## Information Technology Laboratory

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Modes of Operation Validation System for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TMOVS):<br>Requirements and Procedures

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## Computer Science

## and Technology

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Modes of Operation Validation System for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
(TMOVS):

## Requirements and Procedures

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## Revision History

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| Section | Revision |
| :---: | :--- |
| 5.7.2, Table <br> 62 | Within the "Perform Triple DES" pseudocode for OFB-I mode of operation, change <br> the ELSE command to $\mathrm{j}=0_{\mathrm{j}-3}$. The subscript was $\mathrm{j}-2$ which was incorrect. |
| 5.7.2, Item <br> $2 . \mathrm{b} .2$ | Within 2.b.2. change (j-2) to (j-3). This change is made to correct an incorrect <br> subscript. (Same change as above.) |
| Revision <br> History <br> April 2000 | Changed page numbers to section numbers |

## Revision History

## April 2000

| Section | Revision |
| :---: | :---: |
| OVERALL | Rename the Modes Tests to the Monte Carlo Tests to coincide with all other documents. |
| OVERALL | Represent "through" as ".." not "-" |
| OVERALL | Draw a box around the Triple DES operations in the pseudocode to indicate what code is from the Triple DES standard and what code is part of the Validation test. |
| OVERALL | Replace subscript numbers with subscript variable names. For example, $\mathrm{C}_{9999}$ is replaced with $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}$. |
| 2 | Make reference to the three different keying options specified in FIPS PUB 46-3. |
| 4.3.2 | Input Type 2 - remove "...represented as a 16 character ASCII...", replace with "...represented as an ASCII..." |
| 4.3.5 | Input Type 5 - same as above |
| 4.3.8 | Input Type 8 - same as above |
| 4.3.13 | Input Type 13 - same as above |
| 4.3.15 | Input Type 15 - same as above |
| 4.3.18 | Input Type 18 - same as above |
| 4.3.21 | Input Type 21 - same as above |
| 4.3.22 | Input Type 22 - for TEXT 1, TEXT2, and TEXT3 remove "... 1 to 64 binary..." replace with "... 64 binary..." |
| 4.3.24 | Input Type 24 - same as above |
| 4.4.2 | Output Type 2 - for DATA and RESULT remove "...is a 16 character hexidecimal...", replace with "...is 1-64 binary bits represented as an ASCII hexidecimal..." |


| 4.4.3 | Output Type 3 - same as above |
| :---: | :---: |
| 4.4.6 | Output Type 6 - same as above |
| 4.4.7 | Output Type 7 - same as above |
| 4.4.8 | Output Type 8 - same as above |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 5.1.1.1 } \\ & \text { Table } 1 \end{aligned}$ | In pseudocode, Send statement - the subscript on C should be lowercase i. |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 5.1.1.6 } \\ & \text { Table } 6 \end{aligned}$ | Replace $\mathrm{P}_{0}=\mathrm{C}_{9999}$ with $\mathrm{P}_{0}=\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}$ |
| 5.2.1.1 <br> Table 13 | In pseudocode, the subscript should be lowercase i |
| 5.2.1.6, 2.f | Switch 2) and 3) to make the text coincide with the pseudocode |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { 5.3.1.1 } \\ \text { Table } 25 \end{gathered}$ | In pseudocode, Send statement $-\mathrm{I} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{I} 3_{\mathrm{i}}$ should be sent instead of $\mathrm{P} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{P} 3_{i}$ |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { 5.3.1.1 } \\ \text { Table } 25 \end{gathered}$ | Clock Cycle T4, 2) - The subscript on TEMP3 should be 1. |
| 5.3.1.1 | b. - Replace $\mathrm{P} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{i}}$ with $\mathrm{I} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{I} 2_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{I} 3_{\mathrm{i}}$. |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { 5.3.1.6 } \\ \text { Table } 30 \end{gathered}$ | Replace $\mathrm{Ck}_{9998}$ with $\mathrm{Ck}_{\mathrm{j}-1}$ and replace $\mathrm{Ck}_{9999}$ with $\mathrm{Ck}_{\mathrm{j}}$ |
| 5.3.1.6 | Clock Cycle T4, a) - replace $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$ with $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$ <br> b) - replace $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$ with $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$ <br> replace $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ with $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$ <br> Swap a) and b) to make the text coincide with the pseudocode. |
| 5.3.1.6 | In f), g) and h) - <br> Replace subscript 9999 with j <br> Replace subscript 9998 with j-1 <br> Replace subscript 9997 with j-2 |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { 5.3.2.6 } \\ \text { Table } 36 \end{gathered}$ | In the pseudocode, add "FOR $\mathrm{k}=1$ to 3 " |


| 5.3.2.6 <br> Table 36 | Replace subscript 9999 with j |
| :---: | :---: |
| 5.3.2.6 | In Clock Cycle T1-b), Clock Cycle T2: b), and Clock Cycle T3: b): <br> The j in $\mathrm{I} 1 \mathrm{j}, \mathrm{I} 2 \mathrm{j}$, and I 3 j , respectively, should be a subscript: $\mathrm{I} 1_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{I} 2_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{I} 3_{\mathrm{j}}$. |
| 5.3.2.6 | In 2b) - Add comma after $\mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{j}}$. |
| 5.3.2.6 | In f. - Add comment "Note j=9999." |
| 5.3.2.6 | In f), g) and h) - <br> Replace subscript 9999 with j <br> Replace subscript 9998 with j-1 <br> Replace subscript 9997 with j-2 |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { 5.4.2.1 } \\ \text { Table } 42 \end{gathered}$ | In pseudocode, replace the subscript 9999 with j |
| 5.4.2.1 | In 2) and 3) - Replace the subscript 9999 with j |
| 5.4.2.1 | In 3) - Add subscripts to I and k-bit C so they read $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}$ and $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}$ |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { 5.4.2.2 } \\ \text { Table } 43 \end{gathered}$ | In pseudocode, replace the subscript 9999 with j . |
| 5.4.2.2 | In 2) and 3) - Replace the subscript 9999 with j . |
| 5.4.2.2 | In 2) - Add subscripts to I and k-bit C so they read $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}$ and $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}$ |
| $\begin{gathered} \hline 5.5 .2 .1 \\ \text { Table } 49 \end{gathered}$ | In pseudocode, the code pertaining to the Triple DES algorithm does not coincide with the Triple DES standard. The subscript on RESULT should be j-3, i.e., $\mathrm{Ij}=\mathrm{RM}^{(64-\mathrm{K})}(\mathrm{I}(\mathrm{j}-1)) \\| \mathrm{K}^{-b i t} \text { RESULT }_{\mathrm{j}-2}$ <br> Should be $\mathrm{Ij}=\mathrm{RM}^{(64-\mathrm{K})}(\mathrm{I}(\mathrm{j}-1)) \\| \mathrm{K}^{-b i t} \operatorname{RESULT}_{\mathrm{j}-3}$ |
| 5.5.2.2 | Add a separate Monte Carlo Test for the Encryption and Decryption processes of the CFB-P Mode of operation. |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { 5.5.2.2 } \\ \text { Table } 50 \end{gathered}$ | In pseudocode, replace 19999 with Ij. |


| 5.5.2.2 | In b2), replace subscript $\mathrm{j}-2$ with j -3. |
| :---: | :---: |
| 5.5.2.2 | In 3) and 4) - Replace the subscript 9999 with j . Add statement ". . where $\mathrm{j}=9999$. " |
| $5.6 .2$ <br> Table 56 | At the end of the external loop, where new values are generated for the keys, the text and the input block, it was unclear in the generation of the new text which value of text was being referred to in this statement: $\mathrm{TEXT}_{0}=\mathrm{TEXT}_{0} \oplus \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}$ <br> $\mathrm{TEXT}_{0}$ is referring to the initial text of the INTERNAL loop. Therefore, add the following code to make this clear: <br> In pseudocode, add statement "INITTEXT $=$ TEXT $_{0}{ }_{0}$ " in the external loop before the internal loop. This will capture the initial text used for each internal loop. <br> Also, modify the statement at the end of the external loop: $\mathrm{TEXT}_{0}=\mathrm{TEXT}_{0} \oplus \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}$ <br> To read $\mathrm{TEXT}_{0}=\mathrm{INITTEXT} \oplus \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}$ |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { 5.6.2 } \\ \text { Table } 56 \end{gathered}$ | In the pseudocode, replace the subscript 9999 with j . |
| 5.6.2 | In the text, add after b: "c. Assign the value of TEXT $_{0}$ to INITTEXT. This will contain the initial text from every j = 0 loop." |
| 5.6.2 | Reletter text. |
| 5.6.2 | In g 1), 2), and 3) - Replace subscript 9999 with j . <br> Replace subscript 9998 with j-1. <br> Replace subscript 9997 with j-2. |
| 5.6.2 | In g 2) - This should read: <br> Assign a new value to the $\mathrm{TEXT}_{0}$. The $\mathrm{TEXT}_{0}$ should be assigned the value of INITTEXT exclusive-ORed with $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}$. |
| 5.6.2 | In g NOTE - P should be replaced with TEXT. |


| 5.7 .2 <br> Table 62 | In the pseudocode, Replace the subscript 9999 with j. |
| :---: | :--- |
| 5.7 .2 | Replace subscript 9999 with j. |
| Table A.5 | Replace column headings PLAINTEXT1, 2, and 3 with INPUTBLOCK1, 2, and 3. |
| Table A.7 | Replace column headings PLAINTEXT1, 2, and 3 with one column labeled <br> CIPHERTEXTS. <br> Replace column headings CIPHERTEXT1, 2, and 3 with PLAINTEXT 1, 2, and 3. |
| Table A.8 | Start ROUND numbers with 0. <br> Table A.8Replace colum headings PLAINTEXT1, 2, and 3 with one column labeled <br> PLAINTEXTS. |
| Table A.9 | Replace column headings PLAINTEXT1, 2, and 3 with PLAINTEXT1 $\oplus$ IV1, <br> PLAINTEXT2 $\oplus$ IV2, and PLAINTEXT3 $\oplus$ IV3, respectively. |
| Table A.10 | Replace column headings PLAINTEXT1, 2, and 3 with IV1, 2, and 3. |

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#### Abstract

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Modes of Operation Validation System (TMOVS) specifies the procedures involved in validating implementations of the Triple DES algorithm in FIPS PUB 46-3 Data Encryption Standard (DES) (and ANSI X9.52-1998). The TMOVS is designed to perform automated testing on Implementations Under Test (IUTs). This publication provides brief overviews of the Triple DES algorithm and introduces the basic design and configuration of the TMOVS. Included in this overview are the specifications for the two categories of tests that make up the TMOVS, i.e., the Known Answer tests and the Monte Carlo tests. The requirements and administrative procedures to be followed by those seeking formal NIST validation of an implementation of the Triple DES algorithm are presented. The requirements described include the specific protocols for communication between the IUT and the TMOVS, the types of tests which the IUT must pass for formal NIST validation, and general instructions for accessing and interfacing with the TMOVS. An appendix with tables of values and results for the Triple DES Known Answer tests is also provided.


Key words: automated testing, computer security, cryptographic algorithms, cryptography, Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA), Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES), Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS), NVLAP, secret key cryptography, validation.

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Background

The publication specifies the tests required to validate Implementations Under Test (IUTs) for conformance to the Triple DES algorithm (TDEA) as specified in ANSI X9.52, Triple Data Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation. When applied to IUTs that implement the TDEA, the TDEA Modes of Operation Validation System (TMOVS) provides testing to determine the correctness of the algorithm implementation. This involves both testing the specific components of the algorithm, as well as, exercising the entire algorithm implementation. In addition to determining conformance, the TMOVS is structured to detect implementation flaws including pointer problems, insufficient allocation of space, improper error handling, and incorrect behavior of the TDEA implementation.

The TMOVS is composed of two types of validation tests, the Known Answer tests and the Monte Carlo tests. The validation tests are based on the standard DES test set and the Monte Carlo test described in Special Publication 800-17, Modes of Operation Validation System (MOVS): Requirements and Procedures. By applying the same framework specified in Special Publication 800-17 to TDES, the TMOVS specifies how to validate implementations of the TDEA in software, firmware, hardware, or any combination thereof.

The Known Answer tests are designed to verify the components of the DES algorithm in the IUT (e.g., S boxes, permutation tables,...). The tests exercise each bit of every component of the algorithm implementation. This is accomplished by processing all possible basis vectors through the IUT. To perform the Known Answer tests, the TMOVS supplies known values to the IUT and the

IUT then processes the input through the implemented algorithm. The results produced by the IUT are compared to the expected values.

The Monte Carlo Test is designed to exercise the entire implementation of the TDEA, as opposed to testing only the individual components. The purpose of the Monte Carlo Test is to detect the presence of flaws in the IUT that were not detected with the controlled input of the Known Answer test. The Monte Carlo Test does not guarantee ultimate reliability of the IUT that implements the TDEA (i.e., hardware failure, software corruption, etc.). To perform the Monte Carlo Test, the TMOVS supplies the IUT with pseudorandom values for the initial plaintext, key(s), and, if applicable, initialization vector(s). Using these values, the IUT is exercised through four million DES encryption/decryption iterations. The results are then compared to the expected values.

The successful completion of the tests contained within the TMOVS is required to claim conformance of Triple DES implementations as defined in FIPS PUB 46-3, Data Encryption Standard (DES). Testing for single DES implementations is defined in Special Publication 800-17, Modes of Operation Validation System (MOVS): Requirements and Procedures. Testing for the cryptographic module in which Triple DES is implemented is defined in FIPS PUB 140-1, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules.

### 1.2 Organization

Section 2 gives a brief overview of the Triple DES algorithm and the five modes of operation allowed by this algorithm as well as the interleaved and pipelined versions of several of these modes. Section 3 provides an overview of the tests that make up the Triple DES Modes of Operation Validation System (TMOVS). Section 4 describes the basic protocol used by the TMOVS. Section 5 provides a detailed explanation of each test required by the TMOVS to validate an IUT of the TDEA. Section 6 outlines the design of the TMOVS. Appendix A provides tables of values for the Known Answer tests for TDEA. These tables include:

- For modes of operation including TECB, TCBC, TCFB, and TOFB:

Table A. 1 - Resulting Ciphertext from the Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test
Table A. 2 - Resulting Ciphertext from the Variable Key Known Answer Test
Table A. 3 - Values to be Used for the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test
Table A. 4 - Values to be Used for the Substitution Tables Known Answer Test

- For the TCBC-I mode of operation:

Table A. 5 - Resulting Ciphertext from the Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test for TCBC-I

Table A. 6 - Resulting Ciphertext from the Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test for TCBC-I

## Table A. 7 - Resulting Ciphertext from the Initial Permutation Known Answer Test for

 TCBC-ITable A. 8 - Values to be Used for the Substitution Tables Known Answer Test for TCBC-I

- For the TCFB-P and TOFB-I modes of operation:

Table A. 9 - Resulting Ciphertext from the Variable Text Known Answer Test for TCFB-P and TOFB-I

Table A. 10 - Values to be Used for the Substitution Tables Known Answer Test for TCFB$P$ and TOFB-I

- For the TCBC-I, TCFB-P, and TOFB-I modes of operation:

Table A. 11 - Resulting Ciphertext from the Variable Key Known Answer Test for TCBC-I, TCFB-P and TOFB-I

Table A. 12 - Values to be Used for the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for TCBC-I, TCFB-P and TOFB-I

### 1.3 Definition(s)

### 1.3.1 Basis vector

A vector consisting of a " 1 " in the $i$ th position and " 0 " in all of the other positions.

### 1.3.2 Block

A binary vector. In this document, the input and output of encryption and decryption operation are 64-bit block. The bits are numbered from left to right. The plaintext and ciphertext are segmented to k-bit blocks, $\mathrm{k}=1,8,64$.

### 1.3.3 Ciphertext

Encrypted (enciphered) data.

### 1.3.4 Cryptographic boundary

An explicitly defined contiguous perimeter that establishes the physical bounds around the set of hardware, software and firmware which is used to implement the TDEA and the associated cryptographic processes.

### 1.3.5 Cryptographic key

A parameter that determines the transformation from plaintext to ciphertext and vice versa. (A DEA key is a 64-bit parameter consisting of 56 independent bits and 8 parity bits). Multiple (1, 2 or 3) keys may be used in the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm.

### 1.3.6 Data Encryption Algorithm

The algorithm specified in FIPS PUB 46-3, Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA).

### 1.3.7 Decryption

The process of transforming ciphertext into plaintext.

### 1.3.8 Encryption

The process of transforming plaintext into ciphertext.

### 1.3.9 Exclusive-OR

The bit-by-bit modulo 2 addition of binary vectors of equal length.

### 1.3.10 Initialization Vector

A binary vector used as the input to initialize the algorithm for the encryption of a plaintext block sequence to increase security by introducing additional cryptographic variance and to synchronize cryptographic equipment. The initialization vector need not be secret. Some of the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation require 3 initialization vectors.
1.3.11 Key

See cryptographic key.

### 1.3.12 Plaintext

Intelligible data that has meaning and can be read or acted upon without the application of decryption. Also known as cleartext.

### 1.3.13 Self-dual Key

A key with the property that when you encrypt twice with this key, the result is the initial input.

### 1.3.14 Triple Data Encryption Algorithm

The algorithm specified in FIPS PUB 46-3 -1999, Data Encryption Algorithm.

### 1.4 Symbols (and Acronyms)

### 1.4.1 C Ciphertext

1.4.2 $\mathrm{C} n \quad$ Block of data representing the Ciphertext $n$
1.4.3 $\mathrm{C}^{1}, \ldots, \mathrm{C}^{64} \quad$ Bits of the Ciphertext Block
1.4.4 $\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{KEY}}(\mathrm{Y}) \quad$ Decrypt Y with the key $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{x}}$
1.4.5 DEA The Data Encryption Algorithm specified in FIPS 46-3
1.4.6 DES Data Encryption Standard specified in FIPS 46-3
1.4.7 $\quad \mathrm{E}_{\mathrm{KEY}}(\mathrm{Y}) \quad$ Encrypt Y with the key $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{x}}$
1.4.8 FIPS PUB Federal Information Processing Standard Publication
1.4.9 I Input Block
1.4.10 I $n \quad$ Block of data representing the Input Block $n$
1.4.11 $\mathrm{I}^{1}, \ldots, \mathrm{I}^{64} \quad$ Bits of the Input Block
1.4.12 IUT Implementation Under Test
1.4.13 IV Initialization Vector
1.4.14 IVn Block of data representing IV $n$
1.4.15 KEYn Block of data representing KEY $n$
1.4.16 NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
1.4.17 O Output Block
1.4.18 $\mathrm{O}^{1}, \ldots, \mathrm{O}^{64} \quad$ Bits of the Output Block
1.4.19 On Block of data representing Output Block $n$
1.4.20 P Plaintext
1.4.21 $\mathrm{P}^{1}, \ldots, \mathrm{P}^{64} \quad$ Bits of the Plaintext Block
1.4.22 $\mathrm{P} n \quad$ Block of data representing Plaintext $n$
1.4.23 RESULT $n \quad$ Block of data representing Plaintext $n$, if encryption state, or Ciphertext $n$, if decryption state
1.4.24 TCBC TDEA Cipher Block Chaining Mode of Operation
1.4.25 TCBC-I TDEA Cipher Block Chaining Mode of Operation - Interleaved
1.4.26 TCFB TDEA Cipher Feedback Mode of Operation
1.4.27 TCFB-P TEA Cipher Feedback Mode of Operation - Pipelined
1.4.28 TDEA Triple Data Encryption Algorithm specified in FIPS 46-3
1.4.29 TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard specified in FIPS 46-3
1.4.30 TECB TDEA Electronic Codebook Mode of Operation
1.4.31 TEXT $n \quad$ Block of data representing Plaintext $n$, if encryption state, or Ciphertext $n$, if decryption state
1.4.32 TMOVS TDEA Modes of Operation Validation System
1.4.33 TOFB TDEA Output Feedback Mode of Operation
1.4.34 TOFB-I TDEA Output Feedback Mode of Operation - Interleaved
1.4.35 VARIABLE $n_{n}$ Block of data representing the value of VARIABLE for the $n^{\text {th }}$ iteration

### 1.4.36 $\mathrm{X} \oplus \mathrm{Y} \quad$ Bit-wise inclusive-or of two bit-strings X and Y of the same bit length.

## 2. Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA)

FIPS PUB 46-3-1999, Data Encryption Standard (DES), (and ANSI X9.52 - 1998) specifies the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) modes of operation for the enhanced cryptographic protection of digital data. The modes of operation for TDEA provide a means of extending the effective key space of the Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA). Certain modes also provide increased protection against more sophisticated cryptanalytic attacks. FIPS PUB 46-3-1999 enhances the basic level of cryptographic protection of digital data provided by DEA, thus extending the useful lifetime of this technology.

The TDEA consists of three components - the DES algorithm (DEA), multiple keys, and initialization vector(s). The DEA is called three times in the TDEA. The TDEA utilizes one to three keys and, depending on the mode of operation being implemented, zero, one or three initialization vectors (IVs).

The basic processing involved in the TDEA is as follows: An input block is read into the first DEA (DEA1) and encrypted using the first key (KEY1). The output produced from this stage is read directly into the second DEA (DEA2) and decrypted using the second key (KEY2). The output produced by the second stage is directly read into the third DEA (DEA3) and encrypted using the third key (KEY3). The resultant output block is used, according to the mode implemented, in the calculation of the ciphertext. Note that the output for the intermediate DEA stages is never revealed outside the cryptographic boundary.

Three different keying options are allowed by the TDEA. The first option specifies that all the keys are independent, i.e., KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 are independent. This is referred to as Keying Option 1 in FIPS PUB 46-3 - 1999 (and ANSI X9.52-1998). It will be referred to as 3-key TDES in this document. The second option specifies that KEY1 and KEY2 are independent and KEY3 is equal to KEY1, i.e., KEY1 and KEY2 are independent, KEY3 $=$ KEY1. This is referred to as Keying Option 2 in FIPS PUB 46-3 - 1999 (and ANSI X9.52 - 1998) and will be referred to as 2 -key TDES in this document. And the third option specifies that KEY1, KEY2 and KEY3 are equal, i.e., KEY1=KEY2=KEY3. This is referred to as Keying Option 3 in FIPS PUB 46-3-1999 (and ANSI X9.52 - 1998 and will be referred to as 1-key TDES in this document. 1-key TDES is equivalent to single DES.

The initialization vector (IV) must meet the following attributes as specified by the TDEA:

- For TECB, no IV is used.
- For all modes using an IV, the IV may be public information.
- For TOFB and TOFB-I, the IV should never be a constant.
- If the mode of operation implemented requires one IV, it may be generated in one of two ways:
- Randomly or Pseudo-randomly
- As a counter
- If the mode of operation implemented requires three IVs, they should be generated as follows:
- IV1 should be generated in the same manner as one IV (described above).
- $\quad \mathrm{IV} 2=\mathrm{IV} 1+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $\mathrm{R}_{1}=5555555555555555$.
- $\quad \operatorname{IV} 3=\mathrm{IV} 1+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $\mathrm{R}_{2}=$ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA.

A thorough explanation of the processing involved in the four modes of operation supplied by TDEA, as well as the new message-interleaved and pipelined versions of these modes can be found in FIPS PUB 46-3 - 1999 (and ANSI X9.52-1998). A brief explanation of each mode is found below.

### 2.1 TDEA Electronic Codebook (TECB) Mode



Figure 1 TDEA Electronic Codebook (TECB) Mode
The TDEA Electronic Codebook (TECB) mode is shown in Figure 1. In TECB encryption, a 64-bit plaintext data block (P) is used directly as the input block (I). The input block is processed through the first DEA (DEA1) in the encrypt state using KEY1. The output of this process is fed directly to the input of the second DEA (DEA2) where DES is performed in the decrypt state using KEY2. The output of this process is fed directly to the input of the third DEA (DEA3) where DES is performed in the encrypt state using KEY3. The resultant 64-bit output block (O) is used directly as ciphertext (C).

In TECB decryption, a 64-bit ciphertext block (C) is used directly as the input block (I). The keying sequence is reversed from the encrypt process. The input block is processed through DEA3 in the decrypt state using KEY3. The output of this process is fed directly to the input of DEA2, where DES is performed in the encrypt state using KEY2, and the result is directly fed to the input of DEA1, where DES is performed in the decrypt state using KEY1. The resultant 64 -bit output block $(\mathrm{O})$ produces the plaintext $(\mathrm{P})$.

### 2.2 TDEA Cipher Block Chaining (TCBC) Mode



Figure 2 TDEA Cipher Block Chaining (TCBC) Mode
As shown in the upper half of Figure 2, the TDEA Cipher Block Chaining (TCBC) mode begins processing by dividing a plaintext message into 64-bit data blocks. In TCBC encryption, the first input block $\left(\mathrm{I}_{1}\right)$ is formed by exclusive-ORing the first plaintext data block $\left(\mathrm{P}_{1}\right)$ with a 64-bit initialization vector IV, i.e., $\left(I_{1}=I V \oplus P_{1}\right)$. The input block is processed through DEA1 in the encrypt state using KEY1. The output of this process is fed directly to the input of DEA2, which performs DES in the decrypt state using KEY2. The output of this process is fed directly to the input of DEA3, which performs DES in the encrypt state using KEY3. The resultant 64-bit output block $\left(\mathrm{O}_{1}\right)$ is used directly as ciphertext $\left(\mathrm{C}_{1}\right)$, i.e., $\left(\mathrm{C}_{1}=\mathrm{O}_{1}\right)$. This first ciphertext block is then exclusiveORed with the second plaintext data block to produce the second input block, i.e., $\left(\mathrm{I}_{2}\right)=\left(\mathrm{C}_{1} \oplus \mathrm{P}_{2}\right)$. Note that $\mathrm{I}_{2}$ and $\mathrm{P}_{2}$ now refer to the second block. The second input block is processed through the TDEA to produce the second ciphertext block. This encryption process continues to "chain"
successive cipher and plaintext blocks together until the last plaintext block in the message is encrypted. If the message does not consist of an integral number of data blocks, then the final partial data block should be encrypted in a manner specified for the application.

In TCBC decryption (see the lower half of Figure 2), the first ciphertext block $\left(\mathrm{C}_{1}\right)$ is used directly as the input block $\left(I_{1}\right)$. The keying sequence is reversed from the encrypt process. The input block is processed through DEA3 in the decrypt state using KEY3. The output of this process is fed directly to the input of DEA2, where DES is processed in the encrypt state using KEY2. This resulting value is directly fed to the input of DEA1, where DES is processed in the decrypt state using KEY1. The resulting output block is exclusive-ORed with the IV (which must be the same as that used during encryption) to produce the first plaintext block, i.e., $\left(\mathrm{P}_{1}=\mathrm{O}_{1} \oplus \mathrm{IV}\right)$. The second ciphertext block is then used as the next input block and is processed through the TDEA as shown above. The resulting output block is exclusive-ORed with the first ciphertext block to produce the second plaintext data block, i.e., $\left(\mathrm{P}_{2}=\mathrm{O}_{2} \oplus \mathrm{C}_{1}\right)$. (NOTE $-\mathrm{P}_{2}$ and $\mathrm{O}_{2}$ refer to the second block.) The TCBC decryption process continues in this manner until the last complete ciphertext block has been decrypted. Ciphertext representing a partial data block must be decrypted in a manner as specified for the application.

### 2.3 TDEA Cipher Block Chaining - Interleaved (TCBC-I) Mode

Both the encryption and decryption processes of the TDEA Cipher Block Chaining - Interleaved (TCBC-I) mode of operation require 3 IVs , an $n$ block message interleaved into three sub-texts, and 3 keys. The IVs, denoted IV1, IV2, and IV3, are generated based on the specifications mentioned in Section 2. For both the encryption and decryption processes of the TCBC-I mode of operation, these values are assigned to the initial values of $\mathrm{C} 1, \mathrm{C} 2$, and C 3 .

Prior to commencing both the TCBC-I encryption and decryption processes, the TEXT (which refers to plaintext, P , if encrypting and ciphertext, C , if decrypting) is interleaved into three sub-texts. This is accomplished by taking an $n$-block TEXT and subdividing it into groups consisting of three blocks each accordingly:

```
TEXT=(TEXT },\mp@subsup{T}{1}{},\mp@subsup{\textrm{TEXT}}{2}{},\ldots,,\mp@subsup{\textrm{TEXT}}{n}{})=(\mp@subsup{\textrm{TEXT}}{1,1}{},\mp@subsup{\textrm{TEXT}}{2,1}{,},\mp@subsup{\textrm{TEXT}}{3,1}{},\mp@subsup{\textrm{TEXT}}{1,2}{},\mp@subsup{\textrm{TEXT}}{2,2}{}
TEXT 
```

Then the TEXT is decimated into three sub-texts:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { TEXT }^{1}=\text { TEXT }_{1,1}, \text { TEXT }_{1,2}, \text { TEXT }_{1,3}, \ldots, \text { TEXT }_{1, n 1} ; \\
& \text { TEXT }^{2}=\operatorname{TEXT}_{2,1}, \operatorname{TEXT}_{2,2}, \operatorname{TEXT}_{2,3}, \ldots, \text { TEXT }_{2, n 2} ; \\
& \text { TEXT }^{3}=\operatorname{TEXT}_{3,1}, \text { TEXT }_{3,2}, \operatorname{TEXT}_{3,3}, \ldots, \text { TEXT }_{3, n 3} ;
\end{aligned}
$$

where

- if $n \bmod 3=0$, then $n 1=n 2=n 3=n / 3$; The last block in TEXT is TEXT $_{3, n 3}$.
- if $n \bmod 3=1$, then $n 1=(n+2) / 3, n 2=n 3=(n-1) / 3$; The last block in TEXT is TEXT $_{1, n 1}$.
- if $n \bmod 3=2$, then $n 1=n 2=(n+1) / 3, n 3=(n-2) / 3$; The last block in TEXT is TEXT $_{2, n 2}$.

The TCBC-I mode of operation is intended for systems equipped with multiple DEA processors. Each of the DEA processors used in both the encryption and decryption processes utilize the same processing as that used in the TCBC mode of operation for all three sub-texts. The DEA processors operate simultaneously.

During the encryption process of the TCBC-I mode of operation, for $\mathrm{j}=1$ to 3 and $\mathrm{i}=1$ to $n$, the $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}, \mathrm{i}}$ is exclusive-ORed with the $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}, \mathrm{i}-1}$. This value is processed through DEA1 in the encrypt state using KEY1. The output of this process is fed directly to the input of DEA2, which performs DES in the decrypt state using KEY2. The output of this process is fed directly to the input of DEA3, which performs DES in the encrypt state using KEY3. The resultant 64-bit output block is used directly as the $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}, \mathrm{i}}$.

With three DEA functional blocks, DEA1, DEA2, and DEA3, which are simultaneously clocked, the encryption of three sub-plaintexts can be interleaved.

In pseudocode terms,

```
For \(\mathbf{j}=1\) to 3 \{
    \(\mathbf{C}_{\mathrm{j}, 0}=\mathbf{I V}_{\mathrm{j}}\)
    For \(\mathbf{i}=1\) to \(\boldsymbol{n}_{\mathrm{j}}\) \{
        \(\mathbf{C}_{\mathrm{j}, \mathrm{i}}=\mathbf{E}_{\mathrm{KEY} 3}\left(\mathbf{D}_{\mathrm{KEY} 2}\left(\mathbf{E}_{\mathrm{KEY} 1}\left(\mathbf{P}_{\mathrm{j}, \mathrm{i}} \oplus \mathbf{C}_{\mathrm{j}, \mathrm{i}-1}\right)\right)\right)\)
        Output \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}, \mathrm{i}}\)
    \}
\}
```

During the decryption process of the TCBC-I mode of operation, for $\mathrm{j}=1$ to 3 and $\mathrm{i}=1$ to $n$, the $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}, \mathrm{i}}$ is processed through DEA3 in the decrypt state using KEY3. The output of this process is fed directly to the input of DEA2, which performs DES in the encrypt state using KEY2. The output of this process is fed directly to the input of DEA1, which performs DES in the decrypt state using KEY1. The resultant 64-bit output block is exclusive-ORed with the $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}, \mathrm{i}-1}$. This value is used directly as the $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}, 1}$.

Because there are three DEA functional blocks, $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}, \mathrm{DEA}_{2}$, and $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$, which are simultaneously clocked, the decryption of three sub-ciphertexts can be interleaved.

In terms of pseudocode,

```
For \(\mathbf{j}=1\) to 3 \{
    \(\mathbf{C}_{\mathrm{j}, 0}=\mathbf{I V}_{\mathrm{j}}\)
    For \(i=1\) to \(n_{j}\{\)
        \(\mathbf{P}_{\mathrm{j}, \mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{KEY} 1}\left(\mathrm{E}_{\mathrm{KEY} 2}\left(\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{KEY} 3}\left(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}, \mathrm{i}}\right)\right)\right) \oplus \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}, \mathrm{i}-1}\)
    Output \(\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}, \mathrm{i}}\)
    \}
\}
```


### 2.4 TDEA Cipher Feedback (TCFB) Mode



Figure 3 TDEA Cipher Feedback (TCFB) Mode
The TDEA Cipher Feedback (TCFB) mode is shown in Figure 3. A message to be encrypted is divided into K -bit data units, where K may equal 1 through 64 inclusively ( $\mathrm{K}=1,2, \ldots, 64$ ). In both the TCFB encrypt and decrypt operations, an initialization vector (IV) of length 64 is used. The input block is assigned the value of the IV, i.e., (I = IV). The input block is processed through DEA1 in the encrypt state using KEY1. The output of this process is fed directly to the input of DEA2, where DES is performed in the decrypt state using KEY2. The output of this process is fed directly to the input of DEA3, where DES is performed in the encrypt state using KEY3. During encryption, ciphertext is produced by exclusive-ORing a K-bit plaintext data unit with the most significant K bits of the output block, i.e., $\left(\mathrm{C}^{1}, \mathrm{C}^{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{C}^{\mathrm{K}}\right)=\left(\mathrm{P}^{1} \oplus \mathrm{O}^{1}, \mathrm{P}^{2} \oplus \mathrm{O}^{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{K}} \oplus \mathrm{O}^{\mathrm{K}}\right)$, where each $\mathrm{C}^{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{O}^{\mathrm{i}}$ represents a single bit of the ciphertext block C , plaintext block P , and output block O , respectively. Similarly, during decryption, plaintext is produced by exclusive-ORing a K bit unit of ciphertext with the most significant K bits of the output block, i.e., $\left(\mathrm{P}^{1}, \mathrm{P}^{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{K}}\right)=\left(\mathrm{C}^{1} \oplus\right.$ $\left.\mathrm{O}^{1}, \mathrm{C}^{2} \oplus \mathrm{O}^{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{C}^{\mathrm{K}} \oplus \mathrm{O}^{\mathrm{K}}\right)$. In both cases, the unused bits of the output block are discarded. For both the encryption and decryption processes, the next input block is created by discarding the most significant $K$ bits of the previous input block, shifting the remaining bits $K$ positions to the left and then inserting the K bits of ciphertext just produced in the encryption operation or just used in the decryption operation into the least significant bit positions, i.e., $\left(I^{1}, I^{2}, \ldots, I^{64}\right)=\left(I^{[K+1]}, I^{[K+2]}, \ldots\right.$, $\left.\mathrm{I}^{64}, \mathrm{C}^{1}, \mathrm{C}^{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{C}^{\mathrm{K}}\right)$. NOTE -- I, P, and C now refer to the second block. The second block is processed through the TDEA to produce the second ciphertext block (or plaintext block, if decrypting). The
input block is then processed through DEA1 in the encrypt state. This process continues until the entire plaintext message has been encrypted or until the entire ciphertext message has been decrypted. For each operation of the TDEA, one K-bit unit of plaintext produces one K-bit unit of ciphertext, and one K-bit unit of ciphertext produces one K-bit unit of plaintext.

### 2.5 TDEA Cipher Feedback Mode of Operation - Pipelined (TCFB-P)

Both the encryption and decryption processes of the TDEA Cipher Feedback - Pipelined (TCFB-P) mode of operation require 3 IVs, a K-bit TEXT and 3 keys. The IVs, denoted IV1, IV2, and IV3 are generated based on the specifications mentioned in the introduction of Section 2. For both the encryption and decryption processes of the TCFB-P mode of operation, the IV values are assigned to the input block of DEA1 in succession.

The TCFB-P mode of operation is intended for systems equipped with multiple DEA processors. Each of the DEA processors used in both the encryption and decryption processes utilize the same processing as that used in the TCFB mode of operation. With three DEA functional blocks, which are simultaneously clocked, and with three IVs, the TCFB encryption and decryption processes can be pipelined.

Prior to commencing both the TCFB-P encryption and decryption processes, a 3-step initialization process must be conducted as follows:

Step 1: IV1 is input to DEA1 and encrypted using KEY1.
Step 2: The output of DEA1 is input to DEA2 and decrypted using KEY2. Simultaneously, IV2 is input to DEA1 and encrypted using KEY1.

Step 3: The output of DEA2 is input to DEA3 and encrypted using KEY3. This produces the first output block. Simultaneous with encryption by DEA3, the output of DEA1 (from step 2) is input to DEA2 and decrypted using KEY2, and IV3 is input to DEA1 and encrypted using KEY1.

During encryption, a K-bit ciphertext block is produced by exclusive-ORing the most significant K-bits of the output block from DEA3 with the K-bit plaintext block.

Successive input blocks for DEA1 are formed by discarding the most significant K bits of the previous DEA1 input block, shifting the remaining bits K positions to the left and then inserting the K bits of the newest K-bit ciphertext block into the least significant bit positions. DEA1, DEA2 and DEA3 are run simultaneously to produce successive output blocks that are exclusive-ORed to successive K-bit plaintext blocks to produce successive K-bit ciphertext blocks.

Decryption is performed in the same manner as encryption, except that the role of the plaintext and the ciphertext are reversed.

### 2.6 TDEA Output Feedback (TOFB) Mode



Figure 4 TDEA Output Feedback (TOFB) Mode
The TDEA Output Feedback (TOFB) mode is shown in Figure 4. A message to be encrypted is divided into 64-bit data units. In both the TOFB encrypt and decrypt operations, a 64-bit initialization vector (IV) is used. The IV is used as input in the first round, i.e., (I = IV). This input block is processed through DEA1 where DES is processed in the encrypt state using KEY1. The output of this process is fed directly to the input of DEA2 where DES is processed in the decrypt state using KEY2. The output of this process is fed directly to the input of DEA3 where DES is processed in the encrypt state using KEY3. During encryption, ciphertext is produced by exclusiveORing a plaintext data unit with an output block, i.e., $(\mathrm{C}=\mathrm{P} \oplus \mathrm{O})$. Similarly, during decryption, plaintext is produced by exclusive-ORing a ciphertext with an output block, i.e., $(\mathrm{P}=\mathrm{C} \oplus \mathrm{O})$. In both cases the next input block is assigned the value of the output block, i.e., ( $\mathrm{I}=\mathrm{O}$ ). This input block is then processed through the TDEA as described above. This process continues until the entire plaintext message has been encrypted or until the entire ciphertext message has been decrypted.

### 2.7 TDEA Output Feedback Mode of Operation - Interleaved (TOFB-I)

Both the encryption and decryption processes of the TDEA Output Feedback - Interleaved (TOFBI) mode of operation require 3 IVs, a TEXT and 3 keys. The IVs, denoted IV1, IV2, and IV3, are generated based on the specifications mentioned in the introduction of Section 2. For both the encryption and decryption processes of the TOFB-I mode of operation, the IV values are assigned to the input block of DEA1 in succession.

The TOFB-I mode of operation is intended for systems equipped with multiple DEA processors. Each of the DEA processors used in both the encryption and decryption processes utilize the same processing as that used in the TOFB mode of operation. With three DEA functional blocks, which are simultaneously clocked, and with three IVs, the TOFB encryption and decryption processes can be interleaved.

Prior to commencing both the TOFB-I encryption and decryption processes, a 3-step initialization process must be conducted as follows:

Step 1: IV1 is input to DEA1 and encrypted using KEY1.
Step 2: The output of DEA1 is input to DEA2 and decrypted using KEY2. Simultaneously, IV2 is input to DEA1 and encrypted using KEY1.

Step 3: The output of DEA2 is input to DEA3 and encrypted using KEY3. This produces the first output block. Simultaneous with encryption by DEA3, the output of DEA1 (from step 2) is input to DEA and decrypted using KEY2, and IV3 is input to DEA1 and encrypted using KEY1.

During encryption, a ciphertext block is produced by exclusive-ORing the output block from DEA3 with the plaintext block.

Successive input blocks for DEA1 are formed by assigning them the value of the newest ciphertext block. DEA1, DEA2 and DEA3 are run simultaneously to produce successive output blocks that are exclusive-ORed to successive plaintext blocks to produce successive ciphertext blocks.

Decryption is performed in the same manner as encryption, except that the role of the plaintext and the ciphertext are reversed.

## 3. MODES OF OPERATION VALIDATION SYSTEM FOR THE TRIPLE DES (TDES) ALGORITHM

The TMOVS for the Triple DES algorithm (TDEA) consists of two types of tests, the Known Answer tests and the Monte Carlo tests. The TMOVS provides conformance testing for the components of the algorithm, as well as testing for apparent implementation errors.

The IUTs may be written in software, firmware, hardware, or any combination thereof.
An IUT must allow the TMOVS to have control over the required input parameters for validation to be feasible. The ability to initialize or load known values to the variables required by a specific test may exist at the device level or the chip level in an IUT. If an IUT does not allow the TMOVS to have control over the input parameter values, the TMOVS tests cannot be performed.

An IUT may implement encryption only, decryption only, or both encryption and decryption. This will determine which TMOVS tests will be performed by an IUT.

The following subsections provide an overview of the Known Answer tests and the Monte Carlo tests. This overview discusses the functionality of each test and the components of the TDEA tested by the individual tests.

### 3.1 The Known Answer Tests

The Known Answer tests are based on the standard DES test set discussed in Special Publication 500-20. They are designed to verify the components of the DES algorithm in the IUT. These components include the initial permutation IP, the inverse permutation $\mathrm{IP}^{-1}$, the expansion matrix E , the data permutation P , the key permutations PC 1 and PC 2 , and the substitution tables $\mathrm{S}_{1}, \mathrm{~S}_{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{~S}_{8}$. The tests exercise each bit of every component of the algorithm by processing all possible basis vectors through the IUT.

A generic overview of the sets of Known Answer tests required for the validation of IUTs implementing the encryption and/or decryption processes of all modes of operation for the TDEA is discussed below.

### 3.1. 1 The Encryption Process

An IUT which allows encryption requires the successful completion of five Known Answer tests: the Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test, the Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test, the Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process, the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process, and the Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process.

These Known Answer tests are also used in the testing of IUTs implementing the decryption process of the TCFB, TCFB-P, TOFB and TOFB-I modes of operation. This is due to the fact that these modes call the three DEA stages in the same order for both the encryption and decryption processes, i.e., encrypt KEY1, decrypt KEY2 and encrypt KEY3.

### 3.1.1.1 The Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test

To perform the Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test, the TMOVS supplies the IUT with initial values for the three keys, the plaintext(s) and, if applicable, the initialization vector(s). For IUTs supporting the interleaved and pipelined configurations of TDES, initial values for three initialization vectors are supplied by the TMOVS. For IUTs supporting the TCBC-I mode of operation, an initial value is supplied to three plaintext variables. These three plaintext variables are initialized to the same value. The other modes of operation only require one plaintext variable. The TMOVS initializes all keys to zero (with odd parity set). Each block of data input into the TDEA is represented as a 64-bit basis vector.

For the four basic modes of operation (TECB, TCBC, TCFB, and TOFB), the input block is processed through the DEA three times -- first in the encrypt state with KEY1, next in the decrypt state with KEY2, and lastly, in the encrypt state with KEY3. The resulting output block is used in the calculation of the ciphertext.

For modes of operation supporting interleaving and pipelining (TCBC-I, TCFB-P, TOFB-I), it is assumed that multiprocessing is possible, i.e., each block of input data is processed by three DES processors. Therefore, three input blocks are processed simultaneously through the three DES processors resulting in three output blocks which are then used in the calculation of the three ciphertext values. The formation of the input block is dependent upon the mode of operation supported. Note that the design of the TMOVS assumes that, for security reasons, an IUT is designed so that intermediate values resulting from the first two DES calls are never revealed.

This test is repeated 64 times, using the 64 input basis vectors, allowing for every possible basis vector to be tested. At the completion of the $64^{\text {th }}$ cycle, all results are verified for correctness.

If correct results are obtained from an IUT, the Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test has verified the initial permutation IP and the expansion matrix E via the encrypt operation by presenting a full set of basis vectors to IP and to E. The test also verifies the inverse permutation $\mathrm{IP}^{-1}$ via the decrypt operation. It does this by presenting the recovered basis vectors to $\mathrm{IP}^{-1}$.

### 3.1.1.2 The Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test

To perform the Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test, the TMOVS supplies the IUT with initial values for the three keys, the plaintext(s) and, if applicable, the initialization vector(s). For IUTs supporting the interleaved and pipelined configurations of TDES, three plaintext values and three initialization vector values are supplied by the TMOVS. The values supplied are dependent upon the modes of operation being implemented.

This test performs the same processing as the Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test. The difference is that the plaintext value(s) for this test are set to the ciphertext result(s) obtained from the Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test for the corresponding modes of operation.

The key is initialized to zero (with odd parity set). This key is a self-dual key. A self-dual key is a key with the property that when you encrypt twice with this key, the result is the initial input. Therefore, the result is the same as encrypting and decrypting with the same key. Using a self-dual key allows basis vectors to be presented to components of the DEA to validate the IUT's performance. This is discussed further in the last paragraph of this section.

For the four basic modes of operation (TECB, TCBC, TCFB, and TOFB), the input block is processed through the DEA three times -- first in the encrypt state with KEY1, next in the decrypt state with KEY2, and lastly, in the encrypt state with KEY3. The resulting output block is used in the calculation of the ciphertext, which is then recorded.

For modes of operation supporting interleaving and pipelining (TCBC-I, TCFB-P, TOFB-I), it is assumed that multiprocessing is possible, i.e., each block of input data is processed by three DES processors. Therefore, three input blocks are processed simultaneously through the three DES processors, resulting in three output blocks which are then used in the calculation of the three ciphertext values. The formation of the input block is dependent upon the mode of operation supported. Note that the design of the TMOVS assumes that, for security reasons, an IUT is designed so that intermediate values resulting from the first two DES calls are never revealed.

Using the plaintext and, if applicable, the IV's supplied by the TMOVS, the IUT runs the TDES for 64 cycles. At the completion of the $64^{\text {th }}$ cycle, all results are verified for correctness.

This test, when applied to an IUT, verifies the inverse permutation ( $\mathrm{IP}^{-1}$ ) via the encrypt operation, because as the basis vectors are recovered, each basis vector is presented to the inverse permutation $\mathrm{IP}^{-1}$. By performing the decrypt operation, the initial permutation IP and the expansion matrix E are verified by presenting the full set of basis vectors to them as well.

### 3.1.1.3 The Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process

To implement the Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process, the TMOVS supplies the IUT with initial values for the three keys, the plaintext(s), and, if applicable, the initialization vector(s). For IUTs supporting the interleaved and pipelined configurations of TDES, three initialization vector values are supplied by the TMOVS. For IUTs supporting the TCBC-I mode of operation, an initial value is supplied to three plaintext variables. These three plaintext variables are initialized to the same value. The other modes of operation only require one plaintext variable.

During the initialization process, the plaintext value(s) and the initialization vector value(s) are set to zero. All three keys for each round are initialized to a 56-bit key basis vector which contains a " 1 " in the $\mathrm{i}^{\text {th }}$ significant position and " 0 "s in all remaining significant positions of the keys, i.e., KEY1 $=$ KEY2 $=$ KEY3. (NOTE -- the parity bits are not considered as significant bits. These parity bits may be " 1 "s or " 0 "s to maintain odd parity.)

For the four basic modes of operation (TECB, TCBC, TCFB, and TOFB), the input block is processed through the DEA three times -- first in the encrypt state with KEY1, next in the
decrypt state with KEY2, and lastly, in the encrypt state with KEY3. The resulting output block is used in the calculation of the ciphertext, which is then recorded.

For modes of operation supporting interleaving and pipelining (TCBC-I, TCFB-P, TOFB-I), it is assumed that multiprocessing is possible, i.e., each block of input data is processed by three DES processors. Therefore, three input blocks are processed simultaneously through the three DES processors, resulting in three output blocks which are then used in the calculation of the three ciphertext values. The formation of the input block is dependent upon the mode of operation supported. Note that the design of the TMOVS assumes that, for security reasons, an IUT is designed so that intermediate values resulting from the first two DES calls are never revealed.

This test is repeated 56 times, using the 56 key basis vectors to allow for every possible vector to be tested. At the completion of the $56^{\text {th }}$ cycle, all results are verified for correctness.

When this test is performed for an IUT, the 56 possible key basis vectors which yield unique keys are presented to PC1, verifying the key permutation PC1 via the encrypt operation. Also, during the encrypt operation, a complete set of key basis vectors is presented to PC2 as well, so PC2 is verified.

This test also verifies the right shifts in the key schedule via the DES decrypt operation as the basis vectors are recovered.

### 3.1.1.4 The Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process

To implement the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process, the TMOVS supplies the IUT with 32 key values. The TMOVS also supplies initial values for the plaintext(s) and, if applicable, the initialization vector(s). For IUTs supporting the interleaved and pipelined configurations of TDES, initial values for three initialization vectors are supplied by the TMOVS. For IUTs supporting the TCBC-I mode of operation, an initial value to be assigned to all three plaintext values is supplied. The other modes of operation only require one plaintext value. During the initialization of a test, the plaintext value(s) and the first (or only) initialization vector value are set to 0 , while the key values are assigned to one of the 32 key values supplied by the TMOVS. Note that KEY1=KEY2=KEY3. If more than one initialization vector is used by a TDES mode of operation, the other IVs are computed according to specifications in Section 2.

For the four basic modes of operation (TECB, TCBC, TCFB, and TOFB), the input block is processed through the DEA three times -- first in the encrypt state with KEY1, next in the decrypt state with KEY2, and lastly, in the encrypt state with KEY3. The resulting output block is used in the calculation of the ciphertext, which is then recorded.

For modes of operation supporting interleaving and pipelining (TCBC-I, TCFB-P, TOFB-I), it is assumed that multiprocessing is possible, i.e., each block of input data is processed by three DES processors. Therefore, three input blocks are processed simultaneously through the three DES processors, resulting in three output blocks which are then used in the calculation of the three ciphertext values. The formation of the input block is dependent
upon the mode of operation supported. Note that the design of the TMOVS assumes that, for security reasons, an IUT is designed so that intermediate values resulting from the first two DES calls are never revealed.

Each of the 32 key values supplied by the TMOVS is tested. At the completion of the $32^{\text {nd }}$ cycle, all results are verified for correctness.

The 32 key values used in this test present a complete set of basis vectors to the permutation operator P. By doing so, P is verified. This occurs when both the encrypt and decrypt operations are performed.

### 3.1.1.5 The Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process

To implement the Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process, the TMOVS supplies the IUT with 19 key-data sets. Depending on the mode of operation implemented, the data value will be assigned to the plaintext or to the initialization vector variables. For IUTs supporting the interleaved and pipelined configurations of TDES, initial values for three initialization vectors are also supplied by the TMOVS. For the TCBC-I mode of operation, initial values for three plaintext variables are supplied as well. The other modes of operation only require one plaintext variable. During initialization, the plaintext values (or the initialization vector values, depending on the mode of operation supported), and the key values are initialized to one of the 19 key-data sets supplied by the TMOVS.

For the four basic modes of operation (TECB, TCBC, TCFB, and TOFB), the input block is processed through the DEA three times -- first in the encrypt state with KEY1, next in the decrypt state with KEY2, and lastly, in the encrypt state with KEY3. The resulting output block is used in the calculation of the ciphertext, which is then recorded.

For modes of operation supporting interleaving and pipelining (TCBC-I, TCFB-P, TOFB-I), it is assumed that multiprocessing is possible, i.e., each block of input data is processed by three DES processors. Therefore, three input blocks are processed simultaneously through the three DES processors, resulting in three output blocks which are then used in the calculation of the three ciphertext values. The formation of the input block is dependent upon the mode of operation supported. Note that the design of the TMOVS assumes that, for security reasons, an IUT is designed so that intermediate values resulting from the first two DES calls are never revealed.

This test is repeated for each of the 19 key-data sets, allowing every value in the set of 19 key-data sets to be tested. At the completion of the $19^{\text {th }}$ set, all results are verified for correctness.

The set of 19 key-data sets used in this test result in every entry of all eight S-box substitution tables being used at least once during both the encrypt and decrypt operations. Thus, this test verifies the 64 entries in each of the eight substitution tables.

### 3.1.2 The Decryption Process

The five Known Answer tests required for validation of IUTs implementing the decryption process of the TDEA consist of the Variable Ciphertext Known Answer Test, the Initial Permutation Known Answer Test, the Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process, the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process and the Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process. These tests are only performed by IUTs that support the TECB, TCBC, and TCBC-I modes of operation, since only these modes of operation utilize the three DES stages in reverse order during the decryption process. The TCFB, TCFB-P, TOFB, and TOFB-I modes of operation utilize the DES calls in the same order used in the encryption process, i.e., encrypt with KEY1, decrypt with KEY2 and encrypt with KEY3. Therefore, these modes of operation should be tested using the same Known Answer tests used for IUTs that support the encryption process.

### 3.1.2.1 The Variable Ciphertext Known Answer Test

To perform the Variable Ciphertext Known Answer Test, the TMOVS supplies the IUT with 64 ciphertext values. These values are obtained from the results of the Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test if the IUT performs both encryption and decryption. Otherwise, the TMOVS will supply the IUT with the ciphertext values. If applicable, the TMOVS also supplies initial values for the initialization vector(s). For IUTs supporting the interleaved configuration of the TCBC mode of operation (TCBC-I), 64 sets of ciphertext values consisting of three ciphertext values each and three initialization vectors are supplied. These supplied values are dependent upon the mode of operation being implemented. The keys and initialization vectors are initialized to zero for each test.

For the TECB and TCBC modes of operation, the value of the ciphertext is used directly as the input block of data. The input block is processed through the DEA three times -- first in the decrypt state with KEY3, next in the encrypt state with KEY2, and lastly, in the decrypt state with KEY1. The resulting output block is used in the calculation of the plaintext, which is then recorded.

For the TCBC-I mode of operation, it is assumed that multiprocessing is possible, i.e., each block of input data is processed by three DES processors. Therefore, three input blocks are processed simultaneously through the three DES processors, resulting in three output blocks which are then used in the calculation of the three plaintext values. Note that the design of the TMOVS assumes that, for security reasons, an IUT is designed so that intermediate values resulting from the first two DES calls are never revealed.

This test is repeated once for each of the 64 ciphertext values. If the 64 resulting plaintext values form the set of basis vectors, it can be assumed that all of the operations were performed successfully.

As the basis vectors are recovered via the decrypt operation, they are presented to the inverse permutation $\mathrm{IP}^{-1}$, thus verifying it. This test also verifies the initial permutation IP and the expansion matrix E via the encrypt operation by presenting a full set of basis vectors to these components.

### 3.1.2.2 The Initial Permutation Known Answer Test

To perform the Initial Permutation Known Answer Test, the TMOVS supplies the IUT with initial values for the ciphertext, the keys, and, if applicable, the initialization vector(s). For IUTs supporting the TCBC-I mode of operation, three ciphertext values and three initialization vector values are supplied. The values supplied are dependent upon the mode of operation being implemented. The ciphertext value(s) are set to the plaintext result(s) obtained from the Variable Ciphertext Known Answer Test.

The key is initialized to zero (with odd parity set). This key is a self-dual key. A self-dual key is a key with the property that when you decrypt (or encrypt) twice with this key, the result is the initial input. Therefore, the result is the same as encrypting and decrypting with the same key. Using a self-dual key allows basis vectors to be presented to components of the DEA to validate the IUT's performance. This is discussed further in the last paragraph of this section.

For the TECB and TCBC modes of operation, the values of the ciphertext are used directly as the input block of data. The input block is processed through the DEA three times -- first in the decrypt state with KEY3, next in the encrypt state with KEY2, and lastly, in the decrypt state with KEY1. The resulting output block is used in the calculation of the plaintext, which is then recorded.

For the TCBC-I mode of operation, it is assumed that multiprocessing is possible, i.e., each block of input data is processed by three DES processors. Therefore, three input blocks are processed simultaneously through the three DES processors, resulting in three output blocks which are then used in the calculation of the three plaintext values. The three input blocks are directly assigned the values of the three ciphertext values for each iteration. Note that the design of the TMOVS assumes that, for security reasons, an IUT is designed so that intermediate values resulting from the first two DES calls are never revealed.

This test is run for each of the 64 ciphertext values. At the completion of the $64^{\text {th }}$ cycle, all results are verified for correctness.

This test, when applied to an IUT, verifies the initial permutation IP and the expansion matrix E via the decrypt operation, by presenting the full set of basis vectors to these components. Via the encrypt operation, this test also verifies the inverse permutation ( $\mathrm{IP}^{-1}$ ) as the basis vectors are recovered by presenting each basis vector to the inverse permutation $\mathrm{IP}^{-1}$.

### 3.1.2.3 The Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process

To implement the Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process, the TMOVS supplies the IUT with 56 keys or, for the TCBC-I mode of operation, 56 key sets consisting of three keys each. The TMOVS also supplies initial values for the initialization vector values, if applicable.

During the initialization process, the ciphertext value(s) are initialized in one of two ways. If the IUT supports both encryption and decryption, the values resulting from the encryption
performed in the Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process will be used to initialize the ciphertext values. Otherwise, the TMOVS will supply the ciphertext values along with the information discussed in the previous paragraph. The initialization vector value(s) are set to zero for each test. All three keys for each round are initialized to a 56-bit key basis vector which contains a " 1 " in the $i^{\text {th }}$ significant position and " 0 "s in all remaining significant positions of the keys, i.e., KEY1=KEY2=KEY3. (NOTE -- the parity bits are not considered as significant bits. These parity bits may be "1"s or "0"s to maintain odd parity.)

For the TECB and TCBC modes of operation, the values of the ciphertext are used directly as the input blocks of data. The input blocks are processed through the DEA three times -first in the decrypt state with KEY3, next in the encrypt state with KEY2, and lastly, in the decrypt state with KEY1. The resulting output blocks are used in the calculation of the plaintext values, which are then recorded.

For the interleaved configuration of the TCBC mode of operation (TCBC-I), it is assumed that multiprocessing is possible, i.e., each block of input data is processed by three DES processors. Therefore, three input blocks are processed simultaneously through the three DES processors, resulting in three output blocks which are then used in the calculation of the three plaintext values. The three input blocks are directly assigned the values of the three corresponding ciphertext values for each iteration. Note that the design of the TMOVS assumes that, for security reasons, an IUT is designed so that intermediate values resulting from the first two DES calls are never revealed.

This test is repeated for each of the 56 key basis vectors, allowing for every possible key basis vector to be tested. At the completion of the $56^{\text {th }}$ cycle, all results are verified for correctness.

This test verifies the right shifts in the key schedule via the DES decrypt operation as the basis vectors are recovered.

During the encrypt operation, a complete set of basis vectors is presented to the key permutation, PC1, thus verifying PC1. Since the key schedule consists of left shifts, a complete set of basis vectors is also presented to PC2 verifying PC2 as well.

### 3.1.2.4 The Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process

To implement the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process, the TMOVS supplies the IUT with 32 key-data sets, consisting of an initial value for the three keys and values for the ciphertext. The TMOVS also supplies initial values for the initialization vector(s), if applicable. For IUTs supporting the TCBC-I mode of operation, three ciphertext values are included in the key-data sets, and three initialization vector values are supplied for each set. The values for the key and ciphertext are supplied in one of two ways. If the IUT performs both encryption and decryption, values for the key and ciphertext resulting from the encryption performed in the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process will be used. Otherwise, the key and ciphertext values will be supplied by the TMOVS. If applicable, the initialization vector will be set to zero for each test.

For the TECB and TCBC modes of operation, the values of the ciphertext are used directly as the input blocks of data. The input blocks are processed through the DEA three times -first in the decrypt state with KEY3, next in the encrypt state with KEY2, and lastly, in the decrypt state with KEY1. The resulting output blocks are used in the calculation of the plaintext values, which are then recorded.

For the TCBC mode of operation supporting interleaving (TCBC-I), it is assumed that multiprocessing is possible, i.e., each block of input data is processed by three DES processors. Therefore, three input blocks are processed simultaneously through the three DES processors, resulting in three output blocks which are then used in the calculation of the three plaintext values. The three input blocks are directly assigned the values of the three corresponding ciphertext values for each iteration. Note that the design of the TMOVS assumes that, for security reasons, an IUT is designed so that intermediate values resulting from the first two DES calls are never revealed.

This test is repeated for each of the 32 key-data sets. At the completion of the $32^{\text {nd }}$ set, the results of each of the 32 tests are verified to be zero.

The 32 key sets used in this test present a complete set of basis vectors to the permutation operator P. By doing so, P is verified. This occurs when both the encrypt and decrypt operations are performed.

### 3.1.2.5 The Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process

To implement the Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process, the TMOVS supplies the IUT with 19 key-data sets consisting of an initial value for the three keys and values for the ciphertext. The TMOVS also supplies initial values for the initialization vector, if applicable. For IUTs supporting the TCBC-I mode of operation, three ciphertext values are included in the key-data sets and three initialization vector values are supplied for each set. The values for the keys and the ciphertext value(s) are supplied in one of two ways. If the IUT performs both encryption and decryption, the values for the key and ciphertext resulting from the encryption performed in the Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process will be used. Otherwise, the key and ciphertext values will be supplied by the TMOVS. If applicable, the initialization vector will be set to zero for each test.

For the TECB and TCBC modes of operation, the values of the ciphertext are used directly as the input blocks of data. The input blocks are processed through the DEA three times -first in the decrypt state with KEY3, next in the encrypt state with KEY2, and lastly, in the decrypt state with KEY1. The resulting output blocks are used in the calculation of the plaintext blocks, which are then recorded.

For the TCBC mode of operation supporting interleaving (TCBC-I), it is assumed that multiprocessing is possible, i.e., each block of input data is processed by three DES processors. Therefore, for interleaved modes of operation, three input blocks are processed simultaneously through the three DES processors, resulting in three output blocks which are then used in the calculation of the three plaintext values. The three input blocks are directly assigned the values of the three corresponding ciphertext values for each iteration. Note that
the design of the TMOVS assumes that, for security reasons, an IUT is designed so that intermediate values resulting from the first two DES calls are never revealed.

This test is repeated for each of the 19 key-data sets allowing for the set of 19 key-data sets to be processed. At the completion of the $19^{\text {th }}$ set, all results are verified for correctness.

The set of 19 key-data sets used in this test result in every entry of all eight S-box substitution tables being used at least once during both the encrypt and decrypt operations. Thus, this test verifies the 64 entries in each of the eight substitution tables.

## The Monte Carlo Test

The Monte Carlo Test is the second type of validation test required to validate IUTs. The Monte Carlo Test is based on the Monte-Carlo test discussed in Special Publication 500-20. It is designed to exercise the entire implementation of the TDEA, as opposed to testing only the individual components. The purpose of the Monte Carlo Test is to detect the presence of flaws in the IUT that were not detected with the controlled input of the Known Answer tests. Such flaws may include pointer problems, errors in the allocation of space, improper error handling, and incorrect behavior of the TDEA implementation when random values are introduced. The Monte Carlo Test does not guarantee ultimate reliability of the IUT that implements the TDEA (i.e., hardware failure, software corruption, etc.).

The TMOVS supplies the IUT with initial input values for the keys, the plaintext(s) (or ciphertext(s)), and, if applicable, initialization vector(s). The Monte Carlo Test is then performed (as described in the following paragraph), and the resulting ciphertext (or plaintext) values are recorded and compared to expected values. If an error is detected, the erroneous result is recorded, and the test terminates abnormally. Otherwise, the test continues. If the IUT's results are correct, the Monte Carlo Test for the IUT ends successfully.

Each Monte Carlo Test consists of four million cycles through the TDEA implemented in the IUT. These cycles are divided into four hundred groups of 10,000 iterations each. Each iteration consists of processing an input block through three operations of the DEA resulting in an output block. For IUTs of the encryption process, the three DES operations are encrypted with KEY1, decrypted with KEY2, and encrypted with KEY3. For IUTs of the decryption process, the three DES operations are decrypted with KEY3, encrypted with KEY2, and decrypted with KEY1. At the $10,000^{\text {th }}$ cycle in an iteration, new values are assigned to the variables needed for the next iteration. The results of each $10,000^{\text {th }}$ encryption or decryption cycle are recorded and evaluated as specified in the preceding paragraph.

## 4. BASIC PROTOCOL

### 4.1 Overview

Input and output messages used to convey information between the TMOVS and the IUT consist of specific fields. The format of these input and output messages is beyond the scope of this document, and the testing laboratories have the option to determine the specific formats of those messages. However, the results sent to NIST must include certain minimum information, which is specified in Section 4.4 Output Types.

A separate message should be created for each mode of operation supported by an IUT. The information should indicate the algorithm used (Triple DES), the mode of operation (TECB, TCBC, TCBC-I, TCFB-including feedback amounts, TCFB-P-including feedback amounts, TOFB, TOFBI), the cryptographic process supported (encryption and/or decryption), the test being performed (one of the various Known Answer tests, or the Monte Carlo Tests), and the required data fields. The required data may consist of counts, keys, initialization vectors, and data representing plaintext or ciphertext. Every field in an output message should be clearly labeled to indicate its contents - this is especially important for NIST to be able to ensure that test results are complete.

### 4.1.1 Conventions

The following conventions should be used in the data portion of messages between the TMOVS and the IUT: (See Section 4.1.2 for these notations.)

1. Integers: integers should be unsigned and should be represented in decimal notation.
2. Hexadecimal strings: should consist of ASCII hexadecimal characters. The ASCII hexadecimal characters to be used should consist of the ASCII characters 0-9 and A-F (or af), which represent 4-bit binary values.
3. Characters: the characters to be represented are A-Z (or a-z), 0-9, and underscore (_).

### 4.1.2 Message Data Types

The following data types should be used in messages between the TMOVS and the IUT:

1. Decimal integers: a decimal integer should have the form
ddd ... dd
where each " d " represents a decimal character (0-9); one or more characters should be present. The characters must be contiguous.
2. Hexadecimal strings: a hexadecimal string should have the form
hhh ... hh
where each "h" should represent an ASCII character 0-9 or A-F (or a-f). Each "h" represents a 4-bit binary value.
3. Characters: an ASCII character should have the form
c
where " c " represents an ASCII character A-Z (or a-z), 0-9, or underscore (_).

### 4.2 Message Contents

The information included in a message consists of the following:
Algorithm - Triple DES,
Mode - selections consist of TECB, TCBC, TCBC-I, TCFB-including feedback amounts, TCFB-Pincluding feedback amounts, TOFB, TOFB-I

Process - selections consist of ENCRYPT or DECRYPT,
Test - selections consist of:
VTEXT for Variable Plaintext/Ciphertext Known Answer Test
VKEY for Variable KEY Known Answer Test
INVPERM for Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test
INITPERM for Initial Permutation Known Answer Test
PERM for Permutation Operation Known Answer Test
SUB for Substitution Table Known Answer Test
MODES for Monte Carlo Test

## Input/Output Data

The contents of the input/output data included in a message depend on the algorithm, mode, process, and test being performed. These different combinations of data have been organized into input types and output types. The input types are used by the TMOVS to supply data to the IUT for testing. The output types are used by the IUT to supply results from the tests to the TMOVS, and eventually to NIST.

### 4.3 Input Types

Twenty-five different combinations of input data are used by the TMOVS to support the various Known Answer tests and Monte Carlo tests.

### 4.3.1 Input Type 1

Input Type 1 consists of:
KEY and DATA
where KEY is represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES key should be presented in odd parity. KEY represents the value of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3; and

DATA is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing plaintext if the encryption process is being tested, or ciphertext if the decryption process is being tested.

### 4.3.2 Input Type 2

Input Type 2 consists of:
KEY, IV, and DATA
where KEY is represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES key should be presented in odd parity. KEY represents the value of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3;

IV is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing the 64-bit initialization vector; and
DATA is 1 to 64 binary bits represented as an ASCII hexadecimal string representing plaintext if the encrypt process is being tested, or ciphertext if the decrypt process is being tested.

### 4.3.3 Input Type 3

Input Type 3 consists of:
KEY, $n$, DATA $_{1}$, DATA $_{2}, \ldots$, DATA $_{n}$
where KEY is represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES key should be presented in odd parity. KEY represents the value of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3;
$n$ is an integer which indicates the number of ciphertext (C) values to follow; and
each DATA ${ }_{n}$ is 1 to 64 binary bits represented as a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string. This field should provide plaintext if the encryption process is being tested, or ciphertext if the decryption process is being tested.

### 4.3.4 Input Type 4

Input Type 4 consists of:
KEY
where KEY is represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES key should be presented in odd parity. KEY represents the value of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3.

### 4.3.5 Input Type 5

Input Type 5 consists of:
KEY, IV, $n$, TEXT $_{1}$, TEXT $_{2}, \ldots$, TEXT $_{n}$
where KEY is represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES key should be presented in odd parity. KEY represents the value of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3;

IV is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing the 64-bit initialization vector; $n$ is an integer which indicates the number of TEXT values to follow; and
each $\mathrm{TEXT}_{n}$ is 1 to 64 binary bits represented as an ASCII hexadecimal string. TEXT represents P , C, or RESULT.

### 4.3.6 Input Type 6

Input Type 6 consists of:
KEY and IV
where KEY is represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES key should be presented in odd parity. KEY represents the value of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3; and

IV is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing the 64-bit initialization vector.

### 4.3.7 $\quad$ Input Type 7

Input Type 7 consists of

$$
\mathrm{P}, \mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}, \ldots, \text { KEY }_{32}
$$

where P is 1 to 64 binary bits represented as a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string; and
each $\mathrm{KEY}_{i}$, where $\mathrm{i}=1$ to 32, is represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES key should be presented in odd parity. KEY represents the value of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3.

### 4.3.8 Input Type 8

Input Type 8 consists of:
TEXT,IV, KEY $_{1}$, KEY $_{2}, \ldots$, KEY $_{32}$
where TEXT is 1 to 64 binary bits represented as an ASCII hexadecimal string. (NOTE -- TEXT may be referred to as plaintext or text.);

IV is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing the 64-bit initialization vector; and
each $\mathrm{KEY}_{i}$, where $\mathrm{i}=1$ to 32 , is represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES key should be presented in odd parity. KEY represents the value of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3.

### 4.3.9 Input Type 9

Input Type 9 supplies $n$ key/input block pairs. It consists of:
$n, \operatorname{PAIR}_{1}, \mathrm{PAIR}_{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{PAIR}_{n}$
In this input type, the integer $n$ indicates the number of KEY values to follow. Each $\mathrm{PAIR}_{i}$ consists of:
$\mathrm{KEY}_{i}$ and $\mathrm{TEXT}_{i}$
where each $\mathrm{KEY}_{i}$, where $\mathrm{i}=1$ to $n$, is represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES key should be presented in odd parity. KEY represents the value of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3; and
each TEXT $_{i}$, for $i=1$ to $n$, is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing either plaintext or ciphertext.

### 4.3.10 Input Type 10

Input Type 10 consists of:
$n, \mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{KEY}_{n}$
where $n$ is an integer which indicates the number of KEY values to follow; and
each $\mathrm{KEY}_{i}$, where $i=1$ to $n$, is represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES key should be presented in odd parity. KEY represents the value of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3;

### 4.3.11 Input Type 11

Input Type 11 consists of:
INITVAL, $n$, PAIR $_{1}$, PAIR $_{2}, \ldots$, PAIR $_{n}$
where INITVAL is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing either the 64 -bit IV or the TEXT, depending on the mode of operation implemented by the IUT. (NOTE -- The TEXT may be referred to as plaintext, ciphertext, or text.);
$n$ is an integer, which indicates the number of KEY/INPUT PAIRs to follow.
Each PAIR ${ }_{i}$ consists of:
$\mathrm{KEY}_{i}$ and $\mathrm{I}_{i}$
where each $\mathrm{KEY}_{i}$, where $i=1$ to $n$, is represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES key should be presented in odd parity. KEY represents the value of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3; and
each $\mathrm{I}_{i}$ is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing either the 64-bit IV, P or C, depending on the mode of operation implemented.

### 4.3.12 Input Type 12

Input Type 12 consists of:
INITVAL, $n$, KEY $_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{KEY}_{n}$
where INITVAL is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing either the 64-bit IV or the 64-bit TEXT depending on the mode of operation implemented by the IUT. (NOTE -- The TEXT may be referred to as ciphertext.);
$n$ is an integer which indicates the number of KEYS to follow; and
each $\mathrm{KEY}_{i}$, where $i=1$ to $n$, is represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES key should be presented in odd parity. KEY represents the value of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3.

### 4.3.13 Input Type 13

Input Type 13 consists of:

KEY, IV1, IV2, IV3, DATA
where KEY is represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES key should be presented in odd parity. KEY represents the value of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3;

IV1 is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing the 64-bit initialization vector;
IV2 is assigned the value of IV1 $+R_{1} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $R_{1}=5555555555555555$;
IV3 is assigned the value of IV1 $+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $\mathrm{R}_{2}=$ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA;
and
DATA is 1 to 64 binary bits represented as an ASCII hexadecimal string representing plaintext if the encrypt process is being tested, ciphertext if the decrypt process is being tested, or TEXT for TCFBP mode. DATA may represent the value of DATA1, DATA2 and DATA3 for Interleaved modes of operation.

### 4.3.14 Input Type 14

Input Type 14 consists of:
KEY, IV1, IV2, IV3
where KEY is represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES key should be presented in odd parity. KEY represents the value of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3;

IV1 is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing the 64-bit initialization vector;
IV2 is assigned the value of $I V 1+R_{1} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $R_{1}=5555555555555555$;
IV3 is assigned the value of IV1 $+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $\mathrm{R}_{2}=$ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA;

### 4.3.15 Input Type 15

Input Type 15 consists of:
KEY, IV1, IV2, IV3, $n$, TEXT $_{1}, \ldots$, TEXT $_{n}$, TEXT $_{1}, \ldots$, TEXT $_{n}$, TEXT $_{1}, \ldots$, TEXT $_{n}$ where KEY is represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES key should be presented in odd parity. KEY represents the value of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3;

IV1 is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing the 64-bit initialization vector;

IV2 is assigned the value of IV1 $+R_{1} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $R_{1}=5555555555555555$;
IV3 is assigned the value of IV1 $+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $\mathrm{R}_{2}=$ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA; $n$ is an integer, which indicates the number of TEXT1s, TEXT2s, and TEXT3s to follow;
each TEXT $1_{n}$ is 1 to 64 binary bits represented as an ASCII hexadecimal string. TEXT1 represents P, C, or RESULT;
each TEXT2 ${ }_{n}$ is 1 to 64 binary bits represented as an ASCII hexadecimal string. TEXT2 represents P, C, or RESULT; and
each TEXT3 ${ }_{n}$ is 1 to 64 binary bits represented as an ASCII hexadecimal string. TEXT3 represents P, C, or RESULT.

### 4.3.16 Input Type 16

Input Type 16 consists of:
IV1, IV2, IV3, $n, \mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{KEY}_{n}$
where IV1 is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing the 64-bit initialization vector;
IV2 is assigned the value of IV1 $+R_{1} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $R_{1}=5555555555555555$;
IV3 is assigned the value of IV1 $+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $\mathrm{R}_{2}=$ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA;
$n$ is an integer which indicates the number of KEY values to follow; and
each $\mathrm{KEY}_{i}$, where $i=1$ to $n$, is represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES key should be presented in odd parity. KEY represents the value of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3;

### 4.3.17 Input Type 17

Input Type 17 consists of:
IV1, IV2, IV3, $n$, GROUP $_{1}$, GROUP $_{2}, \ldots$, GROUP $_{n}$
where IV1 is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing the 64-bit initialization vector;
IV2 is assigned the value of $I V 1+R_{1} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $R_{1}=5555555555555555$;
IV3 is assigned the value of IV1 $+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $\mathrm{R}_{2}=$ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA;
$n$ is an integer, which indicates the number of KEY/INPUT GROUPs to follow.
Each GROUP ${ }_{i}$ consists of:

KEY $_{i}$, TEXT1 $_{i}$, TEXT2 $_{i}$, and TEXT3 ${ }_{i}$
where each $\mathrm{KEY}_{i}$, where $i=1$ to $n$, is represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES key should be presented in odd parity. KEY represents the value of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3; and
each TEXT1 ${ }_{i}$, TEXT $_{i}{ }_{i}$, and TEXT3 ${ }_{i}$ is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing the 64-bit C1, C2, and C3 respectively.

### 4.3.18 Input Type 18

Input Type 18 consists of
TEXT, IV1, IV2, IV3, KEY $_{1}$, KEY $_{2}, \ldots$, KEY $_{32}$
Where TEXT is 1 to 64 binary bits represented as an ASCII hexadecimal string. TEXT may represent P or TEXT depending on the mode of operation being implemented;

IV1 is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing the 64-bit initialization vector;
IV2 is assigned the value of IV1 $+R_{1} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $R_{1}=5555555555555555$;
IV3 is assigned the value of IV1 $+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $\mathrm{R}_{2}=$ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA; and
each $\mathrm{KEY}_{i}$, where $\mathrm{i}=1$ to 32, is represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES key should be presented in odd parity. KEY represents the value of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3.

### 4.3.19 Input Type 19

Input Type 19 consists of:
IV1, IV2, IV3, $n$, PAIR $_{1}, \mathrm{PAIR}_{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{PAIR}_{n}$
where IV1 is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing the 64-bit initialization vector;
IV2 is assigned the value of IV1 $+R_{1} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $R_{1}=5555555555555555$;
IV3 is assigned the value of IV1 $+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $\mathrm{R}_{2}=$ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA;
$n$ is an integer which indicates the number of KEY/INPUT PAIRs to follow.
Each $\operatorname{PAIR}_{i}$ consists of:
$\mathrm{KEY}_{i}$ and $\mathrm{TEXT}_{i}$
where each $\mathrm{KEY}_{i}$, where $i=1$ to $n$, is represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES key should be presented in odd parity. KEY represents the value of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3; and
each $\mathrm{TEXT}_{i}$ is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string. TEXT may represent the 64-bit TEXT1, TEXT2, and TEXT3 values, or the IV1 value depending on the mode of operation implemented.

### 4.3.20 Input Type 20

Input Type 20 consists of:
KEY1, KEY2, KEY3, DATA
where KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 are represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES key should be presented in odd parity; and

DATA is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing plaintext if the encryption process is being tested, or ciphertext if the decryption process is being tested.

### 4.3.21 Input Type 21

Input Type 21 consists of:
KEY1, KEY2, KEY3, IV, and DATA
where KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 are represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES key should be presented in odd parity.;

IV is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing the 64-bit initialization vector; and
DATA is 1 to 64 binary bits represented as an ASCII hexadecimal string representing plaintext if the encrypt process is being tested, or ciphertext if the decrypt process is being tested.

### 4.3.22 Input Type 22

Input Type 22 consists of:
KEY1, KEY2, KEY3, IV1, IV2, IV3, TEXT1, TEXT2, and TEXT3
where KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 are represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES key should be presented in odd parity.;

IV1 is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing the 64-bit initialization vector;
IV2 is assigned the value of IV1 $+R_{1} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $R_{1}=5555555555555555$;

IV3 is assigned the value of IV1 $+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $\mathrm{R}_{2}=$ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA;
TEXT1 is 64 binary bits represented as a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing plaintext if the encrypt process is being tested, or ciphertext if the decrypt process is being tested;

TEXT2 is 64 binary bits represented as a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing plaintext if the encrypt process is being tested, or ciphertext if the decrypt process is being tested; and TEXT3 is 1 to 64 binary bits represented as an ASCII hexadecimal string representing plaintext if the encrypt process is being tested, or ciphertext if the decrypt process is being tested.

### 4.3.23 Input Type 23

Input Type 23 consists of:
KEY, IV1, IV2, IV3, $n$, TEXT $_{1}, \ldots$, TEXT $_{n}$
where KEY is represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES key should be presented in odd parity. KEY represents the value of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3;

IV1 is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing the 64-bit initialization vector;
IV2 is assigned the value of IV1 $+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $\mathrm{R}_{1}=5555555555555555$;
IV3 is assigned the value of IV1 $+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $\mathrm{R}_{2}=$ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA;
$n$ is an integer which indicates the number of TEXT values to follow; and
each TEXT $_{n}$ is 1 to 64 binary bits represented as a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string. TEXT1 represents $\mathrm{P}, \mathrm{C}$, or RESULT;

### 4.3.24 Input Type 24

Input Type 24 consists of:
KEY1, KEY2, KEY3, IV1, IV2, IV3, and TEXT
where KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 are represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES key should be presented in odd parity.;

IV1 is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing the 64-bit initialization vector;
IV2 is assigned the value of IV1 $+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $\mathrm{R}_{1}=5555555555555555$;
IV3 is assigned the value of IV1 $+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $\mathrm{R}_{2}=$ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA; and

TEXT is 1 to 64 binary bits represented as an ASCII hexadecimal string representing plaintext if the encrypt process is being tested, or ciphertext if the decrypt process is being tested.

### 4.3.25 Input Type 25

Input Type 25 consists of:
TEXT, $n$, GROUP $_{1}$, GROUP $_{2}, \ldots$, GROUP $_{n}$
where TEXT is 1 to 64 binary bits represented as a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing plaintext if the encrypt process is being tested, or ciphertext if the decrypt process is being tested;
$n$ is an integer which indicates the number of KEY/IV1/IV2/IV3 groups to follow.
Each GROUP ${ }_{i}$ consists of:
$\mathrm{KEY}_{i}, \mathrm{IV}_{i}, \mathrm{IV}_{i}$, and IV3 ${ }_{i}$
where each $\mathrm{KEY}_{i}$, where $i=1$ to $n$, is represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES key should be presented in odd parity. KEY represents the value of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3;
$\mathrm{IV}_{i}$ is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing the 64 -bit initialization vector;
$\operatorname{IV} 2_{i}$ is assigned the value of $\mathrm{IV} 1+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $\mathrm{R}_{1}=5555555555555555$; and
$\mathrm{IV} 3_{i}$ is assigned the value of IV1 $+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $\mathrm{R}_{2}=$ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA.

### 4.4 Output Types

Eight different combinations of output data are used by the TMOVS to support the various Known Answer tests and Monte Carlo tests.

### 4.4.1 Output Type 1

Output Type 1 consists of:

## COUNT, KEY, DATA, and RESULT

where COUNT is an integer between 1 and 64 , i.e., $0<$ COUNT $<=64$, representing the output line;

KEY should be represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES key should be presented in odd parity. KEY represents the value of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3;

DATA is a 16 character hexadecimal string representing plaintext if the encrypt process is being tested or ciphertext if the decrypt process is being tested; and

RESULT is a 16 character hexadecimal string indicating the resulting value. Depending on the process of the IUT being tested, the resulting value represents ciphertext (if encrypting) or plaintext (if decrypting).

### 4.4.2 Output Type 2

Output Type 2 consists of:
COUNT, KEY, CV, DATA, and RESULT
where COUNT is an integer between 1 and 64, i.e., $0<$ COUNT $<=64$, representing the output line;
where KEY is represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES keys should be presented in odd parity. KEY represents the value of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3;

CV is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string;
DATA is 1-64 binary bits represented as an ASCII hexadecimal string representing plaintext if the encrypt process is being tested, or ciphertext if the decrypt process is being tested.; and

RESULT is 1-64 binary bits represented as an ASCII hexadecimal string indicating the resulting value. Depending on the process of the IUT being tested, the resulting value may be ciphertext (if encrypting) or plaintext (if decrypting).

### 4.4.3 Output Type 3

Output Type 3 consists of:
COUNT, KEY, IV1, IV2, IV3, DATA1, DATA2, DATA3, RESULT1, RESULT2, RESULT3
where COUNT is an integer between 1 and 64, i.e., $0<$ COUNT $<=64$, representing the output line;

KEY is represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES key should be presented in odd parity. KEY represents the value of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3;

IV1 is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing the 64-bit initialization vector;
IV2 is assigned the value of IV1 $+R_{1} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $R_{1}=5555555555555555$;
IV3 is assigned the value of IV1 $+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $\mathrm{R}_{2}=$ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA;

DATA1, DATA2, and DATA3 are 1-64 binary bits represented as an ASCII hexadecimal strings representing values of plaintext P1, P2, and P3 or input blocks I1, I2, and I3 respectively, if the encrypt process is being tested, or values of ciphertext for $\mathrm{C} 1, \mathrm{C} 2$, and C 3 if the decrypt process is being tested;

RESULT1, RESULT2, and RESULT3 are 1-64 binary bits represented as an ASCII hexadecimal strings indicating the resulting values corresponding to either $\mathrm{C} 1, \mathrm{C} 2$, and C 3 or $\mathrm{P} 1, \mathrm{P} 2$, and P 3 . Depending on the process of the IUT being tested, the resulting value may be ciphertext (if encrypting) or plaintext (if decrypting).

### 4.4.4 Output Type 4

Output Type 4 consists of:
COUNT, KEY1, KEY2, KEY3, CV1, CV2, CV3, DATA1, DATA2, DATA3, RESULT1, RESULT2, RESULT3
where COUNT is an integer between 1 and 64, i.e., $0<$ COUNT $<=64$, representing the output line;
where KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 is represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES keys should be presented in odd parity.;

CV1 is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing the 64 -bit initialization vector; CV2 is assigned the value of IV1 $+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $\mathrm{R}_{1}=5555555555555555$;

CV3 is assigned the value of IV1 $+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $\mathrm{R}_{2}=$ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA;
DATA1, DATA2, and DATA3 are 16 character hexadecimal strings representing values of plaintext for P1, P2, and P3 respectively, if the encrypt process is being tested, or values of ciphertext for $\mathrm{C} 1, \mathrm{C} 2$, and C 3 if the decrypt process is being tested;

RESULT1, RESULT2, and RESULT3 are 16 character hexadecimal strings indicating the resulting values corresponding to either $\mathrm{C} 1, \mathrm{C} 2$, and C 3 or $\mathrm{P} 1, \mathrm{P} 2$, and P 3 . Depending on the process of the IUT being tested, the resulting value may be ciphertext (if encrypting) or plaintext (if decrypting).

### 4.4.5 Output Type 5

Output Type 5 consists of:
COUNT, KEY1, KEY2, KEY3, DATA, and RESULT
where COUNT is an integer between 1 and 400, i.e., $0<$ COUNT $<=400$, representing the output line;

KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 are represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES keys should be presented in odd parity.;

DATA is a 16 character hexadecimal string representing plaintext if the encrypt process is being tested, or ciphertext if the decrypt process is being tested; and

RESULT is a 16 character hexadecimal string indicating the resulting value. Depending on the process of the IUT being tested, the resulting value represents ciphertext (if encrypting) or plaintext (if decrypting).

### 4.4.6 Output Type 6

Output Type 6 consists of:

## COUNT, KEY1, KEY2, KEY3, CV, DATA, and RESULT

where COUNT is an integer between 1 and 400, i.e., $0<$ COUNT $<=400$, representing the output line;

KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 are represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES keys should be presented in odd parity.;

CV is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing IV or I depending on the mode implemented;

DATA is 1-64 binary bits represented as an ASCII hexadecimal string representing plaintext if the encrypt process is being tested, or ciphertext if the decrypt process is being tested; and

RESULT is 1-64 binary bits represented as an ASCII hexadecimal string indicating the resulting value. Depending on the process of the IUT being tested, the resulting value should represent ciphertext (if encrypting) or plaintext (if decrypting).

### 4.4.7 Output Type 7

Output Type 7 consists of:
COUNT, KEY, IV1, IV2, IV3, DATA, RESULT1, RESULT2, RESULT3
where COUNT is an integer between 1 and 64 , i.e., $0<$ COUNT $<=64$, representing the output line;

KEY is represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES key should be presented in odd parity. KEY represents the value of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3;

IV1 is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing the 64-bit initialization vector;

IV2 is assigned the value of IV1 $+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $\mathrm{R}_{1}=5555555555555555$;
IV3 is assigned the value of IV1 $+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $\mathrm{R}_{2}=$ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA;
DATA is 1-64 binary bits represented as an ASCII hexadecimal string representing the value of the plaintext if the encrypt process is being tested, or the value of the ciphertext if the decrypt process is being tested; and

RESULT1, RESULT2, and RESULT3 is 1-64 binary bits represented as an ASCII hexadecimal string indicating the resulting values, which may be ciphertext (if encrypting), or plaintext (if decrypting).

### 4.4.8 Output Type 8

Output Type 8 consists of:
COUNT, KEY1, KEY2, KEY3, I1, I2, I3, DATA, and RESULT
where COUNT is an integer between 1 and 400, i.e., $0<$ COUNT $<=400$, representing the output line;

KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 are represented as 64 bits in hexadecimal notation (i.e., 4 bits per hexadecimal character). The 8 parity bits should be present but ignored, yielding 56 significant bits. For consistency purposes, the DES keys should be presented in odd parity;

I1 is a 16 character ASCII hexadecimal string representing IV or I;
I2 is assigned the value of $\mathrm{I} 1+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $\mathrm{R}_{1}=5555555555555555$;
I3 is assigned the value of $\mathrm{I} 1+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}$, where $\mathrm{R}_{2}=$ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA;
DATA is 1-64 binary bits represented as an ASCII hexadecimal string representing plaintext if the encrypt process is being tested or ciphertext if the decrypt process is being tested; and

RESULT is 1-64 binary bits represented as an ASCII hexadecimal string indicating the resulting value. Depending on the process of the IUT being tested, the resulting value should represent ciphertext (if encrypting) or plaintext (if decrypting).

## 5. TESTS REQUIRED TO VALIDATE AN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRIPLE DES ALGORITHM

The validation of IUTs of the Triple DES algorithm (TDEA) should require the successful completion of an applicable set of Known Answer tests and the appropriate Monte Carlo tests. The tests required for validation of an IUT should be determined by several factors. These include the mode(s) of operation supported (TECB, TCBC, TCBC-I, TCFB, TCFB-P, TOFB, TOFB-I), the keying option used, and the allowed cryptographic processes (encryption, decryption, both).

A separate set of Known Answer tests has been designed for use with each of the seven modes of TDES. Within these sets of tests are separate subsets of tests corresponding to the encryption and decryption processes. If an IUT implements multiple modes of operation, the set of Known Answer tests corresponding to each supported mode of operation should be tested.

The Monte Carlo tests have been designed for use with each of the seven modes of TDES. For the TECB, TCBC, TCBC-I, TCFB, and TCFB-P modes of operation, there are two tests associated with each: one to be used for IUTs allowing the encryption process, and the other to be used for IUTs allowing the decryption process. If both the encryption and decryption processes are allowed by an IUT, both tests are required. The TOFB and TOFB-I modes of operation only require one Monte Carlo test, which is designed for use with both the encryption and decryption processes of an IUT. For example, if an IUT implements the TCBC mode of operation in both the encryption and decryption processes, the Monte Carlo Test for the encryption process and the Monte Carlo Test for the decryption process of the TCBC mode of operation should be successfully completed to validate the IUT. If an IUT implements both the encryption and decryption processes of the TCFB-P mode of operation, the Monte Carlo Test for the encryption process and the Monte Carlo Test for the decryption process of the TCFB-P mode of operation should be successfully completed to validate the IUT. If an IUT implements both the encryption and decryption processes of the TOFB mode of operation, the Monte Carlo Test for the TOFB mode of operation should be successfully completed to validate the IUT.

If an IUT supports more than one mode of operation, the Monte Carlo Test corresponding to each supported mode should be performed successfully. For example, if an IUT implements the TECB and TCBC modes of operation in the encryption process, the Monte Carlo Test for the encryption process of both the TECB and the TCBC modes of operation should be successfully completed to validate the IUT.

If an IUT supports the 3-key keying option, where KEY1, KEY2 and KEY3 are independent, the Monte Carlo Test should be successfully completed three times - once where the three keys are independent, once where KEY1 and KEY2 are independent and KEY3 $=$ KEY1, and once where KEY1 $=$ KEY2 $=$ KEY3 - to validate the IUT. If an IUT supports the 2-key keying option, where KEY1 and KEY2 are independent and KEY3 = KEY1, the Monte Carlo Test should be successfully completed two times - once where KEY1 and KEY2 are independent and KEY3 $=$ KEY1, and once where KEY1 $=$ KEY2 $=$ KEY3 - to validate the IUT. If an IUT only supports the 1 -key keying option, where KEY1=KEY2=KEY3, the Monte Carlo Test should be successfully completed once with all the keys being equal to validate the IUT.

The tests required to successfully validate IUTs are detailed in the following sections. These sections are categorized by mode of operation. Within each mode of operation, the tests are divided into tests to use with the encryption process and tests to use with the decryption process.

### 5.1 TDEA Electronic Codebook (TECB) Mode

The IUTs which implement the TDES Electronic Codebook (TECB) mode should be validated by the successful completion of a series of Known Answer tests and Monte Carlo tests corresponding to the cryptographic processes allowed by the IUT.

### 5.1.1 Encryption Process

The process of validating an IUT which implements the TECB mode of operation for the encryption process should involve the successful completion of the following six tests:

1. The Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test - TECB mode
2. The Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test - TECB mode
3. The Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process - TECB mode
4. The Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process - TECB mode
5. The Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process - TECB mode
6. The Monte Carlo Test for the Encryption Process - TECB mode

An explanation of the tests follows.

### 5.1.1.1 The Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test - TECB Mode

Table 1 The Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test - TECB Mode
TMOVS: Initialize KEYs: KEY1 = KEY2 = KEY3 $=0101010101010101$ (odd parity set)
$P_{1}=8000000000000000$
Send KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, KEY3), $\mathrm{P}_{1}$
IUT: $\quad$ FOR $i=1$ to 64
\{


Send i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$, $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$
$P_{i+1}=$ basis vector where single " 1 " bit is in position $\mathrm{i}+1$
\}
TMOVS: Compare results from each loop with known answers.
See Table A.1.

Table 1 illustrates the Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test for the TECB mode of operation.

1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 to the constant hexadecimal value 0 with odd parity set, i.e., $K E Y 1_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 2_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 3_{\text {hex }}=010101$ 0101010101.
b. Initializes the 64-bit plaintext $\mathrm{P}_{1}$ to the basis vector containing a " 1 " in the first bit position and " 0 " in the following 63 positions, i.e., $\mathrm{P}_{1 \text { bin }}=1000000000000000$ 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 . The equivalent of this value in hexadecimal notation is 8000000000000000 .
c. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 1.
2. The IUT should perform the following for $\mathrm{i}=1$ through 64:
a. Set the input block $I_{i}$ equal to the value of $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$.
b. Process $I_{i}$ through the three DEA stages resulting in ciphertext $C_{i}$. This involves processing $I_{i}$ through the first DEA stage, denoted DEA $_{1}$, in the encrypt state using KEY1, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the second DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$, in the decrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the third DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$, in the encrypt state using KEY3, resulting in ciphertext $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$.
c. Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (where KEY represents the value of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and the resulting $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 1.
d. Retain $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ for use with the Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test for the TECB Mode (Section 5.1.1.2 ), and, if the IUT supports the decryption process, for use with the Variable Ciphertext Known Answer Test for the TECB Mode (Section 5.1.2.1).
e. Assign a new value to $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ by setting it equal to the value of a basis vector with a "1" bit in position $\mathrm{i}+1$, where $\mathrm{i}+1=2, \ldots, 64$.

NOTE -- This continues until every possible basis vector has been represented by the P, i.e., 64 times. The output from the IUT should consist of 64 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 1.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to known values found in Table A.1.

### 5.1.1.2 The Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test - TECB Mode

Table 2 The Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test - TECB Mode


Table 2 illustrates the Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test for the TECB mode of operation.

1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 to the constant hexadecimal value 0 with odd parity set, i.e., $K E Y 1_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 2_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 3_{\text {hex }}=010101$ 0101010101.
b. Initializes the 64-bit plaintext $P_{i}$ (where $i=1 . .64$ ) to the $C_{i}$ results obtained from the Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test.
c. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 3.
2. The IUT should perform the following for $\mathrm{i}=1$ through 64:
a. Set the input block $I_{i}$ equal to the value of $P_{i}$.
b. Process $I_{i}$ through the three DEA stages resulting in ciphertext $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$. This involves processing $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the first DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$, in the encrypt state using KEY1, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the second DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$, in the decrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the third DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$, in the encrypt state using KEY3, resulting in ciphertext $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$.
c. Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and the resulting $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 1.
d. Assign a new value to $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ by setting it equal to the corresponding output from the TMOVS.

NOTE -- The output from the IUT should consist of 64 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 1.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to known values. The C values should be the set of basis vectors.

### 5.1.1.3 The Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process TECB Mode

Table 3 The Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process - TECB Mode


As summarized in Table 3, the Variable Key Known Answer Test for the TECB Encryption Process is performed as follows:

1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{1}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}$ to contain " 0 " in every significant bit except for a " 1 " in the first position, i.e., the 64 -bit $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{1 \text { bin }}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{1}$ bin $=\mathrm{KEY}_{1 \text { bin }}=100000000000000100000001000000010000000100000001$ 0000000100000001 . The equivalent of this value in hexadecimal notation is 8001 010101010101.

NOTE -- the parity bits are set to " 0 " or " 1 " to get odd parity.
b. Initializes the 64-bit plaintext $P$ to the value of 0 , i.e., $P_{\text {hex }}=00000000000000$ 00.
c. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 1.
2. The IUT should perform the following for $\mathrm{i}=1$ to 56 :

NOTE -- 56 is the number of significant bits in a TDES key.
a. Set the input block I equal to the value of P .
b. Using the corresponding $K E Y 1_{i}, K E Y 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ parameters, process I through the three DEA stages resulting in ciphertext $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$. This involves processing I through the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$ in the encrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$ in the decrypt state using KEY $2_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$ in the encrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in ciphertext $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$.
c. Forward the current values of the loop number i, $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ (representing KEY1 ${ }_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ ), P , and the resulting $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 1.
d. If the IUT supports the decryption process, retain $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ for use with the Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process for the TECB Mode (Section 5.1.2.3).
e. Set $\mathrm{KEY}_{1+1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ equal to the vector consisting of " 0 " in every significant bit position except for a single " 1 " bit in position $\mathrm{i}+1$. The parity bits may contain " 1 " or " 0 " to make odd parity.

NOTE -- The above processing continues until every significant basis vector has been represented by the KEY parameter. The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 56 output strings. Each output string should consist of information inclu ded in Output Type 1.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to known values found in Table A.2.

### 5.1.1.4 Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process - TECB Mode

Table 4 The Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process TECB Mode


Table 4 illustrates the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the TECB Encryption Process.

1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 variables with the 32 constant KEY values from Table A. 3 .
b. Initializes the plaintext $P$ to the value of 0 , i.e., $\mathrm{P}_{\text {hex }}=0000000000000000$.
c. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 7.
2. The IUT should perform the following for $\mathrm{i}=1$ to 32 :
a. Set the input block I equal to the value of P .
b. Using the corresponding $K E Y 1_{i}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ values, process I through the three DEA stages resulting in ciphertext $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$. This involves processing I through the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$ in the encrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{i}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$ in the decrypt state using KEY2 ${ }_{i}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$ in the encrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY}_{i}$, resulting ciphertext $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$.
c. Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, KEY3), P , and the resulting $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 1.
d. If the IUT supports the decryption process, retain $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ for use with the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process for the TECB mode (Section 5.1.2.4).
e. Set $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$, and $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ equal to the next key supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE-- The above processing should continue until all 32 KEY values are processed. The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 32 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 1.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to known values found in Table A.3.

### 5.1.1.5 Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process TECB Mode

Table 5 The Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process TECB Mode

| TMOVS: | Initialize | $K E Y 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}($ where $\mathrm{i}=1 . .19)=19 \mathrm{KEY}$ values in Table A. 4 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}($ where $\mathrm{i}=1 . .19)=19$ corresponding P values in Table A. 4 |
|  | Send | $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{P}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}, \mathrm{P}_{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{KEY}_{19}, \mathrm{P}_{19}$ (Since all three keys are the same, these key values represent the values of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3.) |
| IUT: | FOR i $=1$ to 19 |  |
|  |  | $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$ |
|  | Perform Triple DES: | $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ is read into TDEA and is encrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$ using KEY $1_{i}$, resulting in TEMP1 |
|  |  | TEMP1 is decrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$ using $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in TEMP2 |
|  |  | TEMP2 is encrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$ using $\mathrm{KEY}_{3}$, , resulting in $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ |
|  |  | Send $\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\left(\right.$ representing $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}{ }_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}{ }_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ ), $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ |
|  |  | $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}^{\mathrm{i}+1}$ $=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ from TMOVS |
|  |  | $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ from TMOVS |
|  | \} |  |
| TMOVS: | Compare results from each | loop with known answers. Use Table A.4. |

As summarized in Table 5, the Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the TECB Encryption Process is performed as follows:

1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY-plaintext (KEY-P) pairs with the 19 constant KEY-P values from Table A.4. The KEY value indicates the value of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3, i.e., $\mathrm{KEY} 1=\mathrm{KEY} 2=\mathrm{KEY} 3$.
b. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 9.
2. The IUT should perform the following for $\mathrm{i}=1$ to 19 :
a. Set the input block $I_{i}$ equal to the value of $P_{i}$.
b. Using the corresponding $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}$ values, process $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the three DEA stages resulting in ciphertext $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$. This involves processing $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the first DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$, in the encrypt state using $K E Y 1_{i}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the second DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$, in the decrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the third DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$, in the encrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in ciphertext $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$.
c. Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, KEY3), $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and the resulting $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 1.
d. If the IUT supports the decryption process, retain $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ for use with the Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process for the TECB mode (Section 5.1.2.5).
e. Set $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ equal to the $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ supplied by the TMOVS.
f. $\quad$ Set $P_{i+1}$ equal to the corresponding $P_{i+1}$ value supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE-- The above processing should continue until all 19 KEY-P pairs are processed. The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 19 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 1.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to known values found in Table A.4.

### 5.1.1.6 Monte Carlo Test for the Encryption Process - TECB Mode

Table 6 The Monte Carlo Test for the Encryption Process - TECB Mode



```
            independent and KEY3 }\mp@subsup{\textrm{i}}{\textrm{i}}{= KEY1}\mp@subsup{1}{\textrm{i}}{})\mathrm{ ,
            KEY3 }\mp@subsup{\textrm{i}+1}{}{= KEY3}\mp@subsup{\textrm{K}}{\textrm{i}}{}\oplus\mp@subsup{\textrm{C}}{\textrm{j}}{
            else
            KEY3 }\mp@subsup{\textrm{i}+1}{}{=}=\mp@subsup{\textrm{KEY3}}{\textrm{i}}{}\oplus\mp@subsup{\textrm{C}}{\textrm{j}-2}{
            P
}
TMOVS: Check IUT's output for correctness.
```

As summarized in Table 6, the Monte Carlo Test for the TECB Encryption Process is performed as follows:

1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3, and the plaintext P variables. The P and KEYs consist of 64 bits.
b. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 20.
2. The IUT should perform the following for $\mathrm{i}=0$ through 399:
a. Record the current values of the output loop number $\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{P}_{0}$.
b. Perform the following for $\mathrm{j}=0$ through 9999:
1) Set the input block $I_{j}$ equal to the value of $P_{j}$.
2) Using the corresponding $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$ and $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{i}$ values, process $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}$ through the three DEA stages resulting in ciphertext $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}$. This involves processing $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}$ through the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$ in the encrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$ in the decrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the DEA stage DEA $_{3}$ in the encrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in ciphertext $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}$.
3) Prepare for loop $j+1$ by assigning $P_{j+1}$ with the current value of $C_{j}$.
c. $\quad$ Record $C_{j}$.
d. Forward all recorded information for this loop, as specified in Output Type 5, to the TMOVS.
e. Assign new values to the KEY parameters, KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 in preparation for the next outer loop. Note $\mathrm{j}=9999$.

The new $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{i+1}$ should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$ with the $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}$.

The new KEY2 ${ }_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ calculation is based on the values of the keys. If $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$ and $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ are independent and $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$, or $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}$ are independent, the new $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{i+1}$ should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$ with the $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}-1}$. If $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, the new $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$ with the $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}$.

The new $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ calculation is also based on the values of the keys. If $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{i}$, $K E Y 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ are independent, the new $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{i}$ with the $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}-2}$. If $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$ and $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$ are independent and $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$, or if $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}$, the new $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current $\mathrm{KEY}_{i}$ with the $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}$.
f. Assign a new value to P in preparation for the next output loop. $\mathrm{P}_{0}$ should be assigned the value of the current $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}$. Note $\mathrm{j}=9999$.

NOTE -- the new $P$ should be denoted as $P_{0}$ to be used for the first pass through the inner loop when $j=0$.
NOTE-- The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 400 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 5.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to known values.

### 5.1.2 Decryption Process

The process of validating an IUT which implements the TECB mode of operation in the decryption process should involve the successful completion of the following six tests:

1. The Variable Ciphertext Known Answer Test - TECB mode
2. The Initial Permutation Known Answer Test - TECB mode
3. The Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process- TECB mode
4. The Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process- TECB mode
5. The Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process - TECB mode
6. The Monte Carlo Test for the Decryption Process- TECB mode

An explanation of the tests follows.

### 5.1.2.1 The Variable Ciphertext Known Answer Test - TECB Mode

Table $7 \quad$ The Variable Ciphertext Known Answer Tests - TECB Mode

| TMOVS: | Initialize KEYs: KEY1=KEY2=KEY3=0101010101010101 (odd parity set) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | If encryption is supported by IUT: |  |
|  | Send KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3) |  |
|  | If encryption is not supported by IUT: |  |
|  | Initialize $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}($ where $\mathrm{i}=1 . .64)=64 \mathrm{C}$ values in Table A. 1 |  |
|  | Send KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), $\mathrm{C}_{1}, \mathrm{C}_{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{C}_{64}$ |  |
| IUT: | If encryption is supported by IUT: |  |
|  | Initialize $\mathrm{C}_{1}=$ first value from output of Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test. |  |
|  | Otherwise, use the first value received from the TMOVS. |  |
|  | FOR $\mathrm{i}=1$ to 64 |  |
|  | \{ |  |
|  | Perform <br> Triple DES: | $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{C}_{i}$ |
|  |  | $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ is read into TDEA and is decrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$ using KEY3, resulting in TEMP1 |
|  |  | TEMP1 is encrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$ using KEY2, resulting in TEMP2 |
|  |  | TEMP2 is decrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$ using KEY1, resulting in $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$ |
|  |  | Send i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$ |
|  |  | If encryption is supported: |
|  |  | $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=$ corresponding $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ from output of Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test |
|  |  | else |
|  |  | $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=$ the corresponding $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ value from TMOVS |
|  | \} |  |

TMOVS: Compare results from each loop with known answers. Should be the set of basis vectors.

Table 7 illustrates the Variable Ciphertext Known Answer test for the TECB mode of operation.

1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 to the constant hexadecimal value 0 with odd parity set, i.e., $K E Y 1_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 2_{\text {hex }}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\text {hex }}=010101$ 0101010101.
b. If the IUT does not support encryption, the 64 constant ciphertext values from Table A. 1 are initialized.
c. If encryption is supported by the IUT, the KEYs are forwarded to the IUT using Input Type 4. If encryption is not supported by the IUT, forward the KEYs and 64 C values to the IUT using Input Type 3.
2. The IUT should:
a. If encryption is supported, initialize the C value with the first C value retained from the Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test for the TECB Mode (Section 5.1.1.1). Otherwise, use the first value received from the TMOVS.
b. Perform the following for $\mathrm{i}=1$ through 64:
1) Set the input block $I_{i}$ equal to the value of $C_{i}$.
2) Process $I_{i}$ through the three DEA stages resulting in plaintext $P_{i}$. This involves processing $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$ in the decrypt state using KEY3, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$ in the encrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the DEA stage DEA $_{1}$ in the decrypt state using KEY1, resulting plaintext $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$.
3) Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and the resulting $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$ to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 1.
4) Retain $P_{i}$ for use with the Initial Permutation Known Answer Test for the TECB Mode (Section 5.1.2.2).
5) If encryption is supported, set $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ equal to the corresponding output from the Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test for the TECB mode. If encryption is not supported, assign a new value to $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ by setting it equal to the corresponding $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ value supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE-- The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 64 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 1.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to known values. The P results should be the set of basis vectors.

### 5.1.2 2 The Initial Permutation Known Answer Test - TECB Mode

## Table 8 Initial Permutation Known Answer Test - TECB Mode



Table 8 illustrates the Initial Permutation Known Answer Test for the TECB mode of operation.

1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 to the constant hexadecimal value 0 with odd parity set, i.e., $\mathrm{KEY}_{\text {hex }}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\text {hex }}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\text {hex }}=010101$ 0101010101.

NOTE -- the significant bits are set to " 0 " and the parity bits are set to " 1 " to make odd parity.
b. Initializes the 64-bit ciphertext $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ (where $\mathrm{i}=1, \ldots, 64$ ) to the $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$ results obtained from the Variable Ciphertext Known Answer Test.
c. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 3.
2. The IUT should perform the following for $\mathrm{i}=1$ through 64:
a. Set the input block $I_{i}$ equal to the value of $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$.
b. Process $I_{i}$ through the three DEA stages resulting in plaintext $P_{i}$. This involves processing $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$ in the decrypt state using KEY3, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$ in the encrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$ in the decrypt state using KEY1, resulting in plaintext $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$.
c. Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and the resulting $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$ to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 1.
d. Set $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ equal to the corresponding $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ value supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE-- The output from the IUT should consist of 64 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 1.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to known values.

### 5.1.2.3 The Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process TECB Mode

Table 9 The Variable Key Known Answer Tests for the Decryption Process - TECB Mode
TMOVS: $\quad$ Initialize $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}: \quad \mathrm{KEY}_{1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{1}=8001010101010101$ (odd parity set)

If encryption is supported by the IUT:
Send $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}$ (representing $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{1}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}$ )
If encryption is not supported by the IUT:
Initialize $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ (where $\mathrm{i}=1 . .56$ ): 56 C values in Table A. 2
Send $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}$ (representing $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{1}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}$ ), $\mathrm{C}_{1}, \mathrm{C}_{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{C}_{56}$
IUT: If encryption is supported by the IUT:
Initialize $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}=$ first value from output of Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process

Otherwise, use the first value received from the TMOVS.
FOR $\mathrm{i}=1$ to 64
\{
IF (i $\bmod 8 \neq 0)$ \{process every bit except parity bits $\}$

| Perform Triple DES: | $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ |
| :---: | :---: |
|  | $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ is read into TDEA and is decrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$ using KEY3 ${ }_{i}$ resulting in TEMP1 |
|  | TEMP1 is encrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$ using $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{i}$ resulting in TEMP2 |
|  | TEMP2 is decrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$ using $K E Y 1_{\mathrm{i}}$ resulting in $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$ |

Send i, KEY ${ }_{\mathrm{i}}$ (representing KEY ${ }_{\mathrm{i}}$, $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and KEY3 ${ }_{\mathrm{i}}$ ), $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$, $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$
$K E Y 1_{i+1}=K E Y 2_{i+1}=K E Y 3_{i+1}=$ vector consisting of " 0 " in every significant bit position except for a single " 1 " bit in

|  | position $\mathrm{i}+1$. NOTE -- odd parity is set. <br> If encryption is supported by the IUT: <br> $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=$ corresponding $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ from output of Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process <br> else $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\text { corresponding } \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1} \text { from TMOVS }$ <br> \} |
| :---: | :---: |
| TMOVS: | Compare results of the 56 decryptions with known answers. <br> Should be $P=0000000000000000$ for all 56 rounds. |

Table 9 illustrates the Variable Key Known Answer Test for the TECB Decryption Process.

1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{1}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}$ to contain " 0 " in every significant bit except for a " 1 " in the first position, i.e., the 64-bit KEY1 $1_{1 \text { bin }}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{1}$ bin $=K E Y 3_{1 \text { bin }}=100000000000000100000001000000010000000100000001$ 0000000100000001 . The equivalent of this value in hexadecimal notation is 8001 010101010101.

NOTE -- the parity bits are set to " 0 " or " 1 " to get odd parity.
b. If the IUT does not support encryption, the $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ values are initialized with the 56 constant C values from Table A.2.
c. If encryption is not supported by the IUT, the KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, KEY3), and the 56 C values are forwarded to the IUT using Input Type 3.
Otherwise, the KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3) is forwarded to the IUT using Input Type 4.
2. The IUT should:
a. If encryption is supported, initialize the C value with the first C value retained from the Variable KEY Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process for the TECB Mode (Section 5.1.1.3). Otherwise, use the first value received from the TMOVS.
b. Perform the following for $\mathrm{i}=1$ to 56 :

NOTE - 56 is the number of significant bits in a TDES key.

1) Set the input block $I_{i}$ equal to the value of $C_{i}$.
2) Using the corresponding $K E Y 1_{i}, K E Y 2_{i}$, and $K E Y 3_{i}$ parameters, process $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the three DEA stages resulting in plaintext $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$. This involves processing $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$ in the decrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$ in the encrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$ in the decrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{i}$, resulting in plaintext $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$.
3) Forward the current values of the loop number $\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ (representing $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ ), $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and the resulting $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$ to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 1.
4) $\operatorname{Set} \mathrm{KEY} 1_{i+1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$, and $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{i+1}$, equal to the vector consisting of " 0 " in every significant bit position except for a single " 1 " bit in position $\mathrm{i}+1$. The parity bits may contain " 1 " or " 0 " to make odd parity.

NOTE -- KEY1 $_{i+1}=$ KEY2 $_{i+1}=$ KEY3 $_{i+1}$.
5) If encryption is supported, set $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ equal to the corresponding $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ value retained from the Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process for TECB mode. If encryption is not supported by the IUT, set $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ equal to the corresponding $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ value supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE -- The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 56 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 1.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to known values. The P results should be all zeros.

### 5.1.2.4 Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for Decryption Process TECB Mode

Table 10 The Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process TECB Mode

TMOVS: $\quad$ Initialize $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=($ where $\mathrm{i}=1 . .32)=32$ KEY values in Table A. 3 If encryption is supported by the IUT:

Send $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{KEY}_{32}$ (Since all three keys are the same, these key values represent the values of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3.)

If encryption is not supported by the IUT:
Initialize $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ (where $\mathrm{i}=1 . .32$ ) = corresponding C values in Table 3
Send $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{C}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}, \mathrm{C}_{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{KEY}_{32}, \mathrm{C}_{32}$ (The key values represent the values of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3.)

IUT: If encryption is supported by the IUT:
Initialize $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}=$ first value retained from Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process

Otherwise, use the first value received from the TMOVS.
FOR $\mathrm{i}=1$ to 32
\{


Send i, KEY $_{\mathrm{i}}$ (representing KEY1 ${ }_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and KEY3 ${ }_{\mathrm{i}}$ ), $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$
$K E Y 1_{i+1}=K E Y 2_{i+1}=K E Y 3_{i+1}=$ corresponding KEY ${ }_{i+1}$ supplied by TMOVS

If encryption is supported:

|  | $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=$ corresponding $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ from output of <br>  <br> Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the <br> Encryption Process |
| :--- | :--- |
| else |  |
| TMOVS: $\quad$ Compare results from each loop with known answers. |  |
|  | $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=$ corresponding $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ from TMOVS |
|  | Should be $\mathrm{P}=0000000000000000$ for all 32 rounds. |

Table 10 illustrates the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the TECB Decryption Process.

1. The TMOVS:
a. If the IUT supports encryption, the KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 variables are initialized with the 32 constant KEY values from Table A.3. If the IUT does not support encryption, the KEY-ciphertext (KEY-C) pairs are initialized with the 32 constant KEY-C pairs from Table A.3.

NOTE -- KEY1=KEY2=KEY3.
b. If encryption is supported by the IUT, the 32 KEY values for KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 are forwarded using Input Type 10. If encryption is not supported by the IUT, the 32 KEY-C pairs are forwarded to the IUT using Input Type 9.
2. The IUT should:
a. If encryption is supported, initialize the C value with the first C value retained from the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process for the TECB Mode (Section 5.1.1.4). Otherwise, use the first value received from the TMOVS.
b. Perform the following for $\mathrm{i}=1$ to 32 :

1) Set the input block $I_{i}$ equal to the value of $C_{i}$.
2) Using the corresponding $K E Y 1_{i}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{{ }_{i}}$ values, process $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the three DEA stages resulting in plaintext $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$. This involves processing $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$ in the decrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$ in the encrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value

TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$ in the decrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{i}$, resulting in plaintext $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$.
3) Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and the resulting $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$ to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 1.
4) Assign a new value to $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ by setting them equal to the corresponding $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ value supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE -- KEY1=KEY2=KEY3.
5) If encryption is supported, set $C_{i+1}$ equal to the corresponding $C_{i+1}$ value retained from the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process for the TECB mode. If encryption is not supported, set $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ equal to the corresponding $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ value supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE-- The above processing should continue until all 32 KEY-C values are passed as specified in Input Type 9, or all 32 KEY values are passed as specified in Input Type 10. The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 32 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 1.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to known values. The P results should be all zeros.

### 5.1.2.5 Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process TECB Mode

Table 11 The Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process TECB Mode
TMOVS: $\quad$ Initialize $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}($ where $\mathrm{i}=1 . .19)=19 \mathrm{KEY}$ values in Table A. 4
If encryption is supported by the IUT:
Send $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{KEY}_{19}$ (Since all three keys are the same, these key values represent the values of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3.)

If encryption is not supported by the IUT:
Initialize $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}($ where $\mathrm{i}=1 . .19)=$ corresponding C values in Table A. 4
Send $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{C}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}, \mathrm{C}_{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{KEY}_{19}, \mathrm{C}_{19}$ (The key values represent the values of KEY1, KEY2 and KEY3.)

IUT: If encryption is supported by the IUT:
Initialize $\mathrm{C}_{1}=$ first value retained from the Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process

Otherwise, use the first value received from the TMOVS.
FOR $\mathrm{i}=1$ to 19
\{

|  | $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| Triple DES: | $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ is read into TDEA and is decrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$ using $\mathrm{KEY}_{i}$, resulting in TEMP1 <br> TEMP1 is encrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$ using $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in TEMP2 <br> TEMP2 is decrypted by DEA ${ }_{1}$ using KEY $1_{i}$, resulting in $P_{i}$ |

Send $\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}\left(\right.$ where $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ represents the value of KEY1, KEY2 and KEY3)
$K E Y 1_{i+1}=K E Y 2_{i+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=$ corresponding $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ supplied by TMOVS

If encryption is supported:

$$
\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\text { corresponding } \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1} \text { from output of Substitution Table Known }
$$

```
    Answer Test for the Encryption Process for the TECB mode
else
    C
```

TMOVS: Compare results from each loop with known answers. See Table A.4.

As summarized in Table 11, the Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the TECB Decryption Process is performed as follows:

1. The TMOVS:
a. If the IUT supports encryption, the KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 variables are initialized with the 19 constant KEY values from Table A.4. If the IUT does not support encryption, the KEY-ciphertext (KEY-C) pairs are initialized with the 19 constant KEY-C pairs from Table A.4.

NOTE -- KEY1=KEY2=KEY3.
b. If encryption is supported by the IUT, the 19 KEY values for KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 are forwarded to the IUT using Input Type 10. The 19 KEY-C pairs are forwarded to the IUT using Input Type 9 if encryption is not supported by the IUT.
2. The IUT should:
a. If encryption is supported, initialize the $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ value with the first C value retained from the Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process for the TECB Mode (Section 5.1.1.5). Otherwise, use the first C value received from the TMOVS.
b. Perform the following for $\mathrm{i}=1$ to 19 :

1) Set the input block $I_{i}$ equal to the value of $C_{i}$.
2) Using the corresponding $K E Y 1_{i}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ values, process $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the three DEA stages resulting in plaintext $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$. This involves processing $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$ in the decrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$ in the encrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$ in the decrypt state using KEY $1_{i}$, resulting in plaintext $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$.
3) Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and the resulting $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$ to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 1.
4) Set $\mathrm{KEY}_{1+1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ equal to the next key supplied by the TMOVS.
5) If encryption is supported, set $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ equal to the corresponding $\mathrm{C}_{i+1}$ value retained from the Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process for the TECB mode. If encryption is not supported, set $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ equal to the corresponding $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ value supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE --The above processing should continue until all 19 KEY-C pairs, as specified in Input Type 9, or all 19 KEY values, as specified in Input Type 10, are processed. The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 19 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 1.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to known values.

### 5.1.2.6 Monte Carlo Test for the Decryption Process - TECB Mode

Table 12 The Monte Carlo Test for the Decryption Process - TECB Mode


$$
\begin{gathered}
\left.\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\right), \\
\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}} \\
\text { else } \\
\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}-2} \\
\mathrm{C}_{0}=\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}} \\
\text { \} } \\
\text { TMOVS: } \quad \text { Check IUT's output for correctness. }
\end{gathered}
$$

As summarized in Table 12, the Monte Carlo Test for the TECB Decryption Process is performed as follows:

1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3, and the ciphertext C variables. The C and KEYs consist of 64 bits.
b. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 20.
2. The IUT should perform the following for $\mathrm{i}=0$ through 399:
a. Record the current values of the output loop number $\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{C}_{0}$.
b. Perform the following for $\mathrm{j}=0$ through 9999:
1) Set the input block $I_{j}$ equal to the value of $C_{j}$.
2) Using the corresponding $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}$ values, process $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}$ through the three DEA stages resulting in plaintext $P_{j}$. This involves processing $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}$ through the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$ in the decrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$ in the encrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$ in the decrypt state using $K E Y 1_{i}$, resulting in plaintext $P_{j}$.
3) Prepare for loop $j+1$ by assigning $C_{j+1}$ with the current value of $P_{j}$.
c. Record $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}}$.
d. Forward all recorded information for this loop, as specified in Output Type 5, to the TMOVS.
e. Assign new values to the KEY parameters, KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 in preparation for the next outer loop. Note $\mathrm{j}=9999$.

The new $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{i}} 1}$ should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$ with the $P_{j}$.

The new $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ calculation is based on the values of the keys. . If $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{i}$ and $\mathrm{KEY}_{2}{ }_{\mathrm{i}}$ are independent and $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$, or $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}$ are independent, the new $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{i+1}$ should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ with the $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}-1}$. If $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, the new $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$ with the $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}}$.

The new $K E Y 3_{i+1}$ calculation is also based on the values of the keys. If $K E Y 1_{i}$, $K E Y 2_{i}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ are independent, the new $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{i+1}$ should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current $\mathrm{KEY}_{3}$ with the $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}-2}$. If $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{i}$ and $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$ are independent and $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$, or if $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, the new $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ with the $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}}$.
f. Assign a new value to C in preparation for the next output loop. $\mathrm{C}_{0}$ should be assigned the value of the current $P_{j}$. Note $\mathrm{j}=9999$.

NOTE -- the new C should be denoted as $\mathrm{C}_{0}$ to be used for the first pass through the inner loop when $\mathrm{j}=0$.
NOTE -- The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 400 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 5.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to known values.

### 5.2 Cipher Block Chaining (TCBC) Mode

The IUTs which implement the Cipher Block Chaining (TCBC) mode are validated by successfully completing a series of Known Answer tests and Monte Carlo tests corresponding to the cryptographic processes allowed by the IUT.

### 5.2.1 Encryption Process

The process of validating an IUT which implements the TCBC mode of operation in the encryption process should involve the successful completion of the following six tests:

1. The Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test - TCBC mode
2. The Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test - TCBC mode
3. The Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process - TCBC mode
4. The Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process - TCBC mode
5. The Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process - TCBC mode
6. The Monte Carlo Test for the Encryption Process - TCBC mode

An explanation of the tests follows.

### 5.2.1.1 The Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test - TCBC Mode

Table 13 The Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test - TCBC Mode


Table 13 illustrates the Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test for the TCBC mode of operation.

1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 to the constant hexadecimal value 0 with odd parity set, i.e., $K E Y 1_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 2_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 3_{\text {hex }}=010101$ 0101010101.
b. Initializes the 64-bit IV parameter to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., $\mathrm{IV}_{\text {hex }}=$ 0000000000000000 .
c. Initializes the 64-bit plaintext $\mathrm{P}_{1}$ to the basis vector containing a " 1 " in the first bit position and " 0 " in the following 63 positions, i.e., $\mathrm{P}_{1 \text { bin }}=1000000000000000$

000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 . The equivalent of this value in hexadecimal notation is 8000000000000000 .
d. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 2.
2. The IUT should perform the following for $i=1$ through 64:
a. Calculate the input block $I_{i}$ by exclusive-ORing $P_{i}$ with IV.
b. Process $I_{i}$ through the three DEA stages resulting in ciphertext $C_{i}$. This involves processing $I_{i}$ through the first DEA stage, denoted DEA $_{1}$, in the encrypt state using KEY1, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the second DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$, in the decrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the third DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$, in the encrypt state using KEY3, resulting in ciphertext $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$.
c. Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV, $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and the resulting $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 2.
d. Retain $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ for use with the Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test for the TCBC Mode (Section 5.2.1.2 ), and, if the IUT supports the decryption process, for use with the Variable Ciphertext Known Answer Test for the TCBC Mode (Section 5.2.2.1).
e. Assign a new value to $P_{i+1}$ by setting it equal to the value of a basis vector with a "1" bit in position $\mathrm{i}+1$, where $\mathrm{i}+1=2, \ldots, 64$.

NOTE -- This continues until every possible basis vector has been represented by the P , i.e., 64 times. The output from the IUT should consist of 64 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 2.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values found in Table A.1.

### 5.2.1.2 The Inverse Permutation Known Answer - TCBC Mode

Table 14 The Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test - TCBC Mode

| TMOVS: | Initialize | KEYs: | $\begin{aligned} & \text { KEY1 }=\text { KEY2 }=\text { KEY3 }=0101010101010101 \text { (odd parity } \\ & \text { set) } \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | $\mathrm{IV}=0000000000000000$ |
|  |  |  | $P_{i}($ where $i=1 . .64)=64 \mathrm{C}$ values from the Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test |
|  | Send |  | KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV, $\mathrm{P}_{1}, \ldots, \mathrm{P}_{64}$ |
| IUT: | FOR $\mathrm{i}=1$ to 64 |  |  |
|  | \{ |  |  |
|  | Perform <br> Triple DES: | $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \mathrm{IV}$ |  |
|  |  | $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ is read into TDEA and is encrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$ using KEY1, resulting in TEMP1 |  |
|  |  | TEMP1 is decrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$ using KEY2, resulting in TEMP2 |  |
|  |  | Send i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, KEY3), IV, P $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$, $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ |  |
|  |  | $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=$ corresponding $\mathrm{C}_{i+1}$ from TMOVS |  |
|  | \} |  |  |
| TMOVS: | Compare results from each loop with known answers. |  |  |
|  | Should be | e set of ba | vectors. |

Table 14 illustrates the Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test for the TCBC mode of operation.

1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 to the constant hexadecimal value 0 with odd parity set, i.e., $K E Y 1_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 2_{\text {hex }}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\text {hex }}=010101$ 0101010101.

NOTE -- the significant bits are set to " 0 " and the parity bits are set to " 1 " to make odd parity.
b. Initializes the 64-bit IV parameter to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., $\mathrm{IV}_{\text {hex }}=$ 0000000000000000 .
c. Initializes the 64-bit plaintext $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$ (where $\mathrm{i}=1 . .64$ ) to the $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ results obtained from the Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test.
d. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 5.
2. The IUT should perform the following for $i=1$ through 64:
a. Calculate the input block $I_{i}$ by exclusive-ORing $P_{i}$ with IV.
b. Process $I_{i}$ through the three DEA stages resulting in ciphertext $C_{i}$. This involves processing $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the first DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$, in the encrypt state using KEY1, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the second DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$, in the decrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the third DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$, in the encrypt state using KEY3, resulting in ciphertext $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$.
c. Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV, $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and the resulting $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 2.
d. Assign a new value to $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ by setting it equal to the corresponding output from the TMOVS.

NOTE -- The output from the IUT should consist of 64 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 2.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to known values. The C values should be the set of basis vectors.

### 5.2.1.3 The Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process TCBC Mode

Table 15 The Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process - TCBC Mode


As summarized in Table 15, the Variable Key Known Answer Test for the TCBC Encryption Process is performed as follows:

## 1. The TMOVS:

a. Initializes the KEY parameters $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{1}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}$ to contain "0" in every significant bit except for a " 1 " in the first position, i.e., the 64-bit $K E Y 1_{1 \text { bin }}=K E Y 2_{1 \text { bin }}=K E Y 3_{1 \text { bin }}=100000000000000100000001$ 0000000100000001000000010000000100000001 . The equivalent of this value in hexadecimal notation is 8001010101010101 .

NOTE -- the parity bits are set to " 0 " or " 1 " to get odd parity.
b. Initializes the 64-bit IV parameter to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., $\mathrm{IV}_{\text {hex }}=$ 0000000000000000 .
c. Initializes the 64-bit plaintext $P$ to the value of 0 , i.e., $P_{\text {hex }}=00000000000000$ 00.
d. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 2.
2. The IUT should perform the following for $\mathrm{i}=1$ to 56 :

NOTE -- 56 is the number of significant bits in a TDES key.
a. Calculate the input block $I_{i}$ by exclusive-ORing P with IV.
b. Using the corresponding $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ parameters, process $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the three DEA stages resulting in ciphertext $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$. This involves processing $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the first DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$, in the encrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{i}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the second DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$, in the decrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the third DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$, in the encrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in ciphertext $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$.
c. Forward the current values of the loop number i, $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ (representing $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}$, , IV, P , and the resulting $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 2.
d. If the IUT supports the decryption process, retain $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ for use with the Variable KEY Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process for the TCBC Mode (Section 5.2.2.3).
e. Set $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}$, and $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}+1}$, equal to the vector consisting of " 0 " in every significant bit position except for a single "1" bit in position $\mathrm{i}+1$. The parity bits may contain "1" or "0" to make odd parity.

NOTE -- The above processing continues until every significant basis vector has been represented by the KEY parameter. The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 56 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 2.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values found in Table A.2.

### 5.2.1.4 Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process - TCBC Mode

Table 16 The Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process TCBC Mode

| TMOVS: | Initialize | $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}($ where $\mathrm{i}=1 . .32)=32 \mathrm{KEY}$ values in Table A 3 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\mathrm{IV}=0000000000000000$ |
|  |  | $\mathrm{P}=0000000000000000$ |
|  | Send | P, IV, $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{KEY}_{32}$ (Since all three keys are the same, these key values represent the values of KEY1, KEY2 and KEY3.) |
| IUT: | FOR i $=1$ to 32 |  |
|  |  | $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{P} \oplus \mathrm{IV}$ |
|  | DES: | $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ is read into TDEA and is encrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$ using $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in TEMP1 |
|  |  | TEMP1 is decrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$ using $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in TEMP2 |
|  |  | TEMP2 is encrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$ using $\mathrm{KEY}_{3}$, resulting in $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ |
|  |  | Send i, KEY ${ }_{\mathrm{i}}$ (representing KEY $1_{\mathrm{i}}$, $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ ), IV, P, $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ $K E Y 1_{i+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ from TMOVS |
|  | \} |  |
| TMOVS: | Compare result | with known answers. Use Table A.3. |

Table 16 illustrates the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the TCBC Encryption Process.

1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 variables with the 32 constant KEY values from Table A. 3 .
b. Initializes the 64-bit IV parameter to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., $\mathrm{IV}_{\text {hex }}=$ 0000000000000000 .
c. Initializes the plaintext $P$ to the value of 0 , i.e., $\mathrm{P}_{\text {hex }}=0000000000000000$.
d. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 8.
2. The IUT should perform the following for $\mathrm{i}=1$ to 32 :
a. Calculate the input block $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ by exclusive-ORing P with IV.
b. Using the corresponding $K E Y 1_{i}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ values, process $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the three DEA stages resulting in ciphertext $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$. This involves processing $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the first DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$, in the encrypt state using $K E Y 1_{i}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the second DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$, in the decrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the third DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$, in the encrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in ciphertext $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$.
c. Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV, P, and the resulting $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 2.
d. If the IUT supports the decryption process, retain $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ for use with the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process for the TCBC mode (Section 5.2.2.4).
e. Set $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ equal to the next key supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE -- The above processing should continue until all 32 KEY values are processed. The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 32 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 2.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values found in Table A.3.

### 5.2.1.5 Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process TCBC Mode

Table 17 The Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process TCBC Mode

| TMOVS: | Initialize | $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}($ where $\mathrm{i}=1 . .19)=19 \mathrm{KEY}$ values in Table A. 4 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}($ where $\mathrm{i}=1 . .19)=19$ corresponding P values in Table A. 4 |
|  |  | $\mathrm{IV}=0000000000000000$ |
|  | Send | IV, 19, KEY $_{1}, \mathrm{P}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}, \mathrm{P}_{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{KEY}_{19}, \mathrm{P}_{19}$ (Since all three keys are the same, these key values represent the values of KEY1, KEY2 and KEY3.) |
| IUT: | FOR $\mathrm{i}=1$ to 19 |  |
|  | Perform <br> Triple DES: | $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \mathrm{IV}$ |
|  |  | $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ is read into TDEA and is encrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$ using $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}$, |
|  |  | TEMP1 is decrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$ using $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in TEMP2 |
|  |  | TEMP2 is encrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$ using $\mathrm{KEY}_{3}$, resulting in $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ |
|  |  | Send $\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\left(\right.$ representing $^{\text {KEY1 }}{ }_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}{ }_{\mathrm{i}}$, and KEY3 ${ }_{\mathrm{i}}$ ), IV, $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ |
|  |  | $K E Y 1_{i+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{2}{ }_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{3}{ }_{\text {i+1 }}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ from TMOVS |
|  |  | $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=$ corresponding $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ from TMOVS |
|  | \} |  |

TMOVS: Compare results from each loop with known answers. Use Table A.4.

As summarized in Table 17, the Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the TCBC Encryption Process is performed as follows:

1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY-plaintext (KEY-P) pairs with the 19 constant KEY-P values from Table A.4. The KEY value indicates the value of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3, i.e., $\mathrm{KEY} 1=\mathrm{KEY} 2=\mathrm{KEY} 3$.
b. Initializes the 64-bit IV parameter to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., $\mathrm{IV}_{\text {hex }}=$ 0000000000000000 .
c. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 11.
2. The IUT should perform the following for $\mathrm{i}=1$ to 19 :
a. Calculate the input block $I_{i}$ by exclusive-ORing $P_{i}$ with IV.
b. Using the corresponding $K E Y 1_{i}, K E Y 2_{i}$, and $K E Y 3_{i}$ values, process $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the three DEA stages resulting in ciphertext $C_{i}$. This involves processing $I_{i}$ through the first DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$, in the encrypt state using KEY1 ${ }_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the second DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$, in the decrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the third DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$, in the encrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in ciphertext $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$.
c. Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV, $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and the resulting $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 2.
d. If the IUT supports the decryption process, retain $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ for use with the Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process for the TCBC mode (Section 5.2.2.5).
e. Set $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$, and $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ equal to the $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ supplied by the TMOVS.
f. $\quad$ Set $P_{i+1}$ equal to the corresponding $P_{i+1}$ value supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE -- The above processing should continue until all 19 KEY-P pairs are processed. The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 19 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 2.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values found in Table A. 4 .

### 5.2.1.6 Monte Carlo Test for the Encryption Process - TCBC Mode

Table 18 The Monte Carlo Test for the Encryption Process - TCBC Mode


```
            KEY2 }\mp@subsup{}{\textrm{i}}{2}\mathrm{ , and KEY3 }\mp@subsup{}{\textrm{i}}{}\mathrm{ are independent)
            KEY2 }\mp@subsup{\textrm{i}+1}{}{= = KEY2 }\mp@subsup{\textrm{i}}{\textrm{i}}{}\oplus\mp@subsup{\textrm{C}}{\textrm{j}-1}{
            ELSE
            KEY2 }\mp@subsup{\textrm{i}+1}{}{= KEY2 }\mp@subsup{\textrm{i}}{\textrm{i}}{}\oplus\mp@subsup{\textrm{C}}{\textrm{j}}{
```



```
            KEY3 }\mp@subsup{\textrm{i}}{= KEY1 ()}{i
            KEY3 }\mp@subsup{\textrm{i}+1}{}{= KEY3}\mp@subsup{\textrm{K}}{\textrm{i}}{}\oplus\mp@subsup{\textrm{C}}{\textrm{j}}{
            ELSE
            KEY3 }\mp@subsup{}{\textrm{i}+1}{}=\mp@subsup{\textrm{KEY3}}{\textrm{i}}{}\oplus\mp@subsup{\textrm{C}}{\textrm{j}-2}{
            P
            CV
            }
```

TMOVS: Check IUT's output for correctness.

As summarized in Table 18, the Monte Carlo Test for the TCBC Encryption Process is performed as follows:

1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3, the initialization vector IV, and the plaintext P variables. The P, IV, and KEYs consist of 64 bits each.
b. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 21.
2. The IUT should perform the following for $\mathrm{i}=0$ through 399:
a. If $\mathrm{i}=0$ (if this is the first time through this loop), set the chaining value $\mathrm{CV}_{0}$ equal to the IV.
b. Record the current values of the output loop number $\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{CV}_{0}$, and $\mathrm{P}_{0}$.
c. Perform the following for $\mathrm{j}=0$ through 9999:
1) Calculate the input block $I_{j}$ by exclusive-ORing $P_{j}$ with $C V_{j}$.
2) Using the corresponding $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{i}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ values, process $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}$ through the three DEA stages resulting in ciphertext $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}$. This involves processing $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}$ through the first DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$, in the encrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the second DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$, in the decrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the third DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$, in the encrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in ciphertext $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}$.
3) Prepare for loop $\mathrm{j}+1$ by doing the following:
a) If the inner loop being processed in the first loop, i.e., $j=0$, assign $P_{j+1}$ with the current value of $\mathrm{CV}_{0}$. Otherwise, assign $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}+1}$ with the C from the previous inner cycle, $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}-1}$.
b) Assign $\mathrm{CV}_{\mathrm{j}+1}$ with the current value of $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}$.
d. Record the $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}$.
e. Forward all recorded information from this loop, as specified in Output Type 6, to the TMOVS.
f. In preparation for the next outer loop (Note $\mathrm{j}=9999$ ):
4) Assign new values to the KEY parameters, KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 in preparation for the next outer loop.

The new $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{i+1}$ should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$ with the $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}$.

The new $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{i+1}$ calculation is based on the values of the keys. If $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$ and $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$ are independent and $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$, or $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$, $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ are independent, the new $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ with the $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}-1}$. If $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, the new $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$ with the $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}$.

The new $\mathrm{KEY}_{i_{i+1}}$ calculation is also based on the values of the keys. If $K E Y 1_{i}, K E Y 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}$ are independent, the new $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ with the $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}-2}$. If $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}$ and $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ are independent and $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$, or if $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, the new $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ with the $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}$.
2) Assign a new value to $\mathrm{P}_{0}$ in preparation for the next output loop. $\mathrm{P}_{0}$ should be assigned the value of $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}-1}$.

NOTE -- the new $P$ should be denoted as $P_{0}$ to be used for the first pass through the inner loop when $\mathrm{j}=0$.
3) Assign a new value to $\mathrm{CV}_{0}$ in preparation for the next outer loop. $\mathrm{CV}_{0}$ should be assigned the value of $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}$.

NOTE -- the new CV should be denoted as $\mathrm{CV}_{0}$ because this value is used for the first pass through the inner loop when $\mathrm{j}=0$.

NOTE -- The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 400 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 6.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values.

### 5.2.2 Decryption Process

The process of validating an IUT for the TCBC mode which implements the decryption process involves the successful completion of the following six tests:

1. The Variable Ciphertext Known Answer Test - TCBC mode
2. The Initial Permutation Known Answer Test - TCBC mode
3. The Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process - TCBC mode
4. The Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process - TCBC mode
5. The Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process - TCBC mode
6. The Monte Carlo Test for the Decryption Process - TCBC mode

An explanation of the tests follows.

### 5.2.2.1 The Variable Ciphertext Known Answer Test - TCBC Mode

Table 19 The Variable Ciphertext Known Answer Test - TCBC Mode


$$
\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\text { corresponding } \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1} \text { value from TMOVS }
$$

\}
TMOVS: Compare results from each loop with known answers. Should be the set of basis vectors.

Table 19 illustrates the Variable Ciphertext Known Answer Test for the TCBC mode of operation.

## 1. The TMOVS:

a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 to the constant hexadecimal value 0 with odd parity set, i.e., $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\text {hex }}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\text {hex }}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\text {hex }}=010101$ 0101010101.
b. Initializes the 64-bit IV parameter to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., $\mathrm{IV}_{\text {hex }}=$ 0000000000000000 .
c. If the IUT does not support encryption, the 64 constant ciphertext values are initialized with the 64 constant $C$ values from Table A.1.
d. If encryption is supported by the IUT, the KEYs and the IV are forwarded to the IUT, as specified in Input Type 6. If encryption is not supported by the IUT, the KEYs, the IV, and 64 C values are forwarded to the IUT using Input Type 5.
2. The IUT should:
a. If encryption is supported, initialize the C value with the first C value retained from the Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test for the TCBC Mode (Section 5.2.1.1). Otherwise, use the first value received from the TMOVS.
b. Perform the following for $\mathrm{i}=1$ through 64:

1) Set the input block $I_{i}$ equal to the value of $C_{i}$.
2) Process $I_{i}$ through the three DEA stages resulting in the output block $O_{i}$. This involves processing $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$, in the decrypt state using KEY3, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$, in the encrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$, in the decrypt state using KEY1, resulting in output block $\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}$.
3) Calculate the plaintext $P_{i}$ by exclusive-ORing $O_{i}$ with IV.
4) Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV, $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and the resulting $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$ to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 2.
5) Retain $P_{i}$ for use with the Initial Permutation Known Answer Test for the TCBC Mode (Section 5.2.2.2).
6) If encryption is supported, set $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ equal to the corresponding output from the Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test for the TCBC mode. If encryption is not supported, assign a new value to $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ by setting it equal to the corresponding $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ value supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE -- The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 64 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 2.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values. The P results should be the set of basis vectors.

### 5.2.2.2 The Initial Permutation Known Answer Test - TCBC Mode

Table 20 The Initial Permutation Known Answer Test - TCBC Mode


Table 20 illustrates the Initial Permutation Known Answer Test for the TCBC mode of operation.

1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 to the constant hexadecimal value 0 with odd parity set, i.e., $K E Y 1_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 2_{\text {hex }}=$ KEY $_{\text {hex }}=010101$ 0101010101.
b. Initializes the 64-bit IV parameter to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., $\mathrm{IV}_{\text {hex }}=$ 0000000000000000 .
c Initializes the 64 C values with the 64 P values obtained from the Variable Ciphertext Known Answer Test.
d. Forwards the KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV, and the 64 C values to the IUT using Input Type 5.
2. The IUT should perform the following for $\mathrm{i}=1$ through 64:
a. Set the input block $I_{i}$ equal to the value of $C_{i}$.
b. Process $I_{i}$ through the three DEA stages resulting in the output block $\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}$. This involves processing $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the DEA stageDEA ${ }_{3}$ in the decrypt state using KEY3, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$ in the encrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the DEA stage DEA $_{1}$ in the decrypt state using KEY1, resulting in $\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}$.
c. Calculate the plaintext $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$ by exclusive-ORing $\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}$ with IV.
d. Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV, $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and the resulting $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$ to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 2.
e. $\quad$ Set $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ equal to the corresponding $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ value supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE -- The output from the IUT should consist of 64 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 2.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values.

### 5.2.2.3 The Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process TCBC Mode

Table 21 The Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process - TCBC Mode

| TMOVS: | Initialize | KEYs: $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{1}=8001010101010101$ (odd parity set) $\mathrm{IV}=0000000000000000$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | If encrypt | is supported by the IUT: |
|  | Send | $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}$ (representing KEY1 $1_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{1}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}$ ), IV |
|  | If encrypt | not supported by the IUT: |
|  | Initialize | $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ values (where $\mathrm{i}=1 . .56$ ): C values in Table A. 2 |
|  | Send | $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}$ (representing KEY1 $1_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{1}{ }_{1}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}$ ), IV, $\mathrm{C}_{1}, \mathrm{C}_{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{C}_{56}$ |
| IUT: | If encryption is supported by the IUT: |  |
|  | Initialize | $\mathrm{C}_{1}=$ first value from output of Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process |
|  | Otherwise, use the first value received from the TMOVS. |  |
|  | FOR $\mathrm{i}=1$ to 64 |  |
|  | IF (i $\bmod 8 \neq 0)$ \{process every bit except parity bits \} |  |
|  | Perform <br> Triple DES: | $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ |
|  |  | $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ is read into TDEA and is decrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$ using $\mathrm{KEY}_{i}$, resulting in TEMP1 |
|  |  | TEMP1 is encrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$ using $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in TEMP2 |
|  |  | TEMP2 is decrypted by DEA $_{1}$ using $K E Y 1_{i}$, resulting in $\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}$ |
|  |  | $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \mathrm{IV}$ |

Send $\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ (representing KEY1 ${ }_{\mathrm{i}}$, $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ ), $\mathrm{IV}, \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$

> KEY $1_{i+1}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{i+1}=\mathrm{KEY} 3_{i+1}=$ vector consisting of " 0 " in every significant bit position except for a single " 1 " bit in the $\mathrm{i}+1^{\text {th }}$ position. NOTE - - odd parity is set.

If encryption is supported by the IUT:
$\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=$ corresponding $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ from output of Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process
else
$\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=$ corresponding $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ value from TMOVS
\}
\}
TMOVS: Compare results of the 56 decryptions with known answers.
Should be $\mathrm{P}=0000000000000000$ for all 56 rounds.

Table 21 illustrates the Variable Key Known Answer Test for the TCBC Decryption Process.

1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{1}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}$ to contain " 0 " in every significant bit except for a " 1 " in the first position, i.e., the 64-bit KEY $1_{1 \text { bin }}=K E Y 2_{1}$ bin $=\mathrm{KEY}_{1 \text { bin }}=100000000000000100000001000000010000000100000001$ 0000000100000001 . The equivalent of this value in hexadecimal notation is 8001 010101010101.

NOTE -- the parity bits are set to " 0 " or "1" to get odd parity.
b. Initializes the 64-bit IV parameter to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., $\mathrm{IV}_{\text {hex }}=$ 0000000000000000 .
c. If the IUT does not support encryption, the $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ values are initialized with the 56 constant C values from Table A.2.
d. If encryption is not supported by the IUT, the KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV, and the 56 C values are forwarded to the IUT, as specified in Input Type 5. Otherwise, the KEY1, KEY2, KEY3, and IV are forwarded to the IUT, as specified in Input Type 6.
2. The IUT should:
a. If encryption is supported, initialize the $\mathrm{C}_{1}$ value with the first C value retained from the Variable KEY Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process for the TCBC Mode (Section 5.2.1.3). Otherwise, use the first value received from the TMOVS.
b. $\quad$ Perform the following for $\mathrm{i}=1$ to 56 :

NOTE -- 56 is the number of significant bits in a TDES key.

1) Set the input block $I_{i}$ equal to the value of $C_{i}$.
2) Using the corresponding $K E Y 1_{i}, K E Y 2_{i}$, and $K E Y 3_{i}$ parameters, process $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the three DEA stages resulting in the output block $\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}$. This involves processing $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$ in the decrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$ in the encrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$ in the decrypt state using $K E Y 1_{i}$, resulting in $\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}$.
3) Calculate the plaintext $P_{i}$ by exclusive-ORing $O_{i}$ with IV.
4) Forward the current values of the loop number i, $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ (representing $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, $K E Y 2_{i}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ ), IV, $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and the resulting $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$ to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 2.
5) $\quad$ Set $K E Y 1_{i+1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$, and $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{i+1}$, equal to the vector consisting of " 0 " in every significant bit position except for a single " 1 " bit in position $\mathrm{i}+1$. The parity bits may contain " 1 " or "0" to make odd parity.

NOTE -- KEY1 $_{i+1}=\operatorname{KEY}_{i+1}=\operatorname{KEY3}_{i+1}$.
6) If encryption is supported, set $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ equal to the corresponding $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ value retained from the Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process for TCBC mode. If encryption is not supported by the IUT, set $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ equal to the corresponding $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ value supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE -- The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 56 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 2.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values. The P results should be all zeros.

### 5.2.2.4 Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for Decryption Process TCBC Mode

Table 22 The Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process TCBC Mode

| TMOVS: | Initialize | $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}($ where $\mathrm{i}=1 . .32)=32 \mathrm{KEY}$ values in Table <br> A. 3 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |

$$
\mathrm{IV}=0000000000000000
$$

If encryption is supported by the IUT:
Send IV, $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{KEY}_{32}$ (Since all three keys are the same, these key values represent the values of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3.)

If encryption not supported by the IUT:
Initialize $\quad \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}($ where $\mathrm{i}=1 . .32)=$ corresponding C values in Table A. 3
Send IV, $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{C}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}, \mathrm{C}_{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{KEY}_{32}, \mathrm{C}_{32}$ (The key values represent the values of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3.)

IUT: If encryption is supported by the IUT:
Initialize $\quad C_{1}=$ first value retained from Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process

Otherwise, use the first value received from the TMOVS.
FOR $\mathrm{i}=1$ to 32

| Perform | $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| Triple DES: | $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ is read into TDEA and is decrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$ using $\mathrm{KEY}_{i}$, resulting in TEMP1 |
|  | TEMP1 is encrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$ using $\mathrm{KEY}_{2}$, resulting in TEMP2 |
|  | TEMP2 is decrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$ using $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in $\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}$ |
|  | $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \mathrm{IV}$ |

Send $\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ (representing $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}$ ), $\mathrm{IV}, \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$
$\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=$ corresponding $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ supplied by TMOVS

If encryption is supported:
$\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=$ corresponding $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ from output of Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process
else

$$
\begin{array}{cc}
\hline & \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\text { corresponding } \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1} \text { from TMOVS } \\
\text { TMOVS: } & \text { Compare results from each loop with known answers. } \\
& \text { Should be } \mathrm{P}=0000000000000000 \text { for all } 32 \text { rounds. }
\end{array}
$$

Table 22 illustrates the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the TCBC Decryption Process.

## 1. The TMOVS:

a. If the IUT supports encryption, the KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 variables are initialized with the 32 constant KEY values from Table A.3. If the IUT does not support encryption, the KEY-ciphertext (KEY-C) pairs are initialized with the 32 constant KEY-C pairs from Table A.3.

NOTE -- KEY1=KEY2=KEY3.
b. Initializes the 64-bit IV parameter to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., $\mathrm{IV}_{\text {hex }}=$ 0000000000000000 .
c. If encryption is supported by the IUT, the 32 KEY values for KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3, and the IV value are forwarded to the IUT using Input Type 12. If encryption is not supported by the IUT, the 32 KEY and C pairs and the IV value are forwarded to the IUT using Input Type 11.
2. The IUT should:
a. If encryption is supported, initialize the $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$ value with the first C value retained from the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process for the TCBC Mode (Section 5.2.1.4). Otherwise, use the first value received from the TMOVS.
b. Perform the following for $\mathrm{i}=1$ to 32 :

1) Set the input block $I_{i}$ equal to the value of $C_{i}$.
2) Using the corresponding $K E Y 1_{i}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{i}$, and $K E Y 3_{i}$ values, process $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the three DEA stages resulting in output block $\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}$. This involves processing $I_{i}$ through the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$ in the decrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$ in the encrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$ in the decrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in $\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}$.
3) Calculate the plaintext $P_{i}$ by exclusive-ORing $O_{i}$ with IV.
4) Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV, $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and the resulting $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$ to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 2.
5) Assign a new value to $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{i+1}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}$, and $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ by setting them equal to the corresponding $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ value supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE -- KEY1=KEY2=KEY3.
6) If encryption is supported, set $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ equal to the corresponding $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ value retained from the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process for the TCBC mode. If encryption is not supported, set $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ equal to the corresponding $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ value supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE -- The above processing should continue until all 32 KEY-C values are passed as specified in Input Type 11, or all 32 KEY values are passed as specified in Input Type 12. The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 32 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 2.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values. The P results should be all zeros.

### 5.2.2.5 Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process TCBC Mode

Table 23 The Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process TCBC Mode

TMOVS: Initialize $\quad \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}($ where $\mathrm{i}=1 . .19)=19 \mathrm{KEY}$ values in Table A. 4 $I V=0000000000000000$

If encryption is supported by the IUT:
Send IV, $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{KEY}_{19}$ (Since all three keys are the same, these key values represent the values of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3.)

If encryption not supported:
Initialize $\quad \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}($ where $\mathrm{i}=1 . .19)=19 \mathrm{C}$ values in Table A. 4
Send IV, $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{C}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}, \mathrm{C}_{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{KEY}_{19}, \mathrm{C}_{19}$ (These key values represent the values of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3.)

IUT: If encryption is supported:
Initialize $\quad \mathrm{C}_{1}=$ first C value retained from the Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process.

Otherwise, use the first value received from the TMOVS
FOR $\mathrm{i}=1$ to 19
\{

Perform Triple DES:
$\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$
$\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ is read into TDEA and is decrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$ using $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting
in TEMP1
TEMP1 is encrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$ using $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in TEMP2
TEMP2 is decrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$ using $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{i}$, resulting in $\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}$
$\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \mathrm{IV}$

Send $\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{IV}, \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$ (where $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ represents the value of KEY1, KEY2 and KEY3)
$K E Y 1_{i+1}=K E Y 2_{i+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=$ corresponding $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ supplied by TMOVS

```
        If encryption is supported:
            C
            Test for the Encryption Process for the TCBC mode
        else
            C
}
TMOVS: Compare results from each loop with known answers. See Table A.4.
```

As summarized in Table 23, the Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the TCBC Decryption Process is performed as follows:

1. The TMOVS:
a. If the IUT supports encryption, the KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 variables are initialized with the 19 constant KEY values from Table A.4. If the IUT does not support encryption, the KEY-ciphertext (KEY-C) pairs are initialized with the 19 constant KEY-C pairs from Table A.4.

NOTE -- KEY1=KEY2=KEY3.
b. Initializes the 64-bit IV parameter to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., $\mathrm{IV}_{\text {hex }}=$ 0000000000000000 .
c. If encryption is supported by the IUT, the IV and the 19 KEY values for KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 are forwarded to the IUT using Input Type 12. Otherwise, if encryption is not supported by the IUT, the IV and the 19 KEY-C pairs are forwarded to the IUT using Input Type 11.
2. The IUT should:
a. If encryption is supported, initialize the $\mathrm{C}_{1}$ value with the first C value retained from the Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process for the TCBC Mode (Section 5.2.1.5). Otherwise, use the first C value received from the TMOVS.
b. Perform the following for $\mathrm{i}=1$ to 19 :

1) Set the input block $I_{i}$ equal to the value of $C_{i}$.
2) Using the corresponding $K E Y 1_{i}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{i}$, and $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{i}$ values, process $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the three DEA stages resulting in the output block $\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}$. This involves processing $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$ in the decrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY3}_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the DEA
stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$ in the encrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the DEA stage DEA $_{1}$ in the decrypt state using $K E Y 1_{i}$, resulting in $\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}$.
3) Calculate the plaintext $P_{i}$ by exclusive-ORing $O_{i}$ with IV.
4) Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV, $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and the resulting $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$ to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 2.
5) Set $\mathrm{KEY}_{1+1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{{ }_{\mathrm{i}+1}}$, and $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ equal to the next key supplied by the TMOVS.
6) If encryption is supported, set $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ equal to the corresponding $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ value retained from the Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process for the TCBC mode. If encryption is not supported, set $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ equal to the corresponding $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ value supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE -- The above processing should continue until all 19 KEY-C pairs, as specified in Input Type 11, or all 19 KEY values, as specified in Input Type 12, are processed. The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 19 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 2.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values.

### 5.2.2.6 Monte Carlo Test for the Decryption Process - TCBC Mode

Table 24 The Monte Carlo Test for the Decryption Process - TCBC Mode


```
        ELSE
        KEY2 }\mp@subsup{\textrm{i}+1}{}{= = KEY2 }\mp@subsup{\textrm{i}}{1}{}\oplus\mp@subsup{\textrm{P}}{\textrm{j}}{
```



```
        KEY3 }\mp@subsup{\textrm{i}}{= KEY1 (),}{\textrm{i}
        KEY3 i
        ELSE
        KEY3 }\mp@subsup{\textrm{i}+1}{}{= KEY3 ( }\oplus\mp@subsup{\textrm{P}}{\textrm{j}-2}{
        CV
        C
}
TMOVS: Check IUT's output for correctness.
```

As summarized in Table 24, the Monte Carlo Test for the TCBC Decryption Process is performed as follows:

1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3, the initialization vector IV, and the ciphertext C variables. All variables consist of 64 bits.
b. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 21.
2. The IUT should perform the following for $\mathrm{i}=0$ through 399:
a. If $\mathrm{i}=0$ (if this is the first time through this loop), set the chaining value $\mathrm{CV}_{0}$ equal to IV.
b. Record the current values of the output loop number $\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{CV}_{0}$ and $\mathrm{C}_{0}$.
c. Perform the following for $\mathrm{j}=0$ through 9999:
1) Set the input block $I_{j}$ equal to the value of $C_{j}$.
2) Using the corresponding $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{i}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{i}$, and $K E Y 3_{i}$ values, process $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}$ through the three DEA stages resulting in the output block $\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}$. This involves processing $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}$ through the DEA stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$ in the decrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the DEA
stage $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$ in the encrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the DEA stage DEA $_{1}$ in the decrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{i}$, resulting in $\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}$.
3) Calculate the plaintext $P_{j}$ by exclusive-ORing $\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}$ with $\mathrm{CV}_{\mathrm{j}}$.
4) Prepare for loop $\mathrm{j}+1$ by:
a) Assigning $\mathrm{CV}_{\mathrm{j}+1}$ with the current value of $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}$.
b) Assigning $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}+1}$ with the current value of $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}}$.
d. Record $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}}$.
e. Forward all recorded information for this loop, as specified in Output Type 6 to the TMOVS.
f. Assign new values to the KEY parameters, KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 in preparation for the next outer loop. Note $\mathrm{j}=9999$.

The new $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$ with the $P_{j}$.

The new $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ calculation is based on the values of the keys. If $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$ and $\mathrm{KEY}_{2}{ }_{\mathrm{i}}$ are independent and $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$, or $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}$ are independent, the new $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{i+1}$ should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ with the $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}-1}$. If $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, the new $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current $K E Y 2_{i}$ with the $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}}$.

The new $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ calculation is also based on the values of the keys. If $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$, $\mathrm{KEY} \mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}$ are independent, the new $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{i}$ with the $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}-2}$. If $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$ and $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$ are independent and $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$, or if $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, the new $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ with the $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}}$.
g. Assign a new value to $\mathrm{CV}_{0}$ in preparation for the next outer loop. $\mathrm{CV}_{0}$ should be assigned the value of the current $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}$. Note $\mathrm{j}=9999$.

NOTE -- the new CV should be denoted as $\mathrm{CV}_{0}$ to be used for the first pass through the inner loop when $\mathrm{j}=0$.
h. Assign a new value to $\mathrm{C}_{0}$ in preparation for the next outer loop. $\mathrm{C}_{0}$ should be assigned the value of the current $P_{j}$. Note $\mathrm{j}=9999$.

NOTE -- the new C should be denoted as $\mathrm{C}_{0}$ to be used for the first pass through the inner loop when $\mathrm{j}=0$.
NOTE -- The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 400 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 6.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values.

### 5.3 Cipher Block Chaining Mode - Interleaved (TCBC-I)

The IUTs in the Cipher Block Chaining mode - Interleaved (TCBC-I) are validated by successfully completing a series of Known Answer tests and Monte Carlo tests corresponding to the cryptographic processes allowed by the IUT.

The interleaved configuration is intended for systems equipped with multiple DEA processors. By interleaving the data, throughput is improved and propagation delay is minimized by initializing the three individual DEA stages and then simultaneously clocking them. Thus, with each clock cycle, data is processed by each $\mathrm{DEA}_{\mathrm{i}}$ stage (where $\mathrm{i}=1,2,3$ ) and passed onward to the output buffer or the next stage so that idle $\mathrm{DEA}_{\mathrm{i}}$ stages are minimized.

The processing for each Known Answer test and Monte Carlo Test is broken down into clock cycles T1, T2, T3.... Within each clock cycle, the processing occurring on each active DEA is discussed. For convenience, let KEY1 represent the key used on processor DEA ${ }_{1}$, KEY2 represent the key used on processor $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$, and KEY3 represent the key used on processor $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$.

### 5.3.1 Encryption Process

The process of validating an IUT which implements the TCBC-I mode of operation in the encryption process involves the successful completion of the following six tests:

1. The Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test - TCBC-I mode
2. The Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test - TCBC-I mode
3. The Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process - TCBC-I mode
4. The Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process - TCBC-I mode
5. The Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process - TCBC-I mode
6. The Monte Carlo Test for the Encryption Process - TCBC-I mode

An explanation of the tests follows.

### 5.3.1.1 The Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test - TCBC-I Mode

Table 25 The Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test - TCBC-I Mode



Table 25 illustrates the Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test for the TCBC-I mode of operation.

1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 to the constant hexadecimal value 0 with odd parity set, i.e., $K E Y 1_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 2_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 3_{\text {hex }}=010101$ 0101010101.
b. Initializes the 64-bit IV parameters, IV1, IV2, and IV3. IV1 is initialized to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., $\mathrm{IV} 1_{\text {hex }}=0000000000000000$. Based on specifications in ANSI X9.52-1998, IV2 is computed by the following equation: IV1 $+R_{1} \bmod 2^{64}$ where $R_{1}=555555555555555$, i.e., IV $2_{\text {hex }}=555555555555$ 5555 . IV3 is computed by the equation IV1 $+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}$ where $\mathrm{R}_{2}=$ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA, i.e., $I V 3_{\text {hex }}=$ AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA.
c. Initializes the 64-bit plaintext values $\mathrm{P} 1_{1}, \mathrm{P} 2_{1}, \mathrm{P} 3_{1}$ to the basis vector containing a " 1 " in the first bit position and " 0 " in the following 63 positions, i.e., $\mathrm{P} 1_{1 \text { bin }}=\mathrm{P} 2_{1 \text { bin }}$ $=P 3_{1 \text { bin }}=100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000$ 0000000000000000 . The equivalent of this value in hexadecimal notation is 8000 000000000000 .
d. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 13.
2. The IUT should perform the following for $i=1$ through 64:

NOTE -- the processing for each clock cycle $\mathrm{T} i$ is displayed.
a. At clock cycle T1:

1) Calculate the input block $\mathrm{I} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$ by exclusive-ORing $\mathrm{P} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$ with IV1.
2) Process $\mathrm{I} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the first DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$, in the encrypt state using KEY1, resulting in intermediate value TEMP $1_{1}$.

At clock cycle T2:

1) Calculate the input block $\mathrm{I} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$ by exclusive-ORing $\mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$ with IV2.
2) Process $\mathrm{I} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the first DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$, in the encrypt state using KEY1, resulting in intermediate value TEMP $2_{1}$.
3) Process TEMP1 $1_{1}$ through the second DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$, in the decrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1 ${ }_{2}$.

At clock cycle T3:

1) Calculate the input block $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ by exclusive-ORing $\mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{i}}$ with IV3.
2) Process $\mathrm{I} 3_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the first DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$, in the encrypt state using KEY1, resulting in intermediate value TEMP3 ${ }_{1}$.
3) Process TEMP2 $2_{1}$ through the second DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$, in the decrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2 $2_{2}$.
4) Process TEMP1 $1_{2}$ through the third DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$, in the encrypt state using KEY3, resulting in the ciphertext value $\mathrm{C1}_{\mathrm{i}}$.

At clock cycle T4:

1) Process TEMP $2_{2}$ through the third DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$, in the encrypt state using KEY3, resulting in the ciphertext value $\mathrm{C}_{2}$.
2) Process TEMP3 $3_{1}$ through the second DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$, in the decrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP3 $2_{2}$.

At clock cycle T5:

1) Process TEMP $3_{2}$ through the third DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$, in the encrypt state using KEY3, resulting in the ciphertext value $\mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{i}}$.
b. Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV1, IV2, IV3, $\mathrm{I} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{I} 2_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{I} 3_{\mathrm{i}}$, and the resulting $\mathrm{C} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{i}}$, to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 3.
c. Retain $\mathrm{C1}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{i}}$, for use with the Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test for the TCBC-I Mode (Section 5.3.1.2 ), and, if the IUT supports the decryption process, for use with the Variable Ciphertext Known Answer Test for the TCBC-I Mode (Section 5.3.2.1).
d. Assign a new value to $\mathrm{P1}_{\mathrm{i}+1}, \mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}$, and $\mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{i}+1}$, by setting them equal to the value of a basis vector with a "1" bit in position $\mathrm{i}+1$, where $\mathrm{i}+1=2, \ldots, 64$. the IUT should consist of 64 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 3.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received C 1 results to the known values found in Table A.5.

### 5.3.1.2 The Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test - TCBC-I Mode

Table 26 The Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test - TCBC-I Mode


```
        TEMP3}\mp@subsup{2}{2}{
            TEMP2 2 is encrypted by DEA }\mp@subsup{2}{3}{}\mathrm{ using KEY3, resulting in C2 }\mp@subsup{}{i}{
        T5: TEMP3 is encrypted by DEA }\mp@subsup{3}{3}{}\mathrm{ using KEY3, resulting in C3 }\mp@subsup{\textrm{T}}{\textrm{i}}{
            Send i, Key (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV1, IV2, IV3, P1 }\mp@subsup{}{\textrm{i}}{
        P2 i, P3 i, C1 ( }\mp@subsup{\textrm{C}}{\textrm{i}}{2
            Pk
}
```

TMOVS: Compare C1, C2, and C3 results from each loop with known answers. See Table A.6. C1 should be the set of basis vectors.

Table 26 illustrates the Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test for the TCBC-I mode of operation.

1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 to the constant hexadecimal value 0 with odd parity set, i.e., $K E Y 1_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 2_{\text {hex }}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\text {hex }}=010101$ 0101010101.
b. Initializes the 64-bit IV parameters, IV1, IV2, and IV3. IV1 is initialized to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., $\mathrm{IV} 1_{\text {hex }}=0000000000000000$. Based on specifications in ANSI X9.52-1998, IV2 is computed by the following equation: $\mathrm{IV} 1+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}$ where $\mathrm{R}_{1}=5555555555555555$, i.e., IV2 ${ }_{\text {hex }}=555555555555$ 5555 . IV3 is computed by the equation IV1 $+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}$ where $\mathrm{R}_{2}=$ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA, i.e., $I V 3_{\text {hex }}=$ AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA.
c. Initializes the 64-bit plaintext values P1, P2, P3 to the 64-bit ciphertext values C1, C2, and C3 respectively, obtained from the Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test.
d. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 15.
2. The IUT should perform the following for $\mathrm{i}=1$ through 64:

NOTE -- the processing for each clock cycle $\mathrm{T} i$ is displayed.
a. At clock cycle T1:

1) Calculate the input block $\mathrm{I} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$ by exclusive-ORing $\mathrm{P} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$ with IV1.
2) Process $\mathrm{I1}_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the first DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$, in the encrypt state using KEY1, resulting in intermediate value TEMP $1_{1}$.

At clock cycle T2:

1) Calculate the input block $\mathrm{I} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$ by exclusive-ORing $\mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$ with IV2.
2) Process $\mathrm{I} 2_{i}$ through the first DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$, in the encrypt state using KEY1, resulting in intermediate value TEMP $2{ }_{1}$.
3) Process TEMP1 $1_{1}$ through the second DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$, in the decrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1 ${ }_{2}$.

At clock cycle T3:

1) Calculate the input block $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ by exclusive-ORing $\mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{i}}$ with IV3.
2) Process $\mathrm{I} 3_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the first DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$, in the encrypt state using KEY1, resulting in intermediate value TEMP $3_{1}$.
3) Process TEMP2 $2_{1}$ through the second DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$, in the decrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2 $2_{2}$.
4) Process TEMP1 $1_{2}$ through the third DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$, in the encrypt state using KEY3, resulting in the ciphertext value $\mathrm{C1}_{\mathrm{i}}$.

At clock cycle T4:

1) Process TEMP2 $2_{2}$ through the third DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$, in the encrypt state using KEY3, resulting in the ciphertext value $\mathrm{C}_{2}$.
2) Process TEMP3 ${ }_{1}$ through the second DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$, in the decrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP3 $2_{2}$.

At clock cycle T5:

1) Process TEMP3 $3_{2}$ through the third DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$, in the encrypt state using KEY3, resulting in the ciphertext value $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}$.
b. Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (which represents KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV1, IV2, IV3, $\mathrm{P} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{i}}$, and the resulting $\mathrm{C} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{i}}$, to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 3.
c. Assign a new value to the plaintext values, $\mathrm{P} 1_{i+1}, \mathrm{P} 2_{i+1}$, and $\mathrm{P} 3_{i+1}$, by setting them equal to the corresponding output from the TMOVS.

NOTE -- This processing continues until all ciphertext values from the Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test have been used as input. The output from the IUT should consist of 64 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 3.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received $\mathrm{C} 1, \mathrm{C} 2$, and C3 results to known values. The C1 values should be the set of basis vectors. See Table A.6.

### 5.3.1.3 The Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process -TCBC-I Mode

Table 27 The Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process - TCBC-I

| TMOVS: | Initialize |  | $K E Y 1_{1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{2}=\mathrm{KEY}_{1}=8001010101010101 \text { (odd parity }$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | IV1=0000000000000000 |
|  |  |  | $\mathrm{IV} 2=5555555555555555$ |
|  |  |  | IV3 $=$ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA |
|  |  |  | $\mathrm{P} 1=\mathrm{P} 2=\mathrm{P} 3=0000000000000000$ |
|  | Send |  | $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}$ (representing KEY1 $1_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{1}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}$ ), IV1, IV2, IV3, P1, P2, P3 |
| IUT: | FOR i $=1$ to 64 |  |  |
|  | IF (i mod $8 \neq 0$ ) \{process every bit except parity bits\} |  |  |
|  | Perform Triple DES: | T1: <br> T2: | $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{P} 1 \oplus \mathrm{IV} 1$ |
|  |  |  | $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ is read into TDEA and is encrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$ using KEY $1_{i}$, resulting in TEMP1 $1_{1}$ |
|  |  |  | $\mathrm{I} 2 \mathrm{i}=\mathrm{P} 2 \oplus \mathrm{IV} 2$ |
|  |  |  | $\mathrm{I} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$ is read into TDEA and is encrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$ using KEY $1_{i}$, resulting in TEMP $2_{1}$ |
|  |  |  | TEMP1 $_{1}$ is decrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$ using $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in TEMP1 $_{2}$ |
|  |  | T3: | $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{P} 3 \oplus \mathrm{IV} 3$ |
|  |  |  | $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}$ is read into TDEA and is encrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$ using KEY $1_{i}$, resulting in TEMP3 ${ }_{1}$ |
|  |  |  | TEMP2 $2_{1}$ is decrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$ using $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{i}$, resulting in TEMP $_{2}$ |



```
    C1
    T4: TEMP3 3 is decrypted by DEA }\mp@subsup{\mp@code{N}}{2}{}\mathrm{ using KEY2 }\mp@subsup{}{\textrm{i}}{2}\mathrm{ , resulting in
        TEMP3 }
        TEMP2 2 is encrypted by DEA }\mp@subsup{\mp@code{S}}{3}{}\mathrm{ using KEY3 3, resulting in
        C2
    T5: TEMP3 }\mp@subsup{2}{2}{}\mathrm{ is encrypted by DEA }\mp@subsup{3}{3}{}\mathrm{ using KEY3 i, resulting in
        C3i
```



```
    IV3, P1, P2, P3, C1 i, C2 }\mp@subsup{\textrm{i}}{\textrm{i}}{2
    KEY1 }\mp@subsup{1}{i+1}{}=KEY2 2 i+1 = KEY3 i+1 = vector consisting of "0" in every
    significant bit position except for a single "1" bit in position i+1.
    NOTE -- the parity bits are "0" or "1" to set odd parity.
    }
    }
```

TMOVS: Compare results of the 3 triple DES encryptions per 56 different keys with known answers. See Table A. 11 .

Table 27 illustrates the Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process for the TCBCI mode of operation.

## 1. The TMOVS:

a. Initializes the KEY parameters $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}, \mathrm{KEY}_{1}$ to contain " 0 " in every significant bit except for a " 1 " in the first position, i.e., the 64 -bit $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{1 \text { bin }}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{1}$ bin $=K E Y 3_{1 \text { bin }}=100000000000000100000001000000010000000100000001$ 0000000100000001 . The equivalent of this value in hexadecimal notation is 8001 010101010101.

NOTE -- the parity bits are set to " 0 " or" 1 " to get odd parity.
b. Initializes the 64-bit IV parameters, IV1, IV2, and IV3. IV1 is initialized to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., $\mathrm{IV} 1_{\text {hex }}=0000000000000000$. Based on specifications in ANSI X9.52-1998, IV2 is computed by the following equation: $\mathrm{IV} 1+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}$ where $\mathrm{R}_{1}=5555555555555555$, i.e., IV $2_{\text {hex }}=555555555555$ 5555 . IV3 is computed by the equation IV1 $+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}$ where $\mathrm{R}_{2}=A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A$, i.e., $I V 3_{\text {hex }}=$ AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA.
c. Initializes the P parameters $\mathrm{P} 1, \mathrm{P} 2$, and P 3 to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., $\mathrm{P} 1_{\text {hex }}=\mathrm{P} 2_{\text {hex }}=\mathrm{P} 3_{\text {hex }}=0000000000000000$.
d. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 13.
2. The IUT should perform the following for $i=1$ through 56 :

NOTE -- 56 is the number of significant bits in a TDES key.
NOTE -- the processing for each clock cycle $T i$ is displayed.
a. At clock cycle T1:

1) Calculate the input block $\mathrm{I} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$ by exclusive-ORing P1 with IV1.
2) Process $\mathrm{I} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the first DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$, in the encrypt state using KEY1 ${ }_{i}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP $1_{1}$.

At clock cycle T2:

1) Calculate the input block $\mathrm{I} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$ by exclusive-ORing P2 with IV2.
2) Process $\mathrm{I} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the first DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{1}$, in the encrypt state using KEY $1_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP $2_{1}$.
3) Process TEMP1 $1_{1}$ through the second DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$, in the decrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1 ${ }_{2}$.

At clock cycle T3:

1) Calculate the input block $\mathrm{I} 3_{i}$ by exclusive-ORing P3 with IV3.
2) Process $\mathrm{I} 3_{\mathrm{i}}$ through the first DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$, in the encrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP3 ${ }_{1}$.
3) Process TEMP2 $2_{1}$ through the second DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$, in the decrypt state using KEY $2_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2 ${ }_{2}$.
4) Process TEMP1 $1_{2}$ through the third DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$, in the encrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in the ciphertext value $\mathrm{C1}_{\mathrm{i}}$.

At clock cycle T4:

1) Process TEMP2 $2_{2}$ through the third DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$, in the encrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in the ciphertext value $\mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$.
2) Process TEMP3 $3_{1}$ through the second DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{2}$, in the decrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in intermediate value TEMP3 ${ }_{2}$.

At clock cycle T5:

1) Process TEMP3 $2_{2}$ through the third DEA stage, denoted $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$, in the encrypt state using $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, resulting in the ciphertext value $\mathrm{C3}_{\mathrm{i}}$.
b. Forward the current values of the loop number i, $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ (which represents $\mathrm{KEY}_{1}$, $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}$ ), IV1, IV2, IV3, P1, P2, and P3, and the resulting $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{C}_{3}$, to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 3.
c. If the IUT supports the decryption process, retain $\mathrm{C} 1, \mathrm{C} 2$, and C 3 for use with the Variable KEY Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process for the TCBC-I Mode (Section 5.3.2.3).
d. Assign a new value to $\mathrm{KEY}_{1+1}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}_{+1}}$, by setting them equal to the vector consisting of " 0 " in every significant bit position except for a single " 1 " bit in position $i+1$. The parity bits may contain " 1 " or " 0 " to make odd parity.

NOTE -- The above processing continues until every significant basis vector has been represented by the KEY parameters, i.e., 56 times. The output from the IUT should consist of 56 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 3.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to known values found in Table A.11.

### 5.3.1.4 Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process - TCBC-I Mode

Table 28 The Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process -TCBC-I Mode


```
                    TEMP1 }\mp@subsup{2}{2}{}\mathrm{ is encrypted by DEA 
T4: TEMP \(3_{1}\) is decrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in TEMP3 \(_{2}\)
TEMP \(_{2}\) is encrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in \(\mathrm{C} 2_{i}\)
T5: \(\quad\) TEMP3 \(_{2}\) is encrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{3}\), resulting in \(\mathrm{C} 3_{i}\)
Send i, KEY \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}\) (representing KEY1 \(1_{\mathrm{i}}\), \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), and KEY3 \(_{\mathrm{i}}\) ), IV1, IV2, IV3, P1, \(\mathrm{P} 2, \mathrm{P} 3, \mathrm{C} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{I}}, \mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\)
\(K E Y 1_{i+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) from TMOVS
```

```
}
```

}
TMOVS: Compare results with known answers. See Table A.12.

```

Table 28 illustrates the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process for the TCBC-I mode of operation.

\section*{1. The TMOVS:}
a. Initializes the KEY parameters \(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{1}\) to the 32 constant KEY values from Table A. 12.
b. Initializes the 64-bit IV parameters, IV1, IV2, and IV3. IV1 is initialized to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., \(\mathrm{IV} 1_{\text {hex }}=0000000000000000\). Based on specifications in ANSI X9.52-1998, IV2 is computed by the following equation:
IV1 \(+R_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(R_{1}=5555555555555555\), i.e., IV2 \({ }_{\text {hex }}=555555555555\) 5555 . IV 3 is computed by the equation IV \(1+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where
\(\mathrm{R}_{2}=\) AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA, i.e., \(I V 3_{\text {hex }}=\) AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA.
c. Initializes the P parameters \(\mathrm{P} 1, \mathrm{P} 2\), and P 3 to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., \(P 1_{\text {hex }}=P 2_{\text {hex }}=P 3_{\text {hex }}=0000000000000000\).
d. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 18.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(\mathrm{i}=1\) through 32 :

NOTE -- that the processing for each clock cycle \(\mathrm{T} i\) is displayed.
a. At clock cycle T1:
1) Calculate the input block \(\mathrm{I} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing P1 with IV1.
2) Process \(\mathrm{I1}_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the first DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\), in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(1_{1}\).

At clock cycle T2:
1) Calculate the input block \(\mathrm{I} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing P2 with IV2.
2) Process \(\mathrm{I} 2_{i}\) through the first DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\), in the encrypt state using KEY \(1_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP2 \({ }_{1}\).
3) Process TEMP1 \(1_{1}\) through the second DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP1 \({ }_{2}\).

At clock cycle T3:
1) Calculate the input block \(\mathrm{I}_{3}\) by exclusive-ORing P3 with IV3.
2) Process \(\mathrm{I} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the first DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\), in the encrypt state using KEY \(1_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP3 \({ }_{1}\).
3) Process TEMP2 \(2_{1}\) through the second DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), in the decrypt state using KEY \(2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP2 \({ }_{2}\).
4) Process TEMP1 \(1_{2}\) through the third DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\), in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in the ciphertext value \(\mathrm{C1}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
5) Set ciphertextl \(\mathrm{C}_{1}\) equal to the value of \(\mathrm{O} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\).

At clock cycle T4:
1) Process TEMP2 2 through the third DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\), in the encrypt state using \(K E Y 3_{i}\), resulting in the ciphertext value \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
2) Process TEMP3 \(3_{1}\) through the second DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), in the decrypt state using KEY \(2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP3 \({ }_{2}\).

At clock cycle T5:
1) Process TEMP3 \(3_{2}\) through the third DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\), in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in the ciphertext value \(\mathrm{C3}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b. Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (which represents KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV1, IV2, IV3, \(\mathrm{P} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), and the resulting \(\mathrm{C} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 3.
c. If the IUT supports the decryption process, retain \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\) for use with the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process for the TCBC-I Mode (Section 5.3.2.4).
d. Assign a new value to \(\mathrm{KEY}_{1+1}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}_{+1}}\), by setting them equal to the next key supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE -- The above processing continues until all 32 KEY values are processed. The output from the IUT should consist of 32 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 3.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values found in Table A.12.

\subsection*{5.3.1.5 Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process -} TCBC-I Mode

Table 29 The Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process -TCBC-I Mode

\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { TEMP2 }_{2} \\
& \text { TEMP } 1_{2} \text { is encrypted by } \mathrm{DEA}_{3} \text { using } \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \text {, resulting in } \mathrm{C}_{1} \\
& \text { T4: } \text { TEMP3 }_{1} \text { is decrypted by } \mathrm{DEA}_{2} \text { using } \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \text {, resulting in } \\
& \text { TEMP3 }_{2} \\
& \text { TEMP } 2_{2} \text { is encrypted by } \mathrm{DEA}_{3} \text { using } \mathrm{KEY}_{3} \text {, resulting in } \mathrm{C} 2_{i} \\
& \text { T5: } \quad \text { TEMP3 }_{2} \text { is encrypted by } \mathrm{DEA}_{3} \text { using } \mathrm{KEY}_{3} \text {, resulting in } \mathrm{C} 3_{i} \\
& \text { Send i, KEY }{ }_{\mathrm{i}} \text { (representing KEY } 1_{\mathrm{i}} \text {, } \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \text {, and } \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \text { ), IV1, IV2, IV3, } \mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}{ }_{\mathrm{i}} \text {, } \\
& P 2_{i}, P 3_{i}, C 1_{i}, \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}} \\
& K E Y 1_{i+1}=K E Y 2_{i+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1} \text { from TMOVS } \\
& P 1_{i+1}=P 2_{i+1}=P 3_{i+1}=\text { corresponding } P_{i+1} \text { from TMOVS } \\
& \text { \} } \\
& \text { TMOVS: Compare results from each loop with known answers. See Table A.8. }
\end{aligned}
\]

Table 29 illustrates the Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process of the TCBC-I mode of operation.
1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, KEY3 to the 19 constant KEY values from Table A. 8 .
b. Initializes the 64-bit IV parameters, IV1, IV2, and IV3. IV1 is initialized to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., \(I V 1_{\text {hex }}=0000000000000000\). Based on specifications in ANSI X9.52-1998, IV2 is computed by the following equation: \(\mathrm{IV} 1+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{1}=5555555555555555\), i.e., \(\mathrm{IV} 2_{\text {hex }}=555555555555\) 5555 . IV3 is computed by the equation IV1 \(+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{2}=\mathrm{AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA}\), i.e., \(\mathrm{IV} 3_{\text {hex }}=\mathrm{AA} A A\) AA AA AA AA AA AA.
c. Initializes the P parameters \(\mathrm{P} 1, \mathrm{P} 2\), and P 3 to the 19 constant P values from Table A. 8 .
d. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 19.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(\mathrm{i}=1\) through 19:

NOTE -- the processing for each clock cycle \(T i\) is displayed.
a. At clock cycle T1:
1) Calculate the input block \(\mathrm{I1}_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{P} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\) with IV1.
2) Process \(\mathrm{I1}_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the first DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\), in the encrypt state using KEY1 \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(1_{1}\).

At clock cycle T2:
1) Calculate the input block \(\mathrm{I} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) with IV2.
2) Process \(\mathrm{I} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the first DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\), in the encrypt state using KEY1 \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(2_{1}\).
3) Process TEMP1 \(1_{1}\) through the second DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP1 \({ }_{2}\).

At clock cycle T3:
1) Calculate the input block \(\mathrm{I} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\) with IV3.
2) Process \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the first DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\), in the encrypt state using KEY \(1_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(3_{1}\).
3) Process TEMP2 \(2_{1}\) through the second DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP2 \(2_{2}\).
4) Process TEMP1 \(1_{2}\) through the third DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\), in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in the ciphertext value \(\mathrm{C1}_{\mathrm{i}}\).

At clock cycle T4:
1) Process TEMP2 2 through the third DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\), in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in the ciphertext value \(\mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\).
2) Process TEMP3 \(3_{1}\) through the second DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(3_{2}\).

At clock cycle T5:
1) Process TEMP3 \(2_{2}\) through the third DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\), in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in the ciphertext value \(\mathrm{C3}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b. Forward the current values of the loop number i, \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) (representing \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), IV1, IV2, IV3, \(\mathrm{P} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), and the resulting \(\mathrm{C} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 3.
c. If the IUT supports the decryption process, retain \(\mathrm{C} 1, \mathrm{C} 2\), and C 3 for use with the Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process for the TCBC-I Mode (Section 5.3.2.5).
d. Assign a new value to \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) by setting them equal to the next key supplied by the TMOVS.
e. Assign a new value to \(\mathrm{P1}_{\mathrm{i}+1}, \mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}\), and \(\mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) by setting them equal to the corresponding P supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE -- The above processing continues until all 19 KEY-P values are processed. The output from the IUT should consist of 19 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 3.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values found in Table A.8.

\subsection*{5.3.1.6 Monte Carlo Test for the Encryption Process - TCBC-I Mode}

Table 30 The Monte Carlo Test for the Encryption Process - TCBC-I Mode

\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { TEMP2 } 2_{2} \text { is encrypted by } \mathrm{DEA}_{3} \text { using } \mathrm{KEY} 3_{i} \text {, resulting in } \mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{j}} \\
& \text { T5: } \quad \text { TEMP }_{2} \text { is encrypted by } \mathrm{DEA}_{3} \text { using } \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \text {, resulting in } \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}} \\
& \text { IF ( } \mathrm{j}==0 \text { ) } \\
& \text { FOR k }=1 \text { TO } 3 \\
& \mathrm{Pk}_{\mathrm{j}+1}=\mathrm{CVk}_{0} \\
& \text { FOR k }=1 \text { TO } 3 \\
& \mathrm{Pk}_{\mathrm{j}+1}=\mathrm{Ck}_{\mathrm{j}-1} \\
& \text { FOR } k=1 \text { TO } 3 \\
& \mathrm{CVk}_{\mathrm{j}+1}=\mathrm{Ck}_{\mathrm{j}} \\
& \text { \} } \\
& \operatorname{Record} \mathrm{C1}_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{C3}_{\mathrm{j}} \\
& \text { Send i, } \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{CV}_{0}, \mathrm{CV}_{0}, \mathrm{CV}_{0}, \mathrm{P}_{0}, \mathrm{P}_{0}, \mathrm{P} 3_{0}, \mathrm{C} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{i}} \text {, } \\
& \text { C3 }{ }_{j} \\
& K E Y 1_{i+1}=K E Y 1_{i} \oplus \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}} \\
& \text { IF }\left(\mathrm{KEY}_{1} \text { and } \mathrm{KEY} 2_{i} \text { are independent and } \mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\right) \text { or }\left(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{i}\right. \text {, } \\
& \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \text {, and } \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \text { are independent) } \\
& \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{j}-1} \\
& \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \mathrm{C1}_{\mathrm{j}} \\
& \text { IF }\left(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\right) \text { or }\left(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}} \text { and } \mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\right. \text { are independent and } \\
& \left.\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\right) \\
& \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \mathrm{Cl}_{\mathrm{j}} \\
& \text { ELSE } \\
& \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \mathrm{C3}_{\mathrm{j}-2} \\
& \text { FOR k }=1 \text { TO } 3
\end{aligned}
\]
\[
\begin{array}{cc} 
& \\
& \mathrm{Pk}_{0}=\mathrm{Ck}_{\mathrm{j}-1} \\
& \mathrm{CVk}_{0}=\mathrm{Ck}_{\mathrm{j}} \\
& \\
& \\
&
\end{array}
\]

TMOVS: Check IUT's output for correctness.

As summarized in Table 30, the Monte Carlo Test for the TCBC-I Encryption Process is performed as follows:
1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3, the initialization vectors IV1, IV2, and IV3, and the plaintext variables P1, P2, and P3. The P, IV, and KEY parameters consist of 64 bits each. IV2 is assigned the value of IV1 \(+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(R_{1}=5555555555555555\). IV3 is assigned the value of IV1 \(+R_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{2}=\) AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA.
b. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 22.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(\mathrm{i}=0\) through 399:
a. If \(\mathrm{i}=0\) (if this is the first time through this loop), set the chaining value \(\mathrm{CV} 1_{0}\) equal to the IV1, \(\mathrm{CV} 2_{0}\) equal to the IV2, and \(\mathrm{CV}_{0}\) equal to the IV3.
b. Record the current values of the output loop number \(\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), \(\mathrm{CV} 1_{0}, \mathrm{CV} 2_{0}, \mathrm{CV}_{3}\), and \(\mathrm{P} 1_{0}, \mathrm{P}_{0}, \mathrm{P}_{0}\).
c. Perform the following for \(\mathrm{j}=0\) through 9999:

NOTE -- the processing for each clock cycle \(\mathrm{T} i\) is displayed.
1) At clock cycle T1:
a) Calculate the input block \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{P1}_{\mathrm{j}}\) with \(\mathrm{CV} 1_{\mathrm{j}}\).
b) Process \(\mathrm{I1}_{\mathrm{j}}\) through the first DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\), in the encrypt state using KEY1 \(1_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP1 \(1_{1}\).

At clock cycle T2:
a) Calculate the input block \(\mathrm{I} 2_{\mathrm{j}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{j}}\) with \(\mathrm{CV} 2_{\mathrm{j}}\).
b) Process \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}\) through the first DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\), in the encrypt state using KEY1 \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(2_{1}\).
c) Process TEMP \(1_{1}\) through the second DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), in the decrypt state using KEY \(2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP1 \({ }_{2}\).

At clock cycle T3:
a) Calculate the input block \(\mathrm{I} 3_{\mathrm{j}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{j}}\) with \(\mathrm{CV} 3_{\mathrm{j}}\).
b) Process \(\mathrm{I} 3_{\mathrm{j}}\) through the first DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\), in the encrypt state using KEY1 \({ }_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP3 \({ }_{1}\).
c) Process TEMP2 \(1_{1}\) through the second DEA stage, denoted DEA \(_{2}\), in the decrypt state using \(K E Y 2_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP2 2 .
d) Process TEMP1 \(1_{2}\) through the third DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\), in the encrypt state using \(K E Y 3_{i}\), resulting in the ciphertext value \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}\).

At clock cycle T4:
a) Process TEMP3 \(1_{1}\) through the second DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), in the decrypt state using KEY \(2_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP3 \({ }_{2}\).
b) Process TEMP2 \(2_{2}\) through the third DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\), in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in the ciphertext value \(\mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{j}}\).

At clock cycle T5:
a) Process TEMP3 \(2_{2}\) through the third DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\), in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in the ciphertext value \(\mathrm{C3}_{\mathrm{j}}\).
2) Prepare for loop \(\mathrm{j}+1\) by doing the following:
a) If the inner loop being processed is the first loop, i.e., \(\mathrm{j}=0\), assign \(\mathrm{P} 1_{\mathrm{j}+1}, \mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{j}+1}\), and \(\mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{j}+1}\), with the current value of \(\mathrm{CV} 1_{0}, \mathrm{CV} 2_{0}\), and \(\mathrm{CV} 3_{0}\), respectively. Otherwise, assign \(\mathrm{P} 1_{\mathrm{j}+1}\) with \(\mathrm{C} 1_{\mathrm{j}-1}, \mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{j}+1}\) with \(\mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{j}}\) \({ }_{1}\), and \(\mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{j}+1}\) with \(\mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{j}-1}\).
b) Assign \(\mathrm{CV} 1_{\mathrm{j}+1}, \mathrm{CV} 2_{\mathrm{j}+1}, \mathrm{CV}_{\mathrm{j}+1}\), with the current value of \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{j}}\), \(\mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{j}}\), respectively.
d. Record the \(\mathrm{C} 1_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{j}}\).
e. Forward all recorded information from this loop, as specified in Output Type 4, to the TMOVS.
f. Assign new values to the KEY parameters, KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 in preparation for the next outer loop. Note \(\mathrm{j}=9999\).

The new \(\mathrm{KEY}_{i_{i+1}}\) should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the \(\mathrm{C} 1_{\mathrm{j}}\).

The new \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) calculation is based on the values of the keys. If \(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}\) and \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) are independent and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{1}\), or \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{i}\) are independent, the new \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}-1}\). If
\(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), the new \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) should be calculated by exclusiveORing the current \(K E Y 2_{i}\) with the \(\mathrm{C} 1_{\mathrm{j}}\).

The new \(\mathrm{KEY}_{i_{i+1}}\) calculation is also based on the values of the keys. If \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{i}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\) are independent, the new \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}-2}\). If \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\) and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) are independent and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), or if \(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), the new \(\mathrm{KEY}_{3_{i+1}}\) should be calculated by exclusiveORing the current \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{i}\) with the \(\mathrm{C1}_{\mathrm{j}}\).
g. Assign new values to \(\mathrm{CV} 1_{0}, \mathrm{CV} 2_{0}\), and \(\mathrm{CV} 3_{0}\), in preparation for the next outer loop. \(\mathrm{CV} 1_{0}, \mathrm{CV} 2_{0}\), and \(\mathrm{CV} 3_{0}\) should be assigned the value of the current \(\mathrm{C1}_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{j}}\), and \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}\).

NOTE -- the new CV should be denoted as \(\mathrm{CV}_{0}\) because this value is used for the first pass through the inner loop when \(\mathrm{j}=0\).
h. Assign a new value to \(\mathrm{P}_{0}, \mathrm{P} 2_{0}\), and \(\mathrm{P} 3_{0}\) in preparation for the next output loop. \(\mathrm{P} 1_{0}\) should be assigned the value of the \(\mathrm{C1}_{\mathrm{j}-1} . \mathrm{P} 2_{0}\) should be assigned the value of the \(\mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{j}}\) \({ }_{1}\), and \(\mathrm{P} 3_{0}\) should be assigned the value of the \(\mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{j}-1}\).

NOTE -- the new P variables, \(\mathrm{P} 1, \mathrm{P} 2\), and P 3 should be denoted as \(\mathrm{P} 1_{0}, \mathrm{P} 2_{0}\), and \(\mathrm{P} 3_{0}\), respectively, to be used for the first pass through the inner loop when \(\mathrm{j}=0\).

NOTE -- The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 400 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 4.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to known values.

\subsection*{5.3.2 Decryption Process}

The process of validating an IUT for the TCBC-I mode which implements the decryption process involves the successful completion of the following six tests:
1. The Variable Ciphertext Known Answer Test - TCBC-I mode
2. The Initial Permutation Known Answer Test - TCBC-I mode
3. The Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process - TCBC-I mode
4. The Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process - TCBC-I mode
5. The Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process - TCBC-I mode
6. The Monte Carlo Test for the Decryption Process - TCBC-I mode

An explanation of the tests follows.

\subsection*{5.3.2.1 The Variable Ciphertext Known Answer Test - TCBC-I Mode}

Table 31 The Variable Ciphertext Known Answer Test - TCBC-I Mode



Table 31 illustrates the Variable Ciphertext Known Answer Test for the TCBC-I mode of operation.
1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 to the constant hexadecimal value 0 with odd parity set, i.e., \(K E Y 1_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 2_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 3_{\text {hex }}=010101\) 0101010101.
b. Initializes the 64-bit IV parameters, IV1, IV2, and IV3. IV1 is initialized to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., \(\mathrm{IV} 1_{\text {hex }}=0000000000000000\). Based on specifications in ANSI X9.52-1998, IV2 is computed by the following equation: IV1 \(+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{1}=5555555555555555\), i.e., IV2 \({ }_{\text {hex }}=555555555555\) 5555 . IV3 is computed by the equation IV1 \(+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{2}=A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A\), i.e., \(I V 3_{\text {hex }}=\) AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA.
c. If the IUT does not support encryption, the 64 constant ciphertext values \(\mathrm{C} 1, \mathrm{C} 2\), and C 3 are initialized with the corresponding 64 constant \(\mathrm{C} 1, \mathrm{C} 2\), and C 3 values from Table A. 5 .
d. If encryption is supported by the IUT, the KEYs and the IVs are forwarded to the IUT, as specified in Input Type 14. If encryption is not supported by the IUT, the KEYs, the IVs, and the \(64 \mathrm{C1}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\) values are forwarded to the IUT using Input Type 15.
2. The IUT should:
a. If encryption is supported, initialize the C values \(\mathrm{C} 1_{1}, \mathrm{C} 2_{1}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{1}\), with the corresponding \(\mathrm{C}_{1}, \mathrm{C} 2_{1}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{1}\) values retained from the Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test for the TCBC-I Mode (Section 5.3.1.1). Otherwise, use the first values received from the TMOVS.
b. Perform the following for \(\mathrm{i}=1\) through 64 :

NOTE -- the processing for each clock cycle \(\mathrm{T} i\) is displayed.
At clock cycle T1:
1) Set the input block \(\mathrm{I} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\) equal to the value of \(\mathrm{C} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\).
2) Process \(\mathrm{I1}_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\), in the decrypt state using KEY3, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1 \(1_{1}\).

At clock cycle T2:
1) Set the input block \(\mathrm{I} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) equal to the value of \(\mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\).
2) Process \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the decrypt state using KEY3, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2 \({ }_{1}\).
3) Process TEMP1 \(1_{1}\) through the second DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), in the encrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(1_{2}\).

At clock cycle T3:
1) Set the input block \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) equal to the value of \(\mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\).
2) Process \(\mathrm{I3}_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the decrypt state using KEY3, resulting in intermediate value TEMP3 \({ }_{1}\).
3) Process TEMP2 \(2_{1}\) through the second DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), in the encrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2 \({ }_{2}\).
4) Process TEMP \(1_{2}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the decrypt state using KEY1, resulting in the output block \(\mathrm{O1}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
5) Calculate the plaintext \(\mathrm{P1}_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with IV1.

At clock cycle T4:
1) Process TEMP2 \(2_{2}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the decrypt state using KEY1, resulting in the output block \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\).
2) Calculate the plaintext \(\mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) with IV2.
3) Process TEMP3 \(1_{1}\) through the second DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), in the encrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP3 \(2_{2}\).

At clock cycle T5:
1) Process TEMP3 \(3_{2}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the decrypt state using KEY1, resulting in the output block \(\mathrm{O3}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
2) Calculate the plaintext \(\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with IV3.
c. Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (which represents KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV1, IV2, IV3, \(\mathrm{C} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), and the resulting \(\mathrm{P} 1_{1}, \mathrm{P} 2_{1}\) and \(\mathrm{P} 3_{1}\) as specified in Output Type 3.
d. Retain \(\mathrm{P} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), for use with the Initial Permutation Known Answer Test for the TCBC-I Mode (Section 5.3.2.2 ).
e. If encryption is supported, set \(\mathrm{C1}_{\mathrm{i}+1}, \mathrm{C} 2_{i+1}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{i+1}\) equal to the corresponding output from the Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test for the TCBC-I mode. If encryption is not supported, assign new values to \(\mathrm{C1}_{\mathrm{i}+1}, \mathrm{C} 2_{i+1}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{i}+1}\), by setting them equal to the corresponding \(C\) values supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE -- The output from the IUT should consist of 64 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 3.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values. The values of the P1, P2, and P3 variables should be the set of basis vectors.

\subsection*{5.3.2.2 The Initial Permutation Known Answer - TCBC-I Mode}

Table 32 The Initial Permutation Known Answer Test - TCBC-I Mode
```

TMOVS: Initialize KEY1 = KEY2 = KEY3 = 0101010101010101 (odd parity set)
IV1=00000000000000000
IV2 = 5555555555555555
IV3 = AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

```

```

    Send i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV1, IV2, IV3, C1 }\mp@subsup{}{\textrm{i}}{2
    ```

```

    Ck}\mp@subsup{\textrm{i}+1}{}{(}\mathrm{ where k=1..3)= corresponding Pk
    }

```

TMOVS: Compare C1, C2, and C3 results from each loop with known answers.
See Table A.7.

Table 32 illustrates the Initial Permutation Known Answer Test for the TCBC-I mode of operation.
1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 to the constant hexadecimal value 0 with odd parity set, i.e., \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\text {hex }}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\text {hex }}=\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\text {hex }}=010101\) 0101010101.
b. Initializes the 64-bit IV parameters, IV1, IV2, and IV3. IV1 is initialized to the constant hexadecimal value 0, i.e., \(I V 1_{\text {hex }}=0000000000000000\). Based on specifications in ANSI X9.52-1998, IV2 is computed by the following equation: IV1 \(+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{1}=5555555555555555\), i.e., IV \(2_{\text {hex }}=555555555555\) 5555 . IV3 is computed by the equation IV1 \(+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{2}=\) AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA, i.e., \(I V 3_{\text {hex }}=\) AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA.
c. Initializes the 64-bit ciphertext values \(\mathrm{C} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\) to the corresponding plaintext values \(\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), respectively, obtained from the Variable Ciphertext Known Answer Test.
d. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 15.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(\mathrm{i}=1\) through 64:

NOTE -- the processing for each clock cycle \(\mathrm{T} i\) is displayed.
a. At clock cycle T1:
1) Set the input block \(\mathrm{I1}_{\mathrm{i}}\) equal to the value of \(\mathrm{C} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\).
2) Process \(\mathrm{I} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the decrypt state using KEY3, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1 \(1_{1}\).

At clock cycle T2:
1) Set the input block \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) equal to the value of \(\mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\).
2) Process \(\mathrm{I} 2_{i}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the decrypt state using KEY3, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2 \({ }_{1}\).
3) Process TEMP1 \(1_{1}\) through the second DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), in the encrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(1_{2}\).

At clock cycle T3:
1) Set the input block \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) equal to the value of \(\mathrm{C} 3_{i}\).
2) Process \(\mathrm{I}_{3}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the decrypt state using KEY3, resulting in intermediate value TEMP3 \({ }_{1}\).
3) Process TEMP2 \(2_{1}\) through the second DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), in the encrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2 \({ }_{2}\).
4) Process TEMP1 \(1_{2}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\), in the decrypt state using KEY1, resulting in the output block \(\mathrm{O1}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
5) Calculate the plaintext \(\mathrm{P1}_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\) with IV1.

At clock cycle T4:
1) Process TEMP \(2_{2}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the decrypt state using KEY1, resulting in the output block \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\).
2) Calculate the plaintext \(\mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) with IV2.
3) Process TEMP3 \({ }_{1}\) through the second DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), in the encrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP3 \(2_{2}\).

At clock cycle T5:
1) Process TEMP3 2 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the decrypt state using KEY1, resulting in the output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
2) Calculate the plaintext \(\mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\) with IV3.
b. Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (which represents KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV1, IV2, IV3, \(\mathrm{C} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), and the resulting \(\mathrm{P} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) and \(\mathrm{P} 3_{i}\) as specified in Output Type 3.
c. \(\quad\) Set \(\mathrm{C1}_{1+1}, \mathrm{C}_{2}{ }_{\mathrm{i}+1}\), and \(\mathrm{C}_{3_{i+1}}\) equal to the corresponding output supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE -- The output from the IUT should consist of 64 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 3.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received \(\mathrm{C} 1, \mathrm{C} 2\), and C3 results to the known values. See Table A.7.

\subsection*{5.3.2.3 The Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process -TCBC-I Mode}

Table 33 The Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process - TCBC-I Mode
TMOVS: Initialize \(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{1}=8001010101010101\) (odd parity set)
IV1 \(=0000000000000000\)
\(\mathrm{IV} 2=5555555555555555\)
IV3 \(=\) AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
If encryption supported by IUT:
Send \(\quad \mathrm{KEY}_{1}\) (representing KEY1 \(1_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{1}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}\) ), IV1, IV2, IV3
If encryption is not supported by the IUT:
Initialize \(\quad \mathrm{Ck}_{\mathrm{i}}(\) where \(\mathrm{k}=1 . .3\) and \(\mathrm{i}=1 . .56)=\mathrm{Ck}\) values in Table A .11
Send \(\quad \mathrm{KEY}_{1}\) (representing KEY1 \(1_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{1}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}\) ), IV1,IV2,IV3, \(\mathrm{C} 1_{1}, \ldots, \mathrm{C} 1_{56}, \mathrm{C} 2_{1}, \ldots, \mathrm{C} 2_{56}, \mathrm{C} 3_{1}, \ldots, \mathrm{C} 3_{56}\)

IUT: If encryption is supported by the IUT:
Initialize \(\mathrm{Ck}_{1}\) (where \(\mathrm{k}=1 . .3\) ) = corresponding values from output of Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process.

Otherwise, use the corresponding value received from the TMOVS.
FOR \(\mathrm{i}=1\) to 64
\{
If \((i \bmod 8 \neq 0)\) \{process every bit except parity bits\}
\{
Perform
Triple DES:

T1: \(\quad \mathrm{In}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{C} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\)
\(\mathrm{I}_{1}\) is read into TDEA and is decrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in TEMP \(1_{1}\)

T2: \(\quad \mathrm{I} 2_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\)
\(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) is read into TDEA and is decrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in TEMP \(2_{1}\)

\[
\text { P3 = } 0 \text { for all } 56 \text { rounds. }
\]

Table 33 illustrates the Variable Key Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process - TCBC-I mode of operation.
1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters \(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{1}\) to contain " 0 " in every significant bit except for a " 1 " in the first position, i.e., the 64 -bit \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{1 \text { bin }}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{1}\) bin \(=K E Y 3_{1 \text { bin }}=100000000000000100000001000000010000000100000001\) 0000000100000001 . The equivalent of this value in hexadecimal notation is 8001 010101010101.

NOTE -- the parity bits are set to " 0 " or " 1 " to get odd parity.
b. Initializes the 64-bit IV parameters, IV1, IV2, and IV3. IV1 is initialized to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., \(\mathrm{IV} 1_{\text {hex }}=0000000000000000\). Based on specifications in ANSI X9.52-1998, IV2 is computed by the following equation: IV1 \(+R_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(R_{1}=5555555555555555\), i.e., IV2 \({ }_{\text {hex }}=555555555555\) 5555 . IV3 is computed by the equation IV1 \(+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{2}=\) AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA, i.e., \(I V 3_{\text {hex }}=\) AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA.
c. If the IUT does not support encryption, \(\mathrm{C1}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{C} 2_{i}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\) values are initialized with the constant \(\mathrm{C} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\) values from Table A. 11 where \(\mathrm{i}=1 . .56\).
d. If encryption is not supported by the IUT, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV1, IV2, and IV3, and the \(56 \mathrm{C} 1, \mathrm{C} 2\), and C3 values are forwarded to the IUT, as specified in Input Type 15. Otherwise, the KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV1, IV2, and IV3 are forwarded to the IUT, as specified in Input Type 14.
2. The IUT should:
a. If encryption is supported, initialize the \(\mathrm{C} 1_{1}, \mathrm{C} 2_{1}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{1}\) values with the first corresponding C1, C2, and C3 values retained from the Variable KEY Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process for the TCBC-I Mode (Section 5.3.1.3). Otherwise, use the first values received from the TMOVS.
b. Perform the following for \(\mathrm{i}=1\) to 56 :

NOTE -- 56 is the number of significant bits in a TDES key.
NOTE -- the processing for each clock cycle Ti is displayed.
1) At clock cycle T1:
a) Set the input block \(\mathrm{I1}_{\mathrm{i}}\) equal to the value of \(\mathrm{C} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Process \(\mathrm{I1}_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(1_{1}\).

At clock cycle T2:
a) Set the input block \(\mathrm{I} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) equal to the value of \(\mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Process \(\mathrm{I} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the decrypt state using \(K E Y 3_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(2_{1}\).
c) Process TEMP \(1_{1}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{1}\).

At clock cycle T3:
a) Set the input block \(\mathrm{I3}_{\mathrm{i}}\) equal to the value of \(\mathrm{C3}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Process \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the decrypt state using \(K E Y 3_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(3_{1}\).
c) Process TEMP2 \(1_{1}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the encrypt state using KEY \(2_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(2_{2}\).
d) Process TEMP1 \(1_{2}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in the output block \(\mathrm{O1}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
e) Calculate the plaintext \(\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with IV1.

At clock cycle T4:
a) Process TEMP2 2 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in the output block \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Calculate the plaintext \(\mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) with IV2.
c) Process TEMP3 \(1_{1}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the encrypt state using KEY \(2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP3 \({ }_{2}\).

At clock cycle T5:
a) Process TEMP3 \(2_{2}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in the output block \(\mathrm{O3}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Calculate the plaintext \(\mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with IV3.
2) Forward the current values of the loop number \(\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) (representing \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\) ), IV1, IV2, IV3, \(\mathrm{C} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), and the resulting \(\mathrm{P} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{P} 3_{i}\) to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 3.
3) \(\operatorname{Set} \mathrm{KEY} 1_{i+1}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{i+1}\), equal to the vector consisting of " 0 " in every significant bit position except for a single " 1 " bit in position \(\mathrm{i}+1\). The parity bits may contain " 1 " or " 0 " to make odd parity.

NOTE - -KEY1 \(1_{i+1}=\) KEY2 \(_{i+1}=\) KEY3 \(_{i+1}\).
4) If encryption is supported, set the C values \(\mathrm{C} 1_{i+1}, \mathrm{C} 2_{i+1}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{i}+1}\), equal to the corresponding \(\mathrm{C1}_{\mathrm{i}+1}, \mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) values retained from the Variable KEY Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process for TCBC-I mode. If encryption is not supported by the IUT, set \(\mathrm{C1}_{\mathrm{i}+1}, \mathrm{C} 2_{i+1}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{i+1}\) equal to the corresponding \(\mathrm{C} 1_{i+1}, \mathrm{C} 2_{i+1}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{i+1}\), values supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE -- The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 56 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 3.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values. The P1, P2, and P3 results should be all zeros.

\subsection*{5.3.2 4 Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process - TCBC-I Mode}

Table 34 The Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process -TCBC-I Mode
\begin{tabular}{|ll}
\hline TMOVS: \(\quad\) Initialize & \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}(\) where \(\mathrm{i}=1 . .32)=32 \mathrm{KEY}\) values from \\
& Table A.12 \\
& \(\mathrm{IV} 1=0000000000000000\) \\
& \(\mathrm{IV} 2=5555555555555555\) \\
& \(\mathrm{IV} 3=\) AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
\end{tabular}

If encryption is supported by the IUT:
Send IV1, IV2, and IV3
\(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{KEY}_{32}\) (where KEY represents the values of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3)

If encryption is not supported by the IUT:
Initialize \(\quad \mathrm{Ck}_{\mathrm{i}}(\) where \(\mathrm{k}=1 . .3\) and \(\mathrm{i}=1 . .32)=\) corresponding \(\mathrm{Ck}_{\mathrm{i}}\) values from Table A. 12

Send
IV1, IV2, and IV3,
\(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{KEY}_{32}\) (where KEY represents the values of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3)
\(\mathrm{C} 1_{1}, \ldots, \mathrm{C1}_{32}, \mathrm{C} 2_{1}, \ldots, \mathrm{C} 2_{32}, \mathrm{C} 3_{1}, \ldots, \mathrm{C} 3_{32}\)
IUT: If encryption is supported by the IUT:
Initialize \(\quad \mathrm{C}_{1}, \mathrm{C} 2_{1}, \mathrm{C} 3_{1}\) values with corresponding values retained from Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for Encryption Process.

Otherwise, use the first values received from the TMOVS.
FOR \(\mathrm{i}=1\) to 32
\{
Perform \(\quad\) T1: \(\quad \mathrm{I} 1_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{C} 1_{i}\)

Triple DES:
\(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) is read into TDEA and is decrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) using \(K E Y 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in TEMP1 \(1_{1}\)

T2: \(\quad \mathrm{I} 2_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\)
I2 \(2_{i}\) is read into TDEA and is decrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{i}\), resulting in TEMP2 \({ }_{1}\)

TEMP1 \(_{1}\) is encrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{2}\), resulting in TEMP1 \({ }_{2}\)

T3: \(\quad \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\)
\(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) is read into TDEA and is decrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{i}\), resulting in TEMP3 \({ }_{1}\)

TEMP2 \(2_{1}\) is encrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{i}\), resulting in TEMP \(2_{2}\)

TEMP \(1_{2}\) is decrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{i}\), resulting in \(\mathrm{O}_{1}\)
\(\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \mathrm{IV} 1\)
T4: \(\quad\) TEMP3 \(_{1}\) is encrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in TEMP \(_{2}\)

TEMP \(2_{2}\) is decrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{i}\), resulting in \(\mathrm{O} 2_{i}\)
\(\mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \mathrm{IV} 2\)
T5: \(\quad \mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\) is decrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in \(\mathrm{O} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\)
\(\mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \mathrm{IV} 3\)
Send \(\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) (representing \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\) ), IV1, IV2, IV3, \(\mathrm{C} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{P} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\)
\(K E Y 1_{i+1}=K E Y 2_{i+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{i+1}=\) corresponding KEY \({ }_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) supplied from TMOVS

If encryption is supported:
\(\mathrm{Ck}_{\mathrm{i}+1}(\) where \(\mathrm{k}=1 . .3)=\) corresponding \(\mathrm{Ck}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) from Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process else
\(\mathrm{Ck}_{\mathrm{i}+1}(\) where \(\mathrm{k}=1 . .3)=\) corresponding \(\mathrm{Ck}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) from TMOVS

TMOVS: Compare results with known answers. Results should be \(\mathrm{P} 1=\mathrm{P} 2=\mathrm{P} 3=0\).

Table 34 illustrates the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the TCBC-I Decryption Process.

\section*{1. The TMOVS:}
a. If the IUT supports encryption, the \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\) variables are initialized with the 32 constant \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) values from Table A.12. If the IUT does not support encryption, the KEY variables, \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), and the C variables, \(\mathrm{C} 1, \mathrm{C} 2\), and C 3 are initialized with the 32 constant KEY and \(\mathrm{C} 1, \mathrm{C} 2\), and C3 values from Table A. 12 .

NOTE -- KEY1=KEY2=KEY3.
b. Initializes the 64-bit IV parameters, IV1, IV2, and IV3. IV1 is initialized to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., \(I V 1_{\text {hex }}=0000000000000000\). Based on specifications in ANSI X9.52-1998, IV2 is computed by the following equation: IV \(1+R_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(R_{1}=5555555555555555\), i.e., IV \(2_{\text {hex }}=555555555555\) 5555 . IV 3 is computed by the equation IV1 \(+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{2}=A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A\), i.e., \(I V 3_{\text {hex }}=\) AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA.
c. If encryption is supported by the IUT, the 32 KEY values for KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3, and the IV1, IV2, and IV3 values are forwarded to the IUT using Input Type 16. If encryption is not supported by the IUT, the \(32 \mathrm{KEY}, \mathrm{C} 1, \mathrm{C} 2\), and C 3 groups and the IV1, IV2, and IV3 values are forwarded to the IUT using Input Type 17.
2. The IUT should:
a. If encryption is supported by the IUT, initialize the \(\mathrm{C1}_{1}, \mathrm{C} 2_{1}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{1}\) values with the first \(\mathrm{C1}_{1}, \mathrm{C} 2_{1}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{1}\) values retained from the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process for the TCBC-I Mode (Section 5.3.1.4). Otherwise, use the first values received from the TMOVS.
b. Perform the following for \(\mathrm{i}=1\) to 32 :

NOTE -- the processing for each clock cycle \(\mathrm{T} i\) is displayed.
1) At clock cycle T1:
a) Set the input block \(\mathrm{I} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\) equal to the value of \(\mathrm{C} 1_{i}\).
b) Process \(I 1_{i}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(1_{1}\).

At clock cycle T2:
a) Set the input block \(\mathrm{I} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) equal to the value of \(\mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Process \(\mathrm{I} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{3}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(2_{1}\).
c) Process TEMP \(1_{1}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value \(\mathrm{TEMP} 1_{2}\).

At clock cycle T3:
a) Set the input block \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) equal to the value of \(\mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Process \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(3_{1}\).
c) Process TEMP2 \(1_{1}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the encrypt state using KEY \(2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP2 \({ }_{2}\).
d) Process TEMP \(1_{2}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in the output block \(\mathrm{O1}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
e) Calculate the plaintext \(\mathrm{P1}_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with IV1.

At clock cycle T4:
a) Process TEMP2 2 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in the output block \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Calculate the plaintext \(\mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) with IV2.
c) Process TEMP3 \(1_{1}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the encrypt state using KEY \(2_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(_{2}\).

At clock cycle T5:
a) Process TEMP3 2 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in the output block \(\mathrm{O3}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Calculate the plaintext \(\mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with IV3.
2) Forward the current values of the loop number \(\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{I}}\) (representing \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), KEY \(2_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\) ), IV1, IV2, IV3, \(\mathrm{C} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), and the resulting \(\mathrm{P} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\) to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 3.
3) Assign new values to \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}+1}\), \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}+1}\), by setting them equal to the corresponding KEY values supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE -- KEY1=KEY2=KEY3.
4) If encryption is supported, set the C values \(\mathrm{C} 1_{i+1}, \mathrm{C} 2_{i+1}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{i+1}\) equal to the corresponding \(\mathrm{C} 1_{i+1}, \mathrm{C} 2_{i+1}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{i+1}\) values retained from the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process for TCBC-I mode. If encryption is not supported by the IUT, set \(\mathrm{C} 1_{i+1}, \mathrm{C} 2_{i+1}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{i+1}\) equal to the corresponding \(\mathrm{C} 1_{i+1}, \mathrm{C} 2_{i+1}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{i+1}\), values supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE -- The above processing should continue until all 32 KEY values are processed. The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 32 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 3.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to known values. The resulting P1, P2, and P3 results should be all zeros.

\subsection*{5.3.2.5 Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process -TCBC-I Mode}

Table 35 The Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Decryption Process -TCBC-I Mode
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline \multirow[t]{4}{*}{TMOVS:} & \multirow[t]{4}{*}{Initialize} & \(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}(\) where \(\mathrm{i}=1 . .19)=19 \mathrm{KEY}\) values from Table A. 8 \\
\hline & & IV1=0000000000000000 \\
\hline & & \(\mathrm{IV} 2=5555555555555555\) \\
\hline & & \(\mathrm{IV} 3=\mathrm{AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA}\) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

If encryption is supported by the IUT:
Send IV1, IV2, and IV3,
\(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{KEY}_{19}\) (where KEY represents the values of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3)

If encryption is not supported by the IUT:
Initialize \(\quad \mathrm{Ck}_{\mathrm{i}}(\) where \(\mathrm{k}=1 . .3\) and where \(\mathrm{i}=1 . .19)=\) corresponding \(\mathrm{Ck}_{\mathrm{i}}\) values from Table A. 8

Send
IV1, IV2, and IV3,
\(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{KEY}_{19}\) (where KEY represents the values of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3)
\(\mathrm{C} 1_{1}, \ldots, \mathrm{C1}_{19}, \mathrm{C} 2_{1}, \ldots, \mathrm{C} 2_{19}, \mathrm{C} 3_{1}, \ldots, \mathrm{C} 3_{19}\)
IUT: If encryption is supported by the IUT:
Initialize \(\quad \mathrm{C}_{1}, \mathrm{C} 2_{1}, \mathrm{C} 3_{1}\) values retained from Substitution Table Known Answer Test for Encryption Process.

Otherwise, use the first values received from the TMOVS.
FOR \(\mathrm{i}=1\) to 19
\{

Perform
Triple DES:

T1: \(\quad \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{C} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\)
\(\mathrm{I1}_{\mathrm{i}}\) is read into TDEA and is decrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{1}\)


TMOVS: Compare results with known answers.

Table 35 illustrates the Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the TCBC-I Decryption Process.
1. The TMOVS:
a. If the IUT supports encryption, the \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\) variables are initialized with the 19 constant KEY values from Table A.8. If the IUT does not support encryption, the KEY variables, KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3, and the C variables, \(\mathrm{C} 1, \mathrm{C} 2\), and C 3 are initialized with the 19 constant KEY and \(\mathrm{C} 1, \mathrm{C} 2\), and C3 values from Table A.8.

NOTE -- KEY1=KEY2=KEY3.
b. Initializes the 64-bit IV parameters, IV1, IV2, and IV3. IV1 is initialized to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., \(\mathrm{IV} 1_{\text {hex }}=0000000000000000\). Based on specifications in ANSI X9.52-1998, IV2 is computed by the following equation: \(\mathrm{IV} 1+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{1}=555555555555555\), i.e., IV2 \({ }_{\text {hex }}=555555555555\) 5555 . IV3 is computed by the equation IV1 \(+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{2}=\) AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA, i.e., \(I V 3_{\text {hex }}=\) AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA.
c. If encryption is supported by the IUT, the 19 KEY values for KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3, and the IV1, IV2, and IV3 values are forwarded to the IUT using Input Type 16. If encryption is not supported by the IUT, the \(19 \mathrm{KEY}, \mathrm{C} 1, \mathrm{C} 2\), and C 3 groups and the IV1, IV2, and IV3 values are forwarded to the IUT using Input Type 17.
2. The IUT should:
a. If encryption is supported by the IUT, initialize the \(\mathrm{C} 1, \mathrm{C} 2\), and C 3 values with the first C1, C2, and C3 values retained from the Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process for the TCBC-I Mode (Section 5.3.1.5). Otherwise, use the first value received from the TMOVS.
b. Perform the following for \(\mathrm{i}=1\) to 19 :

NOTE -- the processing for each clock cycle \(T i\) is displayed.
1) At clock cycle T1:
a) \(\quad\) Set \(I 1_{i}\) equal to the value of \(\mathrm{C1}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Process \(\mathrm{I1}_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(1_{1}\).

At clock cycle T2:
a) \(\quad\) Set \(I 2_{i}\) equal to the value of \(\mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Process \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{3}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(2_{1}\).
c) Process TEMP1 \(1_{1}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the encrypt state using KEY \(2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value \(\mathrm{TEMP} 1_{2}\).

At clock cycle T3:
a) \(\quad\) Set \(I 3_{i}\) equal to the value of \(\mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Process \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP3 \({ }_{1}\).
c) Process TEMP \(2_{1}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the encrypt state using KEY \(2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP2 \({ }_{2}\).
d) Process TEMP \(1_{2}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in the output block \(\mathrm{O1}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
e) Calculate the plaintext \(\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\) with IV1.

At clock cycle T4:
a) Process TEMP2 \(2_{2}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in the output block \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Calculate the plaintext \(\mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) with IV2.
c) Process TEMP3 \(1_{1}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the encrypt state using KEY \(2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\).

At clock cycle T5:
a) Process TEMP3 \(2_{2}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in the output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Calculate the plaintext \(\mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with IV3.
2) Forward the current values of the loop number i, \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) (representing \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\), \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\) ), IV1, IV2, IV3, \(\mathrm{C} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), and the resulting \(\mathrm{P} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\) to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 3.
3) Assign new values to \(\mathrm{KEY}_{1+1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\), by setting them equal to the corresponding \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) values supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE -- KEY1 \(1_{i+1}=\) KEY2 \(_{i+1}=\) KEY3 \(_{i+1}\).
4) If encryption is supported, set the C values \(\mathrm{C} 1_{i+1}, \mathrm{C} 2_{i+1}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{i+1}\) equal to the corresponding \(\mathrm{C} 1_{i+1}, \mathrm{C} 2_{i+1}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) values retained from the Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the Encryption Process for

TCBC-I mode. If encryption is not supported by the IUT, set \(\mathrm{C} 1_{i+1}, \mathrm{C} 2_{i+1}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{i+1}\) equal to the corresponding \(\mathrm{C} 1_{i+1}, \mathrm{C} 2_{i+1}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{i+1}\), values supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE -- The above processing should continue until all \(19 \mathrm{KEY}, \mathrm{C} 1, \mathrm{C} 2\), and C 3 groups, as specified in Input Type 17, or all 19 KEY values, as specified in Input Type 16, are processed. The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 19 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 3.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values.

\subsection*{5.3.2.6 Monte Carlo Test for the Decryption Process - TCBC-I Mode}

Table 36 The Monte Carlo Test for the Decryption Process - TCBC-I Mode

```

                    \(\mathrm{P} 1_{\mathrm{j}}=\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}} \oplus \mathrm{CV} 1\)
    T4: \(\quad\) TEMP3 \(_{1}\) is encrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{2}\), resulting
        in TEMP3 \({ }_{2}\)
        TEMP \(_{2}\) is decrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{1}\), resulting in
        \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{j}}\)
        \(\mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{j}}=\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{j}} \oplus \mathrm{CV} 2\)
    T5: \(\quad \mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\) is decrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}\), resulting in
        \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}\)
        \(\mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{j}}=\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}} \oplus \mathrm{CV} 3\)
    FOR k= 1 to 3
        \{
            \(\mathrm{CVk}_{\mathrm{j}+1}=\mathrm{Ck}_{\mathrm{j}}\)
            \(\mathrm{Ck}_{\mathrm{j}+1}=\mathrm{Pk}_{\mathrm{j}}\)
        \}
    \}
    $\operatorname{Record} \mathrm{P} 1_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{j}}$
Send i, $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{CV1}_{0}, \mathrm{CV} 2_{0}, \mathrm{CV} 3_{0}, \mathrm{C} 1_{0}, \mathrm{C} 2_{0}, \mathrm{C} 3_{0}, \mathrm{P} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$,
P3 ${ }_{j}$
$\mathrm{KEY}_{1+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}}$
$\operatorname{IF}\left(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}\right.$ and $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$ are independent and $\left.\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\right)$ or $\left(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\right.$,
$\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ are independent)

$$
\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{j}-1}
$$

```

\section*{ELSE}
```

$$
K E Y 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \mathrm{P} 1_{\mathrm{j}}
$$

IF $\left(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\right)$ or $\left(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\right.$ and $\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}$ are independent and $\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}$ )

$$
K E Y 3_{i+1}=K E Y 3_{i} \oplus P 1_{j}
$$

```
```

ELSE
KEY3 i+1 = KEY3 i
FOR k= 1 to 3
{
CVk
Ck
}
}

```

TMOVS Check IUT's output for correctness.
:

As summarized in Table 36, the Monte Carlo Test for the TCBC-I Decryption Process is performed as follows:
1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3, the initialization vectors IV1, IV2, and IV3, and the ciphertext variables C1, C2, and C3. The C variables, the IV variables, and the KEY variables consist of 64 bits each. IV2 is assigned the value of \(I V 1+R_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(R_{1}=5555555555555555\). IV3 is assigned the value of \(\mathrm{IV} 1+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{2}=\) AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA.
b. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 22.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(\mathrm{i}=0\) through 399:
a. If \(\mathrm{i}=0\) (if this is the first time through this loop), set the chaining value \(\mathrm{CV} 1_{0}\) equal to the IV1, \(\mathrm{CV} 2_{0}\) equal to the IV2, and \(\mathrm{CV}_{0}\) equal to the IV3.
b. Record the current values of the output loop number \(\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), \(\mathrm{CV} 1_{0}, \mathrm{CV} 2_{0}, \mathrm{CV} 3_{0}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 1_{0}, \mathrm{C} 2_{0}, \mathrm{C} 3_{0}\).
c. Perform the following for \(\mathrm{j}=0\) through 9999:

NOTE -- the processing for each clock cycle \(\mathrm{T} i\) is displayed.
1) At clock cycle T1:
a) Set the input block \(\mathrm{I1}_{\mathrm{j}}\) equal to the value of \(\mathrm{C} 1_{\mathrm{j}}\).
b) Process \(\mathrm{I1}_{\mathrm{j}}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(1_{1}\).

At clock cycle T2:
a) Set the input block \(\mathrm{I} 2_{\mathrm{j}}\) equal to the value of \(\mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{j}}\).
b) Process \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the decrypt state using \(K E Y 3_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(2_{1}\).
c) Process TEMP1 1 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{1}\).

At clock cycle T3:
a) Set the input block \(\mathrm{I} 3_{\mathrm{j}}\) equal to the value of \(\mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{j}}\).
b) Process \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the decrypt state using KEY \(3_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(3_{1}\).
c) Process TEMP2 \(1_{1}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the encrypt state using KEY2 \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(2_{2}\).
d) Process TEMP \(1_{2}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in the output block \(\mathrm{O} 1_{\mathrm{j}}\).
e) Calculate the plaintext \(\mathrm{P1}_{\mathrm{j}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}\) with IV1.

At clock cycle T4:
a) Process TEMP2 2 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in the output block \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{j}}\).
b) Calculate the plaintext \(\mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{j}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{j}}\) with IV2.
c) Process TEMP3 \(1_{1}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\).

At clock cycle T5:
a) Process TEMP3 \(2_{2}\) through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in the output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}\).
b) Calculate the plaintext \(\mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{j}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O} 3_{\mathrm{j}}\) with IV3.
2) Prepare for loop \(\mathrm{j}+1\) by doing the following:
a) Assign \(\mathrm{CV} 1_{\mathrm{j}+1}, \mathrm{CV} 2_{\mathrm{j}+1}, \mathrm{CV}_{\mathrm{j}+1}\) the current value of \(\mathrm{C} 1_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{C} 2_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{j}}\), respectively.
b) Assign \(\mathrm{C1}_{\mathrm{j}+1}, \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}+1}, \mathrm{C} 3_{\mathrm{j}+1}\) the current value of \(\mathrm{P} 1_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{j}}\), respectively.
d. Record \(\mathrm{P} 1_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{j}}\).
e. Forward all recorded information for this loop, as specified in Output Type 4, to the TMOVS.
f. Assign new values to the KEY parameters, KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 in preparation for the next outer loop. Note \(\mathrm{j}=9999\).

The new \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{i+1}\) should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{i}\) with the \(\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}}\).

The new \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{i+1}\) calculation is based on the values of the keys. If \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\) and \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) are independent and \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\), or \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\), \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{i}\) are independent, the new \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the \(\mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{j}-1}\). If
\(K E Y 1_{i}=K E Y 2_{i}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), the new \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) should be calculated by exclusiveORing the current KEY2 \({ }_{i}\) with the \(\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}}\).

The new \(\mathrm{KEY}_{i_{i+1}}\) calculation is also based on the values of the keys. If \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) are independent, the new \(\mathrm{KEY}_{3}{ }_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{i}\) with the \(\mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{j}-2}\). If \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\) and \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) are independent and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\), or if \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), the new \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{i}+1}}\) should be calculated by exclusiveORing the current \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{i}\) with the \(\mathrm{P} 1_{\mathrm{j}}\).
g. Assign new values to \(\mathrm{CV1}_{0}, \mathrm{CV} 2_{0}\), and \(\mathrm{CV} 3_{0}\), in preparation for the next outer loop. \(\mathrm{CV} 1_{0}, \mathrm{CV} 2_{0}\), and \(\mathrm{CV} 3_{0}\) should be assigned the value of the current \(\mathrm{C} 1_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{C} 2{ }_{\mathrm{j}}\), and \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}\), respectively.

NOTE -- the new CV should be denoted as \(\mathrm{CV}_{0}\) because this value is used for the first pass through the inner loop when \(\mathrm{j}=0\).
h. Assign a new value to \(\mathrm{C1}_{0}, \mathrm{C} 2_{0}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{0}\) in preparation for the next output loop. \(\mathrm{C}_{0}\) should be assigned the value of the \(\mathrm{P} 1_{\mathrm{j}}\). Likewise, \(\mathrm{C} 2_{0}\) should be assigned the value of the \(\mathrm{P} 2_{\mathrm{j}}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{0}\) should be assigned the value of the \(\mathrm{P} 3_{\mathrm{j}}\).

NOTE -- the new C variables, \(\mathrm{C} 1, \mathrm{C} 2\), and C 3 should be denoted as \(\mathrm{C}_{0}, \mathrm{C} 2_{0}\), and \(\mathrm{C} 3_{0}\), respectively, to be used for the first pass through the inner loop when \(\mathrm{j}=0\).

NOTE -- The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 400 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 4.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to known values.

\subsection*{5.4 The Cipher Feedback (TCFB) Mode}

The IUTs in the TDES Cipher Block Feedback (TCFB) mode of operation are validated by successfully completing (1) a set of Known Answer tests applicable to both IUTs supporting encryption and/or decryption and (2) a Monte Carlo test for each cryptographic process supported by the IUT.

The process of validating an IUT which supports the K-bit TCFB mode in either the encryption and/or decryption process involves the successful completion of the following six tests:
1. The Variable Text Known Answer Test - K-bit TCFB mode
2. The Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test - K-bit TCFB mode
3. The Variable Key Known Answer Test - K-bit TCFB mode
4. The Permutation Operation Known Answer Test - K-bit TCFB mode
5. The Substitution Table Known Answer Test - K-bit TCFB mode
6. The Monte Carlo Test for the Encryption Process - K-bit TCFB mode (if encryption is supported)

\section*{OR}

The Monte Carlo Test for the Decryption Process - K-bit TCFB mode (if decryption is supported)

NOTE -- For IUTs, K can range from 1 to 64 bits.
An explanation of the tests follows.

\subsection*{5.4.1 The Known Answer Tests - TCFB Mode}

The K-bit TCFB mode has one set of Known Answer tests which is used regardless of supported process, i.e., the same set of Known Answer tests is for IUTs supporting the encryption and/or decryption processes.

Throughout this section, TEXT and RESULT will refer to different variables depending on whether the encryption or decryption process is being tested. If the IUT performs TCFB encryption, TEXT refers to plaintext, and RESULT refers to ciphertext. If the IUT performs TCFB decryption, TEXT refers to ciphertext, and RESULT refers to plaintext.

The notation \(\mathrm{LM}^{\mathrm{K}}(\mathrm{A})\) refers to the leftmost K -bits of A .

\subsection*{5.4.1.1 The Variable TEXT Known Answer Test - TCFB Mode}

Table 37 The Variable TEXT Known Answer Test - TCFB Mode


As summarized in Table 37, the Variable TEXT Known Answer Test for the TCFB mode of operation is performed as follows:
1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 to the constant hexadecimal value 0 with odd parity set, i.e., \(K E Y 1_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 2_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 3_{\text {hex }}=010101\) 0101010101.
b. Initializes the 64-bit initialization vector \(\mathrm{IV}_{1}\) to the basis vector containing a" 1 " in the first bit position and " 0 " in the following 63 positions, i.e., \(\mathrm{IV}_{1 \text { bin }}=10000000\) 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 . The equivalent of this value in hexadecimal notation is 8000000000000000 .
c. Initializes the K-bit TEXT parameter to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{\text {hex }}=0000000000000000\).
d. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 2.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(i=1\) through 64 :
a. Assign the value of the initialization vector \(\mathrm{IV}_{\mathrm{i}}\) to the input block \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b. Process \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the three DEA stages, resulting in a 64-bit output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\). This involves processing \(I_{i}\) through the first DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\), in the encrypt state using KEY1, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the second DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), in the decrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the third DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\), in the encrypt state using KEY3, resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
c. Calculate the K -bit RESULT \(_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing the leftmost K -bits of \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the K-bit TEXT, i.e., \(\left(\right.\) RESULT \(^{1}{ }_{i}\), RESULT \(^{2}{ }_{i}, \ldots\), RESULT \(\left.^{K}{ }_{i}\right)=\left(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}^{1} \oplus\right.\) TEXT \(^{1}, \mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}^{2} \oplus\) \(\left.\mathrm{TEXT}^{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{O}^{\mathrm{K}}{ }_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \mathrm{TEXT}^{\mathrm{K}}\right)\).
d. Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), \(\mathrm{IV}_{\mathrm{i}}\), K-bit TEXT, and the resulting K-bit RESULT \(_{\mathrm{i}}\) to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 2.
e. Retain the K-bit RESULT values for use with the Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test for the TCFB Mode (Section 5.4.1.2).
f. Assign a new value to \(\mathrm{IV}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) by setting it equal to the value of a basis vector with a " 1 " bit in position \(\mathrm{i}+1\), where \(\mathrm{i}+1=2, \ldots, 64\).

NOTE -- This continues until every possible basis vector has been represented by the IV, i.e., 64 times. The output from the IUT should consist of 64 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 2.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values found in Table A.1. For IUTs where K is less than 64, the leftmost K bits of output for each RESULT value in Table A. 1 are used.

\subsection*{5.4.1.2 The Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test - TCFB Mode}

Table 38 The Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test - TCFB Mode


Send i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV \(_{\mathrm{i}}\), K-bit TEXT \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}\), K-bit RESULT \({ }_{i}\)
\(\mathrm{IV}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\) basis vector where single " 1 " bit is in position \(\mathrm{i}+1\)
K-bit \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\) corresponding K-bit RESULT value from the TMOVS
\}
TMOVS: Compare RESULT from each loop with known answers.
The RESULTs should be all zeros.

As summarized in Table 38, the Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test for the TCFB mode of operation is performed as follows:
1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 to the constant hexadecimal value 0 with odd parity set, i.e., \(K E Y 1_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 2_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 3_{\text {hex }}=010101\) 0101010101.
b. Initializes the 64-bit initialization vector \(\mathrm{IV}_{1}\) to the basis vector containing a" 1 " in the first bit position and " 0 " in the following 63 positions, i.e., \(\mathrm{IV}_{1 \text { bin }}=10000000\) 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 . The equivalent of this value in hexadecimal notation is 8000000000000000 .
c. Initializes the K-bit TEXT \(_{\mathrm{i}}\) (where \(\mathrm{i}=1\)..64) to the RESULT \(_{\mathrm{i}}\) values obtained from the Variable TEXT Known Answer Test.
d. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 5.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(i=1\) through 64:
a. Assign the value of the initialization vector \(\mathrm{IV}_{\mathrm{i}}\) to the input block \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b. Process \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the three DEA stages, resulting in a 64-bit output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\). This involves processing \(I_{i}\) through the first DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\), in the encrypt state using KEY1, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the second DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), in the decrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the third DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\), in the encrypt state using KEY3, resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
c. Calculate the K-bit \(\operatorname{RESULT}_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing the leftmost K -bits of \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the K-bit TEXT \({ }_{i}\), i.e., \(\left(\operatorname{RESULT}^{1}, \operatorname{RESULT}^{2}{ }_{i}, \ldots, \operatorname{RESULT}^{\mathrm{K}}{ }_{\mathrm{i}}\right)=\left(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}^{1} \oplus \operatorname{TEXT}^{1}{ }_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}^{2} \oplus\right.\) \(\mathrm{TEXT}^{2}{ }_{\mathrm{i}}, \ldots, \mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}^{\mathrm{K}} \oplus \mathrm{TEXT}^{\mathrm{K}}{ }_{\mathrm{i}}\).
d. Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV, K-bit TEXT \(_{\mathrm{i}}\), and the resulting K-bit RESULT \(_{\mathrm{i}}\) to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 2.
e. Assign a new value to \(\mathrm{IV}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) by setting it equal to the value of a basis vector with a " 1 " bit in position \(\mathrm{i}+1\), where \(\mathrm{i}+1=2, \ldots, 64\).
f. Assign a new value to \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) by setting it equal to the corresponding output from the TMOVS.

NOTE -- This processing continues until all RESULT values from the Variable TEXT Known Answer Test have been used as input. The output from the IUT should consist of 64 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 2.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values. The RESULT values should be all zeros.

\subsection*{5.4.1.3 The Variable KEY Known Answer Test - TCFB Mode}

Table 39 The Variable Key Known Answer Test - TCFB Mode


As summarized in Table 39, the Variable Key Known Answer Test for the TCFB mode of operation is performed as follows:
1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{1}\) to contain " 0 " in every significant bit except for a " 1 " in the first position, i.e., the 64 -bit KEY \(1_{1 \text { bin }}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{1}\) bin \(=\mathrm{KEY}_{1 \text { bin }}=100000000000000100000001000000010000000100000001\) 0000000100000001 . The equivalent of this value in hexadecimal notation is 8001 010101010101.

NOTE -- the parity bits are set to " 0 " or " 1 " to get odd parity.
b. Initializes the 64-bit IV parameter to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., \(\mathrm{IV}_{\text {hex }}=\) 0000000000000000 .
c. Initializes the K-bit TEXT to the constant hexadecimal value 0 . It is represented as K binary bits, where \(\mathrm{K}=1, \ldots, 64\), i.e., \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{\text {bin }}=0^{1} 0^{2}, \ldots, 0^{\mathrm{K}}\). This is then translated into hexadecimal.
d. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 2.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(\mathrm{i}=1\) to 56 :

NOTE -- 56 is the number of significant bits in a TDES key.
a. Assign the value of the initialization vector IV to the input block \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b. Process \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the three DEA stages, resulting in a 64-bit output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\). This involves processing \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the first DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\), in the encrypt state using KEY1 \(1_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the second DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the third DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\), in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
c. Calculate the K-bit \(\operatorname{RESULT}_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing the leftmost K -bits of \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the K-bit TEXT, i.e., \(\left(\right.\) RESULT \(^{1}\), RESULT \(\left.^{2}{ }_{i}, \ldots, \operatorname{RESULT}^{\mathrm{K}}{ }_{\mathrm{i}}\right)=\left(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}{ }_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus\right.\) TEXT \(^{1}, \mathrm{O}^{2}{ }_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus\) TEXT \(\left.^{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{O}^{\mathrm{K}}{ }_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \mathrm{TEXT}^{\mathrm{K}}\right)\).
d. Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV, K-bit TEXT, and the resulting K-bit RESULT \({ }_{i}\) to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 2.
e. Set \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) equal to the vector consisting of " 0 " in every significant bit position except for a single " 1 " bit in position \(i+1\). The parity bits contain " 1 " or " 0 " to make odd parity.

NOTE -- This processing should continue until every significant basis vector has been represented by the KEY parameters. The output from the IUT should consist of 56 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 2.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values found in Table A.2. For IUTs where K is less than 64, the leftmost K bits of output for each RESULT in Table A. 2 are used.

\subsection*{5.4.1.4 The Permutation Operation Known Answer Test - TCFB Mode}

Table 40 The Permutation Operation Known Answer Test - TCFB Mode
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline \multirow[t]{4}{*}{TMOVS:} & VS: Initialize & \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}(\) where \(\mathrm{i}=1 . .32)=32 \mathrm{KEY}\) values in Table A. 3 \\
\hline & & \(\mathrm{IV}=0000000000000000\) \\
\hline & & K-bit TEXT \(=0\) \\
\hline & Send & K-bit TEXT, IV, \(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{KEY}_{32}\) (Since all three keys are the same, these KEY values represent the values of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3.) \\
\hline \multirow[t]{10}{*}{IUT: \(\begin{aligned} & \\ & \\ & \\ & \\ & \text { Per } \\ & \text { Tr } \\ & \text { DE }\end{aligned}\)} & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{FOR i \(=1\) to 32} \\
\hline & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{\{} \\
\hline & \multirow[t]{5}{*}{\begin{tabular}{l|l} 
& \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) \\
Perform \\
Triple \\
DES:
\end{tabular}\(\quad\)\begin{tabular}{l}
\(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) \\
in \\
T \\
T \\
K
\end{tabular}} & \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{IV}\) \\
\hline & & \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) is read into TDEA and is encrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in TEMP1 \\
\hline & & TEMP1 is decrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in TEMP2 \\
\hline & & TEMP2 is encrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{i}\), resulting in \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) \\
\hline & & K-bit \(\operatorname{RESULT}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{LM}^{\mathrm{K}}\left(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\right) \oplus\) K-bit TEXT \\
\hline & & Send \(\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\left(\right.\) representing \(^{\mathrm{KEY}} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\) ), IV, K-bit TEXT, Kbit RESULT \({ }_{i}\) \\
\hline & \multicolumn{2}{|r|}{\(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\) corresponding \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) from TMOVS} \\
\hline & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{\}} \\
\hline \multicolumn{3}{|l|}{TMOVS: Compare results from each loop with known answers. Use Table A.3.} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

As summarized in Table 40, the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the TCFB mode of operation is performed as follows:
1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 with the 32 constant KEY values from Table A.3.
b. Initializes the 64-bit IV parameter to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., \(\mathrm{IV}_{\text {hex }}=\) 0000000000000000 .
c. Initializes the K-bit TEXT parameter to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{\text {hex }}=0000000000000000\).
d. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 8.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(\mathrm{i}=1\) through 32 :
a. Assign the value of the initialization vector IV to the input block \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b. Process \(I_{i}\) through the three DEA stages resulting in a 64 -bit output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\). This involves processing \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the first DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\), in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY1}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the second DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), in the decrypt state using \(K E Y 2_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the third DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\), in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
c. Calculate the K -bit \(\operatorname{RESULT}_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing the leftmost K -bits of \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the K-bit TEXT, i.e., \(\left(\operatorname{RESULT}^{1}{ }_{i}, \operatorname{RESULT}^{2}{ }_{i}, \ldots, \operatorname{RESULT}^{\mathrm{K}}{ }_{\mathrm{i}}\right)=\left(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}{ }^{1} \oplus\right.\) TEXT \(^{1}, \mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}{ }_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus\) \(\left.\mathrm{TEXT}^{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}^{\mathrm{K}} \oplus \mathrm{TEXT}^{\mathrm{K}}\right)\).
d. Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV, K-bit TEXT \({ }_{i}\), and the resulting K-bit RESULT \(_{i}\) to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 2.
e. Set \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) equal to the corresponding \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE -- The above processing should continue until all 32 KEY values are processed. The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 32 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 2.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values found in Table A.3. For IUTs where K is less than 64 , the leftmost K bits of output for each RESULT value in Table A. 3 are used.

\subsection*{5.4.1.5 The Substitution Table Known Answer Test - TCFB Mode}

Table 41 The Substitution Table Known Answer Test - TCFB Mode
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline \multirow[t]{4}{*}{TMOVS:} & Initialize & \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}(\) where \(\mathrm{i}=1 . .19)=19 \mathrm{KEY}\) values in Table A. 4 \\
\hline & & \(\mathrm{IV}_{\mathrm{i}}(\) where \(\mathrm{i}=1 . .19)=19\) corresponding TEXT values in Table A. 4 \\
\hline & & K-bit TEXT \(=0\) \\
\hline & Send & K-bit TEXT, 19, \(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{IV}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}, \mathrm{IV}_{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{KEY}_{19}, \mathrm{IV}_{19}\) (Since all three keys are the same, these key values represent the values of KEY1, KEY2 and KEY3.) \\
\hline \multirow[t]{11}{*}{IUT:} & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{FOR i \(=1\) to 19} \\
\hline & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{\{} \\
\hline & \multirow{8}{*}{Perform Triple DES:} & \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{IV}_{\mathrm{i}}\) \\
\hline & & \(I_{i}\) is read into TDEA and is encrypted by DEA \({ }_{1}\) using KEY \(1_{i}\), resulting in TEMP1 \\
\hline & & TEMP1 is decrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in TEMP2 \\
\hline & & TEMP2 is encrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) \\
\hline & & \[
\text { K-bit } \operatorname{RESULT}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{LM}^{\mathrm{K}}\left(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\right) \oplus \text { K-bit TEXT }
\] \\
\hline & & Send i, \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) (representing \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) ), \(\mathrm{IV}_{\mathrm{i}}\), K-bit TEXT, K-bit RESULT \({ }_{i}\) \\
\hline & & KEY1 \(1_{i+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{2}{ }_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}^{\text {i }+1}\) \(=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) from TMOVS \\
\hline & & \(I V_{i+1}=\) corresponding DATA \(_{i+1}\) from TMOVS \\
\hline & \} & \\
\hline TMOVS: & Compare & esults from each loop with known answers. Use Table A.4. \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

As summarized in Table 41, the Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the TCFB mode of operation is performed as follows:
1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY-IV pairs with the 19 constant KEY-DATA values from Table A.4. The DATA values are assigned to the values of the initialization vectors IV. The KEY value indicates the values of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3, i.e., KEY1=KEY2=KEY3.
b. Initializes the K-bit TEXT parameter to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , where \(\mathrm{K}=1, \ldots, 64\), i.e., \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{\text {bin }}=0^{1}, 0^{2}, \ldots, 0^{\mathrm{K}}\).
c. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 11.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(\mathrm{i}=1\) through 19 :
a. Assign the value of the initialization vector \(\mathrm{IV}_{\mathrm{i}}\) to the input block \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b. Process \(I_{i}\) through the three DEA stages resulting in a 64 -bit output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\). This involves processing \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the first DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\), in the encrypt state using KEY1 \(1_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the second DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the third DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\), in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
c. Calculate the K-bit RESULT \(\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing the leftmost K -bits of \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\), \(\operatorname{LM}^{\mathrm{K}}\left(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\right)\), with the K-bit TEXT, i.e., \(\left(\operatorname{RESULT}^{1}{ }_{\mathrm{i}}, \operatorname{RESULT}^{2}{ }_{\mathrm{i}}, \ldots, \operatorname{RESULT}^{\mathrm{K}}{ }_{\mathrm{i}}\right)=\left(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}^{1}\right.\) \(\left.\oplus \mathrm{TEXT}^{1}, \mathrm{O}^{2}{ }_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \mathrm{TEXT}^{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}^{\mathrm{K}} \oplus \mathrm{TEXT}^{\mathrm{K}}\right)\).
d. Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV, K-bit TEXT \({ }_{i}\), and the resulting K-bit RESULT \({ }_{i}\) to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 2.
e. Set \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) equal to the corresponding \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) supplied by the TMOVS.
f. Set \(\mathrm{IV}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) equal to the corresponding DATA \(_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE -- The above processing should continue until all 19 KEY-DATA are processed. The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 19 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 2.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values found in Table A.4. For IUTs where K is less than 64 , the leftmost K bits of output for each RESULT value in the Table A. 4 are used.

\subsection*{5.4.2 The Monte Carlo Tests - TCFB Mode}

The Monte Carlo Tests required to validate an IUT for the TCFB mode of operation are determined by the process or processes allowed by an IUT. The K-bit TCFB Monte Carlo Test for the Encryption Process is successfully completed if an IUT supports the encryption process of the TCFB mode of operation. The K-bit TCFB Monte Carlo Test for the Decryption Process is successfully completed if an IUT supports the decryption process.

\subsection*{5.4.2.1 The Monte Carlo Test for the Encryption Process - TCFB Mode}

Table 42 The Monte Carlo Test for the Encryption Process - TCFB Mode


Record K-bit \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{I}_{0}\)
Send i, KEY \(1_{i}\), KEY \(_{i}\), KEY \(_{i}\), I \(_{0}\), K-bit \(\mathrm{P}_{0}\), K-bit C \({ }_{\mathrm{j}}\)
Concatenate enough Cs together to get (length(KEY)*3) bits (192 bits)
\(K E Y 1_{i+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{1} \oplus\) bits \(129-192\) of C
IF \(\left(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}\right.\) and \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) are independent and \(\left.\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\right)\) or \(\left(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\right.\), \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) are independent),
\[
K E Y 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}=K E Y 2_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \text { bits } 65-128 \text { of } \mathrm{C}
\]

\section*{ELSE}
\[
K E Y 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \text { bits 129-192 of C }
\]
\(\operatorname{IF}\left(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\right)\) or \(\left(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\right.\) and \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) are independent and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{1}\) ),
\[
\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \text { bits 129-192 of C }
\]

\section*{ELSE}
\[
\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \text { bits 1-64 of } \mathrm{C}
\]

K-bit \(\mathrm{P}_{0}=\mathrm{LM}^{\mathrm{K}}\left(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}\right)\)
\(\mathrm{I}_{0}=\mathrm{RM}^{(64-\mathrm{K})}\left(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}\right) \|\) K-bit \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}\)
\}
TMOVS: Check the IUT's output for correctness.

As summarized in Table 42, the Monte Carlo Test for the TCFB Encryption Process is performed as follows:
1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3, the initialization vector IV, and the plaintext \(P\) variables. The IV, and KEYs consist of 64 bits each. The \(P\) is represented as K-bits, where \(\mathrm{K}=1, \ldots, 64\).
b. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 21.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(\mathrm{i}=0\) through 399:
a. If \(\mathrm{i}=0\) (if this is the first time through this loop), assign the value of the initialization vector IV to the input block \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b. Record the current values of the output loop number i, KEY1 \(1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), and the K-bit \(\mathrm{P}_{0}\).
c. Perform the following for \(\mathrm{j}=0\) through 9999:
1) Using the corresponding \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{i}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{i}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{3}\) values, process \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}\) through the three DEA stages resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}\). This involves processing \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}\) through the first DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\), in the encrypt state using KEY \(1_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the second DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the third DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\), in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}\).
2) Calculate the K -bit \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}\) by exclusive-ORing the leftmost K -bits of \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}\), \(L^{K}\left(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}\right)\), with the K-bit \(\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}}\), i.e., \(\left(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}^{1}, \mathrm{C}^{2}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}, \ldots, \mathrm{C}^{\mathrm{K}}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}\right)=\left(\mathrm{O}^{1}{ }_{\mathrm{j}} \oplus \mathrm{P}^{1}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}^{2} \oplus \mathrm{P}^{2}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}, \ldots\right.\), \(\mathrm{O}^{\mathrm{K}}{ }_{\mathrm{j}} \oplus \mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}}^{\mathrm{K}}\) ).
3) Prepare for loop \(\mathrm{j}+1\) by doing the following:
a) Assign the K -bit \(\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}+1}\) with the value of the leftmost K -bits of the \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}\), i.e., \(\left(P^{1}{ }_{j+1}, P^{2}{ }_{j+1}, \ldots, P^{K}{ }_{j+1}\right)=\left(I^{1}, I_{j}^{2}, \ldots, I_{j}^{K}\right)\).
b) Assign \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}+1}\) with the value of the concatenation of the rightmost (64\(\underset{\text { K b bits of } I_{j}}{ }\) with the K-bit \(C_{j}\), i.e., \(\left(I^{1}{ }_{j+1}, I_{j+1}^{2}, \ldots, I^{64}{ }_{j+1}\right)=\left(I^{[K+1]}{ }_{j}\right.\), \(\left.I^{[K+2]}{ }_{j}, \ldots, I^{64}{ }_{j}, C^{1}, C^{2}, \ldots, C^{K}{ }_{j}\right)\).
d. Record the K-bit \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}\) and \(\mathrm{I}_{0}\).
e. Forward all recorded values for this loop, as specified in Output Type 6, to the TMOVS.
f. In preparation for the next output loop:
1) Assign new values to the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3. This is accomplished by exclusive-ORing C with the KEY value to obtain the new KEY. If the length of the \(C\) is less than 64 (the length of a DES key), then \(C\) should be expanded in length to \(64 * 3\) (to correspond to the combined lengths of KEY1+KEY2+KEY3) before forming the new KEY values. This expansion should be accomplished by concatenating X of the most current Cs together to obtain 192 bits of C . For example, if the length of the C is 50 bits ( \(K=50\) ), the expanded \(\mathrm{C}=\left(\mathrm{C}^{9}{ }_{9996}, \ldots, \mathrm{C}^{50}{ }_{9996}, \mathrm{C}^{1}{ }_{9997}, \ldots, \mathrm{C}^{50}{ }_{9997}\right.\), \(\left.\mathrm{C}^{1}{ }_{9998}, \ldots, \mathrm{C}^{50}{ }_{9998}, \mathrm{C}^{1}{ }_{9999}, \ldots, \mathrm{C}^{50}{ }_{9999}\right)\).

Bits 129-192 of the expanded C will be exclusive-ORed with KEY1 to form the new KEY1.

The calculation of the new KEY2 and KEY3 are based on the values of the keys. . If \(K E Y 1_{i}\) and \(K E Y 2_{i}\) are independent and \(K E Y 3_{i}=K E Y 1_{i}\), or KEY1, KEY2 and KEY3 are independent, the new KEY2 should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current KEY2 with bits 65-128 of the expanded C. If KEY1=KEY2=KEY3, the current KEY2 will be exclusiveORed with bits 129-192 of the expanded C to calculate the new KEY2.

If KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 are independent, the new KEY3 should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current KEY3 with bits 1-64 of the expanded C. Otherwise, the current KEY3 will be exclusive-ORed with bits 129-192 of the expanded C to calculate the new KEY3.
2) Assign a new value to the \(K\)-bit \(P_{0}\). The \(K\)-bit \(P_{0}\) should be assigned the value of the leftmost K -bits of the current \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}\), i.e., \(\left(\mathrm{P}^{1}{ }_{0}, \mathrm{P}^{2}{ }_{0}, \ldots, \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{K}}{ }_{0}\right)=\left(\mathrm{I}^{1}, \mathrm{I}^{2}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}, \ldots, \mathrm{I}^{\mathrm{K}}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}\right)\). Note \(\mathrm{j}=9999\).
3) Assign a new value to \(\mathrm{I}_{0}\). \(\mathrm{I}_{0}\) should be assigned the value of the rightmost (64-K) bits of the current \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}\) concatenated with the current K -bit \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}\), i.e., ( \(\mathrm{I}^{1}{ }_{0}\), \(\left.I^{2}{ }_{0}, \ldots, I^{64}{ }_{0}\right)=\left(I^{[K+1]}{ }_{j}, I^{[K+2]}{ }_{j}, \ldots, I^{64}{ }_{j}, C^{1}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}, \ldots, \mathrm{C}^{\mathrm{K}}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}\right)\). Note \(\mathrm{j}=9999\).

NOTE -- the new \(P\) and \(I\) should be denoted as \(P_{0}\) and \(I_{0}\) because these values are used for the first pass through the inner loop when \(\mathrm{j}=0\).

NOTE -- The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 400 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 6.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values.

Table 43 The Monte Carlo Test for the Decryption Process - TCFB Mode


```

KEY2 }\mp@subsup{}{\textrm{i}}{2},\mp@subsup{\textrm{KEY}}{\textrm{i}}{}\mathrm{ are independent),
KEY2 }\mp@subsup{\textrm{i}}{1+1}{}=\mp@subsup{\textrm{KEY}}{\textrm{i}}{}\oplus\mathrm{ bits 65-128 of P
ELSE
KEY2 i+1 = KEY2 }\mp@subsup{\mp@code{i}}{\textrm{i}}{}\oplus\mathrm{ bits 129-192 of P
IF (KEY1 }\mp@subsup{1}{\textrm{i}}{=KEY2}\mp@subsup{2}{\textrm{i}}{=}=\textrm{KEY}\mp@subsup{3}{\textrm{i}}{2})\mathrm{ or (KEY1 }\mp@subsup{}{\textrm{i}}{}\mathrm{ and KEY2 }\mp@subsup{2}{\textrm{i}}{}\mathrm{ are independent and
KEY3 }\mp@subsup{\textrm{i}}{= KEY1i}{i})
KEY3 i+1 = KEY3 }\mp@subsup{\textrm{K}}{\textrm{i}}{}\oplus\mathrm{ bits 129-192 of P
ELSE
KEY3 }\mp@subsup{}{i+1}{}=\mp@subsup{KESY3}{i}{}\oplus\mathrm{ bits 1-64 of P
I
K-bit Con = LM }\mp@subsup{}{}{\textrm{K}}(\mp@subsup{\textrm{O}}{\textrm{j}}{}

```
\}

TMOVS: Check the IUT's output for correctness.

As summarized in Table 43, the Monte Carlo Test for the TCFB Decryption Process is performed as follows:
1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3, the initialization vector IV, and the ciphertext C variables. The IV and KEYs consist of 64 bits each. The C is represented as K -bits, where \(\mathrm{K}=1, \ldots, 64\).
b. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 21.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(\mathrm{i}=0\) through 399:
a. If \(\mathrm{i}=0\) (if this is the first time through this loop), assign the value of the initialization vector \(I V\) to the input block \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b. Record the current values of the output loop number i, KEY1 \(1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), and the K-bit \(\mathrm{C}_{0}\).
c. Perform the following for \(\mathrm{j}=0\) through 9999:
1) Using the corresponding \(K E Y 1_{i}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) values, process \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}\) through the three DEA stages resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}\). This involves processing \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}\) through the first DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\), in the encrypt state using KEY \(1_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the second DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the third DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\), in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}\).
2) Calculate the \(K\)-bit \(P_{j}\) by exclusive-ORing the leftmost \(K\)-bits of \(\mathrm{O}_{j}\), \(\mathrm{LM}^{\mathrm{K}}\left(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}\right)\), with the K-bit \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}\), i.e., \(\left(\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{P}^{2}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}, \ldots, \mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}}^{\mathrm{K}}\right)=\left(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}^{1} \oplus \mathrm{C}^{1}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{O}^{2}{ }_{\mathrm{j}} \oplus \mathrm{C}^{2}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}, \ldots\right.\), \(\mathrm{O}^{\mathrm{K}}{ }_{\mathrm{j}} \oplus \mathrm{C}^{\mathrm{K}}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}\) ).
3) Prepare for loop \(\mathrm{j}+1\) by doing the following:
a) Assign \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}+1}\) with the value of the concatenation of the rightmost (64K) bits of \(I_{j}\) with the K-bit \(C_{j}\), i.e., \(\left(I^{1}{ }_{j+1}, I_{j+1}^{2}, \ldots, I^{64}{ }_{j+1}\right)=\left(I^{[K+1]}{ }_{j}\right.\), \(I^{[K+2]}{ }_{j}, \ldots, I^{64}{ }_{j}, \mathrm{C}^{1}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}^{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}^{\mathrm{K}}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}\).
b) Assign the K-bit \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}+1}\) with the value of the leftmost K -bits of the \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}\), i.e., \(\left(\mathrm{C}^{1}{ }_{\mathrm{j}+1}, \mathrm{C}^{2}{ }_{\mathrm{j}+1}, \ldots, \mathrm{C}^{\mathrm{K}}{ }_{\mathrm{j}+1}\right)=\left(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{O}^{2}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}, \ldots, \mathrm{O}^{\mathrm{K}}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}\right)\).
d. Record the K-bit \(\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}}\) and \(\mathrm{I}_{0}\).
e. Forward all recorded values for this loop, as specified in Output Type 6, to the TMOVS.
f. In preparation for the next output loop:
1) Assign new values to the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3. This is accomplished by exclusive-ORing P with the KEY value to obtain the new KEY. If the length of the P is less than 64 (the length of a DES key), then P should be expanded in length to \(64 * 3\) (to correspond to the combined lengths of KEY1+KEY2+KEY3) before forming the new KEY values. This expansion should be accomplished by concatenating \(X\) of the most current Ps together to obtain 192 bits of \(P\). For example, if the length of the \(P\) is 50 bits \((K=50)\), the expanded \(\mathrm{P}=\left(\mathrm{P}^{9}{ }_{9996}, \ldots, \mathrm{P}^{50}{ }_{9996}, \mathrm{P}^{1}{ }_{9997}, \ldots, \mathrm{P}^{50}{ }_{9997}, \mathrm{P}^{1}{ }_{9998}, \ldots, \mathrm{P}^{50}{ }_{9998}\right.\), \(\mathrm{P}^{1}{ }_{9999}, \ldots, \mathrm{P}^{50}{ }_{9999}\) ).

Bits 129-192 of the expanded P will be exclusive-ORed with KEY1 to form the new KEY1.

The calculation of the new KEY2 and KEY3 are based on the values of the keys. . If \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\) and \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) are independent and \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{i}=\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\), or KEY1, KEY2 and KEY3 are independent, the new KEY2 should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current KEY2 with bits 65-128 of the expanded P. If KEY1=KEY2=KEY3, the current KEY2 will be exclusiveORed with bits 129-192 of the expanded P to calculate the new KEY2.

If KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 are independent, the new KEY3 should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current KEY3 with bits 1-64 of the expanded P. Otherwise, the current KEY3 will be exclusive-ORed with bits 129-192 of the expanded \(P\) to calculate the new KEY3.
2) Assign a new value to \(I_{0} . I_{0}\) should be assigned the value of the rightmost (64-K) bits of the current \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}\) concatenated with the current K -bit \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}\), i.e., ( \(\mathrm{I}^{1}{ }_{0}\), \(\left.I^{2}, \ldots, I^{64}{ }_{0}\right)=\left(I^{[K+1]}{ }_{j}, I^{[K+2]}{ }_{j}, \ldots, I^{64}, C^{1}{ }_{j}, C^{2}, \ldots, C^{K}{ }_{j}\right)\). Note \(j=9999\).
3) Assign a new value to the K -bit \(\mathrm{C}_{0}\). The K -bit \(\mathrm{C}_{0}\) should be assigned the value of the leftmost K -bits of the current \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}\), i.e., \(\left(\mathrm{C}^{1}{ }_{0}, \mathrm{C}^{2}{ }_{0}, \ldots, \mathrm{C}^{\mathrm{K}}{ }_{0}\right)=\left(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}^{1}\right.\), \(\mathrm{O}^{2}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}, \ldots, \mathrm{O}^{\mathrm{K}}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}\). Note \(\mathrm{j}=9999\).

NOTE -- the new \(C\) and \(I\) should be denoted as \(C_{0}\) and \(I_{0}\) because these values are used for the first pass through the inner loop when \(\mathrm{j}=0\).

NOTE -- The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 400 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 6.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values.

\subsection*{5.5 The Cipher Feedback (CFB-P) Mode}

The IUTs that implement the Cipher Block Feedback - Pipelined (CFB-P) mode of operation are validated by successfully completing (1) a set of Known Answer tests applicable to both IUTs supporting encryption and/or decryption and (2) a Monte Carlo test designed for use with both the encryption process and the decryption process.

The pipelined configuration is intended for systems equipped with multiple DEA processors. By pipelining the data, throughput is improved and propagation delay is minimized by initializing the three individual DEA stages and then simultaneously clocking them. Thus, with each clock cycle, data is processed by each \(\mathrm{DEA}_{i}\) stage and passed onward to the output buffer or the next stage so that idle \(\mathrm{DEA}_{\mathrm{i}}\) stages are minimized.

The processing for each Known Answer test and Monte Carlo test is broken down into clock cycles \(\mathrm{T} 1, \mathrm{~T} 2, \mathrm{~T} 3, \ldots\). Within each clock cycle, the processing occurring on each active DEA is discussed. For convenience, let KEY1 represent the key used on processor \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\), KEY2 represent the key used on processor \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), and KEY3 represent the key used on processor \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\).

The process of validating an IUT which only supports the K-bit TCFB-P mode in either the encryption and/or decryption processes involves the successful completion of the following six tests:
1. The Variable Text Known Answer Test - K-bit TCFB-P mode
2. The Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test - K-bit TCFB-P mode
3. The Variable Key Known Answer Test - K-bit TCFB-P mode
4. The Permutation Operation Known Answer Test - K-bit TCFB-P mode
5. The Substitution Table Known Answer Test - K-bit TCFB-P mode
6. The Monte Carlo Test - K-bit TCFB-P mode

NOTE -- for IUTs, \(K\) can range from 1 to 64 bits.
The notation \(\mathrm{LM}^{\mathrm{K}}(\mathrm{A})\) refers to the leftmost K bits of A .
An explanation of the tests follows.

\subsection*{5.5.1 The Known Answer Tests - TCFB-P Mode}

The K-bit TCFB-P mode has only one set of Known Answer tests which are used regardless of process, i.e., the same set of Known Answer tests are used for IUTs supporting the encryption and/or decryption processes.

Throughout this section, TEXT and RESULT will refer to different variables depending on whether the encryption or decryption process is being tested. If the IUT performs TCFB-P encryption, TEXT refers to plaintext, and RESULT refers to ciphertext. If the IUT performs TCFB-P decryption, TEXT refers to ciphertext, and RESULT refers to plaintext.

\subsection*{5.5.1.1 The Variable TEXT Known Answer Test - TCFB-P Mode}

Table 44 The Variable TEXT Known Answer Test - TCFB-P Mode
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline \begin{tabular}{l}
TMOVS: Initialize \\
Send
\end{tabular} & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { KEY1 }=\mathrm{KEY} 2=\mathrm{KEY} 3=0101010101010101 \text { (odd parity set) } \\
& \mathrm{IV} 1_{1}=8000000000000000 \\
& \mathrm{IV} 2_{1}=\mathrm{D} 555555555555555 \text { (based on specifications in ANSI } \\
& \text { X9.52-1998) } \\
& \mathrm{IV} 3_{1}=2 \text { AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA (based on specifications in } \\
& \text { ANSI X9.52-1998) }^{\text {K-bit TEXT }=0} \\
& \text { KEY (representing KEY1, } \mathrm{KEY} 2 \text {, and } \mathrm{KEY} 3), \mathrm{IV} 1_{1}, \mathrm{IV} 2_{1}, \mathrm{IV} 3_{1} \text {, } \\
& \text { K-bit TEXT }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline \begin{tabular}{l}
IUT: \(\quad\) FOR \(\mathrm{i}=\) \\
Perform \\
Triple DES:
\end{tabular} & \begin{tabular}{l}
With the feedback path disconnected:
\[
\mathrm{I} 1=\mathrm{IV} 1_{\mathrm{i}}
\] \\
I1 is read into TDEA and is encrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) using KEY1, resulting in TEMP1 \(1_{1}\) \\
T2: \(\quad \mathrm{I} 2=\mathrm{IV} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) \\
I2is read into TDEA and is encrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) using KEY1, resulting in TEMP2 \(1_{1}\) \\
TEMP \(1_{1}\) is decrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) using KEY2, resulting in TEMP1 \({ }_{2}\) \\
T3: \(\quad \mathrm{I} 3=\mathrm{IV} 3_{i}\) \\
I3 is read into TDEA and is encrypted by DEA \({ }_{1}\) using KEY1, resulting in TEMP3 \({ }_{1}\) \\
TEMP \(2_{1}\) is decrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) using KEY2, resulting in TEMP \(2_{2}\) \\
Connect the feedback path: \\
TEMP \(1_{2}\) is encrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) using KEY3, resulting in \(\mathrm{O} 1_{i}\)
\end{tabular} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline & & T4: & \begin{tabular}{l}
K-bit RESULT \(1_{i}=\) LM \(^{\mathrm{K}}\left(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\right) \oplus\) K-bit TEXT \\
TEMP3 \(1_{1}\) is decrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) using KEY2, resulting in TEMP \(_{2}\) \\
TEMP2 \(2_{2}\) is encrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) using KEY3, resulting in \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\text {i }}\) \\
K-bit RESULT \(2_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{LM}^{\mathrm{K}}\left(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\right) \oplus\) K-bit TEXT \\
\(\mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\) is encrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) using KEY3, resulting in \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) \\
K-bit \(\operatorname{RESULT}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{LM}^{\mathrm{K}}\left(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\right) \oplus\) K-bit TEXT
\end{tabular} \\
\hline & & & d i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), I1, I2, I3, K-bit K, K-bit RESULT \(1_{i}\), K-bit RESULT2 \({ }_{i}\), K-bit RESULT3 \({ }_{i}\) \\
\hline & & IV1 & \({ }_{\text {i+1 }}=\) basis vector where single "1" bit is in position i+1 \\
\hline & & & \(\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{i} 1}=\mathrm{IV} 1_{\mathrm{i}}+\mathrm{R}_{1}\) mod \(2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{1}=5555555555555555\) \\
\hline & & & \(\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{IV1} 1_{\mathrm{i}}+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{2}=\) AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA \\
\hline & \} & & \\
\hline TMOVS: & Compar answers & & SULT1, RESULT2, and RESULT3 from each loop with known \\
\hline & Use K b & & output in Table A.9. \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

As summarized in Table 44, the Variable TEXT Known Answer Test for the TCFB-P mode of operation is performed as follows:

\section*{1. The TMOVS:}
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 to the constant hexadecimal value 0 with odd parity set, i.e., \(K E Y 1_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 2_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 3_{\text {hex }}=010101\) 0101010101.
b. Initializes the 3 initialization vectors accordingly: IV1 \(1_{1}\) is set to the basis vector containing a" 1 " in the first bit position and " 0 " in the following 63 positions, i.e., \(\mathrm{IV}_{1}\) bin \(=10000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000\) 00000000 . The equivalent of this value in hexadecimal notation is 8000000000 000000 . Based on specifications in ANSI X9.52-1998, IV2 \({ }_{1}\) is computed by the following equation: \(\mathrm{IV} 1_{1}+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{1}=5555555555555555\). In hexadecimal, this equates to D5 555555555555 55. And IV3 \({ }_{1}\) is computed by the equation \(\mathrm{IV} 1_{1}+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{2}=A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A\). In hexadecimal, this equates to 2 A AA AA AA AA AA AA AA.
c. Initializes the K-bit TEXT parameter to the constant hexadecimal value 0, i.e., \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{\text {hex }}=0000000000000000\).
d. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 13.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(i=1\) through 64:
a. With the feedback path disconnected:
1) At time T 1 :
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector \(\mathrm{IV} 1_{i}\) to the input block I1.
b) Process I1 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using KEY1, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1 \({ }_{1}\).

At time T2:
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector IV2 \({ }_{i}\) to the input block I2.
b) Process I2 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using KEY1, resulting in intermediate value TEMP 2 .
c) \(\quad \mathrm{TEMP} 1_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1 \({ }_{2}\).

At time T3:
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector \(\operatorname{IV} 3_{i}\) to the input block I3.
b) Process I3 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using KEY1, resulting in intermediate value TEMP3 \({ }_{1}\).
c) TEMP \(2_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2 \({ }_{2}\).

Connect the feedback path:
d) TEMP \(1_{2}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using KEY3, resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O1}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
e) Calculate the K-bit RESULT1 \(1_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing the leftmost K bits of \(\mathrm{O} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the K-bit TEXT.

At time T4:
a) \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using KEY3, resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Calculate the K-bit RESULT \(_{2}\), by exclusive-ORing the leftmost K bits of \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the K-bit TEXT.
c) \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP3 \(2_{2}\).

At time T5:
a) \(\quad\) TEMP \(3_{2}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using KEY3, resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Calculate the K-bit RESULT3 \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing the leftmost Kbits of \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the K-bit TEXT.
b. Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV1 \(1_{\mathrm{i}}\), IV \(2_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{IV}_{\mathrm{i}}\), K-bit TEXT, K-bit RESULT \(1_{\mathrm{i}}\), K-bit RESULT \(_{\mathrm{i}}\), and K-bit RESULT3 \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}\), to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 7.
c. Retain the K-bit RESULT1, RESULT2, and RESULT3 values for use with the Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test for the TCFB-P Mode (Section 5.5.1.2).
d. Assign a new value to the IV variables. IV1 \(1_{i+1}\) is set to the value of a basis vector with a " 1 " bit in position \(i+1\), where \(i+1=2, \ldots, 64\). IV \(2_{i+1}\) is set to the value of \(I V 1_{i+1}+\) \(R_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(R_{1}=5555555555555555\). And \(I V 3_{i+1}\) is set to \(I V 1_{i+1}+R_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{2}=\) AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA.

NOTE -- This continues until every possible basis vector has been represented by the IV1, i.e., 64 times. The output from the IUT should consist of 64 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 7.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values found in Table A.9. For IUTs where K is less than 64 , the leftmost K bits of output for each RESULT value in the Table A. 9 are used.

\subsection*{5.5.1.2 The Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test - TCFB-P Mode}

Table 45 The Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test - TCFB-P Mode

\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { K-bit } \operatorname{RESULT}_{1}=\operatorname{LM}^{\mathrm{K}}\left(\mathrm{O} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\right) \oplus \text { K-bit TEXT } 1_{\mathrm{i}} \\
& \text { T4: } \quad \mathrm{TEMP3}_{1} \text { is decrypted by } \mathrm{DEA}_{2} \text { using KEY2, resulting in } \\
& \text { TEMP3 }_{2} \\
& \text { TEMP2 } 2_{2} \text { is encrypted by } \mathrm{DEA}_{3} \text { using KEY3, resulting in } \mathrm{O} 2_{i} \\
& \text { K-bit } \text { RESULT }_{2}=\text { LM }^{\mathrm{K}}\left(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\right) \oplus \text { K-bit TEXT } 2_{\mathrm{i}} \\
& \text { T5: } \text { TEMP3 }_{2} \text { is encrypted by } \mathrm{DEA}_{3} \text { using KEY3, resulting in } \mathrm{O} 3_{i} \\
& \text { K-bit } \operatorname{RESULT}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{LM}^{\mathrm{K}}\left(\mathrm{O} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\right) \oplus \text { K-bit TEXT3 }{ }_{\mathrm{i}} \\
& \text { Send i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), I1, I2, I3, K-bit } \\
& \text { TEXT }_{1} \text {, , K-bit TEXT2 }{ }_{\mathrm{i}} \text {, K-bit TEXT3 }{ }_{\mathrm{i}} \text {, K-bit RESULT } 1_{\mathrm{i}} \text {, K-bit RESULT }{ }_{\mathrm{i}} \text {, } \\
& \text { K-bit RESULT3 }{ }_{i} \\
& \text { IV } 1_{i+1}=\text { basis vector where single " } 1 \text { " bit is in position } \mathrm{i}+1 \\
& \mathrm{IV} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{IV} 1_{\mathrm{i}}+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64} \text { where } \mathrm{R}_{1}=5555555555555555 \\
& \mathrm{IV} 3_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{IV} 1_{\mathrm{i}}+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64} \text { where } \mathrm{R}_{2}=\text { AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA } \\
& \text { K-bit TEXTr }{ }_{i+1}(\text { where } r=1 . .3)=\text { corresponding K-bit } \text { RESULTr }_{i+1} \text { value } \\
& \text { from the TMOVS } \\
& \text { \} } \\
& \text { TMOVS: Compare RESULT1, RESULT2, and RESULT3 from each loop with known answers, } \\
& \text { They should be all zeros. }
\end{aligned}
\]

As summarized in Table 45 the Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test for the TCFB-P mode of operation is performed as follows:

\section*{1. The TMOVS:}
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 to the constant hexadecimal value 0 with odd parity set, i.e., \(K E Y 1_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 2_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 3_{\text {hex }}=0101010101010101\).
b. Initializes the 3 initialization vectors accordingly: IV1 \(_{1}\) is set to the basis vector containing a" 1 " in the first bit position and " 0 " in the following 63 positions, i.e., \(\mathrm{IV}_{1 \text { bin }}=\) 10000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000 . The equivalent of this value in hexadecimal notation is 800000000000 0000 . Based on specifications in ANSI X9.52-1998, IV2 \({ }_{1}\) is computed by the following equation: \(\mathrm{IV} 1_{1}+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{1}=555555555555555\). In hexadecimal, this equates to D5 55555555555555 . And \(\operatorname{IV} 3_{1}\) is computed by the equation IV1 \(+\mathrm{R}_{2}\)
\(\bmod 2^{64}\) where \(R_{2}=A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A . ~ I n ~ h e x a d e c i m a l\), this equates to \(2 A A A\) AA AA AA AA AA AA.
c. Initializes the K-bit \(\operatorname{TEXTr}_{\mathrm{i}}\) (where \(\mathrm{r}=1, \ldots, 3\) and \(\mathrm{i}=1, \ldots, 64\) ) to the RESULTr \(_{\mathrm{i}}\) obtained from the Variable TEXT Known Answer Test.
d. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 15.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(\mathrm{i}=1\) through 64:
a. With the feedback path disconnected:
1) At time T1:
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector \(\operatorname{IV} 1_{i}\) to the input block I1.
b) Process I1 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using KEY1, resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(1_{1}\).

At time T2:
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector IV2 \({ }_{i}\) to the input block I2.
b) Process I2 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using KEY1, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2 \({ }_{1}\).
c) TEMP \(1_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1 \({ }_{2}\).

At time T3:
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector \(\operatorname{IV} 3_{i}\) to the input block I3.
b) Process I3 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using KEY1, resulting in intermediate value TEMP3 \(1_{1}\).
c) TEMP \(2_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2 \({ }_{2}\).

Connect the feedback path:
d) \(\quad\) TEMP \(1_{2}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using KEY3, resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O1}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
e) Calculate the K-bit RESULT1 \(1_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing the leftmost K bits of \(\mathrm{O} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the K-bit TEXT \(1_{\mathrm{i}}\).

At time T4:
a) \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using KEY3, resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Calculate the K-bit RESULT2 \(2_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing the leftmost K bits of \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the K-bit TEXT2 \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}\).
c) \(\quad\) TEMP \(3_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP3 \(2_{2}\).

At time T5:
a) \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using KEY3, resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O3}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Calculate the K-bit RESULT3 \(3_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing the leftmost K bits of \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the K-bit \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b. Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV1 \(1_{\mathrm{i}}\), IV \(2_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{IV}_{\mathrm{i}}\), K-bit TEXT \(1_{\mathrm{i}}\), K-bit TEXT \(2_{\mathrm{i}}\), K-bit TEXT3 \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}\), K-bit RESULT \(_{1}\), K-bit RESULT \(2_{i}\), and K-bit RESULT3 \({ }_{i}\), to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 3.
c. Assign a new value to the IV variables. IV1 \(1_{i+1}\) is set to the value of a basis vector with a " 1 " bit in position \(\mathrm{i}+1\), where \(\mathrm{i}+1=2, \ldots, 64\). IV2 \({ }_{i+1}\) is set to the value of IV1 \(1_{i+1}\) \(+R_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(R_{1}=5555555555555555\). And IV3 \({ }_{i+1}\) is set to \(I V 1_{i+1}+R_{2} \bmod\) \(2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{2}=A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A\).
d. Assign a new value to the K-bit TEXT \(1_{i+1}\), K-bit TEXT \(_{\mathrm{i}+1}\), and K-bit TEXT3 \({ }_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) by setting it equal to the corresponding output from the TMOVS.

NOTE -- This continues until every RESULT1, RESULT2, and RESULT3 value from the Variable TEXT Known Answer Test has been used as input. The output from the IUT should consist of 64 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 3.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to known values. The RESULT1, RESULT2, and RESULT3 values should be all zeros.

\subsection*{5.5.1.3 The Variable KEY Known Answer Test - TCFB-P Mode}

Table 46 The Variable KEY Known Answer Test - TCFB-P Mode



As summarized in Table 46, the Variable KEY Known Answer Test for the TCFB-P Mode is performed as follows:
1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters \(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{1}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{1}\) to contain " 0 " in every significant bit except for a " 1 " in the first position, i.e., the 64 -bit \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{1 \text { bin }}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{1}\) bin \(=\mathrm{KEY}_{1 \text { bin }}=100000000000000100000001000000010000000100000001\) 0000000100000001 . The equivalent of this value in hexadecimal notation is 8001 010101010101.

NOTE -- the parity bits are set to " 0 " or " 1 " to get odd parity.
b. Initializes the 3 initialization vectors accordingly: IV1 is assigned the value 0 , i.e., IV1 hex \(=0000000000000000\). Based on specifications in ANSI X9.52-1998, IV2 is computed by the following equation: IV1 \(+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{1}=5555555555555555\). In hexadecimal, this equates to 5555555555555555. And IV3 is computed by the equation IV1 \(+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{2}=A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A\). In hexadecimal, this equates to AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA.
c. Initializes the K-bit TEXT parameter to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{\text {hex }}=0000000000000000\).
d. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 13.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(i=1\) through 64:
a. With the feedback path disconnected:
1) At time T 1 :
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector IV1 to the input block I1.
b) Process I1 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using \(K E Y 1_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(1_{1}\).

\section*{At time T2:}
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector IV2 to the input block I2.
b) Process I2 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using KEY1 \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(2_{1}\).
c) \(\quad\) TEMP \(1_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using \(K E Y 2_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(1_{2}\).

At time T3:
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector IV3 to the input block I3.
b) Process I3 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using KEY \(1_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(3_{1}\).
c) TEMP \(2_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using \(K E Y 2_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value \(\mathrm{TEMP} 2_{2}\).

Connect the feedback path:
d) \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
e) Calculate the K-bit RESULT1 \(1_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing the leftmost K bits of \(\mathrm{O1}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the K-bit TEXT.

At time T4:
a) \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Calculate the K-bit RESULT2 \(2_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing the leftmost Kbits of \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the K-bit TEXT.
c) \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\).

At time T5:
a) \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Calculate the K-bit RESULT3 \(_{i}\) by exclusive-ORing the leftmost K bits of \(\mathrm{O3}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the K-bit TEXT.
b. Forward the current values of the loop number \(\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) (representing \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), and KEY3 \(3_{\mathrm{i}}\) ), IV1, IV2, IV3, K-bit TEXT, K-bit RESULT \(1_{\mathrm{i}}\), K-bit RESULT2 \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}\), and K-bit RESULT3 \(3_{i}\), to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 7.
c. Set \(\mathrm{KEY}_{1+1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{{ }_{\mathrm{i}+1}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) equal to the vector consisting of " 0 " in every significant bit position except for a single " 1 " bit in position \(\mathrm{i}+1\). The parity bits contain " 1 " or " 0 " to make odd parity.

NOTE -- This processing should continue until every significant basis vector has been represented by the KEY parameters. The output from the IUT should consist of 56 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 7.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values found in Table A.11. For IUTs where K is less than 64 , the leftmost K bits of output for each RESULT value in the Table A. 11 are used.

\subsection*{5.5.1.4 The Permutation Operation Known Answer Test - TCFB-P Mode}

Table 47 The Permutation Operation Known Answer Test - TCFB-P Mode



Send i, \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) (representing KEY1 \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}\), \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) ), I1, I2, I3, K-bit TEXT, K-bit RESULT \(1_{i}\), K-bit RESULT2 \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}\), K-bit RESULT3 \({ }_{i}\)
\(K E Y 1_{i+1}=K E Y 2_{i+1}=K E Y 3_{i+1}=\) corresponding \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) from TMOVS.
TMOVS: Compare results from each loop with known answers.
Use K bits of output in Table A. 12.

As summarized in Table 47, the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the TCFB-P mode of operation is performed as follows:
1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 with the 32 constant KEY values from Table A.12.
b. Initializes the 3 initialization vectors accordingly: IV1 is assigned the value 0 , i.e., \(\mathrm{IV}_{\text {hex }}=0000000000000000\). Based on specifications in ANSI X9.52-1998, IV2 is computed by the following equation: IV1 \(+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{1}=5555555555555555\). In hexadecimal, this equates to 5555555555555555. And IV3 is computed by the equation IV1 \(+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{2}=A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A\). In hexadecimal, this equates to AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA.
c. Initializes the K-bit TEXT parameter to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{\text {hex }}=0000000000000000\).
d. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 18.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(i=1\) through 32 :
a. With the feedback path disconnected:
1) At time T 1 :
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector IV1 to the input block I1.
b) Process I1 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using KEY \(1_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(1_{1}\).

At time T2:
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector IV2 to the input block I2.
b) Process I2 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using \(K E Y 1_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(2_{1}\).
c) \(\quad\) TEMP \(1_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using \(K E Y 2_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(1_{2}\).

At time T3:
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector IV3 to the input block I3.
b) Process I3 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using KEY \(1_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(3_{1}\).
c) TEMP \(2_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using \(K E Y 2_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value \(\mathrm{TEMP} 2_{2}\).

Connect the feedback path:
d) \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O1}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
e) Calculate the K-bit RESULT \(1_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing the leftmost K bits of \(\mathrm{O} 1_{i}\) with the K-bit TEXT.

At time T4:
a) \(\quad \mathrm{TEMP} 2_{2}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Calculate the K-bit RESULT2 \(2_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing the leftmost K bits of \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the K-bit TEXT.
c) \(\quad\) TEMP \(3_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using KEY2 \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\).

At time T5:
a) \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O3}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Calculate the K-bit RESULT3 \(3_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing the leftmost K bits of \(\mathrm{O} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the K-bit TEXT.
b. Forward the current values of the loop number i, \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) (representing KEY1 \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), and KEY3 \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}\) ), IV1, IV2, IV3, K-bit TEXT, K-bit RESULT1 \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}\), K-bit RESULT2 \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}\), and K-bit RESULT3 \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}\), to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 7.
c. Set \(\mathrm{KEY}_{1+1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) equal to the corresponding \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE -- The above processing should continue until all 32 KEY values are processed. The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 32 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 7.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values found Table A.12. For IUTs where \(K\) is less than 64 , the leftmost \(K\) bits of output for each RESULT value in Table A. 12 are used.
5.5.1.5 The Substitution Table Known Answer Test - TCFB-P Mode

Table 48 The Substitution Table Known Answer Test - TCFB-P Mode



As summarized in Table 48, the Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the TCFB-P Mode is performed as follows:
1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY-IV1 pairs with the 19 constant KEY-DATA values from Table A.10. The DATA values are assigned to the values of the initialization vectors \(\mathrm{IV} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\). The KEY value indicates the values of \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), i.e., \(K E Y 1_{i}=K E Y 2_{i}=K E Y 3_{i}\). Based on specifications in ANSI X9.52-1998, IV2 \({ }_{i}\) is set to \(\mathrm{IV} 1_{i}+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{1}=5555555555555555\) and \(\mathrm{IV} 3_{i}\) is set to \(I V 1_{i}+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod\) \(2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{2}=\) AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA.
b. Initializes the K-bit TEXT parameter to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{\text {hex }}=0000000000000000\).
c. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 25.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(\mathrm{i}=1\) through 19:
a. With the feedback path disconnected:
1) At time T1:
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector \(\mathrm{IV} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\) to the input block I1.
b) Process I1 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using \(K E Y 1_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(1_{1}\).

At time T2:
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector IV2 \({ }_{i}\) to the input block I2.
b) Process I2 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using \(K E Y 1{ }_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(2{ }_{1}\).
c) \(\quad\) TEMP \(1_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using \(K E Y 2_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(1_{2}\).

At time T3:
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector \(\operatorname{IV} 3_{i}\) to the input block I3.
b) Process I3 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using \(K E Y 1{ }_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(3_{1}\).
c) \(\quad\) TEMP \(2_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using \(K E Y 2_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\).

Connect the feedback path:
d) \(\quad\) TEMP \(1_{2}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O1}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
e) Calculate the K-bit RESULT1 \(1_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing the leftmost K bits of \(\mathrm{O} 1_{i}\) with the K-bit TEXT.

At time T4:
a) \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Calculate the K-bit RESULT2 \(2_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing the leftmost K bits of \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the K-bit TEXT.
c) \(\quad\) TEMP \(3_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\).

At time T5:
a) \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O3}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Calculate the K-bit RESULT3 \(3_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing the leftmost K bits of \(\mathrm{O} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the K-bit TEXT.
b. Forward the current values of the loop number \(\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) (representing \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) ), \(\mathrm{IV1}_{\mathrm{i}}\), IV2 \(2_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{IV} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), K-bit TEXT, K-bit RESULT1 \(1_{\mathrm{i}}\), K-bit RESULT2 \(_{\mathrm{i}}\), and K-bit RESULT3 \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}\), to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 7.
c. Set \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) equal to the corresponding \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) supplied by the TMOVS.
d. Set \(I V 1_{i+1}\) equal to the corresponding DATA \(A_{i+1}\) supplied by the TMOVS. Based on specifications in ANSI X9.52-1998, IV \(2_{i+1}\) is set to \(\operatorname{IV} 1_{i+1}+R_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{1}=5555555555555555\) and IV3 \({ }_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) is set to \(\mathrm{IV} 1_{\mathrm{i}+1}+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{2}=A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A\).

NOTE -- The above processing should continue until all 19 KEY-DATA are processed. The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 19 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 7.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values found in Table A.10. For IUTs where K is less than 64, the leftmost K bits of output for each RESULT value in the Table A. 10 are used.

\subsection*{5.5.2 The Monte Carlo Tests - TCFB-P Mode}

The Monte Carlo tests required to validate an IUT for the K-bit TCFB-P mode of operation are determined by the process or processes allowed by an IUT. The K-bit TCFB-P Monte Carlo Test for the Encryption Process is successfully completed if an IUT supports the encryption process of the TCFB-P mode of operation. The K-bit TCFB-P Monte Carlo Test for the Decryption Process is successfully completed if an IUT supports the decryption process.

\subsection*{5.5.2.1 The Monte Carlo Test for the Encryption Process - K-bit TCFB-P Mode}

Table 49 The Monte Carlo Test for the Encryption Process - K-bit TCFB-P Mode
\begin{tabular}{|lll}
\hline TMOVS: & Initialize & \(\mathrm{KEY}_{0}, \mathrm{KEY}_{0}, \mathrm{KEY}_{0}\), IV1, IV2, IV3, K-bit \(\mathrm{P}_{0}\) \\
& Send & \(\mathrm{KEY1}_{0}, \mathrm{KEY}_{0}, \mathrm{KEY}_{0}\), IV1, IV2, IV3, K-bit \(\mathrm{P}_{0}\)
\end{tabular}

IUT: \(\quad\) FOR \(\mathrm{i}=0\) TO 399
\{

FOR \(\mathrm{j}=0\) TO 9,999


ELSE
\[
\mathrm{Ij}=\mathrm{RM}^{(64-\mathrm{K})}(\mathrm{I}(\mathrm{j}-1)) \| \text { K-bit } \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}-3}
\]

Ij is read into TDEA and is encrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) using \(K E Y 1_{i}\), resulting in TEMP1

TEMP1 is decrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in TEMP2
TEMP2 is encrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}\)
K-bit \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}=\mathrm{LM}^{\mathrm{K}}\left(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}\right) \oplus\) K-bit \(\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}}\)
K-bit \(\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}+1}=\mathrm{LM}^{\mathrm{K}}(\mathrm{Ij})\)
\}
Record I0, \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}\)
Send i, KEY \(1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), I0, I1, I2, K-bit \(\mathrm{P}_{0}\), K-bit \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}\)

> Concatenate enough C together to get (length(KEY)*3) bits (192 bits)
> \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus\) bits 129 -192 of C
> IF \(\left(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}\right.\) and \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) are independent and \(\left.\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\right)\) or \(\left(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\right.\), \(K E Y 2_{i}, \mathrm{KEY}_{3}\) are independent),
> \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus\) bits \(65-128\) of C
> ELSE
> \(K E Y 2_{i+1}=K E Y 2_{i} \oplus\) bits 129-192 of C
> \(\operatorname{IF}\left(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\right)\) or \(\left(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\right.\) and \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) are independent and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\) ),
> \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus\) bits 129-192 of C
> ELSE
> \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus\) bits 1-64 of C
> K-bit \(\mathrm{P}_{0}=\mathrm{LM}^{\mathrm{K}}(\mathrm{Ij})\)
> \(\mathrm{I} 0=\mathrm{RM}^{(64-\mathrm{K})}(\mathrm{Ij}) \|\) K-bit \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}\)
> \(\mathrm{I} 1=\mathrm{I} 0+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{1}=5555555555555555\)
> \(\mathrm{I} 2=\mathrm{I} 0+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{2}=\) AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
> \}

TMOVS: Check the IUT's output for correctness.

As summarized in Table 49, the Monte Carlo Test for the TCFB-P Encryption Process is performed as follows:
1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{0}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{0}\), the initialization vectors IV1, IV2, and IV3, and the K-bit plaintext \(P_{0}\). The IVs, and KEYs consist of 64 bits each. The \(P\) is represented as K-bits, where \(K=1, \ldots, 64\). IV2 is assigned the value of \(I V 1+R_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(R_{1}=5555555555555555\). IV3 is assigned the value of \(I V 1+R_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(R_{2}=\) AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA.
b. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 24.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(\mathrm{i}=0\) through 399:
a. Record the current values of the output loop number \(\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{IV} 1\), IV2, IV3, and \(\mathrm{P}_{0}\).
b. Perform the following for \(\mathrm{j}=0\) through 9,999:
1) If \(\mathrm{j}=0,1\), or 2 , assign the value of the initialization vector \(\mathrm{IV}_{\mathrm{j}+1}\) to the input block Ij.
2) If \(\mathrm{j}>2\), assign Ij with the value of the concatenation of the rightmost ( \(64-\mathrm{K}\) ) bits of \(\mathrm{I}(\mathrm{j}-1)\) with the K -bit \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}-3}\).
3) Process \(I_{j}\) through the DEA stage \(D E A_{1}\) in the encrypt state using \(K E Y 1_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP1.
4) TEMP1 is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP2.
5) TEMP2 is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using \(K E Y 3_{i}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}\).
6) Calculate the K -bit \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}\) by exclusive-ORing the leftmost K -bits of \(\mathrm{O}_{j}\) with the K-bit \(\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}}\).
7) Prepare for loop \(\mathrm{j}+1\) by assigning the K -bit \(\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}+1}\) with the value of the leftmost K-bits of the Ij .
c. Record the current values of the input block I0 and \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}\).
d. Forward all recorded values for this loop, as specified in Output Type 8, to the TMOVS.
e. In preparation for the next output loop:
1) Concatenate enough C values together to obtain (length (KEY)*3) bits of data (192 bits).
2) Assign new values to the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3. This is accomplished by exclusive-ORing C with the KEY value to obtain the new KEY. If the length of the C is less than 64 (the length of a DES key), the C should be expanded in length to \(64 * 3\) (to correspond to the combined lengths of KEY1+KEY2+KEY3) before forming the new KEY values. This expansion should be accomplished by concatenating X of the most current Cs together to obtain 192 bits of C . For example, if the length of the C is 50 bits ( \(K=50\) ), the expanded \(\mathrm{C}=\left(\mathrm{C}^{9}{ }_{9996}, \ldots, \mathrm{C}^{50}{ }_{9996}, \mathrm{C}^{1}{ }_{9997}, \ldots, \mathrm{C}^{50}{ }_{9997}, \mathrm{C}^{1}{ }_{9998}, \ldots\right.\), \(\left.\mathrm{C}^{50}{ }_{9998}, \mathrm{C}^{1}{ }_{9999}, \ldots, \mathrm{C}^{50}{ }_{9999}\right)\).

Bits 129-192 of the expanded C will be exclusive-ORed with KEY1 to form the new KEY1.

The calculation of the new KEY2 and KEY3 are based on the values of the keys. . If \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\) and \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) are independent and \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{i}=\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\), or KEY1, KEY2 and KEY3 are independent, the new KEY2 should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current KEY2 with bits 65-128 of the expanded C. If KEY1=KEY2=KEY3, the current KEY2 will be exclusiveORed with bits 129-192 of the expanded C to calculate the new KEY2.

If KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 are independent, the new KEY3 should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current KEY3 with bits 1-64 of the expanded C. Otherwise, the current KEY3 will be exclusive-ORed with bits 129-192 of the expanded C to calculate the new KEY3.
3) Assign a new value to the K -bit \(\mathrm{P}_{0}\). The K -bit \(\mathrm{P}_{0}\) should be assigned the value of the leftmost K-bits of the current \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}\), where \(\mathrm{j}=9999\), i.e., \(\left(\mathrm{P}^{1}{ }_{0}, \mathrm{P}^{2}{ }_{0}, \ldots, \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{K}}{ }_{0}\right)\) \(=\left(I^{1}, I_{j}^{2}, \ldots, I^{\mathrm{K}}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}\right)\).
4) Assign a new value to the I parameters. \(\mathrm{I}_{0}\) should be assigned the value of the concatenation of the rightmost \((64-\mathrm{K})\) bits of \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}\) with the K -bit \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}\), i.e. \(\left(\mathrm{I}^{1}{ }_{0}\right.\), \(\left.\mathrm{I}^{2}{ }_{0}, \ldots, \mathrm{I}^{64}{ }_{0}\right)=\left(\mathrm{I}^{[\mathrm{K}+1]}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{I}^{[\mathrm{K}+2]}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}, \ldots, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}^{64}, \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}^{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{C}^{\mathrm{K}}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}\right) . \mathrm{I}_{1}\) should be assigned the value of \(I_{0}+R_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(R_{1}=5555555555555555\). \(I_{2}\) should be assigned the value of \(\mathrm{I}_{0}+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{2}=\) AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA. Note \(\mathrm{j}=9999\).

NOTE -- the new \(P\) and \(I\) should be denoted as \(P_{0}\) and \(I_{0}\) because these values are used for the first pass through the inner loop when \(\mathrm{j}=0\).

NOTE -- The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 400 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 8.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values.

\subsection*{5.5.2.2 The Monte Carlo Test for the Decryption Process - K-bit TCFB-P Mode}

Table 50 The Monte Carlo Test for the Decryption Process - K-bit TCFB-P Mode
\begin{tabular}{|lll}
\hline TMOVS: & Initialize & \(\mathrm{KEY}_{0}, \mathrm{KEY}_{0}, \mathrm{KEY}_{0}\), IV1, IV2, IV3, K-bit C \({ }_{0}\) \\
& Send & \(\mathrm{KEY}_{0}, \mathrm{KEY}_{0}, \mathrm{KEY}_{0}\), IV1, IV2, IV3, K-bit C \({ }_{0}\) \\
IUT: & FOR i \(=0\) TO 399 & \\
& \(\{\) \\
& \multicolumn{2}{c}{ FOR j \(=0\) TO 9,999 }
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline & \{ \\
\hline \multirow[t]{10}{*}{\begin{tabular}{l}
Perform \\
Triple DES:
\end{tabular}} & IF ( \(\mathrm{j}==0,1\), or 2 ) \\
\hline & \(\mathrm{Ij}=\mathrm{IV}(\mathrm{j}+1)\) \\
\hline & ELSE \\
\hline & \(\mathrm{Ij}=\mathrm{RM}^{(64-\mathrm{K})}(\mathrm{I}(\mathrm{j}-1)) \| \mathrm{K}\)-bit \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}-3}\) \\
\hline & Ij is read into TDEA and is encrypted by DEA \(_{1}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in TEMP1 \\
\hline & TEMP1 is decrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in TEMP2 \\
\hline & TEMP2 is encrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY3}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in \(\mathrm{O}_{j}\) \\
\hline & K-bit \(\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}}=\mathrm{LM}^{\mathrm{K}}\left(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}\right) \oplus\) K-bit \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}\) \\
\hline & K-bit \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}+1}=\mathrm{LM}^{\mathrm{K}}\left(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}\right)\) \\
\hline & \} \\
\hline & Record I0, K-bit \(\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}}\) \\
\hline & Send i, KEY \(1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}{ }_{\text {, }} \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), IO, I1, I2, K-bit \(\mathrm{C}_{0}\), K-bit \(\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}}\) \\
\hline & Concatenate enough Ps together to get (length(KEY)*3) bits (192 bits) \\
\hline & \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{1}{ }_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus\) bits 129-192 of P \\
\hline & IF \(\left(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\right.\) and \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) are independent and \(\left.\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\right)\) or \(\left(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\right.\), \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) are independent), \\
\hline & \(\mathrm{KEY}_{2}{ }_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus\) bits 65-128 of P \\
\hline & ELSE \\
\hline & \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{2} \oplus\) bits 129-192 of P \\
\hline & IF \(\left(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\right)\) or \(\left(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\right.\) and \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) are independent and \(K E Y 3_{i}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) ), \\
\hline & \(\mathrm{KEY}^{\mathrm{i}+1}{ }^{\text {}}=\mathrm{KEY}^{\mathrm{i}}\) \(\oplus\) bits 129-192 of P \\
\hline & ELSE \\
\hline & \(\mathrm{KEY}_{3}{ }_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus\) bits 1-64 of P \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\[
\begin{aligned}
& \mathrm{I} 0=\mathrm{RM}^{(64-\mathrm{K})}(\mathrm{Ij}) \| \text { K-bit } \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}} \\
& \mathrm{I} 1=\mathrm{I} 0+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64} \text { where } \mathrm{R}_{1}=5555555555555555 \\
& \mathrm{I} 2=\mathrm{I} 0+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64} \text { where } \mathrm{R}_{2}=\text { AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA } \\
& \mathrm{K} \text {-bit } \mathrm{C}_{0}=\mathrm{LM}^{\mathrm{K}}(\mathrm{Oj}) \\
& \}
\end{aligned}
\]

TMOVS: Check the IUT's output for correctness.

As summarized in Table 50, the Monte Carlo Test for the TCFB-P Decryption Process is performed as follows:
1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{0}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{3}\), the initialization vectors IV1, IV2, and IV3, and the K-bit \(\mathrm{C}_{0}\). The IVs, and KEYs consist of 64 bits each. The C is represented as K-bits, where \(\mathrm{K}=1, \ldots, 64\). IV2 is assigned the value of IV1 \(+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{1}=5555555555555555\). IV3 is assigned the value of \(\mathrm{IV} 1+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{2}=\) AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA.
b. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 24.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(\mathrm{i}=0\) through 399:
a. Record the current values of the output loop number i, KEY1 \({ }_{i}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), IV1, IV2, IV3, and \(\mathrm{C}_{0}\).
b. Perform the following for \(\mathrm{j}=0\) through 9,999:
1) If \(\mathrm{j}=0,1\), or 2 , assign the value of the initialization vector \(\mathrm{IV}_{\mathrm{j}+1}\) to the input block Ij.
2) If \(\mathrm{j}>2\), assign Ij with the value of the concatenation of the rightmost ( \(64-\mathrm{K}\) ) bits of \(\mathrm{I}(\mathrm{j}-1)\) with the K -bit \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}-3}\).
3) Process \(I_{j}\) through the DEA stage \(D E A_{1}\) in the encrypt state using \(K E Y 1_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP1.
4) TEMP1 is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP2.
5) TEMP2 is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{i}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}\).
6) Calculate the K -bit \(\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}}\) by exclusive-ORing the leftmost K -bits of \(\mathrm{O}_{j}\) with the K-bit \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}\).
7) Prepare for loop \(\mathrm{j}+1\) by assigning the K -bit \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}+1}\) with the value of the leftmost K-bits of the \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}\).
c. Record the current values of the input block I0 and K-bit \(\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{j}}\).
d. Forward all recorded values for this loop, as specified in Output Type 8, to the TMOVS.
e. In preparation for the next output loop:
1) Concatenate enough \(P\) values together to obtain (length (KEY)*3) bits of data (192 bits).
3) Assign new values to the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3. This is accomplished by exclusive-ORing P with the KEY value to obtain the new KEY. If the length of the P is less than 64 (the length of a DES key), the P should be expanded in length to \(64 * 3\) (to correspond to the combined lengths of KEY1+KEY2+KEY3) before forming the new KEY values. This expansion should be accomplished by concatenating X of the most current Ps together to obtain 192 bits of P . For example, if the length of the P is 50 bits \((K=50)\), the expanded \(\mathrm{P}=\left(\mathrm{P}^{9}{ }_{9996}, \ldots, \mathrm{P}^{50}{ }_{9996}, \mathrm{P}^{1}{ }_{9997}, \ldots, \mathrm{P}^{50}{ }_{9997}, \mathrm{P}^{1}{ }_{9998}, \ldots\right.\), \(\left.\mathrm{P}^{50}{ }_{9998}, \mathrm{P}^{1}{ }_{9999}, \ldots, \mathrm{P}^{50}{ }_{9999}\right)\).

Bits 129-192 of the expanded P will be exclusive-ORed with KEY1 to form the new KEY1.

The calculation of the new KEY2 and KEY3 are based on the values of the keys. . If \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{i}\) and \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) are independent and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\), or KEY1, KEY2 and KEY3 are independent, the new KEY2 should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current KEY2 with bits 65-128 of the expanded P. If KEY1=KEY2=KEY3, the current KEY2 will be exclusiveORed with bits 129-192 of the expanded P to calculate the new KEY2.

If KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 are independent, the new KEY3 should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current KEY3 with bits 1-64 of the expanded P. Otherwise, the current KEY3 will be exclusive-ORed with bits 129-192 of the expanded \(P\) to calculate the new KEY3.
3) Assign a new value to the I parameters. \(I_{0}\) should be assigned the value of the concatenation of the rightmost \((64-K)\) bits of \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}\) with the K -bit \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}\), i.e. \(\left(\mathrm{I}^{1}{ }_{0}\right.\), \(\left.\mathrm{I}_{0}^{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{I}^{64}{ }_{0}\right)=\left(\mathrm{I}^{[\mathrm{K}+1]}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{I}^{[\mathrm{K}+2]}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}, \ldots, \mathrm{I}^{64}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{C}^{1}, \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{j}}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}, \ldots, \mathrm{C}^{\mathrm{K}}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}\right) . \mathrm{I}_{1}\) should be assigned the value of \(I_{0}+R_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(R_{1}=5555555555555555 . I_{2}\) should be assigned the value of \(I_{0}+R_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(R_{2}=\) AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA. Note \(\mathrm{j}=9999\).
4) Assign a new value to the K -bit \(\mathrm{C}_{0}\). The K -bit \(\mathrm{C}_{0}\) should be assigned the value of the leftmost \(K\)-bits of the current \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}\), where \(\mathrm{j}=9999\), i.e., \(\left(\mathrm{C}^{1}{ }_{0}\right.\), \(\left.\mathrm{C}_{0}^{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{C}^{\mathrm{K}}{ }_{0}\right)=\left(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}^{1}, \mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}^{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}^{\mathrm{K}}{ }_{\mathrm{j}}\right)\).

NOTE -- the new \(C\) and \(I\) should be denoted as \(C_{0}\) and \(I_{0}\) because these values are used for the first pass through the inner loop when \(\mathrm{j}=0\).

NOTE -- The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 400 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 8.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values.

\subsection*{5.6 The Output Feedback Mode - TOFB Mode}

The IUTs which implement the Output Feedback (TOFB) mode of operation are validated by successfully completing a set of Known Answer tests and a Monte Carlo test applicable to both IUTs supporting encryption and/or decryption. Encryption and decryption using the TOFB mode of operation involve processing an input block through the encryption process of the specified algorithm. Therefore, the same set of Known Answer tests and Monte Carlo test can be applied to IUTs supporting both encryption and decryption.

The process of validating an IUT which supports the encryption and/or decryption processes of the TOFB mode of operation involves the successful completion of the following six tests:
1. The Variable Text Known Answer Test - TOFB mode

2 The Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test - TOFB mode
3. The Variable Key Known Answer Test - TOFB mode
4. The Permutation Operation Known Answer Test - TOFB mode
5. The Substitution Table Known Answer Test - TOFB mode
6. The Monte Carlo Test - TOFB mode

An explanation of the tests for the TOFB mode follows.

\subsection*{5.6.1 The Known Answer Tests - TOFB Mode}

In the following description of the Known Answer tests, TEXT refers to plaintext, and RESULT refers to ciphertext if the IUT performs TOFB encryption. If the IUT supports TOFB decryption, TEXT refers to ciphertext, and RESULT refers to plaintext.

\subsection*{5.6.1.1 The Variable TEXT Known Answer Test - TOFB Mode}

Table 51 The Variable TEXT Known Answer Test - TOFB Mode


As summarized in Table 51, the Variable TEXT Known Answer Test for the TOFB mode of operation is performed as follows:
1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 to the constant hexadecimal value 0 with odd parity set, i.e., \(K E Y 1_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 2_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 3_{\text {hex }}=010101\) 0101010101.
b. Initializes the 64-bit initialization vector \(\mathrm{IV}_{1}\) to the basis vector containing a"1" in the first bit position and " 0 " in the following 63 positions, i.e., \(\mathrm{IV}_{1 \text { bin }}=10000000\) 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 . The equivalent of this value in hexadecimal notation is 8000000000000000 .
c. Initializes the TEXT parameter to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{\text {hex }}=\) 0000000000000000 .
d. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 2.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(i=1\) through 64:
a. Assign the value of the initialization vector \(\mathrm{IV}_{\mathrm{i}}\) to the input block \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b. Process \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the three DEA stages, resulting in a 64-bit output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\). This involves processing \(I_{i}\) through the first DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\), in the encrypt state using KEY1, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the second DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), in the decrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the third DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\), in the encrypt state using KEY3, resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
c. Calculate the K-bit \(\operatorname{RESULT}_{i}\) by exclusive-ORing the leftmost K-bits of \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the K-bit TEXT.
d. Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV \(_{\mathrm{i}}\), TEXT, and the RESULT \(\mathrm{T}_{\mathrm{i}}\) to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 2.
e. Retain the RESULT values for use with the Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test for the TOFB Mode (Section 5.6.1.2).
f. Assign a new value to \(\mathrm{IV}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) by setting it equal to the value of a basis vector with a " 1 " bit in position \(\mathrm{i}+1\), where \(\mathrm{i}+1=2, \ldots, 64\).

NOTE -- This continues until every possible basis vector has been represented by the IV, i.e., 64 times. The output from the IUT should consist of 64 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 2.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values found in Table A.1.

\subsection*{5.6.1.2 The Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test - TOFB Mode}

Table 52 The Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test - TOFB Mode
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline \multirow[t]{4}{*}{TMOVS:} & Initialize & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { KEYs:KEY1 }=\text { KEY2 }=\text { KEY3 }=0101010101010101 \text { (odd parity } \\
\text { set) }
\end{gathered}
\] \\
\hline & & \(\operatorname{TEXT}_{\mathrm{i}}\) (where \(\mathrm{i}=1 . .64\) )=64 RESULT values from the Variable TEXT Known Answer Test \\
\hline & & \(\mathrm{IV}_{1}=8000000000000000\) \\
\hline & Send & KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), \(\mathrm{IV}_{1}, \mathrm{TEXT}_{1} . . \mathrm{TEXT}_{64}\) \\
\hline \multirow[t]{11}{*}{IUT:} & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{FOR i \(=1\) to 64} \\
\hline & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{} \\
\hline & \multirow[t]{8}{*}{\begin{tabular}{l}
Perform \\
Triple DES:
\end{tabular}} & \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{IV}_{\mathrm{i}}\) \\
\hline & & \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) is read into TDEA and is encrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) using KEY1, resulting in TEMP1 \\
\hline & & TEMP1 is decrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) using KEY2, resulting in TEMP2 \\
\hline & & TEMP2 is encrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) using KEY3, resulting in \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) \\
\hline & & \(\operatorname{RESULT}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \mathrm{TEXT}_{\mathrm{I}}\) \\
\hline & & Send i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), IV \(_{\mathrm{i}}\), TEXT \(_{\mathrm{i}}\), RESULT \(_{i}\) \\
\hline & & \(\mathrm{IV}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\) basis vector where single " 1 " bit is in position \(\mathrm{i}+1\) \\
\hline & & \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\) corresponding \(\mathrm{RESULT}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) value from the TMOVS \\
\hline & \} & \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{TMOVS:} & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{Compare RESULT from each loop with known answers.} \\
\hline & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{The TEXT should be all zeros.} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

As summarized in Table 52 the Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test for the TOFB mode of operation is performed as follows:
1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 to the constant hexadecimal value 0 with odd parity set, i.e., \(K E Y 1_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 2_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 3_{\text {hex }}=010101\) 0101010101.
b. Initializes the 64-bit initialization vector \(\mathrm{IV}_{1}\) to the basis vector containing a" 1 " in the first bit position and " 0 " in the following 63 positions, i.e., \(\mathrm{IV}_{1 \text { bin }}=10000000\) 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 . The equivalent of this value in hexadecimal notation is 8000000000000000 .
c. Initializes the \(\operatorname{TEXT}_{i}\) (where \(\mathrm{i}=1, \ldots, 64\) ) to the RESULT \(_{i}\) values obtained from the Variable TEXT Known Answer Test.
d. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 5.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(i=1\) through 64:
a. Assign the value of the initialization vector \(\mathrm{IV}_{\mathrm{i}}\) to the input block \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b. Process \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the three DEA stages resulting in a 64 -bit output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\). This involves processing \(I_{i}\) through the first DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\), in the encrypt state using KEY1, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the second DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), in the decrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the third DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\), in the encrypt state using KEY3, resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
c. Calculate the RESULT \(\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing the \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the TEXT \(_{\mathrm{i}}\).
d. Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), \(\mathrm{IV}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{TEXT}_{\mathrm{i}}\), and the RESULT \(_{\mathrm{i}}\) to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 2.
e. Assign a new value to \(\mathrm{IV}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) by setting it equal to the value of a basis vector with a " 1 " bit in position \(\mathrm{i}+1\), where \(\mathrm{i}+1=2, \ldots, 64\).
f. Assign a new value to \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) by setting it equal to the corresponding output from the TMOVS.

NOTE -- This processing continues until all RESULT values from the Variable TEXT Known Answer Test have been used as input. The output from the IUT should consist of 64 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 2.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values. The RESULT values should be all zeros.

\subsection*{5.6.1.3 The Variable KEY Known Answer Test - TOFB Mode}

Table 53 The Variable Key Known Answer Test - TOFB Mode


As summarized in Table 53, the Variable Key Known Answer Test for the TOFB mode is performed as follows:

\section*{1. The TMOVS:}
a. Initializes the KEY parameters \(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{1}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}\) to contain " 0 " in every significant bit except for a " 1 " in the first position, i.e., the 64 -bit \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{1 \text { bin }}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{1}\) bin \(=K E Y 3_{1 \text { bin }}=100000000000000100000001000000010000000100000001\) 0000000100000001 . The equivalent of this value in hexadecimal notation is 8001 010101010101.

NOTE -- the parity bits are set to " 0 " or " 1 " to get odd parity.
b. Initializes the 64-bit IV parameter to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., \(\mathrm{IV}_{\text {hex }}=\) 0000000000000000 .
c. Initializes the TEXT to the constant hexadecimal value 0, i.e., \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{\text {hex }}=000000\) 0000000000 .
d. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 2.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(\mathrm{i}=1\) to 56 :

NOTE -- 56 is the number of significant bits in a TDES key.
a. Assign the value of the initialization vector IV to the input block \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b. Process \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the three DEA stages resulting in a 64 -bit output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\). This involves processing \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the first DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\), in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY1}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the second DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), in the decrypt state using KEY2 \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the third DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\), in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
c. Calculate the RESULT \({ }_{i}\) by exclusive-ORing the \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the TEXT.
d. Forward the current values of the loop number \(\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) (representing \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) ), IV, TEXT, and the resulting RESULT \(_{\mathrm{i}}\) to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 2.
e. Set \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{{ }_{\mathrm{i}+1}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) equal to the vector consisting of " 0 " in every significant bit position except for a single " 1 " bit in position \(\mathrm{i}+1\). The parity bits contain " 1 " or " 0 " to make odd parity.

NOTE -- This processing should continue until every significant basis vector has been represented by the KEY parameters. The output from the IUT should consist of 56 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 2.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values found in Table A.2.

\subsection*{5.6.1.4 The Permutation Operation Known Answer Test - TOFB Mode}

Table 54 The Permutation Operation Known Answer Test - TOFB Mode
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline \multirow[t]{4}{*}{TMOVS:} & Initialize & & \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}(\) where \(\mathrm{i}=1 . .32)=32 \mathrm{KEY}\) values in Table A. 3 \\
\hline & & & \(I V=0000000000000000\) \\
\hline & & & TEXT \(=0000000000000000\) \\
\hline & Send & & TEXT, IV, KEY \(_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{KEY}_{32}\) (Since all three keys are the same, these key values represent the values of KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3.) \\
\hline \multirow[t]{11}{*}{IUT:} & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{FOR i \(=1\) to 32} & \\
\hline & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{\{} & \\
\hline & \multirow{6}{*}{Perform Triple DES:} & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{} \\
\hline & & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{\[
\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{IV}
\]} \\
\hline & & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{\(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) is read into TDEA and is encrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) using KEY1 \({ }_{i}\), resulting in TEMP1} \\
\hline & & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{TEMP1 is decrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in TEMP2} \\
\hline & & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{TEMP2 is encrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{3}{ }_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\)} \\
\hline & & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{\(\mathrm{RESULT}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus\) TEXT} \\
\hline & & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{Send \(\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\left(\right.\) representing \(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}{ }_{\mathrm{i}} \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) ), IV, TEXT, RESULT \(_{i}\)} \\
\hline & & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{\(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\) Corresponding \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) in Table A. 3} \\
\hline & \} & & \\
\hline TMOVS: & Compare & results & with known answers. Use Table A.3. \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

As summarized in Table 54, the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the TOFB mode of operation is performed as follows:
1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\) variables with the 32 constant KEY values from Table A.3.
b. Initializes the 64-bit IV parameter to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., \(\mathrm{IV}_{\text {hex }}=\) 0000000000000000 .
c. Initializes the TEXT to the constant hexadecimal value 0, i.e., \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{\text {hex }}=000000\) 0000000000 .
d. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 8.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(\mathrm{i}=1\) through 32 :
a. Assign the value of the initialization vector IV to the input block \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b. Process \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the three DEA stages resulting in a 64 -bit output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\). This involves processing \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the first DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\), in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY1}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the second DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the third DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\), in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
c. Calculate the RESULT \(_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing the \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the TEXT.
d. Forward the current values of the loop number \(\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) (representing \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) ), IV, TEXT, and the RESULT \(\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{i}}\) to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 2.
e. Set \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) equal to the corresponding \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE --The above processing should continue until all 32 KEY values are processed. The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 32 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 2.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values found in Table A.3.

\subsection*{5.6.1.5 The Substitution Table Known Answer Test - TOFB Mode}

Table 55 The Substitution Table Known Answer Test - TOFB Mode


As summarized in Table 55, the Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the TOFB mode of operation is performed as follows:
1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY-IV pairs with the 19 constant KEY-DATA values from Table A.4. The DATA values are assigned to the values of the initialization vectors IVs. The KEY value indicates the value of KEY1, KEY2 and KEY3, i.e., KEY1=KEY2=KEY3.
b. Initializes the TEXT parameter to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{\text {hex }}=\) 0000000000000000 .
c. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 11.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(\mathrm{i}=1\) through 19:
a. Assign the value of the initialization vector \(\mathrm{IV}_{\mathrm{i}}\) to the input block \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b. Process \(I_{i}\) through the three DEA stages, resulting in an output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\). This involves processing \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}\) through the first DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\), in the encrypt state using KEY \(1_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the second DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the third DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\), in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
c. Calculate the RESULT \({ }_{i}\) by exclusive-ORing the \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the TEXT.
d. Forward the current values of the loop number i, \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) (representing KEY1 \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) ), IV \(_{\mathrm{i}}\), TEXT, and the RESULT \(\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{i}}\) to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 2.
e. \(\quad\) Set \(K E Y 1_{i+1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}_{+1}}\) equal to the corresponding \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) value supplied by the TMOVS.
f. Set \(I V_{i+1}\) equal to the corresponding DATA \(_{i+1}\) value supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE -- The above processing should continue until all 19 KEY-DATA pairs are processed. The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 19 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 2.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values found in Table A.4.

\subsection*{5.6.2 The Monte Carlo Test - TOFB Mode}

The TOFB mode has one Monte Carlo test that is used regardless of process, i.e., the same Monte Carlo test is used for IUTs supporting the encryption and/or decryption processes.

Table 56 The Monte Carlo Test - TOFB Mode

\[
\begin{aligned}
& \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \mathrm{RESULT}_{\mathrm{j}} \\
& \text { IF }\left(\mathrm{KEY}_{1} 1_{\mathrm{i}} \text { and } \mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}} \text { are independent and } \mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\right) \text { or } \\
& \left(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \text {, and } \mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\right. \text { are independent) } \\
& \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \operatorname{RESULT}_{\mathrm{j}-1} \\
& \text { ELSE } \\
& \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \operatorname{RESULT}_{\mathrm{j}} \\
& \operatorname{IF}\left(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\right) \text { or }\left(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}} \text { and } \mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\right. \text { are independent } \\
& \text { and } \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY}_{1} \text { ) } \\
& \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \mathrm{RESULT}_{\mathrm{j}} \\
& \text { ELSE } \\
& \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \operatorname{RESULT}_{\mathrm{j}-2} \\
& \mathrm{TEXT}_{0}=\mathrm{INITTEXT} \oplus \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}} \\
& \mathrm{I}_{0}=\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}} \\
& \text { \} } \\
& \text { TMOVS: Check IUT's output for correctness. }
\end{aligned}
\]

As summarized in Table 56, the Monte Carlo Test for the TOFB mode of operation is performed as follows:
1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters \(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{0}{ }_{0}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{0}\), the initialization vector IV, and the TEXT \(_{0}\) variables. All variables consist of 64 bits each.
b. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 21.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(\mathrm{i}=0\) through 399:
a. If \(i=0\) (if this is the first time through this loop), assign the value of the initialization vector IV to the input block \(\mathrm{I}_{0}\).
b. Record the current values of the output loop number i, KEY1 \(1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), and the \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{0}\).
c. Assign the value of \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{0}\) to INITTEXT. This will contain the initial value of the text from every \(\mathrm{j}=0\) loop.
d. Perform the following for \(\mathrm{j}=0\) through 9999:
1) Using the corresponding \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{3}\) values, process \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}\) through the three DEA stages resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}\). This involves processing \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}\) through the first DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\), in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP1. TEMP1 is fed directly into the second DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP2. TEMP2 is fed directly into the third DEA stage, denoted \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\), in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}\).
2) Calculate the RESULT \(_{j}\) by exclusive-ORing the \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}\) with the TEXT \(_{j}\).
3) Prepare for loop \(\mathrm{j}+1\) by doing the following:
a) Assign the \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{j+1}\) with the value of the \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}\).
b) Assign \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}+1}\) with the value of the \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}\).
e. Record the \(\operatorname{RESULT}_{\mathrm{j}}\) and the \(\mathrm{I}_{0}\).
f. Forward all recorded information for this loop, as specified in Output Type 6, to the TMOVS.
g. In preparation for the next output loop (note \(\mathrm{j}=9999\) ):
1) Assign new values to the KEY parameters, KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 in preparation for the next outer loop.

The new \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the RESULT \(_{\mathrm{j}}\).

The new \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) calculation is based on the values of the keys. If \(K E Y 1_{i}\) and \(K E Y 2_{i}\) are independent and \(K E Y 3_{i}=K E Y 1_{i}\), or \(K E Y 1_{i}\), \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{3}\) are independent, the new \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{i}\) with the RESULT \(_{\mathrm{j}-1}\). If \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{i}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), the new \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) should be calculated by exclusiveORing the current \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the RESULT \(_{\mathrm{j}}\).

The new \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{i+1}\) calculation is also based on the values of the keys. If \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\) are independent, the new \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the \(\mathrm{RESULT}_{\mathrm{j}-2}\). If \(K E Y 1_{i}\) and \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) are independent and \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\), or if \(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), the new \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) should be calculated by exclusiveORing the current \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{i}\) with the RESULT \({ }_{j}\).
2) Assign a new value to the \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{0}\). The \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{0}\) should be assigned the value of INITTEXT exclusive-ORed with \(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}\).
3) Assign a new value to \(I_{0} . I_{0}\) should be assigned the value of the \(O_{j}\).

NOTE -- the new TEXT and I should be denoted as \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{0}\) and \(\mathrm{I}_{0}\) because these values are used for the first pass through the inner loop when \(\mathrm{j}=0\).

NOTE -- The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 400 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 6.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values.

\subsection*{5.7 The Output Feedback Interleaved (OFB-I) Mode}

The IUTs which implement the Output Feedback Interleaved (OFB-I) mode are validated by successfully completing a set of Known Answer tests and a Monte Carlo test applicable to both IUTs supporting encryption and/or decryption. Encryption and decryption using the TOFB-I mode of operation involve initializing the three individual DEA stages and then simultaneously clocking them. This improves the throughput and minimizes the propagation delay. Each clock cycle involves the data being processed by each \(\mathrm{DEA}_{i}\) stage and passing it onward to the output buffer or the next stage so that idle \(\mathrm{DEA}_{\mathrm{i}}\) stages are minimized. The pipelined configuration is intended for systems equipped with multiple DEA processors. The same set of Known Answer tests and Monte Carlo test can be applied to IUTs supporting both encryption and decryption because the same sequence of encrypt with KEY1, decrypt with KEY2 and encrypt with KEY3 is used for both encryption and decryption.

The processing for each Known Answer test and Monte Carlo test is broken down into clock cycles T1, T2, T3,.... Within each clock cycle, the processing occurring on each active DEA is discussed. For convenience, let KEY1 represent the key used on processor DEA \({ }_{1}\), KEY2 represent the key used on processor \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\), and KEY3 represent the key used on processor \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\).

The process of validating an IUT which supports the TOFB-I mode of operation in the encryption and/or the decryption processes involves the successful completion of the following six tests:
1. The Variable Text Known Answer Test - TOFB-I mode
2. The Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test - TOFB-I mode
3. The Variable Key Known Answer Test - TOFB-I mode
4. The Permutation Operation Known Answer Test - TOFB-I mode
5. The Substitution Table Known Answer Test - TOFB-I mode
6. The Monte Carlo Test - TOFB-I mode

An explanation of the tests for the TOFB-I mode follows.

\subsection*{5.7.1 The Known Answer Tests - TOFB-I Mode}

In the following description of the Known Answer tests, TEXT refers to plaintext, and RESULT refers to ciphertext if the IUT performs TOFB-I encryption. If the IUT supports TOFB-I decryption, TEXT refers to ciphertext, and RESULT refers to plaintext.

\subsection*{5.7.1.1 The Variable TEXT Known Answer Test - TOFB-I Mode}

Table 57 The Variable TEXT Known Answer Test - TOFB-I Mode



As summarized in Table 57, the Variable TEXT Known Answer Test for the TOFB-I mode is performed as follows:

\section*{1. The TMOVS:}
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 to the constant hexadecimal value 0 with odd parity set, i.e., \(K E Y 1_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 2_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 3_{\text {hex }}=010101\) 0101010101 .
b. Initializes the 3 initialization vectors accordingly: IV1 \(_{1}\) is set to the basis vector containing a" 1 " in the first bit position and " 0 " in the following 63 positions, i.e., \(\mathrm{IV}_{1}\) bin \(=10000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000\) 00000000 . The equivalent of this value in hexadecimal notation is 8000000000 000000 . Based on specifications in ANSI X9.52-1998, IV2 \({ }_{1}\) is computed by the following equation: \(\mathrm{IV} 1_{1}+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{1}=5555555555555555\). In hexadecimal, this equates to D5 55555555555555 . And \(\mathrm{IV}_{1}\) is computed by the equation \(\mathrm{IV} 1_{1}+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{2}=A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A\). In hexadecimal, this equates to 2 A AA AA AA AA AA AA AA.
c. Initializes the TEXT parameter to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{\text {hex }}=\) 0000000000000000 .
d. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 13.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(\mathrm{i}=1\) through 64:
a. With the feedback path disconnected:
1) At time T 1 :
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector \(\mathrm{IV} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\) to the input block I 1 .
b) Process I1 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using KEY1, resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(1_{1}\).
2) At time T2:
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector IV2 \({ }_{i}\) to the input block I2.
b) Process I2 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using KEY1, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2 \({ }_{1}\).
c) \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(1_{2}\).
3) At time T3:
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector \(\mathrm{IV} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\) to the input block I3.
b) Process I3 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using KEY1, resulting in intermediate value TEMP3 \({ }_{1}\).
c) TEMP \(2_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2 \({ }_{2}\).

Connect the feedback path:
d) TEMP \(1_{2}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using KEY3, resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O1}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
e) Calculate the RESULT \(1_{i}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with TEXT \(1_{\mathrm{i}}\).

At time T4:
a) \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using KEY3, resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Calculate RESULT2 \(2_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) with \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{2}{ }_{\mathrm{i}}\).
c) \(\quad \mathrm{TEMP}_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(3_{2}\).

At time T5:
a) \(\quad \mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using KEY3, resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O3}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Calculate the RESULT3 \(3_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with TEXT3 \(3_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b. Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), \(\operatorname{IV} 1_{i}\), IV \(2_{i}\), IV \(3_{i}\), TEXT, RESULT \(1_{i}\), RESULT \(_{2}\), and RESULT \(3_{i}\), to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 7.
c. Retain the RESULT1, RESULT2, and RESULT3 values for use with the Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test for the TOFB-I Mode (Section 5.7.1.2).
d. Assign a new value to the IV variables. IV \(1_{i+1}\) is set to the value of a basis vector with a " 1 " bit in position \(i+1\), where \(i+1=2, \ldots, 64\). IV \(2_{i+1}\) is set to the value of \(\operatorname{IV} 1_{i+1}+\) \(R_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(R_{1}=5555555555555555\). And IV \(3_{i+1}\) is set to \(I V 1_{i+1}+R_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{2}=\) AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA.

NOTE -- This continues until every possible basis vector has been represented by the IV1, i.e., 64 times. The output from the IUT should consist of 64 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 7.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values found in Table A.9.

\subsection*{5.7.1.2 The Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test - TOFB-I Mode}

Table 58 The Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test - TOFB-I Mode

```

RESULT1 }\mp@subsup{\textrm{i}}{1}{= O1}\mp@subsup{1}{\textrm{i}}{}\oplus\mp@subsup{\textrm{TEXT }}{1}{
T4: TEMP3 1 is decrypted by DEA }\mp@subsup{\mp@code{N}}{2}{}\mathrm{ using KEY2, resulting in TEMP3 $_{2}$
TEMP $2_{2}$ is encrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$ using KEY3, resulting in $\mathrm{O} 2_{i}$ RESULT2 $_{i}=\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \mathrm{TEXT}_{\mathrm{i}}$
T5: TEMP3 $_{2}$ is encrypted by $\mathrm{DEA}_{3}$ using KEY3, resulting in $\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}$ RESULT3 $_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{O3}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus$ TEXT3 $_{\mathrm{i}}$
Send i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), I1, I2, I3, TEXT1 $1_{i}$, TEXT $_{i}$, TEXT $_{i}$, RESULT $_{1}$, RESULT $2{ }_{i}$, RESULT $_{i}$
IV $1_{i+1}=$ basis vector where single " 1 " bit is in position $\mathrm{i}+1$
$\mathrm{IV} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{IV} 1_{\mathrm{i}}+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}$ where $\mathrm{R}_{1}=5555555555555555$
$\mathrm{IV} 3_{\mathrm{i}+1}=\mathrm{IV} 1_{\mathrm{i}}+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}$ where $\mathrm{R}_{2}=$ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
$\operatorname{TEXTr}_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ (where $\mathrm{r}=1 . .3$ ) $=$ corresponding RESULTr $_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ value from the TMOVS
\}
TMOVS: Compare RESULT1, RESULT2, and RESULT3 from each loop with known answers. They should be all zeros.

```

As summarized in Table 58 the Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test for the TOFB-I mode is performed as follows:
1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 to the constant hexadecimal value 0 with odd parity set, i.e., \(K E Y 1_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 2_{\text {hex }}=K E Y 3_{\text {hex }}=010101\) 0101010101.
b. Initializes the 3 initialization vectors accordingly: IV1 \(1_{1}\) is set to the basis vector containing a" 1 " in the first bit position and " 0 " in the following 63 positions, i.e., \(\mathrm{IV}_{1}\) bin \(=10000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000\) 00000000 . The equivalent of this value in hexadecimal notation is 8000000000 0000 00. Based on specifications in ANSI X9.52-1998, IV2 \({ }_{1}\) is computed by the following equation: \(\mathrm{IV} 1_{1}+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{1}=5555555555555555\). In hexadecimal, this equates to D5 555555555555 55. And IV3 \({ }_{1}\) is computed by
the equation \(\operatorname{IV} 1_{1}+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{2}=\) AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA. In hexadecimal, this equates to 2 A AA AA AA AA AA AA AA.
c. Initializes the \(\operatorname{TEXTr}_{\mathrm{i}}\) (where \(\mathrm{r}=1, \ldots, 3\) and \(\mathrm{i}=1, \ldots, 64\) ) to the RESULTr \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}\) obtained from the Variable TEXT Known Answer Test.
d. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 15.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(\mathrm{i}=1\) through 64:
a. With the feedback path disconnected:
1) At time T1:
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector \(\operatorname{IV} 1_{i}\) to the input block I1.
b) Process I1 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using KEY1, resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(1_{1}\).
2) At time T2:
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector \(\operatorname{IV} 2_{i}\) to the input block I2.
b) Process I2 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using KEY1, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2 \({ }_{1}\).
c) \(\quad\) TEMP \(1_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP1 \({ }_{2}\).
3) At time T3:
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector \(\mathrm{IV} 3_{i}\) to the input block I3.
b) Process I3 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using KEY1, resulting in intermediate value TEMP3 \({ }_{1}\).
c) \(\quad\) TEMP \(2_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP2 \({ }_{2}\).

Connect the feedback path:
d) \(\quad\) TEMP \(1_{2}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using KEY3, resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O1}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
e) Calculate the RESULT \(1_{i}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O} 1_{i}\) with TEXT \(1_{i}\).

At time T4:
a) \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using KEY3, resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Calculate the RESULT2 \({ }_{i}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O}_{2}\) with \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
c) \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using KEY2, resulting in intermediate value TEMP3 \(2_{2}\).

At time T5:
a) \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{3}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using KEY3, resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Calculate the RESULT3 \(3_{i}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with TEXT3 \(_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b. Forward the current values of the loop number i, KEY (representing KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3), \(\mathrm{IV} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{IV} 2_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{IV} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), TEXT \(_{\mathrm{i}}\), TEXT \(_{\mathrm{i}}\), TEXT \(_{\mathrm{i}}\), RESULT \(_{1}\), RESULT \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}\), and RESULT \(3_{i}\), to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 3.
c. Assign a new value to the IV variables. IV1 \(1_{i+1}\) is set to the value of a basis vector with a " 1 " bit in position \(i+1\), where \(i+1=2, \ldots, 64\). IV2 \(2_{i+1}\) is set to the value of \(I V 1_{i+1}+R_{1} \bmod\) \(2^{64}\) where \(R_{1}=5555555555555555\). And \(I V 3_{i+1}\) is set to \(I V 1_{i+1}+R_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{2}=A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A\).
d. Assign a new value to the TEXT \(_{1+1}\), TEXT \(_{2}{ }_{i+1}\), and TEXT3 \({ }_{i+1}\) by setting it equal to the corresponding output from the TMOVS.

NOTE -- This continues until every RESULT1, RESULT2, and RESULT3 value from the Variable TEXT Known Answer Test has been used as input. The output from the IUT should consist of 64 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 3.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to known values. The RESULT1, RESULT2, and RESULT3 values should be all zeros.

\subsection*{5.7.1.3 The Variable KEY Known Answer Test - TOFB-I Mode}

Table 59 The Variable KEY Known Answer Test - TOFB-I Mode
TMOVS: Initialize \(\quad \mathrm{KEY1}_{1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{1}=\mathrm{KEY}_{1}=8001010101010101\) (odd parity set)
\[
\begin{aligned}
& \mathrm{IV} 1=0000000000000000 \\
& \mathrm{IV} 2=5555555555555555 \\
& \mathrm{IV} 3=\text { AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA } \\
& \text { TEXT }=0
\end{aligned}
\]

Send
\(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}\) (representing \(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{1}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}\) ), IV1, IV2, IV3, TEXT

IUT: \(\quad\) FOR \(i=1\) to 64
IF \((i \bmod 8 \neq 0)\) \{process all bits except parity bits \(\}\)
\{
With the feedback path disconnected:
Perform
Triple DES:

T1: \(\quad \mathrm{I} 1=\mathrm{IV} 1\)
I1 is read into TDEA and is encrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in TEMP1 \(1_{1}\)

T2: \(\quad\) I2 \(=\) IV2
I2 is read into TDEA and is encrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) using \(K E Y 1_{i}\), resulting in TEMP2 \({ }_{1}\)

TEMP1 \(1_{1}\) is decrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in TEMP1 \({ }_{2}\)

T3: \(\quad \mathrm{I} 3=\mathrm{IV} 3\)
I3 is read into TDEA and is encrypted by DEA \(_{1}\) using KEY \(1_{i}\), resulting in TEMP3 \({ }_{1}\)

TEMP \(2_{1}\) is decrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in TEMP \(2_{2}\)

Connect the feedback path:
TEMP \(1_{2}\) is encrypted by \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in \(\mathrm{O1}_{\mathrm{i}}\)
\[
\begin{array}{ll} 
& \text { RESULT }_{i}=\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \text { TEXT } \\
\text { T4: } & \mathrm{TEMP}_{1} \text { is decrypted by } \mathrm{DEA}_{2} \text { using } \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}} \text {, resulting in } \\
\text { TEMP3 } \\
2
\end{array}
\]

Send \(\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) (representing \(^{\mathrm{KEY}} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) ), I1, I2, I3, TEXT, RESULT \(_{\mathrm{i}}\), RESULT \(_{\mathrm{i}}\), RESULT \(_{\mathrm{i}}\)
\(K E Y 1_{i+1}=K E Y 2_{i+1}=K E Y 3_{i+1}=\) vector consisting of " 0 " in every significant bit position except for a single " 1 " bit in position \(\mathrm{i}+1\). Each parity bit may have the value " 1 " or " 0 " to make the KEY odd parity.
\}
TMOVS: Compare results of the 56 encryptions with known answers.
See Table A. 11.

As summarized in Table 59, the Variable KEY Known Answer Test for the TOFB-I Mode is performed as follows:
1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters \(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{1}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{1}\) to contain " 0 " in every significant bit except for a " 1 " in the first position, i.e., the 64 -bit \(K E Y 1_{1 \text { bin }}=K E Y 2_{1}\) \({ }_{\text {bin }}=K E Y 3_{1 \text { bin }}=100000000000000100000001000000010000000100000001\) 0000000100000001 . The equivalent of this value in hexadecimal notation is 8001 010101010101.

NOTE -- the parity bits are set to " 0 " or " 1 " to get odd parity.
b. Initializes the 3 initialization vectors accordingly: IV1 is set to zero, i.e., \(\mathrm{IV}_{1 \text { hex }}=00\) 00000000000000 . Based on specifications in ANSI X9.52-1998, IV2 is computed as IV1 \(+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{1}=5555555555555555\) and IV3 is computed as IV1 \(+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{2}=\) AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA. Since \(\mathrm{IV} 1_{\text {hex }}=0000000000000000\), this equates to IV \(2_{\text {hex }}=5555555555555555\) and \(\mathrm{IV} 3_{\text {hex }}=\) AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA.
c. Initializes the TEXT parameter to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{\text {hex }}=\) 0000000000000000 .
d. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 13.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(i=1\) through 64:
a. With the feedback path disconnected:
1) At time T 1 :
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector IV1 to the input block I1.
b) Process I1 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using \(K E Y 1_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(1_{1}\).
2) At time T2:
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector IV2 to the input block I2.
b) Process I2 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using KEY \(1_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(2_{1}\).
c) TEMP \(1_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using \(K E Y 2_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value \(\mathrm{TEMP} 1_{2}\).
3) At time T3:
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector IV3 to the input block I3.
b) Process I3 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using KEY \(1_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(3_{1}\).
c) TEMP \(2_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using \(K E Y 2_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(2_{2}\).

Connect the feedback path:
d) \(\quad\) TEMP \(1_{2}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O1}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
e) Calculate the RESULT1 \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with TEXT.

At time T4:
a) \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Calculate the RESULT \(2_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O} 2_{i}\) with TEXT.
c) \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\).

\section*{At time T5:}
a) \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Calculate the RESULT3 \({ }_{i}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with TEXT.
b. Forward the current values of the loop number i, \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) (representing KEY1 \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), and KEY \(3_{\mathrm{i}}\) ), IV1, IV2, IV3, TEXT, RESULT \(1_{i}\), RESULT \(_{i}\), and RESULT3 \({ }_{i}\), to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 7.
c. Set \(\mathrm{KEY}_{1+1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{{ }_{\mathrm{i}+1}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{{ }_{i+1}}\) equal to the vector consisting of " 0 " in every significant bit position except for a single " 1 " bit in position \(\mathrm{i}+1\). The parity bits contain " 1 " or " 0 " to make odd parity.

NOTE -- This processing should continue until every significant basis vector has been represented by the KEY parameters. The output from the IUT should consist of 56 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 7.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values found in Table A.11.

\subsection*{5.7.1.4 The Permutation Operation Known Answer Test - TOFB-I Mode}

Table 60 The Permutation Operation Known Answer Test - TOFB-I Mode



As summarized in Table 60, the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the TOFB-I Mode is performed as follows:

\section*{1. The TMOVS:}
a. Initializes the KEY parameters KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 with the 32 constant KEY values from Table A. 12.
b. Initializes the 3 initialization vectors accordingly: IV1 is assigned the value 0, i.e., \(\mathrm{IV}_{\text {hex }}=0000000000000000\). Based on specifications in ANSI X9.52-1998, IV2 is computed by the following equation: IV1 \(+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{1}=5555555555555555\). In hexadecimal, this equates to 5555555555555555. And IV3 is computed by the equation IV1 \(+R_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{2}=A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A\). In hexadecimal, this equates to AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA.
c. Initializes the TEXT parameter to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{\text {hex }}=\) 0000000000000000 .
d. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 18.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(\mathrm{i}=1\) through 32 :
a. With the feedback path disconnected:
1) At time T 1 :
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector IV1 to the input block I1.
b) Process I1 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using KEY \(1_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(1_{1}\).

At time T2:
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector IV2 to the input block I2.
b) Process I2 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using \(K E Y 1_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(2_{1}\).
c) TEMP \(1_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using \(K E Y 2_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(1_{2}\).

At time T3:
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector IV3 to the input block I3.
b) Process I3 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(3_{1}\).
c) TEMP \(2_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using \(K E Y 2_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value \(\mathrm{TEMP} 2_{2}\).

Connect the feedback path:
d) \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
e) Calculate the RESULT1 \(1_{i}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with TEXT.

At time T4:
a) \(\mathrm{TEMP} 2_{2}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Calculate the RESULT2 \(2_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) with TEXT.
c) \(\quad\) TEMP \(3_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\).

At time T5:
a) \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Calculate the RESULT3 \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with TEXT.
b. Forward the current values of the loop number i, \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) (representing KEY1 \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), and KEY \(_{i}\) ), IV1, IV2, IV3, TEXT, RESULT \(1_{i}\), RESULT \(_{i}\), and RESULT \({ }_{i}\), to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 7.
c. Set \(\mathrm{KEY}_{1+1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{i} 1}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) equal to the corresponding \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) supplied by the TMOVS.

NOTE -- The above processing should continue until all 32 KEY values are processed. The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 32 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 7.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values found Table A.12.
5.7.1.5

Table 61 The Substitution Table Known Answer Test - TOFB-I Mode

```

RESULT1 }\mp@subsup{\textrm{i}}{\textrm{i}}{= O1}\mp@subsup{1}{\textrm{i}}{}\oplus\mathrm{ TEXT
T4: TEMP3 is is decrypted by DEA }\mp@subsup{2}{2}{}\mathrm{ using KEY }\mp@subsup{2}{\textrm{i}}{2}\mathrm{ , resulting in
TEMP3 }\mp@subsup{}{2}{
TEMP2 2 is encrypted by DEA }\mp@subsup{3}{3}{}\mathrm{ using KEY3 ;
RESULT2 }\mp@subsup{}{\textrm{i}}{= O2}\mp@subsup{2}{\textrm{i}}{}\oplus\mathrm{ TEXT
T5: TEMP3 3 is encrypted by DEA }\mp@subsup{\mp@code{3}}{3}{}\mathrm{ using KEY3 }\mp@subsup{}{\textrm{i}}{2}\mathrm{ , resulting in O3 }\mp@subsup{}{\textrm{i}}{
RESULT3 }\mp@subsup{}{\textrm{i}}{= O3}\mp@subsup{\textrm{O}}{\textrm{i}}{}\oplus\mathrm{ TEXT

```

```

            TEXT, RESULT1 }\mp@subsup{1}{\textrm{i}}{2},\mp@subsup{\mathrm{ RESULT2 }}{\textrm{i}}{},\mp@subsup{\mathrm{ RESULT3 }}{\textrm{i}}{
    ```

```

            IV1 }\mp@subsup{1}{i+1}{}=\mathrm{ corresponding DATA }\mp@subsup{\textrm{A}}{\textrm{i}+1}{}\mathrm{ from TMOVS
            IV}\mp@subsup{2}{i+1}{}=IV\mp@subsup{1}{i+1}{}+\mp@subsup{R}{1}{}\operatorname{mod}\mp@subsup{2}{}{64}\mathrm{ where }\mp@subsup{R}{1}{}=555555555555555
            IV3}\mp@subsup{\mp@code{i}+1}{}{= IV 1 1 i+1}+\mp@subsup{R}{2}{}\operatorname{mod}\mp@subsup{2}{}{64}\mathrm{ where R R =AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
    }

```

TMOVS: Compare results from each loop with known answers.
See Table A. 10.

As summarized in Table 61, the Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the TCFB-P Mode is performed as follows:
1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY-IV1 pairs with the 19 constant KEY-DATA values from Table A.10. The DATA values are assigned to the values of the initialization vectors IV1 \(1_{\mathrm{i}}\). The KEY value indicates the values of \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), i.e., \(K E Y 1_{i}=K E Y 2_{i}=K E Y 3_{i}\). Based on specifications in ANSI X9.52-1998, IV2 \({ }_{i}\) is computed as \(I V 1_{i}+R_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(R_{1}=5555555555555555\) and \(I V 3_{i}\) is computed as \(\operatorname{IV} 1_{i}+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{2}=\) AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA.
b. Initializes the TEXT parameter to the constant hexadecimal value 0 , i.e., \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{\text {hex }}=\) 0000000000000000 .
c. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 25.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(\mathrm{i}=1\) through 19 :
a. With the feedback path disconnected:
1) At time T1:
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector \(\mathrm{IV} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\) to the input block I1.
b) Process I1 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using \(K E Y 1_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(1_{1}\).

At time T2:
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector IV2 \({ }_{i}\) to the input block I2.
b) Process I2 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using \(K E Y 1{ }_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(2{ }_{1}\).
c) \(\quad\) TEMP \(1_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using \(K E Y 2_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(1_{2}\).

At time T3:
a) Assign the value of the initialization vector \(\mathrm{IV} 3_{i}\) to the input block I3.
b) Process I3 through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using KEY \(1_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP \(3_{1}\).
c) \(\quad\) TEMP \(2_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using \(K E Y 2_{i}\), resulting in intermediate value \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\).

Connect the feedback path:
d) \(\quad\) TEMP \(1_{2}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O1}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
e) Calculate the RESULT1 \(1_{i}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with TEXT.

At time T4:
a) \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Calculate RESULT2 \(2_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) with TEXT.
c) \(\quad \mathrm{TEMP}_{1}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using KEY \(2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\).

At time T5:
a) \(\mathrm{TEMP}_{2}\) is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\).
b) Calculate the RESULT3 \({ }_{\mathrm{i}}\) by exclusive-ORing \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with TEXT.
b. Forward the current values of the loop number i, \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) (representing KEY1 \(1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) ), \(\mathrm{IV} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{IV} 2_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{IV} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), TEXT, \(^{2}\) RESULT \(1_{\mathrm{i}}\), RESULT \(_{\mathrm{i}}\), and RESULT \(3_{i}\), to the TMOVS as specified in Output Type 7.
c. Set \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) equal to the corresponding \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) supplied by the TMOVS.
d. Set IV1 \(1_{i+1}\) equal to the corresponding DATA \(_{i+1}\) supplied by the TMOVS. Based on specifications in ANSI X9.52-1998, IV \(2_{i+1}\) is set to \(\operatorname{IV} 1_{i+1}+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{1}=5555555555555555\) and \(\mathrm{IV} 3_{i+1}\) is set to \(\mathrm{IV} 1_{\mathrm{i}+1}+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{2}=\) AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA.

NOTE -- The above processing should continue until all 19 KEY-DATA are processed. The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 19 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 7.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to the known values found in Table A.10.

\subsection*{5.7.2 The Monte Carlo Tests - TOFB-I Mode}

The TOFB-I mode of operation has one Monte Carlo test that is used regardless of the process, i.e., the same Monte Carlo test is used for IUTs supporting the encryption and/or decryption process. In the following description of the Monte Carlo test, TEXT refers to plaintext, and RESULT refers to ciphertext if the IUT performs TOFB-I encryption. If the IUT supports TOFB-I decryption, TEXT refers to ciphertext, and RESULT refers to plaintext.

Table 62 The Monte Carlo Test - TOFB-I Mode

```

                    IF (KEY 1 }\mp@subsup{i}{\textrm{i}}{}\mathrm{ and KEY2 i
                KEY2}\mp@subsup{}{\textrm{i}}{2}\mathrm{ , and KEY3 }\mp@subsup{}{\textrm{i}}{}\mathrm{ are independent)
                        KEY2 }\mp@subsup{\textrm{i}}{1+1}{}=\mp@subsup{\textrm{KEY}}{\textrm{i}}{}\oplus\mp@subsup{\textrm{RESULT}}{\textrm{j}-1}{
                    ELSE
                            KEY2 }\mp@subsup{\textrm{i}+1}{}{= KEY2 }\mp@subsup{\textrm{i}}{\textrm{i}}{}\oplus\mp@subsup{\textrm{RESULT}}{\textrm{j}}{
    ```


```

                    KEY3 }\mp@subsup{}{\textrm{i}+1}{}=\mp@subsup{\textrm{KEY3}}{\textrm{i}}{}\oplus\mp@subsup{\textrm{RESULT}}{\textrm{j}}{
                    ELSE
            KEY3 }\mp@subsup{\textrm{i}+1}{}{=}=\mp@subsup{\textrm{KEY}}{\textrm{i}}{}\oplus\mp@subsup{\textrm{RESULT}}{\textrm{j}-2}{
            TEXT
            I0 = O
            I1 =I0 + R R mod 2 }\mp@subsup{}{}{64}\mathrm{ where }\mp@subsup{\textrm{R}}{1}{}=555555555555555
                    I2 = I0 + R R mod 2 }\mp@subsup{}{}{64}\mathrm{ where R R2=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
    }

```

TMOVS: Check the IUT's output for correctness.

As summarized in Table 62, the Monte Carlo Test for the TOFB-I is performed as follows:
1. The TMOVS:
a. Initializes the KEY parameters \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{0}, \mathrm{KEY}_{0}{ }_{0}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{3}\), the initialization vectors IV1, IV2, and IV3, and the TEXT \(_{0}\). The TEXT, IVs, and KEYs consist of 64 bits each. IV2 is assigned the value of IV1 \(+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{1}=\) 5555555555555555 . IV3 is assigned the value of IV1 \(+R_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(R_{2}=\) AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA.
b. Forwards this information to the IUT using Input Type 24.
2. The IUT should perform the following for \(\mathrm{i}=0\) through 399:
a. Record the current values of the output loop number \(\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), IV1, IV2, IV3, and TEXT \({ }_{0}\).
b. Perform the following for \(\mathrm{j}=0\) through 9,999:
1) If \(\mathrm{j}=0,1\), or 2 , assign the value of the initialization vector \(\operatorname{IV}(\mathrm{j}+1)\) to the input block Ij.
2) If \(\mathrm{j}>2\), assign Ij with the value of the output block \(\mathrm{O}(\mathrm{j}-3)\).
3) Process Ij through the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{1}\) in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP1.
4) TEMP1 is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{2}\) in the decrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in intermediate value TEMP2.
5) TEMP2 is fed into the DEA stage \(\mathrm{DEA}_{3}\) in the encrypt state using \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), resulting in output block \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}\).
6) Calculate the RESULT \(_{\mathrm{j}}\) by exclusive-ORing the \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}\) with the TEXT \(_{\mathrm{j}}\).
7) Prepare for loop \(\mathrm{j}+1\) by assigning the \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{\mathrm{j}+1}\) with the value of the Ij .
c. Record the current values of the input block I0 and RESULT \({ }_{j}\).
d. Forward all recorded values for this loop, as specified in Output Type 8, to the MOVS.
e. In preparation for the next output loop:
1) Assign new values to the KEY parameters, KEY1, KEY2, and KEY3 in preparation for the next outer loop.

The new \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{i+1}\) should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the RESULT \(_{\mathrm{j}}\).

The new \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) calculation is based on the values of the keys. If \(\mathrm{KEY}_{1}\) and \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) are independent and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\), or \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{i}, \mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{i}\) are independent, the new \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the RESULT \(_{\mathrm{j}-1}\). If
\(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), the new \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) should be calculated by exclusiveORing the current \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the RESULT \({ }_{\mathrm{j}}\).

The new \(\mathrm{KEY}_{i_{i+1}}\) calculation is also based on the values of the keys. If \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\), and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) are independent, the new \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\) should be calculated by exclusive-ORing the current \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}\) with the RESULT \(_{j-2}\). If \(K E Y 1_{i}\) and \(\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}\) are independent and \(\mathrm{KEY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 1_{\mathrm{i}}\), or if \(\mathrm{KEY} 1_{i}=\mathrm{KEY} 2_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{KEY} 3_{\mathrm{i}}\), the new \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{i+1}\) should be calculated by exclusiveORing the current \(\mathrm{KEY} 3_{i}\) with the RESULT \({ }_{j}\).
2) Assign a new value to the \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{0}\). The \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{0}\) should be assigned the value of the current Ij exclusive-ORed with \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{0}\).
3) Assign a new value to the I parameters. I0 should be assigned the value of \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}\). I1 should be assigned the value of \(\mathrm{I} 0+\mathrm{R}_{1} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{1}=\) 5555555555555555 . I2 should be assigned the value of \(\mathrm{I} 0+\mathrm{R}_{2} \bmod 2^{64}\) where \(\mathrm{R}_{2}=\) AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA.

NOTE -- the new TEXT and I should be denoted as \(\mathrm{TEXT}_{0}\) and \(\mathrm{I}_{0}\) because these values are used for the first pass through the inner loop when \(\mathrm{j}=0\).

NOTE -- The output from the IUT for this test should consist of 400 output strings. Each output string should consist of information included in Output Type 8.
3. The TMOVS checks the IUT's output for correctness by comparing the received results to known values.

\section*{6. DESIGN OF THE TRIPLE DES MODES OF OPERATION VALIDATION SYSTEM (TMOVS)}

\subsection*{6.1 Design Philosophy}

NIST validation programs are conformance tests rather than measures of product security. NIST validation tests are designed to assist in the detection of accidental implementation errors, and are not designed to detect intentional attempts to misrepresent conformance. Thus, validation by NIST should not be interpreted as an evaluation or endorsement of overall product security.

An IUT is considered validated for a test option when it passes the appropriate set of TMOVS tests. TMOVS testing is via statistical sampling, so validation of an option does not guarantee \(100 \%\) conformance with the option in the standards.

The intent of the validation process is to provide a rigorous conformance process that can be performed at modest cost. NIST does not try to prevent a dishonest vendor from purchasing a validated implementation and using this implementation as the vendor's IUT. Customers who wish to protect themselves against a dishonest vendor could require that the vendor revalidate the IUT in the customer's presence.

\subsection*{6.2 Operation of the TMOVS}

TMOVS testing is done through the NIST Cryptographic Module Validation (CMV) Program. The CMV Program uses laboratories accredited by the NIST National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) to perform conformance tests to cryptographic-related FIPS. A vendor contracts with a Cryptographic Module Testing (CMT) Laboratory accredited by NVLAP. The CMT laboratory either conducts the TMOVS tests on the IUT or supplies initial values to the vendor to conduct the tests. If the vendor conducts the tests, the vendor sends the results to the CMT where they are verified. In both situations, the CMT laboratory submits the results to NIST for validation. If the IUT has successfully completed the tests, NIST issues a validation certificate for the IUT to the vendor. A list of CMT laboratories is available at http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval.

\section*{Appendix A Tables of Values for the Known Answer Tests}

Tables A. 1 through A. 4 were used with single DES. They will work with the triple DES Validation Modes that are backwards compatible with their single counterparts. These include TECB, TCBC, TCFB, and TOFB.

The other tables include the values obtained for ciphertexts C 2 and C 3 . These values are a result of having three initialization vectors. These tables can be used with the interleaved and pipelined configurations of the Triple DES modes of operation.

Table A. 1 Resulting Ciphertext from the Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test
for the TECB, TCBC, TCFB, and TOFB Modes of Operation
(NOTE -- KEY1=KEY2=KEY3 = 0101010101010101 (odd parity set))
\begin{tabular}{||c||c||c||}
\hline ROUND & \begin{tabular}{c} 
PLAINTEXT or IV \\
(depending on mode)
\end{tabular} & CIPHERTEXT \\
\hline \hline 0 & 8000000000000000 & 95 F8 A5 E5 DD 31 D9 00 \\
\hline \hline 1 & 4000000000000000 & DD 7F 12 1C A5 01 56 19 \\
\hline \hline 2 & 2000000000000000 & 2E 86 53 10 4F 38 34 EA \\
\hline \hline 3 & 1000000000000000 & 4B D3 88 FF 6C D8 1D 4F \\
\hline \hline 4 & 0800000000000000 & 20 B9 E7 67 B2 FB 14 56 \\
\hline \hline 5 & 0200000000000000 & 55 57 93 80 D7 71 38 EF \\
\hline \hline 6 & 0100000000000000 & 6C C5 DE FA AF 04 51 2F \\
\hline \hline 7 & & 0D 9F 27 9B A5 D8 72 60 \\
\hline \hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline ROUND & PLAINTEXT or IV (depending on mode) & CIPHERTEXT \\
\hline 8 & 0080000000000000 & D9 03 1B 0271 BD 5A 0A \\
\hline 9 & 0040000000000000 & 424250 B3 7C 3D D9 51 \\
\hline 10 & 0020000000000000 & B8 06 1B 7E CD 9A 21 E5 \\
\hline 11 & 0010000000000000 & F1 5D 0F 28 6B 65 BD 28 \\
\hline 12 & 0008000000000000 & AD D0 CC 8D 6E 5D EB A1 \\
\hline 13 & 0004000000000000 & E6 D5 F8 2752 AD 63 D1 \\
\hline 14 & 0002000000000000 & EC BF E3 BD 3F 59 1A 5E \\
\hline 15 & 0001000000000000 & F3 56834379 D1 65 CD \\
\hline 16 & 0000800000000000 & 2B 9F 98 2F 2003 7F A9 \\
\hline 17 & 0000400000000000 & 88 9D E0 68 A1 6F 0B E6 \\
\hline 18 & 0000200000000000 & E1 9E 27 5D 84 6A 1298 \\
\hline 19 & 0000100000000000 & 32 9A 8E D5 23 D7 1A EC \\
\hline 20 & 0000080000000000 & E7 FC E2 2557 D 23 C 97 \\
\hline 21 & 0000040000000000 & 12 A9 F5 81 7F F2 D6 5D \\
\hline 22 & 0000020000000000 & A4 84 C 3 AD 38 DC 9C 19 \\
\hline 23 & 0000010000000000 & FB E0 0A 8A 1E F8 AD 72 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline ROUND & PLAINTEXT or IV (depending on mode) & CIPHERTEXT \\
\hline 24 & 0000008000000000 & 750 D 079407521363 \\
\hline 25 & 0000004000000000 & 64 FE ED 9C 72 4C 2F AF \\
\hline 26 & 0000002000000000 & F0 2B 26 3B 32 8E 2B 60 \\
\hline 27 & 0000001000000000 & 9D 6455 5A 9A 10 B8 52 \\
\hline 28 & 0000000800000000 & D1 06 FF 0B ED 5255 D7 \\
\hline 29 & 0000000400000000 & E1 65 2C 6B 13 8C 64 A5 \\
\hline 30 & 0000000200000000 & E4 28581186 EC 8F 46 \\
\hline 31 & 0000000100000000 & AE B5 F5 ED E2 2D 1A 36 \\
\hline 32 & 0000000080000000 & E9 43 D7 56 8A EC 0C 5C \\
\hline 33 & 0000000040000000 & DF 98 C8 27 6F 54 B0 4B \\
\hline 34 & 0000000020000000 & B1 60E4 68 0F 6C 69 6F \\
\hline 35 & 0000000010000000 & FA 0752 B0 7D 9C 4A B8 \\
\hline 36 & 0000000008000000 & CA 3A 2B 03 6D BC 8502 \\
\hline 37 & 0000000004000000 & 5E 090551 7B B5 9B CF \\
\hline 38 & 0000000002000000 & 81 4E EB 3B 91 D9 0726 \\
\hline 39 & 0000000001000000 & 4D 49 DB 153291 9C 9F \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline ROUND & PLAINTEXT or IV (depending on mode) & CIPHERTEXT \\
\hline 40 & 0000000000800000 & 25 EB 5F C3 F8 CF 0621 \\
\hline 41 & 0000000000400000 & AB 6A 20 C0 62 0D 1C 6F \\
\hline 42 & 0000000000200000 & 79 E9 0D BC 98 F9 2C CA \\
\hline 43 & 0000000000100000 & 86 6E CE DD 8072 BB 0E \\
\hline 44 & 0000000000080000 & 8B 5453 6F 2F 3E 64 A8 \\
\hline 45 & 0000000000040000 & EA 51 D3 975595 B8 6B \\
\hline 46 & 0000000000020000 & CA FF C6 AC 4542 DE 31 \\
\hline 47 & 0000000000010000 & 8D D4 5A 2D DF 9079 6C \\
\hline 48 & 0000000000008000 & 1029 D5 5E 88 0E C2 D0 \\
\hline 49 & 0000000000004000 & 5D 86 CB 2363 9D BE A9 \\
\hline 50 & 0000000000002000 & 1D 1C A8 53 AE 7C 0C 5F \\
\hline 51 & 0000000000001000 & CE 33232924 8F 3228 \\
\hline 52 & 0000000000000800 & 8405 D1 AB E2 4F B9 42 \\
\hline 53 & 0000000000000400 & E6 43 D7 8090 CA 4207 \\
\hline 54 & 0000000000000200 & 4822 1B 993774 8A 23 \\
\hline 55 & 0000000000000100 & DD 7C 0B BD 61 FA FD 54 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{||c||c||c||}
\hline ROUND & \begin{tabular}{c} 
PLAINTEXT or IV \\
(depending on mode)
\end{tabular} & CIPHERTEXT \\
\hline \hline 56 & 0000000000000080 & 2F BC 29 1A 57 0D B5 C4 \\
\hline \hline 57 & 0000000000000040 & E0 7C 30 D7 E4 E2 6E 12 \\
\hline 58 & 0000000000000020 & 09 53 E2 25 8E 8E 90 A1 \\
\hline 59 & 0000000000000010 & 5B 71 1B C4 CE EB F2 EE \\
\hline 60 & 0000000000000008 & CC 08 3F 1E 6D 9E 85 F6 \\
\hline \hline 61 & 0000000000000002 & D2 FD 88 67 D5 0D 2D FE \\
\hline \hline 62 & 0000000000000001 & 06 E7 EA 22 CE 92 70 8F \\
\hline \hline 63 & & 16 6B 40 B4 4A BA 4B D6 \\
\hline \hline
\end{tabular}

Table A. 2 Resulting Ciphertext from the Variable Key Known Answer Test for the TECB, TCBC, TCFB, and TOFB Modes of Operation
(NOTE -- Plaintext/text = 0000000000000000 and, where applicable, IV = 0000000000000000 )
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline ROUND & KEY & CIPHERTEXT \\
\hline 0 & 8001010101010101 & 95 A8 D7 2813 DA A9 4D \\
\hline 1 & 4001010101010101 & 0E EC 1487 DD 8C 26 D5 \\
\hline 2 & 2001010101010101 & 7A D1 6F FB 79 C4 5926 \\
\hline 3 & 1001010101010101 & D3 746294 CA 6A 6C F3 \\
\hline 4 & 0801010101010101 & 80 9F 5F 87 3C 1F D7 61 \\
\hline 5 & 0401010101010101 & C0 2F AF FE C9 89 D1 FC \\
\hline 6 & 0201010101010101 & 4615 AA 1D 33 E7 2F 10 \\
\hline 7 & 0180010101010101 & 2055123350 C 00858 \\
\hline 8 & 0140010101010101 & DF 3B 99 D6 577397 C8 \\
\hline 9 & 0120010101010101 & 31 FE 1736 9B 5288 C9 \\
\hline 10 & 0110010101010101 & DF DD 3C C6 4D AE 1642 \\
\hline 11 & 0108010101010101 & 17 8C 83 CE 2B 39 9D 94 \\
\hline 12 & 0104010101010101 & 50 F6 3632 4A 9B 7F 80 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline ROUND & KEY & CIPHERTEXT \\
\hline 13 & 0102010101010101 & A8 46 8E E3 BC 18 F0 6D \\
\hline 14 & 0101800101010101 & A2 DC 9E 92 FD 3C DE 92 \\
\hline 15 & 0101400101010101 & CA C0 9F 79 7D 031287 \\
\hline 16 & 0101200101010101 & 90 BA 68 0B 22 AE B5 25 \\
\hline 17 & 0101100101010101 & CE 7A 24 F3 50 E2 80 B6 \\
\hline 18 & 0101080101010101 & 88 2B FF 0A A0 1A 0B 87 \\
\hline 19 & 0101040101010101 & 25610288924511 C 2 \\
\hline 20 & 0101020101010101 & C7 1516 C 29 C 75 D 170 \\
\hline 21 & 0101018001010101 & 5199 C2 9A 52 C 9 F 059 \\
\hline 22 & 0101014001010101 & C2 2F 0A 29 4A 71 F2 9F \\
\hline 23 & 0101012001010101 & EE 37148371 4C 02 EA \\
\hline 24 & 0101011001010101 & A8 1F BD 44 8F 9E 52 2F \\
\hline 25 & 0101010801010101 & 4F 64 4C 92 E1 92 DF ED \\
\hline 26 & 0101010401010101 & 1A FA 9A 66 A6 DF 92 AE \\
\hline 27 & 0101010201010101 & B3 C1 CC 71 5C B8 79 D8 \\
\hline 28 & 0101010180010101 & 19 D0 32 E6 4A B0 BD 8B \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline ROUND & KEY & CIPHERTEXT \\
\hline 29 & 0101010140010101 & 3C FA A7 A7 DC 8720 DC \\
\hline 30 & 0101010120010101 & B7 26 5F 7F 44 7A C6 F3 \\
\hline 31 & 0101010110010101 & 9D B7 3B 3C 0D 16 3F 54 \\
\hline 32 & 0101010108010101 & 8181 B6 5B AB F4 A9 75 \\
\hline 33 & 0101010104010101 & 93 C9 B6 4042 EA A2 40 \\
\hline 34 & 0101010102010101 & 5570530829705592 \\
\hline 35 & 0101010101800101 & 8638809 E 878787 A 0 \\
\hline 36 & 0101010101400101 & 41 B9 A7 9A F7 9A C2 08 \\
\hline 37 & 0101010101200101 & 7A 9B E4 2F 2009 A8 92 \\
\hline 38 & 0101010101100101 & 2903 8D 56 BA 6D 2745 \\
\hline 39 & 0101010101080101 & 5495 C6 AB F1 E5 DF 51 \\
\hline 40 & 0101010101040101 & AE 13 DB D5 61488933 \\
\hline 41 & 0101010101020101 & 02 4D 1F FA 8904 E3 89 \\
\hline 42 & 0101010101018001 & D1 3997 12 F9 9B F0 2E \\
\hline 43 & 0101010101014001 & 14 C1 D7 C1 CF FE C7 9E \\
\hline 44 & 0101010101012001 & 1D E5 27 9D AE 3B ED 6F \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{||l||c||c||}
\hline ROUND & KEY & CIPHERTEXT \\
\hline \hline 45 & 0101010101011001 & E9 41 A3 3F 85 50 13 03 \\
\hline \hline 46 & 0101010101010801 & DA 99 DB BC 9A 03 F3 79 \\
\hline \hline 47 & 0101010101010401 & B7 FC 92 F9 1D 8E 92 E9 \\
\hline \hline 48 & 0101010101010201 & AE 8E 5C AA 3C A0 4E 85 \\
\hline \hline 49 & 0101010101010180 & 9C C6 2D F4 3B 6E ED 74 \\
\hline \hline 50 & 0101010101010120 & A1 AB 21 90 54 5B 91 D7 \\
\hline \hline 51 & 0101010101010110 & 087504 1E 64 C5 70 F7 \\
\hline \hline 52 & 0101010101010108 & 5 D8 59 45 28 BE BE F1 CC \\
\hline \hline 53 & 0101010101010104 & FC DB 32 91 DE 21 F0 C0 \\
\hline \hline 54 & 0101010101010102 & \(869 E\) FD 7F 9F 26 5A 09 \\
\hline \hline 55 & & \\
\hline \hline
\end{tabular}

Table A. 3 Values To Be Used for the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for the TECB, TCBC, TCFB, and TOFB Modes of Operation (NOTE -- P/TEXT = 0000000000000000 for each round
where applicable, IV \(=0000000000000000\).
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline ROUND & KEY & C/RESULT \\
\hline 0 & 1046913489980131 & 88 D5 5E 54 F5 4C 97 B4 \\
\hline 1 & 1007103489988020 & 0C 0C C0 0C 83 EA 48 FD \\
\hline 2 & 10071034 C 8980120 & 83 BC 8E F3 A6 570183 \\
\hline 3 & 1046103489988020 & DF 72 5D CA D9 4E A2 E9 \\
\hline 4 & 1086911519190101 & E6 52 B5 3B 55 0B E8 B0 \\
\hline 5 & 1086911519580101 & AF 527120 C 485 CB B0 \\
\hline 6 & 5107 B0 1519580101 & 0F 04 CE 39 3D B9 26 D5 \\
\hline 7 & 1007 B0 1519190101 & C9 F0 0F FC 74079067 \\
\hline 8 & 3107915498080101 & 7C FD 82 A5 9325 2B 4E \\
\hline 9 & 3107919498080101 & CB 49 A2 F9 E9 1363 E3 \\
\hline 10 & 10079115 B9 080140 & 00 B 588 BE 70 D2 3F 56 \\
\hline 11 & 3107911598080140 & 40 6A 9A 6A B4 3399 AE \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline ROUND & KEY & C/RESULT \\
\hline 12 & 1007 D0 1589980101 & 6C B7 7361 1D CA 9A DA \\
\hline 13 & 9107911589980101 & 67 FD 21 C1 7D BB 5D 70 \\
\hline 14 & 9107 D0 1589190101 & 9592 CB 4110430787 \\
\hline 15 & 1007 D0 1598980120 & A6 B7 FF 68 A3 18 DD D3 \\
\hline 16 & 1007940498190101 & 4D 102196 C9 14 CA 16 \\
\hline 17 & 0107910491190401 & 2D FA 9F 4573594965 \\
\hline 18 & 0107910491190101 & B4 660481 6C 0E 0774 \\
\hline 19 & 0107940491190401 & 6E 7E 6221 A4 F3 4E 87 \\
\hline 20 & 1907921098 1A 0101 & AA 85 E7 4643233199 \\
\hline 21 & 1007911998190801 & 2E 5A 19 DB 4D 1962 D6 \\
\hline 22 & 1007911998 1A 0801 & 23 A8 66 A8 09 D3 0894 \\
\hline 23 & 1007921098190101 & D8 12 D9 61 F0 17 D3 20 \\
\hline 24 & 100791159819010 B & 05560581 6E 5860 8F \\
\hline 25 & 1004801598190101 & AB D8 8E 8B 1B 7716 F1 \\
\hline 26 & 1004801598190102 & 53 7A C9 5B E6 9D A1 E1 \\
\hline 27 & 1004801598190108 & AE D0 F6 AE 3C 25 CD D8 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{||l||c||c||}
\hline ROUND & KEY & C/RESULT \\
\hline \hline 28 & 1002911598100104 & B3 E3 5A 5E E5 3E 7B 8D \\
\hline \hline 29 & 1002911598190104 & 61 C7 9C 71 92 1A 2E F8 \\
\hline \hline 30 & 1002911598100201 & E2 F5 72 8F 09 95 01 3C \\
\hline \hline 31 & 1002911698100101 & 1A EA C3 9A 61 F0 A4 64 \\
\hline \hline
\end{tabular}

Table A. 4 Values To Be Used for the Substitution Table Known Answer Test for the TECB, TCBC, TCFB, and TOFB Modes of Operation
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline ROUND & KEY & P/TEXT & C/RESULT \\
\hline 0 & 7C A1 1045 4A 1A 6E 57 & 01 A1 D6 D0 39776742 & 69 0F 5B 0D 9A 2693 9B \\
\hline 1 & 0131 D9 61 9D C1 37 6E & 5C D5 4C A8 3D EF 57 DA & 7A 38 9D 1035 4B D2 71 \\
\hline 2 & 07 A1 13 3E 4A 0B 2686 & 0248 D4 3806 F6 7172 & 86 8E BB 51 CA B4 59 9A \\
\hline 3 & 384967 4C 2602319 E & 5145 4B 58 2D DF 440 A & 717887 6E 01 F1 9B 2A \\
\hline 4 & 04 B9 15 BA 43 FE B5 B6 & 42 FD 44305957 7F A2 & AF 37 FB 42 1F 8C 4095 \\
\hline 5 & 0113 B9 70 FD 34 F2 CE & 05 9B 5E 0851 CF 14 3A & 86 A5 60 F1 0E C6 D8 5B \\
\hline 6 & 0170 F1 7546 8F B5 E6 & 0756 D8 E0 774761 D2 & 0C D3 DA 020021 DC 09 \\
\hline 7 & 4329 7F AD 38 E3 73 FE & 762514 B8 29 BF 48 6A & EA 67 6B 2C B7 DB 2B 7A \\
\hline 8 & 07 A7 137045 DA 2A 16 & 3B DD 119049372802 & DF D6 4A 815 C AF 1A 0F \\
\hline 9 & 04689104 C2 FD 3B 2F & 2695 5F 6835 AF 609 A & 5C 51 3C 9C 4886 C 088 \\
\hline 10 & 37 D0 6B B5 16 CB 7546 & 16 4D 5E 40 4F 275232 & 0A 2A EE AE 3F F4 AB 77 \\
\hline 11 & 1F 0826 0D 1A C2 46 5E & 6B 056 E 1875 9F 5C CA & EF 1B F0 3E 5D FA 57 5A \\
\hline 12 & 58402364 1A BA 6176 & 00 4B D6 EF 09176062 & 88 BF 0D B6 D7 0D EE 56 \\
\hline 13 & 025816164629 B0 07 & 48 0D 3900 6E E7 62 F2 & A1 F9 915541020 B 56 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{||l||l||c||c||}
\hline \multicolumn{1}{|c|}{ ROUND } & \multicolumn{1}{|c|}{ KEY } & C/TEXT & C/RESULT \\
\hline 14 & 49 79 3E BC 79 B3 25 8F & 437540 C 869 8F 3C FA & 6F BF 1C AF CF FD 05 56 \\
\hline 15 & 4F B0 5E 15 15 AB 73 A7 & 07 2D 43 A0 77 07 52 92 & 2F 22 E4 9B AB 7C A1 AC \\
\hline 16 & 49 E9 5D 6D 4C A2 29 BF & 02 FE 55 77 81 17 F1 2A & 5A 6B 61 2C C2 6C CE 4A \\
\hline 17 & 0183 10 DC 40 9B 26 D6 & 1D 9D 5C 50 18 F7 28 C2 & 5F 4C 03 8E D1 2B 2E 41 \\
\hline 18 & 1C 58 7F 1C 13 92 4F EF & 30 55 32 28 6D 6F 29 5A & 63 FA C0 D0 34 D9 F7 93 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Table A. 5 Resulting Ciphertext from the Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test for TCBC-I Mode of Operation (NOTE -- KEY1 \(=\) KEY2 \(=\) KEY3 \(=0101010101010101\)
\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { IV1 }=0000000000000000 \\
& \text { IV2 }=5555555555555555 \\
& \text { IV3 }=\text { aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa) }
\end{aligned}
\]
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline ROUND & INPUTBLOCK 1 & CIPHERTEXT1 & INPUTBLOCK 2 & CIPHERTEXT2 & INPUTBLOCK 3 & CIPHERTEXT3 \\
\hline 0 & 8000000000000000 & 95f8a5e5dd31d900 & d555555555555555 & f7552ab6cb21e2bc & 2ааааааааааааааа & 5a48d3de869557fd \\
\hline 1 & 4000000000000000 & dd7f121ca5015619 & 1555555555555555 & e0c2af1ebd89a262 & eaaaaaaaaaaaaaa & f15ee2019a5b547c \\
\hline 2 & 2000000000000000 & 2e8653104f3834ea & 7555555555555555 & 05b865a1e49ed109 & 8аааааааааааааа & 3bee595ef860316a \\
\hline 3 & 1000000000000000 & 4bd388ff6cd81d4f & 45555555555555555 & b447313fc704d321 & baaaaaaaaaaaaaa & f6089ca9b722765c \\
\hline 4 & 0800000000000000 & 20b9e767b2fb1456 & 5d55555555555555 & c39193d42381b313 & a2aaaaaaaaaaaaa & af15a8e9b2c14de5 \\
\hline 5 & 0400000000000000 & 55579380d77138ef & 5155555555555555 & 6a2afdae188494b8 & aeaaaaaaaaaaaa & 45089186180bd591 \\
\hline 6 & 0200000000000000 & 6cc5defaaf04512f & 5755555555555555 & 1359f4d663a3209c & a8aaaaaaaaaaaaa & 280d3ae3a00cfbc9 \\
\hline 7 & 0100000000000000 & 0d9f279ba5d87260 & 5455555555555555 & 4a035e6a81d1314b & abaaaaaaaaaaaa & d27eb94e56c3172a \\
\hline 8 & 0080000000000000 & d9031b0271bd5a0a & 55d5555555555555 & 4334b5fe1b7f5320 & aa2aaaaaaaaaaa & b0555ab990b7e95c \\
\hline 9 & 0040000000000000 & 424250b37c3dd951 & 5515555555555555 & f41a29e0d31107b4 & aаеаааааааааааа & f54f2bd8e2eb2bc6 \\
\hline 10 & 0020000000000000 & b8061b7ecd9a21e5 & 5575555555555555 & c8eb2e340855325b & aa8ааааааааааааа & d51175259c607fb4 \\
\hline 11 & 0010000000000000 & f15d0f286b65bd28 & 5545555555555555 & b75847a2f3f2458a & aabaaaaaaaaaaa & 72ea3aadb569af43 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline ROUND & INPUTBLOCK 1 & CIPHERTEXT1 & INPUTBLOCK 2 & CIPHERTEXT2 & INPUTBLOCK 3 & CIPHERTEXT3 \\
\hline 12 & 0008000000000000 & add0cc8d6e5deba1 & 555d555555555555 & be433af4c5ae0f97 & aaa2aaaaaaaaaaa & 9b003151e8602b7d \\
\hline 13 & 0004000000000000 & e6d5f82752ad63d1 & 5551555555555555 & f68101d125e2e284 & aaaeaaaaaaaaaa & fc 1463bb9bba9e11 \\
\hline 14 & 0002000000000000 & ecbfe3bd3f591a5e & 5557555555555555 & fa510732fa871094 & aaa8aaaaaaaaaa & 65f94c59c59b06e 1 \\
\hline 15 & 0001000000000000 & f356834379d165cd & 5554555555555555 & 458d97a8b6ebd0d7 & aaabaaaaaaaaaa & fbcfc086f8111572 \\
\hline 16 & 0000800000000000 & 2b9f982f20037fa9 & 5555d55555555555 & f4169ca3fc6799ed & aaaa2aaaaaaaaaa & 68c9e70b9de8db79 \\
\hline 17 & 0000400000000000 & 889de068a16f0be6 & 5555155555555555 & f47b9f01a5ee74e9 & aaaeaaaaaaaaaa & 63fc8ec1421399b8 \\
\hline 18 & 0000200000000000 & e19e275d846a1298 & 5555755555555555 & ee26a403caca387d & aaaa8aaaaaaaaaa & 3f1d10e9a1a44a92 \\
\hline 19 & 0000100000000000 & 329a8ed523d71aec & 5555455555555555 & af7e5ad1d9f4ecf8 & aaaabaaaaaaaaaa & e3f663de44003f9b \\
\hline 20 & 0000080000000000 & e7fce22557d23c97 & 55555d5555555555 & bb04e854f99f6352 & aaaa22aaaaaaaa & bc2452fd13e00dcc \\
\hline 21 & 0000040000000000 & 12a9f5817ff2d65d & 5555515555555555 & 01f57ble69290d90 & aаaaeaaaaaaaaa & 4432a11e1c320e7a \\
\hline 22 & 0000020000000000 & a484c3ad38dc9c19 & 5555575555555555 & 8ae9dee849b46527 & aaaaa8aaaaaaaaa & ale9e67f13f932b3 \\
\hline 23 & 0000010000000000 & fbe00a8alef8ad72 & 5555545555555555 & cb706efba6b5110e & aaaabaaaaaaaaa & 6fd1d0793clb7af2 \\
\hline 24 & 0000008000000000 & 750d079407521363 & 555555d555555555 & b8b27d1286bdbb26 & aaaaa2aaaaaaaa & 3d2c39f9d26b589e \\
\hline 25 & 0000004000000000 & 64feed9c724c2faf & 5555551555555555 & 9862c9d770558095 & aaaaaeaaaaaaaa & e3a7abc88132ad7d \\
\hline 26 & 0000002000000000 & f02b263b328e2b60 & 5555557555555555 & a213c5c56fdca139 & aaaaąaaaaaaaa & 08cd945738a222c8 \\
\hline 27 & 0000001000000000 & 9d64555a9a10b852 & 5555554555555555 & a3bebc0e23ab87f2 & aaaaaabaaaaaaaa & 568fa34d2fc7225e \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline ROUND & INPUTBLOCK 1 & CIPHERTEXT1 & INPUTBLOCK 2 & CIPHERTEXT2 & INPUTBLOCK 3 & CIPHERTEXT3 \\
\hline 28 & 0000000800000000 & d106ff0bed5255d7 & 5555555d55555555 & c32c19229d84e2b4 & ааааааа2aaaaaaa & 3771887d7266b49d \\
\hline 29 & 0000000400000000 & e1652c6b138c64a5 & 5555555155555555 & e628ceae5cb3bb34 & aaaaaaeaaaaaaa & edd6029a6b80a442 \\
\hline 30 & 0000000200000000 & e428581186ec8f46 & 5555555755555555 & 5924454953 ad 5732 & aaaaaa8aaaaaaa & 0313da097aec4a43 \\
\hline 31 & 0000000100000000 & aeb5f5ede22d1a36 & 5555555455555555 & 7cc987f5fb33b813 & aaaaaabaaaaaaa & 91f5b30f015b4a54 \\
\hline 32 & 0000000080000000 & e943d7568aec0c5c & 55555555d5555555 & 88e3dd1448c4e0ff & aаaaaaa2aaaaaa & 1e60759f038beec1 \\
\hline 33 & 0000000040000000 & df98c8276f54b04b & 5555555515555555 & a49d286e5dfc6143 & aаaаааааеаааааа & \(97061699383 b b f e 0\) \\
\hline 34 & 0000000020000000 & b160e4680f6c696f & 5555555575555555 & a5206a311e9c2515 & aaaaaaa8aaaaaa & 311f3c96e071f173 \\
\hline 35 & 0000000010000000 & fa0752b07d9c4ab8 & 5555555545555555 & b6e4686a8b957cf2 & aaaaaaabbaaaaaa & 1a6849edcb701b07 \\
\hline 36 & 0000000008000000 & ca3a2b036dbc8502 & 555555555 d 555555 & af1200418fd37fdd & aaaaaaaa2aaaaaa & fa5b2fa26d03558b \\
\hline 37 & 0000000004000000 & 5e0905517bb59bcf & 5555555551555555 & 487deccf0fde5b88 & aааааааааеаааааа & bcaa0b7b7b3464c5 \\
\hline 38 & 0000000002000000 & 814eeb3b91d90726 & 5555555557555555 & 456a1865905ed57d & aаaаaаaaa8aaaaa & 3d245b501c6abb74 \\
\hline 39 & 0000000001000000 & 4d49db1532919c9f & 5555555554555555 & 3e2601fa20895e62 & aaaaaaaaabaaaaaa & 62133d9330e2e86b \\
\hline 40 & 0000000000800000 & 25eb5fc3f8cf0621 & 5555555555d55555 & 58da89972266a7e3 & aаaаaаaaa2aaaaa & 5d7d6bd225890b4d \\
\hline 41 & 0000000000400000 & ab6a20c0620d1c6f & 5555555555155555 & feaca17e5dd05c87 & aaaaaaaaaeaaaaa & db36baba70c3b9af \\
\hline 42 & 0000000000200000 & 79e90dbc98f92cca & 5555555555755555 & 88249b73e99c5ac0 & aаaааааааа8ааааа & a2f5ea90c2179ab4 \\
\hline 43 & 0000000000100000 & 866ecedd8072bb0e & 5555555555455555 & 5f8add8784cc3174 & aaaaaaaaabaaaaa & 70470a07cb34e109 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline ROUND & INPUTBLOCK 1 & CIPHERTEXT1 & INPUTBLOCK 2 & CIPHERTEXT2 & INPUTBLOCK 3 & CIPHERTEXT3 \\
\hline 44 & 0000000000080000 & 8b54536f2f3e64a8 & 55555555555d5555 & cd8dc942ae2bb175 & aaaaaaaaaa2aaaa & 659610094ab3824e \\
\hline 45 & 0000000000040000 & ea51d3975595b86b & 5555555555515555 & cf8442863e68e644 & aaaaaaaaaeaaaa & 26e6223634c857a3 \\
\hline 46 & 0000000000020000 & caffc6ac4542de31 & 5555555555575555 & 16952dc89c0acd65 & aaaaaaaaaa8aaaa & ddd0a647be9604lf \\
\hline 47 & 0000000000010000 & 8dd45a2ddf90796c & 5555555555545555 & 8a4fca2b00c49807 & aaaaaaaaaabaaaa & 363219d8cec5a9f3 \\
\hline 48 & 0000000000008000 & 1029d55e880ec2d0 & 555555555555 d 555 & b40225aea121c8d3 & aaaaaaaaaaa2aaa & bb5710f9dc8dde46 \\
\hline 49 & 0000000000004000 & 5d86cb23639dbea9 & 5555555555551555 & 711 c 066 c 13222 flc & aaaaaaaaaaeaaa & ae527ed311a25ea2 \\
\hline 50 & 0000000000002000 & 1d1ca853ae7c0c5f & 5555555555557555 & 4fb69c832db68026 & aaaaaaaaaaa8aaa & af94496800a32656 \\
\hline 51 & 0000000000001000 & ce332329248f3228 & 5555555555554555 & f24c7444edflc394 & aaaaaaaaaaabaaa & c55d7544aleae274 \\
\hline 52 & 0000000000000800 & 8405d1 abe24fb942 & 5555555555555d55 & 6be457abc511e87c & aaaaaaaaaaa2aa & 9ba49db251748896 \\
\hline 53 & 0000000000000400 & e643d78090ca4207 & 5555555555555155 & 6136fefebb0c8118 & aаaаaаааааааеаа & 3d19267de9c12e7b \\
\hline 54 & 0000000000000200 & 4822 1b9937748a23 & 5555555555555755 & d23a8dfe39c98883 & aaaaaaaaaaaa8aa & 5ce84637532650c8 \\
\hline 55 & 0000000000000100 & dd7c0bbd61 fafd54 & 5555555555555455 & afe2e34f009924e2 & aaaaaaaaaaabaa & d43941ab72932bb0 \\
\hline 56 & 0000000000000080 & 2fbc291a570db5c4 & 55555555555555 d 5 & Oadcf552ec1754c6 & aаaaaaaaaaaa2a & 816c454ba7894865 \\
\hline 57 & 0000000000000040 & e07c30d7e4e26e12 & 5555555555555515 & c06e80c5238135bb & aaaaaaaaaaaaea & 74bc744f10f63889 \\
\hline 58 & 0000000000000020 & 0953e2258e8e90a1 & 5555555555555575 & 0912754e 7c42f637 & aaaaaaaaaaaa8a & 3d2565d9bf62cdbd \\
\hline 59 & 0000000000000010 & 5b711bc4ceebf2ee & 5555555555555545 & b4f82967c658adb8 & aaaaaaaaaaaaba & a2e13c5701a60444 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|l|l|l|l|l|l|}
\hline ROUND & INPUTBLOCK 1 & CIPHERTEXT1 & INPUTBLOCK 2 & CIPHERTEXT2 & INPUTBLOCK 3 & CIPHERTEXT3 \\
\hline 60 & 0000000000000008 & cc083fle6d9e85f6 & 555555555555555 d & 006 fa 12 a 796 ac 4 d 3 & aaaaaaaaaaaaaa2 & cbe2873fd6f63048 \\
\hline 61 & 0000000000000004 & d2fd8867d50d2dfe & 5555555555555551 & \(1 \mathrm{a} 4 a 364616460 \mathrm{~d} 44\) & aaaaaaaaaaaaae & cc6adcef1be975ef \\
\hline 62 & 0000000000000002 & 06 e 7 ea 22 ce 92708 f & 5555555555555557 & f307b5bcd44f3d8d & aaaaaaaaaaaaa8 & 991d770b2bf051dc \\
\hline 63 & 0000000000000001 & \(166 \mathrm{~b} 40 \mathrm{~b} 44 \mathrm{aba4bd6}\) & 5555555555555554 & 9cblc3932c005c49 & aaaaaaaaaaaaab & 17d8e9c374d14494 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Table A. 6 Resulting Ciphertext from the Inverse Permutation Known Answer Test for TCBC-I Mode of Operation (Encryption Process)
\[
\begin{gathered}
(\text { NOTE -- KEY } 1=\text { KEY2 }=\text { KEY3 }=0101010101010101 \\
\text { IV1 }=0000000000000000 \\
\text { IV2 }=5555555555555555 \\
\text { IV3 }=\text { aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa) }
\end{gathered}
\]
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline ROUND & PLAINTEXT1 & CIPHERTEXT1 & PLAINTEXT2 & CIPHERTEXT2 & PLAINTEXT3 & CIPHERTEXT3 \\
\hline 0 & 95f8a5e5dd31d900 & 8000000000000000 & f7552ab6cb21e2bc & 713d058fe58a43f7 & 5a48d3de869557fd & e4999d5c3cceee44 \\
\hline 1 & dd7f121ca5015619 & 4000000000000000 & e0c2af1ebd89a262 & 0ac760c01e5927ef & f15ee2019a5b547c & accd15b5dde0b5c2 \\
\hline 2 & 2e8653104f3834ea & 2000000000000000 & 05b865a1e49ed109 & 363130ca94da9d8a & 3bee595ef860316a & 69732f3dbb5652b1 \\
\hline 3 & 4bd388ff6cd81d4f & 1000000000000000 & b447313fc704d321 & 1e14d9109bc1f46c & f6089ca9b722765c & ace935a115450a05 \\
\hline 4 & 20b9e767b2fb1456 & 0800000000000000 & c39193d42381b313 & 6a46ef972da6a833 & af15a8e9b2c14de5 & c1b2f69f9a21090d \\
\hline 5 & 55579380d77138ef & 0400000000000000 & 6a2afdae188494b8 & 330aec7886295181 & 45089186180bd591 & a8f987e6d0d3af25 \\
\hline 6 & 6cc5defaaf04512f & 0200000000000000 & 1359f4d663a3209c & e518b154c8b8c8a6 & 280d3ae3a00cfbc9 & 87f0fbcb6b40af68 \\
\hline 7 & 0d9f279ba5d87260 & 0100000000000000 & 4a035e6a81d1314b & 8dec119b560a53d0 & d27eb94e56c3172a & 6aa899298c76715b \\
\hline 8 & d9031b0271bd5a0a & 0080000000000000 & 4334b5fe1b7f5320 & d8807ced29f8f8d1 & b0555ab990b7e95c & 7f17a4e7532b04f9 \\
\hline 9 & 424250b37c3dd951 & 0040000000000000 & f41a29e0d31107b4 & dbe8eba35e2a295b & f54f2bd8e2eb2bc6 & 5c899d0cf0f8a135 \\
\hline 10 & b8061b7ecd9a21e5 & 0020000000000000 & c8eb2e340855325b & fa5b70d1b836e88d & d51175259c607fb4 & 726616043 a 1 c 0107 \\
\hline 11 & f15d0f286b65bd28 & 0010000000000000 & b75847a2f3f2458a & 4be2d4ffa6f22133 & 72ea3aadb569af43 & ba0432be3b5bb6f8 \\
\hline 12 & add0cc8d6e5deba1 & 0008000000000000 & be433af4c5ae0f97 & b85a5c395b3a5885 & 9b003151e8602b7d & e40807ea13dd109e \\
\hline 13 & e6d5f82752ad63d1 & 0004000000000000 & f68101d125e2e284 & 9f65cff48d26c258 & fc1463bb9bba9e11 & 7851707ef934aa75 \\
\hline 14 & ecbfe3bd3f591a5e & 0002000000000000 & fa510732fa871094 & 40e8813c718539ac & 65f94c59c59b06e1 & d51aab52aa37dc8d \\
\hline 15 & f356834379d165cd & 0001000000000000 & 458d97a8b6ebd0d7 & 289a7729f22d7703 & fbcfc086f8111572 & 266e7b0862cf5fc2 \\
\hline 16 & 2b9f982f20037fa9 & 0000800000000000 & f4169ca3fc6799ed & a11b556e8c1b26c5 & 68c9e70b9de8db79 & aedab274b2ef15c9 \\
\hline 17 & 889de068a16f0be6 & 0000400000000000 & f47b9f01a5ee74e9 & 3683a86916c7b11d & 63fc8ec1421399b8 & 80fbb2539dd96d8f \\
\hline 18 & e19e275d846a1298 & 0000200000000000 & ee26a403caca387d & 9f073f4f068f3d0e & 3f1d10e9a1a44a92 & 498437929c6ccf59 \\
\hline 19 & 329a8ed523d71aec & 0000100000000000 & af7e5ad1d9f4ecf8 & 07712f196c02eb9b & e3f663de44003f9b & c4ebb01e305e41e2 \\
\hline 20 & e7fce22557d23c97 & 0000080000000000 & bb04e854f99f6352 & 93f4126615626c01 & bc2452fd13e00dcc & 82fb4a9ce4c92818 \\
\hline 21 & 12a9f5817ff2d65d & 0000040000000000 & 01f57b1e69290d90 & b6958170aba384c9 & 4432a11e1c320e7a & 91239239e22f0280 \\
\hline 22 & a484c3ad38dc9c19 & 0000020000000000 & 8ae9dee849b46527 & 3bb724cf5e35707d & a1e9e67f13f932b3 & cc30662b51d40c1a \\
\hline 23 & fbe00a8a1ef8ad72 & 0000010000000000 & cb706efba6b5110e & 9fe1afb876cdb756 & 6fd1d0793c1b7af2 & 8e67cf5371a467a2 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline ROUND & PLAINTEXT1 & CIPHERTEXT1 & PLAINTEXT2 & CIPHERTEXT2 & PLAINTEXT3 & CIPHERTEXT3 \\
\hline 24 & 750d079407521363 & 0000008000000000 & b8b27d1286bdbb26 & 1db03e2b95785d8a & 3d2c39f9d26b589e & 6e79366486097eba \\
\hline 25 & 64feed9c724c2faf & 0000004000000000 & 9862c9d770558095 & ea4e26144ada8e2b & e3a7abc88132ad7d & ce2971055091a1af \\
\hline 26 & f02b263b328e2b60 & 0000002000000000 & a213c5c56fdca139 & 97255bd98b5ed9b3 & 08cd945738a222c8 & 252e33166953cd68 \\
\hline 27 & 9d64555a9a10b852 & 0000001000000000 & a3bebc0e23ab87f2 & 85a52d6656cf13be & 568fa34d2fc7225e & 39a971317391242b \\
\hline 28 & d106ff0bed5255d7 & 0000000800000000 & c32c19229d84e2b4 & 6965b2633fbe37a8 & 3771887d7266b49d & d95a7aa0bec4fa7a \\
\hline 29 & e1652c6b138c64a5 & 0000000400000000 & e628ceae5cb3bb34 & 0e8317ae44e3caa0 & edd6029a6b80a442 & 4dfdcc7a4279b2c0 \\
\hline 30 & e428581186ec8f46 & 0000000200000000 & 5924454953ad5732 & 567efb50dc99f5dc & 0313da097aec4a43 & 96bb89c941631bed \\
\hline 31 & aeb5f5ede22d1a36 & 0000000100000000 & 7cc987f5fb33b813 & 46814855930b3a3f & 91f5b30f015b4a54 & 1c3ba8fbadab9a22 \\
\hline 32 & e943d7568aec0c5c & 0000000080000000 & 88e3dd1448c4e0ff & a77142eabd2bd877 & 1e60759f038beec1 & 8fc77798b1692ab2 \\
\hline 33 & df98c8276f54b04b & 0000000040000000 & a49d286e5dfc6143 & 76395f51bdf699db & 97061699383 bbfe 0 & ace5681dfba69ceb \\
\hline 34 & b160e4680f6c696f & 0000000020000000 & a5206a311e9c2515 & c3e20437ad6c32b7 & 311f3c96e071f173 & 782058 f 728 c 21174 \\
\hline 35 & fa0752b07d9c4ab8 & 0000000010000000 & b6e4686a8b957cf2 & 34cfbfca8df5fb9d & 1a6849edcb701b07 & fc14dafe9d171db5 \\
\hline 36 & ca3a2b036dbc8502 & 0000000008000000 & af1200418fd37fdd & b372320762d438f8 & fa5b2fa26d03558b & 339189931 ada4474 \\
\hline 37 & 5e0905517bb59bcf & 0000000004000000 & 487deccf0fde5b88 & 882402b6dec6675f & bcaa0b7b7b3464c5 & c6d1f875363bf7ea \\
\hline 38 & 814eeb3b91d90726 & 0000000002000000 & 456a1865905ed57d & 69e1758b520187d4 & 3d245b501c6abb74 & 31097d931da2e7bd \\
\hline 39 & 4d49db1532919c9f & 0000000001000000 & 3e2601fa20895e62 & ab8232a31d78e0fc & 62133d9330e2e86b & 0bff0085bb36e9b0 \\
\hline 40 & 25eb5fc3f8cf0621 & 0000000000800000 & 58da89972266a7e3 & aeed06b9f51ce37a & 5d7d6bd225890b4d & 5d09a28ee99cb585 \\
\hline 41 & ab6a20c0620d1c6f & 0000000000400000 & feaca17e5dd05c87 & 96dc5bd6e0b10d83 & db36baba70c3b9af & 46d9a629a0616379 \\
\hline 42 & \(79 \mathrm{e} 90 \mathrm{dbc} 98 \mathrm{f92} \mathrm{cca}\) & 0000000000200000 & 88249b73e99c5ac0 & 55a4cdc28ecf0541 & a2f5ea90c2179ab4 & ab239da3e3fab21b \\
\hline 43 & 866ecedd8072bb0e & 0000000000100000 & 5f8add8784cc3174 & 7349bfc7f6461210 & 70470a07cb34e109 & 9331573af5067b09 \\
\hline 44 & 8b54536f2f3e64a8 & 0000000000080000 & cd8dc942ae2bb175 & 90b4544c9e6ad23b & 659610094ab3824e & 3133eeddd4f2ffec \\
\hline 45 & ea51d3975595b86b & 0000000000040000 & cf8442863e68e644 & 2d7e77de47d0dad4 & 26e6223634c857a3 & 408e7d58ba623208 \\
\hline 46 & caffc6ac4542de31 & 0000000000020000 & 16952dc89c0acd65 & b87887b6dddaab6f & ddd0a647be96041f & 0e5b54a5a9cfbed1 \\
\hline 47 & 8dd45a2ddf90796c & 0000000000010000 & 8a4fca2b00c49807 & 8fdec1977d446e54 & 363219d8cec5a9f3 & b875b2ffa6fea146 \\
\hline 48 & 1029d55e880ec2d0 & 0000000000008000 & b40225aea121c8d3 & aedc1e02bd099571 & bb5710f9dc8dde46 & 1a190ba501176f51 \\
\hline 49 & 5d86cb23639dbea9 & 0000000000004000 & 711c066c13222f1c & 1404bcbe41ce6aa1 & ae527ed311a25ea2 & 863541107 db 40094 \\
\hline 50 & 1d1ca853ae7c0c5f & 0000000000002000 & 4fb69c832db68026 & 83804ddd1b5cd4fd & af94496800a32656 & 0d3834749def9e7a \\
\hline 51 & ce332329248f3228 & 0000000000001000 & f24c7444edf1c394 & 5f54383a55d6198a & c55d7544a1 eae274 & b601d210b21d541b \\
\hline 52 & 8405d1abe24fb942 & 0000000000000800 & 6be457abc511e87c & f1c2172a084f656f & 9ba49db251748896 & 50d294abb12450bb \\
\hline 53 & e643d78090ca4207 & 0000000000000400 & 6136fefebb0c8118 & 88b53f4066285776 & 3d19267de9c12e7b & 010a1b96b9017a94 \\
\hline 54 & 48221b9937748a23 & 0000000000000200 & d23a8dfe39c98883 & 4dc3b1bc755eb684 & 5ce84637532650c8 & 15acb37fde2a095a \\
\hline 55 & dd7c0bbd61fafd54 & 0000000000000100 & afe2e34f009924e2 & 45c93fbf9ea29104 & d43941ab72932bb0 & 7bd2597948ce5bc8 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|l|l|l|l|}
\hline ROUND & PLAINTEXT1 & CIPHERTEXT1 & PLAINTEXT2 & CIPHERTEXT2 & PLAINTEXT3 & CIPHERTEXT3 \\
\hline 56 & 2fbc291a570db5c4 & 0000000000000080 & 0adcf552ec1754c6 & e5c336ae5360d967 & 816c454ba7894865 & b3f30f939f9bc4db \\
\hline 57 & e07c30d7e4e26e12 & 0000000000000040 & c06e80c5238135bb & 31c1c1914e9d7278 & 74bc744f10f63889 & d30cbd5808d8e0ef \\
\hline 58 & 0953e2258e8e90a1 & 0000000000000020 & 0912754 e 7 c 42 f 637 & ca1dad0fa1978258 & 3d2565d9bf62cdbd & b30b208b6ccecada \\
\hline 59 & 5b711bc4ceebf2ee & 0000000000000010 & b4f82967c658adb8 & afd29a3fba18602a & a2e13c5701a60444 & 027d03f04016c3c2 \\
\hline 60 & cc083f1e6d9e85f6 & 0000000000000008 & 006fa12a796ac4d3 & c291dff5ec01e8b3 & cbe2873fd6f63048 & c0950b7f3c1bfaca \\
\hline 61 & d2fd8867d50d2dfe & 0000000000000004 & 1a4a364616460d44 & 6491ba623149f3d0 & cc6adcef1be975ef & 2e475e2153d1c64a \\
\hline 62 & 06e7ea22ce92708f & 0000000000000002 & f307b5bcd44f3d8d & 87c6963b33be0353 & 991d770b2bf051dc & f8f7ded629f3fc48 \\
\hline 63 & 166b40b44aba4bd6 & 0000000000000001 & 9cb1c3932c005c49 & 4fce2baa2cd647d3 & 17d8e9c374d14494 & 776bd1e53ef1d7d6 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Table A. 7 Resulting Ciphertext from the Initial Permutation Known Answer Test for TCBC-I Mode of Operation (Decryption Process)
\[
\begin{gathered}
(\text { NOTE }-- \text { KEY1 }=\text { KEY2 }=\text { KEY3 } 0101010101010101 \\
\text { IV1 }=0000000000000000 \\
\text { IV2 }=5555555555555555 \\
\text { IV3 }=\text { aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa) }
\end{gathered}
\]
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline ROUND & CIPHERTEXTS & PLAINTEXT1 & PLAINTEXT2 & PLAINTEXT3 \\
\hline 0 & 8000000000000000 & 95f8a5e5dd31d900 & c0adf0b088648c55 & 3f520f4f779b73aa \\
\hline 1 & 4000000000000000 & dd7f121ca5015619 & 882a4749f054034c & 77d5b8b60fabfcb3 \\
\hline 2 & 2000000000000000 & 2e8653104f3834ea & 7bd306451a6d61bf & 842cf9bae5929e40 \\
\hline 3 & 1000000000000000 & 4bd388ff6cd81d4f & 1e86ddaa398d481a & e1792255c672b7e5 \\
\hline 4 & 0800000000000000 & 20b9e767b2fb1456 & 75ecb232e7ae4103 & 8a134dcd1851befc \\
\hline 5 & 0400000000000000 & 55579380d77138ef & 0002c6d582246dba & fffd392a7ddb9245 \\
\hline 6 & 0200000000000000 & 6cc5defaaf04512f & 39908baffa51047a & c66f745005aefb85 \\
\hline 7 & 0100000000000000 & 0d9f279ba5d87260 & 58ca72cef08d2735 & a7358d310f72d8ca \\
\hline 8 & 0080000000000000 & d9031b0271bd5a0a & 8c564e5724e80f5f & 73a9b1a8db17f0a0 \\
\hline 9 & 0040000000000000 & 424250b37c3dd951 & 171705e629688c04 & e8e8fa19d69773fb \\
\hline 10 & 0020000000000000 & b8061b7ecd9a21e5 & ed534e2b98cf74b0 & 12acb1d467308b4f \\
\hline 11 & 0010000000000000 & f15d0f286b65bd28 & a4085a7d3e30e87d & 5bf7a582c1cf1782 \\
\hline 12 & 0008000000000000 & add0cc8d6e5deba1 & f88599d83b08bef4 & 077a6627c4f7410b \\
\hline 13 & 0004000000000000 & e6d5f82752ad63d1 & b380ad7207f83684 & 4c7f528df807c97b \\
\hline 14 & 0002000000000000 & ecbfe3bd3f591a5e & b9eab6e86a0c4f0b & \(4615491795 f 3 \mathrm{~b} 0 \mathrm{f} 4\) \\
\hline 15 & 0001000000000000 & f356834379d165cd & a603d6162c843098 & 59fc29e9d37bcf67 \\
\hline 16 & 0000800000000000 & 2b9f982f20037fa9 & 7ecacd7a75562afc & 813532858aa9d503 \\
\hline 17 & 0000400000000000 & 889de068a16f0be6 & ddc8b53df43a5eb3 & 22374ac20bc5a14c \\
\hline 18 & 0000200000000000 & e19e275d846a1298 & b4cb7208d13f47cd & 4b348df72ec0b832 \\
\hline 19 & 0000100000000000 & 329a8ed523d71aec & 67cfdb8076824fb9 & \(9830247 \mathrm{f897db046}\) \\
\hline 20 & 0000080000000000 & e7fce22557d23c97 & b2a9b770028769c2 & 4d56488ffd78963d \\
\hline 21 & 0000040000000000 & 12a9f5817ff2d65d & 47fca0d42aa78308 & b8035f2bd5587cf7 \\
\hline 22 & 0000020000000000 & a484c3ad38dc9c19 & f1d196f86d89c94c & 0e2e6907927636b3 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline ROUND & CIPHERTEXTS & PLAINTEXT1 & PLAINTEXT2 & PLAINTEXT3 \\
\hline 23 & 000001000000000 & fbe00a8a1ef8ad72 & aeb55fdf4badf827 & 514aa020b45207d8 \\
\hline 24 & 000000800000000 & 750 d 079407521363 & 205852c152074636 & dfa7ad3eadf8b9c9 \\
\hline 25 & 000000400000000 & 64feed9c724c2faf & 31abb8c927197afa & ce544736d8e68505 \\
\hline 26 & 000000200000000 & f02b263b328e2b60 & a57e736e67db7e35 & 5a818c91982481ca \\
\hline 27 & 0000001000000000 & 9d64555a9a10b852 & c831000fcf45ed07 & 37cefff030ba12f8 \\
\hline 28 & 0000000800000000 & d106ff0bed5255d7 & 8453a55eb8070082 & 7bac55a147f8ff7d \\
\hline 29 & 0000000400000000 & e1652c6b138c64a5 & b430793e46d931f0 & 4bcf86c1b926ce0f \\
\hline 30 & 000000020000000 & e428581186ec8f46 & b17d0d44d3b9da13 & 4e82f2bb2c4625ec \\
\hline 31 & 0000000100000000 & aeb5f5ede22d1a36 & fbe0a0b8b7784f63 & 041f5f474887b09c \\
\hline 32 & 0000000080000000 & e943d7568aec0c5c & bc168203dfb95909 & 43e97dfc2046a6f6 \\
\hline 33 & 0000000040000000 & df98c8276f54b04b & 8acd9d723a01e51e & 7532628dc5fe1ae1 \\
\hline 34 & 0000000020000000 & b160e4680f6c696f & e435b13d5a393c3a & 1bca4ec2a5c6c3c5 \\
\hline 35 & 0000000010000000 & fa0752b07d9c4ab8 & af5207e528c91fed & 50adf81ad736e012 \\
\hline 36 & 0000000008000000 & ca3a2b036dbc8502 & 9f6f7e5638e9d057 & 609081a9c7162fa8 \\
\hline 37 & 0000000004000000 & 5e0905517bb59bcf & 0b5c50042ee0ce9a & f4a3affbd11f3165 \\
\hline 38 & 0000000002000000 & 814eeb3b91d90726 & d41bbe6ec48c5273 & 2be441913b73ad8c \\
\hline 39 & 0000000001000000 & 4d49db1532919c9f & 181c8e4067c4c9ca & e7e371bf983b3635 \\
\hline 40 & 0000000000800000 & 25eb5fc3f8cf0621 & 70be0a96ad9a5374 & 8f41f5695265ac8b \\
\hline 41 & 0000000000400000 & ab6a20c0620d1c6f & fe3f75953758493a & 01c08a6ac8a7b6c5 \\
\hline 42 & 0000000000200000 & 79e90dbc98f92cca & 2cbc58e9cdac799f & d343a71632538660 \\
\hline 43 & 0000000000100000 & 866ecedd8072bb0e & d33b9b88d527ee5b & 2cc464772ad811a4 \\
\hline 44 & 0000000000080000 & 8b54536f2f3e64a8 & de01063a7a6b31fd & 21fef9c58594ce02 \\
\hline 45 & 0000000000040000 & ea51d3975595b86b & bf0486c200c0ed3e & 40fb793dff3f12c1 \\
\hline 46 & 0000000000020000 & caffc6ac4542de31 & 9faa93f910178b64 & 60556c06efe8749b \\
\hline 47 & 0000000000010000 & 8dd45a2ddf90796c & d8810f788ac52c39 & 277ef087753ad3c6 \\
\hline 48 & 0000000000008000 & 1029d55e880ec2d0 & 457c800bdd5b9785 & ba837ff422a4687a \\
\hline 49 & 0000000000004000 & 5d86cb23639dbea9 & 08d39e7636c8ebfc & f72c6189c9371403 \\
\hline 50 & 0000000000002000 & 1d1ca853ae7c0c5f & 4849fd06fb29590a & b7b602f904d6a6f5 \\
\hline 51 & 0000000000001000 & ce332329248f3228 & 9b66767c71da677d & 649989838 e 259882 \\
\hline 52 & 0000000000000800 & 8405d1abe24fb942 & d15084feb71aec17 & 2eaf7b0148e513e8 \\
\hline 53 & 0000000000000400 & e643d78090ca4207 & b31682d5c59f1752 & 4ce97d2a3a60e8ad \\
\hline 54 & 0000000000000200 & 48221b9937748a23 & 1d774ecc6221df76 & e288b1339dde2089 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|l|l|}
\hline ROUND & CIPHERTEXTS & PLAINTEXT1 & PLAINTEXT2 & PLAINTEXT3 \\
\hline 55 & 0000000000000100 & dd7c0bbd61fafd54 & 88295ee834afa801 & 77d6a117cb5057fe \\
\hline 56 & 0000000000000080 & 2fbc291a570db5c4 & 7ae97c4f0258e091 & 851683b0fda71f6e \\
\hline 57 & 0000000000000040 & e07c30d7e4e26e12 & b5296582b1b73b47 & 4ad69a7d4e48c4b8 \\
\hline 58 & 0000000000000020 & 0953 e 2258 e 8 e 90 a 1 & \(5 \mathrm{c} 06 \mathrm{~b} 770 \mathrm{dbdbc5f4}\) & a3f9488f24243a0b \\
\hline 59 & 0000000000000010 & \(5 \mathrm{~b} 711 \mathrm{bc} 4 \mathrm{ceebf2ee}\) & 0 e 244 e 919 bbea 7 bb & f1dbb16e64415844 \\
\hline 60 & 0000000000000008 & cc083f1e6d9e85f6 & 995d6a4b38cbd0a3 & 66a295b4c7342f5c \\
\hline \hline 61 & 0000000000000004 & d2fd8867d50d2dfe & \(87 \mathrm{a} 8 \mathrm{dd32805878ab}\) & 785722cd7fa78754 \\
\hline 62 & 0000000000000002 & 06e7ea22ce92708f & 53b2bf779bc725da & ac4d40886438da25 \\
\hline 63 & 0000000000000001 & 166b40b44aba4bd6 & 433e15e11fef1e83 & bcc1ea1ee010e17c \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Table A. 8 Values To Be Used for the Substitution Table Known Answer Test
for TCBC-I Mode of Operation
\[
\begin{aligned}
(\text { NOTE -- IV1 } & =0000000000000000 \\
\text { IV2 } & =5555555555555555 \\
\text { IV3 } & =\text { aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa) }
\end{aligned}
\]
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline ROUND & KEY & PLAINTEXTS & CIPHERTEXT1 & CIPHERTEXT2 & CIPHERTEXT3 \\
\hline 0 & 7ca110454a1a6e57 & 01a1d6d039776742 & 690f5b0d9a26939b & 89202f224f1f2261 & 585a1e8d89705d10 \\
\hline 1 & 0131d9619dc1376e & 5cd54ca83def57da & 7a389d10354bd271 & 6dda0de99d3c86b9 & 99985b67b598bd25 \\
\hline 2 & 07a1133e4a0b2686 & 0248d43806f67172 & 868ebb51cab4599a & 8200616c589bc7aa & d2ff67461377fbb5 \\
\hline 3 & 3849674c2602319e & 51454b582ddf440a & 7178876e01f19b2a & 64757292 febccad 1 & 93bd8beeea2310fc \\
\hline 4 & 04b915ba43feb5b6 & 42fd443059577fa2 & af37fb421f8c4095 & 204fc6123992d4e9 & 6bfb4df0569cebce \\
\hline 5 & 0113b970fd34f2ce & 059b5e0851cf143a & 86a560f10ec6d85b & 1fa86f6f735603a3 & Obe3558738c6d7c3 \\
\hline 6 & 0170f175468fb5e6 & 0756d8e0774761d2 & 0cd3da020021dc09 & 65e05d62b35aa365 & 3bfc9a3f034da292 \\
\hline 7 & 43297fad38e373fe & 762514b829bf486a & ea676b2cb7db2b7a & 95c0f9e595aec2ff & ea9ab3585f166586 \\
\hline 8 & 07a7137045da2a16 & 3bdd119049372802 & dfd64a815caf1a0f & 127359c20e10e25a & 953a36ff13a08906 \\
\hline 9 & 04689104c2fd3b2f & 26955f6835af609a & 5c513c9c4886c088 & b089d90f84ef0c4c & 08bd60f6f80d6fad \\
\hline 10 & 37d06bb516cb7546 & 164d5e404f275232 & 0a2aeeae3ff4ab77 & 32bbdd67d4e66dd6 & 83a30606fc78d740 \\
\hline 11 & 1f08260d1ac2465e & 6b056e18759f5cca & ef1bf03e5dfa575a & b4873081fdebc81d & 6445799c9b701694 \\
\hline 12 & 584023641 aba6176 & 004bd6ef09176062 & 88bf0db6d70dee56 & 988fe2e8e1755e78 & 1e1fdd8660a75bb5 \\
\hline 13 & 025816164629 b 007 & 480d39006ee762f2 & a1f9915541020b56 & ee6c0febb212b218 & 60bae59c51767394 \\
\hline 14 & 49793ebc79b3258f & 437540c8698f3cfa & 6fbf1cafcffd0556 & c03adc2b6aa85b5b & 826ec7e02f486885 \\
\hline 15 & 4fb05e1515ab73a7 & 072d43a077075292 & 2f22e49bab7calac & 096a4136e0f65f76 & 9e30377b7a39d5d3 \\
\hline 16 & 49e95d6d4ca229bf & 02fe55778117f12a & 5a6b612cc26cce4a & bf4da6aa59ed5751 & 64b77306321a932c \\
\hline 17 & 018310dc409b26d6 & 1d9d5c5018f728c2 & 5f4c038ed12b2e41 & aab93390e13d3bb3 & 3b17daff733fcfb0 \\
\hline 18 & 1c587f1c13924fef & 305532286d6f295a & 63fac0d034d9f793 & db3c4106c5db5648 & 7f38215d73b0ee62 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Table A. 9 Resulting Ciphertext from the Variable TEXT Known Answer Test
for TCFB-P and TOFB-I Modes of Operation
\[
\begin{aligned}
\text { NOTE }-- & \text { TEXT }=0000000000000000 \\
& \text { IV1 }=0000000000000000 \\
& \text { IV2 }=5555555555555555 \\
& \text { IV3 }=\text { aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa) }
\end{aligned}
\]
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline RND & PLAINTEXT1 \(\oplus\) IV1 & CIPHERTEXT1 & PLAINTEXT2 \(\oplus\) IV2 & CIPHERTEXT2 & PLAINTEXT3 \(\oplus\) IV3 & CIPHERTEXT3 \\
\hline 0 & 8000000000000000 & 95f8a5e5dd31d900 & d555555555555555 & f7552ab6cb21e2bc & 2aaaaaaaaaaaaaa & 5a48d3de869557fd \\
\hline 1 & 4000000000000000 & dd7f121ca5015619 & 9555555555555555 & 0c783d97d0dbf51a & eaaaaaaaaaaaaa & f15ee2019a5b547c \\
\hline 2 & 2000000000000000 & 2e8653104f3834ea & 7555555555555555 & 05b865ale49ed109 & caaaaaaaaaaaaa & f925b68465b6078c \\
\hline 3 & 1000000000000000 & 4bd388ff6cd81d4f & 6555555555555555 & 9e51152dbce90b02 & baaaaaaaaaaaaa & f6089ca9b722765c \\
\hline 4 & 0800000000000000 & 20b9e767b2fb1456 & 5d55555555555555 & c39193d42381b313 & b2aaaaaaaaaaaa & 4f1b8036d441af95 \\
\hline 5 & 0400000000000000 & 55579380d77138ef & 5955555555555555 & e293394891554b68 & aeaaaaaaaaaaaaa & 45089186180bd591 \\
\hline 6 & 0200000000000000 & 6cc5defaaf04512f & 5755555555555555 & 1359f4d663a3209c & асааааааааааааа & d86dd807085fa8e6 \\
\hline 7 & 0100000000000000 & 0d9f279ba5d87260 & 5655555555555555 & 0d0f03e8f8594a66 & abaaaaaaaaaaaaa & d27eb94e56c3172a \\
\hline 8 & 0080000000000000 & d9031b0271bd5a0a & 55d5555555555555 & 4334b5fe1b7f5320 & ab2aaaaaaaaaaa & d6ad42065e31bdb1 \\
\hline 9 & 0040000000000000 & 424250b37c3dd951 & 5595555555555555 & 9484c1c29b62c41e & aaeaaaaaaaaaaaa & f54f2bd8e2eb2bc6 \\
\hline 10 & 0020000000000000 & b8061b7ecd9a21e5 & 5575555555555555 & c8eb2e340855325b & аасаааааааааааа & 6cf8932328c7e49b \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline RND & PLAINTEXT1 \(\oplus\) IV1 & CIPHERTEXT1 & PLAINTEXT2 \(\oplus\) IV2 & CIPHERTEXT2 & PLAINTEXT3 \(\oplus\) IV3 & CIPHERTEXT3 \\
\hline 11 & 0010000000000000 & f15d0f286b65bd28 & 5565555555555555 & e88a676ef848e6d1 & aabaaaaaaaaaaaa & 72ea3aadb569af43 \\
\hline 12 & 0008000000000000 & add0cc8d6e5deba1 & 555d555555555555 & be433af4c5ae0f97 & aab2aaaaaaaaaaa & 0d71ecadd7a49fec \\
\hline 13 & 0004000000000000 & e6d5f82752ad63d1 & 5559555555555555 & 9e32639bb9d27cc7 & aaaeaaaaaaaaaaa & fc1463bb9bba9e11 \\
\hline 14 & 0002000000000000 & ecbfe3bd3f591a5e & 5557555555555555 & fa510732fa871094 & aaacaaaaaaaaaaa & 31568f2e0ac0d693 \\
\hline 15 & 0001000000000000 & f356834379d165cd & 5556555555555555 & 9f1b31571ed41078 & aaabaaaaaaaaaaa & fbcfc086f8111572 \\
\hline 16 & 0000800000000000 & 2b9f982f20037fa9 & 5555d55555555555 & f4169ca3fc6799ed & aaab2aaaaaaaaaa & d67ca5071769cafe \\
\hline 17 & 0000400000000000 & 889de068a16f0be6 & 5555955555555555 & e9a738ac85e2ca4b & aaaaeaaaaaaaaaa & 63fc8ec1421399b8 \\
\hline 18 & 0000200000000000 & e19e275d846a1298 & 5555755555555555 & ee26a403caca387d & аааасааааааааааа & 5d84b7acabb63bfb \\
\hline 19 & 0000100000000000 & 329a8ed523d71aec & 5555655555555555 & 0b3f88ef87d85953 & aaaabaaaaaaaaaa & e3f663de44003f9b \\
\hline 20 & 0000080000000000 & e7fce22557d23c97 & 55555d5555555555 & bb04e854f99f6352 & aaaab2aaaaaaaaa & 4e5892f230b6d6d1 \\
\hline 21 & 0000040000000000 & 12a9f5817ff2d65d & 5555595555555555 & f0881280455dec63 & aaaaeaaaaaaaaa & 4432a11e1c320e7a \\
\hline 22 & 0000020000000000 & a484c3ad38dc9c19 & 5555575555555555 & 8ae9dee849b46527 & aаaаacaaaaaaaaa & 02ce21a9c83ba4d6 \\
\hline 23 & 0000010000000000 & fbe00a8alef8ad72 & 5555565555555555 & 74b7d252cae558fb & aaaabaaaaaaaaa & 6fd1d0793c1b7af2 \\
\hline 24 & 0000008000000000 & 750d079407521363 & 555555d555555555 & b8b27d1286bdbb26 & aaaaab2aaaaaaaa & fc286fa362d8c93c \\
\hline 25 & 0000004000000000 & 64feed9c724c2faf & 5555559555555555 & 4e3dd222e292dd96 & ааааааеаааааааа & e3a7abc88132ad7d \\
\hline 26 & 0000002000000000 & f02b263b328e2b60 & 5555557555555555 & a213c5c56fdca139 & аааааасааааааааа & 8868d3114021a027 \\
\hline 27 & 0000001000000000 & 9d64555a9a10b852 & 5555556555555555 & 05df49a56a345cf9 & aaaaabaaaaaaaa & 568fa34d2fc7225e \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline RND & PLAINTEXT1 \(\oplus\) IV1 & CIPHERTEXT1 & PLAINTEXT2 \(\oplus\) IV2 & CIPHERTEXT2 & PLAINTEXT3 \(\oplus\) IV3 & CIPHERTEXT3 \\
\hline 28 & 0000000800000000 & d106ff0bed5255d7 & 5555555d55555555 & c32c19229d84e2b4 & aaaaaab2aaaaaaa & 1f81cbb9403ecc59 \\
\hline 29 & 0000000400000000 & e1652c6b138c64a5 & 5555555955555555 & 89c6e06ce6164d84 & aaaaaaeaaaaaaaa & edd6029a6b80a442 \\
\hline 30 & 0000000200000000 & e428581186ec8f46 & 5555555755555555 & 5924454953 ad 5732 & aаaaaaacaaaaaaa & ef90911c0f9a66f3 \\
\hline 31 & 0000000100000000 & aeb5f5ede22d1a36 & 5555555655555555 & 7a3e15c0953b08cc & aaaaaabbaaaaaaa & 91f5b30f015b4a54 \\
\hline 32 & 0000000080000000 & e943d7568aec0c5c & 55555555d5555555 & 88e3dd1448c4e0ff & aaaaaab2aaaaaaa & a5aec2896cff08e5 \\
\hline 33 & 0000000040000000 & df98c8276f54b04b & 5555555595555555 & 9f55ebaca42cb845 & ааааааааеаааааа & 97061699383bbfe0 \\
\hline 34 & 0000000020000000 & b160e4680f6c696f & 5555555575555555 & a5206a311e9c2515 & аааааааасаааааа & 08e218f2cblede18 \\
\hline 35 & 0000000010000000 & fa0752b07d9c4ab8 & 5555555565555555 & e944c64af09dfa84 & aaaaaaabaaaaaaa & 1a6849edcb701b07 \\
\hline 36 & 0000000008000000 & ca3a2b036dbc8502 & 555555555d555555 & af1200418fd37fdd & aaaaaaab2aaaaaa & 85480c507233c006 \\
\hline 37 & 0000000004000000 & 5e0905517bb59bcf & 5555555559555555 & 574a377b5a150353 & aаaааааааеаааааа & bcaa0b7b7b3464c5 \\
\hline 38 & 000000002000000 & 814eeb3b91d90726 & 5555555557555555 & 456a1865905ed57d & ааааааааасаааааа & 0439f36972dc531f \\
\hline 39 & 0000000001000000 & 4d49db1532919c9f & 5555555556555555 & 8427c42d027a34d0 & aaaaaaaabaaaaa & 62133d9330e2e86b \\
\hline 40 & 0000000000800000 & 25eb5fc3f8cf0621 & 5555555555d55555 & 58da89972266a7e3 & aaaaaaaab2aaaaa & f9c2472742b5f9e8 \\
\hline 41 & 000000000400000 & ab6a20c0620d1c6f & 5555555555955555 & 1ed858bcbc934c17 & aaaaaaaaaeaaaaa & db36baba70c3b9af \\
\hline 42 & 0000000000200000 & 79e90dbc98f92cca & 5555555555755555 & 88249b73e99c5ac0 & аааааааааасааааа & 0758b13e912d53cb \\
\hline 43 & 0000000000100000 & 866ecedd8072bb0e & 5555555555655555 & 69314212c7a9d6bl & aaaaaaaaabaaaaa & 70470a07cb34e109 \\
\hline 44 & 000000000080000 & 8b54536f2f3e64a8 & 55555555555 d 5555 & cd8dc942ae2bb175 & aaaaaaaaab2aaaa & 9c6ade3a9e772c7c \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline RND & PLAINTEXT1 \(\oplus\) IV1 & CIPHERTEXT1 & PLAINTEXT2 \(\oplus\) IV2 & CIPHERTEXT2 & PLAINTEXT3 \(\oplus\) IV3 & CIPHERTEXT3 \\
\hline 45 & 000000000040000 & ea51d3975595b86b & 5555555555595555 & 4c0a052894ed7436 & aaaaaaaaaeaaaa & 26e6223634c857a3 \\
\hline 46 & 000000000020000 & caffc6ac4542de31 & 5555555555575555 & 16952dc89c0acd65 & aaaaaaaaaacaaaa & 72dfd337fe183a6d \\
\hline 47 & 0000000000010000 & 8dd45a2ddf90796c & 55555555555565555 & 92ef4c4350711745 & aaaaaaaaaabaaaa & 363219d8cec5a9f3 \\
\hline 48 & 000000000008000 & 1029d55e880ec2d0 & 555555555555 d 555 & b40225aea121c8d3 & aaaaaaaaaab2aaa & 4bc89c1804bcae82 \\
\hline 49 & 0000000000004000 & 5d86cb23639dbea9 & 5555555555559555 & a9eab121edde0ca7 & ааааааааааааеааа & ae527ed311a25ea2 \\
\hline 50 & 000000000002000 & 1d1ca853ae7c0c5f & 5555555555557555 & 4fb69c832db68026 & aaaaaaaaaaacaaa & a1584c1024f61f3d \\
\hline 51 & 0000000000001000 & ce332329248f3228 & 5555555555556555 & 761b3d1ff06c513e & aaaaaaaaaaabaaa & c55d7544aleae274 \\
\hline 52 & 0000000000000800 & 8405d1abe24fb942 & 5555555555555 d 55 & 6be457abc511e87c & aaaaaaaaaaab2aa & aef861c69fd34489 \\
\hline 53 & 0000000000000400 & e643d78090ca4207 & 5555555555555955 & ebb5a1887b1f6e3a & аааааааааааааеаа & 3d19267de9c12e7b \\
\hline 54 & 0000000000000200 & 48221b9937748a23 & 5555555555555755 & d23a8dfe39c98883 & aaaaaaaaaaaacaa & ade513b3ed994800 \\
\hline 55 & 0000000000000100 & dd7c0bbd61fafd54 & 5555555555555655 & 9f986bb8f7e6fa46 & aaaaaaaaaaabaa & d43941ab72932bb0 \\
\hline 56 & 0000000000000080 & 2fbc291a570db5c4 & 55555555555555 d 5 & Oadcf552ec1754c6 & aaaaaaaaaaab2a & 7f7352dfade13e13 \\
\hline 57 & 000000000000040 & e07c30d7e4e26e 12 & 5555555555555595 & 6c25b868caf1f7d3 & аааааааааааааеа & 74bc744f10f63889 \\
\hline 58 & 0000000000000020 & 0953e2258e8e90a1 & 55555555555555575 & 0912754e7c42f637 & ааааааааааааааса & a483f2da4099a136 \\
\hline 59 & 0000000000000010 & 5b711bc4ceebf2ee & 5555555555555565 & 2fa6a76d9b83e3dd & aaaaaaaaaaaaaba & a2e13c5701a60444 \\
\hline 60 & 000000000000008 & cc083f1e6d9e85f6 & 555555555555555d & 006fa12a796ac4d3 & aaaaaaaaaaaab2 & bc10a45ceedb56b3 \\
\hline 61 & 000000000000004 & d2fd8867d50d2dfe & 5555555555555559 & 6a0bd7954b5aa04d & aaaaaaaaaaaae & cc6adcef1be975ef \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|l|l|l|l|l|l|}
\hline \hline RND & PLAINTEXT1 \(\oplus\) IV1 & CIPHERTEXT1 & PLAINTEXT2 \(\oplus\) IV2 & \multicolumn{1}{|c|}{ CIPHERTEXT2 } & PLAINTEXT3 \(\oplus\) IV3 & CIPHERTEXT3 \\
\hline \hline 62 & 0000000000000002 & 06 e 7 ea 22 ce 92708 f & 5555555555555557 & f307b5bcd44f3d8d & aaaaaaaaaaaaaaac & 3 dc 004 f 9 cd 4 a 9 c 22 \\
\hline 63 & 0000000000000001 & 166 b 40 b 44 aba 4 bd 6 & 5555555555555556 & 009 e 8232891 c 8 a 36 & aaaaaaaaaaaaaab & 17 d 8 e 9 c 374 d 14494 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Table A.10 Values to be Used for the Substitution Table Known Answer Test
for TCFB-P and TOFB-I Modes of Operation
(NOTE -- TEXT \(=0000000000000000\) )
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline RND & KEY & IV1 & CIPHERTEXT2 & IV2 & CIPHERTEXT2 & IV3 & CIPHERTEXT3 \\
\hline 0 & 7ca110454a1a6e57 & 01a1d6d039776742 & 690f5b0d9a26939b & 56f72c258eccbc97 & 97fc 1b9381f05ffa & ac4c817ae42211ec & e90a658ca212b240 \\
\hline 1 & 0131d9619dc1376e & 5cd54ca83def57da & 7a389d10354bd271 & b22aa1fd9344ad2f & 1697f74514a33238 & 077ff752e89a0284 & 21329d25683b4606 \\
\hline 2 & 07a1133e4a0b2686 & 0248d43806f67172 & 868ebb51cab4599a & 579e298d5c4bc6c7 & 3 c 33 dc 00289664 d 0 & acf37ee2b1a11c1c & 66477e326b77dd91 \\
\hline 3 & 3849674c2602319e & 51454b582ddf440a & 7178876e01f19b2a & a69aa0ad8334995f & 941fcf0e43a965af & fbeff602d889eeb4 & 8d71d3da699fa6f5 \\
\hline 4 & 04b915ba43feb5b6 & 42fd443059577fa2 & af37fb421f8c4095 & 98529985aeacd4f7 & 1e327e778501022a & eda7eedb04022a4c & 9e547f92a9ad358c \\
\hline 5 & 0113b970fd34f2ce & 059b5e0851cf143a & 86a560f10ec6d85b & 5af0b35da724698f & 637038eaaa7d167e & b04608b2fc79bee4 & 6f975aa305eb7548 \\
\hline 6 & 0170f175468fb5e6 & 0756d8e0774761d2 & 0cd3da020021dc09 & 5cac2e35cc9cb727 & 1c7fe0ddc80d3f6e & b201838b21f20c7c & cad8716fc1176297 \\
\hline 7 & 43297fad38e373fe & 762514b829bf486a & ea676b2cb7db2b7a & cb7a6a0d7f149dbf & 4b36062823e8190f & 20cfbf62d469f314 & 664e8d98d3986cfe \\
\hline 8 & 07a7137045da2a16 & 3bdd119049372802 & dfd64a815caf1a0f & 913266e59e8c7d57 & 1ff289bc8e07c5f3 & e687bc3af3e1d2ac & 948ab876125e7c7f \\
\hline 9 & 04689104c2fd3b2f & 26955f6835af609a & 5c513c9c4886c088 & 7beab4bd8b04b5ef & 19f76ad4a415blc1 & d1400a12e05a0b44 & 75d6085d1b1e472d \\
\hline 10 & 37d06bb516cb7546 & 164d5e404f275232 & 0a2aeeae3ff4ab77 & 6ba2b395a47ca787 & c78b293dc022c9aa & c0f808eaf9d1fcdc & 6ac4da432141aa16 \\
\hline 11 & 1f08260d1ac2465e & 6b056e18759f5cca & ef1bf03e5dfa575a & c05ac36dcaf4b21f & 5469ad2a9c97bf19 & 15b018c3204a0774 & 9983b852b915da86 \\
\hline 12 & 584023641 aba6176 & 004bd6ef09176062 & 88bf0db6d70dee56 & 55a12c445e6cb5b7 & 77aeb7e9d51577e5 & aaf68199b3c20b0c & fb716445f1a43232 \\
\hline 13 & 025816164629b007 & 480d39006ee762f2 & a1f9915541020b56 & 9d628e55c43cb847 & 08cdd6072e276e2e & f2b7e3ab19920d9c & fdb44a9e6f4bd7dc \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline RND & KEY & IV1 & CIPHERTEXT2 & IV2 & CIPHERTEXT2 & IV3 & CIPHERTEXT3 \\
\hline 14 & 49793ebc79b3258f & 437540c8698f3cfa & 6fbf1 cafcffd0556 & 98ca961dbee4924f & 0aa3768ad4358b6c & ee1feb731439e7a4 & 68b40c29c2238233 \\
\hline 15 & 4fb05e1515ab73a7 & 072d43a077075292 & 2f22e49bab7calac & 5c8298f5cc5ca7e7 & 7fd1411fd6a31497 & b1d7ee4b21b1fd3c & dd6359e601656be3 \\
\hline 16 & 49e95d6d4ca229bf & 02fe55778117f12a & 5a6b612cc26cce4a & 5853aaccd66d467f & 116a6ae6e1e47270 & ada900222bc29bd4 & b16f4467a4f95fd0 \\
\hline 17 & 018310dc409b26d6 & 1d9d5c5018f728c2 & 5f4c038ed12b2e41 & 72f2b1a56e4c7e17 & de11d7e1c6d5797c & c84806fac3a1d36c & 9cb7c0a87fa2bdbe \\
\hline 18 & 1c587f1c13924fef & 305532286d6f295a & 63fac0d034d9f793 & 85aa877dc2c47eaf & 9896336cbadada37 & daffdcd31819d404 & 1c5e61a81d05a5ef \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Table A. 11 Resulting Ciphertext from the Variable KEY Known Answer Test

\section*{for TCBC-I, TCFB-P and TOFB-I Modes of Operation}
(NOTE -- TEXT1 \(=\) TEXT \(2=\) TEXT3 \(=0000000000000000\)
IV1 = 0000000000000000
IV2 = 5555555555555555
IV3 = aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa)
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline ROUND & KEY & C1/RESULT1 & C2/RESULT2 & C3/RESULT3 \\
\hline 0 & 8001010101010101 & 95a8d72813daa94d & b8bc8dbc0b24cfa9 & 1e08a515c11e0de1 \\
\hline 1 & 4001010101010101 & 0eec1487dd8c26d5 & badb3425df504209 & 0608b0c77f0ab511 \\
\hline 2 & 2001010101010101 & 7ad16ffb79c45926 & 34069d06536cfaf8 & 3d090b850910022e \\
\hline 3 & 1001010101010101 & d3746294ca6a6cf3 & 53edd6c7b2d8663c & 19d83418eaf8e3ab \\
\hline 4 & 0801010101010101 & 809f5f873c1fd761 & 17d1d4a8731b3acd & 91da457d7e16d6a5 \\
\hline 5 & 0401010101010101 & c02faffec989d1fc & 51454c54f4ea817e & 6a4ec92bc50c9503 \\
\hline 6 & 0201010101010101 & 4615aa1d33e72f10 & 8f640c66e3ad6c5f & a185e92b67a45257 \\
\hline 7 & 0180010101010101 & 2055123350c00858 & e09a8dbe2b782986 & 0b7e13fdbadc96aa \\
\hline 8 & 0140010101010101 & df3b99d6577397c8 & 6ble20d1belc25e5 & eacef886f5087ce8 \\
\hline 9 & 0120010101010101 & 31fe 17369b5288c9 & d7c9ed116a4ca5c3 & 69c60f1118060221 \\
\hline 10 & 0110010101010101 & dfdd3cc64dae1642 & bb34b6ec92447bdc & 99547b8b947e8c44 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline ROUND & KEY & C1/RESULT1 & C2/RESULT2 & C3/RESULT3 \\
\hline 11 & 0108010101010101 & 178c83ce2b399d94 & 39ad35b103ea754c & aef4932bb880ffe 7 \\
\hline 12 & 0104010101010101 & 50f636324a9b7f80 & 502c48c0b6f5dale & cd7942c2f0db9598 \\
\hline 13 & 0102010101010101 & a8468ee3bc18f06d & 6da06bc26cd27347 & b299efe073df56d0 \\
\hline 14 & 0101800101010101 & a2dc9e92fd3cde92 & 048b509f61329322 & 57fd7a94bd090076 \\
\hline 15 & 0101400101010101 & cac09f797d031287 & cf18ef06ff4726dd & 364898370f13783a \\
\hline 16 & 0101200101010101 & 90ba680b22aeb525 & 5e68a2a3f420ced2 & 7021fa3c611c5353 \\
\hline 17 & 0101100101010101 & ce7a24f350e280b6 & f2241608a9c01443 & 4ad01e2a4f325e1b \\
\hline 18 & 0101080101010101 & 882bff0aa01a0b87 & 4d5268c568b57e87 & d06a7e3c1016a256 \\
\hline 19 & 0101040101010101 & 25610288924511c2 & 12537c78d5b135f5 & af1c2074ea3952f7 \\
\hline 20 & 0101020101010101 & c71516c29c75d170 & 2a447d1d0918e635 & 643eacd845d0ac81 \\
\hline 21 & 0101018001010101 & 5199c29a52c9f059 & c45e53dbad3642c6 & 077f60d16feecc6d \\
\hline 22 & 0101014001010101 & c22f0a294a71f29f & 86b57a072d1af70c & 2add0d3ff6b568ba \\
\hline 23 & 0101012001010101 & ee371483714c02ea & 3 c 6 c 5 d 0 ad 80 d 7409 & 0730787152b406bc \\
\hline 24 & 0101011001010101 & a81fbd448f9e522f & 3613b5811324cac7 & ae3ef9ebdca26f00 \\
\hline 25 & 0101010801010101 & 4f644c92e192dfed & 50ed144cedb736ac & 2abd3b256652632b \\
\hline 26 & 0101010401010101 & 1afa9a66a6df92ae & bc5bc5a66a53b929 & a2e9fa40e6b6cfca \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline ROUND & KEY & C1/RESULT1 & C2/RESULT2 & C3/RESULT3 \\
\hline 27 & 0101010201010101 & b3c1cc715cb879d8 & 5d1f09ffcd80d21b & bd11881fa1f9c189 \\
\hline 28 & 0101010180010101 & 19d032e64ab0bd8b & a8b79d2e02415d8e & 925d1851ab04bafa \\
\hline 29 & 0101010140010101 & 3cfaa7a7dc8720dc & 932c31352789dff9 & 4dafea6ad259c035 \\
\hline 30 & 0101010120010101 & b7265f7f447ac6f3 & 2ec8e9923a8a010c & e0f7a70dbdd597b7 \\
\hline 31 & 0101010110010101 & 9db73b3c0d163f54 & f36e475bb9a8fb57 & 88dad0c28986f116 \\
\hline 32 & 0101010108010101 & 8181b65babf4a975 & 73f174b827a22fbf & 205fd48356602a2f \\
\hline 33 & 0101010104010101 & 93c9b64042eaa240 & c76d844d9918627d & ddaba956a4fd22c5 \\
\hline 34 & 0101010102010101 & 5570530829705592 & beff48907877eedd & 775f3bbfea9a0637 \\
\hline 35 & 0101010101800101 & 8638809e878787a0 & 7829e156fdd34db6 & c26ea76714b38596 \\
\hline 36 & 0101010101400101 & 41b9a79af79ac208 & 7b2545576a6992d9 & 46ca820bcf0a462b \\
\hline 37 & 0101010101200101 & 7a9be42f2009a892 & 0b59503dc812b27f & 2a5e46fd70852d73 \\
\hline 38 & 0101010101100101 & 29038d56ba6d2745 & 07b67fe9359a3026 & 145ad75857e4b4b3 \\
\hline 39 & 0101010101080101 & 5495c6abf 1e5df51 & a82b120e4080136e & 99525cafa664a0f9 \\
\hline 40 & 0101010101040101 & ae13dbd561488933 & e3533571ee3d99eb & d1c679a7a2c4156c \\
\hline 41 & 0101010101020101 & 024d1ffa8904e389 & eb57f8c58f18b849 & e653401e4d004c74 \\
\hline 42 & 0101010101018001 & d1399712f99bf02e & 505e3b0af188d731 & 02b8091c05f5e061 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline ROUND & KEY & C1/RESULT1 & C2/RESULT2 & C3/RESULT3 \\
\hline 43 & 0101010101014001 & 14c1d7c1cffec79e & 0f38a59e95a70f13 & 9879d116764dafe3 \\
\hline 44 & 0101010101012001 & 1de5279dae3bed6f & 97108885 fe 2018 ed & 154b6e3c9a2871b1 \\
\hline 45 & 0101010101011001 & e941a33f85501303 & 71147052540af3d8 & 21397c0ec6a47e75 \\
\hline 46 & 0101010101010801 & da99dbbc9a03f379 & 563df95ec668d933 & d11d4e56261716a9 \\
\hline 47 & 0101010101010401 & b7fc92f91d8e92e9 & c8003e219b996cc7 & fb258b1abf89b7c4 \\
\hline 48 & 0101010101010201 & ae8e5caa3ca04e85 & 722 fb 450715 fb 317 & c52f5e37f39d1e6f \\
\hline 49 & 0101010101010180 & 9cc62df43b6eed74 & 7edfaaa980158515 & e91439e9838dcc9d \\
\hline 50 & 0101010101010140 & d863dbb5c59a91a0 & 82fb07d5e1d5b100 & 78c2810a85028047 \\
\hline 51 & 0101010101010120 & a1ab2190545b91d7 & 04f0cbaff1735340 & d466ec944alfe7f7 \\
\hline 52 & 0101010101010110 & 0875041e64c570f7 & 70ee1ae9b095db22 & 2fcd9094c8d397f2 \\
\hline 53 & 0101010101010108 & 5a594528bebef1cc & 004dd0b91a2e7709 & 80181b831cdc8d61 \\
\hline 54 & 0101010101010104 & fcdb3291de21f0c0 & cab8e849e0ab0c32 & 3367b1fbb4d2ffa7 \\
\hline 55 & 0101010101010102 & 869efd7f9f265a09 & 451f0c33f24fb8dc & 2b74c1d96cde840b \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Table A. 12 Values To Be Used for the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test for TCBC-I, TCFB-P and TOFB-I Modes of Operation
```

(NOTE -- TEXT1 = TEXT2 = TEXT3 = 0000000000000000

```

IV1 \(=0000000000000000\)
IV2 = 5555555555555555
IV3 = aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa)
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline ROUND & KEY & C1/RESULT1 & C2/RESULT2 & C3/RESULT3 \\
\hline 0 & 1046913489980131 & 88d55e54f54c97b4 & 23c25ab3e19b6b94 & e5b490db69b0f2ec \\
\hline 1 & 1007103489988020 & 0c0cc00c83ea48fd & 9e7b9f655eafef5d & 2031be52988cd49e \\
\hline 2 & 10071034c8980120 & 83bc8ef3a6570183 & 948e0180ec95ab61 & fcb4a56abf4b7b4e \\
\hline 3 & 1046103489988020 & df725dcad94ea2e9 & e97bb3b10db9f700 & f627685cf879c481 \\
\hline 4 & 1086911519190101 & e652b53b550be8b0 & df9e3ce144e6a0df & 373a495e2a289a9e \\
\hline 5 & 1086911519580101 & af527120c485cbb0 & 5fc7e5405519f6fb & 5d8c63f84dc7b760 \\
\hline 6 & 5107b01519580101 & 0f04ce393db926d5 & 4ce6c34fc99a7e47 & 43599c906eaa26af \\
\hline 7 & 1007b01519190101 & c9f00ffc 74079067 & d59da3b97fa77d57 & 3ad69f58d64555fd \\
\hline 8 & 3107915498080101 & 7cfd82a593252b4e & 2c90e8dcbfd28764 & f5fec7cc3602fb9c \\
\hline 9 & 3107919498080101 & cb49a2f9e91363e3 & e3ef1da5cdfe2040 & cbab42d154f3248c \\
\hline 10 & 10079115 b 9080140 & 00b588be70d23f56 & ab256e068344f3d9 & 2957f7aec090659f \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline ROUND & KEY & C1/RESULT1 & C2/RESULT2 & C3/RESULT3 \\
\hline 11 & 3107911598080140 & 406a9a6ab43399ae & 142df8fbcdf06f6c & f3e52c8470bd4d49 \\
\hline 12 & 1007d01589980101 & 6cb773611dca9ada & 646449eb196edbc7 & 2c73895acb28e4d4 \\
\hline 13 & 9107911589980101 & 67fd21c17dbb5d70 & 5bc918389c2a4f52 & 6d09d8d4450d34ef \\
\hline 14 & 9107d01589190101 & 9592cb4110430787 & 325e278ccb35a9b4 & c67bed021618f6e8 \\
\hline 15 & 1007d01598980120 & a6b7ff68a318ddd3 & bb2eaf9937470838 & e45e7c5e8ba13dae \\
\hline 16 & 1007940498190101 & 4d102196c914ca16 & a79acae80a89e1cf & 73a5317d256ee9e6 \\
\hline 17 & 0107910491190401 & 2dfa9f4573594965 & 70ce079b819d62a4 & a6683459b9162215 \\
\hline 18 & 0107910491190101 & b46604816c0e0774 & d40017b0499f3b3f & ef4c12c38fa94b67 \\
\hline 19 & 0107940491190401 & 6e7e6221a4f34e87 & 484e191a8899dbd3 & 5bc2e500fd653804 \\
\hline 20 & 19079210981a0101 & aa85e74643233199 & 34ca696261a93635 & d566849104e9f2f4 \\
\hline 21 & 1007911998190801 & 2e5a19db4d1962d6 & 59a314314758d33c & fde57dae97810b56 \\
\hline 22 & 10079119981a0801 & 23a866a809d30894 & 7782def75ae242b2 & efaaba105ea97d41 \\
\hline 23 & 1007921098190101 & d812d961f017d320 & e216e 1e31589ec45 & 046bb3c67162342f \\
\hline 24 & 100791159819010b & 055605816e58608f & 75ecaecf73060451 & e1729017bbdcfbd2 \\
\hline 25 & 1004801598190101 & abd88e8b1b7716f1 & 19dfcaebdf3f8958 & ab3b5a50ebd4c354 \\
\hline 26 & 1004801598190102 & 537ac95be69da1e1 & 16886a23bbb4cdba & 353357f88bec120f \\
\hline 27 & 1004801598190108 & aed0f6ae3c25cdd8 & fc9e390a9093a7ac & 8868a9829113d4a3 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|l|l|}
\hline \hline ROUND & \multicolumn{1}{|c|}{ KEY } & \multicolumn{1}{|c|}{ C1/RESULT1 } & C2/RESULT2 & C3/RESULT3 \\
\hline 28 & 1002911598100104 & b3e35a5ee53e7b8d & 13685e1b83c61eef & 0ec122be6dc26c83 \\
\hline 29 & 1002911598190104 & 61c79c71921a2ef8 & 1d19adde7fb74e34 & 9792ca21f5adbce6 \\
\hline 30 & 1002911598100201 & e2f5728f0995013c & 1423 db 30 c 7 e 118 fb & e5f2d4dd2f43d9d1 \\
\hline 31 & 1002911698100101 & 1aeac39a61f0a464 & 31eed52fa33c013d & dcf4548cf2374875 \\
\hline \hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{REFERENCES}
[1] Triple Data Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation, ANSI X9.52-1998.
[2] Modes of Operation Validation System (MOVS): Requirements and Procedures, NIST Special Publication 800-17, 1998.
[3] Data Encryption Standard (DES), FIPS PUB 46-3-1999.```

