[Senate Hearing 115-166]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-166
CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JANUARY 10, 2017
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman JACK REED, Rhode Island
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma BILL NELSON, Florida
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska TIM KAINE, Virginia
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
TED CRUZ, Texas MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
BEN SASSE, Nebraska GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
LUTHER STRANGE, Alabama
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff
Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
January 10, 2017
Page
Civilian Control of the Armed Forces............................. 1
Hicks, Kathleen H., Senior Vice President; Henry A. Kissinger, 5
Chair; Director, International Security Program, Center for
Strategic and International Studies.
Cohen, Eliot A., Robert E. Osgood, Professor of Strategic 10
Studies, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International
Studies.
(iii)
CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES
----------
TUESDAY, JANUARY 10, 2017
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m. in Room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Perdue, Reed, Nelson,
Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King,
Heinrich, Warren, and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. The committee meets this morning to
receive testimony on civilian control of the Armed Forces.
I'd like to welcome our witnesses: Dr. Eliot Cohen, Robert
E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins
School of Advanced International Studies--that's very
impressive; Dr. Kathleen Hicks, also impressive, Senior Vice
President, Kissinger Chair and Director of the International
Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies. Welcome.
Civilian control of the Armed Forces has been a bedrock
principle of American government since our Revolution. A
painting hanging in the Capitol Rotunda celebrates the legacy
of George Washington, who voluntarily resigned his commission
as Commander of the Continental Army to the Congress. This
principle is enshrined in our Constitution, which divides
control of the Armed Forces among the President, as Commander
in Chief, and the Congress as coequal branches of government.
Since then, Congress has adopted various provisions separating
military and civilian positions.
In the 19th century, for example, Congress prohibited an
Army officer from accepting a civil office. More recently, in
the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent revisions,
Congress has prohibited any individual from serving as
Secretary of Defense within seven years of Active Duty service
as a commissioned officer in the Armed Forces. Of course, it
was only three years later, in 1950, that Congress granted
General George Marshall an exemption to that law and the Senate
confirmed him to be Secretary of Defense.
Indeed, the separation between civilian and military
positions has not always been so clear. Twelve of our Nation's
Presidents previously served as generals in the Armed Forces.
Over the years, numerous high-ranking civilian officials in the
Department of Defense have had long careers in military
service. Our current Deputy Secretary of Defense, for example,
served 27 years in the United States Marine Corps.
The basic responsibilities of civilian and military leaders
are simple enough: for civilian leaders, to seek the best
professional military advice while under no obligation to
follow it; for military leaders, to provide candid counsel
while recognizing civilians have the final say or, as James
Mattis once observed, to insist on being heard and never insist
on being obeyed.
But, the fact is that the relationship between civilian and
military leaders is inherently and endlessly complex. It is a
relationship of unequals who nonetheless share responsibility
for the defense of the Nation. The stakes could not be higher.
The gaps in mutual understandings are sometimes wide,
personalities often clash, and the unique features of the
profession of arms and the peculiarities of service cultures
often prove daunting for civilians who never served in uniform.
Ultimately, the key to healthy civil-military relations and
civilian control of the military is the oath soldiers and
statesmen share in common, to protect and defend the
Constitution. It is about the trust they have in one another to
perform their respective duties in accordance with our
republican system of government. It is about the candid
exchange of views engendered by that trust and which is vital
to effective decisionmaking. It is about mutual respect and
understanding.
The proper balance in civil-military relations is difficult
to achieve, and, as history has taught us, achieving that
balance requires different leaders at different times. The
President-elect has announced his intention to nominate James
Mattis to be our next Secretary of Defense. In light of his
recent military experience, his nomination will require
Congress to pass legislation providing a one-time exception
allowing him to serve as Secretary, legislation this committee
plans to consider this Thursday. The members of this committee
will have to reach their own conclusion, but, as for me, I will
fully support that legislation and Mr. Mattis's--and General
Mattis's nomination. There is no military officer I have met in
my lifetime with a deeper understanding of civil-military
relations than James Mattis. He even co-edited a book on the
subject. He has upheld the principle of civilian controlling
the Armed Forces in four decades of military service, as well
as in civilian life. His character, judgment, and commitment to
defending our Nation and its Constitution have earned him the
trust of our next Commander in Chief, Members of Congress on
both sides of the aisle, and so many serving in our Armed
Forces. In short, I believe James Mattis is an exceptional
public servant worthy of exceptional consideration.
The committee is fortunate to have with us two of the
foremost scholars on civil-military relations, both of whom
have a record of distinguished government service. I'm eager to
hear their views on this important subject. I'd like to add, it
was the Ranking Member, Senator Reed's request and legitimate
concern about this issue that we are having this hearing. I
want to thank my friend, the Ranking Member, for making sure
that this hearing is held.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this hearing, because I do think, as you have indicated
so well, how critical this issue is to the country.
Also let me welcome our distinguished witnesses, Dr. Eliot
Cohen and Dr. Kathleen Hicks. Thank you very much for your
scholarship and your service to the Nation.
Civilian control of the military is enshrined in our
Constitution and dates back to General George Washington and
the Revolutionary War. For almost 230 years, this principle has
distinguished our Nation from many other countries around the
world, and it has helped ensure that our democracy remains in
the hands of the people.
When the Department of Defense was created by the National
Security Act of 1947, the law included a stipulation that an
individual appointed to serve as the Secretary of this new
agency could not be within ten years of Active Duty as a
commissioned officer in a regular component of the Armed
Services. However, an exception to this statute was enacted
into law shortly thereafter, in 1950, to permit George Marshall
to serve as Secretary of Defense shortly after he concluded his
service as Secretary of State. It then stood untouched for
nearly six decades, until the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense
Authorization Act modified the requirement by reducing the
integral from ten years to seven years. But, the principle was
very clear, and still was sustained.
This requirement has served our Nation well for the past 70
years, and only once has Congress waived or modified this
statute. For only the second time since the creation of the
Department of Defense, Congress must make a determination if an
exception should be made to allow recently retired General
James Mattis to serve as the Secretary of Defense. As this
committee considers legislation to provide an exception to
General Mattis, I believe that it is extremely important that
we carefully consider the consequences of setting aside the law
and the implications such a decision may have on the future of
civilian and military relations. We must always be very
cautious about any actions that may inadvertently politicize
our Armed Forces.
During this past presidential election cycle, both
Democrats and Republicans came dangerously close to
compromising the nonpartisan nature of our military when the
nominating conventions featured speeches from recently retired
general officers advocating for a candidate for President. As
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin
Dempsey, stated shortly after the conventions, ``If senior
military leaders, active and retired, begin to self-identify as
members or supporters of one party or another, then the
inherent tension built into our system of government between
the executive branch and the legislative branch will bleed over
into suspicion of military leaders by Congress and a further
erosion of civilian-military relations.'' I hope our witnesses
today will speak to the issue and share any reflections they
may have.
Another issue we should consider is whether the total
number of retired senior military officers selected for high-
ranking positions in the Trump administration will impact the
dynamic of the interagency process and the advice that the
President receives. It is true that, throughout our history,
retired general officers have often held positions at the
highest levels of government as civilians. One notable example
is General Colin Powell, when he ably served as Secretary of
State under President George W. Bush.
What concerns me, however, is the number of retired senior
military officers chosen to lead agencies critical to our
national security and the cumulative effect it may have on our
overall national security policy. In addition to General
Mattis, General John Kelly has been nominated to lead the
Department of Homeland Security, while General Michael Flynn
will serve as the National Security Advisor, both of whom, like
General Mattis, have retired from Active Duty service in the
past few years.
While he is not a civilian and remains on Active Duty, if
we include the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Joseph Dunford, the leadership of our national security
apparatus would be comprised of two retired four-star generals,
one Active Duty four-star general, and one retired three-star
general.
Now, diversity of opinion is important when crafting policy
and making decisions as weighty as those facing the next
administration. I think it is appropriate for the committee to
consider the consequences that so many leaders with similar
military backgrounds will have for the development of defense
policy, the impact it could have on the civilian and military
personnel serving in these organizations, and how it may shape
the advice that will ultimately be provided to the President of
the United States.
Finally, if Congress provides an exception for General
Mattis, a question this committee must address is the precedent
this action sets for such waivers in the future. The
restriction was enacted into law for good reason. General
George Marshall is the only retired military officer to receive
this exception. I hope our witnesses will provide their
assessment of this issue and if they believe providing an
exception at this time opens the door to more waivers in the
future. I personally believe such waivers would destroy the
principle that is so critical to the central tenet of our
civil-military relations. Congress is in a position where they
are making a critical decision, and your advice would be deeply
appreciated on this point, particularly.
I want to make it clear that I--concerns I've expressed are
not a reflection on the personal attributes of General Mattis.
General Mattis will testify before this committee later this
week. I look forward to having a robust discussion on his
record as well as his views on defense strategy and policy.
Additionally, it is not my belief that previous military
service is a disqualifying factor for leading the Department of
Defense. Nothing could be further from the truth. Many former
members of the Armed Forces have served their country with
distinctions as civilians after leaving the military service.
One only has to look at many of my colleagues on this committee
to appreciate how their prior military service has positively
impacted their work in the Senate, and those who have served
know better than most the sacrifices required to defend our
Nation, including full-weighting consequences of making the
decision to send our men and women in uniform into harm's way.
What this hearing is about is the principle of civilian
control of the Armed Forces, the bedrock of civilian-military
relations and one of the defining tenets of our democracy. We
must protect against it being compromised or weakened. Any
changes or waivers must be cautiously and carefully considered.
Again, I want to thank the Chairman for holding this
hearing so that we can do just that. I look forward to the
testimony of the witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Welcome, Dr. Hicks.
STATEMENT KATHLEEN H. HICKS, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT; HENRY A.
KISSINGER CHAIR; DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM,
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Dr. Hicks. Thank you, Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed,
and distinguished members of the committee, for the invitation
to appear before you today. Thank you also for taking the time
to consider civilian control of the Armed Forces as it pertains
to the nomination of James N. Mattis, U.S. Marine Corps,
Retired, as Secretary of Defense.
The issue before you today regarding a possible exception
to the limitation against appointment of persons within seven
years of relief from Active Duty as a regular commissioned
officer is one that has caused significant discussion within
the national security community. We are blessed in the United
States with a strong civil-military relations history. Tensions
do exist, however, and we should never take for granted that
civilian control of the military, nor healthy civil-military
relations more generally, are a foregone conclusion for the
Republic.
Congress's passage of the limitation on previously
commissioned officers serving as Secretary of Defense within
ten years of the cessation of their service, subsequently
amended to seven years, has been one of the primary means
employed to maintain civilian control. The Defense Secretary
position is unique in our system. Other than the President
acting as Commander in Chief, the Secretary of Defense is the
only civilian official in the operational chain of command to
the Armed Forces. Unlike the President, however, he or she is
not an elected official. It is my view that the principle of
excluding recently retired commissioned officers from serving
as the Secretary of Defense is a prudent contribution to
maintaining the constitutionally grounded principle of civilian
control, both symbolically and in practice.
A permanent elimination or modification to this statute
would be detrimental to the health of our civil-military
relations and our national security. So, too, would be
substantially populating the upper ranks of our national
security structures with recently retired senior military
personnel or Active Duty personnel well beyond those positions
already designated in statute. I come to this conclusion based
on a number of factors.
First, a regular reliance on former commissioned officers
to serve as the Secretary of Defense or to widely populate the
national security establishment's senior cadre would undermine
the international security advantages that accrue to the United
States from modeling strong civilian control. Others watch our
behavior closely. They note that our leadership typically
communicates through civilian channels, that our policymakers
appear in civilian attire, and that our military demonstrates
respect and deference to civilian leaders. It is also important
to our citizens and those around the world that they witness a
model in which senior civilians manifest appropriate approaches
to civil-military relations demonstrated in their respect for
the professionalism, sacrifice, and expertise of military
personnel and in their knowledge of issues important to the
profession of arms. These outward actions by our military and
civilian officials support U.S. efforts to promote the embrace
of freedom and democracy in the world, which reduces the
instability, external aggression, and internal repression
typically associated with military governments.
Second, were recently retired or Active Duty military
officers routinely selected for Secretary of Defense or to
widely populate senior civilian positions in government, it
would risk furthering incentives for Active Duty officers to
politicize their speech and/or actions and for civilians to
seek to ascertain the political viewpoints of officers as part
of the recruitment and hiring process for political positions.
This leads to a third concern, a coterie of individuals
with like background typically accompanies a senior appointee
into government. Academics know lots of academics. Economists
know many economists. Former military personnel have extensive
military networks. This is natural. But, what is unique in the
national security world is the imperative for healthy civil-
military relations. This requires guarding against an over-
reliance on military viewpoints, just as it relies on ensuring
those coming from civilian backgrounds act as respectful and
knowledgeable counterparts.
Fourth, the United States has an interest in developing
knowledge and expertise about the Armed Forces among those who
have not served, especially in those who have not served at
very senior levels. Motivating civilians to invest in careers
in the defense sector requires having positions of meaning to
which they can aspire. More generally, it requires validation
that such career pathways are legitimate, that civilians can
bring value, expertise, and perspectives to the defense
enterprise.
Fifth, a recently retired senior officer at the helm of DOD
risks prejudice with regard to service interests. Resources are
always more constrained than one would like, so competition for
dollars and mission space among the military departments is a
constant reality. A Secretary of Defense who is closely
associated with a particular service may find it difficult to
be perceived as unbiased on important questions regarding
service roles, combatant-command missions, and resource shares.
These reasons undergird the Congress's general prudence
with regard to the limitation on commissioned officers recently
relieved from Active Duty from assuming the position of
Secretary of Defense and for this committee to remain vigilant
to the possible negative effects of a broad representation of
former senior officers in the national security cadre. I do not
foresee imminent militarization of our national security
architecture, but the concerns about civilian control that
motivated our founders and the architects, the post-World War
II security architecture, have continued validity. We should
not risk a failure of imagination.
Despite all of these considerations, however, it is my
personal conclusion that it is appropriate to create a specific
exception to the statute for the Senate to consider the
confirmation of General James N. Mattis. I reach the assessment
based on two primary factors: the qualities of the specific
nominee together with the safeguards in place to protect
civilian control of the military in the presence of such an
exception. Based on my professional interactions with General
Mattis and a review of available material, I believe his recent
retirement from military service should not be disqualifying to
his consideration by this committee. I am persuaded not only by
his grasp of the most important security issues our Nation
faces, but also by his clear commitment to, and embodiment of,
the principles of civilian control of the military. That
commitment was evident in every interaction I had with General
Mattis when I served as a senior--a civilian defense official,
an experience shared by all such officials with whom I have
spoken. His recently published work on civil-military relations
reinforces my personal impressions.
The second reason I believe it is acceptable to make an
exception to consider the President-elect's preferred nominee
is that I assess that the state of U.S. civil-military
relations to be strong enough to withstand any risks such a
once-in-two-generations exception on its own could pose. The
United States Congress, the Nation's statutes and courts, the
professionalism of our Armed Forces, and the will of the people
are all critical safeguards against any perceived attempts to
fundamentally alter the quality of civilian control of the
military in this country. Should an exception be made in this
case and General Mattis be confirmed as Secretary of Defense,
oversight by this and other committees will be critical in
reassuring domestic and foreign audiences that civilian control
of the military is alive and well in the United States of
America.
As I stated earlier, I believe General Mattis's own
behavior will reinforce that message. If it does not, this
Congress and the courts of the United States should hold him
accountable.
I would like to close with an important caveat to my
endorsement for this exemption. I have grave concerns about the
issuance of any exemption to section 103(a) of title 10 being
portrayed or perceived as the result of the United States
Senate agreeing with the President-elect that it is, quote,
``time for a general,'' unquote, to serve as Secretary of
Defense. It should never be considered ``time for a general''
to fill the senior-most non-elected civilian position in the
operational chain of command. Rather, this exemption is about a
particular individual who is well qualified for the position to
which the President-elect has nominated him, the anticipation
that the exemption will be a rare generational one, and an
assessment that there is at this time a healthy appreciation of
the principle for civilian control of the military in this
country.
Although I would likely not agree with a Secretary Mattis
on every major defense issue of the day, I am convinced that he
passes the standard set forth during consideration of George
Marshall's exemption for this position, whom the Washington
Post referred to as ``a truly authentic American in his respect
for, and devotion to, our American system of government.''
I have submitted a fuller written statement for the record.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hicks follows:]
Prepared Statement by Kathleen H. Hicks
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of
the Committee, thank you for the invitation to appear before you today.
I am grateful that you are taking the time to consider civilian control
of the Armed Forces as it pertains to the nomination of General James
N. Mattis, USMC (ret.) as Secretary of Defense. The issue before you
today regarding a possible exception to the limitation against
appointment of persons within seven years of relief from active duty as
a regular commissioned officer is one that has caused significant
reflection, discussion, and debate within the national security
community. In the United States, we are blessed with a history of
strong civil-military relations. Tensions do exist, however, and we
should never take for granted that civilian control of the military,
nor healthy civil-military relations more generally, are a foregone
conclusion in our Republic.
The principle of civilian control of the military is at the core of
the American civil-military dynamic. It is firmly grounded in our
Constitution and cemented in hundreds of years of supporting statute,
regulation, military education, training, and culture, and senior
civilian practice. At the outset of the Republic, when concern was high
over the threat that a standing military could pose, maintaining fairly
limited federal forces helped ameliorate (though did not eliminate)
those concerns. Two world wars and the emerging Cold War environment
convinced Americans in the twentieth century that a more substantial
standing Armed Forces was appropriate to secure U.S. interests. Yet
many were wary that such a standing force could tempt militarization
and the resulting despotism experienced in Germany and Japan. These
competing imperatives created what Samuel Huntington called a ``new
conservatism'' that attempted to balance civilian control with improved
military readiness.
Congress's passage of the limitation on previously commissioned
officers serving as Secretary of Defense within ten years of the
cessation of their service (subsequently amended to seven years) has
been one of the means employed to maintain civilian control despite the
presence of a sizable standing force. Three years after enacting this
measure, Congress created an exception to allow for the service of
George C. Marshall as Secretary of Defense. No other such exception has
been sought or granted until now.
The Defense Secretary position is unique in our system. Other than
the President acting as commander in chief, the Secretary of Defense is
the only civilian official in the operational chain of command to the
Armed Forces. Unlike the President, however, he or she is not an
elected official.
It is my view that there is a sound and enduring rationale for the
principle of excluding recently retired commissioned officers from
serving as the Secretary of Defense. It is not a limitation on these
individuals' service in civilian positions in government, in national
security, or even in the Department of Defense more generally. Indeed,
veteran's preferences rightly help promote the federal service of
former members of the Armed Forces. Rather, it is a narrowly targeted
restriction for the one nonelected civilian position in the operational
chain of command. As such, it is a prudent contribution to maintaining
the constitutionally-grounded principle of civilian control, both
symbolically and in practice, in the presence of a sizable and highly
capable 21st century military.
A permanent elimination or modification to this statute would be
detrimental to the health of our civil-military relations and our
national security. So, too, would be substantially populating the upper
ranks of our national security structures with recently retired senior
military personnel, or active duty personnel well beyond those
positions already designated in statute. I come to this conclusion
based on a number of factors.
First, a regular reliance on former commissioned officers to serve
as the Secretary of Defense, or to widely populate the national
security establishment's senior cadre, would undermine the
international security advantages that accrue to modeling strong
civilian control of the military. What we do in this area matters in
the world. Others watch our behavior closely. They note that our
leadership typically communicates through civilian channels, that our
policy makers appear in civilian attire, and that our military
demonstrates respect and deference to civilian leaders. However, the
burden of our model does not fall solely on the military. It is also
important our citizens and those around the world witness a model in
which senior civilians manifest appropriate approaches to civil-
military relations, demonstrated in their respect for the
professionalism, sacrifice, and expertise of military personnel and in
their knowledge of issues important to the profession of arms. These
outward actions by our military and civilian officials support U.S.
efforts to promote the embrace of freedom and democracy in the world,
which reduces the instability, external aggression, and internal
repression typically associated with military governments.
Second, were recently retired or active duty military officers
routinely selected for Secretary of Defense, or to widely populate
senior civilian positions in government, it would risk furthering
incentives for active duty officers to politicize their speech and/or
actions and for civilians to seek to ascertain the political viewpoints
of officers as part of the recruitment and hiring process for political
positions. The civil-military dynamic at the highest levels of
government is already challenging, where the professional military
ethos to provide ``best military advice'' must be exercised in the
inherently politicized and civilianized universe of foreign and
security policy decision-making. The lines between civilian and
military roles can be blurry in the policy world; furthering such
tensions is unhelpful for threading the needle that our civil-military
compact requires.
This leads to a third concern. A coterie of individuals with like-
background typically accompanies a senior appointee into government.
Academics know a lot of academics, economists know many economists, and
former military personnel have an extensive military network. This is
natural, and all officials must take pains to ensure they develop well-
rounded teams. What is unique to the national security world, however,
is the imperative for healthy civil-military relations. This requires
guarding against an over-reliance on military viewpoints, just as it
relies on ensuring those coming from civilian backgrounds act as
respectful and knowledgeable counterparts, with expertise and
responsibilities typically distinct from those of their military
colleagues and subordinates.
Fourth, the United States has an interest in developing knowledge
and expertise about the Armed Forces among those who have not served,
especially in those who have not served at the senior-most levels.
Motivating civilians to invest in careers in the defense sector
requires having positions of meaning to which they can aspire. More
generally, it requires validation that such career pathways are
legitimate--that civilians can bring valued perspectives to the defense
enterprise.
Fifth, a recently retired senior officer at the helm of DoD risks
some prejudice with regard to service interests. Most of our
secretaries of defense have had prior service backgrounds, and some
amount of predisposition or at least disproportionate familiarity with
one service over the others is not unusual. Nevertheless, a very
senior, recently retired officer is far more likely to have had an
important role in shaping that service's policies and budgets.
Resources are always more constrained than one would like, so
competition for dollars and mission-space among the Military
Departments is a constant reality. A Secretary of Defense who is
closely associated with a particular service may find it difficult to
be perceived as unbiased on important questions regarding service
roles, combatant command missions, and resource shares.
Overcompensation on such issues is also a possibility against which to
guard.
These reasons undergird the Congress's general prudence with regard
to the limitation on commissioned officers recently relieved from
active duty from assuming the position of Secretary of Defense, and for
this Committee to remain vigilant to the possible negative effects of a
broad representation of former senior officers in the national security
cadre. I do not foresee imminent militarization of our national
security architecture, but the concerns about civilian control that
motivated our Founders and the architects of the post-World War Two
security architecture, have continued validity. We should not risk a
failure of imagination.
Despite all of these considerations, concerns, and cautions,
however, it is my personal conclusion that it is appropriate to create
a specific exception to the statute for the Senate to consider the
confirmation of General James N. Mattis, USMC (ret.). I reach this
assessment based on two primary factors: the qualities of the specific
nominee and the safeguards in place to protect civilian control of the
military in the presence of such an exception.
Based on my professional interactions with General Mattis and a
review of available material, I believe General Mattis's recent
retirement from military service should not be disqualifying to his
consideration by this Committee and the United States Senate to be
confirmed as the nation's next Secretary of Defense. I am persuaded not
only by his expert grasp of the most important security issues our
nation faces but also by his clear commitment to and embodiment of the
principles of civilian control of the military. That commitment was
evident in every interaction I had with General Mattis when I served as
a senior civilian defense official, an experience shared by all such
officials with whom I have spoken. His recently published work on
civil-military relations reinforces my personal impressions. As he and
co-author Kori Shake rightly stated in their 2016 work on this topic:
``The president is elected to determine the amount of effort to
direct toward a war and has the right to disregard the
military's counsel. Military leaders lack the public mandate to
make necessary trade-offs between, for example, security and
civil liberties.''
And
``Our military . . . understands better than do civilians that
its high stature with the American public depends on respecting
the prohibition on activism beyond the military sphere.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Kori Schake and Jim Mattis, ``Ensuring a Civil-Military
Connection,'' in Kori Schake and Jim Mattis, eds., Warriors and
Citizens: American Views of our Military (Stanford: Hoover Institution
Press, Stanford, CA, 2016), 299.
The second reason I believe it is acceptable to make an exception
to the limitation on recently separated officers in order to consider
the President-elect's preferred nominee is that I assess the state of
U.S. civil-military relations to be strong enough to withstand any risk
such a once-in-two-generations exception, on its own, could pose. The
United States Congress, the nation's statutes and courts, the
professionalism of our Armed Forces, and the will of the people are
critical safeguards against any perceived attempts to fundamentally
alter the quality of civilian control of the military in this country.
Should an exemption be made in this case, and General Mattis be
confirmed as Secretary of Defense, oversight by this and other
committees will play a critical role in reassuring domestic and foreign
audiences that civilian control of the military is alive and well in
the United States of America. As I stated earlier, I believe General
Mattis's own behavior will reinforce that message. It if does not, this
Congress and the courts of the United States should hold him
accountable.
I would like to close with an important caveat to my endorsement
for this exemption. I have grave concerns about the issuance of any
exemption to section 103(a) of title 10 being portrayed or perceived as
the result of the United States Senate agreeing with the President-
elect that it is ``time for a general'' to serve as Secretary of
Defense. \2\ It should never be considered ``time for a general'' to
fill the senior-most nonelected civilian position in the operational
chain of command. Rather, this exemption is about a particular
individual who is well qualified for the position to which the
President-elect has nominated him, the anticipation that the exemption
will be a rare, generational one, and that it comes at a time of
healthy appreciation of the principle for civilian control of the
military. Although I would likely not agree with a Secretary Mattis on
every major defense issue of the day, I am convinced that he passes the
standard set forth during consideration of George Marshall's exemption
for this position, whom the Washington Post referred to as ``a truly
authentic American in his respect for and devotion to our American
system of government.'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Donald J. Trump, transcript of interview with the New York
Times, November 23, 2016. Accessed at: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/
23/us/politics/trump-new-york-times-interview-transcript.html?smid=tw-
nytimes&smtyp=cur&--r=0.
\3\ ``Marshall as Secretary,'' Washington Post, 14 September 1950,
10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on this important
issue, and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman McCain. Thank you, Doctor.
Dr. Cohen.
STATEMENT OF ELIOT A. COHEN, ROBERT E. OSGOOD PROFESSOR OF
STRATEGIC STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Dr. Cohen. Thank you, Senator McCain. It's an honor to
appear before you. I have a--I also have a written statement,
which I'd like to submit for the record----
Chairman McCain. Without----
Dr. Cohen.--if I might.
Chairman McCain. Without objection.
Dr. Cohen. I have to say, listening to my friend and
colleague, Dr. Hicks, it is very striking to me that the two of
us are, I think, pretty much in complete agreement. I'll be
making a somewhat different set of arguments, but I find myself
very much convinced by hers, and I share her views.
My bottom line on the issue of the day is simple. I
strongly support the law that prohibits individuals that have--
who have served in the military from becoming Secretary of
Defense within seven years of leaving the service. At the same
time, I favor an amendment to permit General Mattis to serve in
that office despite having met that cooling-off period.
To explain these positions, let me begin with some basic
propositions about our country's experience with civil-military
relations. The principle of civilian control of the military--
not collaboration with it, not mere direction of it, but
civilian control--is central to the American experience since
colonial times. The bill of particulars directed at King George
III in the Declaration of Independence reads, among other
things, that he has effected to render the military independent
of, and superior to, the civil power. For a century before the
Constitution, and certainly throughout the history of the
Republic, firm civilian control has been a matter of American
consensus challenged only on such rare occasions as the Truman-
MacArthur controversy in 1951 and then resolved unambiguously
in favor of civilian authority.
Some degree of civil-military tension has always existed in
our country, and that is usually a good thing, a source of
productive divergence of views about everything from strategy
to internal administration. At times, the difference of views
have been acrimonious, as, for example, during the famous
standoffs between Abraham Lincoln and George McClellan during
the Civil War, or in the late 1940s over the desegregation of
the Armed Forces, or the dispute over ending the draft in the
early 1970s. In these cases, the civilian political view
properly and beneficially prevailed.
The practice embodied in the law of having a civilian
Secretary of Defense stems from both that history and, I think,
from four sets of concerns:
The first is that it reflects the notion that control over
the largest bureaucracy in our government, with the largest
budget, and with enormous power in many dimensions, including,
potentially, over the lives of our own citizens, must rest with
someone who represents the American citizenry, not a military
elite, which, in the nature of things, is appropriately self-
selected along military lines until the very top ranks.
Second, it stems from the belief that there is a breadth of
view and perspective essential to running the military and
making war that is not likely to be found in someone who has
spent 30 or 40 years in uniform. The Armed Forces are what one
sociologist has called ``a total institution,'' comparable in
some ways to the priesthood in the Catholic Church. A career of
military service affects every feature of one's life, down to
how one wears one's hair. Living in such an institution and
removed from civil society throughout the prime of one's life
can be a narrowing as well as a broadening experience, and it
certainly leaves an indelible mark. It is one reason why, in a
certain sense, generals never retire.
Third, having a recently retired general officer as
Secretary of Defense poses all kinds of practical problems.
Would they be inclined to favor the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
military, over the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
civilian? Would they be inclined to favor their own service
over the others? Would they bypass the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff as the senior military advisor to the
President? Would they allow the normal rivalries or close
friendships of their military career to affect their position
of civilian head of the Department? Even the appearance of such
biases, let alone the reality, would make effective leadership
of the Department of Defense difficult or indeed impossible.
Fourth, the Secretary of Defense is in many ways the chief
interlocutor or bridge, if you will, between our Armed Forces
and our society, the President being too busy and burdened with
many other responsibilities. It is the Secretary of Defense who
represents the concerns, values, and interests of the Armed
Forces to politicians and to society. In turn, he or she
guarantees that democratic values, attitudes, and needs will
inform and shape the American military.
Furthermore, countries that have routinely installed
generals as Ministers of War or Defense have often had deeply
problematic patterns of civil-military relations and suffered
military failure, as well. France and Germany in the late 19th
and early 20th centuries, Japan during the 1930s and World War
II are two--are examples of this. Such is the practice in
recent years in Russia, as it was in the Soviet Union. Even
democracies that have gone down this route have suffered from
the politicization of the senior officer corps by the routine
appointment of retired military figures to this top civilian
position. A prime case is Israel, whose politics are often
roiled by maneuvering among Active Duty and retired generals, a
point that has been noticed by American generals familiar with
that country and well documented by Israeli scholars.
The long question, therefore, makes eminent sense. But it
was amended in September 1950 to allow for the appointment of
General George C. Marshall as Secretary of Defense, for two
reasons. The first had to do with the sense of national
emergency. The Korean War had gone on for three bitter months.
The Inchon landings were about to begin, and with them a bloody
campaign to reunify the peninsula in the face of warnings of
Chinese intervention. At the same time, the United States was
sending four divisions to reinforce the two already in Europe,
our first peacetime commitment of substantial Armed Forces
abroad. War with the Soviet Union, which had, only a year
before, detonated a nuclear weapon, seemed a real possibility.
In that setting, and having lost confidence in Secretary of
Defense Louis Johnson, President Truman correctly believed that
he needed an exceptional leader for the relatively new
Department of Defense. Truman had tremendous trust in Marshall
because of the General's character and judgment, as well as the
exceptional breadth of experience of a man who had after all
been an important Secretary of State as well as one of the
architects of the greatest coalition in military history.
Second--and this clearly influenced Congress as well as
President Truman--was the desire to reassure the American
people in extremely difficult times. American political leaders
correctly believed that Marshall, a revered figure because of
his monumental role as Chief of Staff during World War II,
could do that. Congress, therefore, amended the law
reluctantly, insisting that, by so doing, it was not creating a
precedent, and advising that this not be repeated in the
future.
I believe, however, that our current circumstances warrant
taking this step a second time. I have known General Mattis for
well over a decade. He is probably the most widely read and
reflective officer I know. He is a writing general, too, as Dr.
Hicks has pointed out, the coeditor of a recent important book
on civil-military relations. More important than any of that,
he has shown himself to be a man of exceptional character and
judgment and exemplary commitment to legal and constitutional
norms. I would trust him to conceive and execute policy as
anyone on this committee would wish. He's not General Marshall,
but he is, indeed, a man of similar integrity and soundness,
and of very wide experience.
Much as I admire and respect him, however, I would not
advocate this change were it not for two other aspects of the
question. We face a world that may not be quite as dangerous as
that of 1950, but has some deeply troubling similarities to it.
We are waging our third war in Iraq in a generation. We are not
close to ending the Afghan war. We face a contest with jihadi
elements seeking to inflict violence and destroy regimes across
broad swaths of the globe. We must deal with a rising China
with hegemonic aspirations in Asia, a revanchist Russia that
has committed blatant aggression against its neighbors and even
interfered in our own elections, an Iran that has paused but
not halted its drive for nuclear weapons and regional
ascendancy. We will soon be looking at a North Korea that has
built intercontinental ballistic missiles that can hit the
United States with nuclear weapons. Ours is a very dangerous
world that can tip into crisis with very little notice.
Yet, even this sense of danger would not bring me to the
point of urging a revision of the law were it not for my
concerns about the incoming administration. I have sharply
criticized President Obama's policies, but my concerns pale in
comparison with the sense of alarm I feel about the judgment
and dispositions of the incoming White House team. In such a
setting, there is no question in my mind that a Secretary
Mattis would be a stabilizing and moderating force, preventing
wildly stupid, dangerous, or illegal things from happening,
and, over time, helping to steer American foreign and security
policy in a sound and sensible direction.
Under these conditions, then, I urge you to amend the law
to permit the appointment of General Mattis, but, at the same
time, I urge you equally strongly to keep the law on the books,
even restoring, if it seems proper to you, the ten year
cooling-off period. The principle of civilian control of the
military is precious and essential to our form of government.
Making an exception twice in nearly 70 years while keeping the
fundamental legislation intact and reaffirming the arguments
behind it will not, in my judgment, threaten that principle,
but, rather, reinforce it.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Cohen follows:]
Prepared Statement by Eliot A. Cohen
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Committee on this
important topic. What follows reflects my views as both a scholar of
civil-military relations, and my experience as a senior government
official who routinely dealt with general and flag officers, and issues
of war and peace. \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime
(New York: Free Press, 2002) and more recently, The Big Stick: The
Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force (New York:
Basic Books, 2017). From 2007-2008 I served as Counselor of the
Department of State with particular responsibility for strategic
issues, including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
My bottom line on the issue of the day is simple. I strongly
support the law that prohibits individuals who have served in the
military from becoming Secretary of Defense within seven years of
leaving the service. At the same time, I favor an amendment to permit
General James Mattis, USMC (ret.) to serve in that office despite
failing to meet the seven year cooling off period.
To explain these positions, let me begin with some basic
propositions about our country's experience with civil-military
relations.
The principle of civilian control of the military--not
collaboration with it, as some have put it, or mere direction of it--is
central to the American experience since colonial times. The bill of
particulars directed at King George III in the Declaration of
Independence reads, among other things, that ``He has affected to
render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power.''
For a century before the Constitution, and certainly throughout the
history of the Republic, firm civilian control has been a matter of
American consensus, challenged only on rare occasions such as the
Truman-MacArthur controversy in 1951, and then resolved unambiguously
in favor of civilian authority.
Some degree of civil-military tension has always existed in our
country, and that has usually been a good thing--a source of productive
divergence of views about everything from strategy to internal
administration. At times the differences of view have been acrimonious
as, for example, during the famous standoff between Abraham Lincoln and
General George McClellan during the Civil War, or in the late 1940's
turmoil over desegregation of the Armed Forces, or the dispute over
ending the draft in the early 1970's. In these cases, the civilian
political view properly and beneficially prevailed.
The firm practice, embodied in section 113 (a) of title 10 of the
U.S. Code, of having a civilian Secretary of Defense stemmed from this
history and these values. It embodies four sets of concerns:
First, it reflects the notion that control over the largest
bureaucracy in our government, with the largest budget and with
enormous power in many dimensions including potentially over the lives
of our own citizens, must rest with someone who represents the American
citizenry--not a military elite, which in the nature of things is
appropriately self-selected, along military lines until the very top
ranks.
Second, it stems from the belief that there is a breadth of view
and perspective essential to running the military and making war that
is not likely to be found in someone who has spent thirty or forty
years in uniform. The Armed Forces are what one sociologist has called
``a total institution,'' comparable to priesthood in the Catholic
Church. A career of military service affects every feature of one's
life, down to how one wears one's hair. Living in such an institution
at a remove from civil society throughout the prime of one's life can
be a narrowing as well as a broadening experience, and it leaves an
indelible mark. It is one reason why, in a certain sense, generals
never truly retire.
Third, having a recently retired general officer as Secretary of
Defense poses all kinds of practical problems: would they be inclined
to favor the Joint Chiefs of Staff (military) over the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (civilian)? Would they be inclined to favor their
own service over the others? Would they bypass the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff as the senior military adviser to the President?
Would they allow the normal rivalries or close friendships of their
military career to affect their position of civilian head of the
department? Even the appearance of such biases, let alone their
reality, would make effective leadership of the Department of Defense
difficult or impossible.
Fourth, the Secretary of Defense is in many ways the chief
interlocutor between the military and society, the President being too
busy and burdened with many other responsibilities. It is he or she who
represents the concerns, values and interests of the Armed Forces to
politicians and to society. In turn, he or she guarantees that
democratic values, attitudes and needs will inform and shape the
American military.
Furthermore, countries that have routinely installed generals as
Ministers of War or Defense have often had problematic patterns of
civil-military relations, and suffered military failures as well.
France and Germany in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
and Japan during the 1930's and World War II are examples of this. Such
is the practice in recent years in Russia, as it was in the Soviet
Union. Even democracies who have gone down this route have suffered
from the politicization of the senior officer corps by the routine
appointment of retired military figures to this top civilian position.
A prime case is Israel, whose politics are often roiled by maneuvering
among active duty and retired generals--a point often noticed by
American generals familiar with that country and well documented by
Israeli scholars. \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See the work of one of Israel's most thoughtful scholars of
civil-military relations, Yoram Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room: How
the Military Shapes Israeli Policy (Washington, DC: United States
Institute of Peace, 2006). By far the most successful of Israel's
defense ministers--David Ben Gurion, founding father of the Israel
Defense Forces--had minimal military experience.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The law in question, therefore, makes eminent sense. But it was
amended in September 1950 to allow for the appointment of General
George C. Marshall as Secretary of Defense for two reasons.
The first had to do with the sense of national emergency. The
Korean war had gone on for three bitter months; the Inchon landings
were about to begin and with them a bloody campaign to reunify the
peninsula in the face of warnings of Chinese intervention. At the same
time, the United States was sending four additional divisions to
reinforce the two already in Europe--our first peacetime commitment of
substantial Armed Forces abroad. War with the Soviet Union, which had
only a year before stunned the world by testing a nuclear weapon,
seemed a real possibility. In this setting, and having lost confidence
in Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, President Truman correctly
believed that he needed an exceptional leader for the relatively new
Department of Defense. Truman had tremendous trust in Marshall because
of the general's character and judgment, as well as the exceptional
breadth of experience of a man who had, after all, been an important
Secretary of State as well as one of the architects of the greatest
coalition in military history.
Second, and this clearly influenced Congress as well as President
Truman, was the desire to reassure the American people in extremely
difficult times. American political leaders correctly believed that
General Marshall, a revered figure because of his monumental role as
Chief of Staff of the Army during World War II could do that.
Congress therefore amended the law reluctantly, insisting that by
so doing it was not creating a precedent, and advising that this not be
repeated in the future. I believe, however, that our current
circumstances warrant taking this extraordinary step a second time.
I have known General Mattis for over a decade. He is probably the
most widely read and reflective officer I know. He is a writing general
too, the co-editor of an important recent book on civil-military
relations. More importantly, he has proven himself to be a man of
exceptional character and judgment, and exemplary commitment to legal
and Constitutional norms. I would trust him to conceive and execute
policy as any of us would wish. He is not General Marshall--but he is
indeed a man of similar integrity and soundness, and of very wide
experience.
Much as I admire and respect him, however, I would not advocate
this change were it not for two other aspects of the question. We face
a world that may not be quite as dangerous as that of 1950, but has
deeply troubling similarities to it. We are waging our third war in
Iraq in a generation. We are not close to ending the Afghan war. We
face a contest with jihadi elements seeking to inflict violence and
destroy regimes across broad swathes of the globe. We must deal with a
rising China with hegemonic aspirations in Asia; a revanchist Russia
that has committed blatant aggression against its neighbors and even
interfered in our elections; an Iran that has paused but not halted its
drive for nuclear weapons and regional ascendancy. We will soon be
looking at a North Korea that has built intercontinental ballistic
missiles that can hit the United States with nuclear weapons. Ours is a
dangerous world that could tip into crisis with very little notice.
Even this sense of danger, however, would not bring me to the point
of urging a revision of the law were it not for my views of the
incoming administration. I have sharply criticized President Obama's
policies, but my concerns pale in comparison with the sense of alarm I
feel about the judgment and dispositions of the incoming White House
team. In such a setting, there is no question in my mind that a
Secretary Mattis would be a stabilizing and moderating force,
preventing wildly stupid, dangerous, or illegal things from happening,
and over time, helping to steer American foreign and security policy in
a sound and sensible direction.
Under these conditions, then, I urge you to amend the law to permit
the appointment of General Mattis--but at the same time I urge you
equally strongly to keep the law on the books, even restoring, if it
seems proper to you, the ten year cooling off period. The principle of
civilian control of the military is precious, and essential to our form
of government. Making an exception twice in nearly seventy years, while
keeping the fundamental legislation intact and reaffirming the
arguments behind it, will not, in my judgment, threaten that principle
but rather reinforce it.
Chairman McCain. Well, thank you both.
Both of you have known General Mattis for some period of
time. Has he always--or, have you ever known him not to have
the utmost commitment to the civilian control--our fundamental
principle of civilian control of the military?
Dr. Cohen. I have always known him to have exactly that
commitment.
Chairman McCain. Dr. Hicks?
Dr. Hicks. Agree.
Chairman McCain. I guess just one other comment or
question. What you bring to mind, Dr. Cohen, is that, at least
in the minds of some of us, the world is in greater danger than
it's been since the days of then-General, slash, Secretary
Marshall. There's very few people in--both in and out of the
military that have the experience with these challenges that
General Mattis does at this time. Would you agree?
Dr. Cohen. Yes, sir, I would agree, although I would just
add that, as has long been pointed out, the Secretary of
Defense is, other than the presidency, probably the most
difficult job in the Federal Government. I would trust General
Mattis as much as, or more than, just about anybody else. But,
I do think the range of challenges he's--he will face, if he is
confirmed, will be enormous.
Chairman McCain. So, there is some historic parallel
between the selection and need for General Marshall as there is
today a need for the experience and knowledge and leadership of
General Mattis. Is that--is it--do you agree with that
assessment, Dr. Hicks?
Dr. Hicks. I--with the emphasis on the individual
characteristics of General Mattis, I agree with that. I would
hesitate to ever say, as I said, that there's any indication
that dangerous times require a general. I don't think that's
the issue. I think dangerous times require experience and
commitment, which I think--as your question suggests--which I
think General Mattis can bring.
Dr. Cohen. If I may, Senator, just to add to that. I don't
think one can consider this case--rather somewhat unlike the
case of 1950--without regard to the President. I mean, the
President has to have somebody that they will listen to. I
guess I do tend to believe that President-elect Trump will be
inclined to listen to General Mattis. That, for me, is a very,
very important consideration.
Chairman McCain. One can only hope.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank the witnesses for very thoughtful and eloquent
testimony about a very significant issue.
Again, let me thank the Chairman for structuring this
process so that we could have careful deliberation of the
policy before we actually consider the legislation. Thank you
very much, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Hicks, you pointed out that this is a rare generational
moment. I think, Dr. Cohen, you would agree also. That leads to
a sort of very pragmatic question, if I may, that if, indeed,
General Mattis is confirmed, but if he leaves office, that we
would almost have to reflexively object to a replacement of
another recently retired military officer. Would that be your
view, Dr. Hicks?
Dr. Hicks. It would be. In fact, I think less a risk that
this sets a new precedent, I think it's an opportunity cost.
That is to say that I would not imagine, in the next 20-plus
years, that we would see ourselves back in a hearing of this
nature over another recently retired general officer.
Senator Reed. Dr. Cohen, your thoughts?
Dr. Cohen. I very much agree with Dr. Hicks.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Dr. Cohen, you pointed out in your testimonies one of the
areas of concern that I raised, which is a dynamic that results
when a non-civilian is the head of the Department of Defense,
which is--the principal military advisor to the President is
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Yet, you have two
very competent--ironically, Marine four-stars, probably with at
least tangential service, if not joint service. In--how do we
avoid--or how would the--if General Mattis is confirmed, how
does he consciously avoid that? How do we monitor--in fact, you
both made the point, we have a role of making sure that this,
if it takes place, is done aboveboard entirely, completely.
Could you comment?
Dr. Cohen. Well, the first thing I would say is,
absolutely, the role of congressional oversight, and
particularly by this committee, I think--never be important
than it's going to be in coming years. I first met General
Dunford, actually, when he was General Mattis's Chief of Staff
in Iraq, when General Mattis was commanding 1st Marine
Division. I've--I know both of them reasonably well. I guess my
feeling about that is, these are both men with a--an
exceptional sense of professional ethics and rectitude. This
will basically come down to relationships between two
personalities. I think they will both be very conscious about
what the lanes are that they operate in. But, there's no
question, it will be challenging.
I guess the other point one will have to make is, it'll be
interesting to see how long General Dunford is going to stay as
the Chairman and who's the next Chairman. Presumably, it'll
become a little bit easier. But, this will undoubtedly be an
issue, and it would be the most natural thing in the world for
a President Trump to ask General Mattis to act as kind of a
military advisor. I think General Mattis will be--as Secretary
Mattis--will be self-conscious enough to say, ``You know, you
really should be directing that question--I have my views, but
you should be directing that question to the Chairman.''
Senator Reed. Let me ask you both, too. The Secretary of
Defense has responsibilities strategic, but huge
responsibilities when it comes to running a huge bureaucracy
with all of the management issues and personnel issues and
logistical issues and other issues. Your sense of this
exemption in that context. Typically, a civilian going into
this role would have great expertise in business or in other
management positions within government. That's not the case.
General Mattis has a complete dedication to the Marine Corps
since--17 or so. So--Dr. Hicks first, and then Dr. Cohen.
Dr. Hicks. Well, I think it's fair to say every Secretary
comes in truly with a unique set of skills. When you're
staffing in and around that, not just in the national security
team, but in the Defense Department, you do need to take
account, absolutely, in the fuller staffing, the deputy
position and others, what kind of management expertise is being
brought in. I don't think it's fair to put every attribute of
necessary management quality, international security
experience, experience with the military or the Armed Forces,
understanding of the bureaucratic elements--it's too much,
really, to layer onto one person, but it's very important, as
this committee looks at confirmations for the whole team for
defense, that those attributes are covered.
Senator Reed. Dr. Cohen, your comment.
Dr. Cohen. I completely agree with Dr. Hicks.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It's rare that a confession like this is made, but I really
did come here to learn. It's been really good testimony. I--one
thing that has occurred to me is--we keep repeating over and
over again that the senior--the senior officer. What about
enlisted personnel?
Dr. Cohen. I think that's a completely different issue,
Senator. I really do. I think there's--you know, I could give
you a long lecture, which would bore you to tears, about the
history of civil-military relations, but I think the
distinction between officer and enlisted is quite important.
But, more importantly, you know, the purpose of the law is
really to exclude general officers from moving from----
Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
Dr. Cohen.--being generals to Secretaries.
Senator Inhofe. I understand that. The--of course, we had
Chuck Hagel.
Do you have any thoughts about that, Dr. Hicks?
Dr. Hicks. I would just agree, it is very different.
Secretary Hagel, coming as a former enlisted, really did
bring----
Senator Inhofe. Lots of time, too.
Dr. Hicks. Yes. He brought a unique perspective in that
sense, but it is unlike the idea of someone coming from the top
of the organization, the military hierarchy, into the top of
the civilian----
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
Dr. Hicks.--hierarchy.
Senator Inhofe. No, I understand that.
Dr. Hicks. So, it just has a different character.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. The--I understand that. That's----
Well, you know, each one of you talked about what would
justify a--treating this differently than it's been treated
since George Marshall. I--the only disagreement I would have--
and I think that you come up from a much more learned
perspective, but--when you made the statement that the sense of
national emergency and--was not as dangerous as it was back in
the '50s, I have a hard time with that one, because I look and
see that--and I've often said that I look wistfully back at the
days of the Cold War. But, right now, we have mentally deranged
people who are developing a capability of inflicting huge
damages on this country. That does----
So, whom do you--explain, just very briefly, when you say
there's never a time for a general. Tell me what you mean by
that.
Dr. Hicks. Sure. What I mean to say is, because of the way
our Framers put forward civilian control of the military as
central----
Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
Dr. Hicks.--President is Commander in Chief, always in a
civilian capacity, even if the President, like Eisenhower, is a
former general--in the same instance, the Secretary of Defense
is a very unique position in our system. It's non---it's--it
also carries an operational chain-of-command responsibility,
but is not nonelective, so there is special concern around it.
My point being, that position may be filled with someone with
military experience or not military experience. What we want to
look for is someone who has the right desire for knowledge and
expertise and judgment and character to live out the principles
about Secretary of Defense issues. We don't pick them because
they're a general officer. That is antithetical----
Senator Inhofe. That's clear.
Dr. Hicks.--to our very system.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah. That's clear.
Dr. Cohen. Senator, if I could just--the historian in me
wants to point out--in 1950, people thought there was a serious
possibility that World War III was just around the corner. You
know, I don't think any of us really quite feel that as--and,
although I agree with your basic assessment of where we are
these days.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah, of capabilities that are out there
that weren't there before. That's good. I appreciate very much
and enjoyed your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member Reed, for hosting this hearing. I think this is such a
critical discussion for our Nation.
Interestingly, both of you believe so deeply in civilian
control, but not because of this President. That is a
enormously weighty and serious statement that you both said.
Now, Dr. Hicks, you didn't define what your concerns were.
You just said ``the attributes of this President.'' Dr. Cohen,
you were quite specific about the fears that you had on
judgment. Can you please be specific that--why this enormous
exception should be made because of the judgment of this
President or the attributes of this President? Because you both
made a very strong case about why civilian leadership is
essential to our democracy and a very important provision of
our Founding Fathers' concept for what our democracy would look
like.
Dr. Cohen. As you may know, Senator, I was one of the
ringleaders in these two letters by Republican national
security experts that were very critical of then-candidate
Trump. I will just mention one of the issues which is referred
to in both of those letters, and that's the issue of torture.
As a candidate, the President-elect indicated that he would be
in favor of the ample use of torture, not only against
suspected terrorists, but against their families. That's
outrageous. It's illegal. It's profoundly immoral. I think a
General Mattis--a Secretary Mattis would refuse to comply with
that kind of order, and I think that's very important.
Dr. Hicks. Senator----
Senator Gillibrand. Excuse me. You just said that you
believe the Secretary of Defense wouldn't comply with an order
from the Commander in Chief?
Dr. Cohen. A Secretary of Defense should never comply with
an illegal order from the Commander in Chief.
Senator Gillibrand. Dr. Hicks?
Dr. Hicks. Senator, I don't recall referring to the
President-elect's attributes. I did make reference to the
statement he has made about, ``It's time for a general,'' which
worries me greatly. I will say--so----
Senator Gillibrand. You said--your quote was ``qualities of
the nominee.''
Dr. Hicks. I'm sorry, I don't think I have that in my
statement.
Senator Gillibrand. I wrote it down.
Dr. Hicks. I apologize.
Okay. In any case, my view is that there ought to be a
strong national security team at all times in any presidency.
In this particular configuration that we have, as has already
been mentioned, there's a number of retired general officers
coming in. There's a seeming lack of attention to career
diplomatic skills inside that mix. I have concerns about the
way in which that whole apparatus will operate. I think General
Mattis could be a very strong figure in that. It is clear, as
Professor Cohen has indicated, that the President-elect, at
least in one instance that we know of quite publicly, has
listened, in a way that's very effective for civilian control,
to the advice of General Mattis. This being with regard to
reversing any kind of viewpoint on illegal torture.
So, my view is that he could play a very helpful role in
this administration. I would like to think that we--were we
sitting here with a different President-elect who had nominated
General Mattis, I would nevertheless probably come to the same
conclusion. I think our--we may different slightly on that.
Because I think, again, our system is healthy enough, and you
are able, as part of that system, to regulate it and oversee
it. I believe that we are also looking at a person who has
attributes that are on the level of Marshall's attributes for
Secretary of Defense.
Senator Gillibrand. Okay. So, now let's focus on the points
that you both make in your writings, that are very clear, about
the importance of civilian control.
Dr. Cohen, you specifically talk about the unequal dialogue
and how important it is to have the diversity of opinions in
advising on national security, and that there's a push and a
pull that results in better outcomes. Dr. Hicks, you talk about
the importance of thinking through the full rage--range of
implications--operational implications, strategic implications,
pragmatic implications, meaning technical feasibility, dollars
and cents, et cetera, and political elements. So, without the
diversity of opinion, with this particular group of national
security advisors, where do you think this committee will need
to have vigilance because we have a blindspot? What diversity
of opinion will now not be offered because we have such a high
complement of extraordinary public servants, extraordinary
generals with extraordinary capabilities, but--you've both
outlined the importance, because of the diversity, and we now
lack that. So, I need you to tell this committee where are the
blindspots that we will need to be aggressively providing
oversight?
Dr. Cohen. I would say, in addition to all the other things
that you do, the question of strategy. What are we using our
Armed Forces for? I mean, traditionally Congress spends a lot
of time on the administration of the Department of Defense,
acquisition, lots and lots of things. But, I think you also
have an enormous role to play in examining, exploring, in some
cases critiquing the way in which we use military power to
achieve political ends. You've done that before. But, I think
it will be particularly urgent in the period going ahead.
Dr. Hicks. Again, I think I would emphasis, more than
anything, the diplomatic skillset and how that's going to play
out. That's obviously an issue for State Department, but it is
an issue within the Department of Defense, as well. There's a
lot of defense-to-defense diplomacy that we rely upon. You
know, short of the--of actual use of arms, we have a lot of
alliances and partnerships that are important to maintain and
sustain and push forward. I think that will be something to pay
close attention to, particularly given the President-elect's
statements during the campaign with regard to allies.
Chairman McCain. I thank you, Dr. Cohen, for pointing out
that the oath that is taken is to support and defend the
Constitution of the United States, not to obey the orders of
the President of the United States. There is a law against
torture. No Secretary of Defense or officeholder should violate
the law. That's what I would rely on General Mattis or any
other Cabinet member or anyone in position of responsibility.
Their first obligation is to obey the law.
Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
One issue that we have seen come up in this debate is the
so-called militarization of foreign and national security
policy decisions. I've heard some arguments that if we confirm
General Mattis, we're going to continue that trend. So, I would
ask both of you, first, Do you think there is a trend towards
that?
Dr. Cohen. Let me--I'll--let me speak as a former diplomat.
I was the counselor of the Department of State for several
years. There is clearly an imbalance simply because of the size
of the Department of Defense and the way our combatant commands
operate. I don't think the presence of a Secretary Mattis at
the head of the Department of Defense matters, one way or
another. You know, it gets down to much more mundane things,
like, when a combatant commander shows up, they've got an
airplane, they've got, you know, spear carriers and people in a
vast entourage. When an Assistant Secretary of State shows up,
they are kind of poured out of the back of a United Airlines
plane, and they are not in--on a plane that has the seal of the
United States. It's not surprising that the locals look at that
and say, ``Okay, we know who matters. It's the General.'' I
think it's those kinds of issues. You know, I'm not being
facetious, actually. It sounds humorous, but I'm not being
facetious. I have personally seen that happen in capitals
around the world, and that is something that is worthy of your
attention.
Senator Fischer. But, those actions aren't really the
result of any decision or any action taken by any senior
military leader, are they? It's more of a perception that is
out there, right?
Dr. Cohen. Yes and no. I mean, part of it--you know, a
combatant commander has resources. A combatant commander can do
things. They can move airplanes and people and supplies and so
forth. So, there is built-in this kind of asymmetry to the
advantage of the Department of Defense, which is not exercised
in a malign way or with malign intent. It just is. You know, if
you need relief--flood relief or something like that, State
Department can't do a whole lot for you. Department of Defense
can.
Senator Fischer. Okay.
Dr. Hicks?
Dr. Hicks. I completely agree with Professor Cohen. I think
if you layer onto that the high level of trust that the
American public puts in the military, which I think is right,
but it is much higher than at places in other parts of
government, and you combine those things along with the
alacrity of the system with regard to DOD [Department of
Defense] funding, with regard to even authorization for DOD,
which I think you all know is--runs quite smoothly every year
compared to that for other agencies--it's sort of--it's a bias
inside the system that we just have to watch for. It's not
malign, necessarily, but it is something to be careful about.
Senator Fischer. Dr. Cohen, you mentioned the word
``imbalance.'' We've seen, recently, I think, centralized power
within the White House--National Security Council and not the
Pentagon. Yet, some would argue that confirming General Mattis
is going to, I guess, in their view, continue a growing trend
of military influence. How would you respond to that?
Dr. Cohen. I think, in this particular context, not so
much. I think, in this--in the particular context of the
incoming administration, the--it is entirely true, more power
has gravitated to the White House, and more, actually, than I
think is healthy. I think, because General Mattis is such a
forceful character, and if the Senate decides to confirm Mr.
Tillerson as Secretary of State, you will have powerful cabinet
secretaries. I'm hoping that part of what will happen will be,
we'll see a little bit more authority going back to the
Departments, at the expense of a very controlling White House.
So, I think it may work the other way, actually.
Senator Fischer. Wouldn't that also reinforce what is the
role of Congress? If we do have Secretaries who regain--Cabinet
Secretaries who are able to regain that power that they are
given, wouldn't that bring more transparency to the agency
itself, but also to reinforce the role of Congress, when it
comes to the larger debate of the duties of Congress, when you
have a Cabinet Secretary who respects and values the
responsibilities of oversight, of developing relationships with
committees here in Congress, with coming before committees in
Congress and being truthful and transparent and open about
their needs?
Dr. Cohen. I would say, absolutely. Your ability to hold
the people you've confirmed accountable is just absolutely
indispensable to the functioning of our system of government.
It's going to be more important than ever.
Senator Fischer. A strong Secretary would do that.
Dr. Cohen. I believe so.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed [presiding]. On behalf of Chairman McCain, let
me recognize Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Ranking Member. Thank you for
urging us to have this hearing today.
We've spoken a great deal today about civilian control of
the military in terms of the President and the Secretary of
Defense, but I want to raise a broader question about the
relationship between the military and our citizens as a whole
which relates to this question about civilian control.
I come from a military family. All three of my brothers
serve. But, this isn't as common as it used to be. It's been
more than a generation since we've had massive mobilization on
the scale of World War I and World War II and Vietnam. America
has an extraordinary professional fighting force, the best the
world has ever seen, but many people in our country are
disconnected from our military. I think our founders would have
been surprised by this development. They were deeply worried
about our country getting tied up in foreign wars, and they
were especially worried about a President using the military to
increase his own fame and to perpetuate his own power. That is
why Congress, not the President, retains important war powers.
It's also why the founders expected citizens to pay for
military engagements and to serve in the military.
Now, Dr. Hicks, I know you also recognize the extraordinary
skill and professionalism of our military, but, when we think
about civilian control of the military, are there consequences
to having wide portions of the population that no longer have
substantial ties to an active military?
Dr. Hicks. Senator Warren, I do think there are
consequences. I think it's a distortion that can play out both
positively, if you will, and negatively with regard to
decisions about use of force. I would just say, if I had to
pick just a few items to focus on, I am concerned that the lack
of understanding of the long-term cost of conflict is
exacerbated by individuals in the country being less familiar
with the military. I think you see that play out, if you will,
in the longer-term stabilization decisions we've had to make
over time in the United States.
Senator Warren. Thank you. You know, when--one of history's
great military strategists, Carl von Clausewitz, talked about
warfare, he noted the need to pay attention not only to the
military and to political leaders, but also to the people of
the Nation. So, I want to ask a related question about public
support for decisions about when to use our military.
If we want to be successful in future wars, do you think we
need to develop a strategy to get citizens more engaged? If so,
why? Dr. Hicks? Dr. Cohen? Whoever would like to on this.
Dr. Hicks. I do think we're facing a crisis on civic
engagement on foreign and security policy. We have seen, over
time, a general consensus about what the U.S. role in the world
is fraying--not breaking, but fraying--and there seems to be a
lot of confusion and uncertainty. As a matter of fact, two of
the most recent major polls of the public on foreign and
security policy, the Pew Poll and the Chicago Council [on
Global Affairs] poll, use ``uncertainty'' in their titles. It
just goes to this idea that the public and the elite, if you
will, no longer are having a constant dialogue about what the
U.S. role is in the world.
Senator Warren. Thank you.
Dr. Cohen, would you like to add anything to----
Dr. Cohen. Yes, I would.
First thing, to that immediate point, I would say, in my
view, it is extremely important that Congress authorize the use
of military force. I was deeply disappointed that, for our
third Iraq war and for the Libyan intervention, that did not
occur. I'm not going to assign blame, I'm just saying, as a
citizen, I found that profoundly disappointing.
To your earlier point, I would say that there are a number
of things that you can do, that we should do. One is simply--
and I'm--by the way, I speak as the father of two
servicemembers--the first is to get ROTC [Reserve Officers'
Training Corps] programs out on all kinds of campuses,
including campuses where they are not--have not traditionally
been. We're both from Massachusetts, so we know what we're
talking about there. Even if it's not entirely efficient, to
have ROTC out there as a presence.
I also have to say that I think that a lot of the attempt
to rationalize our base structure didn't help us in this
regard. Again, I'll speak as somebody from Massachusetts. When
I was in ROTC, we were always at Fort Devins, trampling around
in the mud. There was a military presence in New England.
There's much less of a military presence today. That's not
healthy. Even if it's not entirely administratively rational or
economically rational, I think it is very important for people
to have contact with the military. For a number of reasons, one
of which is, it's also I'm sorry not to put the military on too
much of a pedestal. You know, Harry Truman was a great
President because he had been a National Guard captain, and he
knew the underside as well as the things that are truly noble
and inspiring about the military and about military service.
So, I really worry about it, from--if you will, from both
ends.
Senator Warren. Well, I just want to say thank you very
much. You know, it seems to me that the broader divide between
our citizens and our military makes it even more important that
we continue to keep front and center the importance of having
civilian control over the military.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. On behalf of Chairman McCain, let me
recognize Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you both today. This has been a very, very
enlightening hearing, so I appreciate your testimony.
Dr. Cohen, thank you for your support of ROTC programs. As
a proud member of the Cyclone Battalion from Iowa State, I
thank you for that. I do believe that we need more of those
programs in other areas that aren't maybe as widely accepting
today. So, thank you very much for that.
While I still do have many commitments to garner from
retired General Mattis before I affirm that I will be
supporting him for Secretary of Defense, I strongly believe he
understands and respects the importance of civilian control of
our armed services. I retired just a little over a year ago
from the military, and I do consider myself a civilian. I view
retired General Mattis as a civilian also.
Dr. Cohen, in your written statement, you suggested that
Congress confirmed George Marshall because the United States
faced imminent and substantial national security threats
requiring his expertise. You drew a parallel between things
that are ongoing today. We have North Korea, we have Russia,
China, radical Islamic terrorism. What I want to do is add to
that list. I would also include there a hollowed-out military,
which is what I believe that we have right now. As a result of
Obama administration policies, our Army has fewer soldiers, and
our Navy has fewer ships, our Air Force is flying antiquated
aircraft. U.S. servicemembers, while proud, are understandably
anxious. Do you see the need for a strong soldier statesman
such as--for Secretary of Defense--just like we did in the
1950s? If so, does James Mattis, like George Marshall, really
fit into that mold?
Dr. Cohen. You know, I'm--again, I'll just speak as an
historian. The buildup of the 1950s was not the work of one
individual. It was a whole team of quite exceptional public
servants and great presidential leadership, as well. But, I
would say that I completely agree with your assessment of the
situation. I've, in fact, just written a book on the subject. I
think there is a need for what will probably be a fairly
substantial expansion in military spending, because we're
facing quite--a quite diverse set of challenges, perhaps none
of them as overwhelming as the possibility of a third world
war--in this case, with the Soviet Union--but our forces are
not adequate for that right now. So, this is partly going to be
an issue of resources, but it will partly be the nature of the
team that is then created to supervise a substantial increase
in defense spending.
Senator Ernst. Okay.
Dr. Hicks, anything to add to that?
Dr. Hicks. Well, I would just say, I agree that General
Mattis, if confirmed as Secretary of Defense, could be a very
effective spokesperson for the requirements of the military.
Again, to my prior answer to Senator Warren on the issue of
what's the U.S. role in the world, we clearly have a gap
between the perception of what we want to be able to achieve in
the world and what we're willing to put toward it and what it
requires. I think the strategic man inside General Mattis, if a
Secretary Mattis, would come forward to help us close that gap,
which I think many of us would greatly appreciate.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
Dr. Hicks, you concluded in your statement that it is
appropriate to create a specific exemption, a once-in-a-70 year
exception to the law for this nominee based on his unique
qualifications and because of the safeguards in place to
protect civilian control of the military. You state that the
ultimate safeguard is the United States Congress. I agree with
that assessment. But, in light of that, what commitments should
we garner from General Mattis in order to ensure that we are
doing our part and our due diligence in vetting him for the
position of Secretary of Defense?
Dr. Hicks. I think, first and foremost, is the comment that
came up earlier in the discussion about adhering to the
Constitution of the United States, not to any individual
President or other political official. I think that is first
and foremost. When General Marshall served as Secretary of
Defense, it was well prior, of course, to Goldwater-Nichols,
but it was prior to having a truly strong Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. In statute, I think securing and understanding
of how he would look at this pretty unique situation of a
recently retired four-star, and what has been strengthened over
time as a very centrally powerful Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, how that would operate. Again, that he's always
bringing his best judgment without bias to his prior Marine
allegiance, if you will. I know a Marine is always a Marine.
That would be very important, in my mind, as well.
Senator Ernst. Very good. Thank you very much, both of you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman McCain [presiding], Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thanks, to the witnesses.
Dr. Cohen, you mentioned, just a second ago, that you
believe, based on the current array of challenges in the world,
we may need an expansion of military spending. I assume you
believe that the arbitrary budget sequester that has put a cap
on defense spending as well as nondefense discretionary
spending is not smart.
Dr. Cohen. I would say I share the Chairman's view of
sequester.
Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you. That view is well known to
the members of the committee and shared on a----
Dr. Cohen. That's why I put it that way.
Senator Kaine.--shared on a bipartisan----
Chairman McCain. This is----
Senator Kaine.--view.
Chairman McCain. This is an R-rated hearing.
[Laughter.]
Senator Kaine. Two items. The title of the hearing is not
just about the waiver for General Mattis, it's testimony on
civilian control of the Armed Forces. To touch upon two points
that have already been raised, civilian control over our Armed
Forces is throughout the Constitution in different ways, not
just the notion of this waiver, which is not constitutional,
but statutory, the requirement that we're talking about, but
also the role of Congress in warmaking powers in article 1. You
referred to this a second ago, Dr. Cohen. In a book retrospect,
the former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara said this about
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, ``We failed to draw Congress and
the American people into a full and frank discussion and debate
of the pros and cons of a large-scale military involvement in
Southeast Asia. It wasn't that we didn't have formal authority.
We did. The problem wasn't with formalities. The problem was
the substance.'' Neither the Congress nor the President
intended that those words would be used as we used them. We're
in the 15th year of using a 60-word authorization passed in the
aftermath of the attack of 9/11, stretching it far beyond
probably what was the original intent in a Congress that is
nearly 70 percent people who weren't even here to vote on that
authorization. You talked about your concern about the absence
of an authorization for current military operations. Isn't the
congressional warmaking power, the article 1 power that gives
that decision to the people's elected legislative body, part of
the framework of civilian control that we are obligated to
uphold?
Dr. Cohen. Senator, I think you're absolutely right. There
are many different aspects of civilian control that--to the--to
include the fact that the President is the Commander in Chief,
which is different than other countries do it. I completely
agree with you on authorizations for the use of military force.
I think--without wishing in any way to be critical of Congress,
I think in--on some occasions, it's also been a way of avoiding
responsibility. It--there's a requirement for Congress to step
up and say, ``I'm going to vote yea or nay on something like
that.'' I also think one has to have a certain acceptance of
the fact that you're going to authorize the use of force and
then there's a limited extent to which you can predict the way
that things are going to go.
But, that was also why I was, in response, I think, to
Senator Gillibrand earlier, I said, ``It's not just the vote
about the authorization of the use of military force, it's
also, you know, over--looking at strategy, getting those kinds
of discussions going.'' I think that is one of the things I
would hope you would ask General Mattis about, because I do
think you should be part of that discussion. You're not going
to be in the chain of command, but you should be part of that
discussion.
Senator Kaine. Dr. Hicks, any additional comments on that?
Dr. Hicks. I would just agree completely with regard to the
important oversight role of Congress, and specifically with
regard to declarations of war and authorization for the use of
military force. I want to thank you personally for how much you
have invested in this issue, which I'm sure seems Sysphean at
times. But, I really do hope, in this Congress, that there can
be movement forward on a new authorization for these----
Senator Kaine. Multiple years of effort, I think I've
managed to persuade two or three people on this, but I'm going
to keep trying, because I think it matters.
[Laughter.]
Senator Kaine. It matters.
A second issue dealing with civilian control--and this
touches upon questions that Senator Fischer asked--is the role
of congressional oversight--budgetary oversight, the
confirmation of a Secretary of Defense. We did some reforms in
the most recent NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] to
reduce the size of the NSC [National Security Council]
operation. We don't confirm the National Security Advisor. We
have less oversight over the NSC operation as we do over the--a
Secretary of Defense and a Pentagon. I actually would like each
of you to comment upon the relationship between the NS--
National Security Advisor and the NSC and the Secretary of
Defense and what you think the right balance in that
relationship should be in connection with this question of
maintaining appropriate civilian control through the civilian
elected Congress over military operations.
Dr. Cohen. You know, I would just say that this is really
one of the most delicate and complicated questions of this kind
one can deal with. So, I suppose my position would be, first,
that, you know, the President really does deserve to have the
staff that he or she wants, who are organized in the way that
suits him or her best, and that they think are most effective.
Secondly, I have my own views about how a--having seen a
bunch of National Security Advisors up close, there's a certain
way that they should do their business, that they should not be
understood to be principals, in the sense that a Cabinet
Secretary is. The NSC staff should not be operational. It is
largely a coordinating function. It is staffing the President
of the United States. I think there may be something more to be
gained by making sure that the functions of the NSC staff,
rather than its particular size and so forth, are appropriate.
I mean, I get very anxious when National Security Council
staffers begin negotiating treaties with other countries.
Again, speaking as an old State Department guy, that's really
wrong. That should not happen.
Chairman McCain. Not only negotiating, but deciding rules
of engagement in faraway places.
Senator Kaine, I appreciate very much your advocacy on this
whole issue, that you have been, sometimes, a voice in the
wilderness, but you've also been absolutely correct. I know
Senator Reed would like to work with you. Perhaps one of the
ways to try to address this issue would be to have a hearing or
two on this issue. Because, certainly, Congress has not
exercised its responsibilities in conflicts that are going on
throughout the globe. So, I thank you for raising that issue. I
thank you for your continued tenacity. I want to commit to us
making this a priority for this committee in the coming year.
Senator Kaine. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. I thank you.
Senator Perdue.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I agree with both of you in your testimony and comments so
far in preparation for today. I think this is an extremely
important tenet, one that we should strive to uphold, going
forward. Any exception to it should be taken very, very
seriously. So, I appreciate your comments on that.
Having said that, I agree with you, also, that I think
we're facing a very unique and dangerous global security crisis
today. I can't compare it to 1950. It's different. They didn't
have cyberwarfare back then. They didn't have a nuclear North
Korea. They didn't have an arms race in space. I think the need
for integration between diplomacy and development and military
capability has never been greater or more complicated. Because
of that unique circumstance, I think, like General Marshall,
General Mattis offers us a unique combination of skillsets and
mindsets that make him an ideal candidate for right now, with
certain cautions that you both have laid out.
Having said that, and having broad experience from the
Foreign Relations Committee here, I'm very concerned about the
relationship between diplomacy and development debates inside
the Cabinet room between two military officers when it's a
military option or a diplomatic option. Could you both speak to
that with your personal experience of General Mattis?
Dr. Hicks?
Dr. Hicks. I'll begin.
I think you're right to have that concern, particularly, if
I may, on development. It--the last 15 years of war, I think,
have brought home, more than ever before, to members of the
military the importance of development, or the role--maybe more
precisely said, the role it plays. But, your average officer, I
think, still maybe doesn't fully understand the role of USAID,
in particular.
That said, I do think General Mattis, through his--both his
role--well, his variety of roles, but particularly the roles as
the head of U.S. then-Joint Forces Command, looking broadly at
the future and at the integration of the military with other
instruments of power, and, of course, as the Commander of U.S.
Central Command, where a region, like many others, where you
absolutely have to understand how these pieces integrate
together, is critical. I think he will have a deep appreciation
of the need for development and diplomacy experts that are
nonmilitary.
Dr. Cohen. I guess I would have a couple of thoughts.
The first is that, it seems to me it's very rare that one
has a choice between a military and a diplomatic option. The
choice is much more likely to be diplomacy of one kind, backed
by a military option, or diplomacy of a different kind, maybe
not backed by a military option. Therefore, what matters most
is actually the cooperation between the State Department and
the Defense Department.
I was very privileged to serve, along with Senator
Sullivan, under Secretary Rice, and to see the exceptionally
close relationship that she had with Secretary Gates as
Secretary of Defense. You know, anybody who is in an
administration tends to feel that way, but I thought I was
seeing an exceptionally close integration of diplomacy and
military power. I think that's really the model. So, I think
the question might be more to General Mattis, if he's Secretary
Mattis, with the Secretary of State.
Senator Perdue. Dr. Cohen, you had mentioned that, you
know, we're not the first ones to do this as a country. I mean,
certain countries have done this, historically, and some not so
very well. You've called that out in your writings. Would you
relate to us just a little bit about the cautionary comments
that you've made about that, relative to other people's
experience, other countries' experience with doing what we're
talking about doing today, but also talk about the unique
character of Dr. Mattis and why this might be a unique
situation?
Dr. Cohen. Well, let me start with General Mattis. I--for
me, what I find myself focusing on is not just the experience
and the expertise, and so on; it is fundamentally my judgment
about his character and his judgment. That's why I think it's
very unfortunate people have used the phrase ``Mad Dog.'' I've
never heard anybody in the uniformed military refer to him as
that. That is not what he is like. This is an extremely
thoughtful, careful, prudent man. I think that's--that is a
tremendously important thing.
To speak to the history of civil-military relations, the
fact is, say, if you look at the French or the Germans, or even
the Russians, the--when you begin to have retired generals as
Ministers of Defense or Ministers of War, you are setting up
the kinds of tensions and problems and blurring that we talked
about, and the kind of isolation of the military from normal
politics. In some ways, this is what has happened in Israel,
which is probably, for us, the most interesting case, because
it is a liberal democracy. But, I know that country pretty
well. There is a serious problem with the politicization of the
senior officer corps, there is a serious problem in
distinguishing between the military advice of the serving
Chiefs of the General Staff and a Minister of Defense, who,
only a couple of years before, was a general officer. In fact,
what's interesting is, the Israelis are--have introduced, and
they've actually recently increased, their own time gap between
when you can take off the uniform, when you can run for public
office and serve in those kinds of positions.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Peters, welcome again to the
committee.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Chairman McCain. It's a pleasure
to be here and to serve.
I'd thank our witnesses today for your testimony, both Dr.
Hicks and Dr. Cohen. Thank you for addressing this very serious
issue.
Just to pick up on Senator Perdue's comments about the need
to make sure we're balancing military options with diplomatic,
economic, the full range of power that can be projected around
the world--soft power in addition to hard power--I think it's
important to remember the last time we did grant this waiver,
the--General Marshall, the--in addition to his extensive
military experience, also served as a Special Envoy to China,
was the Secretary of State and president of the American Red
Cross. So, quite a diverse background, something that we're not
looking at right now, despite all of the qualifications of
General Mattis, but certainly a very rounded background, going
into that position.
But, I'd like to turn to the book that General Mattis
edited, which I think both of you have referenced. In that
book, ``Warriors and Citizens,'' he has a chapter from Dr.
Thomas Owens, who's a professor at the Institute of World
Politics. It's entitled, ``Is Civilian Control of the Military
Still an Issue?'' which raises the prospect if that's even
something we should be thinking about.
Dr. Owens writes that civil-military relations can be seen
as a bargain. I'm going to quote from his writing here, ``There
are three parts to the bargain: the American people, the
government, and the military establishment. Periodically, the
civil-military bargain must be renegotiated to take into
account political, social, technological, or geopolitical
changes.''
So, my question to both of you, first, is, Do you agree
with that assessment, that, basically, as we're discussing the
civil-military relations, that this is, basically, a bargain
between the people, the government, and the military?
Dr. Cohen. No, I do not.
Senator Peters. Why is that?
Dr. Cohen. Because the principle is civilian control of the
military, full stop.
Senator Peters. Ms.----
Dr. Hicks. I agree with that. I do think there is this
issue of how, exactly, it manifests, again, in any given
environment. An example would be that the particular statute
that we're discussing now did not arise until 1947. I think, in
large part, it arose--and there are a variety of reasons, but a
large reason it arose is because we had come out of two world
wars, we had seen militarized societies and their effects, and
we were facing the prospect, which we still have, of a much
larger and very capable standing military. The exact structure
of how we operationalize civil-military relations changed in
that context.
I do think that has been true throughout the history of the
United States, of course, which is, we maintain the principle,
and the particular way--just as this waiver would be, the
particular way in which we judge what it requires to be healthy
at a given time is assessed at that time.
Dr. Cohen. If I could, you know, the patterns clearly do
change, but the word that I would really push back at is
``bargain,'' as if it's a deal that gets cut between different
segments of society. I think that's not the way our
Constitution was intended to operate.
Senator Peters. Well, thank you.
Later in his book--and this--that--the quote that I had was
from a different author; it wasn't General Mattis--later in his
book, General Mattis writes--and I'd love to have your comments
on his thoughts on this issue--he writes, ``If there is a
contemporary departure from the American norm, it is that
military commanders are more, not less, hemmed in by political
leaders, because the wars we are fighting are more removed from
everyday experience of most Americans.'' He goes on to say--
this is his writing again, quote, ``The combined effect is
worrying, since elites without military experience alienated
from the advice offered by the military are more likely to use
military force ineffectively. We believe we have been seeing
exactly this in American national security policies over the
last dozen years.''
Your response, please.
Dr. Cohen. I'm not sure I would agree with that. I mean, I
understand it as a point of view. I think there has undoubtedly
been a fair amount of friction, particularly in the last eight
years, but there was friction in the--during the Bush
administration, as well.
I think, you know, sometimes people like to think that
there was a halcyon period, where generals and politicians got
along very well. There wasn't. Again, I'm essentially a
military historian. I can give you chapter and verse on that if
you like. I--we--that is why I said in my statement that a
certain amount of tension is the norm and is actually a healthy
thing. But, I don't think I really, fully believe that.
I mean, look, the biggest 20th-century blowup in our civil-
military relations was between President Truman and General
MacArthur. President Truman had an outstanding war record in
the first World War as a National Guard battery commander.
I would like to add just one thing. Having edited a bunch
of books, I've stopped doing it, because you can't really
control what the people in the book are going to say. I'd
rather just say what I'm going to say. So, I wouldn't hang
General Mattis with what some feckless author has put in there.
You--it's--you have much less control than you might think.
Senator Peters. Well, but let me be clear, the last two
quotes that I read were General Mattis.
Dr. Cohen. Yes. No, I understand. I was----
Senator Peters. Right.
Dr. Cohen.--referring to the previous quote.
Senator Peters. The previous one, right.
Dr. Hicks. I, basically, agree with Professor Cohen. I
would simply say, again, it's always hard to take quotes and
assess them, but my recollection of that portion of his essay
with his coauthor, Kori Schake, was--the context was also about
this issue, again, of the societal removal, the one percent
issue. I do think, again, it--that has effects. It distorts how
we think, sometimes, about military force. It doesn't mean it's
more likely we use it, which I think is more the implication,
perhaps, of that passage, or we're less likely to use it. I do
think it means that the more distant citizens become from their
understanding of, if you will, the profession of arms, the more
dangerous that is for us, because we remove ourselves from very
real understanding of what the implications of use of force
are.
Dr. Cohen. If I could, you know, there--I think there are
other sources of tension, as well. People may conflate them.
So, for example, simply the fact that anything that happens is
instantaneously visible around the world--and when I'm--say
``visible,'' I mean on YouTube--and, therefore, is a big deal,
does mean that there's going to be more political attention.
So, when you have an Abu Ghraib, it's not something that comes
out, you know, a long time later and there are no photographs;
it's right there in front of you, and it has real
repercussions.
I also think some of this has to do with the nature of the
particular wars that we've been fighting, which, in a variety
of ways, are--have been conducive to civil-military tension.
So, I think--I may agree with the diagnosis of the phenomenon.
I might have a somewhat different analysis of some of the
causes.
Senator Peters. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. You've exceeded your time, Senator Peters.
Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Part of the discussion earlier had to do with whether or
not we were losing contact between the civilian and military
members. I would just suggest that there are some areas where I
just don't believe that that has happened. One area is with
regard to the National Guard. All you have to do is to attend a
single deployment ceremony or a welcome home ceremony or a
funeral and you'll see that, when you mobilize the National
Guard, you mobilize the entire community, and there is clearly
a connection there which has not faded.
I think one thing that leads to that is, is that--that
very, very close connection, where these folks are maintaining
their relationship with their families and with that community,
and folks see them actively involved, but they also see the
sacrifice of the family, as well. Sometimes I suspect that our
military members that have family back here, that sacrifice
that those families make is probably not as evident in their
local communities as it is when you recognize the Guard.
Let me just ask a just a couple of quick questions. I don't
mean to split hairs, but we've talked a lot about the
comparisons between General Marshall and General Mattis, and
about the connectivity between the two, the similarities and so
forth. Can I ask about what you see as the differences between
the recommendation--the nomination at that time and the
nomination that we have before us to date--the differences
that, in your study and your review, that you've found, that
you would point out to us.
Dr. Cohen. Before I do that, let me just--on your point
about the National Guard, I completely agree, but I think there
are many dimensions to that issue, and it's--seems to me it
would be a good thing for our country if our business leaders,
our academic leaders, our leaders of nonprofits also had family
members or people that they knew who were serving, and that has
other kinds of implications for how we go about recruiting
people.
There are a number of differences. Obviously, General
Marshall had--his military experience is different. He had--he
was not a combat commander, as General Mattis most definitely
has been. He was one of the masterminds of this great coalition
effort. He had served as Secretary of State. I think that's
tremendously important. A very effective Secretary of State for
two years.
Conversely, I think one does have to point out, General
Marshall was quite a sick man when the waiver was made. I think
historians think that he was an extraordinarily effective
Secretary of Defense, partly--I believe he had lost a kidney by
then. He was in for about--he was in for about a year. So,
General Mattis, I think, is a much more vigorous type, and
that's actually nontrivial, I believe.
So, those, it would seem to me, would be the largest
differences that you're dealing with. You know, General
Marshall, finally, did have--he had one enormous challenge.
That was, of course, dealing with General MacArthur with--whom
he did not like, but who he tended to respect as the guy who
was in charge out in the Far East. MacArthur was a very
different kind of problem that--Mattis is not going to face any
MacArthurs out there.
Dr. Hicks. I would add just two other factors. One relates
to what Eliot just said, that, you know, he--he served a very
short period of time. In fact, it--all evidence points to the
fact that that was a prearranged agreement, that he would only
serve for a limited period of time. He was essentially helping
the President out, if you will, in a case where he had, I
think, as you referenced earlier, a Secretary of Defense who
was not working out for him. So, this was a way to transition
with a very popular--politically, publicly popular figure, in
the case of General Marshall. You can parse how much of that is
similar and different in this case, but it is the fact that it
wasn't his out-of-the-gate Secretary of Defense, it was a--more
of a transitional approach.
The other thing I think bears in--repeating is that General
Marshall, as best I recall, had come out--he had gone back into
an Active Duty an status, so he was extremely recently retired
just before taking on the position.
Dr. Cohen. He was actually technically not retired, because
the way it worked, if you're a five-star general, which is what
he was, was that you never retire. So, a lot of the discussion
and the testimony is about, What do we do about his pay? I
mean, what--the lofty issues were addressed, too, but some of
it was pretty mundane.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Cohen, first, you mentioned a few minutes ago that you
were reluctant to be critical of Congress. I don't know why you
alone, among all the citizens of this country, should feel any
reservations on that front.
[Laughter.]
Senator King. I would suggest that--yes, that's right.
I also have to point out--a statement was made earlier
about President Obama eviscerating the military or hollowing
out the military. Again, this was--the budgets for the military
come out of this body, and we impose limitations that the
President's budgets reflect. So, again, I think we don't want
to avoid responsibility for our role, either historically or on
a going-forward basis.
The other point, it seems to me probably one of the
greatest challenges to civilian control of the military
occurred in the election of 1864, when George McClellan, one of
the leading generals of the Union Army, ran against the
President of the United States. Lincoln, himself, wrote his
wife, in August of that year, saying he was likely to lose that
election, and probably would have, other than for Sherman's
taking of Atlanta in September, shortly before the election. I
apologize to the Senator from Georgia for raising that
difficult point.
[Laughter.]
Senator King. When I was a small-town lawyer in Maine, one
of the principles we used to discuss was, ``Hard cases make bad
law.'' Cases that are very appealing on the merits that--widows
and orphans and other kinds of difficult issues, you end up
creating precedents that are bad law. That's what I'm
struggling with in this case. I think that's exactly what we're
talking about here.
I have decided to support this amendment, because I don't
think it will make bad law, because of the narrow way that it's
drafted. I think it's important--we haven't discussed the
specific language, but the language is, ``This section applies
only to the first person appointed as Secretary of Defense as
described in subsection (a) after the date of this Act, and to
no other person.'' That means it can't even be used by another
appointment of this President. It is an extremely narrow
precedent. The precedent was broken, if you will, 70 years ago,
hasn't been broken since. I'm comforted by this language. I
suspect that, if a future occasion of this nature arises,
number one, there's no statutory basis for providing an
automatic exemption; we will have a hearing like this. It will
be decided upon the facts of the case, just as you both have
suggested today.
Mr. Cohen, would you agree with that analysis?
Dr. Cohen. Yes. But, I would add to that that I--it seems
to me it's very important that the committee and the members of
it make very clear the principles that they--that are guiding
them, and how they think about the law, going forward, so that
there's a record. You know, in the same way that I think both
of us looked at the record of the testimony in the Marshall
case, that people will go back and look at the record, and,
most importantly, look at the things that you Senators said at
the time, to help them think this through.
If I could, just--you know, I figured I had taken a swipe
at the Obama administration, I've taken a swipe at the Trump
administration. Taking on Congress, too, just seemed to be a
little bit too much, even for me.
[Laughter.]
Senator King. The other subject that's come up today which
I think is important is the danger of a development of a
military case cast. I was discussing this recently with a high-
ranking officer in charge of personnel who indicated that
something over 80 percent of the current servicemembers come
from military bloodlines or from military families. I think
that is--and he said, ``That's a dangerous situation, because
we don't want our military separated from the society.'' When
we made a decision about all-volunteer service, that created a
professional military. I completely concur with the idea of
broadening ROTC and broadening recruitment efforts so that we
don't have a separate group that feels separated from the rest
of the society, particularly the civilian government.
Dr. Hicks, your thoughts?
Dr. Hicks. I completely agree with that. I'm from a
military family, myself. It is a way of life, and it can seem,
I think, for those who haven't lived it, extraordinarily odd
and nomadic in nature. I think it's dangerous when we start to
look at folks from military families as sort of a self-
perpetuating cone of future military service, and the rest of
society going about its business differently. So, I do think
that's a danger.
Senator King. It also makes it too easy for the rest of
society--meaning Presidents and Congresses--to talk about wars
and deployment of troops if there's no widespread of--element
of sacrifice.
Dr. Cohen. If I could, I think that's true, but I would
also just caution that, as you go forward with this, the
military personnel bureaucracies will not be on your side. You
know, the easiest, the most efficient thing, from their point
of view, is--go to those parts of the country or to those
universities which have massive ROTC programs that they can
bring in, obviously, from--they--I mean, I've had these kinds
of discussions with people--they--if you look at, say, efforts
to try to get ROTC back on the Harvard campus, the opposition
was not from President Larry Sommers. The opposition was
actually from the United States Army. I hate to say that,
having been a former--having been an Army officer at one time.
But, it was--they just thought it was too much of a pain in the
neck, ``We'd have to deal with the Harvard faculty, wouldn't be
that high a yield of officers, blah, blah, blah,'' and
completely missing this larger point of the connection--having
a connection between people who wear the uniform and people who
are going to end up in positions of leadership in other sectors
of our society.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you both for your excellent testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the outstanding testimony. Professor Cohen, I
want to thank you for your service to our Nation. As usual,
your testimony is very insightful and helpful.
You know, just as someone who served as a Marine Corps
staff officer to the CENTCOM [United States Central Command]
Commander and then later as an Assistant Secretary of State, I
can--I certainly agree with your sense of the imbalance between
DOD resources and the State Department, which I think we need
to look at. But also, I think it's helpful in this discussion
on ROTC. I certainly hope that all universities will heed the
call to establish ROTC programs.
You know, Senator Warren was talking about this issue.
Where she taught and where I went to college, you just name the
university, where I--when I went to Harvard, the Spartacist
Youth League, which was a organization for young Communists,
was allowed to meet on campus, but if you wanted to be part of
the ROTC, you were not welcome. I think that was an
embarrassment. It took 40 years to get ROTC back after it was
kicked off the campus there. The opposition was the professors
and the faculty, who were extremely anti-military. I think we
should be looking at all universities that continue to ban
ROTC, and penalize them. So, hopefully, we'll continue to focus
on this.
You know, there's a lot of talk about 1950. You're both
historians. Let me just ask the basic question. In a historical
context, is that waiver now viewed as something that was in the
U.S. interest? Is it--do most historians agree on that?
Dr. Cohen. I think people understand why Truman did it. I
mean, Johnson was really a very dysfunctional Secretary of
Defense. Everybody hated him. He was clearly not the right guy
to supervise a substantial buildup. There was a bit of a whiff
of desperation about this. I think the general consensus is
that, although Marshall did some good things as Secretary of
Defense, you know, he was not--does not go down as one of the
best Secretaries of Defense, by a long shot.
Senator Sullivan. But, the historical record's not widely
critical of it, is it?
Dr. Cohen. No.
Senator Sullivan. Are the analogies that many of my
colleagues have raised today about, you know, Senate--or Dr.
Kissinger testifying before the committee last year about the
world--the United States not facing--you know, hadn't seen this
many crises since the end of the World War II. Some of us are
concerned about a hollowed-out Army. Are those--and the
character and reputation of General Mattis--are those
historical analogies apt when you look at 1950 and General
Marshall?
Dr. Cohen. I think they go a little bit too far. I mean,
the United States military was in much worse shape in 1950. You
know, if you know the history of the Korean War, it is a pretty
sorry tale, with a few exceptions in that first year, as we
were putting ourselves back together. I think the overall sense
of threat was much greater, because, you know, again, there
really was this chance that you'd have World War III. So, it's
not----
Senator Sullivan. Can I ask you--and let me just--sorry to
cut you off, but--let me ask about kind of a question that
relates to the Korean War. You know, there's a conventional
wisdom--and we've heard it today, we've heard it in the media a
lot on this issue--that there's a growing trend of military
influence in our government. But, is that really the case? Let
me give you a couple of counter-examples.
With the incoming Trump administration we'll have now,
three out of the last four Presidents will have not served in
the military. Much of the Obama White House staff never served
in the military. Congress now has 20 percent veterans. In 1971,
it was 73 percent veterans. In your view, can this create
situations where important military matters are not well
understood or emphasized by civilian leaders?
Let me give you one that relates to the Korean War. That's
the issue of rigorous military training. Very, very difficult,
hard, dangerous military training. I think sometimes people
aren't comfortable with that. I think sometimes Members of
Congress don't understand it. When you don't have military
training, you end up with, you know, situations like Task Force
Smith in the Korean War. General Mattis certainly understands
that. I've talked to him about it. But, do we risk, when we
don't have much military experience in our civilian government,
that other leaders don't understand what Task Force Smith is? I
guarantee you a lot of the members of the Obama White House
right now don't even know what I'm talking about. Isn't that an
issue that we should be concerned about, as well, rigorous
military training and having people who actually understand
those kind of military issues through their own military
service, which is increasingly less and less in our civilian
government?
Dr. Hicks. Senator Sullivan, I--first of all, I think
military readiness and training is a major issue. I do know
what Task Force Smith is. But, I do not believe you have to
have served in the military in order to have knowledge and
appreciation of the profession of arms. Is it different than
serving? Absolutely.
Senator Sullivan. I'm not talking knowledge and appreciate,
I'm talking about rigorous military training.
Dr. Hicks. Understand. Again, I do think--as I said before,
I do think there's a distortion when you have a society that's
becoming less familiar with the military, that has had less
service in the military. I think it's a problem when there is
distrust between the military and civilian leadership. I think
we can point to instances both in the current administration
and in the Bush administration and throughout history where
that has--those tensions have moved from helpful to unhelpful.
But, I--the only thing I'm going to say--and obviously, it's
biased, because I have not served in the military, but I have
dedicated my entire professional life to the Department of
Defense and service--that I do not think you have to have
served in the military in order to be an effective civilian
leader in military affairs.
Dr. Cohen. I completely agree with Dr. Hicks on that. I
don't think prior military experience makes any difference to
those kinds of things. You know, they're--again, we can have a
long discussion about the history of training in the United
States military. They had to completely overhaul our training
in the middle of World War II, which was completely in the
hands of the United States Army. It was partly because they had
had no combat experience, and they found themselves having to
change things.
Our greatest Commander in Chief was a man with zero
military--or almost zero military experience: Abraham Lincoln.
The other competing Commander in Chief, Jefferson Davis--
distinguished war record, chairman of this committee's
predecessor--he was a terrible Commander in Chief, luckily. So,
I don't think that, per se, military experience is what
matters, although I think it's a good thing.
The fact is, we're not going to get it back. You know, in
1971, the World War II vets were still around, and dominated
Congress. Well, that's not coming back. I think we have to
accept that and find other ways of doing with it.
But, I very much agree with Dr. Hicks, it's important not
to denigrate people who have not served, for whatever reason.
Chairman McCain. Could I say, Dr.--both doctors--I totally
agree. Some of the challenges we face in the military today,
particularly the much needed reforms in acquisition and other
areas, require talents that have nothing to do with the
military. I agree with you, some of our finest leaders have
not--it should not be a requirement.
Thank you.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, to both of our panelists, for your testimony and
for your thoughtful and pragmatic approach to this issue.
Because I think this is an issue that it may not be helpful to
be doctrinaire on.
You know, I totally agree with the statements that have
been made that it's important for the country to have skin in
the game when it comes to military engagement and conflict
around the world. As a--someone who came of age during the
Vietnam era, I very clearly remember the debate over draft
versus a volunteer--All-Volunteer Army. I think some of the
ideas about what would happen at the time have not proved to be
accurate, and we have a very professional, very well-trained
military. But, it's only about one percent of the population
who actually have skin in the game, and that that's not healthy
for the long-term future of the country.
Now, having said that, I want to pick up on the comments
you just made, Dr. Cohen, because, in 2002, for the Washington
Post, you wrote an article called ``Hunting Chicken Hawks,''
where you made the point that I think you've just made, which
is that there's no evidence that generals, as a class, make
wiser national security policymakers than civilians. So, I
wonder if you can talk a little bit more about that, beyond
just Lincoln and Jefferson Davis, and what you've seen that
makes you come to that conclusion.
Dr. Cohen. Well, it's a result of, basically, being a
military historian. I--you know, if you look at things like the
Vietnam War, where there have been some very interesting books,
including one by my friend H.R. McMaster, ``Dereliction of
Duty,'' all about the Joint Chiefs not standing up to Robert
McNamara, my reservation about the book--and I've talked to
General McMaster about this--is, it's not like they really had
a better idea. I mean, when you really press into the history
of the Vietnam War, did they have a different conception which
would have allowed us to achieve our national objectives?
You know, this is why in my book, ``Supreme Command,'' I
talk about an unequal dialogue. It has to be a dialogue. It has
to be give-and-take. At the end of the day, the civilians are
responsible, the civilians are accountable. The military
absolutely has to be heard, and they have a duty to speak up.
But, it--it can only be forged in a dialogue. I think the--we
have to be very careful in our understanding of, What is the
nature of military expertise? Because when you go to war,
you're trying to use force to achieve political purposes. I--if
I might, I'd say one other thing, which is, I do think it's
important to have skin in the game. Speaking as someone who had
skin in the game, you know, I was in favor of the Iraq War, and
my son went off and fought in it twice. I would have been in
favor of it in exactly the same way, I think, if he hadn't made
that decision entirely on his own, actually before 9/11, to
join the service. It does affect how you think about things. It
affects how you think about the political leadership. It
affects about how you hold them accountable. But, I think, if
you're a serious individual, I don't think it actually changes
how carefully you weigh decisions about sending young men or
young women into harm's way.
Senator Shaheen. So, I think the argument that I find most
persuasive, that you make, Dr. Cohen, and, to some extent, you
also made it, Dr. Hicks, about why this waiver at this time
might be appropriate, is because of your comments that a
Secretary Mattis might be a stabilizing and moderating force
preventing stupid, dangerous, or illegal things from happening
in the incoming administration. So, with that in mind, I want
to ask you a little bit more about an issue that Senator Perdue
raised with respect to the interaction between the National
Security Council, under former General Flynn, and the
Department of Defense and how policy might get made with that
kind of interaction.
So, do you have any insights, either one of you, into what
we might expect and who we might expect to come out on top in
those kinds of debates about what policy should be?
Dr. Hicks. Senator, I would be foolish to predict what is
going to happen here. I think, in any administration, you see,
in the first 9-plus months, for really the cycle of Congress,
some shaking around, if you will, inevitably in every
administration; and there is a particularly combustive
combination, potentially, in this set of factors we have coming
in, in a few weeks. So, I can't predict what that will look
like.
I do want to add to the very good comments that Professor
Cohen made earlier with regard to this issue of the National
Security Council's role and the President's ability to choose
his own staff, that it's always important for the Secretary of
Defense, of course, but also throughout the national security
system, to remember that the National Security Advisor is not
in the chain of command. That sounds so very straightforward,
but, in the day-to-day actions inside an administration, it can
become confusing about whether that National Security Advisor,
to use Professor Cohen's words, is a principal or not.
Certainly with regard to where orders come from, how they
are communicated--is it from the President, is it from the
National Security Advisor?--I think that tension, which, again,
is present in many administrations, will play itself out here,
and we will see what the answer to your question is very soon.
Dr. Cohen. Once again, I agree with Dr. Hicks. You know,
you--it seems--I also have no idea what this will turn into,
but, from what I've read of the President-elect's
decisionmaking style, he likes to have lots of competing power
centers competing for his ear, and jockeying around and
bouncing into each other. My personal preference is for orderly
processes, but, then again, I'm not President, so I don't get
to make that decision. I think there will be a lot of pushing
and shoving.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you both.
Chairman McCain. Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Flynn versus Mattis and Kelly. That's going
to be an interesting tension. A three-star versus two four-
stars. But, the three-star has the President's ear daily. You
want to comment on that?
Dr. Cohen. I think you summarized it very well. It is one
of the arguments, in the long run, for not having retired
general officers in these--you know, in a position like
Secretary of Defense or even possibly as National Security
Advisor, because they never forget their rank. I have yet to
meet a General who says, ``Please, just call me Bob.'' Well,
that's not entirely true, but their--you know, their rank
carries with them after they retire. That's just a
psychological fact that you cannot get around.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Hicks, you used the term ``self-
perpetuating cone of military service.'' That's going to occur
as long as we don't have a draft, isn't it?
Dr. Hicks. Well, I don't necessarily think that's true. I
certainly don't recommend a return to a draft. I do think,
inevitably--we don't need a military, let's say, two to three
times the size it is now. I think most people would agree with
that. So, we're not really looking to vastly grow the size of
our military; and thus, the percent of the population. It
really gets back to the issue of, Is it all occurring--is all
that recruitment and accession occurring within a population
that's never changing? That's not healthy, if that's true.
It goes back to some of the issues about looking for new
pools of interest. That obviously can relate to opening up, for
instance, positions to women, looking at areas like cyber, new
skillset areas, where different types of people, maybe, would
be attracted to service than have been before and that we need.
So, I think there are a variety of ways to get at this
issue. I don't think there's a single solution. It's certainly
not the draft.
Dr. Cohen. Dr. Hicks said it better than I could.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Cohen, you gave the dramatic example of
civilian control of Truman over MacArthur. Can you think, in
history of the country, any examples in reverse, where the
military has actually overcome the civilian control? Maybe
other countries. But, you----
Dr. Cohen. Oh, I mean--yeah, but that--well----
Senator Nelson. Not a dictatorship, a democracy. You
mentioned the situation in Israel.
Dr. Cohen. Well, you know, the most effective Israeli
Minister of Defense was also the Prime Minister, David Ben
Gurion, who leveled out as a junior corporal in the British
Army, I think, over a period of about three months in World War
I. I think anybody who knows anything about Israeli military
history knows he was far and away the most effective Minister
of Defense that they ever had. He's really the guy who built
the Israel defense forces.
Whereas, conversely, let's say, if you look at the Yom
Kippur War, Moshe Dayan, great military hero, in many ways got
in the way. It was Prime Minister Golda Meir who ended up being
a much more effective strategic decisionmaker, working with the
chief of staff. So, I'd say Dayan in the 1973 war is a pretty
good example of that.
By and large in the United States, you know, the civilians
always win. Not--but not without, occasionally, some serious
pushing and shoving.
Chairman McCain. ``An American Caesar.''
Senator Nelson. Yes.
Dr. Hicks. May I just simply add--I want to answer that
question a different way than I'm sure you intended it, but--it
bears stating here that there are heavy political costs
sometimes for exercising that civilian control of the military.
The MacArthur case is a good example. MacArthur was very
popular. Truman was very much not popular. He returned, after
being fired, to tickertape parades. Truman didn't seek an
additional term in office. In fact, the next general was
Eisenhower, who had been an aide to MacArthur. So--and I think
you could even look at the McChrystal issue more recently and
the sort of--the--where the political or the public weight of
approval of the military may be very strong, and, even when
civil-military analysts look at it and say, ``Yes, these are
good cases of exercising civilian control,'' there can be a
significant political cost to pay for that.
Senator Nelson. What was the cost that the President paid
in firing [General Stanley] McChrystal?
Dr. Hicks. Well, I think that will be left to historians,
but my view is that there is a lack of trust between the
military and the Obama senior leadership, as Senator Sullivan
said, and particularly in the White House. I think, you know,
to the extent that that might have further fueled that sense of
distance, I think that's a possibility. But, I haven't seen any
actual historical reporting on that.
Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal has arrived.
Senator Blumenthal. I wish that were true. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
[Laughter.]
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member for
holding this hearing, because civilian control over the
Department of Defense and the military in general is really a
bedrock principle, one of the founding principles of this
democracy recognized from the inception of our great Nation. I
have deep respect for General Mattis and his service to this
country, having met with him over numerous years and having had
the benefit of his advice and insights over my service in the
United States Senate.
We're here today to discuss, in general, the issue of
civilian control over the military and how that principle is
served, or not, by his appointment. But, the general issue
applies, regardless of what we think of him. To emphasize the
uniqueness of the waiver contained in this statute, Congress
included a nonbinding section expressing the intent that
Marshall's waiver was to be an exception, quote, ``This Act is
not to be construed as approval by the Congress of continuing
appointments of military men to the office of Secretary of
Defense in the future,'' and--end of quote--and, quote, ``No
additional appointments of military men to that office shall be
approved,'' end quote.
I'm concerned--I think many of us are--that a waiver here
would set a precedent. I wonder if you have advice to us as to
how a waiver here can avoid setting precedent. I know, in
response to one of the questions previously, I think perhaps by
my colleague Senator Reed, you have emphasized a waiting period
or a period of time as avoiding the repetition of that
precedent, but the exception may swallow the rule. My question
to you is whether there is anything by way of legislative
intent in what we may have to say about doing a waiver here, or
perhaps even in the legislative statutory language, whether we
can assure that, in fact, we are making a very unusual and
unique exception so as to avoid some of the concerns, the
general concerns that have been expressed, even if we want to
move ahead with General Mattis's nomination and confirmation.
Dr. Cohen. Senator, I'm no expert on draftsmanship of the
law, but I--you know, I do think it makes sense to put things
into the text of the law that make it very clear just how
exceptional you all believe this case is.
The one other thing which I suggested in my testimony,
which may or may not be helpful, is that you consider restoring
the ten year rule and going back from the seven year rule. I
think that would be, actually--that would send a certain
message about how seriously Congress takes that. But, that
would be my only additional thought. I'm not--I'm--and that
really, obviously, is a matter for you folks to deliberate on.
Dr. Hicks. I would just add, I think, again, that the very
narrow way in which the legislation, as I have it in front of
me at least, is construed is very helpful, and, as you point
out, the additional language with regard to how exceptional--
and, you know, I think in generational term--people may want to
use different language, but--generationally exceptional this
decision would be.
Senator Blumenthal. I would just point out, it's an obvious
point, that--the difference between 10 years, 7 years, 3 years,
15 years--these are all sort of arbitrary time periods. I don't
know of the fact-based justification for any specific numbers
of years. It's more the principle that's important. So, I do
agree that the language is narrow, but I'm just trying to, in
effect, narrow the intent so that it's clear to future
Presidents--or this President, for matter--that it is truly an
exception based on General Mattis's extraordinary
qualifications and the very extraordinary time in which we
live.
Thank you.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. I think Senator Gillibrand has asked for
another question.
Senator Gillibrand. No. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Oh.
Chairman McCain. No?
I thank the witnesses.
I don't know why, Dr. Cohen, I was reminded of--probably
one of the seminal moments was the firing of Harry Truman, an
authentication of civilian--the adherence of civilian control
of the military, since he was the most popular man at the time.
Truman, in later years, said, ``I didn't fire MacArthur because
he was an SOB, which he was.'' He said, ``I fired him because
he was dumb.'' Do you remember that quote? As only Harry Truman
could have put it. An individual that history treats with much
more admiration and respect than it did at the time. The more I
study, the more I appreciate that seminal moment. It took
enormous courage to dispense with the services of, arguably,
one of the most popular Americans. It's hard to describe the
way Americans revered war heroes at that time.
Would you have any closing comments? Or have you had
enough?
[Laughter.]
Chairman McCain. I thank the witnesses. This has been very
helpful.
[Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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