “banning of many words” that accurately described the intelligence. They alleged that certain terminology was used in order to convey a more positive narrative regarding the progress of the counter-ISIL campaign. Some witnesses told us that certain words would consistently be changed during the editing process to words that they believed “softened the tone” of poor performance by the ISF.

However, other witnesses told us that words were not changed to soften the tone of poor performance by the ISF. They said that the CCJ2 senior intelligence leaders wanted to use terminology consistent with military doctrine to characterize the ISF’s actions, that they wanted to avoid emotional language in intelligence products, and that they wanted to use terminology that the commander and operators understood. We found no written list of banned words. We also found that some of the allegedly banned words were included in final intelligence products.

As another example of alleged distortion, one of the complainants pointed to the CCJ2 leadership’s decision not to change the WATCHCON level (a numerical system that categorizes intelligence concerns) in May 2014, as several analysts recommended, and that Mosul fell in June 2014 before the WATCHCON was eventually changed, after MG Grove’s arrival. We do not believe that this provides evidence of an intent to distort intelligence or present a rosier intelligence picture. The decision not to change the WATCHCON, but to continue to assess the environment, was a reasonable, good-faith decision by CCJ2 leadership at the time, and does not

indicate any intent to present a rosier picture of the fight against ISIL. However, the CCJ2 leadership's decision not to raise the WATCHCON level when analysts recommended it be changed, but instead to raise it after the fall of Mosul, contributed to the early perception that the leadership did not trust the analysts and wanted to control the "narrative."

Similarly, the allegation raised in the complaints that changes to the format of intelligence products were implemented to ensure that a narrative was imposed on the analysts also was not supported. When we interviewed the CCJ2 leaders, and others, about their reasons for the changes – such as the reason to reduce the size of the Intelligence Summary (INTSUM) and turn it into a more summarized, executive-level product – the decision seemed to be a reasonable management decision. However, while the change appeared to be reasonable, CCJ2 leadership provided inadequate explanation and communication to the workforce about the rationale for the change, which contributed to the perception that the changes were being imposed to enforce a narrative that ISIL was weak and the ISF was strong.

In addition, MG Grove changed how coordination and collaboration among analysts occurred, but we found that the change was not explained clearly. There is a distinction between collaboration (discussions among analysts on evidence and analysis), which was still permitted, and coordination (USCENTCOM's official concurrence to another organization's intelligence product), which was restricted. In our view, it was not unreasonable for CCJ2 leadership to want to ensure that the official USCENTCOM position on intelligence products was reviewed by leadership. On the other hand, it would have been unreasonable and counter to effective intelligence practices to restrict collaboration between analysts. After our interviews, we found that CCJ2 leadership did not intend to restrict collaboration. However, CCJ2 leaders at various levels did not clearly articulate this policy change, either orally or in writing, which resulted in widespread confusion about whether collaboration was still permitted.

We also did not find evidence that the JICCENT reorganizations were designed for any improper purpose. Rather, they were legitimate management decisions to address the crisis production and to improve the quality of the intelligence products. The changes did impose more oversight, review, and editing of CCJ2 intelligence products, which many analysts did not like. This was a change for the analysts, whose work in the past underwent less scrutiny and editing. Some witnesses told us that the editing and scrutiny was necessary and productive. Others thought it was unnecessary and did not improve the products. However, these changes appeared to be justifiable management actions, intended to improve products in a crisis environment. Once again, the rationale for these changes was not adequately communicated to the workforce.

We discuss in detail in our classified report the results of our investigation of these and other allegations of falsification, distortion, or suppression.

As noted above, we also conducted an analytical assessment of a random sample of USCENTCOM intelligence products. This assessment provided mixed results. For the individual edits, we did not find a statistically significant difference across the entire time period for ISIL and ISF individual tone changes. However, in one time period, from October 2014 to January 2015, the raw numbers in the sample product review show a greater number of ISIL- weaker tone changes and fewer number of ISIL-stronger tone changes. We believe the greater

number of ISIL-weaker tone changes may have contributed to some analysts' perception of distortion.

With respect to the testimony of other intelligence officials regarding the USCENCOM products, the testimony of those officials was also mixed. Some saw USCENCOM's products as consistent with those from the Intelligence Community. Others thought that USCENCOM's intelligence products were somewhat more optimistic than their products. None thought that USCENCOM's products were inaccurate or unreasonable. Also, none of these witnesses asserted that they perceived a deliberate or systematic attempt by USCENCOM to distort intelligence.

Yet, while we did not find evidence to support a finding of systematic or intentional distortion of intelligence, we found it very troubling that so many USCENCOM analysts believed their leaders distorted intelligence or imposed a narrative on their intelligence products. Almost half of the intelligence analysts that we interviewed in the JICCENT and who provided an opinion on this question believed that intelligence was being skewed in some way, either by imposing a narrative, requiring a higher burden of proof if the intelligence provided bad news, or requiring additional sourcing. These numbers were also consistent with the survey that the ODNI conducted in 2015. We believe that the widespread perception alone indicated a significant problem, which we found the CCJ2 leaders failed to adequately address in a timely way.

Our investigation identified multiple causes for this widespread perception of distortion and the lack of trust in the CCJ2 leadership among analysts who worked on OIR products. First, the operational tempo of intelligence production was high, and stressful, even before MG Grove and Mr. Ryckman assumed their leadership positions in 2014. The pace was fast, the workload was unrelenting, and the diversity of important intelligence matters within USCENCOM's area of responsibility was vast. As a result, workforce morale was low when MG Grove and Mr. Ryckman arrived. Soon thereafter, the pace increased as the crisis production began with the onset of the counter-ISIL campaign (OIR), and intelligence products were modified to create more tactically oriented products on an around-the-clock basis.

Also contributing to the tension was the atypical requirement for the CCJ2 to report not simply on ISIL's operations, but also on the operations of friendly forces – the ISF. The CCJ2's responsibility for reporting on the ISF often required the CCJ2 to make assessments that related to the success of the USCENCOM commanders and troops who were training, advising, and assisting the ISF in the counter-ISIL campaign. Resolving the intelligence inputs and the inputs of operators on the ground was sensitive and at times led to friction with the operational commanders. This created a difficult dynamic when the operations side of USCENCOM had divergent views from the intelligence analysts regarding what was happening on the ground.

In addition, we found that MG Grove and Mr. Ryckman's management style differed significantly from prior CCJ2 senior intelligence leaders. MG Grove and Mr. Ryckman were much more involved in the product approval process, which was their prerogative. They often believed that the products were not well written, fully explained, adequately supported, or inclusive of all inputs, including the operators' perspectives. Their scrutiny created further distrust and friction with the analytic workforce and likely contributed to the perception of an imposed narrative.

Coupled with these changes and differing requirements, we found a notable lack of communication from CCJ2 leaders at multiple levels explaining the changes, providing guidance on what they sought, giving feedback on the edits they were making, or communicating their expectations to the analytic workforce. We believe this failure was a significant cause of the analysts' belief in distortion, and a significant reason that allegations were made.

Overall, we were struck by the inadequate efforts, especially during the first 6 months of the counter-ISIL campaign, and continuing until the allegations of distortion became public and the initiation of this investigation, by CCJ2 senior leaders to communicate with the workforce and to address the serious concerns among intelligence analysts about distortion of their products.

As reflected in surveys and witnesses' testimony, the command climate deteriorated after MG Grove and Mr. Ryckman first arrived at the CCJ2. However, it is important to note that it has improved since the lowest point in 2014. MG Grove and Mr. Ryckman eventually took some positive steps to address command climate issues within the CCJ2, which resulted in improvements in the 2015 and 2016 survey results. Yet, we believe that additional improvements can be made in the CCJ2, and we provide specific recommendations regarding such steps.

### **III. Recommendations resulting from investigation**

During our investigation, we identified various weaknesses and flaws in the process that we believe contributed to the allegations, as well as the widespread perception that CCJ2 senior intelligence leaders were distorting intelligence to present a more positive view of the success of the ISF and a more negative view of the success of ISIL. We also believe these management deficiencies hindered the effectiveness and efficiency of the CCJ2 and JICCEN, as well as the morale of the analytic workforce.

Our review concluded that more effective communication and feedback throughout the organization, improved written policies and guidance, and better application of analytical tradecraft, such as Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203's standard of incorporating analysis of alternatives, could have mitigated some of the conflict and concern about CCJ2 and JICCEN intelligence products and analysis, as well as improved the intelligence production process. In our report, we discuss 29 recommendations in the following sections:

1. Communication and Feedback,
2. Organizational Change and Priorities,
3. Inconsistency and Ambiguity in the Production and Analytical Review Process,
4. Friendly Force Assessment, and
5. Balance of the Intelligence Effort.

Some of the most important recommendations include that:

- USCENTCOM improve feedback, communication, and guidance between CCJ2 leaders and their workforce (Recommendations #1 and #2);

- USCENTCOM update and maintain its JICCENT standard operating procedures, including the employment of the Intelligence Fusion Center (Recommendation #5);
- The relationship, reporting responsibilities, and intelligence requirements that apply to DIA analysts detailed to combatant commands should be clarified, in writing, so that DIA employees and their supervisors clearly understand their roles and responsibilities (Recommendation #11);
- CCJ2 and JICCENT leaders should provide clearer guidance and feedback to the analysts on how intelligence products are reviewed and considered above the JICCENT level. JICCENT should incorporate additional training to address any trends or systemic deficiencies identified in intelligence products (Recommendation #16);
- USD(I) supervise DIA's training and certification of DIA analysts assigned to USCENTOM (Recommendation #17);
- USCENTCOM intelligence leaders should avoid stating or implying any blanket policy that eliminates or reduces sources of intelligence, especially in crisis situations where there may be poor clarity and limited sources. (Recommendation #22);
- CCJ2 leaders should require that intelligence analysis include analysis of alternatives. Consider requiring multiple courses of action, when feasible, to encourage comparison and evaluation of reports (Recommendation # 26).

We also recommend that senior leaders in the responsible organization review this report with regard to the overall performance of the individuals described in this report.

We believe that all 29 recommendations are important, and that they provide a useful roadmap for improving intelligence processes, not only in USCENTCOM, but throughout other Combatant Commands and the DoD. We also note that many of our recommendations are consistent with what the U.S. House of Representatives Task Force found.

We therefore urge the DoD, DIA, and USCENTCOM to take these recommendations seriously and to fully implement corrective action in response to the recommendations, or to explain in detail why such corrective action is not necessary or warranted. We believe that such actions can further improve intelligence processes and reduce the risk that allegations such as the ones at issue in this report will arise in the future.

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our investigation with the Subcommittee. This concludes my statement and I would be glad to answer any questions you may have.

**Glenn A. Fine**  
**Acting Inspector General**  
**U.S. Department of Defense**

On January 10, 2016, Glenn A. Fine became the Acting Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Defense. Mr. Fine was named as the Department of Defense Principal Deputy Inspector General on June 1, 2015. Prior to joining the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, he was a partner at Dechert LLP in the White Collar and Securities Litigation Practice.

Mr. Fine previously served as Inspector General of the Department of Justice (DOJ) from 2000 to 2011. He also served as Special Counsel to the DOJ Inspector General and as Director of the Special Investigations and Review Unit (1995 to 2000).

Mr. Fine earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in economics from Harvard College and his Juris Doctorate from Harvard Law School, graduating magna cum laude both times. He also obtained bachelor's and master's degrees from Oxford University where he was a Rhodes Scholar.

While at Harvard, Mr. Fine served as co-captain of the Harvard varsity basketball team and was later a 10th-round draft pick by the San Antonio Spurs.

**Joint Statement for the Record**

**Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence  
Defense Intelligence Agency  
Joint Staff Director for Intelligence  
U.S. Central Command Director for Intelligence**

**HASC Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee**

**Hearing on the Department of Defense Inspector General Report: “Investigation on  
Allegations Relating to USCENTCOM Intelligence Products”**

**28 February 2017**

Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Moulton, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to offer the testimony of the Department of Defense (DoD) on the DoD Inspector General (IG) Report “Investigation Allegations Relating to USCENTCOM Intelligence Products.” The Department appreciates the extensive DoD IG report, and we are integrating its recommendations into our continuous efforts to improve intelligence analysis across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

It’s great to be here with Neil Wiley, Director for Analysis, Defense Intelligence Agency. Mr. Wiley serves as the Functional Manager for DoD All-Source Analysis on behalf of the DIA Director. Also with me are the Joint Staff Director for Intelligence, Maj Gen James Marrs, who serves as a focal point for intelligence activities at the Combatant Commands; and the USCENTCOM J-2 MG Mark Quantock, who leads USCENTCOM’s analytic workforce.

As senior leaders for defense intelligence, we hold ourselves to the highest standards, and take great pride in the exceptional intelligence professionals who support the full spectrum of DoD intelligence customers, from the President to the Soldier in the field. Every day, thousands of defense intelligence professionals across the globe tirelessly work to provide insight and



analysis without politicization. Our commitment is, and always will be, to provide unvarnished intelligence and key assessments into the myriad of issues facing our country each day.

The Department has already taken a number of policy, governance, and oversight steps over the past several years to create a stronger foundation for objective, high quality defense intelligence analysis. While these steps were initiated without specific reference to the IG investigation at USCENTCOM, and some predate that investigation, our actions align with many of the IG's recommendations.

- Analytic quality and objectivity are priorities for the Department. In a May 2016 memo to Defense Intelligence components, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) stated that improvements in tradecraft and adherence to analytic integrity standards were key to strengthening defense intelligence analysis.
- The USD(I) also sponsored the first ever Analytic Objectivity Symposium in September 2016 bringing together diverse communities responsible for producing objective, defensible, and useful analysis in finance and accounting, medical and academic research, law enforcement, and intelligence. The expert speakers at the symposium agreed that a combination of analyst training, clear tradecraft standards, application of structured analytic techniques, and supervisory and oversight measures can reduce the incidence of bias and politicization in analysis and yield high quality analytic products. The Office of the USD(I) has made the symposium proceedings widely available and will follow up with additional public events to provide DoD intelligence analysts access to a wide range of resources and ideas.
- In November 2016, the USD(I) signed a new policy titled "Management and Oversight of DoD All-Source Analysis," that provides for the first time a framework for DoD

intelligence analysis. This policy extends Intelligence Community analytic standards to all DoD intelligence analytic organizations, including those within the Combatant Commands. The policy establishes training, education, and certification programs for defense intelligence all-source analysis; these programs are keystones for improving analytic tradecraft and helping to ensure analysis is objective.

- Further, the policy institutionalizes the role of a Functional Manager for DoD All-Source Analysis (FM/A) and assigns that role to the Director of DIA. Overall, the FM/A, in collaboration with the USD(I) and DoD intelligence analytic organizations, will promote an analytic environment of data sharing and trust.
- The FM/A plays a significant role in DoD training and certification programs – two key areas that help ensure that analysis is free from bias. Accordingly, DIA has developed a Professional Analyst Career Education (PACE) program to train DIA analysts and managers of analysts, whether they serve at DIA headquarters or a combatant command, to a consistent tradecraft standard, including analytic objectivity. DIA also offers the Defense Intelligence Enterprise numerous courses on providing manager feedback to analysts. DIA is also managing the Certified All-Source Analyst (CDASA) program, a three-tiered credentialing program that recognizes DoD personnel who have demonstrated, through experience and analytic knowledge, a level of competence consistent with the baseline of the analytic profession. More than 600 DoD analysts from DIA, Combatant Commands, and Services have achieved the CDASA Tier 1 certification. An exam for Tier 2 certification is being developed for mid-level analysts, and the Tier 3 certification is in planning for advanced analysts. CDASA professionalizes, unifies, and integrates defense intelligence all-source analysis by

validating individuals who consistently meet and sustain common standards for competency in knowledge, skills, and practice.

- The FM/A and OUSD(I) jointly chair the Defense Analytic Tradecraft Council (DATC), which serves as a forum for advancing analytic integrity and tradecraft standards across the Department. The DATC has already provided guidance and best practices for DoD intelligence analytic organizations to establish both an analytic ombudsman program—with the goal of developing a corps of senior analytic personnel to serve as analytic ombudsmen equipped to monitor and react confidentially and appropriately to any real or perceived instance of analytic manipulation—and a periodic analytic product review program, which evaluates finished analytic products based on Intelligence Community analytic tradecraft standards.
- OUSD(I) has been working closely with ODNI to elevate ODNI's annual Analytic Objectivity and Process Survey more broadly throughout the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. OUSD(I) has encouraged Combatant Commands, in particular, to have their analysts respond to ensure we are collecting the most comprehensive data possible on current perceptions and concerns related to analytic objectivity.
- Finally, OUSD(I) is developing an analytic oversight program that will include site visits to the Combatant Commands, Service Intelligence Centers, counterintelligence analytic components, and combat support agencies to gauge the health of the defense intelligence analytic community. The assessment criteria are drawn from the new DoD all-source analysis policy and from OUSD(I) emphasis areas articulated in the May 2016 memo to the DoD intelligence analytic organizations to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of defense analytic operations while implementing rigorous risk management processes.

- USCENTCOM has developed and is executing an aggressive action plan to make improvements and address the recommendations from the DoD IG and the Joint Task Force.

The Department's actions have already established a firm foundation for DoD intelligence analysis. We look forward to continuing along this path to ensure that DoD analysis meets the highest standards of quality and objectivity.

**Jacques T. Grimes**  
**Director, Defense Analysis and Partner Engagement**  
**Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence**

Mr. Grimes assumed duties as USD(I)'s Director for Defense Analysis and Partner Engagement (DAPE) on January 4, 2016. He provides direction and oversight of the department's Intelligence Analysis Enterprise and its US Government and international partnerships. The scope of his duties include working with other OSD and Intelligence Community (IC) offices, the Combat Support Agencies, the Military Services, Combatant Commands, Allied governments and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to enhance military intelligence sharing and to make the Intelligence Analysis Enterprise as effective as possible.

Mr. Grimes previously served as USD(I)'s Director for HUMINT and Sensitive Activities where he developed and oversaw policy, advocated for and enabled Defense HUMINT & Sensitive Activities while advising the USD(I) on HUMINT, Cover and National sensitive programs. Prior to that, he served as the Deputy Director, Defense Combating Terrorism Center (DCTC), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). DCTC is a joint, cross- functional Department of Defense (DoD) CT organization, focused on terrorism-related warning, support to collection and military operations, and decision-making. As Chief, Office of Operations Integration (DXI), Defense CI & HUMINT Center, Mr. Grimes integrated, synchronized and deconflicted DoD counterintelligence and HUMINT. He was appointed Assistant Deputy Director for National Intelligence for HUMINT in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) where he worked closely with the National HUMINT Manager, NCS, and USD(I) to identify and exploit opportunities for integration, meaningful end-to-end performance measurements of HUMINT outcomes, and to realign resources to boost overall strength and efficiencies of the National HUMINT Enterprise. Mr. Grimes also served as the Chief, Office of HUMINT Campaigns and HUMINT Targeting in the Directorate for Human Intelligence at DIA .

A dependent of a Foreign Service Officer, Mr. Grimes began his federal service in 1981 as a foreign Export Controls Coordinator with the Office of Strategic Trade Controls-COCOM, U.S. Mission to the Office of Economic Coordination and Development. He joined the U.S. Army's Military Intelligence Excepted Career Program in 1986 and was assigned as an Intelligence Officer in controlled HUMINT collection in Frankfurt, Germany, and later as Senior Intelligence Officer in Karlsruhe, Germany. Mr. Grimes returned to CONUS in 1992 where he served in various positions of increasing responsibility within DIA's Directorate for Human Intelligence, to include deployments to the Balkans in support of a Special Access Program during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR and to the Iraq Survey Group, Baghdad, serving as Chief of Operations and Analysis in support of the DCI's Special Advisor on Weapons of Mass Destruction. Mr. Grimes has worked and resided in various overseas posts including Panama, Scotland, Malta, Trinidad, Tobago, France, Belgium, Zaire, Tunisia, Denmark, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

A graduate of St. John's University, Mr. Grimes holds a B.A. in Political Science and Linguistics. He studied Romance Languages and Linguistics as a graduate student at Columbia University, New York, and speaks fluent French and German, limited Arabic, Spanish and Italian. Mr. Grimes is also a graduate of the Military Operations Training Course, the Military Operations Seminar, Harvard University's JFK School of Government, and a myriad of management training courses within the IC.

Mr. Grimes is the recipient of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Meritorious Civilian Service Award, the Director DIA Intelligence Award, the National Intelligence Superior Service Medal, the Ellis Award for Excellence in HUMINT Collaboration, and the Presidential Rank Award.

He is married with four children and resides in Northern Virginia.

January 2017

**Neil R. Wiley**  
**Director for Analysis**  
**Defense Intelligence Agency**

Mr. Neil Wiley has over 30 years of experience in the national security arena both as a naval officer and as a civilian intelligence professional. He was appointed Director for Analysis (DI) in August 2015 and leads DIA's all-source analytic effort across the regional, functional and S&TI portfolios, producing Defense Intelligence in support of policymakers, military planners and warfighters, and defense acquisition. As DI, he also serves as Functional Manager for all-source analysis for the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, responsible for the alignment, quality, and integrity of the analytic output of DIA, the service intelligence centers, and the combatant commands. Mr. Wiley also serves as the Analysis Career Field (ACF) Manager responsible for overseeing the career development of DIA intelligence analysts.

Prior to his current posting, Mr. Wiley served as the Principal Deputy Director for Analysis. He has also served as Chief of DIA's Technology and Long-Range Analysis Office, responsible for analysis of emerging defense technologies and forecasting future global trajectories and long-term adversary force structures and military capabilities in support of Defense Department acquisition and force shaping. He also served as Chief, DIA Military Forces Analysis Office, responsible for producing and maintaining foundational military order of battle on behalf of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise in support of warfighters, planners and policymakers, and as Defense Intelligence Integration Officer (DIIO) for Military Issues. Prior to that, Mr. Wiley served at the United States European Command's Joint Analysis Center from 2003 through 2012 in various capacities including Maritime Intelligence Branch Chief, Warfare Support Division Chief, Deputy Senior Defense Intelligence Analyst and Deputy Director of Intelligence.

Mr. Wiley served in the United States Navy from 1983 through 2003, initially as a Surface Line Officer and, latterly, as an Intelligence Officer. During his naval career, Mr. Wiley served operational tours in USS BRISCOE (DD 977), USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71) and USS AMERICA (CV 66). Additionally, he served as a tactics instructor, Senior Intelligence Officer for a National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP) Operations Team, and Operations Officer for the USEUCOM Joint Analysis Center. Mr. Wiley's last assignment in uniform was as US Liaison Officer to the United Kingdom's Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) from 2000 through 2003.

Awards and honors include a number of military awards and decorations, the DIA Exceptional Civilian Service Medal and creation as an Honorary Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire (OBE) for service as US Liaison Officer to PJHQ.

Born and raised in Baltimore, Maryland, Mr. Wiley attended the University of Maryland, where he earned degrees in Biological Sciences and Ancient History and Classical Languages. Mr. Wiley is married to the former Alison Michelli, a writer. They reside in Charlottesville, Virginia with their son and a black Labrador named Hannibal.

**Major General James Marrs**  
**Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, J-2**

Major General James R. Marrs is the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. He serves as the principal intelligence adviser to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and is responsible for all aspects of the management and execution of the Joint Staff's intelligence support to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense. He leads a team of professionals providing current and crisis intelligence, warning, and intelligence insights and advice to operations, policy and plans, and acquisition.

Major General Marrs was commissioned in 1987 as a distinguished honors graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy. His career includes a variety of duties spanning operations, strategy, policy, and plans. His deployments include participation in operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Southern Watch, and Enduring Freedom, and he has commanded at the squadron, group, center, and wing levels.

Major General Marrs is a graduate of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. He also served as a special adviser to the Vice President of the United States, where he provided advice and expertise on a range of national security issues. Prior to his current assignment, General Marrs served as the Director for Intelligence, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland.

**EDUCATION**

1987 Bachelor of Science, International Affairs, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.  
 1989 Master of Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.  
 1993 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.  
 1998 Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.  
 1999 Master of Airpower Art and Science, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala.  
 2003 Senior Service School, National Defense Fellow, Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, Va.  
 2006 National Security Management Course, Maxwell School, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y.  
 2007 Executive Leadership Seminar, Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill  
 2009 Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.  
 2010 Senior Executive Fellows Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.  
 2014 Senior Joint Information Operations Applications Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

**ASSIGNMENTS**

1. June 1987 – July 1989, Student, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
2. July 1989 – January 1990, Student, Intelligence Officer Technical Training, Goodfellow AFB, Tex.
3. January 1990 – November 1992, Intelligence Requirements Officer, Air Force Electronic Warfare Center, Kelly AFB, Tex.
4. November 1992 – May 1993, Chief, Center C4I Systems, Air Force Electronic Warfare Center, Kelly AFB, Tex.
5. May 1993 – August 1993, Chief, Command and Control Warfare Tactical Analysis Branch, Air Force Electronic Warfare Center, Kelly AFB, Tex.
6. August 1993 – March 1994, Command Staff Analyst, Commander's Action Group, Headquarters Air Intelligence Agency, Kelly AFB, Tex.
7. March 1994 – August 1997, Operations Officer, 18 Intelligence Squadron, Schriever AFB, Colo.
8. August 1997 – July 1998, Student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
9. July 1998 – June 1999, Student, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala.



10. June 1999 – August 2000, Chief, Air and Space Strategy Branch, Directorate of Strategic Planning, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
11. August 2000 – February 2001, Chief, Information Operations, and Speechwriter for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Chief of Staff of the Air Force Operations Group, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
12. February 2001 – June 2001, Director of Operations, 70 Intelligence Wing, Fort George G. Meade, Md.
13. June 2001 – August 2002, Commander, 91st Intelligence Squadron, Fort George G. Meade, Md.
14. August 2002 – April 2003, National Defense Fellow, Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, Va.
15. April 2003 – June 2005, Special Adviser to the Vice President, National Security Affairs, the White House, Washington, D.C.
16. July 2005 – June 2007, Commander, National Security Agency/Central Security Service Texas, and 543rd Intelligence Group, Lackland AFB, Tex.
17. June 2007 – April 2009, Commander, 480th Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Wing, Langley AFB, Va.
18. April 2009 – June 2009, Student, Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
19. June 2009 – July 2010, Senior Air Force Planner and Chief, Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Security Council Matters Division, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
20. July 2010 – July 2011, Senior Military Assistant, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Washington, D.C.
21. August 2011 – July 2012, Deputy to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters International Security Assistance Force, Kabul, Afghanistan and Deputy Director of Intelligence, United States Forces-Afghanistan
22. July 2012 – February 2014, Vice Director for Intelligence, Joint Chiefs of Staff J2 and Director, Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force (APTF), the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
23. March 2014 – June 2015, Director of Intelligence, U.S. Cyber Command, Fort George G. Meade, Md.
24. June 2015 – present, Director for Intelligence, Joint Chiefs of Staff J2, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

#### **SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS**

1. April 2003 – June 2005, Special Adviser to the Vice President, National Security Affairs, the White House, Washington, D.C., as a Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel
2. June 2009 – July 2010, Senior Air Force Planner and Chief, Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Security Council Matters Division, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C., as a Colonel
3. July 2010 – July 2011, Senior Military Assistant, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Washington, D.C., as a Colonel and Brigadier General
4. August 2011 – July 2012, Deputy to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters International Security Assistance Force, Kabul, Afghanistan and Deputy Director for Intelligence, United States Forces-Afghanistan, as a Brigadier General
5. July 2012 – February 2014, Vice Director for Intelligence, Joint Chiefs of Staff J2 and Director, Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force (APTF), the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., as a Brigadier General
6. March 2014 – June 2015, Director of Intelligence, U.S. Cyber Command, Fort George G. Meade, Md., as a Brigadier General and Major General
7. June 2015 – present, Director for Intelligence, Joint Chiefs of Staff J2, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

#### **MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS**

Defense Superior Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters  
 Legion of Merit  
 Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters  
 Air Force Commendation Medal  
 Air Force Achievement Medal

**EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION**

Second Lieutenant – May 27, 1987

First Lieutenant – May 27, 1989

Captain – May 27, 1991

Major – Sept. 1, 1997

Lieutenant Colonel – May 1, 2000

Colonel – Aug. 1, 2004

Brigadier General – Apr. 1, 2011

Major General – Aug. 2, 2014

July 2015

**Major General Mark R. Quantock, U.S. Army**  
**Director of Intelligence**  
**Headquarters, United States Central Command**

Major General Mark R. Quantock assumed duties as Director of Intelligence (CCJ2), United States Central Command, July 2016. MG Quantock received his commission from the New Mexico Military Institute. He has a BA from the State University of New York (SUNY), Plattsburg, and Master's Degrees from Central Michigan and the National War College. MG Quantock has served in a variety of Military Intelligence, staff and command positions. His most recent assignment was as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Resolute Support, CJ2, U.S. Forces Afghanistan in Kabul where he served as the senior intelligence officer in theater with oversight over all intelligence operations in Afghanistan. Previous key staff assignments included the Military Deputy of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), Fort Belvoir, VA; Deputy Director for Trans-Regional Policy, J-5, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.; CJ-2 International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan; and G3 Army Cyber Command/2nd US Army, Ft. Belvoir, VA. His other combat assignments include: Intelligence Advisor/Liaison Officer for Joint Forces Command-East, OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/STORM, Saudi Arabia; Commander, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, V Corps, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq.

MG Quantock lives in Tampa, FL with his wife Rebecca; they have three adult children. MG Quantock is authorized to wear the Defense Superior Service Medal with 3 Oak Leaf Cluster (OLC), Legion of Merit with three OLCs, Bronze Star with OLC, and numerous other personal and unit awards.

01 June, 2016

