[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE FUTURE OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND
PROTECTIVE SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 2, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-1
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
John Katko, New York Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Will Hurd, Texas Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Martha McSally, Arizona J. Luis Correa, California
John Ratcliffe, Texas Val Butler Demings, Florida
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin
Clay Higgins, Louisiana
John H. Rutherford, Florida
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan V. O'Hara, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND PROTECTIVE SECURITY
John Katko, New York, Chairman
Peter T. King, New York Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Mike Rogers, Alabama William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Krista P. Harvey, Subcommittee Staff Director
Cedric C. Haynes, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
and Protective Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Bonnie Watson Coleman, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Transportation and Protective Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Witnesses
Mr. Roger Dow, CEO, U.S. Travel Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Ms. Nina E. Brooks, Head of Security, Airports Council
International:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
Mr. J. David Cox, Sr., National President, American Federation of
Government Employees:
Oral Statement................................................. 25
Prepared Statement............................................. 26
Appendix
Questions From Honorable Brian Fitzpatrick for Roger Dow......... 45
Question From Honorable Brian Fitzpatrick for Nina E. Brooks..... 46
THE FUTURE OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
----------
Thursday, February 2, 2017
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Transportation and
Protective Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
Room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. John Katko [Chairman
of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Katko, Higgins, Watson Coleman,
Keating, and Payne.
Also present: Representative Jackson Lee.
Mr. Katko. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee
on Transportation and Protective Security will come to order.
Before I commence with my statement, I do want to note for the
record how happy I am to have Mrs. Watson Coleman as my new
Ranking Chair on this.
We have a very good working relationship, as well we
should. I think it is something more people in Congress could
try and do. We are going to endeavor to do that going forward.
So Mrs. Watson Coleman, welcome, and thank you for being on
the committee with me.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. Delighted to be here with
you.
Mr. Katko. Thank you for being here as well, Mr. Payne.
There are others in the committee. They have some conflicts, so
may be coming in and out, but we will deal with that as we move
forward.
The subcommittee is meeting today to examine how TSA can
better achieve its mission to secure transportation systems
across the United States. In addition, the hearing will cover
opportunities for TSA to improve, as it relates to
technological advances and communications, for the State,
local, and private-sector partners.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement. I would
like to welcome everyone to the Subcommittee on Transportation
and Protective Security's first hearing of the 115th Congress,
which gave us added responsibilities to have oversight of the
Secret Service as well as TSA. So, we kind-of doubled our
workload here, much to the chagrin of my staff.
I am grateful to my constituents for giving me the
opportunity and privilege to return to Congress and continue to
Chair this important subcommittee. This committee has a proven
track record of working together to advance long-term, common-
sense, and strategic reforms to the Department of Homeland
Security.
While there may be divisions and discord elsewhere, here in
this room, we all share an unshakable commitment to ensuring
the security of the traveling public, because we know that the
consequences of failure are just too great.
The Transportation Security Administration was founded just
weeks after 9/11. Congress did what it does best. It reacted to
a crisis, and unfortunately threw a lot of money at it without
sometimes thinking about the overall structure.
Here we are nearly 16 years later. The American taxpayer
has spent billions of dollars. It is clear that TSA is long
overdue for an overhaul. The agency has been plagued with
uncertainty and a lack of consistent leadership. Since 2014,
TSA has had 6 different administrators leading the agency--6.
While we have been able to advance legislation to address
many of the challenges that TSA faces, it is incumbent upon us
to provide clearer direction and intent for this often-troubled
agency in the form of a full-scale reauthorization, and find a
way to limit the revolving door of leadership.
Without continuity at the top, it is impossible for any
organization to successfully implement a long-term strategic
vision. Instead, we have all been left with the many fits and
starts of the last few years.
I have juxtaposed that with, for example, the FBI, an
agency where the director is there for a 10-year term and how
the stability really helps moving forward.
Under former Administrator Neffenger, TSA began to move in
the right direction. A new training and education program was
put into place for all front-line employees.
Emphasis was placed on engagement with the private sector.
TSA launched an innovation task force to seek out new
technologies. All of these things had a very positive effect on
morale, at least to some extent.
While these were important first steps, they did not go far
enough, and now many of these potentially transformative
initiatives are left to languish or disappear altogether with
yet another change in leadership when the President names a new
administrator.
It would be wise for the new administrator to continue to
build upon many of these positive changes initiated by Admiral
Neffenger.
When confirmed, he or she will have an eager partner in the
subcommittee to help garner Congressional support for reform
and improvement within the agency. Over the last few years, we
saw record-breaking numbers of Americans traveling.
Unfortunately, TSA was at times ill-prepared for the volume of
travelers and was caught flat-footed.
At the height of the wait-time crisis last summer, news
coverage around the country showed passengers stranded at
airports overnight due to long TSA wait lines, sleeping on cots
or on the floor. The number of passengers will continue to
increase. We must ensure TSA is prepared to effectively and
efficiently screen passengers.
Simultaneously, TSA must focus on working with its State
and local partners to keep all areas of our airports safe and
secure. This issue was front and center on January 7 when a
disturbed individual opened fire in the baggage claim area at
the Hollywood-Fort Lauderdale International Airport, resulting
in the loss of 5 lives and scores of injuries.
Air traffic was brought to a halt as law enforcement
officials and first responders rushed to contain the situation.
This tragic incident served as a stark reminder of the threats
facing our Nation's aviation system.
Although TSA is one of the youngest agencies in the Federal
Government, it has come to operate as an entrenched Federal
bureaucracy. This means that oftentimes it fails to achieve
important efficiencies. It lacks the flexibility to respond to
an ever-changing threat landscape.
I believe, that with the start of this new administration
we have a unique opportunity to effect positive change at TSA.
The purpose of our hearing today is to look forward--not
backwards, forward.
We will hear from the many willing and ready partners TSA
has to help inform us what innovations and efficiencies TSA
could better leverage to enhance its ability to achieve its
critical mission.
The private sector is a primary engine of innovation and
efficiency in the U.S. economy. The Department of Homeland
Security and TSA must look to them for best practices and new
technologies that can simultaneously improve aviation security
and passenger experience.
I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses today
on the specific reforms necessary to advance TSA and make the
traveling public safer.
[The statement of Chairman Katko follows:]
Statement of Chairman John Katko
February 2, 2017
I would like to welcome everyone to the Subcommittee on
Transportation and Protective Security's first hearing of the 115th
Congress. I am grateful to my constituents for giving me the
opportunity and privilege to return to Congress and continue to chair
this important subcommittee. This committee has a proven track record
of working together to advance long-term, common-sense strategic
reforms to the Department of Homeland Security. While there may be
divisions and discord elsewhere, here in this room, we all share an
unshakable commitment to ensuring the security of the traveling public,
because we know that the consequences of failure are too great.
The Transportation Security Administration was founded just weeks
after 9/11. Congress did what it does best--it reacted to a crisis and
threw money at a problem. Here we are nearly 16 years later, the
American taxpayer has spent billions of dollars, and it is clear that
TSA is long overdue for an overhaul. The agency has long been plagued
with uncertainty and a lack of leadership. Since 2014, TSA has had 6
different administrators leading the agency. While we have been able to
advance legislation to address many of the challenges that TSA faces,
it is incumbent upon us to provide clearer direction and intent for
this often troubled agency in the form of a full-scale reauthorization,
and find a way to limit the revolving door of leadership. Without
continuity at the top, it is impossible for any organization to
successfully implement a long-term strategic vision. Instead, we have
all been left with the many fits and starts of the last few years.
Under former Administrator Neffenger, TSA began to move in the
right direction. A new training and education program was put into
place for all front-line employees, emphasis was placed on engagement
with the private sector, and TSA launched an Innovation Task Force to
seek out new technologies. While these were important first steps, they
did not go far enough, and now many of these potentially transformative
initiatives are left to languish or disappear altogether with yet
another change in leadership when the President names a new
administrator. It would be wise for the new administrator to continue
to build upon many of these positive changes initiated by Admiral
Neffenger. When confirmed, he or she will have an eager partner in this
subcommittee, to help garner Congressional support for reform and
improvement within the agency.
Over the last year, we saw record-breaking numbers of Americans
traveling; unfortunately TSA was ill-prepared for the volume of
travelers and was caught flat-footed. At the height of the wait times
crisis, news coverage around the country showed passengers, stranded at
airports overnight due to long TSA wait lines, sleeping on cots. The
number of passengers will continue to increase, and we must ensure TSA
is prepared to effectively and efficiently screen passengers.
Simultaneously, TSA must focus on working with its State and local
partners to keep all areas of our airports safe and secure. This issue
was front and center on January 7, when a disturbed individual opened
fire in the baggage claim area at the Hollywood-Fort Lauderdale
International Airport. The incident resulted in the loss of 5 lives and
scores of injuries. Air traffic was brought to a halt as law
enforcement officials and first responders rushed to contain the
situation. This tragic incident served as a stark reminder of the
threats facing our Nation's aviation system.
Although TSA is one of the youngest agencies in the Federal
Government, it has come to operate as an entrenched Federal
bureaucracy. This means that often times it fails to achieve important
efficiencies, and it lacks the flexibility to respond to an ever-
changing threat landscape. I believe that with the start of this new
administration, we have a unique opportunity to affect positive change
at TSA.
The purpose of our hearing today is to look forward. We will hear
from the many willing and ready partners TSA has to help inform us what
innovations and efficiencies TSA could better leverage to enhance its
ability to achieve its critical mission. The private sector is the
primary engine of innovation and efficiency in the U.S. economy. The
Department of Homeland Security and TSA must look to them for best
practices and new technologies that can simultaneously improve aviation
security and passenger experience. I look forward to hearing from all
of our witnesses today, on the specific reforms necessary to advance
TSA and make the traveling public safer.
I would like to thank all of you for being here today and with
that, I am pleased to recognize the new Ranking Member of the
subcommittee, the gentlelady from New Jersey, Ms. Watson Coleman, for
her opening statement.
Mr. Katko. With that, I am pleased to recognize the new
Ranking Member of the subcommittee, the gentlelady from New
Jersey, Mrs. Watson Coleman, for her opening statement.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Chairman Katko. I really do
appreciate this opportunity to work with you. I look forward to
working in a bipartisan way to ensure that we have efficiency,
effectiveness, and a robust traveling economy that benefits
from the things that we shall do together.
I want to thank you for convening this hearing. At the
outset, let me say that I am looking forward to working with
the Transportation and Protective Security Committee to address
those challenges within all modes of transportation.
The Transportation Security Administration as well as
airlines, airports, and other stakeholders have experienced
major challenges recently in regard to aviation security. While
there have been many lessons learned and improvements made to
aviation security, there is much to be done in this area.
Mr. Dow. I understand that the U.S. Travel Association has
taken time to produce a plan for the future of aviation
security. I look forward to hearing your perspective on how we
can enhance security while facilitating an efficient experience
for travelers.
I also look forward to your perspective on ensuring that
the aviation security fee, which is currently diverted to
offsetting the deficit, is utilized as a resource for enhancing
aviation security, the purpose for which it was originally
introduced.
Ms. Brooks, I look forward to hearing the perspective of
aviation security stakeholders around the world through your
expertise as head of security for Airports Council
International. Aviation security is a global issue. Your
exposure to technology and diverse security policies through
the Smart Security initiative will add great value to this
hearing.
President Cox, I thank you for being here today. In 2016,
TSOs screened more than 738 million passengers, 466 million
checked bags, and discovered more than 3,300 firearms in carry-
on bags.
However, when issues arise at the Nation's checkpoints,
such as lengthy wait times associated with the recent peak
travel season or reported high failure rates from covert
testing, transportation security officials usually bear the
brunt of the traveling public's frustrations.
Eventually, we learned that a multitude of factors can
contribute to these issues, including, but not limited to,
technology, policies, and management, not just transportation
security officers.
I thank TSOs for working day in and day out to ensure that
no weapon or person with ill intent is able to harm us via our
commercial aviation system. I look forward to your testimony
about disparities between the rights of these Federal employees
in comparison to those in the other workforce.
As we discuss the future of TSA and transportation
security, we cannot leave out the perspectives of those that
you represent. I also believe that this subcommittee must
convene a hearing on this topic that also includes the
perspective of the agency whose future we are discussing, the
Transportation Security Administration.
Last, year after year, the funding for the aviation sector
is multiples higher than the funding for the surface sector. My
district has extensive rail infrastructure, including Amtrak's
Northeast Corridor, as well as both freight and commuter trains
that run through it and are extremely important to my
constituents.
Given the attacks on trains in Brussels, in which a metro
train was the subject of a bombing that killed and injured
travelers, as well as the attempted attack on a high-speed
train traveling from Amsterdam to Paris, we must ensure that
discussions of the future of TSA and transportation security
also incorporate other modes of transportation, Mr. Chairman. I
look forward to engaging in those opportunities with you.
Those who wish to do American citizens harm will continue
to attempt to exploit soft targets. We must shore up
vulnerabilities that exist throughout all transportation
systems.
Once again, I thank all witnesses for appearing before us
today and look forward to your testimony.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time, Mr.
Chairman.
[The statement of Ranking Member Watson Coleman follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bonnie Watson Coleman
February 2, 2017
The Transportation Security Administration, as well as airports,
airlines, and other stakeholders, have experienced major challenges
recently in regard to aviation security.
While there have been many lessons learned and improvements made to
aviation security, there is much left to be done in this area.
Mr. Dow, I understand that the U.S. Travel Association has taken
time to produce a plan for the future of aviation security, and I look
forward to hearing your perspective on how we can enhance security
while facilitating an efficient experience for travelers. I also look
forward to your perspective on ensuring that the aviation security fee,
which is currently diverted to offsetting the deficit, is utilized as a
resource for enhancing aviation security--the purpose for which it was
originally intended.
Ms. Brooks, I look forward to hearing the perspective of aviation
security stakeholders around the world through your expertise as head
of security for Airports Council International. Aviation security is a
global issue, and your exposure to technology and diverse security
policies through the Smart Security initiative will add great value to
this hearing.
President Cox, I thank you for being here today.
In 2016, Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) screened more than
738 million passengers, 466 million checked bags, and discovered more
than 3,300 firearms in carry-on bags.
However, when issues arise at the Nation's checkpoints, such as
lengthy wait times associated with the recent peak travel season, or
reported high failure rates from covert testing, transportation
security officers usually bear the brunt of the traveling public's
frustrations.
Eventually we learned that a multitude of factors can contribute to
these issues, including, but not limited to technology, policies, and
management--not just transportation security officers.
I thank TSOs for working day in and day out to ensure that no
weapon or person with ill intent is able to harm us via our commercial
aviation system.
I look forward to your testimony about disparities between the
rights of these Federal workers in comparison to those of other Federal
workers. As we discuss the future of TSA and transportation security,
we cannot leave out the perspectives of those that you represent.
I also believe that this subcommittee MUST convene a hearing on
this topic that also includes the perspective of the agency whose
future we are discussing, the Transportation Security Administration.
Lastly, year after year, the funding for the aviation sector is
multiples higher than the funding for the surface sector.
My district has extensive rail infrastructure, including Amtrak's
Northeast Corridor, as well as both freight and commuter trains that
run through it and are extremely important to my constituents.
Given the attacks on trains in Brussels, in which a metro train was
the subject of a bombing that killed and injured travelers, as well as
the attempted attack on a high-speed train travelling from Amsterdam to
Paris, we must ensure that discussions of the future of TSA and
transportation security also incorporate other modes of transportation.
Those who wish to do American citizens harm will continue to
attempt to exploit soft targets, and we must shore up vulnerabilities
that exist throughout our transportation systems.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mrs. Watson Coleman.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
February 2, 2017
The Transportation Security Administration is essential to our
Nation's security.
I believe that this committee, particularly this subcommittee
should work in a bipartisan fashion to achieve the shared goal of
advancing TSA.
However, we cannot discuss TSA's future without hearing from the
agency. It is my hope that after confirmation of a TSA administrator,
this subcommittee will hold a hearing to receive the administrator's
vision for the agency.
When we discuss TSA and its future, it is imperative that we give
attention to its workforce.
Contrary to statements made by the President--TSA is not a
``disaster'' and has not been on the brink of ``falling apart''.
Unfortunately, the President has used his public platform to
disparage TSA employees, many of whom are TSOs, Federal workers who are
at the front line of aviation security.
The President's irresponsible and baseless statements about the
component, which is already plagued with low morale, demoralizes a work
force who work day in and day out but do not receive the compensation
and benefits of other Federal employees.
I am introducing a bill that will give the TSOs the same rights as
Federal employees. As we consider options for improving TSA, I urge
both Congress and the administration to look for viable solutions that
actually improve security.
I know some of my colleagues across the aisle believe that putting
aviation security in the hands of contractors is a viable solution for
TSA.
I disagree. Our Nation's aviation security should not be for sale.
The pre-9/11 model of having a privatized screening workforce, is
not an option that can improve security. Instead, it puts security
directly in the hands of the best bidder.
When it comes to our Nation's security, we cannot operate off of
the best deal.
Instead we have to explore solutions, including improving
technological advancements. TSA needs technologies that address the
threats of tomorrow, instead of the threats from yesterday.
TSA also needs to ensure that it engages with the small business
community to ensure that those businesses with ideas and technologies
to improve security are not left out just because of their size.
Mr. Katko. We are very pleased to have a distinguished
panel here to testify before us today on this very important
topic. The idea of having you here is to hear from you the
concerns you have before we find out who the new administrator
is so that when an administrator gets here he will know that we
have a game plan as to what we would like to do to help them
address some of their issues.
Our first witness, Mr. Roger Dow, serves as the president
and chief executive officer for the U.S. Travel Association.
Prior to joining U.S. Travel in 2005, Mr. Dow had a 34-year
career at Marriott International. Most notably, Mr. Dow served
in the United States Army with the 101st Airborne Division in
Vietnam, where he received the Bronze Star and other citations.
That is something I think about often these days as my son
is beginning his career in the Army in the infantry after
graduating from college as an officer. So I will be swearing
him into the Army as an officer in May. That is going to be a
high honor for me, but also high fear, as you might imagine.
Our second witness, Ms. Nina Brooks, has been the head of
security at Airports Council International in Montreal since
2015. She has worked in the aviation industry for many years
and started her aviation career at Virgin Atlantic Airways.
In addition to her current role, Ms. Brooks also teaches
aviation security at McGill University, a truly fine
institution, and is a member of the editorial board of Aviation
Security International.
I am hoping at some point she invites me up to Montreal to
see a hockey game because I am a hockey nut. So I would be
happy to come up.
Our third witness is Mr. Cox, J. David Cox, the national
president of American Federation of Government Employees, whom
we know well. Mr. Cox was first elected president of AFGE in
August 2012 and was re-elected to a second 3-year term in
August 2015.
I have had many conversations with your group. I always
find it fruitful, productive, and helpful. So I applaud you for
that, and thank you all for being here today.
I now recognize Mr. Dow for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF ROGER DOW, CEO, U.S. TRAVEL ASSOCIATION
Mr. Dow. Thank you, Chairman Katko. Thanks to your son for
what he is about to do.
Ranking Member Watson Coleman, I am a Jersey boy. So I grew
up in Jersey, so my heart is there, and good to be with you.
Members of the committee, I thank you for allowing this
testimony.
I am talking on behalf of U.S. Travel, which represents the
entire of the travel industry, which is $2.1 trillion of our
economy and 15.1 million jobs, 1 in 9 jobs. Our mission is
simple, to get more people traveling to the United States and
within the United States.
We have been driving the National discussion on aviation
security and traveler security for a decade now and have worked
with every one of the administrators, and look forward to
working with the next administrator.
We have a belief that greater security and increased travel
are mutually compatible goals. I also believe that without
security there is no travel, period. So this is why this is so
important.
Five years ago, we made a recommendation to the TSA of
several points that we believed could take place. Last month,
we issued an update of that report. I was pleased that the
Chairman was with us as we rolled it out.
Also with us was Member Keating. It was an event at Roll
Call where we talked about items that I will get to that can
really make a difference here. It is very important with a new
Congress and the dawn of a new administration that we really
make sure that we are doing the right thing for the safety of
Americans.
We are pleased to offer many policy recommendations here.
We are going to suggest a new series of reforms that we think
are very important to give the American people the best return
on the investment that we are making in our country's security
at the airports.
We recognize TSA has a mission that is critical to detect
and deter any threats, and the challenge that you mentioned,
Mr. Chairman, of the 750 million people that go through
airports every year. It is complex. It is expensive. It is
extremely important. Recognize that TSA has made many good
moves. But we think there is more that can be done.
As you mentioned with the long lines and all that, there
have been some perceived failures. There have been real
failures, but also a perception that those lines could make it
difficult to travel. We have done some research that shows that
Americans would make two or three more trips if they felt they
could get through an airport efficiently.
But when they think there are big lines, they avoid the
trip and they make a telephone call. It is not nearly as
effective, as we know, as face-to-face.
We know there are many challenges that the TSA has faced
over the past 5 years. We think a lot of work remains.
Some of the ideas that we put forward--I would like to work
15 recommendations. But I would like to focus on just a few of
those in our report ``Transforming Security at Airports: An
Update on Progress and the Future of Aviation Security.''
First is fee diversion, and you mentioned that. It is so
important. What has basically happened is the fees went up by
$1.6 million but the decision was made to keep the amount of
money going to TSA at TSA, and that overflow would go to the
general fund.
We are strong believers that that one-third of fees should
go to TSA and to improve TSA. Congress should stop diverting
funds and put those fees toward staffing, technology,
equipment, et cetera.
The next way is the best way to really ensure this is
trusted traveler programs. We all know that PreCheck and the
Global Entry Program are very effective. But when it comes to
those programs, I talk about the four P's.
One is the process. We have got to get the ability to sign
people up efficiently. I don't think we need to have two forms
of ID. I can get on any plane, any airport, with one form of
ID. We can do things like that to get people signed up.
Promotion. If 10 million people signed up, it would be $850
million. In the private sector, if we had an opportunity to get
these people signed up, we would put money toward promoting it
and getting people to sign up.
We would also look at price. When you look at price, if it
is $85, to a businessman, that is not much. But if you take a
company that signs up several thousand people, we should figure
out a way to get a volume discount.
For a family of 4, that is $340. So we should think about
what we can do. Making it a priority is very important.
Next area I want to focus on is innovative technology. We
have got to not just talk about technology, but we have got to
put it in place and spend the money to do so.
Last place is empower the airports and the private sector
to really help in SPP, which is basically the Secure
Partnership Program, to really help bring more innovative
ideas, better security. We are extremely interested in this.
This committee is doing extraordinarily important work. As
I say once again, without security there is no travel. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dow follows:]
Prepared Statement of Roger Dow
February 2, 2017
Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Rice, and Members of the
subcommittee, I am pleased to offer testimony on behalf of the U.S.
Travel Association (U.S. Travel), the National non-profit organization
representing all sectors of America's travel community. I've testified
numerous times over the years on the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) and ideas the travel community has on improving
this vital security and facilitation part of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS).
The U.S. Travel Association has been driving the National
discussion regarding aviation safety and travel security for more than
a decade. Our advocacy is rooted in the belief that greater security
and increased travel are mutually compatible goals. Based on this view,
we commissioned a report 5 years ago offering recommendations for the
TSA. Late last year, we issued an update of that report, and were
pleased to have Chairman Katko and Subcommittee Member Keating
participate in the roll-out of that report at a Roll Call event in
November.
Despite some challenges, TSA has improved its performance over the
last 5 years, providing greater convenience to travelers while ensuring
a high level of safety and security across the system. In particular,
the TSA PreCheck trusted traveler program has been a major breakthrough
in improving the travel experience. The leadership of the last two TSA
administrators--John Pistole and Peter Neffenger--has been critical to
the growth of this very popular and effective program. I'm pleased to
report that our relationships with these two former administrators in
particular was of tremendous benefit to the travelling public, and we
look forward to similarly strong dealings with the Trump
administration's nominee for TSA once that is decided.
But no matter who the next nominee for TSA head is, he or she will
find that much work remains. As we've looked back at our policy
recommendations over the years, we've seen that some of the ideas our
organization put forward in 2011 still need to be implemented fully;
for others, work has not yet begun.
For example, we continue to believe that funds raised from TSA fees
should be used to improve transportation security, not be diverted to
general revenues. The Screening Partnership Program (SPP) has not yet
brought broad-based efficiency improvements and innovation to enough
checkpoints across the country. And we have not yet harnessed the
technology innovation of our country's leading security companies to
bring a better checkpoint experience to all travelers.
But the best opportunity to ensure security and get travelers
through lines quickly is presented by effective trusted traveler
programs such as TSA PreCheck. Efforts to continue that program's
expansion--for which you, Chairman Katko, have been such an effective
proponent--should focus on Four Ps: Process, promotion, price, and
prioritization.
We look forward to working with this committee, others in Congress,
the new leadership team at TSA and DHS, our colleagues in the travel
industry, and the traveling public to continue improving TSA so that it
delivers what we all deserve--the highest possible levels of security
and expanded travel facilitation.
background
In 2011, the U.S. Travel Association concluded a year-long expert-
led project to formulate recommendations for travel-enhancing changes
to the goals and performance of the TSA. Led by former Department of
Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge, Congressman Jim Turner, Sabre
CEO Sam Gilliland, and American Airlines CEO Robert Crandall, this
blue-ribbon panel issued a groundbreaking report, ``A Better Way,''
which made 14 recommendations for reforming TSA, based on the
experience of security professionals, input from industry stakeholders,
advice from privacy advocates, and surveys of travelers.
Six years later, we now urge the new administration and the new
Congress to place a renewed focus on refining and enhancing the
operations of the TSA. Its mission to detect and deter security threats
to the busiest aviation system in the world while facilitating the
travel of nearly 750 million fliers per year is a complex, expensive,
and extremely important undertaking. However, an effective TSA is
crucial not only to our National security, but also to the U.S.
economy. U.S. Travel surveys have demonstrated that the public travels
less when the system is bogged down by excessive or unpredictable wait
times, or TSA dysfunction and chaos. These real or perceived failures
impose an immense cost on the American economy. Research found that
travelers would take between two and three more trips per year if TSA
hassles could be reduced without compromising security effectiveness--
and these additional trips would add $85 billion in spending and
888,000 more jobs to our economy.
Unfortunately, the past 6 years for the TSA have been the most
tumultuous political and budgetary environment in recent history,
forcing the agency to regularly navigate a series of fiscal crises amid
its usual operational challenges. Notably, the TSA suffered a major
budgetary setback when the Murray-Ryan 2013 budget deal became law.
This law mandated that TSA fee increases be diverted to the General
Fund as part of a deficit reduction package, which U.S. Travel opposed.
These fees should have been appropriately reinvested into enhancing
security measures and creating a first-class travel experience. In
addition, despite many efforts by this subcommittee, Congress has
failed to reauthorize TSA since its original creation. This void
creates confusion and dysfunction, because numerous Congressional
committees have oversight of TSA and often provide inconsistent
recommendations on how to balance security, privacy, and facilitation.
The need to continually focus on TSA improvements was made obvious
to all during the spring and early summer of 2016. Unacceptably long
lines were commonplace at too many TSA checkpoints due to a combination
of more travelers, reductions in TSA screening staff numbers, and the
return of many travelers to the regular screening lanes after the
sudden end of the arbitrary ``managed inclusion'' practice from the
early days of TSA PreCheck. These lines were alleviated only through an
emergency real location of funds, along with significant efforts by
airlines and airports to assume non-essential tasks from TSA and invest
private-sector funds into many checkpoints. The crisis demonstrated,
however, that more structural changes are needed to help TSA succeed in
its mission of strengthening security and facilitating travel.
As we look at the beginning of a new Congressional session and the
dawn of a new administration, U.S. Travel is pleased to offer policy
recommendations on some of the most pressing issues facing our aviation
security system, suggesting a new series of reforms that would further
improve air travel in America, protect traveler privacy and dignity,
and give the American people the best return on their investment of
traveler fees and Government dollars.
recommendations
Redirect Airline Passenger Fees to Cover the Cost of and Improve TSA
Screening Operations
The 2013 budget deal (known as ``Murray-Ryan'') increased TSA fees
from $2.50 per segment to $5.60, but used the increased Federal revenue
as a general revenue measure, failing to provide the funds to TSA. Thus
more than one-third of all airline passenger fees collected are being
diverted from TSA aviation security screening to the General Fund until
fiscal year 2025. As a result, travelers are paying considerably more
in user fees but are not receiving the benefits of their fees in terms
of better TSA performance, shorter lines, or better-trained screeners.
This provision was included in the budget deal as one of many
measures designed to meet revenue targets and avert additional worry
about a Government shutdown or debt limit crisis. Changes to TSA ticket
taxes had been proposed numerous times by the Bush and Obama
administrations but were always rejected by Congress as an
inappropriate additional tax on travelers. During this budget
negotiation, however, the breadth of the budget package made it
possible for negotiators to not only include ticket tax increases, but
also to use the additional revenue as an offset for spending outside of
DHS or TSA. Over the objection of the travel and aviation industries,
the provision became law in early 2014, and became effective in July
2014.
Comparing 2013 to 2015, travelers paid $1.6 billion more in fees--
$3.5 billion vs. $1.9 billion--for the exact same service. This
diversion essentially requires travelers to fund aspects of Government
completely unrelated to TSA's mission--anything from military bands to
education funding to flood control.
While we recognize the emergency nature of the Murray-Ryan deficit
reduction package, Congress must reverse the on-going diversion.
Revenue raised from aviation security fees should go toward securing
travelers, not to deficit reduction. We support solutions to repeal the
current requirement that a portion of aviation security service fees be
credited as offsetting receipts and deposited into the General Fund of
the Treasury. More broadly, we encourage Congress to ensure that
security funding is used to improve all aspects of aviation security
including, but not limited to, staffing, developing technologies and
checkpoint and airport facility enhancements.
Improve and Expand the TSA Pre-Check Trusted Traveler Program
As urged in our 2011 report, TSA has implemented TSA PreCheck, a
voluntary, Government-run trusted traveler program that utilizes a
risk-based approach to checkpoint screening. The goal of TSA PreCheck
is to refocus resources on the higher-risk passengers and expedite
screening of low-risk, pre-vetted travelers. This program is one of the
most popular programs across all of Government, and one of the most
celebrated initiatives ever launched by the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS).
The current TSA PreCheck program allows travelers to apply for
program participation and, if eligible, receive expedited screening
through designated lanes at participating airports. Individuals who
apply pay $85 to receive the expedited screening benefit for 5 years.
As part of the application, individuals have a fingerprint-based
background check conducted by the FBI. As of early 2017, more than 4
million travelers are enrolled in TSA PreCheck and more than 3.7
million are enrolled in the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP)
Global Entry program, which also provides participants with PreCheck
benefits. TSA is working on providing additional enrollment mechanisms
and more fully integrating these marketing and enrollment mechanisms
for all trusted travel programs--not just TSA PreCheck.
The program, while generally successful, needs important reforms to
increase participation, particularly making enrollment more convenient
without sacrificing security.
Reduce the Cost of TSA PreCheck for Families and Corporate
Groups
Currently, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has required
TSA to charge a standard enrollment fee (currently $85 for 5 years) for
all TSA PreCheck applicants. This one-size-fits-all approach has
hindered efforts to enroll large classes of individuals that would
benefit TSA and more than pay for the cost of their enrollment. Thus, a
parent who is handling enrollment for 3 young children is treated the
same as 4 distinct enrollments. A corporate travel manager who is
handling enrollment for perhaps thousands of employees pays the same
fee per employee, ignoring obvious economies of scale.
For families, the math is important. While younger children (12 and
under) are allowed to join a parent in the TSA PreCheck lane, older
children cannot. The one-time cost of enrolling a family of 5 may be a
significant factor for many families and deter enrollment. We encourage
TSA and its partners at OMB to reconsider fee rules for children, offer
volume discounts, and explore a subscription model for fees that would
be paid on an annual basis, not 5 years at a time.
In terms of companies, Microsoft last year announced it would
reimburse employees for both TSA PreCheck and Global Entry. The company
hosted a mobile enrollment event for 800 employees as a first step to
potentially enrolling up to 5,000 employees. This decision came after
then-DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson and then-Commerce Secretary Penny
Pritzker wrote to 100 large U.S. companies requesting assistance in
marketing and promoting TSA PreCheck.
The fact that more companies have not followed Microsoft's lead may
be because the up-front cost of an $85 enrollment fee, multiplied by
hundreds or thousands of employees, is a measurable and significant
cost, with harder-to-measure returns. Providing quantity discounts to
corporate travel managers, especially those who supply applicants to
TSA for on-site enrollment, may create more corporate interest. Annual
payment plans would also spread the cost out and ease concerns for
cost-conscious managers.
Offer Vetted Populations for TSA PreCheck Expansion
Various proposals have been suggested to allow those individuals
who have passed a security review automatic access to TSA PreCheck,
including security clearance holders and Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC) card-holders. Millions of Americans
have gone through elaborate and regularly recurring background checks
deemed sufficient to provide them access to Classified information,
weapon systems, or sensitive transportation facilities and conveyances.
However, other than expansion to active military members, TSA has been
very slow to leverage Government security reviews for its own purposes.
As one particularly egregious example, an airport worker allowed access
to secure areas of an airport and aircraft in the morning is not
entitled to use the TSA PreCheck line if he or she is flying out of the
same airport later in the day.
We recognize that issuance of a clearance does not mean an
individual poses no risk. However, many of the categories listed above
go through a more elaborate background check than TSA PreCheck
requires. In an era where we expect that Government will coordinate
programs and not allow information to exist in silos, TSA should make
prompt decisions about expansion of the TSA PreCheck program to these
or other applicable populations.
Leverage REAL ID Compliance for TSA PreCheck Enrollment
The two-document requirement for TSA PreCheck applications is a
major deterrent to travelers who would otherwise start an enrollment
application spur-of-the-moment (i.e., with time to spend in an
airport). Currently, individuals who want to apply for TSA PreCheck,
but who do not have a passport (or one of six other forms of identity/
citizenship) must instead present two forms of identity documents--
generally, an unexpired driver's license and a U.S. birth certificate.
These identification requirements were set by law, and have not changed
over time. Obviously, most individuals rarely carry around their birth
certificates or passports, and thus, spontaneous enrollment in TSA
PreCheck is unlikely.
In 2005, Congress passed, and the President signed the REAL ID Act,
which set new security requirements for driver's licenses. After
numerous delays, implementation of the law will occur in two phases,
with one phase beginning in January 2018, and the second phase in
October 2020. During the first phase, individuals who want to board a
commercial aircraft will have to show a REAL ID-compliant credential at
the TSA security checkpoint.
REAL ID documents are secure under Federal standards and will
become more commonplace over the next couple of years. Since the two-
document requirement unnecessarily burdens individuals who want to
spontaneously apply for the program, we recommend that Congress direct
DHS to allow an applicant with a REAL ID-compliant driver's license to
fulfill the document requirement with that form of identification
alone.
Clarify the Role of Third-Party Vendors
Currently, TSA PreCheck facilitates the movement of travelers
through designated lanes at airports. Additionally, CLEAR, a company
that uses biometric scanning technology to help customers speed through
security by using fingerprints and iris images to confirm identity,
operates at a limited number of airports. CLEAR lanes are available at
16 airports, and speed the movement of the program's members through
security checkpoints. CLEAR members who have TSA PreCheck simply verify
their identity at a CLEAR lane and are then taken to the designated TSA
PreCheck lane to be physically inspected.
In the near future, we may see additional number of third-party
prescreening vendors providing TSA PreCheck enrollment services to TSA.
With the proliferation of travel facilitation products in the
marketplace, it is important that the roles of each vendor, the
benefits of their products and the regulatory structure they operate
under are clearly understood by the public, airports, and airlines.
While enlisting third-party prescreening companies to sign individuals
up for the program has not worked out as an approach to date, TSA
should find ways to make enrollment more convenient and more accessible
for passengers. As the agency's Unified Enrollment contract (which TSA
uses for its PreCheck enrollment) expires later this year, TSA should
look for ways to improve our 4 Ps of PreCheck improvement: Process,
promotion, price, and prioritization.
Empower Airports and the Private Sector to Innovate and Improve
Security
The years-long political fight over allowing airports the option to
utilize privatized airport screening under TSA supervision has been a
disappointing development. While the current TSA Security Partnership
Program (SPP) has proven popular among the limited number of airports
that participate, TSA has made it very difficult for airports to make a
business case for shifting into the SPP. As we wrote in our original
TSA report in 2011, current law provides only limited flexibility for
airports to utilize different methods of screening passengers and
bags--therefore, the variations between ``Federal'' and ``privatized''
screening workforces are not sufficient to merit consideration of
another option.
Congress should overhaul the SPP so that it becomes a viable,
flexible, and innovative option for helping airports deploy more
efficient, effective security solutions tailored to their specific
requirements. We believe that the legal authorities regulating the SPP
should be amended to provide airports with greater flexibility to
propose alternate screening programs and vendors to TSA for their
review and approval. This could include different approaches to
equipment procurement, checkpoint configuration, workforce scheduling,
use of canines, and other screening requirements. In addition, TSA must
be much more willing to work with interested airports on their SPP
options, focusing more on oversight of security effectiveness than on
micromanaging airport decisionmaking about security workforces. TSA
should set the security requirements and allow airports to meet them in
the way they deem appropriate for their particular environment. In this
model, TSA would also be responsible for auditing performance against
those requirements.
Annually Test Vulnerabilities and Weaknesses to Improve Perimeter
Security of U.S. Airports.
In May 2016, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
recommended that TSA update the risk assessment of airport security to
reflect changes to its risk environment and share results of this risk
assessment with stakeholders on an ongoing basis. According to the
report, since 2009, TSA has conducted perimeter security assessments at
only 19 percent of commercial airports.
The risk to aircraft does not solely come from passengers. Security
experts have been increasingly worried about insider and perimeter
threats, especially in light of the recent shooting at Fort Lauderdale
International Airport and attacks at foreign airports. The 2016 GAO
report notes that while TSA has made some progress in assessing airport
perimeter and access control security risks, including developing its
own Comprehensive Risk Assessment of Perimeter and Access Control
Security in 2013, it has not updated this 2013 assessment to reflect
the current potential for insider threats. TSA needs to update this
risk assessment to better focus limited resources on the most severe
risks to airport security. TSA's Joint Vulnerability Assessment (JVA)
process, which it conducts with the FBI, has only been conducted at 81
(about 19 percent) of the 437 commercial airports in the United States
due to resource constraints.
GAO recommended, and we concur, that TSA should develop and
implement a method for conducting a system-wide assessment of airport
vulnerability that will provide a more comprehensive understanding of
security vulnerabilities in airport perimeter and access control.
Perimeter security assessment at only 19 percent of commercial airports
is not acceptable. While we recognize that resources are not unlimited,
we do not believe constraining this program is in the best interest of
National security, the airports or the traveling public.
Improve Preparation of Travelers and Encourage Wider Use of Secure ID
Documents
While the public's general understanding of how TSA checkpoints
work has improved, TSA officers still encounter far too many travelers
who attempt to bring inappropriate and disallowed items through the
checkpoint, or are confused by the rules for removing their personal
items. For example, in 2015, TSA detected more than 2,600 firearms at
airport checkpoints, and the amount of firearm detections continues to
escalate. TSA typically releases ``travel tips'' around busy travel
periods such as holidays and spring breaks, noting that travelers who
fail to properly follow standards for liquids and weapons ``cause
delays for themselves and everyone behind them.'' Travel industry
stakeholders should work with TSA to improve its education and
communication efforts about security rules and regulations, targeting
locations and sources that travelers are likely to review as they book
or prepare for their trip.
The reduction in use of the ``managed inclusion'' program means
that travelers either clear checkpoints under TSA PreCheck rules if
they are enrolled, or under the rules for the general public--no
exceptions. While airlines and travel agencies normally provide TSA-
related guidance somewhere on their websites, giving specific TSA
screening instructions during the flight check-in process would be more
useful to travelers. There is no reason for travelers to arrive at a
TSA checkpoint unclear of what to do with their electronics, belts,
jackets, shoes, and liquids as they go through security. Additionally,
families should be able to know in advance how the checkpoint will
handle a mixture of adults and children.
Meanwhile, the percentage of Americans traveling with secure travel
documents continues to climb thanks to record issuance of passports,
increased REAL ID compliance, and growth in trusted traveler programs.
However, the current standoff between non-compliant States and DHS over
the agency's planned enforcement of REAL ID document standards
potentially means that tens of millions of Americans will not be
allowed to use their State-issued driver's licenses as a primary form
of identity at airport checkpoints beginning in 2018.
As of early 2017, only 25 States and the District of Columbia were
fully compliant with REAL ID, and several large States have repeatedly
refused to enact compliance legislation. Education targeting these
travelers on the new rules has begun late in 2016, far in advance of
the January 22, 2018 deadline, so that citizens of these States know
that they may need to obtain alternate identification when traveling.
More broadly, we urge Federal and State governments to embrace programs
that build and deploy secure identification documents in order to
provide the traveling public with higher-quality identity documents
that meet Government security standards.
Improve the Checkpoint Experience
We encourage stakeholders to make the TSA process less stressful by
collaborating on ways to occupy travelers' time and minds with
interesting content such as informational videos, updates on flights
and security processing times, and information about eating and
shopping options after the checkpoint. This recommendation requires a
partnership at the local level, between TSA and airports and airlines
servicing the airport. Private-sector players such as theme parks and
hotels have long recognized that the time waiting in line can be less
frustrating and more helpful when guests are occupied with interesting
content while in a queue. We recommend that checkpoints not only
feature informational videos prepared by DHS about threat levels and
programs like ``See Something, Say Something,'' but also display
updates about flight departures, gate changes, and eating and retail
opportunities after security. Airports may also find value in providing
information about new flight routes, amenities, transit options, and
the like.
The time travelers spend waiting at the checkpoint may also present
a marketing opportunity for TSA PreCheck. And if TSA PreCheck
opportunities are available post-checkpoint, they should be advertised
as well. In short, there is no reason to make the time waiting in a TSA
line a boring, frustrating process. Providing a traveler with
information relevant to his or her flight or future travel options will
make the wait more manageable and take advantage of a captive audience.
Develop a Strategic Technology Planning Capability
While TSA produces a 5-year technology plan every 2 years, it does
not use that plan when building budgets or funding deployment of the
most advanced technology possible. Akin to the Department of Defense,
TSA's budget submissions should aim to implement multi-year strategic
planning priorities, particularly related to checkpoint technologies.
These plans should take advantage of technology advances developed
elsewhere inside DHS via robust information sharing across agencies and
offices.
TSA is implementing a new procurement strategy consistent with
legislation successfully backed by U.S. Travel. To date, two 5-year
procurement plans have been developed by the agency, approved by the
OMB and released to stakeholders. They have included an appropriate
level of detail on what TSA envisions deploying and when the agency
plans to do so.
In 2014, Congress passed, and the President signed H.R. 2719, the
Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act. A core part of this
measure requires the TSA to annually produce a projection of its
technology needs over the next 5 years. This requirement emerged due to
years of strained relationships between technology vendors and TSA.
Vendors complained that TSA's failure to produce a technology roadmap
made it difficult for companies to create investment plans, while TSA
argued that its technology needs have changed quickly, and a detailed
forecast would become outdated too quickly to be useful.
While the requirement to create a 5-year plan has been helpful in
enabling all stakeholders to better understand how TSA views
technology's ability to manage risk, the agency has not built and
followed acquisition strategies designed to field the technology in the
plans. As a result, the five-year planning process is just an exercise
on paper that has meant little in terms of deploying technology in the
commercial aviation sphere.
In order to make this a truly effective process that improves
security and the experience of commercial aviation passengers, TSA
should, like the Department of Defense, include implementing plans,
acquisition strategies and sufficient budgets in its 5-year plans.
Until the link between plans, acquisition, and budget is effectively
made, this 5-year planning effort will be of little value to TSA or its
stakeholders.
Additionally, to be as effective as possible, this plan should draw
from resources across DHS that are trying to solve security problems
similar to TSA. The DHS Science and Technology Directorate and Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) for example, have reviewed inspection and
detection technologies that should be assessed to determine if they
might assist TSA as it implements its transportation security mission.
Deploy Modern Staffing Solutions
Domestic and international travel are key drivers of the U.S.
economy, supporting over 15 million jobs, $2.1 trillion in economic
output and $231 billion in wages. It is expected that domestic and
international travel will continue to increase in 2017. This growth is
positive for the U.S. economy and job creation as a whole, but these
increases and persistent funding fluctuations are straining TSA's
current staffing resources. It is imperative for TSA to continually
strive to develop and deploy strategies that will optimize its current
workforce.
For TSA to most effectively manage its workforce, the agency should
provide its airport Federal Security Directors (FSD) the ability to
utilize world-class staffing management tool and technologies,
including staffing software. It is imperative that staffing and
technology solutions be managed under the FSD's authority and
coordinated with the local airport.
Given these factors, the efficiency of the TSA workforce must be
constantly evaluated. Staffing airports with the right number of full-
and part-time workers is a complicated responsibility, taking into
account leave, vacation, union rules, management of the overtime
budget, and training. Regardless of whether the TSA has the appropriate
number of Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) or is understaffed,
it is imperative that the TSA be able to fully optimize the efficiency
and effectiveness of its current workforce. This approach will have the
added benefit of reducing staff turnover, overtime, training costs, and
traveler complaints.
To accomplish this goal, the agency should utilize world-class
staffing management tools and technologies, including staffing software
that exists in the market today. Deploying available technologies that
continuously collect and aggregate real-time data from numerous sources
including airlines, airports, and third-party providers will lead to
more accurate predictions of staffing needs at airports. This will
allow for the creation of a strategic short- and long-term staffing
matrix that will enhance TSA's ability to predict and incorporate the
complexities of scheduling a large and dynamic workforce.
Undertaking a technology assessment to identify enhancements and
close any technology gaps will further the goal of TSA's management at
the National and local level to remove pressure from the front-line
workforce, so it can focus on security while creating a scheduling
system that provides flexibility to local airports. This would help
keep travelers secure, but also create a memorable customer experience,
which would be a win for the traveling public and the TSA.
Further Utilize Canine Screening Units
The National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP) was
transferred to TSA in 2002, after its establishment as the Federal
Aviation Administration's Explosives Detection Canine Program in 1972.
TSA's NEDCTP utilizes Passenger Screening Canine (PSC) teams to deter
and detect explosives within airports and other transportation systems
across the Nation. The agency currently deploys 997 canines, 322 of
which are led by TSA handlers, with the remaining 675 utilized by local
law enforcement in transportation environments, including airports.
Approximately one-half of TSA's 322 teams are already certified, and 10
teams are operational in passenger screening.
TSA currently uses two types of canines to support airport security
operations--the traditional ``approach and sniff'' type (called
Explosive Detection Canines) and ``vapor wake method'' PSC dogs trained
specifically for use in the checkpoint area, while also being able to
perform the more traditional explosive detection missions.
In a June 2016 hearing before the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee, then-TSA Administrator Peter Neffenger
emphasized the importance of PSC, noting that the program increases
efficiency in the passenger screening process, often with greater
accuracy than conventional methods. As a result, TSA shifted PSC teams
to the 20 largest airports in the United States, to maximize detection
capability in an effort to mitigate long wait times outside of secure
areas.
TSA has been retraining cargo canines for passenger screening, and
the remaining multi-modal teams will be trained for passenger screening
operations in 2017.
TSA should continue to increase funding for the PSC program to
bring this capability to a larger number of Category X and Category 1
airports. At the same time, we encourage TSA to better engage local law
enforcement so that resolution protocols (i.e., operating procedures
employed when a PSC detect explosives) can be adopted, which is
critical to program expansion.
Focus TSA Screening on Bags from International Arrivals Not Screened to
TSA Standards
The requirement that TSA rescreen luggage that has safely arrived
in the United States on an inbound international flight has long been
the bane of travelers forced to reclaim, manage, and recheck their bags
during a flight connection. TSA has agreed to end the rescreening
requirement for bags arriving from Canada. We recommend that TSA
negotiate agreements with the United Kingdom and European Union based
on the Canadian initiative.
The rescreening issue remains a major problem for inbound flights
from all other countries in the world. The policy requires TSA and
airlines to expend immense resources in order to rescreen such checked
luggage. The policy was predicated on the concept that TSA should only
recognize screening at a foreign airport if it used the same high
standards imposed on the U.S. aviation process.
In 2011, as part of the U.S.-Canadian ``Beyond the Border''
initiative, the countries agreed that inbound bags from Canadian
flights would not need to be rescreened once Canadian airports utilized
TSA-approved explosive detection equipment. We understand that by the
end of 2016, all Canadian airports with flights to the United States
will meet this standard, and TSA will end the rescreening requirement
for bags associated with connecting flights in the United States.
In late 2016, the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority
installed explosive detection systems that fully meet TSA baggage
screening requirements. The technology will be fully operational by
mid-2017 at all 8 Canadian preclearance facilities and thus eliminates
the need for baggage rescreening on connecting U.S. flights.
While TSA has improved its scrutiny of foreign airport screening, a
wholesale end to rescreening is not likely. We recommend that TSA
negotiate agreements with the United Kingdom and European Union based
on the Canadian initiative. We understand that productive discussions
on issues such as screening of liquids have been held, but also
recognize that recent events in Europe require that our mutual
confidence levels in detection programs be high. This initiative should
be a top priority as part of broader border and aviation security
discussions.
For U.S. Travel, nothing matters more than the safety of our Nation
and travelers. We appreciate your holding this hearing to explore ways
to make TSA more efficient and effective both from a security and
facilitation perspective.
Again, thank you Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Rice, and all
Members of the subcommittee for inviting me to testify today. I look
forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Katko. Thank you very much. I appreciate your
testimony. I have many questions to ask you when the time
comes, but I appreciate that.
Now, I now recognize Ms. Nina Brooks for her testimony.
STATEMENT OF NINA E. BROOKS, HEAD OF SECURITY, AIRPORTS COUNCIL
INTERNATIONAL
Ms. Brooks. Thank you. Chairman Katko, Ranking Member
Watson Coleman, and Members of the subcommittee, I would like
to thank you for the opportunity to provide a perspective from
the Airports Council International, the global trade
representative of the world's airports on the advancements in
airport security, screening practices, and in particular, the
Smart Security project.
Recognizing the challenges of growing passenger numbers,
continuously evolving security threats and limited resources,
ACI and our airline partners at the International Air Transport
Association joined forces in 2013 to define a future for
passenger and cabin baggage screening where passengers proceed
through security with minimal inconvenience, where security
resources that got allocated based on risk, and where airport
facilities are optimized.
Today this vision is being widely recognized throughout the
world by airports, airlines, and regulators. An increasing
number of airports around the world are implementing measures
and processes recommended by the Smart Security Program.
The objectives of the program are threefold. First, to
deliver strengthened security through a focus on risk, better
use of existing technologies, and the introduction of advanced
detection capabilities.
Second, to increase the operational efficiency of the
checkpoints, including faster throughputs, better use of
equipment, reduced cost per passenger, and the best use of
space and staff.
Finally, to improve passenger and staff experience through
a reduction in queues and waiting times, reduce manual
handling, and better use of technology for less intrusive and
less time-consuming security screening. Although focused on the
screening checkpoints, Smart Security also benefits the
security as an airport as a whole, particularly through the
reduction in queues and crowds in public areas.
The Smart Security Program is structured through trial of
tests and information sharing. Airports, regulators, and
airlines have worked together to test different technologies
and processes, and have shared their findings with the project
team in order to produce a set of best practices or guidance
material. This, in turn, is shared with the wider community so
that all can benefit from the experience of participants in the
project.
There is no one solution for all airports. Instead, the
project has identified a number of components that can be
implemented depending on the regulatory requirements, the
needs, facilities, and the risk profile of the airports. For
this reason, there is not one smart checkpoint that can be used
as an exact model, rather a menu of options that can be
combined to meet requirements.
Smart Security has demonstrated significant improvements in
operational efficiency, passenger satisfaction, and security
valuing. To give you some examples, some of the components
deployed include centralized image processing or remote
screening to enable X-ray machines to be networked and images
viewed away from the checkpoint location or across lanes.
Trials have demonstrated significant efficiency
improvements. Some airports have seen increases in image
throughput as well as reductions in total passenger processing
times by an average of 30 seconds per passenger.
Checkpoint environments and management enhancements include
greater automation, for example, tray handling systems,
resource optimization such as parallel divesting, and automated
checkpoint performance monitoring solutions. Using these, some
airports have reported a flow increase of up to 20 percent.
Some airports have implemented a completely new look and
feel at checkpoints, such as Amsterdam's Schiphol, which is
designed to provide a calmer, more passenger-friendly
environment for travelers to divest and then be reunited with
their possessions. This reimagined checkpoint benefits the
passenger experience, but also aids the detection of suspicious
behavior.
Using full-body scanners for passenger screening is also
demonstrated to provide effective security while improving the
passenger experience and reducing the need for full manual
searches. Airports that have taken part in trials include
Amsterdam's Schiphol, Dublin, Doha, Melbourne, London Heathrow,
Gatwick, and Manchester, and many others.
Many have implemented components--for example, the Canadian
Air Transport Security Authority has installed new automated
lanes in Montreal and Calgary. Automated lanes are beginning to
be deployed here in the United States using many of the same
principles recommended by Smart Security, such as lane
automation, parallel divesting, and tray return systems.
Looking forward, the focus for the coming year will be on
technology such as computer tomography, advances in stand-off
trace detection, queue management, passenger tracking, identity
management, and differentiated screening according to risk.
Some of the key enablers of Smart Security have been the
outcome-focused regulation, flexibility in checkpoint design
and configuration, understanding that not all airports and risk
profiles are the same, adequate funding for staffing, screening
technology, and research and development, along with efficient
processes for testing and evaluation of new technologies.
In the United States, we have been working with TSA toward
sharing of information, from the implementation of automated
screening lanes at Hartsfield Jackson Atlanta International
Airport, which implement a number of these Smart Security best
practices. We have also had some very constructive discussions
with the TSA's Innovation Task Force.
We believe that there is a great deal of opportunity here
in the United States to benefit from the lessons learned by
Smart Security and vice versa, and we look forward to working
further with TSA and more U.S. airports.
I would like to thank you for this opportunity to testify,
and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Brooks follows:]
Prepared Statement of Nina E. Brooks
February 2, 2017
Airports Council International--the global trade representative of
the world's airports--is pleased to submit this testimony on global
advancements in airport security screening practices, in particular the
``Smart Security'' Program.
smart security vision and objectives
Recognizing the challenges of growing passenger numbers,
continuously evolving threats, and limited resources, ACI and our
airline partners at the International Air Transport Association joined
forces in 2013 to define a future for passenger and cabin baggage
screening where passengers proceed through security with minimal
inconvenience, where security resources are allocated based on risk,
and where airport facilities are optimized.
Today, this vision has been widely recognized throughout the world
by airports, airlines, and regulators. An increasing number of airports
around the world are implementing measures and processes recommended by
the Smart Security program.
The objectives of the program are three-fold. First, to deliver
strengthened security through a focus on risk, increased
unpredictability, better use of existing technologies, and the
introduction of advanced detection capabilities.
Second to increase operational efficiency including faster
throughput, better use of equipment, reduced cost per passenger, and
best use of space and staff.
And finally, to improve passenger and staff experience through
reduction in queues and waiting times, reduced manual handling and
better use of technology for less intrusive and less time-consuming
security screening.
Although focused on the screening checkpoint, Smart Security also
benefits the security at an airport as a whole, particularly through
the reduction of large crowds in public areas.
The Smart Security program is structured through trials, tests, and
information sharing. Airports, regulators, and airlines have worked
together to test different technologies and processes and have shared
their findings with the project team, in order to produce a set of best
practices or guidance material. This, in turn, is shared with the wider
community so that all can benefit from the experience of participants
in the project.
There is no one solution for all airports. Instead, the project has
identified a number of ``components'' that can be implemented,
depending on the regulatory requirement, and the needs, facilities, and
risk profile of the airport. For this reason there is not one ``Smart
Checkpoint'' that can be used as an exact model, rather a menu of
options that can be combined to meet requirements.
Smart Security has demonstrated significant improvements in
operational efficiency, passenger satisfaction, and security value.
Components deployed include Centralized image processing--or remote
screening--to enable X-ray machines to be networked, and images viewed
away from the checkpoint location or across lanes. Trials have
demonstrated significant efficiency improvements, especially when
combined with other concepts. Most notably, airports have seen
increases in image throughput and as well as reductions in total
passenger processing times by an average of 30 seconds per passenger at
some airports.
Checkpoint environment and management enhancements include greater
automation (e.g. tray handling systems), resource optimization (such as
parallel divesting) and automated checkpoint performance monitoring
solutions. Some airports have reported a flow increase of up to 20%.
Some airports have implemented a completely new look and feel at
checkpoints, such as Amsterdam Schiphol, which is designed to provide a
calmer, more passenger friendly environment for travelers to divest and
reunite with their possessions. This reimagined checkpoint benefits the
passenger experience and aids the detection of suspicious behavior.
Using full-body scanners as a primary or secondary measure for
passenger screening also has been demonstrated to provide effective
security while improving passenger experience and reducing the need for
full manual searches. Smart Security pilots have demonstrated that an
airport using a WTMD and a security scanner as a secondary screening
device can facilitate over 400 passengers per hour per lane.
Airports that have taken part in trials and research include
Amsterdam Schiphol, Dublin, Doha, Melbourne, London-Heathrow, Gatwick,
and Manchester. Many others have implemented components; for example
the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority has installed new
automated lanes at Montreal and Calgary, and automated lanes are
beginning to be deployed here in the United States, using many of the
same principles recommended by Smart Security such as lane automation,
parallel divesting stations, and tray return systems.
Turning to governance, the project is steered by a group of
international partners made up from regulators, airports, and airlines.
This means that all interests are taken into account and there is a
high degree of cooperation between all parties that need to buy-in to a
trial or implementation. Both TSA and CATSA are members of the steering
group, along with the U.K. and Dutch governments. The key to success
has been collaboration and openness, with a view to improving the whole
aviation security system.
results
Quantifying results has been achieved through proof-of-concept
implementations in close collaboration with early adopters, and uses a
set of very specific performance measures to evaluate the impact.
security effectiveness
The threat detection capability and the robustness of a security
system can be measured through observation, covert testing, security
officer performance data, and the evolution in the number and type of
items detected/confiscated, etc. Screening equipment is tested and
certified against specific threat detection standards. Other key
performance indicators, such as the deterrence factor, the level of
adaptability, and the application of an outcome focused risk-based
framework requires qualitative appraisal by State agencies.
The key role of measuring security effectiveness is reserved for
the Government regulators and agencies represented on the Smart
Security Management Group (SSMG), which currently include the Canadian
Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA), the U.S. Transportation
Security Administration (TSA), the New Zealand Aviation Security
Service, the UK Department for Transport (DfT), and the Dutch National
Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV). While the project
team focuses on the operational performance and passenger experience
implications of Smart Security solutions in the various tests, trials,
and proof-of-concept implementations, regulators and government
agencies need to ascertain that these solutions are in line with their
expected security outcomes.
However, there are strong qualitative arguments to support the
notion that the solutions promoted by Smart Security are a step up from
the conventional security checkpoint that relies on walk-through metal
detectors (WTMD) and conventional X-ray equipment.
Security scanners address metallic and non-metallic threats
in a single process.
Multi-view X-ray equipment, which is increasingly prevalent,
provides the operator with more information by showing multiple
viewing angles of the same bag or tray. Next generation X-ray
systems that are currently in operational testing stage,
further improve on this by displaying the image in a 3-
dimensional projection that can be rotated freely to allow the
operator to see around objects; this can be complemented with
software capabilities like virtual separation of objects,
allowing the operator for instance to virtually ``remove'' a
laptop from the image and to inspect the bag and the laptop
separately in a 3D view.
Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) further augments explosives
detection on passengers and cabin baggage.
Auto Clear (automatic clearance of low-clutter images) and
Auto Reject (automatic rejection of high-clutter images)
algorithms do not directly add to the threat detection
capability of the system, but will allow the officer to
dedicate more attention to those images where human
intelligence provides added value.
Automated threat detection systems such as Explosive
Detection Systems (EDS) will further augment the officers'
threat detection capability.
There is general consensus among security experts that the
unpredictable approaches that Smart Security promotes would
contribute to the deterrence factor.
operational efficiency
This arguably is the area where most progress has been made to
date. Very significant improvements in operational efficiency have been
achieved through a combination of the following components:
Centralized Image Processing (CIP) or remote screening is by far
the biggest game-changer we have seen in recent years. It allows for
networking of cabin baggage screening equipment so that the images can
be reviewed and analyzed by an officer without the need to be
physically located next to the equipment. This also opens the door for
further optimization, for instance by assessing images from passenger,
crew, and staff checkpoints in a single control room, or by
centralizing across terminals or even across airports in a long-
distance scenario.
While CIP has the ability to dramatically increase X-ray image
processing capacity, the benefits will be even more substantial when it
is combined with optimized lane configuration and automation, starting
with innovative divest solutions to maximize the in-feed and reduce X-
ray starvation, such as a parallel loading system, which has the added
benefit of allowing passengers to overtake one another in the process,
reducing the stress factor as passengers can take their time to unpack
without holding up the queue.
An optimized CIP lane will also require further automation, such as
the use of tray handling systems and an automated diverter to ensure
that bags/trays that are selected for secondary search are duly
separated in the process without the need for human intervention.
Furthermore, these lanes will have to be equipped with secondary
screening workstations, allowing the secondary search officer to
precisely identify what caused the bag to be rejected by the remote X-
ray operator.
It has also been demonstrated that, in most scenarios, security
scanners can be deployed as primary screening device while keeping pace
with the optimized CIP lanes; where higher throughput is required or
where other factors come into play, they can be deployed as a secondary
screening method.
The most common way of expressing operational efficiency is by
measuring sustainable throughput (i.e. with a continuous in-feed, the
throughput rate that can be sustained for an extended period of time).
This is typically measured in terms of passengers per hour per lane
(i.e per X-ray).
A conventional security lane (typically about 10 to 12 meters long,
with walk-through metal detector and conventional X-ray equipment),
will typically reach sustainable throughput of 150 passengers per
hour--and often much less. A state-of-the-art Smart Security lane
(typically about 20 meters long, with security scanner, lane
automation, parallel processing of passengers, and centralized image
processing) has been demonstrated to achieve sustainable throughput of
well above 200 passengers per hour where the security scanner is used
as primary screening measure (e.g. Schiphol), and even in excess of 400
passengers per hour where the security scanner is used as secondary
screening measure (e.g. Gatwick). While these lanes come at a higher
cost (mainly due to equipment cost and staffing requirements), the cost
per passenger actually remains stable or may even come down, while at
the same time delivering passenger experience and security
effectiveness benefits.
A key element of realizing full operational benefit is for any
given airport to test different configuration of equipment and staffing
to find the optimal solution for their environment. For example, by
varying the time-out value on an X-ray, efficiencies may be gained in
processing time. Likewise, providing different numbers of divest
stations may be suitable for different passenger demographics.
passenger experience
It has been demonstrated that Smart Security solutions have a
beneficial impact on passenger experience. Amsterdam Schiphol Airport,
implemented all Smart Security wave 1 solutions with special attention
to the customer service aspect, and was also the first Smart Security
global showcase. After they went live with their first re-imagined
security checkpoint in June 2014, passenger satisfaction scores for
security increased from 61% to 83%\1\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Based on ASQ scores for security. ASQ is ACI's Airport Service
Quality, the leading and globally established benchmarking program
measuring passengers' satisfaction whilst they are travelling through
an airport.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Queues and waiting times have consistently been identified by
passengers as the most frustrating element of the security experience
(source: IATA Global Passenger Survey). This is where passenger
experience is closely linked with operational efficiency: As Smart
Security solutions have been demonstrated to have the potential to
significantly increase throughput (see below), they provide screening
authorities at least theoretically with the capacity to process more
passengers during peak times and thus reduce queues and waiting times--
as demonstrated at Schiphol and other airports.
Where security screening is privatized (as in many European
countries) and airports thus have more control over and are directly
responsible for funding the screening processes and technologies used,
airports have increasingly reported a link between reduced waiting
times in security and increased customer spending on airside, further
strengthening the case for investment in security processes. Where
security screening is in the hands of a central screening authority (as
is for instance the case in North America), we see that there is
significant political pressure to balance cost efficiency with
passenger experience and reasonable waiting times. In some states
(United Kingdom for instance), waiting times at security checkpoints
are regulated and there are steep penalties associated with not meeting
mandated service levels.
Intrusiveness of security measures is another key driver of
passenger dissatisfaction at security checkpoints. This is associated
with security measures that are inherently uncomfortable, such as full-
body pat-downs. Security scanners and Explosive Trace Detection (ETD),
which are key components of the first wave of Smart Security solutions,
offer the possibility to screen passenger effectively for threats while
minimizing the number of full-body pat-downs. Experience at early
adopter airports has shown that passengers generally respond very well
to the current technology--especially now that security scanners better
respect the privacy of passengers thanks to the anonymized format of
images and automatic target recognition.
The need to disrobe (outerwear, shoes, belt) and divest (liquids,
electronics) is a further element that influences the passenger
experience. The second wave of Smart Security solutions, currently
being trialled, including next generation X-ray equipment and computed
tomography systems that will effectively enable more items such as
laptops and liquids to be left in passengers' bags during the screening
process, and other technology innovations such as a new generation of
shoe scanners and improved security scanner algorithms that will reduce
the need to disrobe.
The checkpoint environment also has an important impact, including
considerations such as noise, light, space, and other design elements.
A customer service approach to security screening from staff also
benefits passenger experience.
A subjective feeling of safety and security, especially in the
current environment of increased concerns about terrorist activity--
particularly in public areas--is an equally important element of the
passenger experience. While security measures should be efficient and
as non-intrusive as possible, they should also be visible and make
sense to passengers, who will be more comfortable with a robust
security screening system rather than a lax one.
Consistency of process, i.e. the overall passenger's perception of
the process being predictable despite the fact that the screening
itself may be unpredictable in order to improve security outcomes, will
help to reduce the level of passenger frustration. This is closely
related to the preparation process and the need to disrobe and divest--
why does one need to remove shoes and belts in one State or airport but
not in another, for instance? While this is mainly illustrative of the
need for the development of commensurate international security
standards, Smart Security plays a role in demonstrating that effective
and efficient technology solutions are available that will simplify the
preparation process by reducing the need to disrobe and divest.
business case and funding
The cost of implementing Smart Security components varies widely
depending on the combination of features implemented, the cost of
equipment and staff in a particular country, the competitive market for
such certified equipment and the configuration required. Although there
is clearly a capital outlay, the benefits can be significant.
Increase in throughput will usually come at a cost--i.e. the lane
may require additional staff, more expensive equipment, and/or more
space in order to reach these higher throughput rates. Optimal use of
staffing resources, optimal asset utilization, and optimal use and
availability of space are factored into the cost case. Cost per
passenger is therefore the most useful measure; the increase in
throughput needs to be higher than or equal to the increase in cost
that is required to achieve it.
Funding for checkpoints varies widely across the globe, depending
on whether an airport or a Federal agency is responsible for the
delivery of security. Generally, passenger security charges or fees are
used to invest in security improvements including checkpoint upgrade.
The provision of well-trained, highly-motivated staff is also
critical to success, and throughput results will not be achieved
without sufficient staffing. Smart Security enables security
professionals to focus on detection, and takes away many of the manual
processes such as physically moving trays back and forth at the
checkpoint. This frees up resources to enable more officers to work on
examining X-ray images and facilitating secondary search and passenger
screening. Models for the provision of security staff vary around the
world; for example in Europe, the majority of screening services are
delivered by airport staff or contractors, with strong oversight by the
regulator. This enables greater freedom for an airport to implement new
technologies and innovative practices, provided that security outcomes
are maintained.
uptake
It is not possible to quantify how many airports have implemented
``Smart Security'', as there is no one solution that can be categorized
as such. However, taking an individual component, we estimate that in
excess of 100 of the world's major airports have implemented some form
of automated lane so far.
The project has also delivered close to 30 individual assessments
at airports, to help airports identify the best smart security
components for their needs, with an estimated uptake of 45% so far. The
project will continue to deliver regional workshops in 2017 to
encourage the implementation of this first phase of innovation.
future plans
Looking forward, the focus for the coming year will be on
technologies such as computed tomography, advances in stand-off trace
detection, queue management, passenger tracking, identity management,
and differentiated screening according to risk. The project is always
seeking innovative solutions and plans an innovation event to identify
new ideas.
For each of the Smart Security components, additional work and
research continue to be carried out or have been identified to be
completed in the following areas.
Passenger screening
The core performance of full-body scanners is improving, and
technology is rapidly evolving towards to models that have no moving
parts and are therefore virtually walk-through. Further research in
passenger screening will continue to focus on finding and developing
solutions and technologies that will increase throughput and reduce the
need for divesting.
In addition, future research should focus on integration with other
components. For example, the use of biometrics for identity management
and verification can enable risk-based differentiated screening to be
applied on a per-passenger basis. This means that passengers identified
as high-risk might either be directed to a separate screening lane for
more rigorous measures, or might be coupled with variable algorithms on
a security scanner to apply different levels of screening within the
same equipment.
Another potential area for integration is the inclusion of
explosive trace detection or other detection methods into security
scanners to enhance detection capability, improve security
effectiveness, and reduce passenger touchpoints.
Cabin baggage screening
Future research will focus on improving the functionality of the
screening equipment (especially in its capacity to automatically detect
threats) while keeping the false alarm rate as low as possible. By
efficiently assisting the X-ray operator's decision in all aspects of
cabin baggage screening, advanced equipment will allow a further
increase in security while improving the passenger experience with
reduced divestment and fewer bags sent to secondary search. Further
work will also need to be carried out in hardware and software
decoupling to allow for independent upgrades and easier certification,
as well as checkpoint solutions tailored to an airport's needs.
In addition, while Computed Tomography systems are still maturing
(toward improved belt speed, lower false alarm rate, and better image
quality), there is a great deal of work to be done in understanding and
optimizing the way that screening officers will use the equipment.
Alternative detection methods
With ETD already used in some States as a primary screening measure
for crew, future work is needed to determine whether the same principle
could be applied to passengers as part of a risk-based screening
approach. As explosive detection advances to the extent that stand off
screening and dynamic adjustment may be possible, further research will
be required to evaluate how this technology interacts with other
checkpoint elements for optimal checkpoint design. Operational
unpredictability will also be assessed.
Covert unpredictability combined with dynamic lanes will make the
checkpoint more robust.
Unpredictability, new screening equipment, and alternative
detection methods offer the opportunity to move the current
prescriptive regulations to a more flexible, outcomes-based approach.
Rather than checkpoint methodology, security outcomes should be the
focus.
Checkpoint environment
Future research in this area will focus on evaluating the optimum
working environment, which will allow security officers to focus on
their core screening duties and reduce the need for extensive manual
handling.
Improvements in the checkpoint environment will always be a work in
progress as designs adapt to new threats and the associated detection
technologies.
These changes in screening technology and the introduction of
additional elements, such as biometrics and video analytics into the
passenger journey, will further facilitate the development of enhanced
automated solutions.
Future trials may even move away from the conventional screening
approach, exploring innovative checkpoint configurations. This could
include physically separating passenger and cabin baggage screening
processes and reuniting passengers with their belongings at the end of
the process.
In addition, research on predictive modeling and optimal staff
allocation must be conducted to assess any possible benefits relating
to checkpoint reactivity and adaptability.
Centralized image processing
Future studies will contribute to understanding the feasibility and
benefits of more extensive networking, both on an airport and country-
wide level, including networking operations centrally across several
airports.
Taking the networking concept even further, some stakeholders are
now considering whether image assessment for cabin and hold baggage can
be combined. Further work is needed in this area to develop the
concept.
Checkpoint management
Screening equipment is increasingly becoming networked, and
automated lanes are now being equipped with RFID readers, associating
the passenger with their tray(s) and removing the need to manually
identify trays selected for additional scrutiny. A wealth of data is
therefore becoming available that, through the use of advanced data
analytics, may give rise to a whole new generation of checkpoint
management systems that will allow for real-time and even predictive
decision making and thus achieve even greater operational efficiencies.
Risk-based differentiation
Risk-based passenger differentiation exists today, most notably
with TSA's Pre-Check program. To facilitate wider adoption, States will
likely seek further collaboration and agreement on issues, such as
mutual recognition and equivalence, standards for risk assessment,
interaction with existing security arrangements, and flexibility to
counter emerging threats.
The ability to measure the effectiveness of risk-based procedures,
the potential impact of false positives on the traveling public, and
data protection and privacy are also key elements to be considered.
Further work will take place on identity management and the ability
to track and trace passengers and their belongings through the
checkpoint, providing States with a full end-to-end risk-based
passenger differentiation model.
working with tsa
Smart Security has a long-standing relationship with TSA, including
TSA's participation in the Smart Security Management Group. We have
been working with TSA towards sharing of information from the
implementation of automated screening lanes at Hartsfield Jackson
Atlanta International Airport, which employ many of the features of
Smart Security, and have also had some very constructive discussions
with the TSA's Innovation Task Force. We believe that there is a great
deal of opportunity in the United States to benefit from the lessons
learned by Smart Security and vice versa, and we look forward to
working further with TSA and more U.S. airports.
Mr. Katko. Thank you very much. I also look forward to the
discussion moving forward. I hear you loud and clear, both Mr.
Dow and Ms. Brooks, about the technological aspects. We have
been beating that drum since we started on this committee; TSA
is behind the curve in technology.
I will just tell you a brief example I had last year. I had
to go to Ireland for work, and it was a real struggle, of
course. But, we went through England. The use of biometrics in
England were stunning.
You would walk up. You would stand in front of just before
when they check your passport, and they do a facial recognition
scan in about 1 second.
Then when I went to go check into the gate, when I was
checking in to go on the airplane, you did it again. It matched
the facial recognition from the person who came in to the
person who got on the airplane.
They have technology like this all over the world, and it
is maddening to me that we don't have it here. So, I am going
to definitely explore that with you moving forward.
But of course, all the technology in the world will be
useless if you don't have the right personnel doing the job. So
that is why I am looking forward to hearing from Mr. Cox's
testimony.
So I now recognize Mr. Cox for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF J. DAVID COX, SR., NATIONAL PRESIDENT, AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
Mr. Cox. Mr. Chairman, welcome back. AFGE is so excited to
have you back as Chair of the subcommittee.
To Ranking Member Watson Coleman, congratulations on your
new post.
Congressman Payne, it is always so good to be with you.
Mr. Dow and the Chairman's son and all men and women who
are serving in the military and all veterans, we owe them a
debt of gratitude for their service to this country.
I would remind everyone, the 40,000 transportation security
officers that work for TSA that AFGE proudly represents, over
31 percent of them are also veterans that have served this
country and continue to serve this country by keeping all of us
safe and secure.
Every Member of Congress travels home to their district.
They travel back to conduct hearings and to hold votes, and
they do it safely because of the great work of TSOs. Airline
pilots and flight attendants travel safely right now all over
this country because these men and women are protecting us and
keeping us safe.
My main message today is that no discussion of the future
of TSA should ever exclude the voices of the TSO workforce.
TSOs are the eyes, ears, and hands of TSA at the checkpoints
and the baggage areas of our Nation's airports.
They are the most visible of TSAs components and most
likely to be blamed for perceived failures on the part of the
agency. They are rarely, if ever, recognized for a job well
done.
The best way for Congress and TSA to show its appreciation
for TSO's contributions to National security would be fair
treatment on the job.
Second, we ask that Congress ensure TSOs have the resources
necessary to carry out the agency's mission, such as
appropriate and proper equipment.
Finally, we ask that Congress hold TSA accountable for both
of these priorities.
Security screening of passengers and baggage was made a
direct Federal Government responsibility after a National
examination of aviation security following 9/11.
That examination found that fatal security lapses were due,
in no small part, to the fact that screening contractors
operated with too little oversight. The screeners they hired
had little training, or did not understand operating
procedures, high turnover, and very low pay.
For 15 years, TSOs have kept America safe from terrorism
and other risks. They have got the job done and done it very
effectively. Their record is one that we should all applaud.
TSO has seized over 3,300 firearms, most of them loaded at
checkpoints. They defied all projections this past summer with
long wait lines due to understaffing and made it happen
throughout this country.
Yet there are some politicians who believe that we should
privatize TSA. Make no mistake, privatization through the
Screening Partnership Program takes us back to pre-9/11
conditions. The future of TSA lies with civil servant TSOs and
not private contractors.
TSOs sign up for their job because they want to serve the
American public by keeping our air travel safe. In return, they
have every right to expect fair treatment from their employer,
the Federal Government.
TSOs have the workplace policies changed every time there
is a new administrator, and we have had more than our fair
share, sir. Each time we go through many changes of all working
conditions. AFGE recently ratified a new contract with the
agency. Many of the terms and conditions of employment were
changed unilaterally, without any input from Congress or from
the union that represents those employees.
I certainly believe the one thing that we could do that
would help TSOs is to grant them Title V rights under the U.S.
Code. You know, this would prevent discrimination. It would
give them full collective bargaining rights.
I would certainly like to salute Senator Schatz, Warren,
Merkley, and others who have introduced legislation in the
Senate. It is our understanding that Ranking Member Bennie
Thompson and Congresswoman Nita Lowey will be introducing
legislation in the House for Title V rights for TSOs.
I thank you so much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, for
having us today and we look forward to taking any questions. It
is always a pleasure to be with you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cox follows:]
Prepared Statement of J. David Cox, Sr.
February 2, 2017
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rice, and Members of the subcommittee:
My name is J. David Cox, Sr., and I am the national president of the
American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO (AFGE). On behalf
of the more than 670,000 Federal and District of Columbia workers our
union represents, including Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) at
airports across the United States and its territories who are on the
job ensuring safe air travel for over 2 million passengers each day, I
thank you for the opportunity to testify today on ``The Future of the
Transportation Security Administration.''
Members of Congress who can attend town hall meetings in their
districts and return to Washington for hearings and votes can thank
over 40,000 members of the TSO workforce. Hundreds of thousands of
Americans who visited the Nation's capital for inaugural events
experienced first-hand the effective and efficient screening performed
by TSOs. Airline crews--pilots, engineers, and flight attendants--greet
their loved ones after landing safely each day because TSOs screening
passengers and baggage prevented acts of aviation terrorism. The
economies of major tourist destinations from Orlando, Florida to Las
Vegas, benefit from families who arrive safely for the vacation of a
lifetime because experienced, committed, and patriotic TSOs and other
civil servants work to protect the public. The contributions of TSOs to
the security of our Nation are clear. Those contributions will be
enhanced when Congress and the Transportation Security Administration
provide the TSO workforce the basic rights and protections necessary to
recruit and retain a workforce that is such an integral part of our
National security framework.
No discussion of the future of TSA is complete without the voice of
the TSO workforce. TSOs are the most visible of TSA's components, the
most likely to be blamed for any perceived failures on the part of the
agency and the last to receive credit from the public or their employer
for a job well done. It is necessary for TSA to recognize the TSO
workforce's contribution to National security by ensuring the fair
treatment of TSOs on the job, and by ensuring TSOs have the resources
necessary to carry out the agency's mission and to hold TSA
accountable. AFGE believes this is the best path forward to provide
better stewardship of taxpayer funds and enhanced security to address
ever-changing threats to American aviation.
the tso workforce is the legacy of the deadliest act of terrorism in
the united states
The duty of screening passengers and baggage at our Nation's
airports is based on the National examination of aviation security
following the terrible events of September 11, 2001. The airline
industry felt the aftershock of the attacks long after their
occurrence: Even after airports reopened after 9/11, airlines
experienced at least a 30% reduction in demand for air travel. A 2002
Congressional Research Service report entitled ``The Economic Effects
of 9/11: A Retrospective Assessment'' noted that Congress created the
Air Transportation Stabilization Board to assist airlines with up to
$10 billion in loans. The industry suffered significant layoffs. Nearly
18,000 business were disrupted or destroyed by the 9/11 attacks. The
Gross City Product of New York City fell by $27.3 billion between the
fall of 2001 and the end of 2001. Nationally, 462 extended mass layoffs
affecting nearly 130,000 workers were attributable to the 9/11 attacks.
Congress extended unemployment compensation benefits an additional 13
weeks for workers who had exhausted their benefits and for those in
``high-unemployment States.'' Most important, 2,977 innocent civilians
and brave first responders lost their lives on that tragic day. America
resolved to address the lapses in security that contributed to the
events of 9/11 and to prevent the reoccurrence of another act of mass
terrorism on American soil.
Experts quickly recognized one important security lapse on
September 11. The patchwork of private firms with little oversight
employing screeners with inconsistent training and no standard
operating procedures, high turnover, low pay, and paltry benefits left
a gap in airport security the terrorists could exploit. As noted at the
time by Senator John McCain (R-AZ) ``the people who now are employed as
screeners can make more money by going down and working at a concession
at the same airport.'' A frightened and frustrated public demanded
thoroughly vetted, highly-trained, professional workforce of civil
servants. Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
(ATSA), Pub. L. 107-71, with the intention that the new positions of
TSO have higher wages and benefits than screeners employed by private
firms to create a well-trained, professional workforce with low
turnover able to protect the public from those seeking to commit
terrorist acts.
I recite these sad facts to remind everyone what is at stake:
Throughout the world terrorists remained fixated on transportation hubs
such as airports, bus terminals, and railway stations as a focus for
mass casualty attacks. The United States has a formula that has kept us
safe from these types of attacks for over 15 years: Better
intelligence-gathering methods shared among agencies, deployment of up-
to-date technology, and in the case of commercial aviation, a career
workforce of well-trained, dedicated TSOs entrusted by the Federal
Government as the first and best line of defense against aviation
terrorism at airports in the United States and its territories. It
continues to be imperative that the duties of airport screening be
performed by Federal Government employees, and that these employees be
provided adequate resources to do their jobs. Likewise, Congress must
pass legislation that ends the shameful practice of treating the 42,000
members of the TSO workforce as second-class civil servants by granting
the TSO workforce the same legal protections as other Federal
employees.
privatizing screening duties is a gamble the united states cannot
afford
Although airports have had the ability to apply for privatization
of screening since 2004, only 21 out of 435 commercial airports
currently participate in the Screening Partnership Program (SPP), TSA's
privatization program. By its nature the SPP circumvents TSA's direct
responsibility for passenger screening. There is no documentation of
superiority of private screeners, or that they save taxpayer dollars.
In 2012 Congress inexplicably tied the hands of the TSA administrator
by requiring the approval of airport applications to participate in the
SPP if on its face the application does not compromise security or
detrimentally effect cost efficiency or screening effectiveness. SPP
does not ``get rid of TSA'': To the contrary, the only change is that
TSOs with years of experience are swapped-out for newly-hired screeners
who are paid less and have fewer benefits, allowing the contractor to
shift costs to workers. TSA management remains in place under SPP, as
do TSA's policies and procedures.
The TSO workforce is a well-known quantity. TSA reports that in
2016 3,391 firearms were seized at checkpoints at 238 airports. The
highest number of guns were found by Federal TSOs at Atlanta
Hartsfield-Jackson International, Dallas/Fort Worth International and
George Bush Intercontinental Airport. Despite the burden of relentless
overtime due to short staffing, TSOs defied predictions of a summer of
long checkpoint lines. In addition to Presidential inaugurations, TSOs
continued to be called upon to provide the effective, speedy screening
necessary to maintain free movement of large groups of people at
National events. TSOs have provided screening for Amtrak and large
public transportation systems. The diligence and dedication of the TSO
workforce has coordinated effectively with updated intelligence
information to prevent another act of transportation terrorism in the
United States.
AFGE calls on the Congress to limit the SPP, and require that TSA
provide the same transparency to private screeners as the TSO
workforce. AFGE has strongly supported the legislative efforts of
Homeland Security Committee Ranking Member Bennie Thompson (D-MS) to
bring much-needed reforms to the SPP. Because screening of passengers
and baggage at airports reacts to rapidly updated intelligence, TSO
duties must be recognized as being inherently Governmental and should
not be subject to privatization under any circumstances.
In addition to maintaining the TSO workforce, Congress must be
accountable for providing the resources necessary to provide the level
of screening demanded by the public. Last summer's checkpoint delays
were largely caused by TSA's failure to maintain the necessary level of
staffing. TSA admitted that TSO staffing levels fell from 47,147 full-
time employees in 2013 to 42,525 in 2015. TSA allowed TSO vacancies to
go unfilled based on faulty staffing projection resulting from expected
PreCheck enrollments that ever materialized. Congress must not allow
TSA to ``blow smoke'' about necessary staffing levels. The PreCheck
program produces a known population of passengers who still require
some TSO screening. Piloted use of automated bin return systems may
move passengers through checkpoints faster but they do not impact the
number of TSOs needed to screen. Congress must provide the oversight
necessary to hold TSA accountable for adequate staffing to ensure
security and reduce wait times. Congress continues to divert $1.25
billion each year from the Security fee to deficit reduction. AFGE
calls for Security fee funds to be directed to TSA.
congress must act to end the second-class status of the tso workforce
and provide the resources needed to protect the public
If you have departed from a U.S. commercial airport, flown with
excitement to greet a new grandchild, traveled by air to follow a
favorite sports team to a major sporting event such as the World Series
or the Final Four, or returned to your Congressional district to meet
with your constituents during the last 15 years, the work of a TSO
facilitated your safety. The TSO workforce is the eyes, ears, and hands
of aviation security in the United States. They are part of the reason
why traveling on a U.S. airline is the safest mode of transportation.
According to the U.S. Travel Association, almost 4 out of 5 domestic
trips are taken for leisure purposes, including families with children
visiting relatives or popular vacation destinations. In 2015, the U.S.
Travel Association noted that ``U.S. residents logged 459 million trips
ways from home for business purposes. Until something goes wrong it is
difficult to recognize the contributions of a group. The work of TSOs
makes it far more likely that Americans fly safely and we never again
suffer the horrendous loss of life or economic downturn caused by an
act of air terrorism. It is very important work.''
TSOs signed up for the job because they wanted to serve the public
by keeping travel safe. In return they have every right to expect fair
treatment from their employer: The Federal Government. Instead TSA
remains heavily invested in treating the 40,000-plus TSOs like second-
class employees. Not only is this an affront to the entire TSO
workforce--it is also an affront to all civil servants. Congress should
never have given TSA the option of whether to provide fundamental
workplace rights and protections to TSOs. And Congress should never
have divided the TSA workforce into a group of management ``haves''
with statutory rights under title 5 of the U.S. code, and the front-
line TSO ``have nots'' who do not. Ranking Member Bennie Thompson (D-
MS) and Representative Nita Lowey (D-NY) have authored legislation
granting all TSA employees equal rights under the law during successive
sessions of Congress. The Rights for Transportation Security Employees
Act now has a Senate companion, the Strengthening American
Transportation Security Act introduced by Senator Brian Schatz (D-HI).
Both bills ensure that TSOs and all other TSA employees have rights and
protections under title 5, including:
The Family and Medical Leave Act;
The Federal Labor Standards Act;
Employment discrimination protections, including application
of the Rehabilitation Act;
Access to the Merit Systems Protection Board to appeal
adverse personnel actions;
Fair shift and annual leave bid procedures;
Fair pay under the General Schedule of wages; and
Full collective bargaining rights.
AFGE has testified before the disproportionately negative impact of
TSA's policies on women in the TSO workforce. Our female members
continue to report that they are prohibited from bidding on certain
lines at the airport or to change positions, shifts, or regular days
off because TSA has too few women working. This is especially true at
checkpoints, where the less than 40% of TSOs who are women are required
to ``patdown'' the over 50% of female passengers. Although employers
are required to provide breastfeeding rooms to new mothers under the
Affordable Care Act and Office of Personnel Management guidelines, AFGE
members report that the rooms provided for TSOs to express breast milk
at some airports were far from checkpoints, unclean, lacked
refrigerators, and did not have locks on the doors. These issues were
only addressed through the activism of local AFGE leadership stood up
to TSA management.
The union remains concerned about TSA's lack of commitment to the
labor-management relationship. A working labor-management relationship
requires transparency, good faith, and respect. AFGE recently ratified
a contract with TSA through a process wholly created by TSA that is
different from any other process in the Federal Government. Despite
previous agreements and representations, TSA repeatedly sought to
invoke different negotiating rules, including the date on which the
contract became effective previously agreed to by both parties. Without
consulting or notifying the union, TSA unilaterally issued interim
guidance on outstanding sections of the collective bargaining
agreement. The interim guidance contains new provisions applicable to
AFGE and TSA. TSA should have followed the contract provisions of the
first contract until the issues were settled.
Most recently, TSA failed to inform AFGE of the active-shooter
situation at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport during
December 2016. AFGE was forced to contact TSA to confirm that TSOs were
not among the wounded. TSA also failed to inform AFGE that an
application for private screeners under SPP was filed for Atlantic City
International Airport. Previously, the late Robert Ball, who served as
TSA's Senior Executive for AFGE Relations, would inform AFGE upon the
filing of an SPP application. TSA has not named a new Senior Executive
to function in this role. This list only includes recent unilateral
actions on behalf of TSA inconsistent with previous determinations,
agreements, or past practice and evidence of why Congress should
require TSA to follow the same labor-management rules as other Federal
agencies. Good labor management relations in the Federal sector result
in a better-functioning workplace and advance of the agency's core
mission.
TSOs are in the untenable position of changing workplace policies
with each new TSA administrator. This level of unaccountable authority
does nothing to help National security and contributes to the
continuing turnover in the TSO workforce. I call on the Members of the
House Homeland Security Committee and the Senate Commerce, Science, and
Transportation Committee to not only sponsor, but favorably report out
the Rights for Transportation Security Employees Act and the
Strengthening American Transportation Security Act.
Fifteen years after the creation of TSA it us unthinkable that our
union is still fighting for equality for over 40,000 Federal workers.
This workforce has not kept us safe because they lack workplace rights
and protections. They have done so despite the fundamental rights so
important to the effectiveness of Government work. Let us commit now to
send to President Trump a bill strengthening aviation security through
rights for Transportation Security employees.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Cox. You make a very good point.
You know, the front line folks are rarely recognized at TSA for
a job that they do it, day in and day out.
It is a very difficult job to try and find the proverbial
needle in the haystack every time. It is remarkable that they
found 3,300 guns last year. It is also deeply troubling that
they found 3,300 guns.
But, every day they get up and go to work and they, you
know, have the pressure of the safety of the traveling public
in their hands.
So I definitely want to commend them for their work. I
thank them for their work. Our job is not only to support them
but try to make their job as easy as possible.
It is clear to me, and we will have more discussion about
this, that the technology is lacking in this country compared
to the rest of the world. It is kind-of like asking someone to
go fight a battle with bow and arrows when your adversaries
have more sophisticated weapons. I mean, we have to give them
better tools to work with and better working conditions under
which to work.
So, that is the tension we have in these days of limited
budgets. But, finding the efficiencies and finding ways to make
them better is what we need to do. Again, I applaud them for
all their efforts and please extend that to them for me.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions. I think
I am going to start with--there is so much to ask you, we may
do a second round here, if time permits.
But just quickly, Mr. Dow, you mentioned that the average
traveler would take two to three more trips a year if the
experience in traveling was better than it is today. I would
probably take more trips, too, if the seats were a little bit
bigger because, being a tall person is brutal, especially when
someone puts the seat back in front of you. I can't even sit up
straight, hardly, in those seats.
But, did you do any sort of a calculation as to what the
economic impact would be of those two to three more trips per
year, just ballpark figures that you can get to us?
Mr. Dow. Ballpark $85 billion.
Mr. Katko. Billion?
Mr. Dow. Billion, 888,000 jobs. What we are finding is
people, when it gets to be an hour flight that might be a 3- or
4-hour drive, they are driving. That creates another problem,
puts all the people on the road.
So there is no question about it. Travelers, anything gets
in their way impedes them from wanting to travel. So this is so
critical to get people through efficiently and safely.
Mr. Katko. Right. I appreciate that.
Now, moving forward, there does seem to be a virtual
certainty that the amount of additional travelers per year is
going to explode in this country and, indeed, around the world.
I wonder if you could comment for me, based on what your
projections and your experiences are, whether we are ready for
it, No. 1, from an infrastructure standpoint, but also from a
processing standpoint?
Mr. Dow. We are absolutely not ready for it. Right now, we
have gone, in the past 5 years, from 55 million international
travelers, domestic travel, up to 77 million. Domestic
travelers are going up 3 and 4 percent a year.
So we are going to get to a point that that 750 million
travelers is going, definitely, to be a billion travelers. When
that happens in a short time, we are not ready for it.
Our airports we don't have the facilities, the screening
areas, the technology. It will be a mess and it will impede the
growth of the economy and jobs. So there is no question, and
that is going to be upon us before we know it. This is not a
10-year problem. This is a 5-year problem.
Mr. Katko. What do you see as TSA's greatest hurdles that
they need to clear in order to make it ready for that
challenge?
Mr. Dow. I think the greatest hurdles, as you have heard it
several times, is to be able to have technology to make sure
that the TSOs are doing the mission-critical jobs versus
standing there and watching someone exit the airport that
someone else could do if they try to go the wrong way. There
are many jobs that we have got these well-trained people and we
have got to get them to really utilize their talents and find
other ways.
The lady next to me talked about trace things. There are a
lot of things we can do. But TSA has to get technology, has to
get efficiency, and has got to get more people in PreCheck.
Trusted traveler program is critical.
Mr. Katko. I agree with that, and I think that we have made
great strides with that but there is much more we need to do.
In Syracuse, my airport, for example, we put in--they used to
have to travel to Oswego, New York, 45 minutes away on not a
very good road, just to go to the Port of Oswego to see the
Border Patrol to get yourself on a pre-clearance, which is
insane.
So, I had them put a kiosk at the airport. They now have
close to 50 percent of the travelers coming out of Syracuse in
PreCheck, which is amazing. It has completely changed the
burden on the TSO officers, I mean the TSA officers, as well as
the overall enjoyable experience for the public.
So there is so much more we can do, and I am probably going
to follow up again with more questions if I have time, here.
But, I thank you for that and there is so much more we need to
talk about but technology is key.
That is why, Ms. Brooks, I would like to ask you some
questions. The SPP Program, obviously, there are many
initiatives and what have you but it just seems like when you
travel internationally, at some of the airports, like Schiphol,
for example or some of the others, that in Europe, that the
technology is light-years ahead of ours.
So, what do you see as the biggest technological drawbacks
we have here in the United States, that critically need to be
addressed?
Ms. Brooks. Well, I think some of the things that we are
starting to see in the automated lanes are actually making
great strides toward actually getting greater throughput at the
checkpoints.
Mr. Katko. That being the automated lanes, being the----
Ms. Brooks. The tray return and the----
Mr. Katko [continuing]. Trails?
Ms. Brooks. Yes. There is a lot more than can be done with
that. The tray return is very visible. But there is a lot that
can be done with actually automating threat detection and
actually putting some intelligence into the machines
themselves.
Then that coupled with--I mentioned, centralized image
processing. That is networking the checkpoints so that you can
actually have a continuous flow of images provided to the
screening officers. We have seen a great deal of efficiency
gained from that.
Then actually through networking the checkpoints, you can
also get a lot of efficiency in terms of understanding the
throughput and getting some good management information from
the checkpoints to enable you to better deploy your resources.
We talked about biometrics a little bit. I think that, for
the future, is going to be absolutely critical. We talk a lot
about screening according to risk.
But if you don't know who the person is that you have got
in front of you and who you are screening, then you can't do
that. So I think that is going to be a very, very important
piece, being able to say that this bag, in this tray, belongs
to this person.
I know who this person is, and I know that they are
supposed to be here, going these checkpoints and traveling
today. That is the piece that really is missing right now.
It is being worked on all over the world. I don't think
anybody has quite cracked that nut yet, but it is something
that we really need to be working on.
Mr. Katko. Yes. We have really been on TSA over the last
couple of years. We have had 18 subcommittee hearings, which
is, I think, more than anyone in Congress.
So, we have held TSA to task. We have had all kinds of
meetings with them. We have had roundtable discussions with
industry leaders in an attempt to try and drag them out of the
Stone Age, the proverbial Stone Age as far as the screening
equipment goes. There is still an awful long way to go.
But, do you see some glimmers of hope on the horizon with
changes that have been made recently within TSA?
Ms. Brooks. Yes. Absolutely. I mean, I think the Innovation
Task Force that was set up is really looking at some of these
future technologies and making great progress in some of the
areas that we are very interested in as well.
I would really like to see the work of that task force
continuing and with a lot of engagement with us as well, so
that we can share experiences and, you know, help by looking
globally at what everybody is doing and bring all of that
information together.
Because, you know, some of the future technologies,
particularly with things like stand-off screening so that you
could walk through a checkpoint without having to stop, you
know, that is really where we want to be.
And, you know, through the work of airports and regulators
and organizations like TSA, then, you know, we will be able to
get there. But we need to push ahead with the R&D and obviously
that requires money. So, you know, unfortunately, it comes back
to the bottom line again.
Mr. Katko. Yes, it does. Well, I appreciate it.
There is so much more to ask all of you.
Mr. Cox, I suspect Mrs. Watson Coleman has some questions
for you that I would have asked anyhow.
So the Chair now recognizes Ranking Member Mrs. Watson
Coleman for 5 minutes for questions.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Before I engage in my questions, I ask
that I get an opportunity to make some observations. I really
appreciated the ones that you made with regard to the testimony
that was offered. It is----
Mr. Katko. Absolutely.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. It is really important that
the three of you were here to give us your perspective. It is
so important that we make sure that there is efficient and
effective traveling. It is so important that we contribute to
the economy with people who want to travel.
It is so important that we recognize the significance of
the people on line and recognize that, because things have not
happened that are bad, don't ignore the problems that exist as
it relates to them.
The information with regard to technology and how we stand
in relation to the rest of the world is really important. I
think it speaks volumes to a couple of things. TSA needs
stability.
It needs the access to the fees that are being diverted for
other reasons, because that money can be used for purposes of
improving technology, the newest most innovative technology
that is evidence-based and works, as well as supporting the
people, the staff that is charged to doing this.
So before I engage in my very short questions, I just want
to ask unanimous consent that Representative Jackson Lee be
allowed to sit and question the witnesses as well?
Mr. Katko. Without objection, so ordered.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for your indulgence.
So I will start with Mr. Cox, because I don't want to
disappoint my Chairman. Mr. Cox, in the past, it was common for
TSOs and TSA to revel in the fact that the agency was able to
screen a certain amount of travelers within a certain amount of
time. Following the leaked OIG report in 2015, which brought to
light a number of TSA security gaps, TSA rightfully rechanneled
its focus to effective screenings.
With the steadily increasing volume of travelers and a
pressure to screen them in a certain amount of time--and I do
hope that there is an increase in traveling, and I hope that
this ban that we are trying to get--wrap our brain around right
now is understood and applied appropriately so it doesn't
decrease the appropriate travel. How has TSA worked to ensure
that effective and efficient screening is of the utmost
importance?
Mr. Cox. Thank you, Congresswoman. TSA has definitely
refocused on the training. They were training for quick and
fast, to the most efficient mannerism to get the passengers
through. But they realized they needed to be screening for
quality, that teaching and training folks exactly what to look
for.
All of us go through airports and it is pretty amazing. I
see those screens, and I have no idea what I am looking at. But
these are trained professionals, a skillful workforce, and
being able to focus directly on training.
I commend our previous Administrator Neffenger, for
spending the time and resources to retrain TSOs and to do that.
Obviously, that is a hardship, because if a person is in
training, they are not directly on the job that day.
One thing I would point out. We are about 5,000 less
transportation security officers today than we were several
years ago, so we have less people doing a lot more screening.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. With that--that was going to be my
second question. There are about 40,000 now, right?
Mr. Cox. Correct.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. You say that is 5,000 less than we
had----
Mr. Cox. We had right at 45,000 several, I would say, 3 or
4 years ago.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Given what you have experienced and
given what Mr. Dow has even expressed in terms of expectations
of increased traveling, how many TSOs do you feel would be
needed?
Mr. Cox. I wouldn't be the best person to ask, but
certainly that 5,000 that has been lost, I believe, needs to be
returned. The air traffic is much higher. Technology is
improving and we applaud, and we want greater technology. Yes,
the frequent traveler program, all those things come hand-in-
hand.
But still, yet, we can never get rid of the human element.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Yes.
Mr. Cox. There is a person, even at the frequent traveler
check lane, that has to be there. The human resources still
have to exist with all of that.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. I know we have got some
serious concerns with the fact that TSOs are not covered under
Title V.
Mr. Cox. Correct.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. I know that you recently ratified your
second collective bargaining agreement with TSA. How is
negotiating with TSA different from negotiating with other DHS
agencies that are represented by your union?
Mr. Cox. TSOs do not have Merit Systems Protection Board
rights as all other Federal employees and most other agencies.
There is not the ability to have a negotiated grievance
procedure to resolve workplace disputes.
There are very, very limited things that can be negotiated.
Basically, we spend a lot of time talking about when you can
wear a jacket and when you cannot wear a jacket, or when you
can wear shorts or long pants.
So those are very minimal things, but very important for
the work. Border Patrol Agents, ICE agents, CIS, all other
Homeland Security employees, Coast Guard, many of those, have
Title V protections.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. It has been noted that TSOs have the
lowest one--just about the lowest morale in the workforce. I
would suspect you might align that concern with the fact that
they don't have the same rights and privileges as other Federal
employees do?
Mr. Cox. That is correct. They don't have the same rights
and privileges, nor are they on the GS pay scale. Their pay is
less than most other Federal employees, and so it is an
entirely different employment system.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Does that impact the ability to
recruit enough and to retain enough?
Mr. Cox. Yes, ma'am. The turnover in TSA is higher than
many other Government agencies.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. I am going to have some questions for
Ms. Brooks and Mr. Dow, and I will do it on the second round.
So I thank you for your indulgence thus far. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. I yield.
Mr. Katko. Mrs. Watson Coleman, if you just have a few
minutes of questions we might try and do this in one round, if
you would like to just go for a few minutes longer?
Mrs. Watson Coleman. OK. Thank you, thank you.
Ms. Brooks, as you observed, integrating innovative
technology into the passenger screening process will help make
airport security procedures more effective and more efficient.
What are the biggest challenges to getting the state-of-
the-art technologies into our airports, as compared to the
procurement processes within the airports around the world? Is
it the money?
Ms. Brooks. Well----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Is it the lack of planning?
Ms. Brooks. Well, money does come into it, of course. One
of the things that I think really needs to be looked at is the
time it takes for technology to get out of the lab and into the
airports, the certification processes. There is a lot that can
be done with that.
You know, clearly the TSA has to certify equipment, and
that is absolutely right. But that turnaround time is very
important for getting things actually out into airports.
You know, maybe there are opportunities to look at what has
done in Europe with E-Cat, for example, the certified
equipment. Maybe to have some kind of recognition that if
Europe has already certified something, then, you know, maybe
there is a less rigorous process that can be done here. You
know, maybe there are some reciprocal arrangement, because that
really is critical to getting things done.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Does the instability of the leadership
in TSA, whether or not there is indeed an alignment between a
long-term plan, long-term needs, long-term budgeting, does that
affect the rolling out of technology that you see in use in
other airports that is already evidence-based?
Ms. Brooks. Well, I think probably the shifting emphasis
between, you know, whether there is research and development or
something seen as very critical and important and the roll-out
of new technologies.
Yes, that probably does have an impact given, you know, one
administrator to the next may have very different views about
how fast these things need to happen. We certainly had some
very good experiences with the previous administrator, Admiral
Neffenger.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. Do I still have my last
question?
Mr. Katko. Sure.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. OK. Thank you. This is actually for
Mr. Dow and President Cox. According to media reports, airline
crews have been caught up in the President's recent travel ban.
Specifically, airline crew members from 7 countries referenced
in the Executive Order are now prohibited from entering this
country, despite having approved U.S. entry visas.
Some crew members have been detained and carriers have had
to shift staff away from the U.S. routes to prevent additional
crew members from being affected. According to the
International Air Transportation Association, the Executive
Order was issued without prior coordination, warning, causing
confusion among both airlines and travelers.
It also placed additional burdens on airlines to comply
with unclear requirements to bear implementation costs, and to
face potential penalties for noncompliance.
What does the botched rollout of the travel ban executive
order say about the importance of DHS consulting and
coordinating with partners like carriers, airports, and travel
industry, stakeholders and employees, in the development and
implementation of the security policy?
I will start with you, Mr. Dow, and I will ask you, Mr.
Cox, to respond, and then I will say thank you to my Chairman.
Mr. Dow. Well, we respect and appreciate the President's
concern for the safety of America.
That said, we need to find a way to end the confusion and
the chaos that it has created, and we urge them to get through
this quickly, these 90 days, because there is a great deal of
misunderstanding that was caused.
I think it is very important to have everybody in the loop
as we work through these things. So we understand and respect
the need for security, but we also need to make sure that the
world knows clearly what we are doing.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. Mr. Cox.
Mr. Cox. I think there has been a great deal of confusion.
Clearly, AFGE proudly represents the National Border Patrol
throughout the country.
The comments and feedback that I have had from those agents
is, basically, confusion of not knowing exactly what to do at
airports. That that has sort-of focused resources away,
particularly from our Southern Border, where we worry strongly
about drug cartels and those that are into human trafficking,
and many things that are very, very harmful.
That, clearly, most people coming into airports have met
the proper visa requirements and have the proper paperwork. We
always want to prevent against anyone coming into this country
to do harm to the American public.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Chairman Katko, let me just say that,
you know, when we think of our safety and security, we think of
our intelligence community, our FBI, and places of that nature,
and we wouldn't privatize them. With regard to travelers, I
think that that is the same level of security we are expecting
and hoping for.
While we can use the best technologies in the world, I
believe that those who take an oath to uphold our Constitution
and work as employees of our workforce are the ones that should
be making sure that we are safe and secure at airports. Thank
you. With that, I appreciate your indulgence.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mrs. Watson Coleman, and I will note,
as a matter of practice with this committee, the Ranking Member
will have more flexibility with respect to time moving forward.
Unfortunately, given the growing list of people doing
questions here today, we will not be able to grant all of you
as much flexibility. So, we ask you to stick as close as you
can to the 5-minute limit as you can.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Higgins, the gentleman from
Louisiana. First, I want to welcome you to Congress, and
welcome you to this committee. Mr. Higgins, the floor is yours.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Question for Mr. Dow. Sir, if we could move to airport
security overall, I would like to ask you about your opinions
regarding the vetting and supervision of airport employees that
have regular access to aircraft, and luggage, and cargo.
There is a great deal of emphasis being placed upon the
screening of travelers. Those of us that fly regularly wonder,
you know, what is it, the level of screening being given to the
employees that have access to the aircraft that we are
entering, and to our luggage and cargo that travel as well.
Overall just give us some feedback, please, on the
vulnerabilities and weaknesses of perimeters to your security
at United States airports.
Mr. Dow. Yes, sir. First of all, we believe that everyone
who has access to the air transportation system has to be
properly vetted and screened, and that is back-of-the-house
employee--that is my hotel talk--back-of-the-airport employees,
pilots. So everyone has to do that.
You asked a question, also, on how important it is to--the
last part of your question? I dropped it. I apologize.
Mr. Higgins. Just your overall assessment of the
vulnerabilities or weakness of airport perimeter security.
Mr. Dow. Yes. I am glad. That is a very important area
because, as we have seen, the couple of problems that we have
had around the world----
Mr. Higgins. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dow [continuing]. Have been outside the screening area.
I think it is extremely important that we put measures in
there, whether it be presence of security, security practices.
But we have to be careful we don't move TSA out to the
beginning of the highway getting to the airport, because so
many airports are so difficult to get through.
So we have to have systems, people have to know we are
watching those areas, but perimeter security is important, but
we do not want to move the checkpoint to the road approaching
the airport, which would be a total disaster. So it is a high
priority and we have got to address it.
Mr. Higgins. Yes, sir. I am wondering what level of
coordination TSA has with airport police to address these
matters of safety of the aircraft and the travelers?
Mr. Dow. Just as the Ranking Member said of having
everybody involved, I think it is very important that local
police, airport police, and security, and our Secret Service
people all work in conjunction to put a net.
In your State, I have seen a tremendous amount of
cooperation between the State police, the city police, and in
New Orleans, which is very important. So I think it is
important. It can be done. You can get everyone working
together.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, sir. Generally speaking, Nation-
wide, are you seeing that level of cooperation in other States?
Mr. Dow. It varies. You have seen one airport, you have
seen one airport. But it is becoming more and more important
and all our airport directors have it on their radar that we
need to look not only at the security checkpoint, but
understand and have a plan in place for perimeter security.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Dow.
Ms. Brooks and Mr. Cox, thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time.
Mr. Katko. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr.
Payne.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to the Ranking
Member of the subcommittee. It is really an honor and a
privilege to have her join this committee that has really done
great work and worked in a bipartisan manner over the course of
the time that I have been involved within. So we are looking
forward to continuing that work.
Mr. Dow, in your testimony, you discuss implementing
improvements to the checkpoint experience. In your opinion,
what are the most effective and pressing adjustments that
should be made to the PreCheck process, in order to encourage
greater participation among trusted populations without
sacrificing the security of all the passengers?
Mr. Dow. That is a very good question, Mr. Payne. Thank
you. On the PreCheck process, No. 1, we have got to get more
people in the program. We have millions of people who have been
vetted very deeply from a secure standpoint. We should figure
out how we can get those people in the program.
The second thing, I can apply for a mortgage and get an
answer in 40 seconds. We should be able to have people apply
for PreCheck and get a very quick answer, going through all the
security processes. If we can do that, that will help.
I think we have to, as I said earlier, promote more. If I
owned TSA, I would put a lot of dollars behind promoting and
getting another $10 million or $15 million in this program and
that, in turn, would raise over a billion dollars.
So we need to promote, we need to have a good process, we
have got to be able to sign people up. It has to be a priority.
It has not been a big enough priority, whether it be with
Congress, or a lot of people, to get people in this program.
You and I are not going to blow up an airport. So bottom line,
we should figure out how to get more of us in this program.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, sir.
Ms. Brooks, what reasons can you give for the lack of
innovation here, in the States, as opposed to other
jurisdictions where you have seen this technology implemented?
You know, we here in America like to pride ourselves of
being on the cutting edge, and in so many instances I am
finding that we are lacking in areas. Can you give me some
context on why you think we are where we are?
Ms. Brooks. Well, I think the innovation actually isn't
lacking. It is there. It is happening in the labs. TSA is doing
a lot of really good work and looking at new technologies.
Some of the things that we are starting to see rolled out
now in airports with, for example, in Atlanta, is actually
getting toward some of that innovation.
But I think it comes to getting it out there more quickly
and, again, it comes down to, you know, there has to be
adequate funding to get that technology tested, certified, and
rolled out into the airports.
Mr. Payne. Well, I, you know, I mean, you know, I get
concerned sometimes about, you know, us trying to reinvent the
wheel. I mean, if there is something, you know, that is working
in Heathrow, my pride isn't going to keep me from saying, well,
hey, how are you doing that? How are you implementing that?
You know, I just don't understand, you know, the lag time
in finding technology that is moving us forward and advancing
and, you know, getting to the airports in a timely manner if it
is working there.
Ms. Brooks. I think the collaboration that we have now with
TSA is critical, and I really hope that, you know, with the new
administrator going forward that we continue that, because we
are starting to exchange some very good information with TSA
and have some very good discussions about the technology, the
research, the trials, the processes, that are happening, you
know, both in the United States and in the rest of the world.
So I think there is a lot we can learn from each other, and
I really hope that that continues going forward, because we
have seen a big difference in the last couple of years.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
President Cox, it is good to have you here again. We
respect the work of the men and women at TSA. The TSOs are
really on the front line, and we have to make sure that we--
some of us in Congress make sure that the traveling public, and
people in this country understand the difficult work being on
the front line every single day that our TSOs are and really
raise their profile and respect in this country for the work
that they do. Thirty-three hundred weapons that they found, and
that is just firearms.
On January 23, President Trump signed an Executive Order
initiating a Federal hiring freeze. TSOs are Federal employees.
Have you received any guidance from the administration on
whether or not this hiring freeze will effect TSOs?
Mr. Cox. I have not, sir. It is our understanding that
there is a hiring freeze for all of Homeland Security at this
point. I may be wrong with that. It is changed by the moment,
but it is our understanding there is a hiring freeze for TSA
and other departments inside of Homeland Security.
Mr. Payne. Well, I think that some type of correspondence
should go out to the administration in terms of maybe looking
at that freeze in this area, making sure that the traveling
public is safe should not be something that is curtailed. You
said you are down 5,000 TSOs as it is?
Mr. Cox. Yes, sir, about 5,000 less than there was just
several years ago.
Mr. Payne. OK. Well, then I really think that is something
that needs to be addressed and hopefully through this committee
we can do so. With that I yield back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Payne.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts,
Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome the new
Ranking Member and the staff. It is great to be here.
You know, one of the things that concerns me generally is
the fact that we are viewing this in the lens of a terrorist
attack, which we should, and people's safety personally.
However, there is another target for these attacks and that
is our economies. It is the economy of an industry. It is the
economy of the countries that are affected by this.
So I want to thank Mr. Dow for the dialog that the Chairman
and I participated in and the close relationship with this
committee. I think it is very important from an industry
standpoint you do that.
President Cox, I have got to tell you, I fly a lot. The
attitude of the people on the front line that are there is
extraordinary, their helpfulness. I have really been impressed
by that. It is a tough job.
But I have seen definite, you know, high level of helping
people, even when they are perhaps doing some things that
common sense would prevail against.
But I just want to delve into a couple of issues on those
lines quickly. No. 1, Mr. Dow, Ms. Brooks, you know, enhancing
PreCheck, we touched on it but how have we come in terms of the
airlines themselves being helpful?
I mean, the idea of, for instance, being able to exchange
maybe some frequent flyer miles in exchange for PreCheck status
if people want to make that trade-off. Is that something that
has been explored? How are businesses that have people that
work for them, are they stepping up more?
Have you seen a trend to make sure their companies and
their employees have PreCheck paid for them by the companies?
What can we do to expand that, you know, to a greater extent
even?
Mr. Dow. Well, two things, Mr. Keating, thank you for all
your engagement in this issue. You have become an expert on
this so I appreciate it. You mentioned the--I am going to touch
on you mentioned the economy.
When September 11 happened, the air travel industry came to
its knees in 45 minutes. The U.S. economy followed in about 30
days. The world economy followed in about 2 months. So the link
between travel and economy is so clear.
When you ask about TSA PreCheck, we would like to see all
of those things happen. Some companies have stepped up and will
pay for their employees. Google, some of the tech companies
have done that, but we need to get these, the ability to use
frequent flyer miles.
There have been some experiments and it has worked.
Enterprise Rent-a-Car is doing that. We have had----
Mr. Keating. So that the people can make that trade-off if
they want.
Mr. Dow. They can make the trade-off or not. It doesn't
matter how they get there. As long as we get more people in
this program it allows more TSO resources to look for the folks
that we don't know a lot about, and so we have got to make it a
high priority. We have got----
Mr. Keating. Yes. There is one other area, and I hate to
interrupt.
Mr. Dow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keating. There is one other area where they maybe could
make a trade-off that would help. In my experience and I think
in anyone that travels, and that is, you know, the extra charge
for the baggage.
I see so many, you know, slow-ups as a result of people
just struggling to get the extra bag on so they are not charged
with it. Maybe there is something they could do with frequent
flyer miles and the extra charge for baggage, too, because that
does slow things down. I think it makes security a little
harder as well. Just a thought.
Mr. Dow. I wish someone from the airlines could speak with
you also on that, so thank you.
Mr. Keating. Well, thank you.
Mr. Cox, one thing I am worried about. We are talking about
the freeze and the freeze will have an effect because they are
going to lose some good recruits that will give up.
When people see a freeze and they are already working in a
tough job like that, they are going to quit and you are going
to lose some very valuable people along the lines.
But also, I think training is as important as anything
else. I have seen it in so many other areas. I have seen it in
the major cities, you know, with UASI training and those funds,
how cross-professionalization, training together.
In airports, with soft targets now more and more being a
concern, that is what we saw in Istanbul, as we saw in
Brussels, as we saw in Fort Lauderdale, that training is going
to be more valuable, training with local police and the people
that are there for airport security. Do you see a need for
further funding for that training yourself with your personnel?
Mr. Cox. Yes, sir. There is clearly a need for more
training, and I think you have touched on it very nicely. There
are more people that work in an airport than just the screening
employees. There are the vendors, the airline employees, the
passengers. There are lots of personnel in airports. They are
almost a city unto themselves.
You have got to have training for all those individuals
that are working in those facilities every day. To play on some
things, the Chair, Mr. Dow, and you have said I think we are
talking infrastructure.
Infrastructure that would improve the economy because we
get more people to travel, that we move them through faster,
all these things that will help our economy.
I think investing in better equipment, investing in the
human resources, all of that will do great things for our
economy. So I am excited to see Congress talk about improving
the infrastructure.
Mr. Keating. Yes, I do think, and I have seen some of the
new technology myself and that is not replacing people's jobs.
That is being able to shift people----
Mr. Cox. To other jobs.
Mr. Keating [continuing]. To other jobs, which are
important, too. So I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Keating. There being no more
witnesses, we don't have time for another round because I have
a hard stop and a short period of time.
But, let me ask you something which is somewhat
unconventional, but since we have a few minutes here, is there
anything that you, any of you three witnesses wanted to say
that you didn't have an opportunity to say briefly that we
should have touched on or something? Things that are important
to note before we conclude?
Mr. Dow. I think one thing that is important, too, is to
engage the airports. Many airports are in favor of SPP, some
are not, and I think it is very important that TSA take a look
at the main mission of security and keeping us safe.
Then bringing the technology and the folks from the
airports, because they can add on facilitation, on equipment,
on canines. I think we have got to have a better marriage of
the folks that run the airports and TSA.
Mr. Katko. Yes, I couldn't agree more with that. No better
example of that was last summer when some administrative
glitches within TSA helped contribute greatly to the wait lines
at airports.
Once they started talking more with the airlines and the
airports, those lines were alleviated significantly along with
working collaboratively with the folks on the front lines. So,
you are absolutely right in that regard, and I thank you for
noting that.
Mr. Keating. Mr. Chairman, can I have unanimous consent for
one comment?
Mr. Katko. Absolutely.
Mr. Keating. Yes, thank you. I just wanted to point out
that with the help of the committee here we passed in the House
just this week a bill that will take the GAO study about
looking at the uniqueness of the design of every airport into
consideration with our safety plans. So we have moved forward
as a committee taking some of that advice.
I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Katko. No, that is an excellent point. No need to
apologize. I appreciate you making it. Anyone else before we
conclude?
Mr. Cox. Mr. Chairman, I have to say this with all honesty.
I think particularly this subcommittee has a great Chairman, a
great Ranking Member.
Mr. Katko. I agree.
Mr. Cox. I know.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Cox. I mean it from the bottom of my heart because you
work together. You want to find solutions. It is easy to
constantly identify problems. The American people are looking
for solutions, employees are looking for solutions.
Government does lots of good things that helps this country
operate and helps the private industry operate. So I am excited
about this Congress and this subcommittee. I will work with you
and AFGE works with the two of you in any way we can to find
solutions to help our economy and keep us all safe.
Mr. Katko. Well, thank you, Mr. Cox. I appreciate the kind
words. I think they are well-earned by everyone on the
committee because we do try and dispense with party loyalties
and to do the right thing to keep the American public safe and
keep this system humming. Also to make it better.
That is our job and hopefully it can stand as an example of
what others in Congress can do when they put down their swords
and start working together. I think it is important to do that.
So Ms. Brooks, before we wrap up would you like to say
anything?
Ms. Brooks. Yes, just very briefly, thank you. I just
wanted to underscore Mr. Dow's point that engagement with the
airports, engagement with other industry parties is absolutely
critical.
Where we have seen the best results, and I am not just
talking technology, but also people, human factors, the
screening checkpoints, perimeters, insider threat, all of that.
It works best when there is strong collaboration between the
industry and the regulators. So that would be probably my key
message.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Ms. Brooks.
I want to thank all the folks here today. When the
situation permits itself, as a matter of course going forward
we will have a little more flexibility in how we conduct the
hearings like we did today.
I can't guarantee you it is always going to be like that,
but I will signal certainly to Mrs. Watson Coleman at the
outset how we are going to be doing it. But, you know, we have
a structure we follow but when we can deviate from it from the
good of the order to, you know, get a more full hearing, we are
going to do that if we can.
So, I would like to thank the witnesses for their
thoughtful testimony. Members of the committee may have some
additional questions for the witnesses, and we will ask you to
respond to these in writing.
Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the hearing record will
be open for 10 days. Without objection, the subcommittee stands
adjourned. Thank you all.
[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions from Honorable Brian Fitzpatrick for Roger Dow
Question 1. Mr. Dow, thanks very much for providing a travel
community perspective on how we improve TSA. Your positive
recommendations are quite helpful to me as a new Member of this
subcommittee, and should give me lots to think about as I work with
Chairman Katko to improve this critical part of our Nation's security
system. As I read through your recommendations, it seems that improving
PreCheck is near the top of your list, with a particular focus on
addressing pricing--for large groups, for families, for companies who
want to enroll their employees. Tell me, as you've looked at PreCheck
how much of an impact do you think the current $85.00 fee has on
dissuading enrollment?
Answer. In 2016, U.S. Travel Association conducted a study to
estimate the number of air travelers who are likely to enroll in the
TSA PreCheck Program: (1) If the price of enrolling in the TSA PreCheck
program would be reduced; (2) if the application process would be
simplified by getting it done completely on-line. To accomplish this
task, U.S. Travel conducted a survey to investigate the likelihood of
air travelers to enroll in the program. The survey results were then
incorporated with U.S. Travel's estimates of total air travelers as
well as the actual number of enrollment provided by the TSA to
calculate the total number of potential TSA PreCheck enrollment if TSA
would reduce the price or if the application process could be
simplified by getting it done completely on-line.
Key Findings
Of those air travelers who are currently not enrolled in the
TSA PreCheck Program and unlikely to enroll the program:
Half thought the cost to enroll in the program is too
high.
18 percent thought the application process is too
complicated.
Of those respondents who thought the price is too high:
12.1 percent are likely to enroll if the price would be
$15 lower than the current level ($85);
Of those who are unlikely to enroll if the price is
reduced by $15 (or to $70), 10.5 percent said they will
likely enroll the program if the cost is further reduced to
$60.
Of those who thought the application process is too
complicated:
55 percent would likely to enroll the program if the
application process could be simplified by getting it done
completely on-line.
Applying the percentage of survey respondents to U.S.
Travel's estimate of the number of air travelers not currently
enrolled in this program, U.S. Travel calculates that:
About 2 million air travelers are likely to enroll in the
TSA PreCheck if the price of enrollment could be reduce to
$70 ($15 lower than current $85);
An additional 1.5 million travelers are likely to enroll
in PreCheck if the price is lowered from $70 to $60.
Overall, about 3.5 million air travelers are likely to
enroll in PreCheck program if the price could be reduced
from the current $85 to $60.
About 3.2 million air travelers are likely to enroll the
PreCheck program if the application process could be
simplified by getting it done completely on-line.
Methodology
The U.S. Travel Association TSA PreCheck Survey used TNS'
TravelsAmerica survey program (a syndicated on-line tracking
study) that provides leisure and business travel information
for its clients. The survey respondents were drawn from air
travelers (defined as having taken at least one air trip in the
past 12 months) within the TravelsAmerica program. TNS
completed 1,000 interviews from March 7-10, 2016.
Survey respondents consisted of general population males and
females over the age of 18 and representative of gender,
geographic division, income, household size, household
designation, and market size. The survey has a margin of error
of +/-4 percent at 95 percent confidence level.
Because the TNS survey of 1,000 respondents is of a
representative sample of U.S. domestic air travelers, the
results of the survey can be used to extrapolate to total
domestic U.S. air travelers based on standard statistical
estimation methods.
The number of total domestic air travelers in the United
States is estimated by the U.S. Travel Association, which is
considered the leading travel research organization in the
country. This number is widely used in research as a benchmark
of air travel.
Question 2a. Mr. Dow, as a former FBI agent, I had the pleasure of
avoiding security screening at airports. Once I retired from the FBI, I
got to experience the TSA security process for the first time. That got
me to thinking about all of the individuals in Government who have
security clearances, and who, therefore, merit inclusion in the TSA
program.
How do you think TSA should treat individuals who have gone through
a background check as part of their Federal Government job?
Question 2b. Should they all automatically be included in PreCheck,
since we know so much about them?
Answer. Americans who have gone through elaborate and regularly
recurring background checks deemed sufficient to provide them access to
Classified information, weapon systems, or sensitive transportation
facilities and conveyances should be allowed access into the PreCheck
pool of vetted indivudals. Unfortunately, other than expanding PreCheck
to active military members, TSA has been very slow to leverage
Government security reviews for its own purposes.
As one particularly egregious example, an airport worker allowed
access to secure areas of an airport and aircraft in the morning is not
entitled to use the TSA PreCheck line if he or she is flying out of the
same airport later in the day.
We do recognize that issuance of a clearance does not mean an
individual poses no risk. However, many of the categories listed above
go through a more elaborate background check than TSA PreCheck
requires. In an era where we expect that Government will coordinate
programs and not allow information to exist in silos, we believe TSA
should make prompt decisions about expansion of the TSA PreCheck
program to these or other applicable populations.
Question From Honorable Brian Fitzpatrick for Nina E. Brooks
Question. Ms. Brooks, I understand that in response to long lines
at airport security checkpoints last summer, TSA, airlines, and
airports all worked closely together to manage the crowds as best they
could. As you look back on that experience, what can we learn from it,
and how can we make sure we are better prepared for this summer travel
season?
Answer. The success last summer in keeping wait times to a minimum
was due to the collaborative, coordinated effort between TSA, airports,
and airlines. Airports contributed significantly--on a voluntary and
temporary basis--by providing staff to support non-screening functions.
This allowed TSA to focus on its core mission of screening passengers
and baggage.
Most airports do not have the available funds to provide staff to
support TSA functions or for needed infrastructure modernization
projects.
Even though Congressional approval for TSA to reprogram funds
allowed the agency to hire 1,368 new Transportation Security Officers
(TSOs), convert 1,865 TSOs from part-time to full-time and utilize
additional overtime, TSA was and is understaffed by approximately 4,000
TSOs.
Last year, TSA's staffing allocation model demonstrated that
security checkpoints around the country were understaffed by thousands
of TSOs. Due to existing staffing shortages, for instance, TSA cannot
open all the screening lanes at many security checkpoints, including
PreCheck lanes. With the continual increase in the volume of passengers
and baggage along with growing security demands, TSA needs more
resources and screening technology now and in the coming fiscal years.
In accordance with Section 3302 of the FAA Extension, Safety and
Security Act of 2016, TSA apparently conducted an assessment of its
Staffing Allocation Model to determine the necessary number of TSOs at
all airports.
In order to ensure TSA is adequately positioned to efficiently and
effectively screen passengers this coming summer, Congress should
provide the agency the authorization and funding necessary to support
the appropriate number of TSOs, technology procurement, deployment, and
maintenance, and a surge capacity to keep pace with the continued
growth in passenger traffic.
To provide the funding for additional TSOs and security technology
at passenger screening checkpoints, Congress must end the diversion of
the 9/11 Passenger Security Fee to pay down the National debt. The 9/11
passenger security fee is supposed to be used for the costs of
providing civil aviation security services, including the salary,
benefits, and TSO overtime. However, over a 10-year period $12.6
billion of the user fee will be syphoned off to subsidize other Federal
programs. With long lines and wait times at TSA security checkpoints,
travelers are definitely not getting their money's worth. The entire 9/
11 passenger security fee should be used to provide TSA funding for the
number of TSOs necessary to provide effective and efficient screening
of passengers and their baggage.
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