[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SECURING OUR SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
SYSTEMS: EXAMINING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S ROLE IN
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION TECHNOLOGIES
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION
AND PROTECTIVE SECURITY
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS,
RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JANUARY 30, 2018
__________
Serial No. 115-47
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
30-193 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
John Katko, New York Filemon Vela, Texas
Will Hurd, Texas Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Martha McSally, Arizona Kathleen M. Rice, New York
John Ratcliffe, Texas J. Luis Correa, California
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York Val Butler Demings, Florida
Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
Clay Higgins, Louisiana
John H. Rutherford, Florida
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania
Ron Estes, Kansas
Don Bacon, Nebraska
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Steven S. Giaier, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND PROTECTIVE SECURITY
John Katko, New York, Chairman
Mike Rogers, Alabama Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Clay Higgins, Louisiana William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Ron Estes, Kansas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Kyle D. Klein, Subcommittee Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York, Chairman
Peter T. King, New York Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Martha McSally, Arizona James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
John H. Rutherford, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Kerry A. Kinirons, Subcommittee Staff Director
Moira Bergin, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director/Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
and Protective Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Bonnie Watson Coleman, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Transportation and Protective Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., a Representative in
Congress From the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
The Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Witnesses
Ms. Sonya Proctor, Director, Surface Division, Office of Security
Policy and Industry Engagement, Transportation Security
Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 12
Mr. Robert Pryor, Director, Intermodal Division, Office of
Requirements and Capabilities Analysis, Transportation Security
Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 12
Mr. Donald E. Roberts, Program Manager, Explosive Threat
Detection, Explosives Division, Homeland Security Advanced
Research Projects Agency, Science and Technology Directorate,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Mr. Brian Michael Jenkins, Director, National Transportation
Security Center of Excellence, Mineta Transportation Institute:
Oral Statement................................................. 19
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
FOR THE RECORD
The Honorable Bonnie Watson Coleman, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Transportation and Protective Security:
Letter from the American Public Transportation Association..... 24
SECURING OUR SURFACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS: EXAMINING THE DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S ROLE IN SURFACE TRANSPORTATION TECHNOLOGIES
----------
Tuesday, January 30, 2018
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation and
Protective Security, and
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Response, and Communications,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in
room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. John Katko (Chairman
of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Katko, Donovan, Higgins,
Rutherford, Estes, Watson Coleman, Payne, Keating, and
Langevin.
Mr. Katko. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee
on Transportation and Protective Security and Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications will come
to order. The subcommittees are meeting today to examine the
degree to which the Department of Homeland Security leverages
its research and development expertise to improve the security
architecture of our Nation's surface transportation systems.
Specifically, the subcommittees will examine how the TSA and
the Science and Technology Directorate collaborate to improve
security capabilities and address identified needs.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
The free movement of goods and people depends on the
security of our transportation networks. A substantial number
of Americans utilize surface transportation on a daily basis,
including over 10 billion riders annually on 6,800 U.S. mass
transit systems.
While TSA is responsible for securing all of America's
transportation systems, its approaches to aviation security and
surface transportation security are, to say the least, markedly
different. Whereas TSA is directly involved in security
operations at airports, the agency provides oversight and
assistance to surface transportation modes through partnerships
with operators as well as State and local authorities. This
collaborative, whole-of-the-community approach helps make sure
that resources are applied efficiently and have the highest
efficacy in reducing risk to the Nation's transportation
systems.
We know that DHS provides support through security threat
assessments, explosives detection canines--nowhere near
enough--and security grants. However, our subcommittees hope to
learn more today of how S&T--short for Science and Technology--
and TSA are helping to drive security technology innovation for
the surface sector.
This committee understands that this is a complex
undertaking, and I hope we can help you with this critically
important responsibility. The current threat environment facing
surface transportation is persistent. The 2015 bombing of a
railway station in Turkey, the 2016 metro bombing in Belgium,
and the 2017 metro bombing in Russia demonstrate that
terrorists continue to see surface transportation modes as soft
targets which can yield high numbers of casualties.
The attempted suicide bombing in the Port Authority Bus
Terminal in New York City last month, a few blocks from where I
was standing at the time it happened, followed a recent vehicle
ramming attack in Manhattan that killed 8 people.
As a Representative of New York's 24th District in
Syracuse, I recognize the importance of securing commuter
buses, transit agencies, freight rail, and all modes of surface
transportation. That is why I am so pleased to be working
together with my fellow New Yorker, Chairman Donovan, as well
as Ranking Members Watson Coleman and Payne, whose New Jersey
transportation systems are so closely linked to those of our
home State of New York.
This hearing continues the committee's efforts to
understand the challenges facing the diverse spectrum of
surface transportation modes as well as the bureaucratic
hurdles that stymie the development of security technology.
Previously, we heard from transit police and law
enforcement personnel, surface transportation operators, and
industry stakeholders. Their insights have helped us to
identify obstacles that contribute to an impractical
development time line. Security regulations, inspections, VIPR
teams, and grants are only parts of the conversations we should
be having on how to properly secure surface transportation.
These initiatives must be supplemented by the deployment of
innovative security technologies to effectively reduce risk.
Based on your experiences and your expertise, I want to know
what you all envision as an appropriate balance of security
initiatives and technology in the surface transportation
environment.
More importantly, I want to know how DHS can lead the way
to achieve this balance. In recent testimony, TSA Administrator
Pekoske said, ``Although we have invested significant resources
and implemented numerous programs and policies to reduce
identified vulnerabilities and minimize potential consequences,
in the current climate, vigilance and preparation can only take
us so far.'' Truer words have not been spoken.
While I do believe that vigilance is a critical part of
threat mitigation, I also agree with the administrator that TSA
must look beyond existing efforts. We need the effective
innovation of security technologies to remain proactive against
evolving threats.
Today, I would like to discuss how we can expand upon DHS
and TSA's efforts to ensure that stakeholders have the tools
they need to properly secure surface transportation modes.
Specifically, how could TSA and S&T better coordinate with each
other and with surface transportation stakeholders to
streamline the development and deployment of critical security
technologies in surface transportation systems?
Ms. Proctor, Mr. Pryor, Mr. Roberts, and Mr. Jenkins, thank
you all very much for appearing before us today to testify
about this timely and important issue. We look forward to
hearing your testimony.
I am pleased to recognize the Ranking Member of the
Subcommittee on Transportation and Protective Security, the
gentlelady from New Jersey, my friend, Mrs. Watson Coleman, for
her opening statement.
[The statement of Chairman Katko follows:]
Statement of Chairman John Katko
January 30, 2018
The Subcommittee on Transportation and Protective Security and the
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications
are meeting today to examine the degree to which the Department of
Homeland Security leverages its research and development expertise to
improve the security architecture of our Nation's surface
transportation systems. Specifically, the subcommittees will examine
how the Transportation Security Administration and the Science and
Technology Directorate collaborate to improve security capabilities and
address identified needs.
The free movement of goods and people depends on the security of
our transportation networks. A substantial number of Americans utilize
surface transportation on a daily basis, including over 10 billion
riders annually on 6,800 U.S. mass transit systems.
While TSA is responsible for securing all of America's
transportation systems, its approaches to aviation security and surface
transportation security are markedly different. Whereas TSA is directly
involved in security operations at airports, the agency provides
oversight and assistance to surface transportation modes through
partnerships with operators, as well as State and local authorities.
This collaborative ``whole-of-community'' approach helps to ensure that
resources are applied efficiently and have the highest efficacy in
reducing risk to the Nation's transportation systems. We know that DHS
provides support through security threat assessments, explosives
detection canines, and security grants; however our subcommittees hope
to learn more today of how S&T and TSA are helping to drive security
technology innovation for the surface sector. This committee
understands that this is a complex undertaking, and I hope we can help
you with this critically important responsibility.
The current threat environment facing surface transportation is
persistent. The 2015 bombing of a railway station in Turkey, the 2016
metro bombing in Belgium, and the 2017 metro bombing in Russia
demonstrate that terrorists continue to see surface transportation
modes as soft targets which can yield high numbers of casualties. The
attempted suicide bombing in the Port Authority Bus Terminal in New
York City last month followed a recent vehicle ramming attack in
Manhattan that killed 8 people. As the representative of New York's
24th District, I recognize the importance of securing commuter buses,
transit agencies, freight rail, and all modes of surface
transportation. That is why I am so pleased to be working together with
my fellow New Yorker, Chairman Donovan, as well as Ranking Members
Watson Coleman and Payne, whose New Jersey transportation systems are
so closely linked to those in our home State of New York.
This hearing continues the committee's efforts to understand the
challenges facing the diverse spectrum of surface transportation modes,
as well as the bureaucratic hurdles that stymie the development of
security technology. Previously, we heard from transit police and law
enforcement personnel, surface transportation operators, and industry
stakeholders. Their insights have helped us identify obstacles that
contribute to an impractical development time line.
Security regulations, inspections, VIPR teams, and grants are only
parts of the conversations we should be having on how to secure surface
transportation. These initiatives must be supplemented by the
deployment of innovative security technologies to effectively reduce
risk. Based on your experiences and your expertise, I want to know what
you all envision as an appropriate balance of security initiatives and
technology in the surface transportation environment. More importantly,
I want to know how DHS can lead the way to achieve this balance.
In recent testimony, TSA Administrator Pekoske said, ``Although we
have invested significant resources and implemented numerous programs
and policies to reduce identified vulnerabilities and minimize
potential consequences, in the current climate, vigilance and
preparation can only take us so far.'' While I do believe that
vigilance is a critical part of threat mitigation, I also agree with
the administrator that TSA must look beyond existing efforts. We need
the effective innovation of security technologies to remain proactive
against evolving threats.
Today, I would like to discuss how we can expand upon DHS and TSA's
efforts to ensure that stakeholders have the tools they need to
properly secure surface transportation modes. Specifically, how can TSA
and S&T better coordinate with each other and with surface
transportation stakeholders to streamline the development and
deployment of critical security technologies in surface transportation
systems?
Ms. Proctor, Mr. Pryor, Mr. Roberts, and Mr. Jenkins, thank you for
appearing before us today to testify about this timely and important
issue. We look forward to hearing your testimony.
Mr. Katko. I am pleased to recognize the Ranking Member of
the Subcommittee on Transportation and Protective Security, the
gentlelady from New Jersey, my friend, Mrs. Watson Coleman, for
her opening statement.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Chairman.
I want to thank you and Chairman Donovan and Ranking Member
Payne for convening today's hearing.
Thank you to the panel of witnesses for testifying on this
very important topic.
Surface transportation systems, which include freight,
passenger trains, commuter rail, mass transit, buses, and
pipelines, are vital to the economy of the United States. Every
day, millions of Americans rely on these transportation
systems. An attack against these systems could be devastating,
and terrorists have taken note.
In recent years, terrorists have targeted surface
transportation systems overseas, including attacks in London
and Brussels. Last month, the threat to public transit systems
hit home as a would-be suicide attacker detonated a pipe bomb
near Times Square within the New York City subway system.
Luckily, the bomb failed to detonate fully, and the bomber was
the only person seriously injured.
Nevertheless, the attack proved that the United States is
not immune to the types of attacks we have witnessed overseas.
The ability of lone-wolf extremists with little to no training,
financial support, or direction to carry out attacks against
soft targets demands increased attention and collaboration at
all levels of government.
Securing such complex, busy transportation systems requires
a variety of security measures, including the development and
employment of innovative technologies capable of detecting
threats without creating congestion.
To develop these new technologies, TSA has established test
beds with many of the country's largest mass transit and
passenger rail agencies to test promising technologies in the
field. While these projects may prove useful, it is clear they
do not receive the same attention the aviation technology
developments receive.
TSA's recent Biennial Strategic 5-Year Technology
Investment Plan Refresh--further referred to by me as Refresh--
which lays out TSA's plans for investing in security technology
makes no mention of these projects or of surface transportation
at all.
In addition, unlike in aviation, when these technology
pilots deliver effective solutions, TSA does not purchase the
equipment for deployment. Instead, it falls to local
transportation authorities to pay for these technologies, and
many of them cannot afford to do so without Federal support.
The American Public Transit Association has testified that
transit agencies across the United States have identified $6
billion in capital and operational security requirements. We
are currently awaiting the President's fiscal year 2019 budget
request, but I would note that, in the face of this massive
need and the frightening threat picture, the President's
proposed budget for fiscal year 2018 suggests cutting that
little Federal support that exists for surface transportation
security. The President wants to cut the Transit Security Grant
Program, the primary source of Federal security funds for most
transit agencies, from $88 million to just $48 million. He
wants to cut the TSA's Visible Intermodal Prevention and
Response Programs, VIPR, which deploys TSA personnel to conduct
security operations at transportation venues from 31 teams to
just 8.
These cuts are reckless. We cannot allow this
administration to turn a blind eye to the threats facing our
surface transportation systems.
That is why I have introduced the Surface Transportation
and Public Area Security Act of 2017, which would restore and
resource those important activities as well as provide a
comprehensive approach to boosting Federal programs aimed at
securing these vital systems. Crucially, my bill would
authorize $400 million for the Transit Security Grant Program,
which would provide a small but significant step in addressing
the $16 billion gap in security needs.
That funding would allow transit agencies to purchase some
of the innovative technologies our witnesses will discuss
today. Additionally, my bill would direct TSA's Innovation Task
Force to expand its work beyond aviation security and seek
technologies with potential to enhance surface transportation
security, providing another avenue for testing new
technologies.
My bill would also direct DHS to report to Congress on
emerging security technologies within the surface
transportation mode, a necessity since such technologies were
left out of TSA's recent report. It is time that we finally
give surface transportation security the attention it requires,
and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about the
challenges they face and how we can be helpful.
Again, I thank my Chairman for convening this hearing, and
I yield back the balance of my time.
[The statement of Mrs. Watson Coleman follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bonnie Watson Coleman
January 30, 2018
Surface transportation systems, which include freight and passenger
trains, commuter rail, mass transit, buses, and pipelines, are vital to
the economy of the United States. Every day, millions of Americans rely
on these transportation systems. An attack against these systems could
be devastating--and terrorists have taken note.
In recent years, terrorists have targeted surface transportation
systems overseas, including attacks in London and Brussels. Last month,
the threat to public transit systems hit home, as a would-be suicide
attacker detonated a pipe bomb near Times Square, within the New York
City subway system. Luckily, the bomb failed to detonate fully, and the
bomber was the only person seriously injured.
Nevertheless, the attack proved that the United States is not
immune to the types of attacks we have witnessed overseas. The ability
of ``lone-wolf'' extremists with little to no training, financial
support, or direction to carry out attacks against soft targets demands
increased attention and collaboration at all levels of government.
Securing such complex, busy transportation systems requires a
variety of security measures, including the development and deployment
of innovative technologies capable of detecting threats without
creating congestion.
To develop new technologies, TSA has established ``test beds'' with
many of the country's largest mass transit and passenger rail agencies
to test promising technologies in the field.
While these projects may prove useful, it is clear they do not
receive the same attention that aviation technology development
receives. TSA's recent ``Biennial Strategic Five-Year Technology
Investment Plan Refresh,'' which lays out TSA's plans for investing in
security technology, makes no mention of these project--or of surface
transportation at all.
In addition, unlike in aviation, when these technology pilots
deliver effective solutions, TSA does not purchase the equipment for
deployment. Instead, it falls to local transportation authorities to
pay for these technologies, and many of them cannot afford to do so
without Federal support. The American Public Transit Association has
testified that transit agencies across the United States have
identified $6 billion in capital and operational security requirements.
We are currently awaiting the President's fiscal year 2019 budget
request, but I would note that, in the face of this massive need and a
frightening threat picture, the President's proposed budget for fiscal
year 2018 suggests cutting what little Federal support exists for
surface transportation security.
The President wants to cut the Transit Security Grant Program--the
primary source of Federal security funds for most transit agencies--
from $88 million to just $48 million. He wants to cut TSA's Visible
Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) program--which deploys TSA
personnel to conduct security operations at transportation venues--from
31 teams to just 8. These cuts are reckless. We cannot allow this
administration to turn a blind eye to the threats facing our surface
transportation systems.
That is why I have introduced the Surface Transportation and Public
Area Security Act of 2017, which would restore and resource these
important activities, as well as provide a comprehensive approach to
boosting Federal programs aimed at securing these vital systems.
Crucially, my bill would authorize $400 million for the Transit
Security Grant Program, which would provide a small but significant
step in addressing the $6 billion gap in security needs. That funding
would allow transit agencies to purchase some of the innovative
technologies our witnesses will discuss today.
Additionally, my bill would direct TSA's Innovation Task Force to
expand its work beyond aviation security and seek technologies with
potential to enhance surface transportation security, providing another
avenue for testing new technologies. My bill would also direct DHS to
report to Congress on emerging security technologies within the surface
transportation mode--a necessity since such technologies were left out
of TSA's recent report.
It is time that we finally give surface transportation security the
attention it requires.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mrs. Watson Coleman.
I now recognize the Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications, my friend
Mr. Donovan, for an opening statement.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
convening our subcommittees together for this very important
hearing.
Surface transportation systems serve over 10 billion riders
annually. Like me--because I am one of those riders; I take
Amtrak back and forth from New York City to Washington every
week--these people depend on the reliability and safety of this
critical infrastructure and so does our economy. The open
systems, multiple hubs, and lack of screening has made surface
transportation systems a target for terrorist organizations and
their sympathizers for years.
We have seen attacks in Brussels, London, and, most
recently, in New York City. Last December, one such terrorist
tried to detonate a suicide bomb in a walkway underneath the
Port Authority Bus Terminal during rush hour. Thankfully, he
constructed a faulty IED. However, this attempted terrorist
attack is a stark reminder of how vulnerable our surface
transportation systems are to terrorist attacks.
Surface transportation system operators are continuously
looking for innovative technology to help create a multi-layer
approach to security. However, this search for technology
solutions has been bogged down by numerous obstacles. That is
why both of our subcommittees have been extensively looking at
how technology can help make our surface transportation systems
more secure without impeding their operations.
Last November, our subcommittees held a roundtable with
surface transportation system operators and heard some of the
challenges that they face when trying to integrate new
technology into their systems. Specifically, technology that is
deemed to be successful in a lab doesn't always work once it is
integrated into a mass transit system. Thus, there needs to be
a test bed and pilot locations to adequately test new
technology. There is a need for a technology clearinghouse
where operators can review impartial assessments of the
technology that is available to them.
Now it is time for us to hear from the Department of
Homeland Security, specifically TSA and S&T, on how they are
helping surface transportation operators with research and
development, test and evaluation, and other issues surrounding
new technology. I am interested in learning more about how S&T
and TSA are working together to ensure our surface
transportation operators have the tools and resources they need
to keep the riders safe, specifically with regard to
technology.
I want to also thank our witnesses for their time, their
expertise, and what they are doing for our riders on a daily
basis, and for this afternoon for being here to share your
expertise with us. I look forward to our discussion.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The statement of Chairman Donovan follows:]
Statement of Chairman Daniel M. Donovan, Jr.
January 30, 2018
Surface transportation systems serve over 10 billion riders
annually. Like me--I am one of those 10 billion riders--these people
depend on the reliability and safety of this critical infrastructure,
and so does our economy.
The open systems, multiple hubs, and lack of screening has made
surface transportation systems a target for terrorist organizations and
their sympathizers for years. We have seen attacks in Brussels, London,
and most recently in New York City.
Last December, Akayed Ullah tried to detonate a suicide bomb in a
walkway underneath the Port Authority Bus Terminal during rush hour.
Thankfully, he constructed a faulty IED. However, this attempted
terrorist attack is a stark reminder of how vulnerable our surface
transportation systems are to terrorist attacks.
Surface transportation system operators are continuously looking
for innovative technology to help create a multi-layer approach to
security. However, this search for technological solutions has been
bogged down by numerous obstacles.
That is why both of our subcommittees have been extensively looking
at how technology can help make our surface transportation systems more
secure, without impeding their operations.
Last November, our subcommittees held a roundtable with surface
transportation system operators and heard some of the challenges they
face when trying to integrate new technology into their systems.
Specifically,
Technology that is deemed successful in a lab doesn't always
work once integrated into a mass transit system. Thus, there is
a need for test beds and pilot locations to adequately test
this technology. And,
There is a need for a technology clearinghouse where
operators can review impartial assessments of the technology
available to them.
Now, it is time for us to hear from the Department of Homeland
Security, specifically TSA and S&T, on how they are helping surface
transportation operators with research and development, test and
evaluation, and other issues surrounding new technology. I'm interested
in learning more about how S&T and TSA are working together to ensure
our surface transportation operators have the tools and resources they
need to keep the riders safe, specifically with regard to technology.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here this afternoon and I
look forward to our discussion.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Donovan. I am very pleased that
our two subcommittees are working together to address this very
important issue.
Before I introduce the next chair of the subcommittee, I
want to just caution all the witnesses here, the way the votes
are lining up, we may have to truncate this hearing a little
bit. So, for the next few minutes, perhaps you can think in
your mind how to shorten your opening statements as best you
can so we can have more times for questions.
With that, I will now recognize the Ranking Member of the
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications, Mr. Payne, for an opening statement.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, and good afternoon. I would like to
thank Chairman Katko and Donovan, as well as Ranking Member
Watson Coleman, for holding today's hearing to assess the
Department of Homeland Security's efforts to develop and
identify novel surface transportation security technologies.
I represent Newark and Jersey City, which are two of the
largest cities in the State of New Jersey. Every day, my
constituents rely on New Jersey Transit, the PATH train, and
Amtrak trains to commute within the tri-State area.
Two years ago, following a horrific attack on the Brussels
metro system, I was pleased that my subcommittee held a field
hearing in my district to learn more about how the Federal
Government could help prevent a similar incident from happening
in the busiest surface transportation corridors in the country.
At the hearing, we also considered how first responders
coordinate with transit owners and operators to ensure we are
prepared if, God forbid, such an attack did occur.
We brought together representatives from the Transportation
Security Administration, the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey, New Jersey Transit, New York City's Metropolitan
Transportation Authority, and Amtrak and had a robust
discussion. There were two major takeaways.
The vast majority of TSA's resources support securing
aviation travel. So the preliminary responsibility for securing
surface transportation infrastructure falls on owners and
operators. Owners and operators rely on the DHS Transit
Security Grant Program funding to install and maintain
technology and security operations to keep transit systems
secure without jeopardizing passenger flow.
These findings were reiterated at the field hearing held in
Mrs. Watson Coleman's district late last year. As Ranking
Member of the Emergency Preparedness Subcommittee, I have
fought for the TSGP funding and to ensure that the Department's
research and development efforts are responsive to the threat
environment and needs of transit owners and operators.
So, when the President released his fiscal year 2018 budget
last year, I was troubled to see that he proposed slashing TSGP
grants funding by 52 percent. On top of that, the President's
budget proposed to gut the Urban Area Security Initiatives and
the State Homeland Security Grant Program by over $270 million.
DHS's suite of grant programs work in concert to make high-risk
targets, like our surface transit systems, more secure.
Attempts to cut them in this threat environment reflect a
genuine disconnect from reality.
As we anticipate the fiscal year 2019 budget proposal, I
hope the administration has come to its senses and will request
more adequate funding for these important programs. Moreover, I
hope that Congress enacts a full year spending bill for fiscal
year 2018 so the grant funds are made available to our
communities to make surface transportation more secure.
Before I close, I would like to acknowledge that the
President's fiscal year 2018 budget also made dramatic cuts to
the Science and Technology Directorate. Although much of S&T
transportation work was not affected, other programs that could
complement its surface transportation efforts were. I implore
the administration to submit a responsible budget that
recognizes the connectivity between various important S&T
research programs.
In the mean time, I will continue to support H.R. 4474,
Mrs. Watson Coleman's Surface Transportation and Public Area
Security Act, which addresses pressing transportation security
gaps, and I urge my colleagues to do the same.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Payne follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Donald M. Payne, Jr.
January 30, 2018
I represent Newark and Jersey City, which are two of the largest
cities in the State of New Jersey. Every day, my constituents rely on
New Jersey Transit, PATH, and Amtrak trains to commute within the tri-
State area.
Two years ago, following a horrific attack on the Brussels metro
system, I was pleased that my subcommittee held a field hearing in my
district to learn more about how the Federal Government could help
prevent a similar incident from happening in the busiest surface
transportation corridors in the country. At the hearing, we also
considered how first responders coordinate with transit owners and
operators to ensure we are prepared if--God forbid--such an attack did
occur. We brought together representatives from the Transportation
Security Administration, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,
New Jersey Transit, New York City's Metropolitan Transportation
Authority, and Amtrak, and had a robust discussion.
There were two major takeaways. The vast majority of TSA's
resources support securing aviation travel, so the primary
responsibility for securing surface transportation infrastructure falls
on owners and operators. Owners and operators rely on the DHS Transit
Security Grant Program (TSGP) funding to install and maintain
technology and security operations that keep transit systems secure
without jeopardizing passenger flow. These findings were reiterated at
the field hearing held in Ms. Watson Coleman's district late last year.
As Ranking Member of the Emergency Preparedness Subcommittee, I
have fought for TSGP funding and to ensure that the Department's
research and development efforts are responsive to the threat
environment and needs of transit owners and operators.
So when the President released his fiscal year 2018 budget last
year, I was troubled to see that he proposed slashing TSGP grant
funding by 52 percent. On top of that, the President's budget proposed
to gut the Urban Area Security Initiative and the State Homeland
Security Grant Program by over $270 million.
DHS's suite of grant programs work in concert to make high-risk
targets--like our surface transit systems--more secure. Attempts to cut
them in this threat environment reflect a genuine disconnect from
reality. As we anticipate the fiscal year 2018 budget proposal, I hope
the administration has come to its senses and will request more
adequate funding for these important programs.
Moreover, I hope that Congress enacts a full year spending bill for
fiscal year 2019 so that grant funds are made available to our
communities to make surface transportation more secure.
Before I close, I would like to acknowledge that the President's
fiscal year 2018 budget also made dramatic cuts to the Science and
Technology Directorate. Although much of S&T's transportation work was
not affected, other programs that could complement its surface
transportation efforts were. I implore the administration to submit a
responsible budget that recognizes the connectivity between various
important S&T research programs.
In the mean time, I will continue to support H.R. 4474, Ms. Watson
Coleman's Surface Transportation and Public Area Security Act, which
addresses pressing transit security gaps, and I urge my colleagues to
do the same.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Payne.
Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
January 30, 2018
When it comes to transportation security, aviation security
dominates the conversation throughout the Government, but given the
diversity of today's terrorist landscape, it is well past time for the
conversation to expand.
We all well know that in recent years, surface transportation
systems both overseas and at home have increasingly been a target of
lethal mass casualty attacks.
Last October, a terrorist in Manhattan ran a vehicle onto a bike
bath killing 8 people and injuring 11.
Just last month, a terrorist strapped a home-made explosive device
onto his body and detonated it in the New York City's subway. While the
blast was not powerful enough to kill, 4 innocent commuters sustained
injuries.
These recent cases indicate that, in the age of lone-wolf and
small-cell attacks, the targeting of mass transit and other surface
transportation centers is growing.
Further, surface transportation systems in Madrid, London, Paris,
and Brussels have all been targeted by terrorists.
Therefore, there is no sensible justification for surface
transportation security to garner only 2 percent of the Transportation
Security Administration's budget.
Additionally, it is incumbent upon Congress to re-examine TSA's
budget allocations for surface transportation security. It is our job
to make sure that DHS is positioned to address this emerging terrorist
threat.
I want to thank Ranking Member Watson Coleman for her leadership on
surface transportation security. Her legislation, the Surface
Transportation and Public Area Security Act of 2017, would restore,
revamp, and resource important programs vital to protecting our
Nation's surface transportation systems.
I hope today's conversation will focus on how DHS can do more to
partner with stakeholders to make these systems more secure and
resilient.
As we have seen with aviation sector, the introduction of
innovative technological solutions is essential to strengthening the
security of surface transportation.
To our witnesses, if there is technology on the cusp of development
that needs research and development funding from Congress, let us know,
we want to be helpful. If there are authorities that DHS needs to
address surface transportation threats, tell us.
To my colleagues, I know we are expecting to see the fiscal year
2019 budget proposal from the Trump administration in the coming weeks.
If you recall, the President Trump's fiscal year 2018 budget
proposed cutting $43 million in surface transportation security. In the
event that the forthcoming budget proposes similar cuts to surface
transportation, I hope you will join me in opposing such cuts.
As evidenced by the testimony and participation in today's hearing,
now is not the time to make drastic, unjustified, and illogical cuts to
our security. I look forward to engaging with both the witnesses and my
colleagues on surface transportation security, not only here today, but
also in the future.
Mr. Katko. We are grateful to have before us this afternoon
a distinguished panel here to testify. Let me remind each of
the witnesses, as I have alluded to, that we are under a time
crunch, No. 1; and, No. 2, their entire written statement will
appear in the record.
Our first witness, Ms. Sonya Proctor, serves as a deputy of
the surface division--I am sorry--the director of the Surface
Division within the Transportation Security Administration's
Office of Security Policy and Industry Engagement. In this
role, she is responsible for developing risk-based security
policy in conjunction with stakeholders for surface
transportation modes.
Prior to this position, Ms. Proctor served as a deputy
federal secretary--security director at Ronald Reagan National
Airport in Washington, DC. Ms. Proctor has a long tenure of law
enforcement service, beginning with the Washington, DC,
Metropolitan Police Department. Ms. Proctor went on to serve as
a chief of police for the National Amtrak Police Department,
developing a new strategic plan to city policing and a
passenger railroad environment.
Ms. Proctor, thank you very much for your service and for
your continuing service to our country and in your current
role. I now recognize Ms. Proctor for her opening statement.
STATEMENT OF SONYA PROCTOR, DIRECTOR, SURFACE DIVISION, OFFICE
OF SECURITY POLICY AND INDUSTRY ENGAGEMENT, TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Proctor. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Katko,
Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, Ranking Member
Payne, and distinguished Members of the subcommittees. Thank
you for the opportunity to testify today about TSA's role in
surface transportation security technology.
TSA appreciates the continued support of this committee and
its Members as we carry out our vital security mission. We are
grateful for the constructive relationship TSA enjoys with this
committee and look forward to our continued work together to
ensure the security of our Nation's transportation systems.
As the director for the Surface Division within TSA's
Office of Security Policy and Industry Engagement, I have the
responsibility for overseeing the development of risk-based
surface transportation security policies in collaboration with
industry operators and other Federal agencies to develop and
implement those policies.
To illustrate the magnitude and importance of the surface
transportation system, which is moving people and commodities
on a continuous basis, consider that over 11 million passengers
daily travel on New York MTA system alone. Every year, more
than 10 billion trips are taken on 6,800 U.S. mass transit
systems, which range from very small bus-only systems in rural
areas to very large multimodal systems like the New York MTA in
major cities. Almost 4,000 commercial bus companies travel on
the 4 million miles of roadway in the United States and on more
than 600,000 highway bridges and through 350 tunnels. Those
same roads, bridges, and tunnels support the movement of goods
throughout the country by 8 million large-capacity commercial
trucks. As for our railroads and pipelines, more than 500
individual freight railroads carry essential goods operating on
nearly 140,000 miles of track, and 2.5 million miles of
pipelines owned and operated by approximately 3,000 private
companies transport natural gas, refined petroleum products,
and other commercial products.
When assessing risk in any particular transportation mode,
TSA considers the threat, the vulnerability, and the
consequence should an incident occur. TSA takes the threat to
surface transportation mode very seriously.
Recent terror attacks and plots, like the attempted suicide
bombing in the New York City Port Authority Bus Terminal and
the vehicle ramming attack in Manhattan, serve as compelling
reminders of the vast challenges of securing a system of
systems that is designed to quickly move massive volumes of
passengers and commodities.
Unlike aviation, where TSA is heavily involved in executing
day-to-day security operations, our approach for surface
transportation security is different. It is one focused on
supporting, collaborating, and partnering with the owners and
operators of the systems. The interconnected varied and
expansive scope of the surface transportation system creates
unique security challenges that are best addressed by system
owners and operators and Federally supported through
stakeholder communication, coordination, and collaboration.
To that end, TSA focuses its efforts on system assessments,
voluntary operator compliance with industry standards,
collaborative law enforcement and security operations, accurate
and timely exchange of intelligence information, regulatory
oversight, and technology expertise. My colleague, Robert
Pryor, who is director for TSA's Intermodal Division within the
Office of Requirements and Capabilities Analysis will further
explain through his testimony the work TSA does to assist
surface owners and operators identify vulnerabilities and risks
in their operations and the role TSA plays in that process.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I am
happy to answer any questions you may have.
[The joint prepared statement of Ms. Proctor and Mr. Pryor
follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Sonya Proctor and Robert Pryor
January 30, 2018
Good morning Chairmen Katko and Donovan, Ranking Members Watson
Coleman and Payne, and distinguished Members of the subcommittees. We
are grateful for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) efforts regarding
surface transportation security and technology initiatives. Today's
hearing is timely, as technology deployment for both aviation and
surface transportation systems will be critical to TSA's success in
2018 and beyond.
TSA appreciates the continued support of this committee and its
Members, as we carry out our vital security mission. We are grateful
for the constructive relationship TSA enjoys with this committee, and
look forward to our continued work together to ensure the security of
our Nation's transportation systems.
The U.S. surface transportation system, which is comprised of
roads, bridges, tunnels, mass transit systems, passenger and freight
railroads, over-the-road bus operators, motor carrier operators,
pipelines, and maritime facilities, is an extremely complex,
interconnected, and largely open network. The various transportation
modes within this system operate daily in close coordination with and
proximity to one another. In fact, many of the modes use the same
roads, bridges, and tunnels to function. Americans and our economy need
and depend on the surface transportation system to operate securely and
safely.
To illustrate the magnitude and importance of the system, which is
moving people and commodities on an essentially continuous basis,
consider that over 11 million passengers daily travel on the New York
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (NY MTA) system alone. Every year
more than 10 billion trips are taken on 6,800 U.S. mass transit
systems, which range from very small bus-only systems in rural areas to
very large multi-modal systems, like the NY MTA, in major cities. Over-
the-road bus operators carry approximately 750 million intercity bus
passengers each year. Almost 4,000 commercial bus companies travel on
the 4 million miles of roadway in the United States and on more than
600,000 highway bridges greater than 20 feet in length and through 350
tunnels greater than 300 feet in length. Those same roads, bridges, and
tunnels support the movement of goods throughout the country by 8
million large capacity commercial trucks. As for our railroads and
pipelines, more than 500 individual freight railroads carrying
essential goods operate on nearly 140,000 miles of track, and 2.5
million miles of pipelines, owned and operated by approximately 3,000
private companies, transport natural gas, refined petroleum products,
and other commercial products.
As these facts demonstrate, securing surface transportation is both
a critically important and complex undertaking. Recent terror attacks
and plots--like the attempted suicide bombing in the New York City Port
Authority Bus Terminal and vehicle ramming attack in Manhattan, serve
as compelling reminders of the vast challenges of securing a ``system
of systems'' that is designed to quickly move massive volumes of
passengers and commodities.
When assessing risk in any particular transportation mode, TSA
considers the threat, the vulnerability, and the consequence, should an
incident occur. TSA takes the threat to the surface mode very
seriously. Although we have invested significant resources and
implemented numerous programs and policies to reduce identified
vulnerabilities and minimize potential consequences, in the current
climate, vigilance and preparation can only take us so far. For this
reason, TSA is reexamining its approaches and actively assessing how
best to leverage and enhance its surface expertise to strengthen our
partnership with surface stakeholders.
Unlike aviation, where TSA has been heavily involved in day-to-day
security operations since the agency was created in 2001, we have
primarily approached surface transportation security as a partnership
with the owners and operators of the system. This difference in
approach is reflective of the characteristics of the system. The
interconnected, varied, and expansive scope of the surface
transportation system creates unique security challenges that are best
addressed by system owners and operators and Federally supported
through stakeholder communication, coordination, and collaboration. To
best assist surface transportation owners and operators with their
security needs, TSA focuses its efforts on system assessments,
voluntary operator compliance with industry standards, collaborative
law enforcement and security operations, accurate and timely exchange
of intelligence information, regulatory oversight, and technology
expertise.
TSA invests its resources to help surface owner and operators
identify vulnerabilities and risks in their operations, and then works
with them to develop and implement risk-mitigating solutions to address
them. The inherently open and expansive scope of surface passenger
transportation and the evolving threat to it requires TSA to continue
researching and developing innovative processes and technologies to
increase security without creating undesired financial or operational
burdens. Engagement and partnership with surface transportation owners
and operators is the key to fostering innovation and ensuring the
system is secure both today and in the future.
TSA incorporates the needs and capability gaps of surface
transportation owners and operators into our work to influence and
stimulate the development of new security technologies in the
marketplace. Our approach is designed to make more readily available
innovative and advanced technologies useful for public area security.
TSA actively follows the fast-moving advancement of security
technologies to assess whether emerging technologies, including from
outside the transportation environment, could be applied to address
current and evolving threats to the surface transportation system.
TSA accomplishes this goal through its Intermodal Division by
working closely with surface transportation owners and operators to
introduce new technology and approaches to securing surface
transportation. We establish collaborative operational test beds for
different modes of transportation (mass transit, highway motor carrier,
pipeline, and freight rail), and critical infrastructure protection
security technology projects to address the increasing threat
demonstrated from attacks world-wide. TSA's Intermodal Division's
Surface program was established in 2004 following the Madrid and London
attacks and has been fostering ``innovation'' within the surface
transportation system for more than a dozen years. Working in
conjunction with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science
and Technology Directorate (S&T), TSA's Intermodal Division provides
security technology recommendations and solutions for surface and
aviation transportation venues by evaluating existing security
technologies and developing requirements for new technologies. The
Division's mission areas reflect provisions in the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 and other public
laws, Executive Orders, and National policies and plans.
Since its creation, the Intermodal Division has stimulated the
marketplace and assessed numerous technologies, ranging from those
effective and suitable for person-borne threats to technology that
protects critical infrastructure, to detection of chemical and
biological threats. TSA is also a National leader in providing analysis
tools and mitigation means for explosive blast in passenger rail
vehicles.
TSA's surface security technology program has progressed as threats
and risk have grown, with the expectation that threats overseas would
eventually manifest in the United States. Our efforts have included
short-term technology demonstrations in venues such as the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey's PATH system and the Manhattan
Bus Terminal, Amtrak, Staten Island Ferry terminals, NY Mass Transit
Authority infrastructure, ferry terminals in Long Island and Cape May,
hazardous materials pipeline cybersecurity vulnerability assessments
and mitigation recommendations, and infrastructure protection work in
the Newark and Jersey City areas.
TSA has formal agreements with leading and higher-risk surface
venues to serve as test beds for promising technology. New Jersey
Transit Police was TSA's first test bed partner over 10 years ago and
continues to work with us on assessing various technologies to address
their security needs. In fact, TSA currently has on-going test beds
with 5 of the 10 highest-risk mass transit and passenger rail venues,
and agreements in principle from NY MTA and Port Authority for the
World Trade Center Oculus. We also have agreements in principle with
Los Angeles World Airports Authority and Burbank Airport to serve as
public area security testbed partners. The results of that public area
security technology testing will support potential use in both surface
and aviation venues. Finally, TSA has formal agreements with several
freight railroads for technology to protect key rail infrastructure
such as bridges, high-risk rail lines in urban areas, and rail yards,
as well as with the Nation's largest hazardous materials pipeline
operator.
For example, TSA is presently working with New Jersey Transit,
Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority, Amtrak, and Los Angeles
Metro to assess the effectiveness of technologies designed to address
threats associated with person- and vehicle-borne improvised explosive
devices. Through such efforts, as well as intelligence, information
sharing, and active engagement with surface owners and operators, TSA
helps technology manufacturers develop their products to better meet
the security needs of the surface transportation system, and serves as
the technology surrogate for the many smaller transportation
authorities that cannot afford or support expensive technology
development and assessments. As a result of TSA's security technology
support efforts, surface owners and operators can make informed
decisions about funding and acquiring security technologies to meet
their operational needs.
TSA and DHS S&T are long-term and close collaborators. We have a
clear understanding of each other's roles and missions and take great
care to optimize our work together. DHS S&T specializes in longer-term
research and development (R&D) and proof of concept technologies while
TSA engages the marketplace for technologies that are more mature. In
most cases, TSA is considering pre-production prototypes that can
immediately benefit from operational user feedback and stimulus to
enter the marketplace more rapidly. As needed, TSA makes its test beds
available to DHS S&T for early user impressions of emergent R&D
technology and design recommendations.
TSA is committed to securing the Nation's surface transportation
system from terrorist activities and attacks. Chairmen Katko and
Donovan, Ranking Members Watson Coleman and Payne, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to testify
before you today. We are honored to serve in this capacity and look
forward to your questions.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Ms. Proctor.
Our second witness, Mr. Robert Pryor, is assigned to the
Office of Operational Requirements and Capabilities Analysis at
the TSA as a director of the Intermodal Division.
The Intermodal Division supports requirements, development,
and field and laboratory assessments of security technologies
for all TSA mission areas, except civil aviation passenger
screening. Mr. Pryor is a former Marine officer, and has Active
Duty experience, including a variety of fleet maritime force
command and specialized counterterrorism assignments.
Sir, thank you for your service to our country and your
dedication to our country as well. The Chair now recognizes the
Mr. Pryor for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT PRYOR, DIRECTOR, INTERMODAL DIVISION,
OFFICE OF REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITIES ANALYSIS,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Pryor. Good afternoon, Chairman Katko and Chairman
Donovan, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, Ranking Member Payne,
and distinguished Members of the Committee of Homeland
Security.
Mr. Katko, congratulations on your son's graduation. That
is a notable achievement. I have spent a little time in Fort
Benning, and it is not easy.
Mr. Katko. It is quite an adventure for him, I got to tell
you. He is going to go to ranger school in June as well, so
that will be even more of an adventure.
Mr. Pryor. Yes, sir, absolutely. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you to discuss surface
transportation technology initiatives that TSA is working on to
assist surface transportation owners and operators protecting
our transportation system.
Since its creation in 2004, following the Madrid and London
attacks, the Intermodal Division has stimulated the marketplace
and assessed numerous technologies, ranging from those
effective and suitable for person-borne threats to technology
that protects critical infrastructure to detection of chemical
and biological threats. TSA is also a national leader in
providing analysis tools and mitigation means for explosive
blast and passenger rail vehicles.
TSA continuously researches and develops innovative
processes and technologies to increase security without
creating undesired financial or operational burdens. We are all
aware that mass transit, in particular, riders are particularly
sensitive to fare increases, and we keep that in mind.
First, TSA helps surface owners and operators identify
vulnerabilities and risks in their operations and then works
with them to develop and implement risk-mitigating solutions to
address the vulnerabilities.
Next, TSA incorporates the needs and capability gaps of
surface transportation owners and operators into our work to
influence and stimulate the development of new security
technologies in the marketplace.
TSA actively follows the advancement of security
technologies to assess whether emerging technologies, including
from outside the transportation environment, could be applied
to address current and evolving threats.
Third, and to that end, TSA's Intermodal Division works
closely with transportation stakeholders to introduce new
technologies and approaches to securing transportation. We
establish collaborative operational test beds for different
modes of transportation and critical infrastructure protection
security technologies to address the incoming threat
demonstrated from attacks world-wide.
TSA currently has on-going test beds with 5 of the 10
highest-risk mass transit and passenger rail venues and is now
also working with additional public area security partners.
TSA also has formal agreements with several freight
railroads for technology to protect key rail infrastructure,
such as bridges, high-risk rail lines in urban areas and rail
yards, as well as with the Nation's largest hazardous material
pipeline operator.
TSA shares the results of its testing with all of the
stakeholders and also technology manufacturers to assist them
in improving their products. We also serve as the technology
surrogate for many smaller transportation authorities that
cannot afford or support expensive technology development
assessment.
As a result of TSA's security technology support efforts,
owners and operators can make more informed decisions about
funding and acquiring security technologies to meet their
operational needs.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify before
you today. I am honored to be here and look forward to your
questions.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Pryor.
Our third witness, Mr. Donald Roberts, serves as a program
manager for the Surface Transportation Explosive Threat
Detection Program for the Explosives Division within the
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, Science
and Technology Directorate.
Mr. Roberts has been with the DHS since 2006. He came there
with over 18 years of experience with the Department of
Defense, where he managed advanced research development test
and evaluation programs. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Roberts
for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF DONALD E. ROBERTS, PROGRAM MANAGER, EXPLOSIVE
THREAT DETECTION, EXPLOSIVES DIVISION, HOMELAND SECURITY
ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Roberts. Thank you. Chairmen Katko and Donovan, Ranking
Members Payne, Watson Coleman, and distinguished Members of the
subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to discuss
Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology
Directorate's work in assisting surface transportation
agencies, as well as how S&T works collaboratively with the
Transportation Security Administration in this area.
S&T, Science and Technology, Explosives Division enjoys a
close working relationship with TSA's Intermodal Division, the
Office of Security Policy and Industry Engagement, and with
public and private-sector partners to address security gaps in
the Nation's transportation network.
The unique challenges of this open system with no fixed
checkpoints, extremely high passenger throughput, the need to
maintain traveler privacy, and physical safety of both the
traveling public and system operators, as well as an
unalterable existing infrastructure within which technologies
for threat detection must fit necessitates a dedicated program
focused specifically on this significant capability gap.
The S&T Surface Transportation Program goal is to develop a
layered detection system consisting of a suite of sensors
capable of identifying person-borne threat items with a high
probability of detection and a low probability of false alarm,
providing a curb-to-platform layered threat detection system.
We are also advancing the state-of-the-art of intelligent
video and video analytics tools to improve detection of leave-
behind bags and quickly highlighting the surrounding
circumstances of how the bag was left to provide actionable
situational awareness of a potential threat. These tools are
currently in use at the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority Security Operation Center here in the District of
Columbia, and we are planning to transition the capability to a
broader Nation-wide end-user community through a commercial
partnership by 2019.
In addition to electronic technology solutions, DHS Science
and Technology Detection Canine Program has also undertaken an
effort to focus on the person-borne improvised explosive, or
PBIED, detection canine. Canines are the most versatile mobile
detections tools we have to protect the homeland today, and
S&T's PBIED canine initiative was created to assess strengths
and limits of canines specially trained to detect threats being
carried by people either on their persons or in bags in mass
transit and large crowd event venues.
This type of parametric study and testing had not
previously been undertaken in the global detection canine
community. S&T has taken the lead to conduct this type of
parametric study, which is critical to understanding the limits
of performance for the canine detection teams in these types of
search applications.
Chairman Donovan, Katko, Ranking Members Payne and Watson
Coleman, distinguished Members of the committee, thank you
again for your attention to this important mission and for the
opportunity to discuss S&T support to TSA and the surface
transportation agencies.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Roberts follows:]
Prepared Statement of Donald E. Roberts
January 30, 2018
Chairman Donovan, Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Payne, Ranking
Member Watson Coleman, and distinguished Members of the committees,
thank you for inviting DHS to speak with you today. I appreciate the
opportunity to discuss the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Science and Technology Directorate's (S&T) work in assisting surface
transportation agencies, as well as how S&T works collaboratively with
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in this mission area.
I have been the Surface Transportation Explosive Threat Detection
(STETD) program manager since the program's inception in fiscal year
2011, and have been with the Department since 2006. Prior to my time at
DHS, I was a research, development, test, and evaluation program
manager for special programs within DoD focusing on Army aviation and
missile systems, and have worked to develop technology addressing
critical operational gaps from idea to fielding throughout my entire
career.
S&T's Explosive Division enjoys a close working relationship with
TSA's Intermodal Division to ensure the security of our Nation's
transportation systems. The Implementing Recommendations Section 1409
of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-53, (codified at 6
U.S.C. 1138) requires the DHS Secretary to carry out an R&D program
through the S&T Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency
(HSARPA) and in consultation with Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) for the purpose of improving the security of
public transportation systems. S&T appreciates the continued support of
this committee and its Members, as we carry this vital security
mission, and are grateful for the opportunity to foster a stronger
constructive relationship in the future
The U.S. surface transportation network is immense, consisting of
buses, passenger and freight railroads, and ferries. DHS has been
working diligently with public and private-sector partners to address
security gaps in the Nation's transportation network. The challenge is
how to address a decentralized, diffuse, complex, and evolving
terrorist threat in the context of an inherently open and diverse
surface transportation system. The two competing challenges of this
need are the ability to provide credible, real-time detection
capabilities without interrupting the rapid movement of passengers.
Public safety officials have little to no capability to detect
threats being carried into surface transportation venues. They must
rely on intelligence reports before an attack or public reporting of
events already under way. There is often no awareness until after an
attack has already occurred.
DHS S&T has a number of programs/pilots under way to address the
identified security needs in the surface transportation sector. The DHS
S&T Surface Transportation Explosive Threat Detection (STETD) program
was designed to develop a layered detection system consisting of a
suite of sensors capable of identifying person-borne threat items, with
a high probability of detection and low probability of false alarm. The
DHS S&T role is to develop such technology through Developmental Test
and Evaluation (DT&E) and then work with TSA's Office of Requirements
and Capabilities Analysis (ORCA) Intermodal Division to move into
Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E), and ultimately transition to a
commercial partner.
The STETD program began in fiscal year 2011 working with the TSA by
defining site-specific requirements through surface transportation
venue assessments, and identifying capability gaps captured via
Homeland Security Enterprise organizations. After visiting several
surface transit venues of varying sizes (large, medium, and small),
meeting with owners/operators and security personnel, surveying
commercial technologies, and reviewing technology development efforts
across Government agencies and the National laboratories, it was
determined there was no existing solution meeting the requirements
posed by this very challenging environment.
The unique challenges of an open system with no fixed checkpoints,
extremely high passenger throughput, the need to maintain traveler
privacy, and the physical safety of both the traveling public and
system operators, and an unalterable existing infrastructure within
which technologies for threat detection must fit, necessitates a
dedicated program focused specifically on this significant capability
gap. Therefore, DHS created a technology development pathway specific
to the challenge.
The program is developing prototype stand-off detection sensors,
with the vision of providing ``curb to platform'' layered threat
detection distributed throughout a surface transportation venue. The
STETD program is also advancing research and development of Intelligent
Video/Video Analytics (IV/VA) algorithms to improve detection of leave-
behind bags and quickly highlight the surrounding circumstances of how
the bag was left to provide actionable situational awareness of a
potential threat. The Forensic Video Exploitation and Analysis (FOVEA)
analytics tool suite, developed within the STETD program, enables the
operators to save resources on response call-outs; compress long
durations of surveillance video into much shorter clips reducing review
effort from days to hours; and helps operators follow individuals of
interest across multiple camera views. The system is currently in use
at Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) Special
Operations Center, and S&T is planning to transition the capability to
the broader Nation-wide end-user community through a commercial partner
by fiscal year 2019.
In addition to technology solutions, DHS S&T's Detection canine
program has also undertaken an effort to focus on the Person-Borne
Improvised Explosive Device (PBIED) detection canine. Canines are the
most versatile mobile detection tools that we have to protect the
homeland today, and S&T's PBIED canine initiative was created to assess
the strengths and limits of canines specially trained to detect threats
being carried by people, either on their person or in bags, in mass
transit and large crowd event venues. This type of parametric study and
testing had not previously been undertaken in the global detection
canine community. S&T has taken the lead to conduct this type of
parametric study and testing, which is critical to understanding the
limits of performance for the canine detection teams in these types of
search applications.
Chairman Donovan, Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Payne, Ranking
Member Watson Coleman, and distinguished Members of the committees,
thank you again for your attention to this important mission and for
the opportunity to discuss S&T's support to TSA and surface
transportation agencies. I look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Roberts.
Our fourth witness is Mr. Brian Michael Jenkins. In his
role as director of the National Transportation Security Center
of Excellence at the Mineta Transportation Institute, Mr.
Jenkins directs continuing research on protecting surface
transportation against terrorist attacks.
In 1996, President Clinton appointed Mr. Jenkins to the
White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. From
1999 to 2000, he served as advisor to the National Commission
on Terrorism and, in 2000, was appointed to U.S. Comptroller
General's Advisory Board.
Mr. Jenkins is a decorated combat veteran, having served in
the 7th Special Forces Group in the Dominican Republic and with
a 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam.
Sir, thank you for your extended service to our country,
and the Chair now recognizes you for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY CENTER OF EXCELLENCE, MINETA
TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE
Mr. Jenkins. Chairman Katko, Donovan, Ranking Members
Watson Coleman and Payne, distinguished Members of the
committee, thank you very much for inviting me to testify.
Just yesterday, Homeland Security Secretary Nielsen
underscored that America is at war, her words, with jihadist
terrorists world-wide who continue to direct, assist, and
inspire attacks here in the United States. Let me talk for a
minute about the threat.
Terrorists see trains, transit systems, and buses as
killing fields where most of their attacks are intended to
cause large-scale casualties. Over the past 20 years, the
Mineta Transportation Institute has maintained a database of
what are now more than 5,000 attacks on surface transportation.
Let me go to that database and give you some numbers.
Since 9/11, there have been nearly 3,000 attacks on surface
transportation world-wide, resulting in more than 7,500 deaths;
14 of those attacks resulted in 50 or more fatalities each. If
you just take those numbers, the 50 or more incidents, then
that gives you something between 6 and 18 airline crashes or
full hull losses.
In the United States alone, since 9/11, there have been 80
jihadist plots against all targets, more than 20 jihadist
attacks. Surface transportation was targeted in 2 attacks and
in 10 separate terrorist plots.
World-wide, bombings, armed assaults, derailments lead the
list on terrorist attacks on surface transportation. Bombings
account for 58 percent of all the attacks and 51 percent of the
fatalities; armed assaults, 11 percent; derailments, 8 percent.
In 2017, both al-Qaeda and ISIS encouraged followers to
derail trains. This is a long-time ambition of Osama bin Laden,
and al-Qaeda went further and provided on-line advice on how to
build a concrete derailment device.
We haven't seen any noticeable increase in the number of
attempted derailments overall, but just last week, a TGV high-
speed train in France hit a concrete block placed on the rail
line. It stopped the train. It did not derail the train. The
incident is now being investigated.
Although, strictly speaking, not an attack on surface
transportation, we do see an increase in vehicular assaults or
car rammings. This is becoming a world-wide trend. There were
10 incidents between 1996 and 2013, but the pace has quickened
since then. In the 4 years since 2014, there have been 40 such
attacks, 20 in 2017 alone. The United States has experienced 6
of these attacks since 2006.
Analysis of foiled terrorist plots gives us some
indications of how adversaries look at security. They avoid
protected targets. They are aware of CCTV. The visible presence
of police and other security personnel affects their planning.
Over the long run, we can discern deterrent effects.
Finally, and this is good news, ``If you see something, say
something'' campaigns work, and the rate of reporting is
increasing. Reports of suspicious activity or suspicious
objects by alert staff and passengers have resulted in
authorities being able to thwart 11 percent of the attacks and
find and disarm 20 percent of the bombs. That is a significant
achievement. We might want to try to explore how we can improve
public engagement even more. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jenkins follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brian Michael Jenkins\1\
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\1\ Jenkins is also the senior adviser to the president of the RAND
Corporation.
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January 29, 2018
Chairman Katko, Chairman Donovan, Ranking Members Watson Coleman
and Payne, and distinguished Members of the Homeland Security
Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify on the important topic
of surface transportation security.
Public surface transportation offers terrorist attackers crowds of
people concentrated in easily accessible (and escapable) venues. While
sabotaging railroad tracks and other right-of-way infrastructure often
may be intended as merely disruptive, terrorists see trains, transit
systems, and buses as killing fields where attacks are intended to
result in large-scale casualties.
Over the past 20 years, the Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI)
has built and updated a detailed database that now contains more than
5,000 attacks on public surface transportation (primarily buses,
trains, stations, and passenger ferries) since 1970. This database,
which supports the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA's)
analysis, as well as MTI's own reporting, provides a basis for
assessing patterns and trends in terrorist tactics, targeting, and
techniques.
My remarks today are largely based on observations from this
database. I will focus on the terrorist threat and therefore the
relevance of the proposed security measures.
Just yesterday, Secretary of Homeland Security Nielsen underlined
that ``America is at war'' with jihadists world-wide who continue to
direct, assist, and inspire attacks. She went on to say that the United
States had seen a spike in terrorist attacks and that terrorist were
increasingly targeting soft targets which have to be hardened.
Terrorist attacks on aviation have declined, although some
terrorist groups remain fixated on sabotaging airliners, attacks
targeting public surface transportation have increased. However, the
shift from airlines to trains and buses and the underlying reasons are
more complex than mere target substitution. Since 9/11, there have been
27 attacks (hijackings and sabotage attempts) on airliners and 110
attacks on airports. Attacking airports instead of airliners may be
target substitution. Attacks on airliners resulted in 496 fatalities,
while attacks on airports resulted in 195.
During the same period, 2,828 attacks targeted public surface
transportation targets, (not including infrastructure) resulting in
7,524 deaths. That is an average of about 3 fatalities per attack, but
it is noteworthy that 14 attacks resulted in 50 or more fatalities
each. These are roughly equivalent to 6 ``hull losses'' or airline
crashes. Examples include the 2004 Madrid commuter train bombing, which
left 191 dead; the 2005 London transport bombings, which killed 52; and
the 2007 Mumbai train bombing, in which 207 were killed.
Since 1970 the majority of attacks on surface transportation have
taken place in developing countries, which have experienced
approximately 4,500 such attacks. These attacks also are more lethal
than attacks elsewhere. Europe has experienced 492 attacks since 1970,
and the United States and Canada together have suffered 65 attacks,
almost half of which were directed against passenger trains, stations,
and buses. However, since 9/11, more than 80 terrorist plots against
all target categories have been uncovered in the United States, along
with more than 21 attacks inspired by jihadist ideology, and surface
transportation has figured prominently in their plans.
Law enforcement authorities in the United States have done
remarkably well in intercepting terrorist plots. Between 9/11 and 2017,
the FBI, working with local police, uncovered and thwarted about 80
percent of all home-grown jihadist plots, often through undercover
operations.\2\ These plots provide a window into terrorist targeting
preferences--and surface transportation features prominently.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Brian Michael Jenkins, The Origins of America's Jihadists,
Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since 9/11, two surface transportation attacks were actually
attempted. In October 2017, an armed white supremacist entered a secure
area of an Amtrak passenger train engine and triggered an emergency
stop. He was overpowered by train personnel and held for arrest; his
ultimate intentions are not known. In December 2017, Akayed Ullah,
inspired by ISIS ideology, detonated a crude pipe bomb attached to his
body at a busy bus terminal in New York City. The device malfunctioned,
injuring only the bomber.
Surface transportation targets were identified by terrorists in at
least 10 additional reported terrorist plots in the United States.
Canadian police also arrested two men charged with plotting to derail a
passenger train between Toronto and New York. In addition to these
plots, at least one terrorist attack and several shootings by mentally
unstable individuals occurred in the public areas of airports.
Few of these interrupted plots reflected mature operational plans.
As indicated, only two terrorists succeeded in making an actual attempt
on surface transportation targets, and they achieved little result.
Several plots were police ``stings,'' in which the perpetrators
identified the transportation targets. However, at least one plot, a
planned multiple-attacker suicide bombing in New York in 2009, can be
considered a close call. The plot's leader, who had trained in
Afghanistan, reportedly had built suicide vests but destroyed them when
he suspected police were about to close in. Collectively, the many
plots indicate continued terrorist interest in targeting surface
transportation.
Fortunately, America's post-9/11 cohort of home-grown terrorists
have not proved to be especially competent. Their plots, for the most
part, can be described as aspirational. Their desire to belong exceeds
their concerns about their own security and they end up joining what
turns out to be the ``FBI branch'' of al-Qaeda or ISIS. Their bombs
seldom work. In two of four bombing attacks, the device did not
detonate as expected. In the third attack--the Boston Marathon
bombing--the terrorists' two bombs killed 3 persons, although many were
injured. In a fourth jihadist attack involving bombs in New Jersey and
New York, 20 were injured, none were killed. This gives U.S. Jihadist
bombers an FPA (fatalities per attack) that is only a fraction of the
world average.\3\ Most jihadist terrorist bombings in the United States
are one-offs--there is no learning and no improvement in skills.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ All statistics derive from MTI's database.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Through their on-line publications, jihadist terrorist groups have
urged followers to attack transportation systems. In 2017, both al-
Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) encouraged
attempts to derail trains, a long-time ambition of Osama bin Laden. Al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) added to its exhortation
instructions on how to build a derailing device. Thus far, there has
been no noticeable increase in attacks aimed at derailment, however, on
Sunday, January 21, a TGV high-speed train hit a concrete block placed
on the rail line in the south of France. Two other blocks reportedly
had been placed on the tracks. The train did not derail. French
authorities are currently investigating whether there is a nexus to
terrorism.
While terrorists have traditionally attacked unprotected targets,
they have historically preferred venues with some symbolic importance.
That is less and less the case as terrorists move toward what might be
called ``pure terrorism,'' attacking assemblies of people or
individuals anywhere, killing simply to participate in bloodshed and
make the point that no one is safe anywhere. ISIS, in particular, has
attracted self-selecting terrorists whom it encourages with the promise
of applause and ex post facto membership.
Bombings, armed assaults, and derailments lead the list of tactics
employed against surface transportation world-wide, accounting for
approximately 77 percent of all types of attacks and 74 percent of all
fatalities. Bombings account for approximately 58 percent of attacks
and 51 percent of fatalities. Armed assaults are individually more
lethal. They account for about 11 percent of all attacks and 18 percent
of all fatalities. We also see a growing number of primitive attacks
involving knives and hatchets. Derailments, using bombs or mechanical
means of sabotage, constitute almost another 8 percent of all attacks
and account for 5 percent of total fatalities.
Although vehicular attacks are not, strictly speaking, attacks on
public surface transportation, they are increasingly employed by
terrorists world-wide (and some vehicular assaults abroad have been
directed against surface transportation targets, for example, driving
cars into bus stops or buses).\4\ Both al-Qaeda and, more recently,
ISIS have urged their followers to drive into crowds of pedestrians. A
deadly vehicle attack took place in New York in October 2017, when an
individual inspired by ISIS veered a rented truck on to a bike path,
killing 8 people. Ten such attacks took place between 1996 and 2013,
but since 2014, the pace has quickened, with more than 40 vehicular
assaults. More than 20 of them occurred in 2017 alone. More than 150
people have been killed by homicidal drivers in the past 19 months, and
nearly 800 have been injured. Seven such attacks have occurred in the
United States since 2006. Vehicular assaults pose a major problem for
urban planners.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce R. Butterworth, Terrorist
Vehicle Attacks on Public Surface Transportation Targets, San Jose,
Calif.: Mineta Transportation Institute, 2017.
\5\ Brian Michael Jenkins, ``Navigating the Latest Terrorist
Trend,'' U.S. News & World Report, December 19, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of security measures
against terrorism. Terrorist attacks are statistically rare and
random--there are too few, and they are spread over too many target
categories and countries to allow empirical evaluation. Moreover,
security measures don't ``catch'' would-be attackers like insects in a
net. Few attacks are visibly prevented by security.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Brian Michael Jenkins, The Challenge of Protecting Transit and
Passenger Rail, San Jose, Calif.: Mineta Transportation Institute,
2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nevertheless, it is possible in some cases to discern deterrent
effects. For example, as security to protect commercial aviation has
increased over the years, there has been a corresponding decline in the
number of attempted airline hijackings and bombings. A majority of
these since 9/11 have involved mentally unbalanced individuals who, in
fact, smuggled no weapons or explosive devices on board, but claimed to
possess bombs. By the nature of their mental condition, they would not
be easily deterred. Finally, most of the recent events have occurred
outside of the United States and Europe, in places where security is
less stringent. All of this suggests that deterrence has been
effective.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce R. Butterworth, The Threat to
Air and Ground Transportation Posed by Mentally Disordered Assailant,
San Jose, Calif.: Mineta Transportation Institute, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Analysis of foiled terrorist plots, in which apprehended terrorists
were questioned about their target choices and planning considerations,
has provided some indications of how adversaries evaluate security
measures. Terrorists demonstrably favor soft targets where they do not
have to penetrate protected perimeters and are unlikely to encounter
armed guards. There are ample public spaces that meet these criteria.
Anecdotally, we know that terrorists are sometimes aware of CCTV and
may try to disguise their reconnaissance efforts. The visible presence
of police and other security personnel has caused them to delay
attacks.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Brian Michael Jenkins, Carnage Interrupted: An Analysis of
Fifteen Terrorist Plots Against Public Surface Transportation, San
Jose, Calif. : Mineta Transportation Institute, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The terrorists may presume that some kind of surveillance is in
place--for example, the presumption of undercover police adds to
uncertainty, which adversaries generally abhor. This suggests that
robust security presence operating in unpredictable ways, accompanied
by the impression that more security personnel might be present,
contributes to deterrence, although the actual effect cannot be
calculated.
One aspect of security merits further examination and effort. ``See
something, say something'' works and the rate of reporting has been
increasing. Observations and reports of suspicious activities or
objects by employees, passengers, or others have enabled authorities to
prevent 11 percent of terrorist attacks and to disarm or destroy 20
percent of terrorist bombs. Public education programs and intensified
campaigns to engage staff and passengers may be able to further improve
this performance.
Mr. Katko. Thank you very much, Mr. Jenkins. We appreciate
you being here today.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions--or
actually what we are going to do is we will go to 3 minutes of
questions, and then we are going to have to break very soon for
votes, and then we are going to have to come back and get
through it. So my question will be very brief, I hope.
We recently had a hearing on TSA's strategic 5-year
technology investment plan. The purpose of that plan is to
accelerate significant advancements in security technology
capabilities and deployment of these systems in the Nation's
TSA arena.
What is starkly lacking from that 5-year plan is any
mention of surface transportation anywhere. So my question to
you is: How would you describe TSA's prioritization of surface
transportation capability gaps compared to aviation capability
gaps? Anyone want to take that?
Mr. Pryor. Yes, sir. I am the sacrificial technologist
today.
Mr. Katko. I guess the point is--I am not trying to put
anybody on the spot here. To me, that is a glaring omission. I
mean, we just had the first suicide--attempted suicide bombing
of an American train system, and that is a pretty serious
thing, and so that the 5-year technology plan is designed to
force TSA to look at the advancing technologies.
Let me ask you this: Isn't it fair to say that it would be
a good idea to have something in the 5-year technology plan
regarding surface transportation systems?
Mr. Pryor. Yes, sir. The 5-year technology plan is
primarily focused on TSA's procurements through those 5 years,
and as mentioned, TSA does not procure technologies directly
for surface transportation venues.
TSA does have other plans--for example, the National
Security Plan, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, and
others--that do talk about advancements in technology. As far
as prioritization, TSA has many different priorities and has to
rank order them according to TSA's understanding of its mission
and its threats.
Mr. Katko. I will just close with this, and I will move on,
because I think it is only fair to give my colleagues a chance
to ask. I will note that given the billions--with a B--the
billions of passengers per year on American surface
transportation systems, to me, it would be a good idea to start
including that in part of the plan because, whether you like it
or not, it is clear now that that is also a target of the bad
guys, and so we should at least have something in there that
forces public scrutiny in a more crystalized manner of that
system.
So, with that, I recognize my colleague from New Jersey,
Mrs. Watson Coleman, for questions.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First, I would like to ask for unanimous consent to enter
this letter in from the American Public Transportation
Association in support of my legislation.
Mr. Katko. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Letter from the American Public Transportation Association
December 13, 2017.
The Honorable Bonnie Watson Coleman,
United States House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Congresswoman Watson Coleman: On behalf of the more than 1,500
member organizations of the American Public Transportation Association
(APTA) and the billions of public transportation riders across the
nation, I thank you for your leadership in introducing the ``Surface
Transportation and Public Area Security Act of 2017.''
The industry welcomes the bill's increased authorization for
federal transit security funding. It would also improve intelligence
information sharing and coordination and create new security training
programs. Lastly, we appreciate the bill's provisions that promote
research, demonstration, and implementation of innovative security
technologies.
I thank you for the opportunity for APTA members to offer input on
the bill. We look forward to working with you as the legislative
process continues.
Sincerely,
Richard A. White,
Acting President and CEO.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you so much.
I am going to try to get some ``yes'' and ``no''s here. So
I am going to start with Ms. Proctor and anybody else that
wants to jump in here.
I want to ask about: Do you believe that the security
grants--the Transit Security Grants Program is effective?
Ms. Proctor. Yes, ma'am, I do.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Do you believe that it is
undersourced? Do you think you need more money?
Ms. Proctor. I would say that the security partners that
receive the grants would certainly agree with that.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Would certainly say so. What about the
VIPR program? Do you think that that is helpful?
Ms. Proctor. The VIPR program has been a great asset to our
security transportation partners in providing----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So do you support increasing the
number of those? Do you think that that is a real link between
security and--well, security?
Ms. Proctor. The presence of VIPR teams and surface
transportation has true value.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. What about just the additional canines
as security? I am just so interested in them because I know
that the surface transportation issue is just so complex and so
diverse that it seems to me that puppies trained are very
helpful to keeping our passengers safe.
Ms. Proctor. I am certainly an advocate of the TSA canine
program and believe it has great value in the surface
transportation arena. You often see canines in places like
Amtrak.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Yes.
Ms. Proctor. And WMATA.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So the answer is basically yes. I am
sorry. I am just----
Ms. Proctor. Yes.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So, in addition to that, do you think
that more law enforcement presence is a good deterrent as well
and a good security measure?
Ms. Proctor. More law enforcement presence is always good.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Should I get you to sign an
endorsement to my surface transportation legislation, which
hopefully will be addressed? This is just a rhetorical
question. I am not going to put you in that position.
Ms. Proctor. Thank you.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. But it does address those needs that
we think that are woefully inadequately addressed by TSA that
is doing a yeoman's job in aviation but leaves a lot to be
concerned about with regard to surface transportation.
I have a number of questions. I certainly would love to
have a conversation with Mr. Jenkins about the fact that we
don't have the experiences that other countries have had, and
were there things that they do or can do with technology that
they have that we don't have and don't employ and don't use,
but I think my time has run out. But I would like you to put
that in your mind, and if we can't get to that today, you will
be able to give that some thought and communicate to us through
the Chairman.
Mr. Katko. I think--I am sorry. Thank you, Mrs. Watson
Coleman.
I think we will have time after votes to revisit that
issue.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. OK.
Mr. Katko. We will do another round of questioning so long
as time permits.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. I yield back.
Mr. Katko. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New
York, Mr. Donovan.
Mr. Donovan. We only have two votes, so we will be back
real quick, so let me ask one question, and then we will get to
the other stuff.
Mr. Roberts, I just wanted to ask you: The Surface
Explosive Transportation Detection Program was created about 5
years ago, 6 years ago, in 2011, I believe it was. It was
supposed to develop multi-layer detection systems. I was just
wondering, have we deployed any of those, and if we have, how
many, and if you at some point can provide a list for us?
Mr. Roberts. Yes, sir. The program began with cooperation
of our customer component here, the TSA, and it began in
basically a survey of the requirements needed. So the first
couple of years was assessing whether what the end-users
needed, what kind of technology would work within their systems
in a high-throughput open system. It also measured the concern
with cost for these systems.
Then we developed a requirements pathway in our current
technology development road map for these systems. So these
current systems, we support TSA in developing technology to a
developmental test and evaluation stage, proof of principle,
and then we hand it off to Bob's mass transit test beds to be
able to go through operational testing.
So we are still in the proof of principle stage with these
multi-layered sensor systems, and so we are not in the
operational testing yet. We are in the developmental testing
phase.
Mr. Donovan. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield so we can get up to votes.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Donovan. The Chair now recognizes
Mr. Payne for questioning.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. Mr. Proctor, last year, there were
reports that Australian officials arrested two men last year
trying to use an improvised chemical dispersion device to
release a toxic chemical in public transportation. How is TSA
working with its partners and offices and components at DHS to
help transit owners and operators prevent, detect, and respond
to similar threats?
Ms. Proctor. Thank you, Ranking Member. TSA has convened a
number of opportunities to share this information with our
stakeholders. We provided a Classified briefing of that threat
to our mass transit and passenger security partners. We have
held a workshop, a chemical threat workshop, to talk about some
of the technological options that are out there. We did that in
December.
We have shared information about countermeasures, and we
continue to have that discussion with our security partners as
we continue to plan training that will help them continue to
train their work force.
Mr. Payne. OK. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Payne.
This subcommittee hearing now stands in recess, subject to
the call of the Chair, and I will caution everyone to please
come back quickly right after the votes, and we will get right
back at it. Thank you very much.
[Recess.]
Mr. Katko. The hearing is now in session. Thank you for
waiting for us in that delay. We got back as quickly as
possible.
The Chair now recognizes from gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.
Higgins, for 3 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will move quickly.
Madam, gentlemen, I represent the Third District of
Louisiana, which is recognized as a hub of industrial growth in
the petrochemical industry and oil and gas. Over $120 billion
worth of projects either currently producing and under
construction and expansion or moving quickly toward production
and under construction. Each of these private-endeavor projects
have stood up quite extensive security measures within their
perimeters. They have excellent teams, including tactical teams
from my friends at the thin blue line. They have excellent
screening of personnel for drugs and explosives regarding
keeping that stuff off of the premises.
But I am concerned about--and I would like to hear your
input on--the rural areas of rail systems and what are we doing
to help secure these rail systems? These products--dangerous
chemicals and fuels are leaving these projects, right, leaving
these plants. They are either shipped by truck or by rail
mostly. But the truck driver himself becomes a security asset
because it is a single unit moving; he is driving it; he is
responsible for it; and they accelerate quickly when they have
left the security environment of the plant itself.
But, by rail, these--the railways--the trains exit very
slowly. It takes them awhile to get up to speed. So I am
concerned about a timed device, an explosive device, or a
remotely-controlled device being placed on a slow-moving train
carrying dangerous products through rural areas, because they
don't stay in rural areas. They leave the plants. They go
through heavily-populated areas and then onto their final
destination. So what are we doing to help with that?
Mr. Pryor. Thank you, sir. Technologically-wise, and of
course, Chief Proctor has numbers of operational solutions as
well, we are doing three general separate things. The first
thing, we have a partnership with a major pipeline company--it
would be a name you know, sir; I prefer not to give it in open
session--where we provide infrastructure protection test bed
for block valve sites, booster sites, and we have also put a
small test bed up on the campus of our analysis laboratory,
Johns Hopkins Applied Physics, up in Maryland, that they can
use as a local prototype, and then we export those
technologies. So that is the work we are doing in the physical
plant.
In the case of rail, TSA led an effort a number of years
ago that led to a redesign in tank cars to make them less
susceptible to ballistic damage from high-powered rifles, 50-
cals, those kinds of things, as well as the IEDs you mentioned.
Those are rapidly coming into service. We also have pretty much
pioneered within the United States under-vehicle screening
systems. S&T collaborated with us, and those systems have
actively been used in places like New York and others. So that
is a third approach.
Then we also have a good understanding of ways that hazmat
vehicles could potentially be controlled. If a shipper or a
truck operator decides that they feel they have a threat, there
are modifications that can be made to the vehicle to allow it
to be safely disabled without harm to the driver or the public.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you for that very thorough answer.
Mr. Chairman, perhaps the members of the panel that have
additional responses to my question could submit their answers
in writing.
In the interest of time, I yield back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you.
Mr. Katko. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Rhode
Island, Mr. Langevin, for 3 minutes of questions.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today.
Mr. Chairman, as the panel's testimony has made very clear,
countless Americans and American businesses depend on surface
transportation every day, highlighting the importance of this
hearing this afternoon.
So, increasingly, surface transportation providers rely on
interconnected systems to monitor and control vehicles in
supporting infrastructure. Now, with that increased
connectivity, though, comes an increased responsibility to
protect those systems against things like cyber threats. So
recent events, including the ransomware attacks last June that
debilitated several shipping and logistics companies in an
incident reported just last week targeting a regional surface
transportation provider in Toronto demonstrate that this threat
is real.
So my question to start with, Ms. Proctor, in your
testimony, you also discussed resources TSA invests to help
surface owners and operators identify vulnerabilities and risks
in their operations and to help owners and operators develop
risk-mitigation solutions. So I want to know: Does TSA
currently view cybersecurity as a capability gap in surface
transportation security?
Ms. Proctor. Thank you so much for that question. Yes, sir.
TSA does view cybersecurity as a gap. As you are aware, we have
done a number of things to both educate our surface security
partners on cybersecurity issues. We have developed tools for
their use. We have developed the cybersecurity tool kit. We
have started a number of cybersecurity workshops. We delivered
4 of those in fiscal year 2017. We have started a series of 6
in this fiscal year. Our focus in those is--those are focused
on the nontechnical issues which end up really creating a lot
of the problems with things like ransomware and phishing
attacks.
So, in those workshops, we are focused on 5 things that
they can do in their company. We call it 5 and 5. Five things
you can do in 5 days that raise the cybersecurity bar in your
company. When there are cyber-related incidents, we distribute
cybersecurity awareness messages to our security partners to
identify the threat and to encourage them to take certain steps
so that they might be able to thwart future attempts.
We work very closely with ICS-CERT. We have worked very
closely with them in developing, for instance, our pipeline
security guidelines because of the significance of cyber in the
control of the Nation's pipeline. So we have partnered with
those that we realize are the recognized experts there in ICS-
CERT, and we bring that knowledge to our surface security
partners.
Mr. Langevin. When you say ``pipeline,'' does that include
things like the supply chain?
Ms. Proctor. Yes, sir.
Mr. Langevin. OK. Thank you. If I could, also, in your
testimony, you described TSA's role in supporting the accurate
and timely exchange of intelligence information with surface
transportation owners and operators. So how does TSA monitor
and share relevant intelligence about cybersecurity threats to
the owners and operators of surface transportation systems?
Ms. Proctor. We provide briefings to our surface security
partners. When appropriate, we provide Classified information
to those cleared partners. But we provide that information
through both teleconferences, through our cybersecurity
awareness messages, and through our work with ICS-CERT.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. I have gone over my time. I have
some other questions I will submit for the record, but I want
to thank our panel.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. I will note that we are
probably going to do a second round of 3 minutes of questions.
If you want to stick around, we are happy to do so.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Rutherford, for 3 minutes of questions.
Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Jenkins, in Mr. Roberts' testimony, he noted, and I
quote: Public safety officials have little to no capability to
detect threats being carried into surface transportation venues
and must rely on intelligence reports before an attack.
You had some really good information, I think, about the
types of attacks that have taken place against surface
transportation. Seventy-seven percent of all attacks were
bombing, armed assaults, or derailments, and then you went on
to break that down. That is pretty good intel.
Has there been any kind of work with TSA to see that the
nature of those attacks and then how we may be able to respond
to those, besides the intelligence gathering that Mr. Roberts
correctly pointed out is necessary?
Mr. Jenkins. The answer is yes. In fact, we maintain that
database to support TSA. So we update the database every 15
days. TSA personnel and their intelligence folks and their
analytical folks have the password that gives them direct
access to the database. It is not available publicly.
Mr. Rutherford. Uh-huh.
Mr. Jenkins. Because the database itself simply doesn't
record the incident, it is a very detailed database that
records, for example, if we are talking about explosives,
method of delivery, method of concealment, type of explosives,
and so on.
Mr. Rutherford. Right.
Mr. Jenkins. TSA uses that to support their own analysis,
and it supports, of course, at the same time, our separate
reporting, and those reports go to TSA, and they go to the
operators.
Mr. Rutherford. OK. I understand, Ms. Proctor, that TSA is
doing some work with stakeholders to get feedback on some
testing and technology, but can you talk about any development
of technology as a result of the information that has been
provided, the kind of information that Mr. Jenkins is talking
about? Are we utilizing that at ORCA or how----
Ms. Proctor. I would defer to Mr. Pryor on that question.
Mr. Pryor. Yes, sir. Our annual work plans and spend plans
rest on several fundamental analyses. One, of course, is threat
and risk. Mr. Jenkins' information is always very helpful for
us. Another one is on capability gaps provided by our industry
partners. We have an annual process where those are developed.
Then the third is National laws, 9/11 Act, National plans, and
those sorts of things.
So risk is an important component of how we determine our
work each year.
Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, sir.
My time has run out. I yield back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Rutherford.
I have two quick questions. The first one is something that
I have been become aware of. It is a little off track here, a
little bit but not much. I have become aware of the fact that
it seems more and more that some train companies that haul
hazardous material will oftentimes park those hazardous
materials, sometimes for days on end, outside a secure area. I
would like to hear if that is a growing concern amongst all of
you, and whether that is an area of inquiry that we should get
into, and whether or not you have concerns. Any of you?
Ms. Proctor. Mr. Chairman, the regulation requires that
hazmat material on freight rail trains be maintained in a
secure area. So they should not be left unattended in an area
that is not considered secure. That is a requirement that they
be in a secure area and maintained until they are transferred.
Mr. Katko. I am aware what the regulations are, but I am
asking--I guess I am asking, are you aware of instances where
that is happening lately? That seems like this term single
tracking comes to mind, where some companies engage in that,
and, therefore, sometimes they are storing things outside of
the secure area when they shouldn't be. Has that become an
issue, or is that something that is not a big issue in your
mind? Any of you? Anybody?
Ms. Proctor. Sir, that has not been something that has been
brought to our attention. To the contrary, our surface
inspectors report extremely high rate of compliance on that, so
we have not had reports of that.
Mr. Katko. OK. In a related matter, when you go through the
cities--well, I will withdraw that. Let me change gears back to
a more germane question here. There seems to be a pervasive,
not just with TSA but Homeland Security as a whole, a prolonged
technology development process. Sometimes by the time the
technology gets to the front lines, it is already antiquated or
on the way to being antiquated.
I would like to know from you all if there is any change to
the TSIF for the testing facility that would help alleviate
that process because there is a perceived bottleneck there. Are
there things we could do with TSIF that might help that
process? Anybody?
Mr. Pryor. Yes, sir. TSIF is not a primary test venue for
surface transportation. Its focus is primarily on passenger
air. Because we are outwardly facing, we have a very adroit and
high-speed process where we can induct products from industry,
get them tested, and, if they are operation effective and
suitable, put them in the field. That is one of the hallmarks
of our program, and we do that through our relationships with
many different laboratories and centers.
As I mentioned, our test lab is Applied Physics, but we
also have relationships with Navy, DOD, a number of DOD
agencies, Department of Energy, and others that allow us to
leverage their developments to get things in the field for
prototyping very quickly.
Mr. Katko. Why aren't they doing it on the aviation side?
Do you have any idea?
Mr. Pryor. Procurement, of course, is managed by the
Federal Acquisition and Regulations and other requirements, and
the degree of rigor leading to a procurement often requires a
significant amount of testing, particularly for passenger air.
It is just in a different environment than the one we operate
in where we have a great deal more flexibility in how we bring
things to the field.
Mr. Katko. All right. Thank you very much, very helpful.
I now recognize the gentlewoman from New Jersey, Mrs.
Watson Coleman.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Jenkins, I would like to have a conversation with you a
little bit here. I am really concerned about the recent trend
of terrorists who use trucks or cars or whatever, like in New
York and like in Charlottesville. I am just wondering: These
attacks, are these lone wolves, low financing, low planning,
low everything? Is there anything that we should be doing,
could be doing, that would make sense from a security
perspective?
Mr. Jenkins. In terms of solving the problem as a security
issue, it is limited. The fact is that, in cities, thousands,
tens of thousands, millions of people live in close proximity,
in some cases only inches away from thousands of vehicles.
Without completely reconfiguring our urban landscape, we are
not going to be able to create effective barriers throughout.
We just have to be realistic about that.
Things that are being explored, I mean, everything from
putting in place some barriers to protection of venues for
certain periods of time that can be done, looking far out as we
move toward more autonomous vehicles, then that may provide
some solution in that they can be programmed not to do that.
But, of course, that raises other kinds of cyber vulnerability.
So this is one that we are simply going to be living with and
struggling with. As I said, I am afraid, because, as you have
correctly pointed out, it is so easy to do, that this is
becoming a trend.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. We have been a bit more
fortunate than places in Europe and otherwise as it relates to
attacks on surface transportation. I am wondering: Do you know
of any lessons that they have learned, any technologies they
employ, any best practices they employ, having had these
experiences, that we could be benefiting from if we had the
resources? Is that kind of sharing happening?
Mr. Jenkins. First of all, there is coordination between
what TSA does in terms of surface transportation and a great
deal of liaison goes on between the other entities abroad,
especially with the British, in terms of what they do for
securing surface transportation. So there is a lot of exchange
going on already.
In some cases, they have different approaches. For example,
in France and in Belgium, either in response to intelligence or
in response to a terrorist event, they will literally flood the
transportation system with thousands of individuals drawn from
the gendarmerie and drawn from the military, simply to augment
security.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. But this is related to intelligence,
advance information, and----
Mr. Jenkins. Or an actual attack, and that is not an
approach that we normally take.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. We actually still haven't gotten to
the other question that I had that I just want to put on the
table, and that is, is there any technology that you see being
employed in places that have had these experiences much more
than us that would be helpful here? I will just be happy if you
would send that information to me.
With that, I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mrs. Watson Coleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York for
questioning.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pryor, I think during the Chairman's questioning, you
said that you are able to quickly deploy security measures that
have been tested and get them out in the field as quickly as
possible.
During your testimony earlier, Mr. Roberts, it has been 7
years now since the detection, multi-layer detection, has been
authorized, has been in progress, and yet, 7 years later, we
have nothing in the field. Can you explain to me what the
obstacles are, and if so, what could be done about overcoming
them?
The other part of my question would be: I suspect in those
7 years, our enemies, the people who are threatening our
passengers, our riders, have changed their modes and their
methods, and so we may be testing things that, in 2011, 2012,
2013, were their modes and methods, but now 6, 7 years later,
those have changed, and maybe we are testing things that are
obsolete now.
Mr. Roberts. Yes, sir. One of the things about the modes
and methods--I will answer that portion first--is that, with
Mr. Jenkins' report and with our international partners, we are
aware of what the evolving threats are. So we are--our design
points for our technology are still relevant and realistic.
As far as the 7-years piece, as I mentioned before, the
first part of our program was standing up from nothing. We,
along with our component customers, TSA, and our stakeholders,
gathered and understood what the requirements were, what their
priorities were. So what we did, in addition to that, is assess
what was available as far as technology to stop this potential
threat in an open system, high throughput, not interfering with
existing infrastructure, those kinds of things. It was--we
reviewed what was available in DOD and National laboratories,
and Mr. Pryor's program tested and evaluated some of that. My
program also did the same thing, the S&T program. So we started
with the first piece of the program, just understanding where
we needed to go and frame out the technology development
pathway to set the requirements for our partners with the
expertise.
So, really, where we are now in driving the technology
development for our end goal started 2013, 2014, but it is--the
testing and evaluation, it is not obsolete. It is designed with
our end-users in mind. That is one of the reasons we are being
successful in our technology development pathways; we are
involving our component customers, as well as the stakeholders,
in the design process.
Mr. Donovan. Even if that is true that it began in 2013,
2014, that is still 4 or 5 years ago. Do we have any
expectations of getting anything in the field in the near
future?
Mr. Pryor. Sir, one part of your answer is that S&T and TSA
occupy two separate parts of the mission space. S&T's job is to
push the boundaries of technology, provide evolving
technologies. TSA's part of the mission space is to take more
advanced technologies, prototypes, things that will be entering
in the marketplace soon, induct them, test them, give
manufacturers improvements. So it is a continuum.
S&T will work for a few years, 3 or 4 or 5, to advance
technology while we are operating in the marketplace, and then
when their technologies are mature enough, they will transition
them to us to actually assess.
Mr. Donovan. But none of the items that they have--and I am
not criticizing their work; I am trying to figure out why it is
such a long period of time--the things that they have tested,
the technology that they have either proven to be workable or
not workable, is still not in the field, it still hasn't been
passed over to you to be put in the field yet? Am I
understanding that correctly?
Mr. Roberts. Well, the program is framed out in near-, mid-
, and far-term goals. Our near goals were video analytics to
help these guys do, that are deployed currently, the FOVEA
tool, at the Washington Metropolitan Area Center. So our near-
term objectives and deliverables, the low-hanging fruit, for
lack of a better word, is deployed now into the developmental
testing realm and is near term with our operators.
The farther--the mid-term is automated detection of leave-
behind bags. That is near-term. The further term is the harder
problem: Detecting threats being brought in, either worn or
carried in, in a high throughput open system. These are the
longer-term goals as we establish the program, and they are
about 3 to 5 years. Technology of this magnitude and for this
hard problem is a long development time line.
Mr. Donovan. Three to 5 years, is that 3 to 5 years from
the beginning or 3 to 5 years from now?
Mr. Roberts. Three to 5 years from now.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you.
I am way over my time, Mr. Chairman, I apologize.
Mr. Katko. Not at all. Well, that concludes the hearing. I
want to thank the witnesses for their thoughtful testimony and
for discussing how TSA and S&T collaborate to address unique
security threats facing transit systems.
To say the least, you are an impressive panel. You all have
very impressive backgrounds, and we all thank you for the
things you do to help keep this country safe.
I think in this time of increased threats--and we all know
about them. We get briefed on a regular basis, and we see them
on TV. The fact that we had the first attempted suicide bombing
of a railway facility in the United States is a sober reminder
of the ever-evolving threat.
So we need to be ever-vigilant, and we need to continue to
work together, to continue to be a--need to conduct robust
oversight of what you are doing, but we definitely need to get
your information. It is impressive how much better the rail
side is than the aviation side is about getting technologies to
the front lines, and even on your side, it is still difficult,
given some of the hurdles you need to go through. So we are
constantly trying to get past those hurdles to make sure that
we give the front-line folks all the tools we have at our
disposal. There is nothing more frustrating than seeing
somebody with a good idea and that good idea never gets to
front lines because of bureaucratic nonsense. That is something
we are constantly fighting against.
So thank you all very much. You helped us and you helped us
advance that cause.
Members of the committee may have some additional questions
for the witnesses, and we will ask you to respond to these in
writing. Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the hearing record
will be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank
you all.
[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
[all]