[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HOW CAN THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE EVOLVE TO MEET THE CHALLENGES
AHEAD?
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND
PROTECTIVE SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 8, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-19
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
27-612 PDF WASHINGTON : 2017
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,
U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free).
E-mail, [email protected].
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
John Katko, New York Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Will Hurd, Texas Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Martha McSally, Arizona J. Luis Correa, California
John Ratcliffe, Texas Val Butler Demings, Florida
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin
Clay Higgins, Louisiana
John H. Rutherford, Florida
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Kathleen Crooks Flynn, Deputy General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND PROTECTIVE SECURITY
John Katko, New York, Chairman
Peter T. King, New York Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Mike Rogers, Alabama William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Krista P. Harvey, Subcommittee Staff Director
Cedric C. Haynes, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
and Protective Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Bonnie Watson Coleman, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Transportation and Protective Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Witnesses
Mr. Randolph D. ``Tex'' Alles, Director, U.S. Secret Service,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Mr. John Roth, Inspector General, Office of the Inspector
General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
HOW CAN THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE EVOLVE TO MEET THE CHALLENGES
AHEAD?
----------
Thursday, June 8, 2017
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Transportation and
Protective Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m., in
room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. John Katko (Chairman
of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Katko, Higgins, Fitzpatrick, and
Watson Coleman.
Also present: Representative Jackson Lee.
Mr. Katko. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee
on Transportation and Protective Security, will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to examine how the United
States Secret Service can more effectively achieve its mission
of protecting the Nation's leaders and financial systems. This
hearing will address agency staffing, recruitment, and morale
improvement efforts as well as agency challenges, such as
resource constraints and misconduct.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
The subcommittee meets today to hold our first Secret
Service-related hearing of the 115th Congress. Since this panel
was tasked with overseeing the United States Secret Service
just this year, I have already come to appreciate as well as my
colleagues have the significant contributions this agency makes
to the functioning of our Government as well as the challenges
it faces in manpower, funding, and perhaps most important,
morale.
Having recently visited the headquarters of the Secret
Service with Ranking Member Watson Coleman and other Members of
the subcommittee, I have seen the incredibly detailed and
challenging work the men and women of this agency are
accomplishing every day to safeguard our Nation's leaders and
ensure the security of America's financial system.
While visiting the agency, I was briefed on investigations
aimed at protecting businesses and individuals from financial
crimes all across the country, even within the district I
represent encompassing the Syracuse, New York area.
Not only is this our first Secret Service hearing of the
115th Congress, but it is also the first time Director Alles
has testified before us in his new appointed capacity as head
of the Secret Service.
May I say, Director, in your previous career as a general,
we want to thank you for your many, many years of service.
Mr. Alles. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Katko. We appreciate all you have done for your
country.
Mr. Alles. Thank you.
Mr. Katko. For that, we welcome the new director and look
forward to hearing more about his vision on how to improve and
transform the agency moving forward. Indeed, most Americans
know the Secret Service for its visible role of protecting the
President and Vice President and their families from threats to
their safety. However, the agency also conducts elaborate, in-
depth investigations related to financial and cyber crimes,
which cut straight to the heart of the overall Homeland
Security mission of the Department of Homeland Security.
For example, on March 1 of this year, the Secret Service,
in conjunction with a number of other Federal law enforcement
partners, helped to facilitate the arrest and indictment of 19
people charged with defrauding 170 people, primarily in the
United States, out of more than $13 million.
Further, in November 2016, the Secret Service conducted the
largest-ever seizure operation of $30 million in counterfeit
U.S. currency in Peru.
For the purpose for highlighting these operations is to
note that these massive investigations were happening
simultaneously with the Secret Service experiencing
unprecedented strains on its protective missions, protecting
such high-profile events as the U.N. General Assembly, a number
of last year's Presidential candidates, the Republican and
Democratic National Conventions, and the recent Presidential
inauguration, to name a few. If I am not mistaken, it also
included the Pope visiting New York City.
Unbelievable job on all of those things, and the fact that
all of them were safe is a testament to the professionalism of
the Secret Service, and we thank them for that. Throughout all
this, the agency has been professional and diligent, and for
that I commend the men and women of the Secret Service.
With unprecedented mission requirements and a demanding
work environment, it is concerning to see that over the last
few years all kinds of measurables have shown consistent
decreases in work force morale and sometimes performance at the
agency.
Through Congressional oversight, third-party reviews, and
internal agency initiatives, the Secret Service has been given
a number of recommendations to improve morale, retention, and
recruitment.
While many of these have been adopted, this hearing will
allow the subcommittee to delve into what more needs to be done
to provide the Secret Service with the resources needed to
continue fulfilling its mission, adequately staffing
operations, and improving morale as we enter a new
administration.
No doubt, with this new administration comes new protective
missions, challenges, and resource constraints which require
Congressional review to ensure efficiency and effectiveness.
Oftentimes, the Secret Service is an agency that prefers to
keep its head down and carry out its missions diligently, away
from the spotlight. However, we here in the subcommittee have a
mandate to pay close attention to the successes, challenges,
needs, and efforts of the Secret Service. I hope that the
testimony before us today will delve into these issues and
inform our work as we commit to working in a partnership with
the Secret Service.
The men and women working to carry out the mission of the
Secret Service comprise one of the finest law enforcement
agencies in the world, and we owe it to them to be responsible
overseers for them and give them the tools they need to
successfully do their job. Whether it be the Secret Service's
special agents, criminal investigators, intelligence analysts,
Counter Assault Team, Emergency Response Team, Airspace
Security Branch, or Electronic Crimes Task Force, we need to
ensure that the agency is well-positioned to carry out its
critically important mission and enhance the stability of our
homeland security enterprise.
With that, I recognize the Ranking Member of the
subcommittee, the gentlelady from New Jersey, my friend, Mrs.
Watson Coleman, for an opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Katko follows:]
Statement of Chairman John Katko
June 8, 2017
The subcommittee meets today to hold our first Secret Service-
related hearing of the 115th Congress. Since this panel was tasked with
overseeing the United States Secret Service just this year, I have
already come to appreciate the significant contributions this agency
makes to the functioning of our Government, as well as the challenges
it faces in manpower, funding, and morale. Having recently visited the
headquarters of the Secret Service with Ranking Member Watson Coleman
and other Members of the subcommittee, I have seen the incredibly
detailed and challenging work the men and women of this agency are
accomplishing every day to safeguard our Nation's leaders and ensure
the security of America's financial system. While visiting the agency,
I was briefed on investigations aimed at protecting businesses and
individuals from financial crimes all across the country, even within
the district I represent encompassing the greater Syracuse area.
Not only is this our first Secret Service hearing of the 115th
Congress, but it is also the first time Director Alles has testified
before us in his newly-appointed capacity as head of the Secret
Service. For that, we welcome the new director and look forward to
hearing more about his vision on how to improve and transform the
agency moving forward.
Indeed, most Americans know the Secret Service for its more visible
role in protecting the President, Vice President, and their families
from threats to their safety. However, the agency also conducts
elaborate, in-depth investigations related to financial and cyber
crimes, which cut straight to the heart of the overall homeland
security mission of DHS. For example, on March 1 of this year the
Secret Service, in conjunction with a number of other Federal law
enforcement partners, helped facilitate the arrest and indictment of 19
people charged with defrauding 170 people, primarily in the United
States, out of more than $13 million. Further, in November of 2016, the
Secret Service conducted the largest-ever seizure operation of $30
million in counterfeit U.S. currency in Peru.
The purpose for highlighting these operations is to note that these
massive investigations were happening at the same time that the Secret
Service was experiencing unprecedented strains on its protective
mission--protecting such high-profile events as the U.N. General
Assembly, a number of last year's Presidential candidates, the
Republican and Democratic National Conventions, and the recent
Presidential Inauguration. Throughout all of this, the agency has been
professional and diligent and for that. I commend the men and women of
the Secret Service.
With unprecedented mission requirements and a demanding work
environment, it is concerning to see that over the last few years
measurements have shown consistent decreases in workforce morale at the
agency. Through Congressional oversight, third-party reviews, and
internal agency initiatives, the Secret Service has been given a number
of recommendations to improve morale, retention, and recruitment. While
many of these have been adopted, this hearing will allow the
subcommittee to delve into what more needs to be done to provide the
Secret Service with the resources needed to continue fulfilling its
mission, adequately staffing operations, and improving morale as we
enter a new administration.
With this new administration comes new protective missions,
challenges, and resource constraints which require Congressional review
to ensure efficiency and effectiveness. Oftentimes, the Secret Service
is an agency that prefers to keep its head down and carry out its
mission diligently away from the spotlight. However, we here on this
subcommittee have a mandate to pay close attention to the successes,
challenges, needs, and efforts of the Secret Service.
I hope that the testimony before us today will delve into these
issues and inform our work as we commit to working in partnership with
the Secret Service. The men and women working to carry out the mission
of the Secret Service comprise one of the finest law enforcement
agencies in the world--and we owe it to them to be responsible
overseers. Whether it be the Secret Service's special agents, criminal
investigators, intelligence analysts, counter-assault team, emergency
response team, airspace security branch, or electronic crimes task
force, we need to ensure that the agency is well-positioned to carry
out its critically important mission and enhance the stability of our
homeland security enterprise.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here today.
Director Alles, thank you for taking on this responsibility
of leading the Secret Service. I do appreciate your willingness
to serve the country. I do associate myself with the fine
things that my Chairman has mentioned with regard to your
former career, and I look forward to establishing a working
relationship with you.
Mr. Roth, it is always good to see you here.
I will start by saying that I am very concerned about the
institutional, operational, and budgetary challenges that the
Secret Service currently faces. Even prior to the election of
Donald Trump, the Secret Service was plagued by low staff
morale, low recruitment, low retention, source limitations, and
cultural problems.
Then we get to 2016. In that Presidential election year,
the Secret Service was busier than ever protecting multiple
Presidential candidates, protecting President Obama, and
overseeing security for major National and international
events. The Secret Service remarkably rose to the occasion, did
it all, and did it with low staff numbers.
The demands of carrying out the protective mission has only
expanded since the election. Today, the Secret Service must
provide protection for the President, the First Lady, his
children, including his adult children who travel regularly for
business and pleasure to places like Uruguay, the UAE, and the
Dominican Republic, Canada, and Aspen, Colorado. Through the
winter, the President traveled weekly to his private club, the
Mar-a-Lago Golf Club.
Agents involved in currency and cyber investigation work
have had to be reassigned to duties in New York City, since the
First Lady has continued to reside in the heart of Manhattan.
Agents have been forced to crisscross the globe at what seems
like a record pace. While President Obama's travel totaled
roughly $97 million for the entire 8 years of his Presidency,
Donald Trump's travel cost taxpayers $20 million in just the
first 80 days of his Presidency.
Beyond the dollars and cents, though, there is a hidden
cost, the time that the men and women who bravely serve in the
Secret Service are taken away from their other homeland
security and investigative work as well as their families as
they shadow the globe-trotting Trumps. That is a tongue
twister. I have heard story after story of Secret Service
agents burning out, and we need to talk about this. Many of the
burnout stories I heard were before Donald Trump took office,
and I hope to hear today how the Trump family's jet-setting
lifestyle is impacting our Secret Service.
Financial resources are also of great concern to me.
Particularly, I am concerned that the Secret Service protection
is being used while members of the Trump family are pursuing
business interests abroad on behalf of the President at the
expense of taxpayers, and I will be introducing a bill in the
coming days to prevent the President from becoming enriched
from these taxpayer dollars.
In March, we learned that the Secret Service asked the
Office of Management and Budget for an additional $60 million
to carry out its current obligations. It was reported then that
the White House flatly rejected the request. If that is true,
that is absurd.
Here you have an agency stretched thin prior to the
administration, their protectee assignments increased
significantly with the new administration, then they asked for
additional money to absorb the new costs incurred, and they
were rebuffed.
I have little confidence that the President's budget
proposal that was released 2 weeks ago is adequate for the
agency. I hope that we hear today some honest expert opinions
on what the Secret Service needs to address its long-standing
challenges and carry out its mission.
I also hope that we get a chance to hear today how the
Secret Service is addressing some of the long-standing concerns
on management practices which came to light in the Moore racial
discrimination litigation and the recommendations that were
made by the Protective Mission Panel.
Mr. Chairman, I do want you and everyone on our
subcommittee to know that I am here to work hand-in-hand with
you and to help provide the Secret Service with needed
resources and oversight. I hope that Director Alles' leadership
will pick up where Director Clancy left off in implementing key
reforms to improve the agency's performance, address staffing
challenges, and elevate the agency's standing with employees
and prospective employees.
Once again, I want to thank both witnesses for appearing
before us today. I look forward to our testimony.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time, Mr.
Chairman.
[The statement of Ranking Member Watson Coleman follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bonnie Watson Coleman
June 8, 2017
I will start with saying that I am very concerned about the
institutional, operational, and budgetary challenges that Secret
Service currently faces. Even prior to the election of Donald Trump,
the Secret Service was plagued by low staff morale, low recruitment,
low retention, resource limitations and cultural problems.
Then we get to 2016. In that Presidential Election year, the Secret
Service was busier than ever protecting multiple Presidential
candidates, protecting President Obama, and overseeing security for
major National and international events. The Secret Service remarkably
rose to the occasion and did it all, with low staff numbers. The
demands of carrying out the protective mission have only expanded since
the election.
Today, the Secret Service must provide protection for President
Trump, the First Lady, his children--including his adult children who
travel regularly for business and pleasure to places like Uruguay, UAE,
the Dominican Republic, Canada, and Aspen. Through the winter, the
President traveled weekly to his private club in Florida, the Mar-a-
Lago Golf Club. Agents involved in currency and cyber investigative
work have had to be reassigned to duties in New York City, since the
First Lady continues to reside in the heart of Manhattan. Agents have
been forced to crisscross the globe at what seems like a record pace.
While the cost of President Obama's travel totaled roughly $97 million
for the entire 8 years of his presidency, President Trump's travel cost
taxpayers $20 million in just the first 80 days.
Beyond the dollars and cents, there is a hidden cost--the time that
the men and women who bravely serve in the Secret Service are taken
away from their other homeland security and investigative work as well
as their families--as they shadow the globe-trotting Trumps. I have
heard story after story of Secret Service agents burning out and we
need to talk about this. Many of the burnout stories I heard, were
before President Trump took office. I hope to hear today how the Trump
family jet-setting lifestyle is impacting the Secret Service.
Financial resources are also of great concern to me. Particularly,
I am concerned that the Secret Service's protection is being used while
members of the Trump family are pursuing business interests abroad on
behalf of the President at the of expense taxpayers. I will be
introducing a bill in the coming days to prevent the President from
becoming enriched from the taxpayer dollars.
In March, we learned that the Secret Service asked the Office of
Management and Budget for an additional $60 million to carry out its
current obligations. It was reported that the White House flatly
rejected the request. If true, that is absurd. Here you have an agency
stretched thin prior to the new administration, their protectee
assignments increase significantly with the new administration, then
they ask for additional money to absorb the new costs incurred and they
are rebuffed. I have little confidence that the President's budget
proposal that was released 2 weeks ago is adequate for the agency. I
hope that we hear today some honest, expert opinions on what the Secret
Service needs to address its long-standing challenges and carry out its
mission.
I also hope that we get a chance to hear today how the Secret
Service is addressing some of the long-standing concerns on management
practices as came to light in the Moore racial discrimination
litigation and the recommendations made by the Protective Mission
Panel.
I want you and everyone on our subcommittee to know that I am here
to work hand-in-hand with you to help provide the Secret Service with
needed resources and oversight. I hope that Director Alles' leadership
will pick up where Director Clancy left off in implementing key reforms
to improve the agency's performance, address staffing challenges, and
elevate the agency's standing with employees and perspective employees.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mrs. Watson Coleman.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
June 8, 2017
Director Alles, we appreciate your background, including your
tenure at the Customs and Border Protection. The Secret Service shares
some of the same challenges as the CBP. I hope that your CBP experience
will translate to improvements at the Secret Service. Similar to CBP,
the staff of the Secret Service is overworked, often forced to work
overtime in positions where getting it right is essential to keeping
Americans safe.
One of the recommendations of the Secret Service Protective Mission
Panel was to find leadership from outside of the Service so that top-
level leadership would have a fresh perspective on how the agency
should be run. I am pleased that that recommendation was fulfilled. I
hope today's conversation will highlight other recommendations from the
Protective Mission Panel and their status.
The dedication of the men and women of the Secret Service is
indisputable; however, the law enforcement agency has been plagued with
cultural problems and management challenges that often overshadow the
Secret Sevice's accomplishments.
Earlier this year, the Moore v. Johnson legal settlement was an
important step in the Secret Service rejecting historic routine and
unfair promotion practices. While the settlement was agreed to in
January, there are many milestones that will need to be achieved under
the terms of the settlement. I look forward to discussing the steps
that the Secret Service has taken to address the terms of the Moore
settlement.
In addition to cultural and management issues, there have been
media accounts of resource shortfalls. I have heard reports of
personnel constraints for the USSS. Most concerning are the reports
that the USSS may have an insufficient number of agents to handle its
increased protectee responsibilities.
Since Donald Trump became the President, the USSS is covering
considerably more protectees but is down 250 special agents and 350
administrative and technical staff members compared to its peak at the
beginning of the Obama administration.
Further, reports have indicated that personnel shortages have
prompted field offices around the country to reassign personnel to
activities unrelated to their usual criminal investigations duties.
Reportedly, the New York field office has had to reassign nearly a
third of the staff from their criminal investigation duties to
protective assignments. I hope to hear today how the adjustments that
have been made for the benefit of the protectees has impacted the
Secret Service's mission.
With all the challenges of the Secret Service, one thing very clear
and that is without the support of Congress, the Secret Service will
not be able to improve. I look forward to hearing today about ways
Congress can be a better partner in helping the agency complete its
mission.
Mr. Katko. We are very pleased to have with us two very
distinguished witnesses to speak on this important topic. Let
me remind the witnesses that their entire written statements
will appear in the record.
Our first witness is Director Randolph Alles, who was
confirmed in April 2017 as the 25th director of the United
States Secret Service in their long and storied existence.
Director Alles oversees the agency's missions in more than
150 offices throughout the United States and abroad. Prior to
this appointment, Director Alles was the acting deputy
commissioner of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, serving
as the chief operating officer.
The director served in the U.S. Marines for 35 years,
retiring as major general.
Sir, thank you for your service again and dedication to the
country.
The Chair now recognizes Director Alles to testify.
STATEMENT OF RANDOLPH D. ``TEX'' ALLES, DIRECTOR, U.S. SECRET
SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Alles. Thank you very much, Chairman Katko and Ranking
Member Watson Coleman and distinguished Members of the
committee. It is a privilege to appear before you today and to
represent the outstanding men and women of the Secret Service.
Since my swearing in as the 25th director, I have met
personnel across all job categories and I am reassured by their
professionalism and their commitment to the agency's mission.
It is not lost on me that I am the first director to be named
from outside the organization in over 70 years. The last
director in 1947 was the last non-agency director.
So although I face a steep learning curve to understand
this unique law enforcement agency, I believe the mission focus
of the Secret Service has much in common with the ethos of my
entire career. My experience as a military officer with the
Marine Corps and serving as the acting deputy commissioner over
at Customs and Border Protection have provided me with common
ground to successfully lead the agency.
So I would like to take a moment to recognize the
protection successes of the agency and its public safety
partners at all levels. Over the past 2 years, the Secret
Service coordinated security for over 11 National special
security events and the Pope's visit to Washington, New York,
and Philadelphia, the National political conventions, and the
Presidential inauguration.
More recently, in locations faced with the persistent
threat of terrorist attack, Secret Service personnel
effectively coordinated the complex security arrangements for
the 11-day foreign trip of Vice President Pence throughout
Southeast Asia and Australia and the 8-day foreign trip by
President Trump to Saudi Arabia, Israel, Belgium, and Italy.
So even as protection has been and remains our primary
focus, the agency has prioritized its resources to effectively
further the investigative mission. In fiscal year 2016, our
field officers closed over 3,500 criminal cases resulting in
over 2,100 arrests.
The agency remains committed in advancing its capabilities
to stop cyber criminals like Roman Seleznev as they develop
innovative ways to compromise our financial institutions.
Seleznev, one of the most prolific traffickers of credit card
data in the past 10 years, targeted over 3,000 banking and
financial institutions, which incurred a total loss of $169
million. The long and painstaking investigation conducted by
our personnel working closely with several State and local
partners resulted in Seleznev's arrest and subsequent 27-year
Federal prison sentence.
It should be noted that the accomplishments of the agency
have been borne by a work force that continues to be
significantly understaffed to meet current operational demands.
This has caused an undue burden on the existing work force and
has contributed to an attrition rate that is far too high.
Staffing, retention, and improving morale are top
priorities. I am fully devoted to addressing these problems and
have already implemented some promising solutions recommended
by our employees and our senior leaders. For example, we have
put in place several efficiencies in our employment practice,
reducing the hiring time from more than 15 months to just 4
months.
Hiring the best candidates and reducing attrition are
critical to the agency's endurance as a top law enforcement
organization. These men and women are among the most highly
skilled in the Federal work force. Their skill sets and
professionalism make them highly desirable across Government
and the private sector. It is clear that increasing staffing to
healthier levels will likely have a positive effect on
attrition and retention, contributing to a better work life
balance and increased training opportunities.
There is no quick fix when it comes to growing staffing
levels, although the agency requires time to fully realize its
personnel needs. We will not take short cuts to compromise our
high standards.
We are building on the momentum of our positive recruitment
efforts. In fiscal year 2017, we expect to hire about 300
special agents, 280 Uniformed Division officers, 260
administrative, professional, and technical staff. Our
Strategic Human Capital Plan includes an additional 450 special
agents, 150 Uniformed Division, and 300 APTs by the end of
fiscal year 2019.
So while we have made significant progress in our hiring
goals, we realize these achievements have the effect of running
in place if attrition is ignored. The agency's retention
efforts have targeted every sector of our work force. With the
assistance of the Department and Congress, we have implemented
the UD Retention Bonus Program as well as student loan
repayment and tuition assistance programs.
The 114th Congress passed H.R. 6302, the Overtime Pay for
Protective Services Act of 2016, which allowed our personnel to
be compensated above the statutory salary cap for the 2016
Presidential campaign year. That was a tremendous morale boost,
and I thank you all for seeing that through to its successful
completion, and I see that as a substantial challenge now and
going forward.
So in closing, I would like to thank former Director Clancy
for his commitment that he exhibited while he was the Director
of the organization. His efforts on the work force and its
critical mission have resulted in the progress mentioned to
date. I also would like to take this opportunity to thank
retired Chief Kevin Simpson for his leadership in the Uniformed
Division.
So as we move forward, I intend to focus considerable
effort on the continual improvement of the agency to include
the Secret Service security posture at the White House,
increased staffing and funding levels, while reinforcing core
principles of leadership and professionalism which are critical
to success.
So Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and
Members of the committee, this concludes my oral testimony, and
I welcome any questions that you have. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Alles follows:]
Prepared Statement of Randolph D. ``Tex'' Alles
June 8, 2017
Good morning Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and
distinguished Members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity
to appear before you today to represent the outstanding men and women
of the U.S. Secret Service (Secret Service). Since my swearing in as
the twenty-fifth director, I have met with many of our personnel across
all jobs and mission categories and I am reassured by their
professionalism and commitment to the Secret Service missions.
It is not lost on me that I am the first Secret Service director to
be named from outside the agency in over 70 years. Although I face a
steep learning curve to understand this unique law enforcement agency,
I believe the mission focus of the Secret Service has much in common
with the ethos of my entire career. My experiences to date as a
military officer with the U.S. Marine Corps and most recently as acting
deputy commissioner with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, have
provided me with significant common ground with our personnel and have
prepared me to successfully lead the agency.
I would like to take a moment to recognize the numerous
accomplishments of the Secret Service over the past 2 years. In this
time period, our personnel have coordinated security for 11 National
Special Security Events (NSSEs), including two State of the Union
addresses, the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, two United
Nations General Assemblies (UNGA) (70 and 71), the visit of Pope
Francis to the United States, which included Washington, DC, New York,
NY and Philadelphia, PA; the Republican and Democratic National
Conventions, and the Presidential Inauguration. In support of these
NSSEs, the Secret Service Uniformed Division and its DHS partners
screened more than 6 million members of the public at the events. It is
worthy to note that UNGA-70 and the Papal visit to New York City
occurred simultaneously--never before had the agency been faced with
coordinating security for two concurrent NSSEs.
In fiscal year 2016, the Secret Service realized a 38 percent
increase in total protective stops compared to fiscal year 2015, as
well as a 32 percent increase in campaign-related stops over fiscal
year (the last Presidential campaign without an incumbent). More
recently, the Secret Service secured several large-scale events, to
include the International Monetary Fund and World Bank Group Spring
Meeting, and an 11-day Vice Presidential foreign trip throughout
Southeast Asia and Australia. In addition, the Secret Service
successfully secured a number of protective stops during the
President's recent 8-day foreign trip to Saudi Arabia, Israel, Belgium,
and Italy.
Even as protection has been and remains our primary mission focus,
the investigative mission of the Secret Service is critically important
and noteworthy. We have prioritized our limited resources to
effectively further the investigative mission. In fiscal year 2016, in
the midst of a demanding Presidential campaign year, our field
personnel closed 3,592 criminal cases resulting in 2,125 arrests. Our
cyber investigations prevented $558 million in potential loss and
$124.5 million in actual loss in fiscal year 2016. The agency remains
committed to advancing its capabilities to protect America's financial
infrastructure to stop cyber criminals as they develop advanced malware
to compromise the computer networks of U.S. financial institutions and
businesses. In fact, to better support these investigations, we have
updated our training curriculum to include basic cyber training for all
new incoming Special Agents.
Criminal investigations provide opportunities for Secret Service
personnel to forge partnerships with Federal, State, and local law
enforcement and prosecutorial partners to promote support for our
integrated missions. The Nation-wide network of Electronic and
Financial Crime Task Forces (ECTF/FCTF) and the cyber forensic training
available through the National Computer Forensic Institute (NCFI) allow
for the sharing of investigative resources with law enforcement at all
levels.
Last, through our international law enforcement relationships, the
Secret Service partners with vetted anti-counterfeit efforts in South
America to reduce the production, sale, and distribution of counterfeit
U.S. currency within Colombia and Peru and its export to other
countries. The latest effort, termed Project South America, seized
$22.9 million in counterfeit notes, arrested 102 individuals and
suppressed one counterfeit operation in fiscal year 2016.
I want to stress the above-mentioned accomplishments have been
borne by a workforce that continues to be significantly understaffed to
meet current and emergent operational demands. This has caused an undue
burden on the existing workforce and has contributed to an attrition
rate that is far too high. Leadership, morale, hiring, retention, and
securing adequate resources are my top priorities for the agency. I am
fully focused on these problems and we are implementing solutions.
human capital (hiring and retention)
The Secret Service remains dedicated to our human capital and we
realize, as with any elite organization, that our people are our most
important asset. A healthy, robust workforce benefits all involved and
allows us to achieve excellence in our integrated mission. Increased
staffing is the key to enabling improved quality of life and to
providing training opportunities for our employees. In 2015, the Secret
Service hired 207 Special Agents, 151 Uniformed Division Officers and
125 Administrative, Professional and Technical (APT) staff members. In
2016, amidst the extraordinary protective tempo of the Presidential
Campaign, the agency hired 327 Special Agents, 309 Uniformed Division
officers, and 194 APT staff members, giving us the highest total
employee population we have had since 2012. In addition, the Office of
Human Resources has been able to reduce applicant processing time for
Special Agents and Uniformed Division Officers from approximately 15
months to 4 months.
Hiring and reducing attrition is critical to the agency's success.
The men and women of the Secret Service are among the most highly
skilled in the Federal workforce. Their skillsets and professionalism
make them highly desirable across Government and the private sector. It
is clear that increasing staffing to healthier levels will have a
positive effect on attrition and retention--contributing to a better
work/life balance and increased training opportunities. There is no
quick fix when it comes to increasing staffing levels. Although the
agency requires time to fully realize its personnel needs, we will not
take shortcuts that compromise our high standards.
We are building on the momentum of our fiscal year recruiting
efforts. In fiscal year 2017, we expect to hire approximately 300
Special Agents, 280 Uniformed Division officers, and 260 APTs. Our
Strategic Human Capital Plan includes an addition of 450 Special
Agents, 150 Uniformed Division Officers, and 300 APTs by the end of
fiscal year 2019. The tireless efforts of our Human Capital Division,
Security Management Division, field offices, and the James J. Rowley
Training Center, in coordination with the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Centers, are making this possible.
While we have made significant progress on our hiring goals, we
realize these achievements have the effect of running in place if
attrition is ignored. The agency's retention efforts are targeted to
every sector of our workforce. With the assistance of the Department
and Congress, we have implemented the Uniformed Division Retention
Bonus Program, as well as student loan repayment and tuition assistance
programs. Two additional examples of retention tools are an updated
telework policy to allow more workforce flexibility, and revitalized
Senior Special Agent and Senior Resident Agent programs. The Secret
Service has also implemented an agency-wide APT Career Progression Plan
and is very close to implementing a child care subsidy program.
Additionally, the 114th Congress passed H.R. 6302, the Overtime Pay for
Protective Services Act of 2016, which allowed our personnel to be
compensated above the statutory salary cap (up to level II of the
Executive Schedule) for the 2016 Presidential Campaign year. This was a
tremendous morale boost to a workforce that had experienced an
operational tempo unlike any other. We will continue to work together
with Congress, the Department, and the administration to institute
additional legislative measures to improve overall staffing, training,
morale, and the work/life balance of our entire workforce.
To accommodate increased hiring, our Office of Training has
adjusted to meet training needs. In addition to growing its training
staff, the Rowley Training Center has begun a series of capital
improvements to meet the needs of our workforce. Upgrades and
investments include a new canine facility and shooting ranges, which
improve the capacity and capability to provide exceptional training.
With continued long-term investments, the Secret Service can provide
the type of immersive, real-life, integrated training that will befit
our premier law enforcement personnel into the future.
a commitment to excellence
A commitment to excellence requires a focus on both mission and
employee. To that end, a number of external studies have examined
agency capabilities and employee well-being. I would like to briefly
summarize some of the studies and findings significant to our future as
an agency.
The independent Protective Mission Panel (PMP) was created in 2014
by then-Secretary of Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson to conduct
an assessment of the security at the White House. The work of the PMP
has led the Secret Service to examine and adopt best practices
throughout organization in areas such as training, operations, and
engagement with every member of the workforce.
A year after the PMP issued its report, the Secret Service invited
the panel members to meet with former Director Clancy to discuss the
progress made and to obtain input to ensure the actions taken were
consistent with the intent of their recommendations.
In November 2016, the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued
its report on the status of the Secret Service's implementation of the
PMP recommendations and noted that fully addressing some will take
considerable time, funding, and stakeholder support. The OIG stated:
``The Secret Service has clearly taken the PMP's recommendations
seriously, which it has demonstrated by making a number of significant
changes. Specifically, it has improved communication within the
workforce, better articulated its budget needs, increased hiring, and
committed to more training. Using funding appropriated for PMP
initiatives, the Secret Service has also begun enhancing security and
refreshing technology at the White House Complex.''
Additionally, the DHS Office of Policy, in conjunction with the DHS
Management Directorate, examined whether the Secret Service protective
mission would benefit from shedding its investigative mission. The
report found not only that the investigative mission should not be shed
but also that it complements the protective mission:
``The review also found that the Secret Service's partnerships with the
law enforcement community, academia, and the private sector are woven
into the fabric of the agency. The USSS has strong, reciprocal
relationships with its State and local law enforcement partners. The
degree of trust and rapport that the USSS has built across the law
enforcement community through task force participation and leadership,
technical support, investigative partnerships, and training
opportunities are critical to the support the Secret Service receives
in turn from State and local law enforcement in carrying out its
protective mission.''\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Department of Homeland Security, Office of Policy, Review of
the United States Secret Service Protective and Investigative Missions
(January, 2017).
This combined strength of our integrated missions also makes the
Secret Service the world's foremost leader in protection and securing
our Nation's financial infrastructure.
work/life balance
As noted, the past 2 years have brought an unprecedented workload
for our employees. In an effort to attain a better understanding of
those work/life balance factors upon which we can improve, we sought
the feedback of the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA),
which completed an assessment of our business transformation efforts in
October 2016. Their findings helped us identify ways to build upon our
completed actions. The critical analysis that the Academy Panel
conducted discovered that:
`` . . . agency efforts are significant and wide ranging in terms of
both scale and scope. The Secret Service has accomplished a substantial
number of organizational, policy and process changes to transform the
way the agency does business, to professionalize administrative,
technical and management functions and to remedy numerous staffing and
employee issues. Agency leadership has achieved these changes in a
relatively short time, demonstrating its commitment to change.''\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ National Academy of Public Administration, United States Secret
Service, Review of Organizational Change Efforts (October 2016).
NAPA was able to study the revised structure of the Secret Service,
instituted by the former director. more specifically, the agency
appointed a senior-executive civilian to the position of chief
operating officer. The agency also aligned several professional,
experienced chief executive officers to report to the chief operating
officer. Prior to September 2014, the Secret Service had nine
directorates, with all but the Office of the Chief Counsel led by a
Special Agent. The agency now has 12 directorates, of which six are
headed by non-Special Agent personnel, including a chief human
resources officer, a chief counsel, a chief technology officer, a chief
financial officer, a chief strategy officer, and a chief information
officer. Additionally, the agency now has a chief personnel research
psychologist, a component acquisition executive, a director of
communications, and an equal employment opportunity manager--all at the
senior-executive service level. This new structure, which increased
civilian professional executive appointments, enables the agency to
better focus attention on both the operational mission and business
needs.
All of these reports and findings demonstrate our focus on
improving the Secret Service in the spirit of the PMP's findings, not
just in short-term actions, but as part of a sustained, long-term
effort. Our work to address the PMP recommendations has also allowed us
to appropriately address similar Congressional oversight concerns,
which include changes in Secret Service leadership and structure,
budgeting for our mission needs, and hiring and retaining personnel.
white house fence
Among recommendations of the PMP was the replacement of the
existing perimeter White House fence. With respect to this
recommendation, the Secret Service and National Park Service have
secured all approvals needed from the Commission on Fine Arts and the
National Capital Planning Commission to construct the proposed new
White House fence. I am further pleased to note that on May 5, 2017,
the President signed into law H.R. 244, Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2017, which included the $50 million of funding needed to support
construction of the new fence. The contract solicitation package is
nearly complete and ready for advertisement. The Secret Service and
National Park Service estimate that it will take 6 months to advertise
and award. After contract award, site mobilization and offsite fence
fabrication will take approximately 6 months.
conclusion
In closing, I would like to thank former Director Joseph Clancy for
the commitment he exhibited in his time as director and his nearly 3
decades of dedication to the Secret Service. His focus on the agency's
workforce and critical mission has resulted in the progress mentioned
to date.
I would also like to take this opportunity to thank recently
retired Chief Kevin Simpson for his leadership of the Uniformed
Division and for his almost 30 years of service.
As we move forward, I will build upon the accomplishments noted
previously to ensure that our workforce is afforded all of the
leadership and resources necessary to accomplish the mission at the
highest level. Thanks to the hard work, dedication, and many sacrifices
of our employees around the world, we have had noteworthy successes
when the demands of the mission were greatest. We will continue to
uphold our core values of justice, duty, courage, honesty, and loyalty
for ourselves and the American people.
Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Watson-Coleman, and Members of the
committee, this concludes my testimony. I welcome any questions you
have at this time.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Director Alles, for your testimony
and statement. We appreciate very much you being here today. I
mean, I think I speak for Mrs. Watson Coleman, I know I do,
when I say that we view this committee as something of a
corroborative nature with you and cooperative nature instead of
an adversarial nature. So going forward, I hope that we can
continue to have these types of give-and-take so that we can
really help the agency grow and do the things it needs to do to
increase morale, which I think is a huge and important problem
with the agency.
Our second witness is Inspector General Roth, who currently
serves as inspector general of the Department of Homeland
Security. Prior to his appointment as inspector general, Mr.
Roth served as the director of the Office of Criminal
Investigations at the Food and Drug Administration and was
chief of staff to the deputy attorney general. Way back when
our paths crossed, we were both at Department of Justice in the
Narcotics Section as baby prosecutors, and I have known Mr.
Roth for quite a while.
I must say, Mr. Roth, you serve a critical role within the
Department of Homeland Security's function in ensuring that the
proper performance and efficiencies are identified and the
inefficiencies in the agency so we can correct them. So I
commend what you do on a regular basis. We have had a long
history with you testifying before our committee, and we have
always been impressed with your thoroughness and your
willingness to make sure you get all the issues out so we can
make it a better agency both at the Homeland Security level and
as the sublevels, like TSA and Secret Service and the others.
So we recognize you for your testimony.
STATEMENT OF JOHN ROTH, INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Roth. Thank you, Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Watson
Coleman, and Members of the subcommittee. Thanks for inviting
me here today to testify about our work regarding the U.S.
Secret Service and give you some insights into the challenges
that they face.
Simply stated, we believe that the Secret Service needs to
continue to focus on management fundamentals, particularly how
it relates to how it hires and manages people and how it
manages and plans for its resources, including technology and
information technology.
Although we have seen encouraging progress, many of the
implemented changes will require long-term leadership
commitment and additional funding. We are encouraged by the
fact that for the first time the Secret Service developed a
mission-based budget for fiscal year 2018, which should start
to address many of the causes of equipment and personnel
shortfalls.
However, we should not underestimate the challenges the
Secret Service faces ahead and the time it will take to fix
them. We estimate, for example, that it will require the Secret
Service to have about 8,200 personnel by 2022, about 1,700 more
than they currently have, in order to have sufficient personnel
to conduct its mission, including the very critical element of
training.
We think that the President's request for fiscal 2018 for
450 more personnel is a step in the right direction, but will
be insufficient to meet current needs. Inadequate work force
strength results in little or no training, mistakes due to work
force fatigue, decreased quality of work life, poor morale, and
increased attrition. Until the Secret Service can hire and
retain a work force at or exceeding its work force staffing
models, this will continue to be a problem.
During our review of the 2014 White House fence jumping
incident, for example, we found that staffing shortages for
uniformed officers led to excessive overtime, inadequate
training, fatigue, low morale, and attrition. An internal
Secret Service report described similar effects on special
agents. Likewise, during another audit in 2015, we observed two
uniformed officers sleeping at their posts. Fatigue from
travel, overtime shifts, and long hours contributed to these
incidents.
Compounding this problem is the Secret Service's inability
to hire efficiently enough to overcome their attrition levels.
In fiscal 2016, the Secret Service suffered more attrition than
any time in its history, beating its 2015 level, which itself
had also set a record. This kind of attrition is troubling in
and of itself and is both a symptom and a cause of deeper
Secret Service troubles.
Since 2011, the Secret Service has been able to hire more
people than they lost only in 1 year, and thus far this year
are on track to lose more people due to attrition than they
have been able to hire.
Part of the problem is that the Secret Service is slow to
hire. The last year we measured this, in 2015, it took 298 days
to hire a special agent and 359 days to hire a uniformed
officer.
The Secret Service will be continually challenged by a lack
of dedicated human resources staff, which lengthens Secret
Service hiring processes. At the end of 2015, for example, 32
percent of human resource positions at the Secret Service were
vacant.
Until they are able to get their hiring right, they will
continue to be understaffed, which will exacerbate the
problems, which will lead to greater attrition.
Additionally, the Secret Service has had difficulty keeping
pace with technological advancements. Instead of investing in
cutting-edge technology and driving research and development,
the Secret Service has relied on outdated systems and equipment
with potentially dangerous consequences.
For example, in a January 2016 report, we found that many
of the radios were well beyond the recommended shelf life or
service life and were difficult to repair. Then in April 2016,
we reported that the confluence of technical problems with
radios, security equipment, and notifications impeded the
Secret Service's ability to apprehend an intruder who had
jumped over the north fence and entered the White House.
While the Secret Service has begun to address these issues,
for example, by appointing civilians with specialized expertise
to critical leadership roles, it will require an extended
leadership commitment and a significant investment in resources
to put the Secret Service back on the right path.
We found similar issues with regard to the Secret Service's
information technology. Special agents were able to access the
personally identifiable information of House Oversight and
Government Reform Committee Chairman Jason Chaffetz because the
Secret Service was using old, insecure data systems with
inadequate controls dating from the 1980's.
This occurred because of the lack of Secret Service
priority in IT management. Specifically, we found limited
authority for the chief information officer, a lack of focus on
IT management, vacancies in key IT leadership and staff
positions, and inadequate training.
The Secret Service has recently initiated steps to improve
its IT management structure, which may give more priority to
the leadership, policies, personnel, and training needed to
ensure protections for sensitive systems and data.
The Secret Service's statutory responsibilities leave no
room for error. Fully implementing changes and resolving
underlying issues plaguing the Secret Service will require a
sustained commitment and depend heavily on adequate funding and
staffing. We will continue to monitor the Secret Service's
progress as it takes corrective actions to address
vulnerabilities.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your invitation to testify
today. I am happy to answer any questions you or other Members
of the committee may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Roth follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Roth
June 8, 2017
Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and Members of the
subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss our work relating
to the United States Secret Service (Secret Service). We have conducted
a number of investigations, audits, and inspections of Secret Service
programs and operations and have made several recommendations. My
testimony today will describe some of that work and discuss its
implications.
Our most recent oversight of the Secret Service has focused on
three key operational areas: The Secret Service's actions to address
recommendations of the Protective Mission Panel, difficulty in hiring
law enforcement personnel, and challenges protecting sensitive case
management systems and data.\1\ In general, the Secret Service has
taken action to address the concerns and challenges identified by our
office. Although we have seen encouraging progress, many of the
implemented changes require long-term commitment and planning. We will
continue to monitor the Secret Service's progress in implementing our
recommendations over time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Secret Service Has Taken Action to Address the
Recommendations of the Protective Mission Panel, OIG-17-10 (November
2016); DHS Is Slow to Hire Law Enforcement Personnel, OIG-17-05
(October 2016); USSS Faces Challenges Protecting Sensitive Case
Management Systems and Data, OIG-17-01 (October 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the secret service has taken action to address recommendations of the
protective mission panel
Following the September 19, 2014 White House fence-jumping
incident, the Secretary of Homeland Security established the Protective
Mission Panel (Panel) to undertake a broad independent review of the
Secret Service's protection of the White House Complex (WHC). The Panel
made 19 recommendations in its December 2014 Unclassified report. To
address the Panel's findings and recommendations, we verified and
evaluated actions the Secret Service has planned and taken since
December 2014.
One of the Panel's major criticisms was that the Secret Service had
never developed a budget process that articulated its mission or a
corresponding staffing and budget plan to meet its needs. Historically,
as its operational tempo has increased, the Secret Service has often
solved short-term problems at the expense of long-term ones, such as
deferring technology upgrades to pay for operational travel, or paying
large amounts of overtime rather than fixing the hiring process. To
cure this, the Secret Service developed a ``mission-based budget'' for
fiscal year 2018,\2\ which should start addressing many of the causes
of equipment and personnel shortfalls.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ U.S. Secret Service Fiscal Year 2018 Congressional
Justification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We estimate that it will require the Secret Service to have about
8,225 personnel, known as ``full-time equivalents'' (FTE) by 2022, up
from the fiscal year level of about 6,500, in order to have sufficient
personnel to conduct its mission, including the very critical element
of training. We think that the President's request for fiscal year for
450 more personnel is a step in the right direction, but will be
insufficient to meet current needs. Inadequate workforce strength
results in little or no training, mistakes due to workforce fatigue,
decreased quality of work life, poor morale, and increased attrition.
Until the Secret Service can hire and retain a workforce at or
exceeding its workforce staffing models, this will continue to be a
problem. Compounding this problem is Secret Service's inability to hire
efficiently, as I discuss below.
The Panel also found--and we have confirmed through subsequent
reviews--that the Secret Service has not kept pace with technological
advancements. Instead of investing in cutting-edge technology and
driving research and development, the Secret Service has relied on
outdated systems and equipment, with potentially dangerous
consequences. For example, in our January 2016 report on the Secret
Service's radio systems, we found that many radios were well beyond
their recommended service life and that many manufacturers had stopped
making several of the major system components, making repairs
difficult.\3\ Then, in April 2016, we reported that a confluence of
technical problems with radios, security equipment, and notifications
impeded the Secret Service's ability to apprehend an intruder who
jumped over the North Fence and entered the White House in September
2014.\4\ To update and enhance its technology, the Secret Service has
committed funding to technology refreshes, is pursuing new technology,
and has appointed civilians with specialized expertise to critical
leadership roles, including Chief Information Officer and Head of the
Office of Technical Development and Mission Support.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ U.S. Secret Service Needs to Upgrade its Radio Systems, OIG-16-
20 (January 2016).
\4\ 2014 White House Fence Jumping Incident (Redacted), OIG-16-64
(April 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Panel also asserted the Secret Service is insular and does not
regularly learn from its external partners. To address the Panel's
recommendations to engage with Federal and international partners, the
Secret Service hosted more joint training exercises; sought to obtain
periodic, outside assessments of the threats to and strategies for
protecting the WHC; and engaged foreign protective services through
events. However, the Secret Service has not yet evaluated these
partnerships or established regular exchanges of knowledge, and
staffing constraints limit joint training, as well as partner outreach.
Leading the Federal protective force community, obtaining periodic
outside assessments, and coordinating with international partners will
require sustained support from Secret Service leadership and the
flexibility to carry out these actions in the face of protective
mission demands.
In short, the Secret Service has clearly taken the Panel's
recommendations seriously, which it has demonstrated by making a number
of significant changes.\5\ Specifically, the Secret Service improved
communication within the workforce, better articulated its budget
needs, increased hiring, and committed to more training of its
workforce. Additionally, using funding appropriated for Panel
initiatives, the Secret Service began enhancing security and refreshing
technology at the WHC. It has also begun working with stakeholders on
plans to construct a new outer fence surrounding the WHC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ The Secret Service Has Taken Action to Address the
Recommendations of the Protective Mission Panel, OIG-17-10 (November
2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nevertheless, there continues to be room for improvement, and we
made five recommendations in our Unclassified November 2016 report to
further the Secret Service's progress in addressing the Panel's
recommendations. That report makes additional recommendations that we
believe will further strengthen the Secret Service. However, fully
resolving underlying issues and implementing necessary changes will
require a multi-year commitment and depend heavily on adequate funding
and staffing. In addition, we recently issued a Classified report
reviewing the Secret Service's actions to address the Panel's
Classified recommendations.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ The Secret Service Has Taken Action to Address the Classified
Recommendations of the Protective Mission Panel (Unclassified Summary),
OIG-17-47 (March 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
dhs is slow to hire law enforcement personnel
In October 2016, we issued a report on the results of our review of
the law enforcement hiring processes at three components: U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and
the Secret Service.\7\ We identified several issues with all three
components' law enforcement hiring processes. Today, I will focus on
those we identified at the Secret Service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ DHS Is Slow to Hire Law Enforcement Personnel, OIG-17-05
(October 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
From fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the Secret Service came close
to meeting or met authorized staffing levels for Special Agents and
Uniformed Division (UD) Officers.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PERCENTAGE OF SECRET SERVICE AUTHORIZED LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS
FILLED, FISCAL YEARS 2011-15
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal
Year Year Year Year Year
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Special Agents............... 100% 97% 94% 100% 87%
UD Officers.................. 100% 97% 93% 94% 87%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the Secret Service continues to be challenged by
significant hiring delays. The table below shows the average number of
days it took to hire Special Agents and UD Officers through job
announcements issued in that fiscal year.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SECRET SERVICE AVERAGE DAYS-TO-HIRE, FISCAL YEARS 2011-15 *
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal
Year Year Year Year Year
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Special Agents............... 286 ---- 482 441 298
UD Officers.................. ---- ---- 294 272 359
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Dashes indicate the Secret Service did not hire personnel that fiscal
year.
The Secret Service will be continued to be challenged by a lack of
dedicated human resources staff, which lengthens the Secret Service's
hiring process. At the end of fiscal year 2015, for example, 32 percent
of human resources positions at the Secret Service were vacant. Hiring
freezes and attrition across the Department have also affected staffing
levels of human resources personnel, resulting in a delay of applicant
processing and hiring.
Rather than employing one comprehensive automated applicant
tracking system, the Secret Service uses two systems, which do not
communicate with each other. The systems also require manual
manipulation of data, making it difficult and cumbersome to process
large numbers of applicants. In addition, applicants do not submit
their Standard Form 86, Questionnaire for National Security Positions
(SF-86), through the web-based, automated e-QIP system; instead they
must email the document to Secret Service staff who print it out and
review it manually. The electronic SF-86 only contains pages the
applicant has completed, whereas the paper version is the entire 140-
page document, including pages not completed. One Secret Service
official described the process as a ``paper mill,'' with boxes of
applicant files filling an entire room.
The Secret Service has made changes to improve its law enforcement
hiring processes and shorten the amount of time it takes to hire
personnel, but most of the changes are relatively new and their long-
term success cannot yet be measured. The Secret Service has established
hiring events that allow applicants to complete several steps in the
hiring process in one location. In fiscal year 2014, it took an average
of 192 days to hire UD Officers who attended these events versus an
average of 290 days for all other UD Officer applicants. In November
2015, the Secret Service created the Applicant Coordinating Center to
further monitor applicant hiring, specifically during the polygraph
examination, medical examination, and background phases of the process.
Despite improvements, the Secret Service continues to fall short of
the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) 80-day hiring goal. And
while OPM's 80-day goal may be unrealistic in the law enforcement
context because it does not account for additional steps in the law
enforcement hiring process, the Secret Service also has failed to meet
its own time-to-hire goals. In 2014, the Secret Service implemented a
118-day hiring target for its law enforcement applicants, but on
average failed to meet this time frame in fiscal year and fiscal year
for both Special Agents and UD Officers. Although the Secret Service
has improved its time-to-hire averages, it likely will never meet OPM's
80-day time frame regardless of process improvements, and it will only
be able to meet attainable internal targets.
Compounding these hiring challenges is that increased attrition
requires increased hiring. For example, the Secret Service was able to
hire 487 people between October 1, 2015 and end of June, 2016. This is
an impressive accomplishment, but largely eviscerated by the fact that
during the same period 439 individuals left the Service, resulting in a
net gain of only 48 people.
We made five recommendations to the Department and components to
improve the efficiency of law enforcement hiring practices, including
that the director of the Secret Service: (1) Prioritize and dedicate
full-time human resources, investigative, or polygraph personnel as
needed; (2) establish an automated method to track applicants
throughout the entire hiring process; and (3) adopt the e-QIP system
for applicants to submit information for their SF-86 electronically.
The Department and all three components concurred with our
recommendations and are taking steps to address them. Based on the
components' most recent responses to the final report, we consider all
five recommendations resolved and open.
The Impact of Understaffing on the Secret Service
The inability to hire law enforcement personnel in a timely manner
may lead to shortfalls in staffing, which can affect workforce
productivity, as well as potentially disrupt mission-critical
operations.
During our review of the 2014 White House fence-jumping incident,
we found that staffing shortages for UD Officers led to excessive
overtime, inadequate training, fatigue, low morale, and attrition.\8\
An internal Secret Service report described similar effects on Special
Agents. Similarly, during the course of an audit on Secret Service
radio communications in 2015, we observed two UD officers sleeping at
their posts. Fatigue from travel, overtime shifts, and long hours
contributed to these incidents.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ 2014 White House Fence Jumping Incident, OIG-16-64 (April
2016).
\9\ Management Alert--Secret Service Staffing and Scheduling
Contributed to Officer Fatigue (October 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Due to understaffing, the Secret Service relies on its UD Officers
to work overtime and cancel days off and leave. In fiscal year 2015,
for example, UD Officers in the White House Branch worked an average of
22.9 overtime hours per pay period and worked 71.7 percent of days off.
Working excessive overtime and having days off routinely canceled has a
long-term negative impact on UD Officers' alertness and preparedness.
Having to work exceedingly strenuous hours leads to fatigue, stress,
and low morale, which is unsustainable and results in attrition.
Attrition in the Uniformed Division has been high; for example, in
fiscal year 2015, 152 UD Officers were hired but 169 left.
Additionally, due to the shortage in staffing many Secret Service
personnel lack adequate training. Secret Service is not fully staffed
to cover all shifts while others are in training. For Secret Service
members a constant, rigorous, and innovative training regimen is a must
because there is no room for error in their protective mission. A lack
of training results in stale and degraded operational skills and could
lead to incorrect or inadequate response during emergencies.
The management issues related to Secret Service staffing are deeply
embedded. These underlying problems are not subject to relatively quick
fixes such as those applied to technical or structural problems.
Overcoming these challenges will require diligence and the full
commitment of Secret Service leadership. It is imperative, however,
that the Secret Service tackles these more fundamental and persistent
management issues or it risks being unable to respond adequately or
accomplish its protective mission.
challenges protecting sensitive case management systems and data
Background
In 2015, our office conducted an investigation regarding
allegations of improper access and distribution of House Oversight &
Government Reform Chairman Chaffetz' personally identifiable
information (PII) contained on the Secret Service mainframe, known as
the Master Central Index (MCI). On September 25, 2015, we reported that
45 Secret Service employees had accessed Chairman Chaffetz' sensitive
PII on approximately 60 occasions. The information, including the
Chairman's social security number and date of birth, was from when he
applied for employment with the Secret Service in September 2003. Of
the 45 employees, only 4 had a legitimate business need to access this
information. The others who accessed the Chairman's record did so in
violation of the Privacy Act of 1974, as well as DHS policy and USSS IT
Rules of General Behavior.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Investigation Into the Improper Access and Distribution of
Information Contained Within a Secret Service Data System (September
2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During our investigation, we planned a follow-up audit to determine
whether adequate controls and data protections were in place on the
MCI.
In 1984, the Secret Service developed and implemented the MCI
mainframe application as an essential system for use by Secret Service
personnel in carrying out their law enforcement mission. An independent
security review performed in 2007 by the National Security Agency (NSA)
identified IT security vulnerabilities on all applications hosted on
the Secret Service mainframe and advised corrective action. According
to Secret Service personnel, a key deficiency of MCI was that once a
user was granted access to the MCI, that user had access to all data
within MCI--regardless of whether it was necessary for the user's role.
In response to NSA's review, Secret Service initiated the Mainframe
Application Refactoring project in 2011. Four years later, it completed
final disassembly and removal of the mainframe in August and September
2015 and migrated MCI data to the following five information systems:
Field Investigative Reporting System (FIRS)
Clearances, Logistics, Employees, Applicants, and
Recruitment (CLEAR)
Protective Threat Management System (PTMS)
Electronic Name Check System (eCheck)
Electronic Case Management System (eCase)
MCI disassembly and data migration occurred just a few weeks prior
to the start of our audit in September 2015. As a result, we focused
our audit on these five systems.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ USSS Faces Challenges Protecting Sensitive Case Management
Systems and Data, OIG-17-01 (October 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ineffective Systems and Data Management
Our audit disclosed that Secret Service did not have adequate
protections in place on the systems to which MCI information was
migrated. Specifically, we found:
Inadequate System Security Plans--These documents, which
provide an overview of system security requirements, were
inaccurate, incomplete, or in one case, nonexistent. As a
result, Secret Service had no reasonable assurance that
mission-critical case management and investigative information
was properly maintained and protected. Those relying on Secret
Service to protect their identities (e.g., informants) had no
assurance against unauthorized access or disclosure of their
information.
Systems with Expired Authorities to Operate (ATO)--Secret
Service was operating IT systems without valid ATOs documenting
senior-level approval to operate those systems. Lacking ATOs,
Secret Service had no reasonable assurance that effective
controls existed to protect the information stored and
processed on these systems.
Inadequate Access Controls--Secret Service lacked access
controls on the information systems we reviewed. Further,
policies did not address the principle of least privilege,
restricting system users to only those privileges needed for
the performance of authorized tasks. According to Secret
Service personnel, 5,414 employees had unfettered access to the
MCI application data before it was retired. These deficiencies
increased the likelihood that any user could gain unauthorized
and covert access to sensitive information, compromising its
confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Inadequate Audit Controls--These controls were not fully
implemented, hindering the Service's ability to detect unusual
user activities and/or provide appropriate response to
potential or actual security risks, anomalies, or attacks. Such
deficiencies significantly hindered Secret Service's ability to
reconcile system events with the responsible individuals,
rendering them unable to conduct appropriate incident response
in the event of cyber security incidents or threats.
Noncompliance with Logical Access Requirements--Secret
Service had not fully implemented Personal Identity
Verification (PIV) cards for logical access to Secret Service
IT systems as required. Approximately 3 percent of privileged
users and 99 percent of non-privileged users were not using PIV
cards to access information systems, hindering USSS' ability to
limit system and data access to only authorized users with a
legitimate need.
Lack of Privacy Protections--Despite National Institute of
Standards and Technology and DHS privacy protection
requirements, Secret Service had not designated a full-time
component privacy officer reporting directly to the Secret
Service Director. Secret Service privacy documentation was
incomplete, out-of-date, or missing documented assessments on
how privacy controls were implemented. Secret Service had not
published component-specific policies and procedures to comply
with DHS policy. Also, responsible system owners and security
personnel (i.e., Information System Security Officers) were
unaware of their responsibilities for documenting and
implementing privacy protections on Secret Service systems.
Ineffective privacy leadership and practices increased the
likelihood of serious breaches to PII, resulting in identify
theft or worse, personal harm to employees, their families,
informants working for Secret Service, or subjects of Secret
Service investigations.
Records Retention--Secret Service retained job applicant
data on information systems longer than was relevant and
necessary, in violation of the Privacy Act of 1974. Many
``rejected'' and ``no longer interested'' applications were
more than 5 years old, including records up to 14 years old. In
January 2016, Secret Service officials advised us that they
were working toward implementing a new 2-year/5-year data
retention protocol.
IT Management Has Not Been a Priority
The systems and data management problems we identified can be
attributed to a lack of Secret Service priority on IT management.
Specifically, our audit disclosed:
Limited CIO Authority and Responsibility--Historically, the
Secret Service CIO has not been effectively positioned to
provide needed IT oversight. In 1988, Secret Service
established the Information Resources Management Division
(IRMD) to manage and support the investigative and protective
operations and associated administrative functions of the
agency from an IT perspective. In 2006, senior management
decided to remove the incumbent CIO from heading IRMD and put a
Special Agent in his place. The Special Agent, with limited IT
management and leadership experience, became responsible for a
technology division with a diverse portfolio of IT services,
programs, acquisitions, and operational elements. In a culture
in which Special Agents are reluctant to relinquish control,
the split contributed significantly to a lack of IT leadership
and inability to build a strong technology program within the
Secret Service.
Lack of Focus on IT Policy Management--Inadequate attention
was given to keeping critical Secret Service IT policies
updated. Key guidance had not been updated since 1992 when
Secret Service was part of the Department of the Treasury.
Outdated IT policies leave the organization hindered in its
ability to implement and enforce IT system security
requirements.
Key IT Leadership Vacancies--Key positions responsible for
the management of IT resources and assets were not filled. Some
vacancies lasted for almost 1 year; other vacancies still
existed at the time of our audit. For example, for almost a
year, from December 2014 to November 2015, Secret Service
lacked a full-time CIO. An acting Chief Information Security
Officer (CISO) departed in September 2015; as of January 2016
the position was still vacant although the agency hired a
Deputy CISO that same month. Further, Secret Service did not
have a full-time Information System Security Manager, critical
to ensuring that the organization's information security
program is implemented and maintained.
Vacant IT Staff Positions--As of December 2015, OCIO
reported having 139 employees and 58 vacancies, which is a
staff vacancy rate of 29 percent. Secret Service relied heavily
on contractors to fill IT security positions rather than on
Federal employees, as background checks for contractors did not
require polygraphs. However, contractor Information System
Security Officers felt they were not getting sufficient
guidance to perform their responsibilities.
Inadequate IT Training--Secret Service personnel did not
receive adequate IT training. For example, not all employees
and contractors completed mandatory IT security awareness,
specialized role-based training, or privacy training. As a
result, many employees lacked knowledge of their specific roles
and responsibilities. For fiscal year 2015, we found that only
85 percent of Secret Service's employee population had
completed the required IT security awareness training.
Recent Steps to Improve IT Management
Secret Service recently initiated steps to improve its IT
management structure, which may give more priority to the leadership,
policies, personnel, and training needed to ensure protections for
sensitive systems and data. Specifically, in December 2015, the Secret
Service Director announced component-wide that the new CIO was put back
in charge of IRMD, giving him control of all IT assets. Additionally,
five new divisions were established to delineate OCIO functions.
These changes are initial steps to address the various IT
deficiencies we identified. However, it will take time for these
improvements to be fully implemented and demonstrate effectiveness.
Until then, the potential for incidents similar to the breach of
Chairman Chaffetz' information in March 2015 remain. Any loss, theft,
corruption, destruction, or unavailability of Law Enforcement Sensitive
data or PII could have grave adverse effects on Secret Service's
ability to protect its employees, stakeholders, or the general public.
We should not underestimate the challenges ahead. While the Secret
Service has made substantial gains in securing its networks, according
to the self-assessment scoring required by the Federal Information
Security Management Act, it still needs to work on securing that each
of its IT systems is properly authorized and protected from external
threat.
previous allegations of employee misconduct
Over the past several years, as part of our independent oversight
effort, we have investigated various incidents involving allegations of
misconduct by Secret Service employees.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ See, e.g. Investigation Into the Improper Access and
Distribution of Information Contained Within a Secret Service Data
System (September 2015); Investigation Into the Incident at the White
House Complex on March 4, 2015 (May 2015); Allegations of Misuse of
United States Secret Service Resources (October 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For example:
We investigated allegations that, in April 2012, during
preparations for President Obama' visit to Cartagena, Colombia,
Secret Service agents solicited prostitutes and engaged in
other misconduct. As part of our investigation, we conducted
283 interviews of 251 Secret Service personnel. Based on our
interviews and review of records, we identified 13 Secret
Service employees who had personal encounters with female
Colombian nationals consistent with the misconduct reported. We
determined that one of the female Colombian nationals involved
in the incident was known to the intelligence community.
However, we found no evidence that the actions of Secret
Service personnel had compromised any sensitive information.
We reviewed the actions of two Secret Service agents who on
the evening of March 4, 2015, had entered an area of the White
House Complex that had been secured as a result of a suspicious
package. We concluded that it was more likely than not that
both agents' judgment was impaired by alcohol. We found that,
notwithstanding their denials, both agents were observed by
uniformed officers as ``not right,'' and ``not making sense,''
had just spent the previous 5 hours in a restaurant/bar in
which one ran up a significant bar tab, and that they drove
into a crime scene inches from what the rest of the Secret
Service was treating as a potential explosive device and which,
under different circumstances, could have endangered their own
lives and those of the UD officers responding. While each agent
had a duty to report the incident to his superior, neither did
do so. We found that their failure to do so reflected either
poor judgment or an affirmative desire to hide their
activities.
The Secret Service has certainly taken steps to address these and
similar challenges, but not always successfully. These persistent
challenges may not be easy to resolve through expeditious action, such
as suspending employees and issuing new guidance. They may require more
fundamental change that addresses the root cause of the misconduct.
As a result of the Cartagena incident, in December 2013, we issued
a report on our review of the Secret Service's efforts to identify,
mitigate, and address instances of misconduct and inappropriate
behavior. In our report, we described a situation in which many
employees were hesitant to report off-duty misconduct either because of
fear that they would be retaliated against or because they felt
management would do nothing about it.\13\ For example, in response to
one survey question, 56 percent of electronic survey respondents
indicated that they could report misconduct without fear of
retaliation, meaning that almost half of the workforce may have feared
retaliation for reporting misconduct.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Adequacy of USSS Efforts to Identify, Mitigate, and Address
Instances of Misconduct and Inappropriate Behavior, OIG 14-20 (December
2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a result of our findings, the Secret Service created a table of
penalties for determining appropriate corrective, disciplinary, or
adverse actions for common offenses and established a centralized
process within headquarters for determining and implementing discipline
for employee misconduct.
on-going oig oversight of the secret service
Our office will continue to help the Secret Service meet its
critical mission through independent and objective audits, inspections,
and investigations. We plan to publish several DHS-wide audits in
fiscal year that will include reviews of the Secret Service, including:
DHS's Use of Polygraphs in the Hiring Process Audit.--We are
conducting a Department-wide audit of the use of polygraphs and
USSS is part of that audit. The purpose of this audit is to
determine whether DHS' polygraph examinations are an effective
tool for screening new employees during the hiring process.
DHS Conduct & Discipline.--We are currently conducting a
Department-wide audit of DHS's disciplinary processes, which
focuses on the depth and breadth of employees' perceptions and
attitudes about misconduct and the application of discipline,
DHS's established rules of conduct, and the application of
discipline across the Department.
conclusion
The Secret Service's statutory responsibility to protect the
President, other dignitaries, and events, as well as investigate
financial and cyber crimes to help preserve the integrity of the
Nation's economy, leaves little, if any, room for error. As our audits
and inspections have demonstrated, to achieve its mission, the Secret
Service needs to continue working to improve its operations and
programs. Although it has planned and taken actions to address the
Protective Mission Panel's recommendations, fully implementing changes
and resolving underlying issues will require the Secret Service's
sustained commitment and depend heavily on adequate funding and
staffing. We will continue to monitor the Secret Service's progress as
it takes corrective actions to address vulnerabilities.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify here today. I
look forward to discussing our work with you and the Members of the
subcommittee.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Roth for your testimony. We
definitely appreciate you taking time out of your schedule to
be here today. We know that your time, along with Director
Alles' time, is very valuable, but I think this is also
important, what we are doing here today.
The Chair now recognizes myself for 5 minutes of questions.
I will note, since there is only a relatively small size of
panel, that we will have some flexibility with respect to the
amount of time we use.
So, first of all, I want to do something a little
different. I normally don't do this. But I think it is pretty
apparent what the primary issue is with respect to Secret
Service, and that is the morale issue, which is tied to
manpower and manpower-type issues. They are just stretched too
thin.
So before I came here, I was a Federal prosecutor and doing
organized crime cases for 20 years, and I routinely came across
Secret Service agents in the field. I was always struck by the
fact that they would be doing criminal cases, doing good
criminal cases, and all of a sudden they are yanked out to do a
protective detail. So they had these bifurcated
responsibilities that were quite difficult.
I also was mindful of the fact that their time constraints
were unlike any other agency I have ever encountered.
So I went back and kind of canvassed my old pals, if you
will, and got input from them. So I just want to read to you
some of the input that I got from them in the field, because I
think what we really need to do is think of it and look at this
through the prism of the guys and gals on the front line and
see what they are experiencing, what their thought process is
now, and maybe we can generate some discussion from that. I am
just going to go no particular order of importance.
No. 1, the new agents we have hired in the past 3 years, or
in the recent past, about 40 percent leave within 3 years. So
there are probably only 1,200 agents in the field offices, and
we are getting crushed. This does not include agents on the
detail to the District of Columbia. We have about a total of
2,000 to 2,200 agents. Our numbers are way down. The 3,200
administration staff, it includes support staff. We are top
heavy with 14 and 15 bosses. I am not sure which branch
particularly they are referring to.
We need to be under a different retirement system. We are
under the FERS and we should be under the Coast Guard
retirement system. This would differentiate us from other
agencies, boost morale, and maybe we could hire more people.
You can't do the job for more than 20 years at the pace we are
going.
Another one: They have to lift the max out of the pay cap.
I made 104 hours of overtime in the month of April and will
only see 16 hours of that money for the month. The rest I won't
see. Anything over 162 hours now through the rest of the year,
I will never see a penny of that money.
The hiring push over the last 3 years has netted only 5
agents total. That is pretty stunning if that is true. Between
people retiring, leaving the job in droves and new hires, we
have netted only five agents.
Morale is terrible, and we are all constantly working long
hours, traveling all the time away from home and not getting
compensated for it. There is no work-life balance, and the
other 1,811 Federal agencies have much more balance than we do.
There is a major disconnect between upper management in the
District of Columbia and what is really going on in the field.
From 1997--this is particularly troubling to me--from 1997
to 2000, the Secret Service hired quite a bit of agents. There
are about 450 to 550 agents that can retire within the next 1
to 3 years. If you don't give them some incentive to stay, they
are going to retire. That is a huge number of agents and
experience leaving the Service at once and will cause a very
large void.
By no means are these exclusive to some of the comments
that I heard, but they do kind of highlight some of the things
I did hear here. This is not here to--I didn't do that to set
up a series of complaints or series of questions, but more to
generate discussion about how to address the problem. I think
we have all kind-of identified it to some extent, but the brass
tacks gets down to what do you need.
So with that, I will just ask you, Director.
Mr. Alles. So, thank you, sir. Actually, I was just talking
with Inspector General Roth before. You know, I see my key--the
No. 1 thing I have to work on is the area of leadership. So all
these things stem out of that particular area. Morale,
resources, hiring, all those, I think, come from that common
point. So that is not to say that we don't--so everything you
have said, I don't have any--I am not sure exactly on the
numbers he said, but all of rest of it sounds pretty
consistent.
I mean, one of the impressive things about the agency is
they get the job done no matter what. As I tell them, that is
good and that is bad. It is good that they are doing the
mission. The bad part is, is where is the work-life balance for
the agency, for our Uniformed Division officers and our special
agents, and it is generally not there. Then you throw on top of
that the pay cap issue. As I say, how fair is it to ask people
to work for free, which is basically what happens. When they
hit that biweekly cap, they keep on working, and they get the
mission done no matter what. So----
Mr. Katko. Right. Just to interrupt you there for a moment.
It is stunning to me that this is early June, and this person
that gave me that information has already used up all and any
overtime. So for the rest of the year when he is working
hundreds of hours of overtime, sometimes on a monthly--
certainly on a monthly basis, there will be zero compensation
for that. I don't know how that doesn't affect you or how it
doesn't affect the performance of some people.
But you are right, you are absolutely right, it is
remarkable how good a job they do under these circumstances. So
please continue.
Mr. Alles. So I think, as you are saying, I am sure the
entire committee is implying too, we owe it to them not only to
pay them but to give them better working conditions than they
have now.
Part of that--a lot of that revolves around leadership,
which is going to affect morale. I have got to find a way to
stem attrition. I can't do that if they don't see any hope for
the future. So as long as they see them working, as I like to
say over at the White House, 6 days a weeks, 12 hours a day,
and then having their days off canceled, we are going to make
little progress.
In the field, estimating this year, we are going to have
about 500 to 700 agents that are, again, going to exceed this
pay cap. So again, I am going to be making people work for
tree. They have to do the mission. They do the mission. But I
really view that as unfair in an area we need to aggressively
work on correcting.
So I think from our standpoint is it is a leadership aspect
in terms of affecting their morale, it is trying to hire more
agents and stem the attrition.
The hiring actually is going well. We actually, hopefully--
Mr. Roth was laying out some numbers there--we will reach 6,800
this year. We are making better progress than we have in the
past. All of the classes are being filled.
But again, as highlighted by the committee and also by the
inspector general, there are issues on attrition. We have to
address those. Part of that is engagement with the work force.
That is my responsibility to get out there and make sure they
understand we recognize their problems and we are going to
correct those issues, that we are not just standing idly by
while it happens.
But in the mean time, it is not something that is
necessarily a quick fix either. So it is a continued pressure
against that. We recognize resource deficiencies mentioned by
the inspector general. We estimate, generally, we are probably
$200 to $300 million a year for what we need to do to actually
hire people, have the correct technology in place. He talked
about IT issues. Certainly don't disagree with any of those
things.
So some of those do revolve around resource issues, but
getting good programs in place, having good leadership to lay
down those programs and execute those programs are all critical
to fundamentally resetting where the Secret Service is.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, General. There is going to be--I keep
calling you General, Director. We will be going back and forth.
It will take a while to get used to your--not calling you by
your old title. But we definitely have to get back with more of
this, and I trust my colleagues will do that you in their
questions.
But I want to hear from Mr. Roth as well on this. Quite
frankly, what we do need, though, is basically a tick list of
what we really need.
So with that, I will let you tell it.
Mr. Roth. I mean, sure. I think it is in two things. One is
money. Two is a focus on management fundamentals. So, for
example, when we took a look at law enforcement hiring, and we
did a report that was issued a couple of months ago, we looked
at Secret Service and we looked at ICE and CBP.
When we asked for data, for example, they couldn't give us
real-time data as to how many people were in the pipeline,
where they were, because they didn't have any data systems that
would allow them to track the kind of hiring they need. This is
something that is fundamental and basic in any private
corporation or private industry to be able to streamline the
kinds of data systems that you have.
So, for example, Secret Service has two different data
systems that don't talk to each other. So there has to be a
manual input of data from one system to the other.
Likewise, they have the SF-86, the security clearance form
that most agencies have filed electronically. Secret Service
doesn't have that capability. So people fill that out. They
email it in a pdf. That pdf then gets printed by the Secret
Service and then reviewed manually. It is just not a very
efficient system.
What we found also is that they had a shortfall, and it
seems trivial but it is not trivial, of personnel specialists.
These are the folks that have to sort-of write the position
descriptions, get the best qualified list together, get the
kinds of information out so that Secret Service can hire.
I would just say that the information that you have given,
Congressman Katko, is consistent with the data that we have
seen, that it is an uphill battle to hire more than they lose
and they are in a vicious cycle, because the more they lose,
the more they have to work their current personnel; the more
they work their current personnel, the more that they lose.
So----
Mr. Katko. Let me just interrupt you for a second. That is
what worries me so much about this big ball just coming near
retirement age, retirement at 2017 to 2020, that pipeline that
is coming up in the next couple of years. You are talking about
almost a quarter of the front-line agents that do the
protection. That is frightening to me. So if you can address
that as well.
Mr. Roth. I think that is right. So if you are hiring 400
or 500 people a year, that is great. But if those get
eviscerated by losing 400 or 500 people a year, then you need
to sort of rethink how it is that you hire folks.
Again, I am encouraged by the fact that Secret Service now
for the first time has a work force that is not simply special
agents doing technical work. So they have a CIO, who is
somebody who specializes in that and is not just simply a
special agent who got promoted to that; somebody in personnel
the same way. They have an individual for management who is on
the same level as the deputy director.
So they are doing all the rights things. It is just a race
to try to be able to get the efficiencies that they need, get
the resources that they need to do the job.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Roth.
Of course, there is much more I could follow up on, but I
think it is time for the Chair to recognize the gentlewoman
from New Jersey, Mrs. Watson Coleman.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is clear that a really big issue that the Secret Service
has, in addition to many others--challenges, I should say--is
the lack of resources, human resources in particular. So I am
struck by a couple of questions that I need to ask to get some
clarification on and to see whether or not this is having a
different impact on the Secret Service than you have
experienced, the agency has experienced in the past.
For instance, I know that we have a responsibility to Trump
Tower, to protect Trump Tower when the President is there. We
have an additional and different responsibility here, I think,
because the First Lady stays there and uses that as her primary
residence. I believe that that is somewhat unprecedented to
have the First Lady live someplace other than her husband, the
President. But that places an additional strain on your already
strained resources both financial and personnel. So, Mr. Alles,
what are we doing to acknowledge that and prepare for that?
In that same vein, I also know--you might want to write
these questions down--I also know that we now have a
responsibility and a legitimate one to provide protective
service to almost triple the number of people associated with
the First Family than we have experienced since 1988 and that
there are some unique opportunities there to provide protection
as it relates to some of the older children, the adult
children, going around the world and going around the country
and advancing their business opportunities that are really
still connected to this President, because he hasn't really
divested himself of those.
I would like to know the kind of relationship we have, and
are we being reimbursed in any way, shape, or form for that
kind of traveling and protection that is taking place? Do you
distinguish personal travel from professional travel?
Then last--it is only a three-part question, I know it
sounds like it is going on forever--but the last part has to do
with do we have any idea what kind of challenge the President's
trips to Mar-a-Lago and other golf courses on a very, very
routine basis will have on your resources as they exist now, as
they are proposed in this upcoming budget, and should we be
looking to provide you additional resources in order to meet
what seems to be an increased challenge?
So if you would just start with those three areas. I do
have some other questions.
Mr. Alles. OK. Very well, ma'am.
I think I would start off by saying, clearly, that the
Trump Tower has been designated as one of his residences. It is
not unusual, I would say, and you would--we would understand
this as parents, they wanted their son to finish the school
year in New York, and the plan is to move down this summer, and
that will alleviate some of the pressure up there in that area.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. OK. Let me stop you.
Mr. Alles. Sure.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Let me ask you this question, then. So
you won't be providing this 24-hour security, 365 days a year
at the Trump Tower? You will only be providing it when the
family, the President's family are there, and they will be
there when they are not at the White House or Mar-a-Lago?
Mr. Alles. We will still, because the sons we be there, we
will still be providing security. The levels of it we are going
to look at it how we can modify those levels.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. You say the sons or the----
Mr. Alles. Yes, the sons that reside at the tower. That is
where they work out of. So that will continue. But I just--
anyways, but the First Lady and their youngest son will move
down here this summer, which will alleviate some of the
pressure on that.
But I will just mention also, I mean, when it comes to
these--to the residences and the trips and those things, this
is all in statute, ma'am. I am simply doing what I am required
to do by law, and the agency is, and I have no flexibility
there whatsoever. So I really don't have the option to, you
know, not to resource it or make requests for that. I mean, we
are doing that as the Presidential protection mission. That is
what required in statute.
I would just amplify, in the post-9/11 era, in the era of
the London Bridge and Manchester, the threat environment, of
course, is not becoming more benign, it is a more serious
threat environment, and we have to think about that as it
affects his entire family, we need to protect as we have to. We
have to cover.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So we will continue to provide this
kind of protection at Trump Tower, because that is where the
Trump business efforts are taking place. Is that what you just
said?
Mr. Alles. Again, it wouldn't really matter if it is a
Trump business. The sons are there, and by statute it
requires----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. But it is a Trump business.
Mr. Alles. I understand. I am just saying, ma'am, if there
was no business, by statute, we would still protect the sons.
That is what is required by law.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. OK. Do you have a number? Do you have
any idea what it costs us to rent the space that we have
created as a protection in the Trump Tower?
Mr. Alles. I do not off the top of my head. I would have to
take it as a record----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. All right. Could you possibly provide
that for us?
Mr. Alles. We can take that as a record question.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. OK.
Mr. Roth, this is something that I raised yesterday. I
guess--I have no idea when it was. Last time we had a hearing
with CHS on the budget Secretary Kelly was in. I am very
concerned that your budget is being reduced by 9 percent. I
asked the Secretary about that, and he said, well, it is not
going to interfere with anything that you are doing or anybody
is doing in that space. But I would like to know from your
perspective, what does that 9 percent reduction represent in
your ability to do your job and the resources necessary to do
it?
Mr. Roth. It is about, by our calculation, about a 10
percent reduction from 17 services to what the President
proposes in fiscal 2018. That represents about a 15 percent
decrease in the number of people that we would have. So it will
decrease the tempo of the kinds of audits, inspections, and
investigations we will do, at the same that the Department
itself is growing by about 6 percent. So we are going down
while the Department is going up.
They are going up in very high-risk areas. Customs and
Border Protection. Increased infrastructure investment in the
Southwest Border barrier. Those kinds of things which really
are meat and potatoes, what we spend a lot of time looking at,
because they are risky areas for the Department, we will be
unable to do anything with.
Likewise, in the cyber area, our desire is to increase our
oversight over how it is that DHS does cyber both within the
Department as well as Government-wide. We will be unable to do
that work as well. So it will have a significant impact on what
we will do, assuming that the President's budget becomes law.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you.
Mr. Alles, one of the things that we talked about is the
kind of training to make sure that our officers on whatever
level have the kind of experiences and scenarios that prepare
them for the breach that happened at the White House. I believe
that there was a proposal and a request for some kind of a
White House mock-up to be used through the training center,
Rowley Training Center. Do I have that correct?
Mr. Alles. Yes, ma'am. That is correct.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. What is your opinion about it being
eliminated from the budget request? How essential do you think
it is in terms of keeping our President and his family and the
people that are there safe from these kinds of intrusions?
Mr. Alles. I mean, like other things, it is resource
priorities. It is one that we have requested now as an unfunded
item. But we view that as important to the training of our
agents overall, otherwise we have to try to run these scenarios
on the White House grounds. That has severe limitations,
because we are working with actual conditions, alarms, people
that are actually armed with live weapons. So we have to
approach that very gently, I guess is how I will say it.
So that training center would absolutely help us run
scenarios, particular scenarios that might be more complex
attack scenarios, in a more effective way. So it is clearly
something we will continue to ask the Department for in terms
of funding. We have scoped out exactly what the amounts that we
need for that are, and we would like to see that funded in the
future.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. I am just going to wrap up
here, but I would just like to ask him a general question.
In addition to asking the questions about the costs
associated with the protection at the Trump Tower, what we are
paying the Trump Organization as a rent in order to do this,
things of that nature, in general, are you comfortable with the
budget request as it responds to what you see as your needs in
order to ensure that you have good morale, good employees,
happy employees, effective employees, and sufficient staff to
do its job? That is No. 1.
No. 2, I guess this is for you, Mr. Roth, since I am just
going to sneak this in, what is it specifically that we do at
the Secret Service in the hiring practice that slows down the
process that is being done better and could be done even
better?
With that, I would yield back to my Chairman after you
answer these.
Mr. Alles. So, ma'am, I would comment that I think the
budget is requesting the resources we need, which will help in
terms of hiring, which will affect morale. But I would also
say, as I indicated earlier, that as we look at our total
organization, what we need to purchase to do our protection
mission, our investigation mission more effectively, we are
generally running on $200 to $300 million a year short of what
would be required there. Again, like other parts of the
agencies, we have to compete in the Department for funding.
That is our job to continue to do that and justify our
requirements.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Right now you are kind of robbing
Peter to pay Paul. You are taking people off of their type of
investigation, criminal investigation work, to put them on some
protection work. So that is negatively impacting your
investigation, criminal investigation work?
Mr. Alles. Right. So over time our investigations drop when
we have to do this much protection. So, clearly, raising the
number of agents we have in the organization, also raising the
number of Uniformed Division officers in the agency, would help
us greatly.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Mr. Roth.
Mr. Roth. With regard to their budget, we do not think the
budget is sufficient. I know that Mr. Alles is constrained to
support the President's budget. I am not similarly constrained
because of the IG Act. We do not think it is sufficient. We
think that it is--they need more personnel.
With regard to what can they do better, we wrote a report
about law enforcement hiring that puts forth specific
recommendations as to what the Secret Service can do. But a
couple of things is, one, they need to ensure that they have a
polygraphy staff that is well-staffed, and it is not a
collateral duty, and they have a full court press to ensure
that that is not a bottleneck.
They need to modernize their systems, their information
technology systems, when it comes to hiring to ensure they are
not doing sort of duplicative work or having data systems that
don't talk to each other, so there is a lot of manual entry,
those kinds of things.
Then they need to ensure that they have a full staff of
personnel specialists. Frankly, you can't overstaff this, given
sort-of the full press that they are going to have to do to get
the kind of personnel on board in a fast manner.
So those would be our recommendations. In that report, the
Secret Service has agreed with our recommendations and is
moving forward with those.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. I need you to know that it
is important for us to work together to make sure that you have
the resources that you need to keep our First Family safe as
well as to do the kind of investigations that you do in your
business. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
With that, I want to ask unanimous consent for Ms. Sheila
Jackson Lee to be on our panel, to be recognized and to be able
to ask questions.
Mr. Katko. Without objection, so ordered.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Katko. Well, thank you, Mrs. Watson Coleman.
The Chairman will now recognize other Members of the
committee for questions they may wish to ask the witness. In
accordance with our committee rules and practice, I plan to
recognize Members who were present at the start of the hearing
by seniority on the subcommittee. Those coming in later would
be recognized in the order of arrival.
The Chair would now recognize the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Fitzpatrick.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Alles, Mr. Roth, thank you for coming, and also thank
you for the work you do. It is not easy. Coming from a Federal
law enforcement background myself here, I want to share with
you a few things.
No. 1, it is easy to criticize agencies like the Secret
Service, but these are men and women that you represent that
make a conscious decision to put their life on the line in
defense of others. So please thank them on behalf of our
committee.
If I could just offer one piece of advice from the agents'
perspectives, focus on morale, because it is very, very
important. I can't think of a more important job as leaders of
an organization than to watch the morale of your agents,
because the higher the morale, the safer we are as a country.
I want to focus on the budget, which Mrs. Watson Coleman
had addressed. The overall Department's budget is going up, one
of the few in the proposed budget. However, certain subsets are
going down, most notably FEMA as well as the OIG.
So, Mr. Roth, I believe that certain outlays of money are
investments and not expenses, because they ultimately result in
a cost savings. The mission of the OIG is to cut back on fraud,
waste, and abuse, which presumably would save the agency money
and make it more efficient in the long run.
What specific programs--you started to address this--what
programs will you be making the decision to cut back on, since
you are going to be managing that budget? What specifically is
going to be cut back so that we know what we can advocate for?
Mr. Roth. Thank you for that. Our budget history has been
very positive since my arrival. Both 2015, 2016, and 2017 have
invested in the OIG with the idea, as the Brookings Institution
had done a study just last year saying that if you actually cut
IG budgets, it actually costs you money when you cut IG
budgets. We have certain metrics as to every dollar spent in
the IG----
Mr. Katko. Of course, you are going to say that, right?
Mr. Roth. Well, it is not just us.
Mr. Katko. I am just kidding.
Mr. Roth. It is the Brookings Institution. We do keep
metrics, for the statutory metrics, about every dollar that you
spend on the IG, and I think community-wide it is about $17 to
$1. I don't have our figure handy.
But the risks that the Department faces are significant,
and any time that you have growth in any areas within the
Department, you are going to have risk. So if you are going to
hire a significant number, for example, of Border Patrol agents
or ICE deportation officers, that represents a risk to the
Department that has to be addressed.
Our internal affairs function, for example, we have one
special agent for every thousand employees in the DHS. It
creates significant challenges.
I can go on. For example, in our cyber area, we have tried
to increase our capabilities in that area to determine whether
or not the Department is fulfilling its responsibilities in the
cyber area, which is an enormous risk.
I could spend your entire 5 minutes talking about the kinds
of things that we do and why it is necessary for the kinds of
budget support that we get, but I think you get the idea.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Mr. Roth and Mr. Alles, more importantly
Mr. Roth, because you oversee all of DHS for OIG, the Border
Corruption Task Force, which sat at the FBI's headquarters--I
was previously part of that--how is that working? How are
relations amongst the partners? Because, as you are aware,
there were some problems in the past there.
Mr. Roth. Yes. There were a number of problems in the past.
I will freely acknowledge the fact that there were. A lot of it
was on the fault of the OIG, and there was no question of that.
I think we have mended those fences and are working well
together.
Frankly, it depends on what field office you go to. Some of
it is personality-driven, and some of that, as you know, very
difficult to change.
Institutionally, we support the Border Corruption Task
Forces. We participate in them. We have individuals who are
colocated in the Border Corruption Task Forces, when we have
the ability to. We only have about 250 special agents, probably
200 and some are in the field. We are not like the FBI with
10,000 agents. So we have to be careful as to where we put our
personnel. But to the extent that we can, we colocate them with
the FBI in those kinds of cases.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Roth.
I do want to note on the issue of the cuts to the OIG at
DHS, there is a lot of talk about border security. One of the
primary functions of your office is border corruption, which is
as much of a vulnerability as a lack of a physical barrier,
aerial surveillance, and the like. So all of that goes into the
concept of border security, would you agree with that, and that
cutbacks to the segments of DHS's budget would actually go to
the border security issue?
Mr. Roth. That is absolutely true. And that is especially
true when you hire a work force, increase the work force that
does the border security. There have to be the cops on the
beat, the people who police the police.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Fitzpatrick.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from Texas, Mrs.
Watson Coleman.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. New Jersey. Ms. Jackson Lee.
Mr. Katko. I am sorry. I have Watson Coleman on top of the
list and I didn't cross it out. Let's try that again.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms.
Sheila Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, I have absolutely no quarrel
with being a twin of Mrs. Watson Coleman.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Likewise.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But let me thank the Chairman and Ranking
Member for their courtesies, and let me thank the inspector
general and the new director of Secret Service for their
service to the Nation.
Let me, as well, indicate some of your staff may be aware
that I have been working with the Secret Service for a very,
very long time as a Member of this committee, and I want to
ensure that you know that I appreciate your service greatly. I
believe the men and women should, it should be known, that we
appreciate the service that they give.
I also want to take note of the fact, because of the able
work of the staff of this committee, that I take very seriously
the words of the Protective Mission Panel regarding the Secret
Service's paramount mission of protecting the President and
First Family, I think it is also important other high-ranking
officials, which is to allow no tolerance for error and a
single miscue or even a split-second delay could have
disastrous consequences for the Nation and the world.
We don't often be reminded of that, and I had the
opportunity to see a movie that most people probably have not
seen called ``Killing Reagan,'' and it powerfully exhibited the
dangers that those who are in the Secret Service face when they
are committed to putting their life on the line.
I also take note that this organization has a problem with
morale and attrition, and the issues are around the agent
burnout due to inflexible schedules, long shifts, and agents
having to work and not use their annual leave or potentially
not receive overtime compensation.
So I want to have a reasoned line of questioning on that
basis. That would be to you, to the IG, again.
I believe that the 102 million cut is obscene. I think the
President's budget is obscene. It is not realistic. In all of
the lipstick on a pig that you are try to place, such as the
Department is increasing, but the cut to the Secret Service is
absolutely obscene.
Would you comment, please, on how deep a debt it is to have
agents that are burned out, have inflexible hours, who have the
responsibility of protectees, no matter how large a group
happens to be in the First Family?
Mr. Roth. Certainly, our prior work has shown the effects
of overwork and fatigue, both on attrition as well as on
mission capability, that our lookback on the fence-jumping
incident, for example, showed that much of what occurred was
because of inattention, we believe, due to fatigue, because of
radios that were 17 years old and outside of their effective
life cycle could not be repaired, for example. A number of
errors upon errors.
I would agree with you that, given the zero-fail mission of
the Secret Service, we ought to be erring on the side of
ensuring that they have the kinds of resources that they need.
Again, in my testimony, I talk about the fact that they
actually need about 7,200--let me make sure I get this right--
about 8,200 personnel, about 1,700 more than they currently
have. The President's budget asks for an increase of 450, we
think that is insufficient, that they need to get to the
staffing models that the Secret Service themselves have
created, sort of on a zero mission----
Ms. Jackson Lee. I am going to interject because I have a
series of questions.
Mr. Roth. I apologize.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So if you could quickly, the $12 million
that is cut from the National Computer Forensics Institute, can
you in answering that question tell me how the Secret Service
is keeping up with its criminal investigation duties while
shifting significant resources to cover its expanded protectee
mission? So a combination of losing computer training dollars
in a Federally-funded training center, helping local law
enforcement, and then to criminal investigation. Just quickly,
difficult, challenge?
Mr. Roth. We haven't looked at that specific issue. I
apologize for that, we don't have an answer for that.
Mr. Alles. I would just comment we will----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Director, I am going to turn right to
you. Just one moment.
Can you finish, what did you say? You didn't what?
Mr. Roth. We haven't looked at that specific issue with
regard to the specific fiscal 2018 budget cuts.
Mr. Jackson Lee. But would it be difficult?
Mr. Roth. Of course, yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right. I want to turn to the director,
and thank you very much. As I indicated, welcome. Go right
ahead, criminal investigation, losing that money for the
National----
Mr. Alles. So we consider it critical, we will move to
reprogram money to make sure it is funded. It is very critical
to State and local people to--we train a lot of them down there
in Hoover, Alabama.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Great. Let me just, if I might, indulge me
just for a moment, two things I want to cast on you. First of
all, we have for a long time--this is to the director--worked
to settle the Moore case. It has been settled, there is a
judgment, there is money. I would like to know the status of
that case and how you are responding to making those people
whole.
The second, what I would like is to try to understand the
size of the First Family--and some of this, Mr. Chairman, I
would like to have in a Classified setting, we may have had one
and I might have missed it. But I would make the point that
there should be no diminishing of security, but it is certainly
an extensive burden when you have protectees that are part of
the Cabinet and sublevels that travel all over.
So my question is how are you facing that generally? Are
you placing people at Mar-a-Lago continuously or people have to
move back and forth? If they wind up on the Mediterranean, do
we have to send people there? We are not used to--we have
humble people that are Presidents. We are not used to having
billionaires, self-stated billionaires that have a life of
frivolity where they summer here and winter here and the
American people are still struggling to pay their rent. But the
question is if they wind up in the Mediterranean for frivolity,
then you have to have international resources to take care of
that. Is that correct? You don't yield that to an international
resource, meaning you don't yield that to foreign secret
service.
Mr. Alles. Well, if they are in a foreign country, ma'am,
we do have to cooperate with foreign service as in make
agreements diplomatic and what services we can provide in terms
of protection. So we will protect them, but we do have to do it
in cooperation with----
Ms. Jackson Lee. So that is costing money?
Mr. Alles. Clearly, when there is travel, there is going to
be cost associated with it. Just to mention, in terms of
residences, unless they are there full-time, we don't
necessarily have full-time protection as residences. So a
couple that you have mentioned would typically be like travel
locations. If they are going to go down there, we will take
necessary actions to ensure the site is prepared for the
protectees to arrive.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I will just finish on this point, Mr.
Chairman and Ranking Member, again, I want to do everything I
can to work with the Secret Service because I do believe the
storied history of the Secret Service deserves our
acknowledgment. Certainly to the work you have done, to the IG,
I am very grateful that you are not subject to political whims
so that we can get the Secret Service both in terms of the
quality of young men and women who I believe would be
interested in being recruited. Based upon salary and work
conditions, but more importantly not to say anybody shuns their
service, but to have them at their peak, because their ultimate
responsibility is to save a life.
So this is a disappointing budget. You are being a good
soldier to the director, but you are being a good soldier and
you are squeezing and picking and nitpicking and squeezing here
and taking here. It is an absolute outrage, and I will frankly
say that the Congress is going to ignore it completely and try
to do what is right as relates to the Secret Service.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. I look forward to
some Classified briefings where we can ask some more detailed
questions about their work with protecting protectees. Thank
you very much.
Mr. Katko. Yes. We will definitely look at that in the
future going forward as far as a Classified briefing or hearing
in that matter. Thank you very much, Ms. Jackson Lee.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.
Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Alles, am I saying your name properly, sir?
Mr. Alles. Alles, sir.
Mr. Higgins. Director Alles, thank you for your service. I
have been a police officer for 14 years, SWAT for 12. It is
interesting when we consider that the Secret Service was born
of the Treasury Department to protect the people's treasure.
Part of this committee's job as we--our Nation faces a $20
trillion debt is it to protect the people's Treasury. So let's
work together.
During the course of the history of the Secret Service,
when President Obama traveled abroad, did the Secret Service
provide protection?
Mr. Alles. Yes, sir, absolutely.
Mr. Higgins. When he vacationed in Martha's Vineyard, did
the Secret Service provide protection?
Mr. Alles. Yes, sir.
Mr. Higgins. When President Bush was President, he traveled
to Crawford. Did the Secret Service provide protection?
Mr. Alles. Yes, sir.
Mr. Higgins. When President Carter traveled, way back in
the 1970's, did the Secret Service provide protection?
Mr. Alles. Yes, sir.
Mr. Higgins. When President Reagan went to the western
White House, did the Secret Service provide protection?
Mr. Alles. Yes, sir.
Mr. Higgins. Are you aware of any notation within the
Constitution of these United States that limits the size of the
First Family's number?
Mr. Alles. No, sir. We are just required by statute to
protect them.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, sir. Let's move on, shall we?
During the course of my career as a police officer, I have
had the honor to work with the Secret Service on a couple of
Treasury cases. I find you gentlemen to be the most
professional and tactically sound amongst our country. I thank
you all for your service.
When you spoke of running scenarios, you were referring to,
of course, tactical scenarios, like active shooter, barricaded
hostage, VIP extraction, et cetera?
Mr. Alles. Those would be sort-of part of them, but also
scenarios that might involve complex attacks in the White
House.
Mr. Higgins. Yes, sir. In the absence of a mock-up of the
White House, has the Secret Service conducted scenario
training?
Mr. Alles. Only in a table-taught manner. We are looking at
how we might do that at the White House itself. It has
complications.
Mr. Higgins. But do you not have access to facilities where
your agents can use--can conduct tactical training with
simunition, et cetera?
Mr. Alles. We do. What I would point out is one of the
recommendations of the Protective Mission Panel was our
training levels. Those have improved for our ERT people, but
for our line agents and our UD officers it is not because of
the workload they are under.
Mr. Higgins. Excellent answer. Regarding cybersecurity,
Inspector General, I would like to direct this question to you,
sir. You have assessed that the Secret Service's efforts to
update and modernize its aging information technology
infrastructure. I recently traveled with this committee to
Eastern Europe to study Russian aggression, including cyber
attack.
Considering the nature of the age of the IT infrastructure
within the Secret Service, what challenges does this budget
pose regarding hardening those systems and protecting them from
cyber attack? This was specifically considering the fact that
the treasury departments of other nations have been targeted by
Russian cyber attack.
Mr. Roth. I think any time that you have an old IT system,
they are inherently vulnerable. One of the defenses for an IT
attack, a cyber attack, is to ensure that you have the most
modern equipment with the most up-to-date software. It is very
difficult in a budget environment that prevents you from having
the kinds of technological refreshes that would, in fact, keep
you up-to-date and keep you current on cyber defenses.
Mr. Higgins. So do you have processes in place that have
responded to the current heightened threat environment of cyber
attack? Is the Treasury sufficiently protected from cyber
attack?
Mr. Roth. Within DHS we do reviews. The Federal Information
Security Management Act requires annual reviews of every
components cyber posture, for lack of a better word. The
Department itself does monthly reviews and scorecards to
determine whether or not each component within the Department
has the right kinds of protections in place. It is an on-going
challenge, it is a continuing challenge. DHS historically has
been challenged in this area, and Secret Service has been
especially challenged in this area.
Mr. Higgins. Do you have dedicated staff that conduct cyber
protection exercises?
Mr. Roth. The Department does have a chief information
security officer, and each component within DHS has a chief
information security officer with staff whose job it is to
harden the computer networks and measure exactly where they are
on that spectrum.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you for that very thorough answer, sir.
Thank you both for being here today.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you Mr. Higgins.
Before we conclude, Mrs. Watson Coleman has one quick
question, and then I have a suggestion I want to proffer to
both of you.
So, Mrs. Watson.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank you for your generosity in this. It is actually a little
bit more than one question.
I just want to lay some things on the table that I hope--so
if you would like for us to----
Mr. Katko. No, it is no problem at all. We have got some
flexibility. Enjoy it.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. I like that, I like that.
First of all, Mr. Alles, I asked a question of you that I
really want you to respond to. I don't know if you will be able
to respond it to it now, but I am seriously interested in
understanding our responsibility to the adult members of the
Trump family that we are protecting while they are doing
business to enrich the Trump agencies and what that means.
I am also interested in following up specifically on the
impact of the Moore settlement. What does it mean? Where are
you all? What have you done? Sort of what your employment
situation looks like.
I want you to also know that I am interested in both of
your comments with regard to resources that are needed. For
instance, the old radios and things of that nature. Well, what
else are we talking about that I can't sort-of quantify in this
budget? What would it be and how much would it be?
Last--and I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, because we
really covered a lot. I want you to know that I want to work
with you all, because I believe that your agency is so vitally
important, and we need to support the good men and women who
are working there. I also look forward to our having our
meetings in a more confidential way.
The other thing is this, for the record, I don't think that
we should not be protecting each and every one of our
Presidents and their families as they are doing their
traveling. But I really do need to reiterate, for the record,
that in the entire Obama Presidency, we spent $97 million on
travel. On the first 80 days of the Trump Presidency, we have
spent $20 million taxpayer dollars. That must mean something in
terms of our responsibilities and the needs associated with
that.
With that, I yield back to my new Chairman, and I thank you
very much.
Mr. Higgins [presiding]. I thank the Ranking Member.
I recognize myself for a moment.
Gentlemen, regarding the budget as it is being discussed,
and we hope that we can discuss this in a bipartisan manner,
this committee recognizes the bipartisan nature of Homeland
Security and every possible endeavor we set politics aside and
try to work together.
So regarding the budget, could you give us a brief
statement regarding how you would prioritize additional budget
expenditures? Were we able to find the people's treasure to be
wisely invested, as our colleagues have suggested? Could you
give us some priorities?
Mr. Alles. So from a Secret Service standpoint, one already
mentioned is IT technology and infrastructure enhancements.
That is one top area for us. The training center out at Rowley
facility upgrades would help us significantly, along with the
White House mock-up. Then beyond that, our weapons upgrades and
our armored vehicle upgrades, really the future program, the
vehicles have to be refreshed obviously and replaced as they
wear. They are heavy vehicles and they do wear out.
So those really are our top five needs that we are looking
at right now. I would just underwrite probably my No. 1 need
continues to be, as mentioned by the IG, is the hiring and
continuing to ramp up the levels in the Secret Service.
Mr. Higgins. I am impressed that you had that list on the
top of your head. Can you provide that prioritized list to this
committee, sir?
Mr. Alles. We can, yes, sir.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you. I will relieve myself as Chair. It
has been a nice visit.
Mr. Katko [presiding]. Might I say, he has done a superb
job.
Do you have any quick questions?
OK. Before we conclude, I do want to make a suggestion, and
it is based on everything that has transpired today, but also
from Mr. Roth's prior report and everything else.
It is clear that some things need to be done and it is
clear that this budget doesn't reflect it. It is also clear
that I think that Director Alles may have some sort of
constraints with respect to what exactly he is going to request
because of his position. I understand that. But I want to
suggest that we do something a little different here, and that
is within a month, ask the staffs of the committee, as well as
folks from Secret Service, as well as from the inspector
general's office, to come up, instead of general
recommendations and general observations that are problems,
come up with specific requests of what you think we are going
to need. Then let us see what we can do. OK? Make it your wish
list, if you will.
But there is obviously some systemic things here. Do we
need to tweak retirement to reflect the fact we need to retain
these highly specialized people in a different field? Do we
need to do something about the pay? Obviously, we do. Do we
need to do something about the manpower? The major issues.
Instead of just giving a top line messaging, give us the nitty-
gritty of what it is from--that is different from the budget
that we really need to do.
I--that is the only way we are ever going to really get to
the bottom of this and try and really make some real changes.
So--and quantify it, right, so we can figure out exactly what
it is we can do to try and help you. Because this is a
critical--I view this as a critical juncture for Secret
Service. Director Alles is in kind-of a good situation because
you have the opportunity to have almost a clean slate, and this
is a new hearing. This is a new committee here as far as our
jurisdiction over Secret Service, so let us try and see what we
can come up with, but let's do it in a collaborative effort and
see what we can do.
So I ask all of you within 1 month of today to come up with
some suggestions as to possible fixes, be they legislatively or
otherwise. Most likely will be legislatively. We have never
been shy to do that, so let's take a look at that.
Does that sound all right, everybody?
Mr. Roth. Yes.
Mr. Alles. Yes, sir.
Mr. Katko. All right. I want to thank all the witnesses for
their testimony and the Members for their questions. The
Members of the committee may have some additional questions for
the witnesses, and we will ask you to respond to these in
writing.
Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the hearing record will
be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[all]